EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES A Serie in Social Philosophy ond Cultural Crisvion Lawnsnce D. Knrrasan anp Rican Wou! European Perpeties seeks to make avilable works of iteriscilinay terest by lenling European thinkers By presenting casi txt ‘Manding contemporary work, the series Hopes to shape the major ‘ual controversies of our day and thereby to facilitate the tasks of hi indenting ‘Theodor W. Adorno Notr to Literature Jolia Kristeva Strangers to Ourselves EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY AN ESSAY ON HUME’S THEORY OF HUMAN NATURE GILLES DELEUZE ‘Transtar AND wrnit AN INTRODUCTION aY CONSTANTIN ¥. BOUNDAS COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS NEW YORKCONTENTS Preface to the English-Language Edition » ix Gilles Deleuze Translator's Acknowledgments + xi TRANSLATORS INTRODUCTION + 1 Delewee, Empiricism, and the Struggle for Subjectivity ONE = 21 ‘The Problem of Knowledge and the Problem of Ethics Wo + 37 (Cultural World and General Rules THREE - 55 ‘The Power of the Imagination in Ethics and Knowledge FOUR - 73 God and the World FIVE + 85 Empiricism and Subjectivity SIX 105 Principles of Human Nature CONCLUSION + 123 Purposivencss NOTES + 135 INDEX + 155PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE EDITION ‘We onzaat someriuas of a history of philosophy that would list only the new concepts created by a great philosopher—his most es- sential and creative contribution, The case of Hume could begin to bbe made with the following list: He established the concepe of blifand put it in the place of knowledge. He laicized belief, turning knowledge into a legitimate belief. He asked about che conditions which legitimate belief, and ‘onthe bass ofthis investigation sketched out a theory of probable, The consequences are important: if the act of thinking is belief, thought has fewer reasons to defend itself against error than against illusion, Hlegitimate beliefs perhaps inevitably surround chought like cloud of illusions. In this respect, Hume anticipates Kant. An entire art and all sorts of rules will be required in order to distinguish bbeewcen legitimate beliefs and the illusions which accompany them. “He gave the auciaton of ideas its real meaning, making it a practice of cultural and conventional formations (conventional instead of contractual), rather than a theory of the human mind. Hence, the association of ideas exists for the sake of law, political economy, acsthetis, and s0 on. People ask, for example, whether itis enough to shoot an artow ata site in order to become its owner, or whether ‘on shold couch the spot with one’s own hand. This is 2 questionPREFACE TO THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE EDITION about the correct association between a person and a thing, for the person to become the owner of the thing. “He created the fist great logic of relations, showing in it that All eelations (not only “matters of face" but also relations among, ideas) are external to thei terms. As a resul, he constituted 2 mul- tifsrious world of experience based upon che principle of the exte~ riority of relations, We stat with atomic parts, but these atomic putts have eransitions, passages, “tendencies,” which circulate from fone to another, These tendencies give rise to habits. Isn't this ehe answer to the question “what are we?” We are habits, nothing but habite—the habit of saying "I." Perhaps, there is no more stiking. answer to the problem of the Sef. ‘We could certainly prolong this list, which already testifies to the genius of Hume Gilles Deleuze 1989 TRANSLATOR’S ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Ligcmxpxsrep co Jacqueline Code, Alison van Rooy, nd Réal Fillion for their invaluable help wich earlier drafts ofthis translation. Susan Dyrkton, as she has done so often before, gave me her sound editorial advice and her friendship, and Lam grateful for both gifts. To Marg Tally, probably the most frequently acknowledged typist in the Academy and certainly one among the most deserving acknowledg- ment a sincere expression of thanks. The completion of the present translation was greatly facilitated by a sabbatical leave granted me by Trent University during the academic year 1989-1990, and Iam ‘thankful for it. Lam also grateful to Professors Frangois Lavelle and ‘Anne-Frangoise Schmid-Laruelle for their hospitality in Paris, and for the time they so kindly spent with me, without which my un- derstanding of the ebizome named “Deleuze” and ofthe articuls- ‘ions of the sprawling philosophies of difference would have been ‘uch poorer than they are now. Above all, to Linda Carol Conway, sho effortlessly knows how to build with childhood blacks and how to become like everybody else, until we meet again, a heartfelt “hank you."ALAILDALANS GNV WSIDIYIdW3TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION DELEUZE, EMPIRICISM, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SUBJECTIVITY I Every history ef philosophy har ts chapter tempi tinny. Bet in Hare thre something very senge tnbick completely dupes empincsm, sng 2 ne pret sheory and practice of ln, ofthe AND. “Gils Deleae- Clie Pave, Dison Tue nuory aN politics of paratactic discourse, or of the minor stuttering in one’s own language to which these Fines allude, are likely to evoke today [1990] the adventures of The Logic of Sense (1969), the assemblages of Kafla: Toward « Minor Literature (1975), and the body without organs of the A Thousand Plateaus (1980). But in face the quotation implicates a much earlier segment of the De- leazian diagram ofthis discourse, inscribed with the name of Hume, and this implication has yet to receive the attention it deserves. It seems likely chat a mindful consideration of this segment, in con- junction perhaps with the segment-Bergson! and the segment-Leib- ay begin to pay attractive dividends toward a more accurate ‘of Deleuze’s nomadic image of thought. Next to che lit- ‘rary linguistic, and psychoanalytic bodies of dlr, eecently unveiled by Jean-Jacques Lecercle,*a philosophical body will chen begin to take shape, and Deleuze’s reasons for having assiduously tended to ie over the last thirty-six years will emerge progressively into a stronger Fight. ‘One of his lst books in circulation today to be translated into English, Empiricism and Subjectivity is Deleuze’s second in a long ist cof hook’length publications, inated in 1952 and still being aug“TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION mented at regular intervals This small book appeared in the Col- lection “Epimethée" of the Presses Universitaires de France in 1953. ‘One year before, in collaboration with André Cresson, Deleuze had ‘leased in the “Collection Philosophes” ofthe same house another book entitled David Hume: Sa Vie, som oeuore, avec un expost de sa ‘philosophic. In one ofits chapters, “Complement sur oeuvre,” to- day's reader can easly recognize Delewze's pen at work in the con struction of a les elaborate version of the elegant discussion of | Hume which was going to be deployed, within one year, in Em- plrism and Subjesivity. In 1972, Deleuze returns to Hume in a chapecr-long contribution to the Histoire dela philosophic, chen edited by Francois Chiteler on behalf of Hachette Littéature.” One can find here a much abbreviated version of the 1953 book, but with no significant deparcure from any of the major points of its extended argument. “To this day, Deleuze has not revisited Hume, with the exception fof some reminiscing references to his own earlier writings.’ made ‘often in the context of "the thought from Ourside” which has always fascinated him and informed his thizomatic theory and practice. Hume is curiously absent from ehe series of memories/tributes of the One Thousand Plateaus,’ to the point chat an argument esilentio could be made, suggesting that a youthful enthusiasm with Hume had Faded away. But such an argument, I think, would be missing the point, forthe intensity named “Hume” has not ceased to resonate throughout Deleuze's writings. Named or not, the intensive en counter with Hume gave Deleuze a decisive and unbending pref terence for empiricism against all forms of transcendental philosophy. Acknowledged or not, the empiricist principle of difference, along with the cheorem of the externality of all relaions* which was de- rived from it, strengthened Deleuze's choice of minoritarian discourse” and fed into the problematic of parataetic seiaizations."® Finally, whether marked or unmarked, the resources of Hume con- solidated Deleuze’s opposition to the pettio principi ofall theories endowing the transcendental field with the very subjective (egolog- ‘eal and personological) coordinates the constitution of which should rather be accounted for and explained. The same resources “moti= vated" Deleaze’s relentless quest for an “activated” and mind-tran- scending subject whose pathways would avoid the transcendental ‘TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION 1 "The concept exit just a ch in mp tine ‘ons, ba har compel diffrent ib Inga instead of beingones = being ot Ising at aes. Emp fundamentally Tink > 2 logics lg of mul (af which elon ae ‘nly one spe) “ills leas, Preach Bosh Tanguage Elton of the Diu ‘The determination of Deleuze's place in the mindscape of the new French theory will always require complex and delicate negotiations; that his place, though, is prominent in itis not under dispute. tis therefore strange to observe thar the frequently noticed new French theoretical bend toward empiricism has not yet generated discussions worthy of the intense interest init by one of its leading contributors vet! Deleuze’ reiteration of his continuing allegiance to empiricism made inthe Preface to the English Language Eaton of his Dilogues with Claire Parner has not lifted the silence.” Nevertheless, signposts, indicating that empiricism has been more than a whimsical choice in the post-struccualist range of options, are not lacking. For example, in V. Descombes's helpfal compet dium of Modern French Philosophy one finds a reference to Deleuze project as a “search fora Transcendental Empiricism,” together with the claim tha, for Deleuze, philosophy is either dialectical or em- Piricist, “according to whether the difference between concept a intuition... is aken to be a conceptual or a non-concepeualiffer- cence." Derrida’ sibylline reference to empiricism as “the dream ‘of a purely heterlogical ehought at its source” is also well known, Indeed this reference is important enough to justify a more faithful reproduction: “[Empiricism is a] pure thought of pure difference. We say the dream because it must vanish at daybreik, as soon as language awakens.” “But pethaps,” continues Derrida, “one will ‘object that itis language which is sleeping. Doubtles, but then one ‘must, ina certain way, become classical once more, and again find other grounds for the divorce between speech and thought. This ‘owe i quite, perhaps 0, abandoned today." * These lines were written in 1967; Descombes repeated them in 1979. Ihave often wondered"TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION vty the altematve rout, rested by Dees in 1953, was no kept {pen or eacld more Begun. “rth tell» few commentators did make the point chat she new French theoretic nee in emp fie a active trac fora ground which, unlike taneendenl Bes, woul be Kespiale wo fhomatisyapes and dagrammai dsplcement.™ But no ane matched Deleur's aly to sie this imetet ad 0 turn into a war machine paints vers and the evidences Cousttutng che abet of the mous (sone) phesomeslogkal fgee In ascniing tis war machine, Dekewve mobile those ‘Sho along wth Lace ume, Spinors, Niet, and Bergson, hare“ Secret bond formed hy she rjue of the negative he Calta of ys the hated of interior, hc external of forces and telacon, ad the denunciation of power." n hit context, = Tere ha often confeed hit low tolance for thea atic of phenomenology which eshine commen and good sense Ih the argumentative momentswin The Lai of Sm, fr iance— Crcountrs with Hist! fled 2 sustained coe of phenome tology. exposing the laters faaion onthe evidence of conscious test fs al tuener to the dene cement of commen snd good tte and above al the anlen dupicton ofthe emp d= tian by a ansendetl eld endowed with perl nd egloge Simenfon Acording to Deleuze, thx dimension sil preset phecomenologys anredued and nc pesppontons* ‘Ofcoune, eure’ wat machine, nouted at empiri Hes ant ted phenomenology (or hermeneatis) tTll with Shmitiated uci Hse st xa reed ike a schoolboy ithe lg Se no anon ex retook Delt’ power and elegnt phenomenological descriptions inthe esay of Michel “Tourniescven if those descptins inthe long fom, te ade to Sand on ther hens The uation ofthe args for sje: tivity in Deleuze’ ace woos, but as they ae around the notions “Told and “folding has clear and acknowledged connections with Heidegger Zvi) and Meriean-Ponty (ph plsemen). Tempting. though ss may be~and even fashionably ecumenical®—1 would hot Wane 0 interpret thee gestures ay iniations of a Delewran Progam ori akazasonatphememogy. The aaa ‘of phenomenology, Deleuze-style, amounts to he transformation phenomenology (and noe only intentions eflecti ‘TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION ‘of it) into an ontology of intensive forces, extended forms, and of the “folding” or “internalization” of these forces and forms. And rcither intensive forces nor the “fold” are phenomena, “ses,” oF cogitationes:* "The transition from phenomenology to nomadic sensation and ‘thought finds its mature moment in Deleuze’s enlisting Bergson in the cause of radical empiricism According to Deleuze, Bergson, having questioned the privilege of natural perception and the sub- ordination of movement to poses. creates the possibilities for an in- vestigation of the “nonhuman” or “superhuman” originary world ‘wherein images move and colide in a state of universal variation and undulation. This is 2 world with no axes, no centers, no ups oF downs. In his quest fr the pure perception (the sntendum), Bergson breaks with the philosophic rradition which had assigned light to the mind and conceived consciousness a8 a searchlight sommoning, things up from their essential darkness. Unlike phenomenology, which remained faithfal co this eadition, Bergson’s vision solicited things in cheir own luminosity. As for consciousness, instead of being the light of the old image of thought, itis, for Bergson, an opaque blade without which light would goon diffusing itself forever, never reflected and never revealed. Deleuze subscribes eo all ches claims and also to Bergson's characterization of conscious perception asthe ‘object perceived, minus the aspects of it which do not ioterest the perceiver. Bergson and Deleuze, therefore, join hands in their de- mand that consciousnes be constituted. Beginning with the Abgrund ‘of an Empedoclean world of elements, consciousness must be ex- posed as the center, the obstacle, and the “living image” which blocks and reflects the lightlineshithereo difsed in every possible direction. Delewze’s later texts will reiterate this demand, and they will designate subjectivity asthe “fold” which bends and envelops the foroes of the Outs “This choice of empiricism over phenomenology inthe context of| new and more critical image of chough is bound to be resisted by some, although the resistance, I suspect, will be based on a more traditional access to empiricism, markedly diffeene from that of Deleuze. We will do well to remember that for Deleuze philo- sophical mathesis has lite to do with purported solutions or answers and everything t© do with the question and the problem, or the ability of the problem to coordinate or serialize other questions"TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION within it range of tonaltes® Viewed fiom tht penpectve the textbook defintion of empiricism, which atsbates to experience the engin end the soure of validity ofall pou Kaowedge, infact an answer without question, Srey speaking, ee deficon is nt even pus, became, despite what the definition inpis, Inonledge doesnot represent the primary concer ofthe empiricist te des expericnce ply the kindof contitative ol thatwxebooks Sign w fe Koowledge isnot primary. Delage reminds us tat Hime was primarily 2 mrait, hstran, and polit hilo ‘pher who placed bis epistemology inthe servic of hese concerns ovwledge is posible Beate ou pasions provide our dea with sci inks in view of our acne apd ends, The prac terest, being primary activates the tcoretcal interes and ses Sooner or ltt the delicate issue of how to harmonize nature and ihuman nature, Whit sofienonetlooked in oar dicusons of em tics is that experience snot unambiguously consittive. Foe i by expeiene™ we mean atomic and distinct peeepions, che re latins which asocate the perceptions to each other, eating thereby an aura of bali and attcpation, cannot be accounted for ‘This because inthe opinion of Bleue, lume views relations as the effects ofthe principles of human mare he does ot atempe to derive them from cof atomic and distincspereep- fons Or agsin i by thoervatons hitherto, goneal rules snd principles will not be ac- ounted for, precisely because they themselves consiate experince fd cannot therefore be desived from i Hence definition of em Pcs, which doesnot fist problemacze the metre and sets of Experience, of Hie vale” [A more helpfaldeinsion of empiricism, in Dele eimate, ast respect the edb dls that exists between things and ‘elation atoms and sructie, preeptons and thee causes, ad lio felatons and their cases. Viewed fom tie vantage point, empit- issm willbe the theory of the extertality of relations, and con- terse al ehcoties wich ental the derivation of relation from the tse of hing wold erly sone ath a sis, Deleaze's commitment to empiricism fests on his comicion Tha cations are syntheses whose provenance cannot be explained fn the basis of the representational mati iea/stom or minl/ Collection of atoms. Relations ate he elt of the pimp "TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION human nature and the latter, as we shall see, constitute the subject at the same time that they constitute relations. ‘Thus, Deleuze’s essay shows empiricism co be matked by an ir- ‘reducible dualism between things and relations, and claims to capture thereby the sense of Hume's dual strategy of atomism (the diferent, the disparate) and assocationism (mise en série, parataxiz) For if a0 ‘ism “isthe theory of ideas insofar a relations are external to them, and associationism, the theory of relations insofar as they are external to ideas, that i, insofar as they depend on (¢he principles of human nature),”® Hume, instead of pulverizing the given, a his ities often allege, would have embarked upon the study of the mechanism which allows atoms to fit in a structure, As long as the mind is a collection of atoms in motion, and mover and motion indistinguish~ able from each other, and as long as the mind can be likened to ‘moving images without frame to restrice thei movement, Hume can easily show thar atomism is not a suficient condition for the constitution ofa science of humanity. This science can be constituted only after the naturalization ofthe mind asthe result ofthe operation ‘of associative principles upon it—in ocher words, only after the con stitution of the subjecr inside the mind as the product of principles ‘of human nature transcending the mind, Now, the reasons why the doctrine of the externality of relations, rooted in atomism and introducing associationism, ean contribute to the critique of phenomenology or to the quest for the elemental ‘world of Bergson ate found in two enabling premises that Hume and Deleuze share, These are the principle of difference and the serialization/compossibility of different elements. Empiricism, in Deleuze's reading of Hume, revolves around a principle of difference, holding that the given is a collection of ideas separable hecause dif. ferent, and different because separable. This principle of difference requires that the mind be nether Subject noe Mirror of Nature. No pression is ever adventitious; all impressions are, in some sense, inate.” Before the constitution of the Subject, no principle of organization rules over che mind. Only the indivisibility of impres- sions interests Hume, because it licenses his principle of difference and guarantees that the only constants of the mind will be non indivisible toms. Ie follows, argues Deleuze, that empiricism is not 4 philosophy of the senses but a philosophy of the imagination, and the statement that “all ideas are derived from impressions” is not‘TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION meant to enshrine representationaism but is rather a regulative prin ciple meant to koep us within the straight and narrow of the atomist principle of difference OF course, difference alone docs not make an empiricist philos- cophy: difference and repetition are required co relate to each other chiastically.® From a host of differential perceptions, 2 subject is born inside the given, and ehe imagination is transformed into a faculty. Terms are related and serialized. When a law of reproduction of representations is formed under the impact of the principles of human mature the subject comes to be, and begins to transcend the ‘ind; it goes beyond the given, Bue repetition cannot occur without Aifecence: the principles of human narure may well be the necessary condition for relations in genera, serializations in gencral, or the advent of he structure-subject. However, particular relations and actual subjects require concrete and different circumstances as theit Sulficene conditions. Circumstances define passions and give direc- tion to interests because affecivity and circumstance go together. ‘And given the primacy assigned to the practical interest over the theoretical, che principles of passion are indispensable for the for- ‘mation of concrete associations, and therefore indispensable for the ceanstitution ofthe subject inside the mind. ‘Ukimately, Deleuze's choice of empiricism amounts to a choice calculated to displace dialectics. The principle of difference that De- Teuze locates in the heart of the Humean text prevents the closure threatened by dialectal sublation. Hypotactic subsumptions are re- placed by paratactic conjunctions and arborite constructions give way two the strategy of the AND. Repettion-—time and also habit as tep= cetition—holds che paratacic series together, making possible their ‘convergence and compossibiity as well as their divergence and res- fonance. Difference and repetition displace the dialectical labor of the concept and thwart the mobilization of negation forthe sake of allegedly superior synthesis. The choice of empiricism is nothing les than a choice fora critical ‘but nontranscendental philosophy. Transcendental philosophy, says Deleuze, beginning with 2 methodologically reduced field from which it derives essential certainty, asks how there can be a given, cot how a subject can give itself the given. Bur Hume's empiricism asks how a subject can be constitated inside the given. The subject, here is a tsk which mast be fulflled. In the process of faléllin, thiv ask, empiricism generate a critique of rules by means of rales "TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION extensive rules are criticized and rectified through the application of corrective rules. But to the extent that both kinds of rules find their origin in habic, che idea of an empiricist critique would be impossible and unintelligible were it not for the fact that habit is not solely the produce of an experientially ascertained repetition of similar cases. Habit can be formed by other kinds of repetition as well. The task assumed by empiricism, therefore, is the constant correction ofthe imagination by means of the understanding. Habit extends the range of imagination but also corrects the accuracy of Judgment. Critique must discipline the anticipating subject and make it focus on objects determined in accordance with the navure of the understanding and the weight of observed repetitions; critique must also educate the moral activity of the subject, that i, the act which accords with the intensive integration of disparate sympathies. But ultimately, Deleuze-Hume eannot prevent a paradox from being, in- scribed in the heart of empiricism: che same critique which disci- plines the mind and prompts it to reject the Fictions of the imagi- nation is also the critique responsible for leading the mind to the biggest of all fctions~Subject, World, and God~and for turning these fictions into “incorrigible,” constitutive idea. In opposition to the prudential demarcation of ideas from concepts, which later on will be the pride of the Kantian critique, the Deleuzian-Humean, ‘empiricist critique will assign to the intensive idea the role of gen ‘tating extensive concepts.» With Hume, the boldest moment of ert thory has come: the efcacy ofthe xiigue depen now m ‘Arcs des ritom pour rie Cet ai wn cops Le ps grec ne atere afore prune ele for ieee cops di sae cde Is eyance, Mat por es rer yd temp dane le comps, Le nest ‘nears gle, tj gut. Mee dane econ Farag, Patent, cet gle eps gincorore le ep, Giles Delon, Pai VII Sei November 20,1984 Many connoisseurs of the debates surrounding the lives and the deaths of the (ncostructuraist!)subjece have complained that the inlesdetermined or even inleterminate (not #0 he confused with-TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION sundeidabe") content of the notion “sjctiviy” often leaves thr dente without pins The jy weil os epg al dx the precic moment ofthe subject Ingress inthe “aco tous and wir ae raed forthe epee ofthe paxalogkal sb- Fer for the mewn mpstion of the pow Meson sec Thich ip “never you po But war tt cver cleat that the “heostactulse?™ ha unceremotnslyouedthe wet om the dscounet Secngthening the conviction tat the ejection did oe is he postings by fends and oes lke, of composite pcre ofthe Rovcturalss which i eeryonc' and no one. The montage weichmaes tis compote pcre posible vere Hop Behe Ios pcon tha oki very start genelity one cat alae fd the sharp outine of the fears of one of the many fay members Bur then the problem with compete irs that they fe, on demas some rey convenient abs wi ths help, 3h ‘renpisic hermeneutics b browg to ear on singe ay Sema leg ar hese tine ey tether of ee fay coulhare been an ually good oie and while this Sau the ast asured of que eait i hs Hof led, A compote pour, fit alk nt lar x cleat individ Sirens am tr suggesting of oune, ht thee somthing inherent vile nconposte pron the contary, Tam leading toward the suggestion car we wast ake then ach ore rom ASS Tht ater» oi de, supposed and ena by the bor ofthe ncouractraisa we ad Bates das ue and ccd eels ine of ig oad plateaus of (avemed) comport and i rings together cole Fling forces long wh he unstable comers of conde dor di Taking thn toa sero pesppocr 2 montage wbich op. trates on aarp foc and fll developed inglr eames noes made adj quickly fete high lew aes, com tobe indapenable fo aryng our hse Ie wll be fay of cet deny tat he death of can sujet bas ely feen wed for and that thas, perhape,ealy Happenels Ram hs tha the death as bec wished fr neh wre of a ext deadly lene perpeted ais the Othee™ Tn this cme the rsureton of ather Safad an tris) Other ha unstable wat or the eompton tec "TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION of the Cartesian, Kantian, and Husserlian subject, and for the un- ‘masking ofthe fraudulent accrediation that this subject had received in classical and modern texts. All this is well knowns but what the composite picture ofthe neostruccuralists renders invisible is the fact that not everyone who wished the death of “the” subject and the advent of a new entity in is place did shate the same motivation for the wish or the same vision for the new dawn, Deleuze undoubtedly is among those wo contributed decisively to the critical unmasking of old pretensions and to the hopefl ine vigilation for the arrival of the new. An important “theory of sub- Jectivity” runs through his entire work, beginning with the essay ‘on Hume and reaching impressive depth and precision with his essay ‘on Leibniz. What is remarkable, first of all, about this conteibution to a theory of subjectivity is chat it combines a radical critique of interority witha stubborn search for “an inside that lies deeper than any internal world." In this sense, che search for the fold—“the inside as the operation of the outside™'—that Deleuze s6 gallantly attributed to Foucauly, is 2s much his own life-long search as it was (for'a mote limited tine span) his friend's There is no doubt that Deleuze’s theory is marked by the tension created by a radial critique of interiorty and a simultaneous quest for an inside deeper than any intetnal world. But, as Manfred Frank (much more convincing in his studies of modera subjectivity than in his parody of neostructuralism) has shown, ehis tension is tna- vidable in all eheories of subjectivity mindful ofthe bankruptcy of ‘models based on the classical optical metaphor, the egological field, and more generally every relational account of the structure con- sciousness /self-consciousnes.* Ic isnot stringe, therefore, that De~ leuze’s contribution to the theory of subjectivity, mindfil a i is of the opening up ofa new space for a new Subject, after the bankruptcy of the old, experiences the same tension, ur whatever the advantages or the shortcomings of Deleuze’s contribution may be, ehis contribution cannot be assesed fairly 20 long as the wrong strategies for reading Deleuze persist and con- tribute to the clouding of the issues. Delewze's own rhizomatic ‘growth and his strategy of writing should have warned against hom- ‘centric evolutionist readings. In fct, any example of his writing ‘on subjectivity aken from his texts would have sufficed to show that no reading of this kind had a chance to succeed. Consider, for ex-“TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION ample, the following three passages: (1) “The subject is defined by the movement through hich i i develope.” Beliving and Siventing i what makes the subject tobe sobject (Empiricim and Subject [1953 (2) “There ae no moe subjects bur dynamic imdtvideation withoat subjects, which constitte collective asem- ilages. Norn becomes subjective but beecties cake shape coring co the compositions of nen-subjectve powers an effets” {Dialga 1977)}#4(0) “The sragle for feodern] subjectivity pre Sent tel; cherefore, asthe right to diferenc, vation and met Soorphoss" Fol [1986))* How ae hese tec satements to ie shown composible through the appeaton of homocentic and evolutions reading statics? Tema sem whe re pring ey and tect of Deleuses text a theory ofsbjecvity after we ads ur inerpre~ tive lenses to the sort. ofpeiodiration that acorn (qestionable) tecepion of che “inal Foucault” made fashionable. Am ae would thea run though Deleuzes writings, lealng from an erly hist Seoplilsophial interest in the sactore-Sobject and its 2cuali- {aon (esay on Hom), through a mide period marked by the “ropant and suicidal pulverization of subjectivity (May 19682 Fe- ine} toa belated imi retrieval of the Subject as folded imtcrioity (Foe, Le Ph) Tie wouble with this periodizaton, however, s that i too facile: I overlooks, once again, the thirome named “Deleuze” and bypases the complex relationships that exist beween Deleurian tos, Te Logic Sense (1963), for example, orchestrates the dis sons on subjectivity around sys published and composed long, {efor the chronological punctum ofthe explosion of deste. Ie anot be fead as a eosttactarlse manifesto celebrating the pul Neriation ofthe Subject iti t0 saber for that. Yet this book Tncipates and prepares Coytion and Schsophrena (1972, 1980), iearing ups wanseendenal fel inhabited by singlaiis, evens, Srinensites and striated with Hines converging forthe creation of Swodls of with series of words diverging and resonant. A radical Taplacement of phenomenology is undosbtedy at workin his teat, Collminaing inthe “greening” of the philosophy of diference. But, tn the other hand, his new focus dacs not prevent the series of The Topic of Sense fom being consistent withthe thes on subjectivity Aeady pomed in the esany an Ham’ theory of om acre. The “TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION structure of the Subject (belief and anticipation) and alo the variable strategies for its actulization inside changing circumstances are themes common to them both. Ie would be fir to say that The Logic of Sense proaches the Ja lt dees dein an ently novel and fascinating way’ ts singularities and its converging or diverging lines ate now full-fledged intensities straggling to avoid thermic death in the course of being stretched and extended. But then again in- tensity does not make its appearance for the fist time here: only a careless reading of Deleuze’ earlier texts on Hume, on Nietzsche, and on Bergson can sidestep the theory of intensive time, already developed and pivotal in them." The only way, I think, to asses correctly Deleuze's contributions toward.a theory of subjectivity is to read him the way he reads others: we must read him according to the series he creates, observing their ways of converging and of becoming compossible, or—and this amounts to the Same thing for our strategy of reading—according to the series on theie way to diverging and beginning to resonate A relentless vigilance is nevesary in every step of such a reading. Te will be a mistake, for example, to take each book of Deleuze for ‘one series, and to try to establish composibility or resonance among the various books. Ido not doube that the names of those that De leuze reads and writes about stand for singular points intensities), ‘capable of generating series. In this sense, one could, with justih- ‘ation, speak of 1 Hume-series, a Bergson-series, 2 Leibniz-series, ‘etc. But none of these series is coextensive with the text oF texts that bear the name of the thinker after whom aserics has been named, ‘Books and series do not coincide, This ie why it would be better to talk aboue the “Hume-effec” series, the “Leibnie-effece”seics, et. ‘At any rate provided that we take adequate precautions, there is no harm in trying to spread Delewze’s contributions to a theory of subjectivity along the following series, each one of which could be identified by means of the question/problem introducing it. The Hume-series how does the mind become a subject2); the Bergson-series (how can a static ontological genesis of the subject be worked out beginning with prepersonal and preindividual singularities and events?) the Leibniz-eries (how can there bea notion of individuality which is neither a mere deduction from the concept "Subject which case it would be contradictory-nor a mere Figure of an Alividualiy deprived of concept—in which case i would be absord‘TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION and inal); the Niche Focal (how can a dynamic gen- ath of subjectivity be conte, in which the subject would be the fling an nea of Oude Ey, woo cumbing te hilosophy of inteioiy?); the Nice Kbsousk- Sey (hw spose to thnk the subject in terms of inclsie Sjonecons and simltanconly armed incomposble world?) ‘Tse scics woul ave ran along thet own ines oF Bight, without ming the construction of ary plans of consiency among fhm we tt for Dela’ ieee “hme” as Coos ant “cracked I” (efi) hich in dhe eapaciy 38 pore ‘Some words dete hugh the ees and uke pole te intuitive aiation of ll ere. cas, chat tous. the becoming word chat pos the consition ofthe sojec Sr aks and dusmos again that goarntecs thatthe consiated sitject wll ot emerge a6. substantive hypokeimeno, bu athe as En aed aye “cracked” eed sriking to find te germs of al hee series present imam eacy wor ke Enprin nd Sujet. Empirii ond Sib Jey forthe tt pry a segmen ofthe Hamer, without tn fet peventing tt fom being also eros by segments of ther series Tespeks of she sctureSabjec tems of antic futon and inventions al ioeodues the aeaalization of che Sub ‘Reran term of comcee and always changing crcamsancs. es ordinate bythe question “how docs the mind become sbject?” Sod wenes the sactare of sbjciiy in terms of bei aici Faron and ieaivencs The Sabet hs seis, possible only eth cotelt of te final les Wen.” The constuie Fane Gon ofthe later el and makes posible the constrative fanction of the principles of oman nares Sales acpte an en nf they agate Decase they int thy tent aly nine ct The putory ae vetve subject wil dot Delores wings, without Se hough er npn wl be called y ae aes late memory"), and invention wl aegir 1 om a eof igh” he. ‘TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION and personal Ocherness, replicating thereby the empiical do ar the very moment that they allege to be inthe proces of grounding it. Empiricists, on the contrary, begin with the mind as a theater without a stages they begin with ehe mind as delirium, contingency, and indifference and strive to understand how a mere collection of images can ever become a system. How can the mind become a subjet? How can it become human nature? Deleuze-Hiume's answer is thatthe mind becomes subject, that is, an entity capable of be- lieving, anticipating, and inventing, asthe tesult of the combined effects upon it of the principles of hurman nacure. These principles, ‘whether as principles of association or as principles of pasion, pursue a selective and a corrective course: they select impressions of sen sation, designate them as cand dats for association, and, on this as they constitute impressions of reflection. In the case of cognition, the principles of asociation—contiguity, resemblance, and causal= iry-designate impressions and organize the given into a system, bringing thereby constancy to the mind and naturalizing it. They form habit, they establish belief, and they constitute the subject as an entity that anticipates On the other hand, Deleuze recognizes that the constitution of the ethical subject presents Hume with adfferent problem: although the building blocks of morality are naturally given, ehey tend none- theless to exclude one another. ‘The mind experiences sympathy naturally. But our sympathies are partial, limited, and narrowly fo- ‘used if violence is to be aided, the extension of our sympathies requites corrective integration.” Only through integration can the ‘ethical toalty be brought about, as an invention and an artifice. General rules, boch extensive and corrective, must be invented and allowed to guide the operations of the principles of passion, for the sake of the integration of sympathies and for the constitution of the ethical subject For Deleuze-Hume, therefore, subjects affirm more than they know, and transcend their partiality in their moral ats; they believe, 4 this allows them ¢o infer one (nongiven) part of nature from another which is already given: and they constitute ethical toralities by inventing inseieuions which nature does not provide. ta both «eases (knowledge and ethics), the subject tanscenls the given, albeit not inthe same manner—at least not initially. Transcendence, in the «ase of koowledge, implies extending the Same or che Similar over‘TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION which are extemal to one another, whereas transcendence, in the cae of etc, ils the intenty ofthe integrative act. The famous pair of categories, extension-intensty, around which the en- tire Deleazian theory of difference and repetition will he orches- trated, hs therefore found inthe Humean empiricism an import ally and a vial inspiration: neither one will ever be abandoned. But, at we now know from Deleuze’s later work, the relations betwcon the extension of contemplation and the intensity of practice are not as unproblematic and unidimensional as my lst paragraph Seems to suggest. Intensity and extension as world-making force are not opposite poles in a feld of exclusive disunctins. An antic~ ipation of thir complex relationship in an eatly work such 36 Ene Pircom and Subjectivity i, in fact, stiking. Te centers on Deleuze's tiscusion of Homean time and on the fnction tha kime has in the ceonstitation of subjeccvity. Time was initially introduced by Hume ts the stratare of the mind: but the subject, formed by the habit inside the mind isthe synthesis of ime. The mind was succession: the abject now dr and aniption The acting and ne venting subject constates the pase which weighs on the present, Inaking tps, wile posting the ps athe tle fo the fate ‘Time as the constitutive force of subjecivity, responsible lor the bending and folding of the given and the formation of interiority, is indeed intensive. ‘The same briding of intensity and extension is discovered by Deleuze in the complex relations that Hume assign to the principles of asociaton and passion: passions require the association of ideas, but on the other hand he association of ideas presupposes passions. ‘The understanding reflects on our interest and sociales passion: bt pasion ako give a disposition, an inelination, and a dreetion to the Essocaton. Ulsmately, though, the relations between epistemic a ‘ociaton ad inclining passion are weighted in favor of the intensity ofthe paso, inc thre would be n sociation of es without the tendency-creating passions. Associations without passions. are ‘ind, but then pasion without astociations would be empey. The ‘weight ofthis Humean move i nt lose on Deleuze: icexplans why no theory of subjectivity cam be sucessful iit eles an the cognitive subject only. ‘The problem can be correctly eased only a the level of practice andthe isiessurtounding subjeciviey cannot be dix soctated from the inpcratives of eaperimintation and struggle "TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION ‘Moreover, the primacy of practice in the correct articulation of the seucture-subjectivity resurfaces during Deleuze-Hlame's discus- sion of the actuaization of chis stucture in concrete subjects. The Principles of association alone cannot accoune for the difference be- tween subjects. Only concrete circumstances can explain the facts of differentiation. A differential psychology, as the science of the particular, must therefore reveal these circumstances. Deleuze will then reiterate Hume's position which asserts that subjectivity ac- ‘quires its form through the principles of association while it is in- clividuated chrough the principles of passion. Affectivity activates a tendency of the subject making her want to identify with the effects ‘of her actions in all cases where these effects are the result of the means chosen, Once again, therefore, subjectiviey is essentially linked with practice for only a mind endowed with ends, and re~ lations corresponding to these ends, can be a subject. Associationism isthe theory of all that is practical, and operates only when harmony between fiction and the principles of passion has been established. Ie should be obvious, despite the Humean tenor of the discussion, thatthe stakes are in fact about the practical and speculative interests ‘of human subjects. The intensive, integrative act of the practical interest and its priority over the cogitive-speculative interest make possible the organization of subjectivity. But the peculiarity of the Hume-seres i that it posits the subject as an always already “eracked subject.” To disclose the cracks inthe structute, Deleuze-Hume must direct his attention co the indispensable roe that fiction plays in the structuration of the subject and to the constitution of individuality. ‘The subject, as we have scen, is the product of the principles of ‘human natures but then the mind, or the given, is the product of the powers of nature. Under these terms, the combined labor of passioned intensity and of the extensive use of associative principles ‘would be spent in vain, 25 long as no frm relation has been esta. lished beeween the principles of human nature and the principles of Deleuze, therefore, in one of the most ingenious and most con- troversial gestures of the entire Hume-sevies, turns to Hume's dis- cussions of religion, and fastens his analysis on the retrieval of pur- posiveness (finalité), made possible by these discussions, and its reentty into the world, Hume concedes that principles of association an passion (in both their extensive and their corrective function),"TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION jointly operate in the realm of religion. Deleuze then argues tha, despite contrary textual appearances, Hume's corrective rules do not refute religion. On the contrary, theism is justified as soon asa certain antinomy affecting our ways of thinking about che world i resolved, (On one hand, Hume is clear thatthe world is not an object; objects are in the world. Ie follows that the world cannot function in an argument, or be made to stand for an effect in a causal narrative, ‘which would sing the glory of God's causal authorship. This stricrare allows Hume to criticize teleological arguments and their God founding pretensions. But there is something more in Hume, and Deleuze is not letting it go unnoticed, The world is always, for Hume, a fiction of the imagination; “bue with che world, fcxion ‘becomes a horizon of experience, a principle of human nature which ‘must co-exist with the other principles, despite the contradictions.” ‘The world abides as a fiction of the imagination, ond also fiction becomes a principle of human nature; the world never turns into an object of the understanding. It remains as an idea, but the idea is not constitutive; it constitutes a fiction, ‘Hume's empiricism, then, in Deleuze’s estimate, shows the subject in the process of being constituted on a soil already eroded by 2 contradiction without possible conciliation. In the antinomy of the ‘world, the imagination with it fiction is opposed to che principles ‘which fix it and the operations which correct it. Under these cit- cumstances, extension and reflection find themselves on 2 collision ‘course: an opposition reigns supreme beewcen the principles of 25- sociation and the fiction which has become a principle of nature. [No choice is posible between the understanding and the suggestions of the imagination: for “when fiction becomes principle, reflection docs not stop reflecting, nonetheless ie can no longer corzect."= All the systematization, naturalization, and subjectivation of the mind that we witnessed so far have not helped the mind silence its delirium, ‘Yer itis che same delirium chat makes possible the solution of the antinomy of the world, Hume, according to Deleuze, prohibits the mobilization of the principles of human mature for the sake of proving thar the world is God's effec; the same Hume, though, is not opposed to thinking of God negatively, as che cause of these principles. This decision, concludes Deleuze, reestablishes purpo- siveness to the extent that it makes the agreement between the prin= "TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION ciples of human nature and the hidden powers of nature thinkable again.” A long quotation from Deleuze’s chapter on Hume in La Philosophie forcefully makes this point: it characterizes the tages by ‘means of which the real world becomes a fiction before the oppo- sition of reality and Getion ie overcome. In opposition to ancien scepticism which ress on the vate ‘ability of sensible appearance and onthe errors ofthe senses modern seepticism rests on the status of relations and on theie exteriority. The fist act of modern scepticism was the discovery of belief inthe foundations of knowledge, thats, the naturalization of belief (positivisn) Starting from this point, its second act was the denunciation of illegitimate belief, chat is, oF beliefs which do not obey the rales which resale in effective knowledge (probabil, calculus of prob- abies). However, ina last refinement and ia a third act the ilegiimae belief in the Wold, the Self and God appear as the horizon of ll possible leguimate bli, ora he lost degre of blo [The tlie are mine.) Incipit simadacrumtone THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE PROBLEM OF ETHICS Huns pxoposts ths cretion of a science of humanity, but what is really his fundamental project? A choice is always defined in terms of what it excludes, and a historical project isa logical substitution. Hume's projec entails the substation of « psychology of the mind by 4 psychology of the mind's ations, The constitution of psychology ‘of the mind is not a all possible, since thie psychology cannot find ints objec the required constancy or universality; only a psychology of affections will be capable of constituting the erve science of haumaniy. In this sense, Hume is a moralist and a sociologist, before being 2 psychologist; the Treatie shows thae the ewo forms under which ‘the mind is afeced are essentially che pasional and the socil. They imply each other, assuring thereby the unity of the object of an authentic science. On one hand, society demands and expects from ‘ach one of its members the display of constant reactions, the pres cence of pasions abe to provide motives and ends, andthe availability of collective or individual characters: “A prince, who imposes a tax ‘upon his subjects, expects their compliance.” On the other hand, the passions implicate society as the oblique means for their sais: faction. In the last analysis, the coherence of the passional and the social, in history, i revealed as an internal sanity, with political‘THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS ‘organization and the institutions giving history its objects. History studies the relations between motive and action in most circumstan- ces, and it also exhibits the uniformity of the human passions. In brief, che option of the psychologist may be expressed paradoxically 4s follows: one must be 3 morist, sociologist, or historian before being a psychologist, in order wo be a psychologist. Here, che project ‘of che human sciences reaches the condition which would make knowledge in general possible: the mind must be affected. By itself and in itself, the mind is not nature; itis not the objec of science. Hence, the question which will preeccupy Hume is this: how does ‘the mind become human nature? Passional and social affection are only a part of human nature: there are aso the understanding and the association of ideas. The fact is, though, ehat thie list is sill based on convention, The real role ofthe understanding, says Hume, is to make the pasions sociable and the interes social. The understanding refleets interest. Ow the other hand, nothing prevents us from thinking of ie as something distinct, the way the physicist fragments a movement, while rec- ‘ognizing all along that itis indivisible and noncomposite* We should not, in fact, forgee thae rwo points of view coexist in Hume: the passions and the understanding present themselves, in a way which rust be made clear, a5 two distinct parts. By itself, though, the understanding is only the process of the passions on their way to socialization. Sometimes we see thatthe understanding and the pas- sions constitute two separate problems, but at other times, we sce that the understanding is subordinated to the passions. This isthe reason why, even when studied separately, the understanding must bow all help us to understand better the general sense of the above question, Hume constantly afirms the identity between the mind, the imag- ination, and ideas. The mind is not nature, not does it have a nature. Its identical with the ideas in the mind. Ideas ate given, a8 given they are experience. The mind, on the other hand, is given as a collection of ideas and not asa system. It follows that our earlier question can be expressed as follows: how does a collection become 2 system? The collection of ideas is called “imagination,” insofar as the collection designates not a faculty but rather an assemblage of things, in the most vague sense of the term: things arc ax they THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS Apcar—a collection without alum, a play without a stage, lx of perceptions. "The compation ofthe heat mus ot ele oe sorhave we the most ditt notion ofthe plc, whee tes seenen te represented, oof the mattis, of which is compord™ The place noe diferent fom what aks plac inf the sepeseaon doesnot take place in a sbject. Then again the questo may be hw dst mind come a bt? Hove dos the imagination cone 2 cle leis tue, Hume constantly strats, that idea ae inthe image ination. But the preposition here docs not signify inherence in sabe ater the the of the prepestion fs metho, a menace me mtd acy whic olin rom the movement of eas smeans cnr the enti bearen ‘he mind andthe ideas inthe mind. The preposition sigs tee the imagincion is nota fcr an agent, or determing dee inition. tia place which ma he aie, that toys feed something determinable. Noting is done by the imagination ery thing is nein the imagination Ie ees ey ie aco ‘eas, beanse the prouction of an idea bythe imagination bee th eon fmm he mga: Cry he icland elsous ic without consancy snl witout walker isthe movemeut of ideas, an the toality oftheir actions sod re ations Beng the plac of ides, he fancy the colleen of so arte, individ items. Being the bond of idea moves toed the ives engendering fe dragons winged hones and ees sou gints* The depth of the mind i indeed eli, or-sane thing fom another punt of view change an inference By isl the imagination nor nature mee fancy. These constancy or uniformity inthe des the have. No oe thee constancy or niformity inthe way in which es arene hgh th imagination only chance makes vp this conneson* The gon, crt ofthe ideas ne characteristic the es tds not hey tothe imagination: eather than being the nature of ome de i ae whey ca py dr the nun of the conta thes her iil How dos he ination the way in whichis ae seid nthe Imai Reco‘THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS wrth its thre principles (Contigiy, resemblance, and caaliy) amends the agitation, an lo dies fom fe. Asoiion 3 fetthe imagination, Rather than finding its origin, sociation finds inthe imagination i term and its objec ea quality which une ids not» quality of ies themselves? ‘Awe wiley throogh bi and cass the sabe ranscends the given, Literal, the sober gocs beyond what the mind gives ict bctive in what t have neither scen nor touched. Bat the subject an go beyond the given boat ist of ll is ssid the mindy the fect of principles sansenng al acing he ind. Before there Gar bebe lhe pnp of ection mw ogni the gen into» sytem, imposing consancy on the imagination. The Teer does aoe dew its own sources from constancy, bie without init would nove be a aman nacre These principles seb 20 ies the links and principles of union, wich instead of beng the Characteristics of des, ae the orginal quite of tan nace” ‘The privilege chateau enjoys that it alone can make os a Crisctce and meu elo. Ht confers oom the ides of he objec Sliiy and an objectivity tha thir en wold not have hadi only icen asociated through contiguigy or recmblance to am actual impreson." Bu the other ewo pipe lo share with causality 2 common role: the and mata the mind; they prepare belek dnd scompany ie, We can no se the pei groind of empiitn torhing inthe mind cansende man nate cae human Sara that in pints, ances the min nothing is ever trscendenal, Atseion, fr fom being a prod ia rae of he imagination and a maifeation of i fee exec, guides the imagination gives tnlformity and also constrain a thik sense, ideas are connected inthe mind-not by the mind. The magination isindeed ham satre bat only to the entnt tat other principles ave made ie constant and seed "There isa dificly, chough, even with this definition, Why is regulated imagination, rather than the nile griped in ie ative orwer human nacre? How can we sy of the imagination tha mea nar, despite the fact htt Bas nok within ela eon for this becoming? The answer is simple. Enenaly, principles eee tothe mind whith they affect, but nate refers othe imagination its entre faneton to gaily the imagination, Asoiton i we tof mae and Ue eey ater l i dein by fees, nr ‘THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS by scat. Simla, onan eniely diferent plan, Go may be eed “atc and prcsablihed harmony or aogy may be ie fll ake" The conlsion ofthe Dis, the cy on i Ack, andthe ey on mori ate in ft Coherent Aaa may dlvap be ough a something inl enscending al the aa cs which provide it with» determined content, inthe eae of Cxperone al knowledge Bu he fais har plilowphy, being 2 fama scence, ace tox seach forthe casei shld het scrutinize flees The ae cannot be knw, piniples have nether Cate nor an orgn ofthe power, Whar aig thr efet ‘pon che agin, ‘The eflec of scion per in three ways. Sometimes the idea takes ona soe snd cones capable of tepcenting all these ideas with which though semblance, tisasocaed (enc dd) ober ics, he anon of ear rough bout y the mind seq 2 regslity ot previously bad in which ese “tur in a maer pein out o everyone thee simple Meas which are mos proper {bev ine» complex one" ubtance and mee aly, tomecnes, one ies ean introduce aother™ (ction), The rel Of the asaciton i al thre nes ithe mins ey pasage rom one eno aot otha teen of eatin becomes peel {bi ary anion.” The minds aring become naar, hs sete sow 3 td Tt despite the fit chat nate makes reference to ies to the extent that scat them inthe mind the eas donot aie {ew guar of thei own aor are hey capable of aeibaing eo thir lets no new das ver appear east clated inform way bt those claons ar no te object ofan es, mein a ttncves thar ene des mute epesete, but cly nthe fing, ‘der the form of 4 partclr ides having a determined ant snd quality On oe Ea, the imagination anno become ell tatite without bing for elf the ancy. As for the fay, Ss hete an enely new exteson The fay an alms ie Fear ons, borrow te clothing of mature and orm gnc le, going beyond the determined eld of legitimate knowledge and cating Knowledge beyond prope imi, Tecan dpay ism nes thers canoe be wish ee French cone have sly” In oer to oipe othe fc ofthese extensive rues ad in ode to coe sat mode, we wll ed the aplion of diferent rls“THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS this time, the application of corrective rules. Albeit les fancifully, the imagination, whenever faced with 2 relation, will not fail to double and reinforce it by means of other relations, however un- merited they may be2? ‘On the other hand, che mind cannot be activated by the principles of nature without remaining passive. Ie only suffers the effects. Re= Tations ate not doing the connecting, but rather they themselves are connected; causality, for example, is passion, an impression of re~ fection and a “resemblance effect" Causality is el Te is a perception of the mind and not a conclusion of the understanding: EWWe mast not here be content with saying, that the idea of cause and effect arises from objects constantly united; but must affirm that “ts the very same with the idea of these objects." In short, the necessary relation is indeed in the subject, but omy insofar as the subject ‘ontemplats2" This isthe reason why Hurne sometimes, on the neg- ative side, insists on the paradox of his thesis; and at other times, on the postive side, he emphasizes its orthodoxy. Insofar as necessity is on the side of the subject, the necessary relation, in the case of things, is only a constant conjunetion—necesty is indeed only thet. ‘But necessity belongs to the subject only insofar as the subject con= templates, and not insofar as i¢ acts.” The constant conjunction is the entre necessary relation” For Hume, the determination is not tletormining; itis rather determined. When Hume speaks of an act fof the mind-of a disposition—he does not mean to say thatthe mind is active but that i is activated and that it has become subject. The ‘coherent paradox of Hume's philosophy is that it offersa subjectivity which transcends itself, withoue being any less pasive. Subjectivity is determined as an effect itis in fact an impresion of reflection. The rind, having been affected by the principles, turns now into a sbjec. ‘Nature cannot be stadid scientifically excep in terms ofits effects upon the mind, yet the only true science of the mind should have nature as its object, “Human Nature is the only science of man." This, of course, means that the psychology of affections disallows any psychology of the mind, but it also means that affections give the mind its qualities, A certain ambiguity may well be explained inthis way. In Hume's work, we witness the unequal development (of two lines of diverse inspiration. On one hand, the psychology of the mind is a psychology of ideas, of simple clements, of rninima fr inuivsiles. Te occupies essentially the second part of he system ‘THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS ‘ofthe understanding —“the ideas of space and ime." This Hume's sumism. On the other hand, the psychology of human nature is 3 psychology of dispositions, perhaps even an anehropology, a scicace af pra, etl moray pois and ory. Hi ally real extigue of prychology, insofar as it locates the reality ofits ‘object i all the detminations not given i an ides, ori all the (qualities transcending the min. This second line of inspiration cone stitutes Hume's auction, and to confuse asociationism with tomism isa cious misunderstanding. Now, we ate faced with the question: why does the fist inspi- ration subsist in Hume's writings, especially in his theory of space? ‘We bave seen tat, although the pepchology of action cosine in its projet the eitigue and even the elimination of a psychology of the nd (a a scence imposible to consiut), it nevertheless ontans in is object an essential reference to the mind a the ob- Jeeive of mur quien, Since he minds iis collection ‘of atoms, true psychology is neither immediately nor directly pos- sible: che principles do noe make the mind an object of posible tcience without fre giving it an objective mature. Hume therefore does not ereate anatomist psychology; he eather indiats, inside som, ae of he mind hich does not permit any yhoo. fe cannot reproach Lume fr having neglected the important prob- tem ofthe conditions of the human sienes, We might cven wonder ‘whether modeen auchors donot tepeat Hunt's philosophical project when they asocate an asidaous critique of atominm with every Positive moment of the human sciences. Ie would follow ehat they treat atomism less a6 historical localized thesis and more a the general schema of what psychology cannot be; they condem it therefore, in the name of the concrete rights of ethology and so- cology, of of the passonal and the socal “The intellect," said Comte with respect to imposible psy= cologes, “is almost exclusively the subject of their spec lations, and the affections have been almose entirely ne~ lected; and, moreover, always subordinated to the understanding... The whole of humav nature is thus very sunaithfally represented by these file systems..." Al serious writers agree the asin. This is why they © the impossibility of a psychology of ine x0 meticulously every single‘THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS identification between consciousness and knowledge. They differ ‘only in the way they determine the factors which give a nature to the mind. Sometimes, these factors are the body and matter, in which ‘case psychology makes room for physiology. Sometimes they are particular principles, constituting 2 psychic equivalent of matter, ‘wherein psychology finds its unique, possible object and its scientific condition. Hume, with bis principles of association, has chosen the latter route, which isthe most difficult and the most audacious. This is where his sympathy for materialism comes from, and at the same time his reticence toward it Unt now, we ave shows oaly that the task that Hume's philosophy sets for itself i fo answer the question “how docs the mind become 4 nature." But why is it tis one? The question must be taken up om 4 iferen plane, Hume's problem would then be exclusively about 4 act and therefore empirical Quid fai? Whats the fact of know ‘ge? Ie is transcendence or going beyond. Lafirm more chan I kno; ry judgment gocs beyond the idea In other words, Iam «subject Tsay “Caesars dead," “ee sun will se tomorow,” “Rome exist I speak in general terms and I have beliefs, 1 establish relations this isa factanda practice. Inthe ease of knowledge, where is che fac? "he fac is that these practices cannot be expressed ithe form of an idea without the idea becoming, immediately contradictory. Take, for example, the incompatibility between a general or abstract idea anid the nature of an idea” or between areal elation beeween objects nd the objets to which we apply the relation. The more in mediate or immediately decided the incompatibility is, the more decisive ie will be. Hume does not reach this point after long, discasion, he Begins with i, o that che point about the contradiction assumes naturally the cole of a basic challenge. This is the only relation between the philosopher and the others inside the system of the undertanding™ “Show me the idea you claim to have ‘What's a stake in the challenge isthe very paychology of mind. fac, the given and experience have now to inverse meanings. The given is the idea ai is given in the mind, without anything tean- scending it—not even the mind, which ie thecfore identical wit the idea Bur, she eanseendenceivet i also given, in am aleogether diferent sense and manner-it is given a practice, as an afetion of the mind, and as an impression of reflection: pasion, says Hui, does not have to be defined: by the same token, belief is a je mess {qi adequately fle by everyone.»* Empirical subjectivity is consti- tuted in the mind under che influence of principles affecting i, the ‘mind therefore does not have the characteristics of a preexisting subject. True psychology, that is, ehe psychology of affections, will bbe duplicated in each one of its moments by means of a critique of the false psychology of the mind; the latter ie in fact incapable of grasping without contradiction the constitutive element of human reality. But why i it finaly necesary that philosophy undertake this critique, express the transcendence in an ides, produce the contra- diction, and manifest the incompatibility asthe fact of knowledge? I is because the transcendence under discussion is not given in an idea, but is rather referred to the mind; it qualifies the mind, The ‘mind is atthe same time the object of a critique and the term of a necessary reference. The necesity of the critique is located her. This isthe reason why, with respect to questions of the understand- ing, Hume's method is always the same: it goes from the absence of an idea in the mind to the presence of an affection of the mind, ‘The negation of the idea of a thing aficms the identity between the character of this thing and the nature ofan impression of reflection, This isthe case with existence, general ideas, necessary connection, the self, and aso viceand virtue. Inall these cass, instead of negating the criterion ofthe idea, we allow the negation of the idea itself to serve a a criterion; ranscendence is first and foremost understood in igs negative relation to that which it tanscends.”” Conversely, in the structures of transcendence, the mind finds a kind of positivity which comes to it from outside. But chen, how can we reconcile chs entite method with Hume's principle, according to which all ideas derive from a corresponding ‘impression and, consequently, every given impresion is reproduced jn an idea which perfectly cepresente i? If, for example, necessity js an impression of reflection, there must necessarily be an idea of sly." Critique, says Hume, does not deprive the idea of nec= essary connection of its sense, it only destroys its improper applic cations.*! There certainly isan idea of necessity. But basicaly, we speak of an impression of reflection, whenever the necessary relation is the mind affected and determined (in certain circumstances) by the idea of an object ta form the idea of another object. The impres- sign of necessity, hecause it is a qualification ofthe mind, would not‘THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS be able to produce the idea a a quality of things. The proper role ‘of the impressions of reflection, being effects of the principles, is 0 in various ways the mind a subject. Afecions then tel the idea of subjecivty. The term “idea” can no longer have the seme ‘meaning. Consequently, ehe psychology of affections becomes the philosophy of the constcuted subject. Rationalism has lost this philosophy. Hume's philosophy is a sharp critique of representation. Ie does not elaborate a ertique of relations but rather a ertigue of representations, precisely because representations cannot present relations. By making representation into a eritrion and by placing ideas within reason, rationalism ex- pects ideas to sand for something which cannot be constituted ‘within experience or be given in an idea without contradiction: the generality ofthe idea, the existence of the object, and the content of the terms “always.” “universal,” “necessary,” and “crue.” Ra sionalism has transferred mental determinations to external objects, taking away thereby from philosophy the meaning and the intelli- ibility of practice and ofthe subject The fact is, though, that che ‘mind isnot reason; reason is an affection of the min In this sense, reason wil be called instine.* habit, or nature. “[W]e have found {reason tbe nothing but a general calm determination ofthe pas- sions, founded on some distant view or refiexion.”* ‘Reason isa kind of feling, Consequently, just as the method of philosophy goes from the absence of an idea to the presence of an Impression, similacly the theory of reason moves also from 2 kind of skepticism toa kind of positivism. Te moves from a skepticism of reason to a positivism of feeling, in which case che latter includes reason a 4 reflection of feeling i the qualified min. In the same way cha a distinction is made between atomism and associatioism, a distinction must also be made beeween the to senses ofthe term “ide,” and therefore the two senses of the term “mnpresion." In one sense, we do not have the idea of necessity, but in another, we do. Despite the texts which present simaltane- ‘ously and render homogeneous as much as posible® the impressions of sensation and che impressions of reflection (or the ideas of sen- sation and the idea of reflection), the diference between the ewo is eallya difference of nature. Wieness, for example, the following, quotation: ‘THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS For tht is necesary to produce a new idea of reflection, nor can the mind, by revolving over a thousand times allies ideas of sensation, ever extact from them any new original idea, sles nature has fram its foci, that ie eels some new ‘original impression sete from such contemplation © ‘The impressions of sensation are only the origin of the mind as for the impressions of reflection, they are the qualification of the ‘mind and the effec of principles in it. The point of view of the origin, according to which every idea derives from a preexisting impression and represents it, does not have the importance that peo ple attibute to itz it merely gives the mind a simple origin and frees the ideas from the obligation of having to represent things, and also from the corresponding difficulty of having to understand the re- semblance of ideas The real importance i on the side of the impees- sions of telection, because they are the ones which qualify the mind as subject. The essence and the destiny of empiricism are not tied to the atom but rather to the essence of association; therefore, em- ism docs not raise the problem of the origin of the mind but rather the problem of the constitution of the subject. Moreover, it cvisages this constitution in the mind as the effect of transcending principles and not as the product of a genesis. The difficulty i establishing a specific relation between the ewo meanings of “idea” "or between origin and qualification. We have al ready seen their diference, It is the same difference that Hume encounters under the form of an antimony of knowledge: it defines the problem of the sel The mind is not subject, itis subjected. ‘When the subject is constituted in the mind under the effec of principles, the mind apprehends itself as a self, fr it has been qoal- ed. But the problem is chs: ifthe subject is constituted only inside the collection of ideas, how can the collection of ideas be appre~ hhended as a self, how can T say “I,” under the influence of those same principles? We do not really understand hove we can from dispositions to the self, or from the subject to the self. How subject and the mind, in the last analysis, be one and the wide the self? The self must be both a collection of ideas and a disposition, mind and subject. It is a synthesis, which is incom- prehensible, since i ties together in its notion, without ever recon- ciling them, origin and qualification,‘THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS In short there are owo principles, which T cannot tender consistent; nor isitin my powers to renounce either of them, vi. that all our distinct percptons are distinct existance, and (ht the mun newer perceives any real connexion among dint ‘Hume in fact adds that a solution may be possible. We will see later ‘on what sense we can give to this bope. ‘Human nature is the real object of science. But Hume's philosophy presents us with two modalities of this nature and with ewo types ‘of affection: we are faced, on one hand, with the effects of asociation, and on the other with ‘the effects of passion. Each one of them determines a system: the system of understanding and the system of | passions and ethics. But what is their relation? ‘To begin with, be- tween the ewo, a kind of parallelism seems to be established and followed exactly. Belief and sympathy correspond. Moreover, every thing that belongs to sympathy and goes beyond belies, according to the analysis, analogous to that which the passions add to the association of ideas* On another plane, just as association fixes in the mind a necessary generality, chat is, rule which is indispensable to theoretical knowledge, in the same way the passions provide the rind with the content of a constancy,” make possible a practical and moral actviey, and give history its meaning, Wiehout chs double movement, there would not even be a human nature, for the imag ination would be mere fancy. The points of correspondence do not stop there: the relation between motive and action is ofa piece with ‘ausality® 0 the point that history must be construed as a physics, of humaniy.* Finally, in the case of the determination of nature, and in the case of the constitution of a world of morality, general rules, being both extensive and corrective, have the same sense, We should not identify the system of understanding with theory, and the system of morality and the passions with practice. Under the name of belief, we have a practice of the understanding, and under the form of social organization and justice, a cheory of morality. ‘Moreover, everywhere in Hume, the only possible theory isa theory of practice: with respect to the understanding, we have the caleu lation of probabilities and general rules; with respect to morality the passions, we have general rules and justice. ‘THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS Importan as they may be, however, all these coresponenees ate che mere presentation of philosophy andthe dsrbutin of its resol The relation of analogy beewoen the two constituted domains should nt make us forget which one of them determines the constittion of the other as 4 philosophical maeter. We actally seck the motive ‘of philosophy. Ae lea, the facts casy wo devide: Hume is aboe all 4 moralist, politcal thinker, and a historian, But why? "The Treatise begins with the system of understanding, and cases the problem of reson. However, the necessity of such a problem is not obvious; it must bave an origin, which we can consider as 4 ‘motive of this philosophy. I is ne beeause reason solves problems thae iti itself a problem. On the contrary, for reson to experience 2 problem, in ts own domain, chere mast bea domain that escapes reason putting it intl inco question. The important and principal Sentence of che Treatises eis "Tis not contrary to Reason fo preter the destevetion ofthe whole world to the serathing of my finger ”™ ‘Contrriety is an excessive relation. Reson canbe pu into quese tion and can raise the problem ofits natuee, because it doesnot apply toall thete is. The fact i that it docs not determine practice: is practically or technically insfficent. Undoubtedly, reason inflacnces Practice, tothe extent chat i informs us ofthe existence ofa thing, 25 the proper object of a passion, or to the extent that it ceveals ‘connection between causes and effects 38 means of satisfaction.” But \we cannot say that reson produces an aetion, that passion contradicts itor even that reason ehwars a pasion. Contradiction implies a leasa disagreement between ideat and the objects which the ideas represent: "A passion isan original existence, ori you will, mod iftation of existence, nd contains not any represcnetive quality, which renders it 2 copy of any other existence or modifcaion."* “Moreover, moral distinctions do not lee themselves be engendered through teason; che aoUse passions, and produce or hinder ation.” ‘Thetis indeed contadicion in minapproprating propertiss and in violating promises, but only to the extent that promises and prope erties exist in naate. Reason can always be brought to ber, but it is brought to bear on a preexisting word and presupposes an an- tecedent ethics and an order of ends > Thus, iis bocsuse practice and morality are in their nature and not in their circumstances) indifferent to reason that reason socks its difference. Becase itis ‘negate from che outs, its denied rom dhe inside and discovered“THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS because this skepticism has itsorigin andes motive on che ouside, in the indifference of practice, practice itself i indiferent to skepticism: we can always play back. {ammon.”” The philosopher behaves as anyone els: the characteristic ff the skeptic is tha he or his resoning doesnot allow a ep and, at che same time, does not produce conviction We at, therefore, ‘brought back to the previous conelson, and this time we find it completed: skepticism and posiivim are mutually implied by the same philosophical reasoning. The positivism of the pasions and erhics proxies a skepticism of reason. This interalized skepticism, having become 4 skepticism of reson, causes a positivism of the tundertanding a1 the theory of 2 practice. This positivism of the tnderstanding isconccived inthe image ofthe skepticism of reason. ‘According to the image, yes, but not according tothe resemblance. ‘We can now understand exactly the difference between the system ‘of thics and the system of the understanding. In the case ofthe affecr, we must distinguish ewo term: passional or moral action, land transcendence asa dimension of knowledge. Without a doubt, the principles of morality, chat i, ehe original and natural slits ofthe passions, transcend and afect the mind, just asthe principles of association do. The empirical subject i firmly consitted in the ‘mind by the combined elect of all principles. Bu iis only under the (anequal) influence of the principles of association not of the others—that this subject can tanicend the given: i believes. In this precise sens, transcendence is exclusively the affir of knowledge: {ecarves the ides beyond itelt, giving ie roe, afirming it object, ana constituting its Finks. I follows that in the system of the tn. derstanding, che most importnt principle which affects the mind will ito ll be staied in acivity, chat i, in the movement of 2 subject that transcends the give is grasped in the context of the inference’ But the ease of ethics is completely diferent, even when it takes analogically the form of the exposition of transcendcuce*" There is no inference to be drawn in this case. "We do not infer a character t0 be virtous, because it pleases: Buin feling that it pleases alter such a particular manner, ‘ve in effect fecl that it i virtuous." Ethics admits the idea a6 faczor only of the relevant rcumstances and accepts che association 2 2 constituted clement of human nature. In the systom of the ‘understanding, on the other hand, association isa constitutive cle ‘THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS ‘ment—in fact, the only constitutive element of human nature. As an illustration of this duality, ie is enough to remember Hume's tinction between two selves, and the different way in which he presents and handles the corresponding problems, ‘Thus, there are two kinds of practice which are immediately marked by very distinctive characteristics. The practice of the n- derstanding determines the internal economy of nature, and proceeds bby means of extension. Nature, the object of physics is parts extra ports. This is its essence. If we consider objects from the point of view oftheir idea, itis posible for all objects “to become causes or fe ofeach other since the causal lation i not one of thei «qualities: from 2 logical point of view, anything could be the cause ‘of anything. But if, on the other hand, we observe the conjunction ‘of rwo objects, each of the numerically diferent cases which presents the conjunction is independent of the other, acither has influence ‘over the other, “they are entirely divided by time and place.”"* They are only the component parts of a certain probability: In fact, if probability presupposes causality, the certainty which is born’ of ‘causal reasoning is also a limit and a particular case of probability, ‘or rather the practically absolute convergence of probabilities!” Na- ture is indeed an extensive magnitude, and as such it lends itself to physical experiment and measurement. The essutial ching is to de- ermine the parts, and, within the realm of knowledge, this isthe function of general rules. Nature is not a whole; the whole can no ‘more be discovered than it can be invented. Totality is jst a collec- tion... Lanswer that the uniting of these part into a whole, ... is performed merely by an arbitrary act of the mind, and has no influence on the nature of things." The general rules of knowledge, insofar as their generality concerns the whole, ae not different from the natural principles of our understanding” The dificulty, says Hume, is notin inventing but rather in applying them. ‘The case ofthe practice of morality, however, is different. Here, the parts ae given immediately, without any inference required, and ‘without any necessary application. But, instead of bing extensive, these pare are mutually exclusive; they are not made up of pars (partielle), a in the case of nature; they are rather partial (partial). In the ethical practice, che dificulty isin diverting and slanting that par- tality. The important thing here is to invent: justice isan artifical Virtue and “man is an inventive species."™ Thhe essential task is to‘THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF ETHICS constitute a whole of morality; for justice is 2 schema?" and the schema is the very principle of society. "[A] single act of justice, ‘consider'd in itself, may often be contrary to the public good; and ‘ts only she concurrence of mankind, in 2 general scheme or system ‘of action, which is advantageous.” ‘The question is no longer about transcendence but rather about integration. Unlike reason, which always proceeds from one part to another, feeling reacs to wholes.” This is why, in the domain of ethics, general rules have a diflerene meaning, two CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES We must now explain some issues pertaining to ethics. I is the essence of moral conscience to approve and disapprove. The feeling ‘which prompts us to praise or blame, the pain and pleasure which determine vice and virtue, have an original nature: they are produced with reference to character in general, and with no reference t0 our particular interest! Bue what can make us abandon the reference to four own point of view, and make us refer, “through mere inspec- tion,” to character in general? In other words, what can make us take hold of something and live in i, hecaus itis useful or agreeable to the Other or to perions in general? Hume's response is simple: sympathy. There is, however, 2 paradox of sympathy: it opens up for ds a moral space and generality, bue the space has no extension, nor does the generality have quantity. In fact, in order to be moral, sympathy must extend into the future and must not be limited to the present moment, It must be a double sympathy, that i, 2 cor- respondence of impressions multiplied by the deste for the pleasure of the Other and by an aversion for her or his pain# Ie isa face chat sympathy exists and chat itis extended naturally. But this extension fs not afiemed withoue exclusion i is imposible for sympathy to extend “without being aided by some circumstance in the present, ‘which strikes upow us in a lively manner,”® excluding chereby allCULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES ce which donot present shee circumstances. The dreamtances ors he pn of fi ofthe acyl be he seo me Sly the enormity of wnsppiness bat from the point of ew human are thee wl be coogi, rmbt, oe. ‘Those whore lve, ncoring wo citumtance are thor coe ton cur pcs and ou claiver® Beefy. cur narra eneony Ted wae is matul to u alimitd generosity Sympathy tates fel aural inthe ft, har oly when the eeu Sancs mie oxcsons The eher side of fener to which Spmpathy ves ws prin tha an ine o cron” ‘Rocbympathy botows pon a cacti of ue mate "50 tro make us egrd any rematabl tansresson of chs dgiee OF palit, either hy foo grata enlargement, or contaction of the aero vious an! imma” We conden she pret tho prefer sages fo tet own cides "Pst ot our matte which orl iis ratheroue moray whch in or natures One of Heme’ sips but ose nporeant {casithisiumanteingsae mcs got than heya pr Some belie thems to be pilsophers and god thinker, they mina tha egoi she retro vey sty, ba his tsteo simple Do ey ntsc that "eee ew hat dom bestow the lage part of teers onthe plese ofthe wien, aed the elation af chee hilen, serving these pardon for thei gn pope ae and entertainments) “The th that an india vay belongs to la o¢ a community. Before beng the spe of community that Tonics de ‘Sib, family fens, and weightorliness ar, n me's work, {he mata dterminans of sympathy. Ie pecly erase the ‘ence of pasion othe esc ofthe arcane i ptialiy tater hanes that sympathy for pt, docs not tance the partial iets or paso, Oe seme of dy lay fellows the Cominan and maul courte of ou pasion Leu ll the trgumene dnwuphy even if we popu the advantage of oo i Eesonbeeween gi and simpy sympathy ns ks oppose to sce dan egos So aoe an acon, ised of Fring men for late soit ano acontrary totem, a the ma aro else” Noone has the same symp of pari, we ae conte wh soe sas anothers given the plarality CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES ‘This is nature's course; there is no reasonable human language at this level. «ss E}very particular man has peculiar postion with ro gard to others; and "és impossible we cow’ ever converse ogether on any easonable cers, were each of us to consider characters and persons, only as they appet fom his poculiae point of view." However if sympathy i ike egoism, what importance should we accord to Hume's observation chat we are not egoistically but rather sympathetically inclined? The truth of the matter is that, even if society finds as much of an obstacle in sympathy as in the purest ‘egoism, what changes absolutely is the sense o the struceute of society itself, depending on whether we consider i¢ from the point of view of égoism or sympathy. Egoisms would only hare to be limited, but sympathies are another matter, for they must be inte- grated inside 2 positive totality. What Hume eriticizes in contrac- tarian cheoris is precisely chat they present us with an abstrace and false image of society, that they define society only in a negative ‘way; they see in ita st of limitations of egoisms and interests instead of understanding society asa positive system of invented endeavors ‘That is why it is so important to be reminded thatthe natural human boeing is not egoist; our entice notion of society depends om it. What ‘we find in nature, without exception, ae families; the state of nature is always already’ more than a simple sate of natute.” The farily, dependently of all legislation, is explained by the sexual instince and by sympathy—sympathy between parents, and sympathy of par- ents for their offspring." We should rather understand the problem of society from this angle, because society Finds its obstacle in sym- pathies rather than in egoism, Without a doubt, society is in the beginning a collection of families; bt a collection of families is not a family reunion. OF cours, families ate social units; but the char- aceite of thee unit tha he ae mot added fo one anothes Rather, they exclude one another, they ate partial (partiale) rather than made up of parts (paris). The parents of one family are always the strangers of other families Consequently, a contradiction ex- plodes inside nature. ‘The problem of society, in this sense, is not a problem of limitation, but rather 2 problem of integration. To in-(CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES tegute sympathies isto make sympathy tanicnd it contradiction Sn nacalpartaly. Such an negation implies postive moral ‘world andis bought abou dhe positive invention a uch a word Tefllows thatthe moral wold isnot redced fo 3 oral tinct of tothe natural determinations of sympathy. The moral world Site its reality when the contain i Cectively disipated, ‘when convertion s possible as an alternative co woleee, when property sipenedes greed, when “notwithstanding thi variation of fur sympathy, we give the sae approbation to the same moral ‘aie fn China sin England" or, ta word, when “the sympathy ‘ves without a varnion in ou ees" ‘xcem is the factor which integrates sympathies, andthe foun- dation of justice. This Foundation o this uniformity of ete i ot the rent ofan imaginary voyage, which trneports in thought tothe most remote ies and lands inorder eo constitute the pesos thom we take tobe out posible kin, per, and relives, “ei ot Concivable how aval satment or pasion can ever ats fom a Kserwn imaginary interest..." The moral and socal problem is how to go om real sympathies which exclude one another to are whole which would include thew sympathies. The problem is how texted sympathy. We se the dference berwen mol at mat, oF rts, the Tack of adequton between nate and ray, The rey of the ‘orl world rues the contain of whale, of scey, hat ithe exalt of anita sytem Th seat sat ural, itis artificial. “The rules of justice, in virtue of their universality fd absolute infin, caonor be derived fom mater, nor at they be the diet eaten ofa atu inclinaon cr motive "A ihe cen of moral (mpi) ae naturally fen, bu they se impotent by theses connie «onl wal. Tatas oF Tartar incre cannot be naturally vrlzey beat they are tmurally exclu, One can only irene a whole since the nly iron lief ten, Thi ea he oc of the mor problem, Justice nota principle of matures raer a El pepe ie ohn pee n tole, che clement inclading the principle of arr, Josie i tneans, The moval problem ic af schemtsm, tha theactby meansof which we ens tothe poi (CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES category of the whole or to the totality which is not given in nature. ‘The moral world is the artifical totality wherein particular ends are integrated and added to one another. Or again, the moral world is the system of means which allow my particular interest, and also the interest of the other, to be satisfied and realized. Morality may equally well be thought of as a whole in relation to parts and as 2 ‘mans in relation to ends. In short, the moral conscience ie apolitical conscience: true morality is politics just asthe true morals i the legislator. Expressed in a different way, the moral conscience is determination of the psychological conscience it isthe psychological conscience apprehended exclusively in the aspect of its inventive power. The moral problem is a problem of the whole and also a problem of means. Legislation isa great invention and the ere ine ventors are not the technologists but rather the legislators. They are not Asclepius and Bacchus but rather Romls and Theseus. Now, a system of directed means, a determined whole, i called rule ora norm. Hume calls it a general rue. The rule has two poles: form and content, conversation and property, a system of customs (mocurs) and stability of possesion, ‘To be in a society is fst to substitute possible conversation for violence: the ehought ofeach one represents in itself the thought of the others. But under what con ditions? Under the condition that the particular sympathies of each ‘one are transcended in a certain way, and surmount the correspond- ing partilities or contradictions which chey generate among people: ‘or under the condition that natural sympathy can be artificially ex. cecised outside its natural limits. The function of the rule is to de- termine a stable and common point of view, firm and calm, and independent of our present situation [Now in judging of characters, the only interest or pleasure, ‘which appears the same to every spectator, is that of the person himself, whose characteris examin'd or that of per- sons, who have a connexion with him: ‘Undoubtedly, such an interest touches us mote feebly than our ‘own, of those of our kin, peers, and relatives; we are going to see that it receives from elsewhere the vividness that it lacks, But at least it has the practical advantage, even when the heart is notin it of| boeing a general and immutable criterion, a thied interest which does(CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES sot depend on iterloctors~a value “[FJverything, which gi uneasiness in human action, upon the general survey, is ell'd Vice... “The obligation which is dhs created difers essentially fom nat- wel obligation, natural and particular interest, or the motive ofthe sn: ml obligation or see of dy. Atte ae pol ery presupposes similar conditions. “I observe, that i wil formy interest leave another in the psscson of his gods, proved he wil acti the sme manner with regard wo me"® Here the third inncrestisa general interest. The convention of propery isthe artifice by means of which the actions of each one ae elated to those of the others. eis the establishment of a seheme and the institution oF a symbolic aggregate or ofthe whole, Hume this finds property to tea phenomenon which is csentaly poliial in face, che political ‘phenomenon par excellence. Property and conversation ae oined at Tast forming the ewo chapter of social science. The general sense ‘ofthe common interest mast be expresedin order o be efcacions.> Reason presents itself here asthe conversation of propritors rom these frst determinations, we ca aleady see that the role ofthe general rule is twofold, extensive and correc. I cores our ‘Eons in making ws forget oar present station At the sme time, in terms ofits esenes, i “goes beyond the circumstance of its birth." Although the sense of duty [is] driv'd only from con- templating the actions of others, yet we fil not to extend it even to ob own actions’ Finally, the rule is that which includes the exception; it makes s sympathize wich the othe, even when the ‘other does nor experience the sentiment which in general corre= sponds 0 the situation. [A] man, who is noc dejected by misfortunes, isthe more lamented on account of his patience ...: and tho’ there be an exception in the present case, yet the imagination is af- fected by the general rule... "Tis an aggravation of a murder, that it was committed upon persons asleep and in perfect security. ‘We mus, of course, ask how the invention ofthe rue is possible indeed, this is the main question. How can we form systems of means, general rules, and aggregates which ate hath corrective and CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES extensive? But we can already answer the following question: what is ie exactly that we invent? In his cheory of the artifice, Hame proposes an entire concept ofthe relation between nature and culture, tendency and institution. Without a doubt, particular interests can” tot be maul identical to one another, or be naturally ttalized. None theless, nature demands that they be made identical. If not, the general rule could never be constituted, property and conversation could not even be conceived of, because sympathies are faced with the following alvernative: either to be extended through artifice or to be destroyed through contradiction. As fo the passions, they must either be satisfied artificially and obliquely or be snubbed out by violence. As Bentham will explain later on, even more precisely, red is natural, but there is no satisfction of need, or at least no ‘constant and enduring satisfaction, which is not ‘made possible through artifice, industry, and cule.” The identity of interests is therefore artificial, but only inthe sense that i eliminates the natural obstacles in the natural identification of che interests themselves. In other words, the significance of justice is exclusively topological. The artifice does not invene a principle other than sympathy. Prin= ciples are not invented. The artifice guarantees ¢o sympathy and to natural pasions an extension within which they will be capable of boeing exercised, deployed naturally, and liberated from eheir natural Timsts. © Passions are not limited by justice; they are enlarged and extended. Justice is the extension of the passions and interest, and only the partial movement of the latter is denied and constrained. It is in this sense that extension is comet and election, There is no pasion, therefore, capable of comtolling the incctested affection, but the very affection itelf, by an al- ‘eration of is direction. Now this alteration roast necesily take place upon the least reflection. ‘We must understand that justice is not a reflection on interest, but rather a reflection of interest, a kind of ewisting of the passion itself inthe mind affected by it. Reflection isan operation of the tendency which reserans itself. "The remedy, then, isnot devi'd from nature, but from arifc; or more properly speaking, nature provides a remedy in the judgment and understanding, for what is iregular and ine ‘commodious in the affecions."™* The reflection of tendency is the(CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES movement that constitutes practical reason; reason is nothing but a determined moment of the affections of the mind ealm oF rather calmed affection, “grounded in a distinct view or in reflection. The teal dualism, in Hume's work, is not between affection and reason, nature and artifice, bur rather beeween the whole of nature which includes the attifice and the mind afected and determined by this whole. Thus, the fact that the meaning of justice is aot reduced fo an instinct or to natural obligation docs not prevent the existence of moral instinct or natural obligation; above all, it does tot prevent the existence of a natural obligation to justice, once the latter is constituted.» TThe fact tha esteem does not vary with sym- pathy, and ehat it i unlimited, despite the fact that generosity nat- trally limits itself, does not prevent natural sympathy or limited generosity from being the necessary condition and the only element fof esteem: it i because of sympathy that we esteem." That justice is inthe final analysis capable, in part, of constraining our passions docs not mean that it has an end other than theie satisfaction,» of another origin other than their determination: it satisfies them obliquely. Justice is not a principle of nature; itis an artifice. But to the extent chat humanity is an inventive species, even the artifice js nature; the stability of possession is a natural Taw.” As Bergson said, habits are not themselves natural, but whae is natural is che habit to take up habits. Nature does not reach its ends except by ‘means of culture, and tendency is not satisfied except through che {nstiction. History is in tis sense par of human nature. Conversely, nature is encountered a the residue of history.\* Nature is what history does not explain, what cannot be defined, what may even be useless to describe, ot what ie common in the most diverse ways of satistying a tendency. ‘Nature and culture form, therefore, a whole ot a composite ‘Hume repudiates the arguments which assign everything, including justice co the instinct,” and the arguments which assign everything, including the meaning of virtue, to politics and education The former, as they forget culture, give usa flse image of nature; the later, as they forget nature, deform culture. Above all, Hume centers his critique on the theory of egoism,*' which is not even a correct psychology of human nature, since ie neglects the equally natoral phenomenon of sympathy. If by “egoism’™ we unulertand the face that al drives pursue their own satisfaction, we posit only the prin ciple of identity, A ~ A, that i, the formal and empty principle of a science of humanity-moreover, of an uncultivated and abstract bbumanity without history and without difference. More specifically, egoism can designate some means only that humanity organizes in order to satisfy drives, but not all possible means. Egoism then is pt in its place, and this place is no longer very important. At this point one can grasp the sense of Hume's political economy. In the Same manner in which he introduces a dimension of sympathy into nature, Hume adds many other motives to interest~motives that are often Contradictory (prodigality, ignorance, heredity, custom, habit, or “spirit of greed and endeavor, of luxury and abundance”). Dis. postions ae never ebtaced rom the means which we organize in onder ‘0 satify them. Indeed, nothing is further from the home eeconomicns than Hume's analysis. History, the true science of human motivation, ‘must denounce the double err ofan abstract economy anda falsified Tn this sense, the idea that Hume forms of society is very strong, He presents us with a critique of the social contract which not only the usliarians but also the majority of che jurist opposed to “natural, law” would have to take up again. The main idea is this: the essence ‘of society is noe the aw but rather the institution, The law, in fact, is a limitation of enterprise and action, and it focuses only on a negative aspect of society. The fault of contracual theories is that they present us with a society whose essence is che law, that i, with 2 society which has no other objective than co guarantee certain preexisting natural rights and no other origin than the contract. ‘Thus, anything positive is aken away from the social, and instead the social is saddled with negativity, limitation, and alienation. The entire Humean critique of the state of nature, natural rights, and the social contract, amounts to the suggestion thatthe problem must be ‘ered, The cana, by inl bee sore of eliption, be cause legal obligation presupposes utiliey. Society cannot guarantee preexisting rights: if people enter society, i is precisely because they do not have preexisting rights. We see clearly in the theory of prom- je which Hume proposes how utility becomes a principle opposed to the contract. Where isthe fundamental difference? Usiigy is on the side of the institution. The institution, unlike the law, is not a limitation but rather a model of actions, 4 veritable enterprise, an(CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES ied system of psi ieans oposite invention of inet tmeany This undertonding ofthe inten eectely revere the problem: outside ofthe sei thee lies the negative, the lack, oF the ced. The socal x profoundly creative, iventive, ad poi ‘Undo, we could sy that he notion of comention mnie a yet portance in Huts work, Bit wets oot cafe on tention and contac Placing conenion tthe bat of he nstaron Signi ony that the system of means epesated by the nstation ita ayer inde, clue std ented in 2 word, clr, “In Tie mone ae languages gadally cali by buman comensons withost any promis Siey 1 tof comentions founded om sity, oot «set of ebligaions fonoded ons contrac. Th, fm 2 social pn of view, the ny tno primary it presppose an ntaion that ne Simty, he legato is notte one wo legis, but rather ist of alte one who inttes, The problem ofthe relation Between tatire and seciery therefore ands shea: there is Gurion dy longer ofthe elation between night and the law, ba ster of eed and isin Ths he implies an eotite temndcling of “igh and an original vision ofthe sence of humanity, that of the new conception of peyhosoioogy Uslty-—tha i theron tenncen inten snd nredintheretore erie principe Home fenenl rule san inttton, Moreover, f the ee thatthe fener rl 3 postive and fanctonal system ndings ov ping ile in wliy he atte ofthe link exiting between and the principle of eit must be ndesood, [Ef the rl of jor Seva cals merely by iret thei connexon with incest ie somewhat singula, and ls diferene fom what may be bser’'d om other oceans “The fact that wate and society form an indisauble complex should not make w forget that we cannot reduce society to are “The fac hat haranty ian inventive species does nat prevent oot inventions fro being trenton, Sometnes Usain given 2 "ncioali” neretaton, on the bat of which scien we Pane by ality and che instaton by des o eed. Perhaps, there have been writers holding this interpretation, although even this nox certain a any tte Fame wot all the one wl bel isles ce that adie side a isto, We pe (CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES bee of specifically social intions noe gorernmentlinsitions. In marrige, sexuality iste; n propery reed. The lassen being the model of actions, isa designed eyatcm of possible satis. Econ The problem ita hs does no cet stone tat theinsution is expla by the dive. The insignia apes of meas, according co Hume, but thew means ate oblige and inde: they donot ai the ive without as cosainag iat thesame time. Take fr example, one frm of matiage, roe ten of property. Why this syst and ths Form? A thousand exhor, which we find in other ies and places, are posible The diffrence Berween instinct and inition tian inition ex whee the means by which a dive i stsied are wot determined by the Sie lf by spec characteris These words, to, inheitance and cont, and for ides infinitely complies ad to dfn them eas bund volumes a an, anda thand lume of commentator hve not ben fon sfc, Docs nar, whan tes in men areal snip, mrs ch complicated a a ficial objects and create a rational ‘xeature without rusting, saying othe operation of hiro? Al tothe Sine specs in cer ag and county bi hi ne kes inthis we ce the freon Mem iret times and place, frame thee hosts deren: hee me perceive the influence of eason and custom. Alike inference may be dawn fom comparing theists of generation ad he inwicion of popes.® 2E nares the principle of semblance and uniformity, is the ene of diferenes. The de is pene dees nt expna the particular, ven when ie ley Binds the particular the frm of is astaction “Tho” the eabshment of the rule, concerning the sailiy of poscnon, be not only wef Bur even asl, pecs hun iy an nw ony pro we In bcc ity doer nox expan th istion rv a dos ince the ison contin how docs pubic ity fae dy bec, sine presppoes an ete sina worl tha(CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES cannot ereate, and to which itis only attached.*” What could then ‘explain the institution in is essence and in is particular character? ‘Hume has just told us that itis reason and custom, elsewhere he said that tis the imagination, Yor the more frivolous properties of ‘our thought and conception." For example, i itor i it noe enough in order to become the owner of an abandoned city, to plant one’s javelin in its gates?” We will not answer the question merely by invoking drives and needs, but rather by examining the relations boeeween drive, citcumstance, and imagination. ‘The javelin is the ‘Where the properties of twa persons are united afer such a manner 2s neither to admit of division nor sp aration, as when one builds a house on another's groand, in thar case, the whole must belong «. «co the proprietor of the most considerable part... The only difficulty is, what we shall be pleas'd to call the most considerable par, and most attractive tothe imagination... The supericies yields tw the soil, says the civil law: The writing to the paper: The canvas to the picture. These decisions do not well agree together, and ate 4 proof of the contzatity of those prin ples, from which they are deriv'd* Without any doube, the laws of association regulating the play ‘ofthe imagination ate both the mos frivolous and the most serious the principle of reason and the advantage ofthe Fancy. But forthe moment, we need not be conecrned with ths problem. Ie suiies, whatever the case, tha we anticipate the following: ehe drive does not explain the insiuton; what explains iis the relation ofthe dive inthe imagination. We were quick to ctitcize associations: we forget too easily that ethnography brings us back toi, and that, 38 Bergson also sys, “among the primitives, we encounter many Pro~ Iibitions and preserpeons which ate explained through a vague association of teas." And this is not true only for the primitives. ‘Associations are vague, but only in the sense that che ate particular and varying according to the citcumstances. Imagination is revealed a. veritable prodaction of extremely diverse model whet drives sate seflected it an imagination submited to the prtcipls of as ‘avon, insticatins are determin hy the fg trace bythe dries (CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES acconding tthe circomstances, This does not mean eha the image ination is in is essence active but only that rings on, and resonate “The instetion isthe figure. When Hume define fecling, he assigns to ita double function: feling posts ens and reacts to. wholes. ‘These ewo fanctions, however, are one: there i feeling when the ‘nds ofthe deve ae aio the wholes to which senaibility reacts. But how are these wholes formed? They are formed when the deve and its ends are reflected in the mind. Because human beings do not have instincts, because instints do not enslave them to the actality ofa pute present, they have liberated the formative power of thei image Ination, and they hae placed thee drives an immediate and direct relation co it. Thus, the satisfaction of human dives is related, not to the drive itself, bur rather to the sefletive dive. This isthe meaning ofthe institution, in its difference from the instinct. We can then conchae that nature and caltore, drive and insittion, are tone wo the extent thatthe one is satis! bythe oeber, but they ate also wo insofar asthe later is not explained by the former. Similaely, with respec co the problem of justice, the words “schema” and “totality” are entirely justified, since the general rule never in= dicates particular persons; it does not name owners. Jostice in her decisions, never regards the fitness or unfitness of objects co particular persons... che general rue, tha poseson muct e sable, i not apply'd by pariculae judg ‘ments, but by other general rules, which must extend ¢o the ‘whole society, and be inflexible either by spite or favour! ‘We have seen that the rule is eablshed by interest and utility, and that itis determined by the imagination. In this sense, it does not determine real people; iti determined and modified in starements reflecting situations and possible circumstances. This is how the sta- bility of possession is divided berween diverse rights: immediate por session, occupation, prescription, accession, succession, But how can the lack of adequation between real persons and possible situations be corrected? This lack of adequation may itself be considered a cit- ccumstance or a situation. In that case, the mobility of persons will be regulated by the agreed-upon transfer, when the object of the ‘ranser is present or particular, and by the promise, when the object(CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES ili absent or generale? We mse therefore inthe case ofthe ene tle dstinguh thee dimensions which re nonetheless Sancou it ublshment, is deminatin,adrecion Mer liealy i stil presents sympathy, ough general uke has wn the conaney, dace, and niforiy ofthe re moral Jalpmen bt ba lost in vividness wht i at guned i extension tereCeomequenecsa every each fey se oe very femot tnd ae notable coumtrelance any imine aang, that my be cap fom "Phe guation fm lange how ro specify the al, but rater how to provi th ce dns which i ck. The question ism Ieegc how daibute bu how c ef a clven justice Teer nor enught then co snl ot by ene of the imagination the pom station ofthe extension oot his extension ast Teel bome mow eal satin. In am atic way he nearest txt become the move dsant, sad the most dane, the nearest ‘Trt meaning of goverment Human beings "nto change thence ll ary can sto change tei sitton and render the oberane of jntce the immedi inert of some patil sony ants vitor thie ore rete "We find here pinpl a al serius politcal philosophy. Tre morn doesnot ade elf cle in the aly but aber tolls inthe tr does ot nae he change of human mare tor the lnenon of artifical and objective condins inode for the bad soc of this nature noe to imp This tvencion, for Hume, fo the ene eighteenth centy, wl be ols ad {ely pole The governor, shag tiiod with thir present Sreddan inthe Seat append the gene interest wer the pct ofthe inmedite ae understand jc she good of thei Tie fr them, te most tant ha become the nearest: Cones, the govermed ee the nears hecome the mt dart othe extent tha thy ave "pe io of tht own poe, a 2 posible 0 thnapest las of occ. Government ahd property athe fone fnalost te sme ication tha ble and sbracion ae the lamer ce the question soa ving oles, nin the former, tatoo confer waciy, Thu, lay completes the Ist of eneal ace Ae this el the tory of sci contae eri Sg ce green fonce again. ‘There is no question of fou promise, because the promise san effect of the specification 9 jas- (CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES tice, and loyalty, is support, Justice and government have the same soures;chey ae invented to femedy similar inconvenience: the one simply invents extension, the oer, vvidnes. Being subordinate to justice, che observation of the law of promises is, by the same token ‘and on a diferent level, ce effect of the institution of government, not its causes” The support of justice is therefore independent of i specication, and is produced on another plane. Evens, or even more, this support mast be determined and distrbted in its arm and, ike the specication, mus, through its conection, make up fr is lack of adequation, The specifications of sovereignty wil be long pos- sesion, acesion, conquest, and succession. The correction of So¥- excignty willbe, in rare and precise cases, a certain right to resistance anda cern legitimacy of revolution. We must notice that the permitted revolutions ae not political. Infact, the main problem of the sae is not a problem of representation, but rather a problem of belie The sate, according to Hume, is not charged with repre senting the general interest bat rather with making the general n- tcreatan objec of bli. 1esuccecds in thisby giving general interest, snosly through the mechanism ofits sanctions, che vividness that only pacticuar terest cam hve for us natraly if the valers, instead of changing their situation, and instead of acquiring an immediate Jterest in the administration of justice, were to subject the admine istration of flifed justice to their own immediate passions, then and only then would resistance be legitimate, in the mame of a general rule" ‘Up ow, ft series of rules has given to interest an extension an gency tat inert i ot hae on ta: hough his possession has turned into property, and stability of posession has Een chic A second sericr of rules has given the gener rile the presence and vividness that it did not have by itself Bue the obseacls which society had to conquer ate not only the instability of goods and the abstract character of the general interest. Society fs also faced with scarcity of goods.” And stability, far from sur- ‘mounting this obstacle, aggravates i further as it provides posession with conditions fiworable for che formation of large proper Hume often elaborates the idea chat, by means ofan inter alectic, property engenders and develops inequality. A tied series orale therefore necesary to correthoth inequality an scarcity. “These rules willbe the objet of politcal economy. To the stability(CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES of pnteson and loyalty to government, the prosperity of commerce added at fst The later “eres indsty by comeing edly from one teber of the sate to tothe, a allowing toe of to pei or become sles With respect vo Hume’ economic theory, ony is main theme willbe dase er. Like the ewo Kh of res preceding the Prosperity of commerce i alo speed and cece specie i ht mney cle, ep, es and spr is relation with propery. corettons, onthe other hand, Show it ebton wth ets an acetal lion ich tonnes fom cute, Commerce prempoiestd aveles a pee iting propery fom an economic ptt of Few and rental pri me ming ofommer gn is gt: 1 (ltl phenomenon) the economic elim thai Ae nor have on own, The rae offtrest gies ut» pee trample By ise "in sve and populated tation” propery puts theca of landowner face to face with the peat las the Famer ga continu “Sond rb” ance es net having the money necesy “to spp ths demand.” The prog: tes of commere overcomes this contrition betwern foo any fa no eis i emi eit ince. “Segering] + mer of lenders and stoking} the rate of wry = [ether bryeen comes a! he See wll Dee derstand is principe if we elo that the prosper of commerce Secamilates 4 working capa allowing forthe ee and apps Ofte sabjecy, bough the sae cm way cso ed demand nd seh thi capital fr ine. It is a violent method, and in most eases impracticable, «0 oblige the labourer to toil, in order to raise from the Land more than what subsists himself and family, Pusnish him with manufacturers and commodities, and he will do i of himself; aferwards you will find ie easy to sire some part ‘of his superfivous labour, and employ it in the public service, ‘without giving him his wonted return. ‘The state without method ot rule acts brusquely and violently, Its actions ate repeated accidents imposed upon its subject, and con CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES trary therefore to human nature, In the methodical state, on the contrary, there appears an entice theory of the accident as the objece ‘of corrective rules: this state finds in commerce the possible aft- ‘ation ofits power and the rel condition of is subjects prosperity, in this way, they both conform to nature. : ne We have often noticed that in the work of Hume and the utili tarians, economic and political inspiration differ greatly. In his book ‘on utilitarianism, Hialévy distinguishes three currents the natural fusion of interests (sympachies) in ethics; the artificial identification of interests in politics; and che mechanical identity of interests in sconomics. We have in fact sen how these three currents relate, Fins of all, we are not confronted with three currents. We should also notice that the mechanics of the economy is no les artificial than the artifice of legislation. Commerce no less than property is an instieution; and it presupposes property. But the economy, we are told, has no need of a legislator of of a state, Undoubveily, this period, at the dawn of the development of capitalism, had not seen ‘¢ had only sometimes dimly foreseen that the interests of land ‘owners, capitalists, and above all workers do not coincide in one and the same interest. We must, however, seek the germ of such an idea, ‘concrete as it may be in other respects, in an idea which appears frequently in Hume's work, Property, according to him, presents a problem of quantity: goods are scarce and they are unstable beease they are rare. This isthe reason why property calls for a legislator and a state. On the contrary, the quantity of money, its abundance ‘oF scarcity, docs not act on its own: money is the abject of a me- chanics. We could say chat the essential, or pethaps the only theme of Hume's economic essays is to show that the effects which we ‘ordinarily atribute to the quantity of money depend in fact on other «causes. What is concrete in this economy isthe idea that economic activity involves a qualitative motivation. But sensitive to the dif- ference between commerce and property, ftom a quantitative point ‘of view, Hume concludes that, in society the quantitative harmony ‘of economic activities is mechanically established, unlike what hap. pens in the ease of property. In view of all this, we can set up the table of general rules or moral categories as follows(CULTURAL WORLD AND GENERAL RULES 1. Content of the general roe: the a= bility of possesion; 2, Specification of the general rules im- mediate postion, occupation, tes 3. Correction of the preceding speci- fication by means of jeneral rules, prom- ise, rane 1. Support of the general tule: loyalty to the gowenment, 2. Specification of suppor: long posses: 3. Correction: 1. Complement of the general rule: the prosperity of com- 2. Specification of the complement: monetary cireula tion, capital, ete 3. Correction: THREE THE POWER OF THE IMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE ‘The fact is that the two are identical. The passions are extended because they are reflected; this is the principle of the institution ofa rule. But at other times Hume says chat we must distinguish between two kinds of non-identical rales, that is between determining and corrective rules, because the former are more extensive than reflective ‘Men ate mightily addicted to gonral rales, and... we often carry oar maxims beyond those reasons, wich fist indue'd tu to catblish them, Where cases are similar in many cir ceumseances, we are apt to put them on the same footing, without considering, that they diff in the most material ‘These rules are characterized by the face that they are extended beyond the circumstances from which they arise. They do not ac- count for the exception, and they misconstmue the accidental, con fusing it with the general or the essential: the disadvantages of cul wre are to be found here. As far as the second kind of rules is the corrective rules, they ate more reflective thanIMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE extensive, precisely because they correct the extension of the deter- mining rules. Instead of confusing the accidental with the general, they present themselves as general rules concerned with the ac dental and with the exceptional. [Gleneral rules commonly extend beyond the principles, on ‘which they are founded; and... we seldom make any ex- ception to them, ulss that exceprion have the qualities of a general rule, and be founded! on very numerous and com= Comecie rales express a sams of experience that accounts for al pou cts nthe ls reste exception iar thing ind by team of habit and raption, boca the object of ‘penence and knowledge Gao) that the object of artic, Se are confronted hete with wo ideas in ned of reconclio exterson and selection are Went, bo they ate ao diferent ‘Tro kinds of rule are datinguahed, co the ten ha they g0 again cach oben noncthele they have the me eign and she thesame principe of consign, Weve tho ed back tothe man Sle: how there poset Pit re bop wit any the ule smtancmly te extension and the ection ofthe pasion, The poss ar ected bt cre and in what? They ate refed inthe inaginaton. The feos ale is uo ested in he iaginaon, Undoubtedly. eels the aon bing principles aa specalchartersieafecing and qualiing the mi Aeoely, ce mind refets ts pes and fection [}verything, which is agreeable tothe sense, ialso in some measure agreeable co the faney and couveys to the thought ain image of that satisfaction, which i gives by its real ap- plication to the bodily organs.” reflects the pasion re found before an enlarged epro- dhution of themscves snd sc themes erated fom the is tnd candions of thts own acraity. They se, heefore acti trill domain opening up that y he Word of eer they eon projet themselesin though mages deploy thems wih IMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE cat limit The selected intrest transcend sown parity. This tens thatthe imagination, filled withthe images othe pasion fd thir objec, auites a et of pasos belonging ti Tn teflon, the pasion imagine thems an the imagination be, Comes pasionat: ther it pull "The real defntion ofa general Toe that fa pasion Of the Imagination. “The imagination alors to the gee views of Thingy In ths enc, we may cng he types of eles. The ale of tate fst We encounter the sae problem heen deren oe how des fecing overcome i ncastancy an becomes aesthetic ndgment? The passions ofthe imagination do not reuieefiieney oftheir objects tor do they regi the Kin of adaption which characteristic of real objec “These pasos ave may by depres ‘flivelinss and suength, which te inferior to bel and cen dent ofthe ral existence oftheir objets Viren rage ll virtue a dscrted bt fertile wi lads to think shout the happiness of posible inhabits. “Sentiments ms ove the heat emake them contol sr pains: Bat they ned ot extend beyond the Imagination, co make them nance ove taste Tus, ese fa feeling of she Imagination, not ofthe heat. fi a rule and what grounds ale in genta the distinction between Feet and the ekerce of poe. Only the imagination can ng this abou, sine eft oth the pasims and tht act see tating them rom hee actuality and tecupenig them nthe mode ef the posible. Aewhei the cence which etsges things and tings under the eatgory of powes or posse A tnndsome man pion for life the objet of an aesthetic Judgment bot only because the vigor nd balance of hi ody ae separated fom chit natural exerci and tha simply imagined ut eben teimag ination sin this ese fcinated by those characteristics Hume de velos this thesis even more preiely inthe ese of topedy. The problem hee tis ow is thatthe spectacle of paso fin themacees dsagrcble nd lek, can come to delight? The more the post knows how to affect, hori, aad make sit ignane, "the more [ve ate dlighted.™ And, a» Hume observes in extn a thesis proposed by Fontenelle isnot enough fo =3y ‘hac passions in agen ae siplyfstous and weakens. Ths is eamamoune to seing only one side af the soltian, the negative nal es inyrtant sd. There eno dierence of degree beereenreality and art; the difference in degree isthe condition of difference in nature, “Ie is thus the fiction of tragedy softens the passion, by an infusion of a new feeling, not merely by weakening or dimin- ishing the sorrow." Te is not enough for the passion to imagine itself; the imagination rust also become passionate at the same time. Tragedy, because it stages an image of passions, provides the spectators’ imagination with passions. Just as the reflected interest transcends its partiality, so reflected passions change its quality: the sadness and bleakness of the represented passions are eliminated in the pleasure of the almost infinite play of the imagination, The work of are has therefore its own particular mode of existence, which is not the mode of a real object nor the mode of an actual passion: the lesser degree of belief isthe condition for another kind of belief. Artifice has its own belief. ‘As for the second type of rule—dhe rule of feedom-we feel that the will, which isa kind of passion, “moves easily every way, and produces an image of itself even on that side, on which it did not settle" Finally, we are faced with the rule of interest and duty “Two objects may be consider'd as plac inthis relation, ax well when one i dhe cause of any of the actions or motions ‘of the other, as when the former isthe cause of the existence of the latter... A master ie such-a-one as by hie stsation, atising either from force or agreement, has a power of di ‘ecting in certain particulars the actions of another, whom swe call servant." ume analyzes with pecion one more example ofthe elton based om duty, tat ste relation which Hinks» wife oa hustand ‘bam objec eal pation a wile cannor give (othe cae wh loves pest evince relay the babar an fever eure hate cre ar hn Rect inte imag ination, his uncertainty cones subimated, takes on social aed Calara content and per asthe eet Fr specially Fe itinerstes»'wor, tothe extent thatthe ithe object of oosle pasion man alay seman chaste, modesty and scent And when a general rule ofthis kind ie once establish, ren ate apt eo extend it hey th principle, fos whi IMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE it first arose, Thus batchelors, however debaucl’'d, cannot chase but be shock'd with any instanceof lewdness or ime pudence in women.” Iki therefore the imagination that makes the reflection of passions possible. The general rule is the resonance of an affection in the mind and the imagination. Rules reflect processes and ideas of prac tice. We must therefore modify our frst scheme, which was still too simple. Farlier we saw that the principles of nature and the qualities ‘of passions had to be studied solely in terms of their effect on the ‘ind. However, ths effect is only the fact that the imagination is affected and fixed; it isa simple effect. But now we see that we must auld a complex effec: the imagination reflects affection, and affection resounds inside the mind. The mind ceases to be fancy, is fixed, and becomes human nature. However, insofar sit reflect the affections which fix it, che mind is stil a fancy on another level and in a new ‘way. The fancy is reestablished in the principles ofits own trans- formation, for at least something within the affections escapes all reflection. That which defines the real exercise of the affections, the actuality of ther limits, and the action by means of which affections fix che mind in specifi Forme is precisely that which cannot, without contradiction, allow itself to be reflected. Imagination, as it reflects ‘on the forms ofits own stability, liberates these forms, and liberates itself from thems; it extends them infinitely. This means that it makes the limit an abject of the fancy, it plays with che limit by presenting the accidental as essential, and separates power from its actual ex erese. This illusion, says Hume, is an illusion of the fancy." The power ofthe imagination is to imagine povrer. In short, the passions ‘do not reflect themselves inthe imagination without the imagination extending the passions. The general rule isthe absolute unity ofthe reflection of the passions in the imagination and the extension of the passions by the imagination. 1 x thi sence that rflection and extension But itis also in this sense that they are ewo, since subsequent corrections are necessary in order to establish a rigor in this new ddomain. This time, the reflection will be a reflection on the previous reflection of, if you will, on the reflected interest. But why ist that, in both cases, the same work “reflection” is used? It is because, in ‘our previous discussion, the extension was already a correction: it transcended the partiality of che natuel passions. But, because it didIMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE not eranscend nature without confusing esence and accident, it called for a new correction of, and within, the new, important order it instituted. In fet, i is not enough to think the artifice only through fancy, frivolity, and illusion, for the artifice is also the serious world ‘of culture. The distinction berween nature and culture is precisely “the dstinetion between simple and complex effets. Hume, through= out his work, shows a constant interest in the problems of animal psychology, pethaps beeause che animal is nature without cure: the principles act upon its mind, but hei only effect is a simple cffect. Not having general rules, being held by the instinet to the actual, lacking any stable fancy and reflective procedures, the animal abso lacks history. Thisis precisely the problem: how to explain tha, in the ease of humanity, culeure and history are constituted in the ‘way that che fancy is reestablished, through the resonance of affec~ tions within the mind. How can we explain this union of the most Jvolous andthe mos serious? ‘We have seen that, insofar asthe passions are reflected, they nec- cesarly reflect themselves within the fancy. But, in fat, they resonate within a fancy which is already seed, affected, and naturalized. Evidently, the fancy isnot seed by the qualities of the passions but rather by those other principles of mature (the modes of 35s0- ciation) which operate on a different level. This isthe reason why the rule determines itself. Only on this condition, the passions are able to trace effectively constant and determined figures in the imag- ination. Hume expressly indicates that “nature provides a remedy the judgrent and undersanding, for what is izegulae and incommmo- dlious inthe afections.""* ‘Already inthe case of aesthetics, the passions reflect themselves through the principles of association, so that these principles provide a detailed account of the rules of composition: “every kind of com position, is nothing but a chain of propositions and reasonings.”"” Similarly, as we have scen, the rules of property, occupation, acces~ sion, and succession are determined through the principles of ‘A person, who as hunted a are othe lst degree of wear iness, wou'd look upon i as an injustice For another 1 rush in before him, and seize his prey. But the same por, advancing to pluck an apple, that hangs within his tal, IMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE thas no teason to complain, iFanother, mote alert, passes hie, and takes posession. What isthe reason for this difference, but ehat immobility, no being natural to the haze, but the fect of indusery, Forms in that case a strong relation wich the hunter, which is wanting in the ochert#™ ‘The entire domain of the right is associationist, We expect that an arbitrator ora judge would apply the association of ideas and decree to which person or entity 2 thing is related inside the mind of an observer in general. "Tis the general opinion of philosophers and civilians, that the sea is incapable of becoming the property of any nati and that because 'is impossible o take postession of i, oF form any such distinct relation with iy as maybe the foun dation of property. Where this reason ceases, property i ‘mediately takes place. Thus the most strenuous advocates for the liberty of the seas universally allow, that fits and bays, ‘naturally belong as an accession to the proprietors of the satrounding continent. These have properly no more bond. ‘or union with the land, than che parc ocean wou'd have, but having an union in the fancy, and being at the same sime inferior, they are of courve regarded as an accession.” In other words, with respect to the determination of the rules of property and with respect to the understanding of history, the imag- ination makes essential use of the principles of association: infact, ies norm isthe easy eanstion.® Ths, the imagination, inthe unity that it forms with the simple effect of the principles of association, has really the ar ofa constitutive imagination: iis quasi-constiutive, But, one should not forgee that, even in this case, i isthe fancy which, in the end, invokes the principles of association: having been, inthe cae of knowledge, sete by the prineiples, it now uss chem to decermine and exphin in detail the world of culture. One then sees the fundamental link between artifice and fancy, of the part phiyed by the most serious and the most frivolous... T suspect, that chese rules are principally fx'd by ehe imagination, or the more Iriwologs properticy of our ehought and conception.” Moree, the ratoning eat makes up the hogival stractare of 3IMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE work is specious and merely plausible; “however disguised by the colouring of the imagination,” it can till be recognized. Behind the determined content of the rules of property and sovereignty, the fancy pokes through; even more clearly, it declares itself in for of the weaknesses ofthese rules or oftheir mutual oppositions." This is why there are trials, or why juridical discussions can be endless. ‘Thus, in the case of occupation, namely in the case of the city and the javelin, "I find the dispute impossible to be decided .. . because the whole question hangs upon the fancy, which in this case is not posses'd of any precise or determinate standard, upon which it can give sentence.” In che lst analysis, the historian is perplesed> His perplexity Kinks up with the skepticism of the philosopher and completes it. This is the reason why the determination of the rule must be coreted; it maust bhecome the abject ofa second reflection, ofa casuistcs and a theory of the accidental. We must fill the gap beeween the principles ofthe understanding and the new domain where the fancy applies them, ‘At any rate, the illusion of the fancy is the reality of culeare. The reality of calture is an illusion from the point of view of the un- derstanding, but it asserts itself within a domain where the under- standing can not, and should not, sek to dissipate illusion. For ex- ample, the necesity ofan action, such a the understanding conceives it, is neither a quality of the action nor a quality of the agent 4 quality of the thinking being which considers it, To the extent that we, the agents in performing the action, can not feel any ne- cessty, we inevitably believe ourselves free." In this sense, the il- Iusion is no less real than the understanding which denounces it; caleute is a false experience, but itis also a true experiment. The understanding has the right to exercise is critique only if we unduly transform the powers of culture into real entities, and only if we sive real existence to general rules. Otherwise, the understanding can do nothing. It allows its principles of association to be borrowed in order for the word of culture to be determined. In this ease, it corrects the extension that these principles assume and composes an entire theory of the exception, although the exception itself forms 2 part of culture ‘The core of the problem is to be found in the relations between the passions and the imagination. The determination of theye telacions IMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE constitutes the true originality of che theory of passions. Indeed, ‘whats che simple relation berween the imagination and the passions ‘hich will permit the latter to develop inside the former a complex cffec? The principles of the passions, like the modes of association, transcend the mind and fx. "Unless nature had given some original qualities co the mind, itcou'd never have any secondary ones; because in that case it wou'd have no foundation for action, nor cou'd ever begin to exert iselé™™ ‘But the qualities ofthe passions do not fx che imagination in the way che modes of association do. The modes of association give the ‘ideas possible reciprocal relations, while the qualities of the passions sive the relations a direction and a sense; they attribute them with a reality, a univocal movement, and hence with a first term, The self, for example, isthe object of pride and humility in virese of a natural and original property which confers a tendency of a dispo- sition upon the imagination, The idea, or rather the impression of the self, fuses the mind.® “If a person be my brother I am his likewise: Bur tho" the relations be reciprocal, they have very different effects on the imagination.” The imagination passes easily from the farthest to the nearest, from my brother to me, but not from me to my brother. And here is another example: “men ate principally concern’d about those objects, which are not much remov'd either in space of time..." Moreover, the tendency of the imagination is to move from the present to the future: “We advance, rather than retard our exist- ence."®> We see how both kinds of affecions—relation and passion — situate themselves vis-a-vis each other: association links ideas in the imagination; the passions give a sense to these relations, and thus ‘they provide che imagination with 2 tendency. I follows, therefore, that the passions need somehow the association of ideas, and con: versely, that the association presupposes the passions. Meas get as- sociated in virtue of a goal, an intention, oF a purpose which only the passions can confer upon human activity.» We associate our ideas because we have passions. There is therefore a rnutial implication Ieeween the passions and the association of idea. “ "Tis observable,’ says Hume, “of these ewo kinds of association,” chat is, of the a5- sociation of ideas in knowledge and the association of impressions i the passions, “that they very much assist and forward each father: Thus the imagination follows the tendency which theIMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE passions give it; the relation tha they suggest, by becoming univocal, has been made real Ie is 2 simple component part, a circumstance of the passions. This is che simple effece of the passions on the imagination. Bue once again, the imagination is that in which the passions, together with their circumstances, reflect themselves through the principles of association. In this manner, they constitute general rules and valorize things which are very distant, beyond the tendency of the imagination. And this is the complex effect: on one hand the possible becomes eeal, but on the other, the real is reflected. ‘Are we not, then, a this point capable of solving the problem of | the self, by giving a sense to Hume's hope? We ate indeed capable of stating whar the idea of subjectivity is. The subject is not a quality but rather the qualification ofa collection of ideas. To say that the ‘imagination is acted by principles amounts to saying that a given collection is qualified as partial, actual subjece. The idea of sub- {ectviey is from then on the reflection of the affection in the imag- ‘nation andthe general rule tel. The idea is no longer here the object of a chought or the quality of a ching; itis not representational. It isa governing principle, a schema, arale of construction. Transcend= ing the partiality ofthe subject whose idea it is, the idea of subjec tivity includes within each collection under consideration the prin- ciple and the rule of a possible agreement between subjects. Thus, the problem of the self, insoluble a the level ofthe understanding, finds, uniquely within culture, a moral and political solution. We saw that origin and affection could not be combined within the self because, a this level, there subsists a great difference between prin= ciples and the fancy. That which constitutes now the self is the synthesis of the affection and its reflection, the synthesis of an af- fection which fixes the imagination and of an imagination which rellecs the affection Practical reason is the establishment of a whole of culture and mo- ray, That this whole ean be presented in detail does not contradict this statement, because itis a detail of general determinations and not of pars. How can this whole be established? The scematizing ‘imagination makes it posible, to the extent that the schematism man. ifests and translates three properties of the imagination: imagin is reflective, essentially excessive, and quasi-constitutive. Bu, 2¢ the ‘other end, theoretical reason is the determination of the detail of nature, that is, of parts submited to caleation, IMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE How ihe deerminaton posible Sry tise posible the wo) he eaten a the wd fel a moo ne ce that he em ofthe unfestanding nd te tn “nou doe epee pal acs of te mind Toe fecha mr ct ih speeches Schema in hi ese woul longer te pm fon: srvston of le blast pinple of te dteraton Spare The oleate pina fsa oe he ag se ot acon, le th stn as neo Bee each oder eel rn oer cones eso Tes tty nan “pert cel sn cmon ed inks sowe on magn ce as tee nse i shetty oh singe ele of scien, gene sae sce an ates Bathe siete ae nf on thee hinds af ean. ne ofthe laos res tea, we must dig vere he ha "pen! etc the es whch ne Sompae topes, ons thanty dogs of guy ene) ade etn of jc, Sah Upon way chong inthe es” ons, Steel pce ous)" Sys we se de fu brent Mnf sn: th exon th: pred nthe Eee etn nto and demmsetn nd te ak pvc ne a ite (epee esn, nod es leche. hese two kaso reson mel Oo (ewes eon now of eo Kin of sons sn mi Secon ompron I wool scam to flo ts she ein ty pect Gee a bean ia iShwin teacher die the th thy ema sins Fo Simple nee he town tar city mr the oto Ley ar knoe, the qin remain whctic ee the ‘Siumeatag hse sets pede eo whens o ‘Sosy deed fom pain’ The anor sn uc Gon weld lb mp, bre gone Bh spr hi tow nga la wre cme tno unevand he en Pec tc tw dimension of “Tapani ome cl elation derived san fe tara lal oan, He hn nate sm by ef oa ae {einai lame eso hy ps expen Fein otcssuh antec any mean vy me spe hein man tte ksIMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE the detour of the observation of nature, or of an experience of na- ture—and this is the essential “As the habit, which produces the association, arses from the frequent conjunction of objects, it must arrive at its perfection by degrees, and must aequite new force from ‘each instance, that fills under ou observation."** ‘We can see clearly at thie point why causality canaot be derived from probability” Actually, we must designate every determined degree of habit a6 a probability, without forgetting that probability presupposes habit asa principle. This presupposition is based on the face that each degree of habit is, in relation co an object, the mere presumption of the existence of another objec, like the one which huabitully accompanies the first object” The paradox of habit is that itis formed by degrees and also that itis a principle of human nature: “habit ie nothing but one of the principles of nacue, and derives al its force from that origin.”"" ‘The principle is the habit of contracting habits. A gradual for- ration, to be specific, is a principle, as long as we consider it in a general way. In Hume's empiricism, genesis is always understood in terms of principles, and iself asa principle. To derive causality fom probability isto confuse the gradual formation of a principle upon which reason depends with the progress of reasoning. In fact, ex- perimental reason is the resule of habit—and not vice versa. Habit is the root of reason, and indeed the principle from which reason stems san effect.” In its other ure, however, that is, in the domain of the relations of ideas, reason is determined immediately by the corresponding principles, without a gradual formation and under the sole influence ‘of human nature. The famous texts on mathematics have precisely this provenance. Similarly, the definition of the relations of ideas, “sin the casein which the relations depend enticely on ideas that we compare to one another,” does not mean that association is here, more than elsewhere, a quality ofthe ideas themselves, nor that mathematics is a system of analytic jadgments, Whether as relations of ideas or as relations of objects, relations are always external to their terms. What Hume means is this: principles of human nature produce in the mind relations of ideas as they act “on their own" om ideas, This is different from what happens in the case of the three relations between objects, where the very observation of ature act a pit ciple. To the logic of mathematic, which we shall discuss Later ox, IMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE there mus therefore be justaposed a logic of physics or of existence, and only general rules will bring about the later effectively. From the point of view of relations only physics i the object ofa schematismn.* To say that a principle of nature—in this case, babit—is formed ‘gradually isto say, in the frst place, chat experience is itself a prin- ciple of nature Experience is a principle, which instructs me in the several ‘conjunctions of object forthe past. Habit i anather principe, Which determines me to expect the same for the future; and both of them conspir[e] to operate upon the imagination. ‘We must also note that habit is a principle diferent from experience, although it also presupposes it. As a matter of fact, the habit I adopt ‘wll never by itself explain the fac that Uadopta habit; a repetition «will never by itself form a progression, Experience causes us to ob- serve particular conjunctions. Its essence isthe repetition of similar cases Its effect is causality asa philosophical relation. This is how {magination turns into understanding. However, this does not yet explain how the understanding is able to make an inference or to reson about causes and effects, The real content of causality—rege istered by the term “always"—cannot be constituted in experience, because, ina sense, it constitutes experience.» One instance of re soning does noe render reasoning possible; nor is reasoning imme- ately given in the understanding, The understanding mast, from 2 principle other than experience, derive the faculty’ of drawing conclusions from experience, and also of transcending experience and making inferences. Repetition by itelf dacs not constitute pro- session, nor does it form anything. The repetition of similar cases does not move us forward, since the only difference between the second case and the first is that the second comes after the frst, ‘without displaying a new idea.*” Habit is not the mechanics of quan tity. “Had ideas no more union in the fancy than objects seem to have to the understanding, we cou'd never draw any inference from causes to effects, nor repove belief im any matter of fact." This isthe reason why habit appears 2s another principle, and causality as a natural relation or as an association of ideas.” ‘The cilfoer of this other principle is to turn imagination inco beliefsIMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE thanks to the transition made from the impression of an object to the idea of another. Thus, a double implication is sketched out. On ‘one hand, habit allows the understanding to reason abour experience, as it transforms belief into a possible act of the understanding. “...[Mlemory, senses, and understanding,” says Hume, “are, there- fore, all of them founded on the imagination or the vivacity of our ideas” On the other hand, habit presupposes experience: once cheit ‘conjunction is discovered, objects are linked together in the imagi- nation. We could even say that habit is experience, insofar 38 it ‘produces the idea of an object by means of the imagination and not bby means ofthe understanding. Repetition becomes a progression, ‘of even a production, when we no longer see it in relation to the ‘objects repeated, because, if we do it changes, discovers and produces nothing. It becomes a production as soon 36 we see it from the point of view of the mind which contemplates it, for it produces a new impression init, “a determination to carry our thoughts from one object to another" and “to transfer the past to the furore," that js, an anticipation or a tendency. The fat is that experience and hab are two different principle; they stand alternatively for the presentation of cass of constant conjunction to the inspecting mind, and for the union of these cases inside the mind which observes them, Because of this, Hume always gives causality two related def ‘nitions: causality is che union of similae objects and also a mental inference from one object to another ‘An analogy seems to be imposed beeween artifice (moral world) and habit (world of knowledge). These ewo instances, inside cheit corresponding worlds, are at the origin of general rules which are both extensive and corrective. But they do not function in the same ‘way. In the system of morality, the rules ate invited to reflect in ‘general the principles of nature inthe imagination. But, in the system ‘of knowledge, the condition of these rules is located in the very particular character of a principle, nt only insofar as it presupposes ‘experience (or something equivalent to experience) but also insofar asi must be formed. Yet we would say that naturally eis formation has its own laws which define the legitimate exercise of a reasoning, understanding. We have seen that the formation of a principle was, the principle of a formation. Belief, says Hume, is the effect of the principles ofa pradent nature. The idea we beliew is by definition, the idea associated with a present impression, the ides thercfore that IMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE fixes the imagination, oF the idea to which the impression com- runiates its vividness, This communication is undoubtedly forced through resemblance and contiguity.” but ie finds is aw essentially in causality and habit, Inthe final analysis ie Sind its aw in the repetition of eases of constant conjunction of two objcts, ‘observed through experience. However, this is precsely where the Aliiculey es. Habit tel is principle diferent fom experienc the unity” af experince and habit nat given ‘By itself, habit can feign oF invoke a false experience, and bring about belief through “a repetition” which “isnot deriv from ex perience." This willbe am ileitimate belie, ation of the image ination “The custom of imagining a dependence has the same cece as the custom of observing it wou'd have." Thus, che imagination ‘ill noe allow itself to be fixed by ehe principle of habit, without ar the same time using habit for the purpose of passing ofits ven fancies, transcending its fixity and going beyond experience “= [Fh habit not only approaches in its influence, but even on ‘many occasions prevails over that which arises from the constant and inseparable wniom of causes and effects” ‘Beliefs produced in cis manner, albeit legitimate from the point of view of a rigorous exercise of the understnding, no matter how ineviable chat may be, form the set of general, extensive, and ex- cessive rules that Fume calls nonphlphial probity. "An Iish- rman cannot be witty, a Frenchman cannot have solidity.” Hence, despite first appearance, the understanding cannot count upon na: tute for the immediate determination ofthe laws ofits legitimate exercise. These laws ean only be the product of conection ad r= flection; the second series of general rules will tem from them. Only ‘when the understanding, through a new operation, resumes the act Of belief and holds i ogether with its principle within the limits of past experience will the legitimate conditions of belief be ree- ‘ognized and applied: only then will they form the rules of phil sophia! probably or the calculus of probabilities. (In this sense, the “emtensive rules ofthe passions, in the moral worl, must be corected sssoon a5 dey have been determined bythe principles of association ‘They must he corected not only becase, a8 happens, there prin- ciples have heen ivolved and activated by the fancy on 3 level which was ot their owns they must be comrected because causality has alvwaly by ise al on eon Teel, a ancl, extensive use. TheIMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE understanding is able to correct the extensive rules of the passions and to question itself on the nature of morality because it mus rst of all correct the extension of knowledge ieelf) legitimate beliefs or repetitions which are not based on expe- rience, 5 well 35 nonphilosophical probabilities, have two sources: Tanguage and the fancy. These are fcuiious causaitis. Language, by itself, produces belief, as it substitutes observed repetition with spo- ken repetition, and the impression ofa present object with the hear- ing of a specific word which allows us eo conceive ideas vividly *{W]e have a remarkable propensity to believe whatever is reported, even concerning apparitions, enchantments, and prodigies, however contrary to daily experience and observation.””* ‘The philosopher, having spoken continuously of faculties and cocult qualities, ends up believing that these words “have a secret rmeaning, which we might discover by reflection."”* The liar, having continuously repeated his own lies, ends up believing ehem.”» Not ‘only is credulity thus explained by the power of words, but also education,” eloquence, and poetry.” We hive been so mach accusom'd to the names of sans, sunrran, vans, dat inthe same manner as education infixes any opinion, the constant repetition of these ideas makes ‘them enter into the mind with failiy, and prevail upon the fancy... The several incidents of the piece acquire a kind of elation by being wnited into one poem or representation; and the vivaity produc'd by the fancy is im many cases treater than that which arses from custom and experience.” In brief, words produce a “phantom of belief" ot a “counter- feit," which renders the most svere critique of language philo- sophically necessary. Moreover, the fancy makes us confuse the ex sential and the accidental. In face, the counterfeit character of beliefs depends always on an accidental characteristic: it depends not on the relations bervcen objects but on “the present cemper and disposition of the person.” The fancy interprets the appearance of merely ac- cidental circumstances accompanying an abject as the repetition of this object within experience.” Thus, for example, in the case of ‘man suffering from vertigo, “the circumstances of slepth descent strike so strongly upon him, that cher influence cannot be destroy’ IMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE by the contrary ccumstances of sopporeand solr, which oughe «give him a perfec secrsy This nth eld ofthe understanding andin tefl of moray, the imagination x csentalyexeeding. However, we cam se the Giference When knowledge exceeded we to longer find the postive of at we fin only the negatvy of er and es. This the reson why coreton will mo lnget be the isttution of alee rigor, bt rather the dentncaon of cro withthe help of s cael of quanti. in the work of Knowledge and n the Cat ofthe undetanng extensive ules ate wo longer te obvene Os reflection of the prin ples in te imaginaton they only asa the impombiliey of preventive reflecon bearing on the penne “When we have ben accom osc one object ied to another, ob imagination pans fom the fst to the secon BY 2 tata ansiony wich pecees reflection, and Which cannot be prevented by t= “The imaginations bet eee only by faiffng bei nthe confusion of the aciental and che gence Habit & 2 principe which cannot imoke experience without fbifing i or witout, the sme tne, inoking Stow reetons, Hence, she nese) ofan skeroreflecdon mbich con only present isl a comecton, ‘aration, second Kind of les, ra eteron fora quand Siwinction berwcenthe general andthe accldenel [ese rls sz form'd onthe nature of ur undesanding, nd on our experience of i operations in the judgments we form concerning objets “The bjet of plowphiea proablisy or ofthe cael of pok- abilities io msinein belt within the limi ofthe understanding nd to care conformity between hai and experience, Habit and Caperence are the ments by which Bion and peje ate dis Spud in other word seating inorder co be sboltely legit mate, must be born of habit "no diy but in an lige tmanaer™' Undoubtedly, che characteris of bles neon, and reoning is o tance expeicnce and to taser the pst othe fare; bee ecsary hath objet of belie be deermined imacordance with a at experience; Beperence pte ext pats cbjecs ae separated nthe understanding, [When we fet the pas tothe fiture, the Keown tothe uaknowny every Pst periment ha these weigh, and "sony a superior number OF then which can thw the blac om any seIMAGINATION IN ETHICS AND KNOWLEDGE We must determine the numer of pat experiences, and als the opposien between prs and ther quantitative arecmet. To be Tene is an ac ofthe imagination, inthe sens tha he concordant images presented by the tndertanding or the concordant pat of three round themes pon one an the sae ean he imag ‘ination. This idea must still find its content and also the measure of ivvividoes nthe greatest amber of sina parts offered eprtly by the undead The meen of crtgu of rls by rules therefore confirmed. “The ely He ha both Kinds of le extensive and comrecie, _ponphilsopieal and philosophical probability nar they “ace ina manner sein opposition vo cach other" ae the effec f ne td the same principe: hai. ‘They hae the same origin. "The flowing of general ride ea very unphilsopicl specie of prob- abl and yeti only by fellowtng them that we an cone hi Indl other unpilosophia prosblis™ However, bene abit a, inl nd by el, confined the repeiton of ees bscred within experience since oer rep Sotto can form i eualy well the aeqaton Ferme habe a Cxpevience sa scene eal hat mas be oad, ad he objet of ask that must be accomplished. This eae complied vo the extent thatthe act of elie beat exclave pon an objec being determined im accordance with the nate ofthe andere ing, and in acordance with repetitions cheered in expeence™ “Tis devernnation contotesthe sense of conctve ales the ster Treognze casi in the deta of nate, thy allow w 0 know then objcs “become causes or effects and they denounce, a Consequence ilegimae beliefs In rc abi has opponte eect ‘pon the imagination and on the great on one ha, extension, fondo the ote the conection of this extension = FOUR GOD AND THE WORLD Ir we wane to look for an example which would bring together all the signfications that we have successively attributed co general ules, ‘we would find it in religion. Four kinds of rule must be distinguished: ‘extensive and corrective rules of passions, and extensive and correc- tive rules of knowledge. Now, religion participates equally in knovwl- cedge and in passion, In fact, religious feeling has two poles: po- Iytheism and theism, The two corresponding sources ace the qualities of the passions and the modes of association, respoctively." Theism has its source in the unity ofthe spectacle of nature, in other words, in the sort of unity which only resemblance and causality can guar antee in phenomena. Polytheism has its source in the diversity of the passions and the irreducibility of sucessive passions Furthermore, religion, in each of these cases, i presented a5 a system of extensive rules. Although the religious feeling finds its source in the passions, itis not itself passion, Ie is not an instinct, says Hume, nora primitive impression of nature, Unlike self-esteem or sexuality, ic is not nacurally determined; rather itis a subject of historical stndy.? The gods of polytheism are the echo, the extension, and the reflection ofthe passions, and their heaven is our imagination csnly Tn this sense, we tet once more the characteristic of the extensive rule: religious feeling confuses the accidental with theGOD AND THE WORLD ‘essential. Hs origin is in dhe events of human life, in the diversity and the contradiction we find in it, andin the alternation of happiness and unhappiness, of hopes and fears.* The religious feeling i swak- ‘ened inthe strange encounters which we make in the sensible world, and in the exceptional and fantastic circumstances or the unknown, phenomena which we (mis)ake for esence, precisely because they ae unknown.* This confusion defines superstiion and idolatry. “Bar~ bariy, caprce;ehese qualities, however nominally disguised, we may universally observe, form the rling character ofthe deity in popular religions.” olaters are people of “artificial lives," the ones who make an essence out of the extraordinary, the ones who look for “an im- aediate service of the Supreme Being.” They are the mystics, the fanatics, and che superstitious. Such souls chrow themselves volun tarily ino criminal sdventres, because chet common denominator is that moral ats are not enough for them. Morality is joyless~after all, morality is noe piceuresque; prestige belongs to vice: “Men are ven afraid of passing for good-natu'd les that should be taken for want of understanding: And often boast of more debauches than they have been really engag’d in...” ‘But on che other hand, at the other pole, theism i also a system of extensive rules. This time, though, the extension under consid- eration isan affair of knowledge. Religion is in cis sense again, a Kind of overstride of the imagination, «fiction, and a simulacrum of, belief. Ie invokes a spoken repetition and an oral or written tradition. ‘The priess speak and the miracles rest on human testimony:* how- ver, the miracles do not immediately manifesta realty, bu claim for themselves the fitness that, generally, we are accustomed 10 fi beeween testimony and realty. Or again, in the proofs for the © ‘stence of God that are based on analogy beeween machines and the ‘world, religion confuses che gencral and the accidenal. It does noe see that the world has but an extremely distant resemblance to ma~ chines, and chat it resembles them only in terms of the most acci~ dental circumstances? Why take human technical activity as the base for the analogy, rather than another mode of operat ‘more and no less partial—such as, for example, generation oF veg ‘tation? Finally, in the proof based on causality religion transcends the limits of experience. Ie aspires to prove Goad by His elec, that is, the world oF natute. But then sometimes, as in the eae ob GOD AND THE WORLD Cleanthes," religion blows the effect out of all proportion, totally denying disorder or che presence and intensity of evil, by constituting God as an adequate cause ofa world which itarbitrarily embellshes, ‘Ac other times, a6 in the case of Demea,? religion accords more with the cause and establishes a disproportionate God. In the end, it redescends to earth and remedies the lack of adequation by in voking unknown effess, the most important of which is farure life. Ie is evident that religion misuses the principle of causality. In fact, thee ino wage of culty in religion shat at egitim ad It's only when two spies of objects ate found to be con- stantly conjoined, that we can infer ehe one from the other, and were an effect presented, which was entcely singular, and could not be comprehended under any known sais, 1 do not see, that we could form any conjecture or inference stall concerning its cause.” In other words, chore are no physical objects or objects of repetition except in the world, The world as such is essentially the Unique. I isa fiction ofthe imagination—never an object of the understand ing. Cosmologies are always fanciful. Thus, in Hume's text, in & manner that differs from Kant's, the theory of causality has two stories to tel: the determination of the conditions of a legitimate ‘exetcise in relation to experience, and the critique of illegitimate ‘exercise outside experience Religion, then, is 2 dual system of extensive rules, But hovr could itbe comrected? We understand easily cha its situation, in knowledge and culture, is very particular. Undoubtedly, the correction exists ‘The miracle is subordinated to the world of knowledge: the evidence drawn from testimony, to the extent that it claims to belong to ‘experience, becomes a probability entering calculations. It becomes ‘one of the two terms of an abstraction, whereas the other stands for contrary evidence."*In culeure ori the moral world, corrective rales, instead of confounding the exception, recognize it and include it, creating thereby a theory of experience wherein all posible cases find a rule of intelligibility and get eo be ordered winder a statute of the unlerstanding. In one of his essays, Hume analyzes an example of this theory of the exception: suicide is nota sransgresion of ourGOD AND THE WORLD duis toward God, nor of our duties toward society, Suicide is within Ihuman powers, anno mare impious an ac han “to bul hous itis a power which should be ted in exceptional cicumstances” “The eeepion therefore comesan objet of mature. "Do you ima ine dat Irepin at Providence, or cute my creation, because 1 go out of if, and puta period to's bing which, were ito contin, ‘would render me miserable?" But the gucston tow isthe lowing ae elgion is comrected, hat is eally lef of #2 In both cates, conection seoms to be atta Critique: ido not allow anything subi Nothing is le ofthe mirc dsppears nan abstraction witht proportion, The fig tre of che xcesion which we have prev stdied jie government, cominere, art, mores, even feedom~had psitvty Stic ows, confemed and enforced as they wer by the come ons they formed the word of clare, On che oer han, Hume seems o excl rcligon from care, and all that goes With When, in religion, words coerate an objet, while in the social and legal spheres promising words change the nature of ation el ative to some other objects the sensei ot the same” Philosephy “is teaching completion here ina praccl bul again superstition. ‘Athe other pole, the corrective roles which make true knowledge ply ingereanforicae do maw Expeling fom the domain they define every Sto sage of en ality and they bogin rth religion In be, seme tht in the domain ofthe extension, tligion keeps only frivolity and loses ll seriounes, We understand why. Religion indeed the extension of passion and their eflection in the imagination. Buti religion, the pasions ae nor teeta in an imagination ata seed by the principles of sociation in away that would make seriousness posable. On the contrary, there religion oaly when these prin {ips ar reflected in pare imagination and mere ancy. Why tha? Because eligion, by tl atin is her apts, sony she fail sage of the prtcples of sociation, resemblance, and cast Te nothing therfore left of religion? If this were the case, how could we expla the Bna eer ofthe esa "On the Immoteny of the Sout” and "The Esay on Mites? To believe in mile fea fae belie but i i abo a eve miracle ‘And whoever is moved by Faith to assent tit, consvions ‘of 2 continued miracle in his wn persen, abil avert GOD AND THE WORLD all the principles of his understanding, and gives hima de termination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience.” ‘The irony of Hume and his necessary precautions may be invoked at this point, But even if i is correct €0 do 30, i¢ will not explain the properly philosophical content of the Dialogues. In fact, religion is justied, but only in its very special situation, outside cultare and ctside true knowledge. We have seen that philosophy has nothing ‘o:ay on what causes the principles and on the origin oftheir power. ‘There itis the place of God. We cannot make use ofthe principles cof association in order to know the world as an effect of divine activity, and even less to know God as the cause of the world; but ‘ve can always think of God negatively, asthe cause of the principles. Tis in this sense that theism is valid, and it is in this sense chat purpose is reintroduced. Purpose will be thoughe, albeit pot known, agreement between the principles of hurgan nature and nature kind of pre-established harmony between the course ‘of nature and the association of our ideas." Purpose gives us therfore in postulate, the originary (riinell) unity of origin and qualification. The idea of God, as originary agreement, isthe chought of something in general; 3s For knowledge, it can only find content in self-mutilation, after being identified with a certain rode of appearance that experience manifests, or after being det ‘ined by micans of an analogy which will necessarily be partial. “In this litte corner ofthe world alone, there are four principles, reson, instinct, generation, vegetation,” and each one of them can furnish tus with a coherent discourse on the origin of che world. But ifthe ‘origin as suck is thought bue not known, if it i all these things at the same time—matter and life as much 35 spirt—it is bound to be indifferent to every opposition; it is beyond good and evil" Fach ‘ne ofthe perspectives we have of it has only one function—to make tus transcend the other perspectives which are equally possible, and to remind us that we are always confronted with partial analogies. In cortain respects, purposiveness is more an dan vital, and less the pojoct or the design of an infinite intelligence? One could object hhore thatall order arises from a design bur that would be to suppose salve to reduce all porposiveness to an intention, ne mids opsrand among, others. Ine aja Fran the belly a8 well 36 the problen eo for iy an that asian is bt ly system mayGoD AND THE WORLD fiom the brain[Z]." In this new sate of affairs, what does the Idea ‘of the World become? Is it sill simple Fiction of the fancy? We have aiready cen two fictitious uses of the principle of causality. ‘The first was defined by repetitions which do not proceed from. sexperience: the second, by a. particular object—the world—which cannot be repeated, and which is not, properly speaking, an object. Now, according to Hume, there isso a third, ftitious or excessive «causality. It is manifested in the belief in the distinct and continuous existence of bodies. On one hand, we attribute a continous existence to objects, in virtue of a type of causal reasoning which has as its round the coherence of certain impressions Despite the discon- ‘nuiy of my perceptions, Iadmit “the cont'd existence of abject inorder to connect their past and present appearances, and give them such an union with each other, as I have found by experience to be suitable to thei particular natures and cireumstances."™ This is then the resolution of the contradiction that would arise beeween the conjunction of two objects in atual experince and the appearance of one of them only in my perception, without the ap- pearance of its counterpart." But this resolution is based ot! a mere fition of the imagination: the «is fictitious and the causal reasoning, extensive, Ie ranscends the principles that determine the conditions ofits legitimate exercise in general and maintain it within the bounds of the understanding. In fat, I confer tothe objece more coherence and regularity than what [find in my perception. But as all reasoning concerning matters of fact arses only fom custom, and custom can only be the effect of repeated perceptions, the extending of castom and reasoning beyond the perceptions can never be the direct and natural effec of the constant repetition and conexion.* On the other hand, distinct existence rexes on an equally false wse ‘of causality, that is, on a fcritious and contradictory causality. We affirm a causal relation between the object and our perception of it, but never do we seize the object independently of the perception that we have of it. We forget that causality is legitimized only when past experience reveals to us the conjunction of ty entities” bn short, continuity and distinctness are outright fit and esis GOD AND THE WORLD ‘of che imagination, since they revolve around, and designate hat “which, by definition, is noe offered to any possible experience, ether through the senses or through the understanding, Te seems that all of this transforms ehe belief in continuous and distince existence into a specific case of the extensive rule. At First glance, the texts which are about che constitution of this belief and the texts which are about the formation of rules seem to parallel cach other, The imagination always makes use of the principles which fix it, that is, of contiguity, resemblance, and causality, in order to transcend its limits, and to extend these principles beyond the conditions of their exercise.® Thus, the coherence of changes causes the imagination to feign yet more coherence, as i€ comes to admit continaous existence.” This constancy and resemblance of appearances cause the imagination to attribute to similar appearances the identity of an invariable object. In this way, the imagination feigns once again continuous existence in order to overcome the ‘opposition between the identity of resembling perceptions and the discontinuity of appearances. The fact is, though, that this paral- Telises between belie and rule is only apparent. The two problems, although they are very different, complement each other. Contrary to extensive rules, the fiction of continuity is not corrigible, ir cannot and should not be corrected. It maintains, therefore, different rela- tions with reflection. Moreoser, 3s far as che imagination is con- come, is origin is very different from that of general rules. ‘We begin with the second point. Extensive rules can be distin- gushed from the belie in the existence of bodies by means of two characteristics, Ftst ofall, the abject ofthe extensive rules of knovl- ‘edge ie a particular determination to which the imagination confers the value of a law. It does so by borrowing, from the principles “which fix it, the power to go beyond principles; and it succeeds in thisby invoking an alleged experience of, in cher words, by offering the understanding a mere item of fancy, a8 though it were an object, which concerned it. Imagination offers the understanding 3s a gen ‘ral, elaborate experienc, the purely accidental content of an ex- perience thae only the senses have registered in chance encounters. On the other hand, the imagination does not present to the under- inct existence as an object of possible ‘experience; tor docs the unetstanding denounce the use of it by ject of a false experience. Undoubtedly,GoD AND THE WORLD there so experience of coninses existence citer through the serus or through che undertanding, becuse coutinsous existence is ota particular object: ti the chute ofthe Woe in gear fb or an bjeat became its the horizon which every Sec presupposes (OF cure we hae ated sen this inthe ease of religious belie But being more than an extensive ral, eligious Teli appears now a somthing compos, made op of rales and the bliin the cxstence of bodice pariipats inthe rules to the extent tha teat the wold aa patel objec nd invokes an experience of the senses and ofthe wndertanding} Stoo onthe bass of th belicfin the existence of bodies, fon secs «princi of human nae. The mos imporcane point sto 5 found here The ene sense of the prncpe of human nate iso transform the maliplcy of Idess which conse the mind into astm that ia stem of knowledge and of is objects But fora sytem fo crs it not coough to have eas sochted inthe tmnt alo necewary that petepions be regarded a separate ffom the mind, and that inpresdons be In some mannet fora Eom the semen We must give the eject ofthe idea an enisteace which docs nt depend on te senses. The objet of nowledge mas taly be objec To that end, the principe of asciaton do ne suf, to more than the vividness of imprestions or 2 mete bl does ‘The system i complete when “sscoming ingerapion” of an 2p pearance othe senses i surpassed “by [hel feigning [a] a conta Tring which may ll hose ner, nd preserve a psfectand entre identi to our perepions™ in other wow, he system i competed in the identity between system and world: Bus ae we hae seen the system i the prod of che prints of nature, wher the world (continity and di- Sinctog) a outight fin of the inagnation Hetion becomes pritiple aecrarlyta the exe of gencal rls, ction ders i ign and its force fom the imagination insofar a the later makes the of principles which fx tan allow ie therfore to go farther Inehe eat ofthe bei in contin, thefrce of tion i the force ofa principle With the Wl the mention bas ral ome con tive ad ceive. The Woeld isa des. Undoxbeely,Hne always present coatimity as an exceve efecr af eausiy see mianee, contiguity, anda the product of ther lleiinate extensive Bat in ft, courguty, rcembance and ausity wi, prey GOD AND THE WORLD speaking, intervene as principles; they are the characteristics of cer- tain impressions—precisely those impressions which will be lifted from the senses in order to constitute the world.” What is treated aa principle isthe belief in the existence of bodies, along, with the ground on which ths belief depends.» The belief in the existence of bodies includes several moments: fest it includes the principle of identity, a a product of the fiction bby means of which the idea of time is applied to an invariable and continuous object; then, it includes the confusion by means of which an eatleridentiy is atcibuted to similar impressions; this confusion is due to the eaty transition (itself an effect of resemblance) that resembles the effect ereated by the consideration af the identical object; then one more fiction is includedthar of continuous exist- ‘ence—which serves to overcome the contradiction berween the dis- continuity of impressions and the identity we attribute to them.” ‘And this is not all. Ie may indeed seem bizarre that Hume, in the space of a few pages, first prevents as satisfactory the conciliation brought about by the fiction of a continuous existence* and then again 2s fake and as dragging along, wich it other fctions and other conciliations.” The reason is that continuous existence is very easily reconciled with the discontinuity of appearances. It can therefore legitimately ti together discontinuous images and the perfect iden- tity which we atebute to them, It is a fact that the attribution of identity is false, that our perceptions are really interrupted, and that the affirmation of a continuous existence hides an illegitimate usage ‘of the principles of human natute. To make things worse, this asage 4s iuelf@ principle, The opposition then is at its imneemoxe state in the center of the imagination. The difference [beeween] imagination and reason has become a contradiction. ‘The imagination res us, that our resembling perceptions have a continu'd and uninterrupted existence, and are not annihilated by their abence, Reflection ell us, that even fur eesembling perceptions are interrupted in thet existence, son diferent trom each other This contradiction, says Hume, is established between extension and flection, imagination and reason, the senses and the under- sanding" lw fat, this way of pheasing the issue is not the bes,GOD AND THE WORLD apply to general rules as well, Elewhere, Hume says it ly: the contradiction is established between the principle of the imagination and the principles of reason. In the preceding chap- fers, we have constantly shown the opposition beeween reason and Jmagination, or beeween human nature and the Fancy. We have seen successively how the principles of human nature fx the imagination; how the imagination resumes its operation beyond thie fixation; and lastly how reason comes to correct this resumption. But the problem ‘now is chat the opposition has really become a contradiction: atthe last moment, the imagination is recuperated on a precise point. But this lat moment is also the firs time. For the frst time, the imag ination is opposed, as a princpl, that is, as a principle of the world, to the principles which fix it and co the operations which correct it, To the extent chat fiction, along with the World, count among the principles, the principles of association encounter fiction, and are ‘opposed to it, without being able to eliminate it. The mose internal ‘opposition is now established berween constituted and consicutive ‘imagination, beeween the principles of association and the fiction srhich hae become a principle of nature. iis precisely because fiction or extension has become a principle, that it ean no longer be included, corrected, and even less eliminated through reflection. We need a new relation between extension and reflection. Thisis no longer the relation offered by the poplar system ‘which affirms continuous existence, but rather the relation offered by the philosophical system which affirms distinct and independent ‘existences: objects ae distinct from perceptions, prceptions are dis- continuous and perishable, objects are “uninterrupted, and ... pre= serve a continu'd existence and identity." “This hypothesis . pleases our reason, in allowing, that our dependent perceptions are interrupted and diferent; and a¢ the same time is agreeable to the imagination, in attributing 2 continu'd existence to something else, which we ell objets." But this aesthetic game of the imagination and reason is not 2 reconciliation; i is rather the persistence of a contradiction, whose terms we alternately embrace." Moreover, it ushers in its own ficulties, involving, as we have scen, a new and illegitimate us ‘ausalty-? The philosophical system is not initially recommended to reason of to the imagination. It is “the monstros offspring of tro principles ... which are both at ouce cmbrac'Ml by the anid GOD AND THE WORLD and which are unable mutually to destroy each other." This system, is a delirium. When fiction becomes principle, reflection goes on reflecting, but it ean no longer corect. Is thus thrown into delirious compromises From the point of view of philosophy, the mind is no longer anything but deltium and madness, There is wo complete system, synthesis, or cosmology that is noe imaginary.” With ehe belief in the existence of bodies, fiction itself as a principle is opposed to the principles of association: che later ate principally instead of being subsepuenly excessive, 26 ic isthe case with general rules. Fantasy teiumphs. To oppose its own nature and to allow its fancies to be deployed has become the nature of the mind. Here, the most insane is sill naural® The system isa mad delirium, Hume shows in the hypothesis of an independent existence the frst step toward this delirium, Subsequently, he studies the manner in which independent txistence is formed in ancient and modern philosophy. Ancient phi- losophy forges the delirium of substances, substantial forms, aci- dents, and occu qualties*"—“specters in the dark." But the new philosophy has also its ghost. It ehinks that it ean recuperate reason by disinguishing primary from secondary qualities, bu in ehe end iti no less mad than the other But if the mind is manifested as, a dei, ics because i is fist ofall, and essentially, madnes.* As soon as extension becomes a principle, i follows its own way, and reflection follows another way: two principles which cannot destroy each other are opposed, “... [NJor is it posible for us to reason justly and regulaly from causes and effects, and atthe same time believe the contin’ existence of matter. How then shall we adjust those principles together? Which of them shall we prefer?" The ‘worstis that these two principles are mutually implicated, since belie in the existence of bodies essentially encompasses causality. But, on the other hand, the principles of association, insoaras chey constitute the given asa system, generate the presentation of the given in the guise of a world. 1 follows thatthe choice isto be made not between fone of the other of the (wo principles but rather between all oF nothing, between dhe contradiction or nothingness. “We have, therefore, tno choice left bur berwixt a false reason and tone at all And this isthe sate of madness. That is why, then, it would be vain to hope that we could separate within the mind its reason from its delirium, its permanent, iresstibie, and universal principles, from is variable,GOD AND THE WORLD fanciful, and irregular principles®” Modern philosophy hopes, and there lies its error. We do not have the means of choosing the un- derstanding ever the suggestions ofthe imagination. *.. [T]he un- derstanding, when it aces alone, according to its most general pri ciples, enttely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowese degree of evidence in any proposition ether in philosophy or common life. ‘The function of the understanding to reflect on something is ex- clusively corrective; functioning alone, the understanding can do ‘only one thing ad infinitun—to correct its corrections, so that all certainty, even practical certainty, is compromised and lost. ‘We have seen three crtial states of the mind. Indifrence and fancy are the stations proper to the mind, independently ofthe external principles which fix te through the association ofits ideas. Madness isthe contradiction in the mind between these principles which affect itand the feion which ieafirms asa principle, Delirium isthe system of fictional reconciliations between principles and fiction, The only resource and positivity offered to the mind is nature ot practice— ‘moral practice and, based on the image of the latter, practice of the understanding, Instead of referring nature to the mind, the mind must be referred to nature. “I may, nay I must yield to the current ‘of nature, in submitting to my senses and understanding: and in this blind submission I shew most perfectly my sceptical disposition and principles. ‘Madness is human nature related to the mind, jst as good sense is the mind related co human nature; each one is the reverse of the ‘other, This s the reason why we must reach the depths of madness and solitude in order to find a passage to good sense. I could not, ‘without reaching contradiction, refer the affections of the mind ‘the mind itself the mind is identical to its ideas, and the afecti docs not let itself be expressed through ideas without a decisive “contradiction. On the other hand, the mind related to its affections constitutes the entire domain of general rules and beliefs. This do- rmain is the middle and temperate region, where the contradict between human nature andthe imagination already exists, and always subsists, but this contradiction is regulated by possible corrections and resolved through practice. In short, there i no science o life ‘except at the level of general rules and beliefs FIVE EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY We miovotrr mar we had located the essence of empiricism in the specific problem of subjectivity. But, frst ofall, we should ask how subjectivity is defined. The subject is defined by the movement through which itis developed. Subject is that which develops itself. "The only content chat we can give to the idea of subjectivity is that of mediation and transcendence, But we note chat the movement of self-development and of becoming-other is double: the subject tran- scende itself, but it is also reflected upon. Hume recognized these ‘wo dimensions, presenting them asthe fundamental characteristics fof human nature: inference and invention, belief and artifice. One should then avoid aetributing too much importance to the analogy, ‘often noted, between belief and sympathy. This is not to say chat this analogy is not real. But, if itis true that belief is the knowing act of the subject, then his moral act, on the contrary, is not sym pathy; it ie rather artifice or invention, with respect ro which sym- pathy, corresponding to belief, is only a necessary condition. In short, and inventing is what makes the subject a subject. what is given, I infer the existence of that which is not Gaesat is dead, Rome did exist, ehe sun will ishing. At the same time and through the same ‘ranscening the given, I judge and posit myself as[EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY subject. affirm more than I know. Therefore, the problem of truth must be presented and seated as the eritical problem of subjectivity itself. By what right does man affirm mote than he knows? Between the sensible qualities and the powers of nature, we infer an unknown (When we sce lke sensible qualities that they have like Secret powers, (ve) expect that eects, similar to those which ‘we have expericaced, will follow from them. fa body of like colour and consisteace with that bread, which we have formerly eat, be presented to us, we make no scruple of sepeating the experiment, and forese, with certainty, like nourishment and support. Now this is a process of the mind or thought, of which I would willingly know the foundation. We are also subjects in another respect, that is, in (and by) the ‘moral, aesthetic, or social judgment. In cis sense, the subject reflects and is reflected upon. Ie extracts fom that which affees it in general 4 power independent of the actual exercise, that is pure function, and then transcends its own partiality? Consequently, artifice and invention have been made possible. The subject invents; itis the maker of artifice. Such is the dual power of subjectivity: to believe and to invent, to asume the secret powers and to presuppose abstract or distinct powers. Ip these two senses, the subject is normative: it creates norms or general rules. We must explain and Find the foun dation, law, or principle of this dual power—this dual exercise of general rules. This isthe problem. For nothing escapes our know edge as radically as the powers of Nature,’ and noching is more futile for our understanding chan the distinction between powers and theit exercise. How can we assume or distinguish thems? To believe isto infer one part of nature from another, which isnot given. To invent is to distinguish powers and to constitute functional tories ot totalties that are not given in nature. The problem is as follows: how can a subject transcending che given be constituted in the gives? Undoubsedly, the sujct itself is Biven. Undoubtedly, that which transcends the given is also given in anocher way and in another sense. This subject wh invents and believes is constituted inside che given in such way that it makes EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY. the given itself a synthesis and a system. This is what we must explain. In this formulation ofthe problem, we discaver the absolute essence of empiricism, We could say that philosophy in gencral has alsvays sought a plan of analysis in order fo undertake and conduct the examination of the structures of consciousness (critique), and to justify the totality of experience. Initially, i is a difference in plan ‘that opposes critical philosophies, We embark upon a transcendental critique when, having situated ourselves on a methodologically re- duced plan that provides an essential certainty—a certainty of es- sence—we ask: how can there be a given, how can something be given toa subject, and how ean the subject give something to itself? Here, the crtial requirement is that of a constructivist logic which finds ies model in mathematics. The critique is empirical when, hhaving sicuated ourselves ina purely immanent point of view, which makes posible a description whose rule is found in determinable hypotheses and whose mode! is found in physics, we ask: how isthe subject constituted in the given? The construction of the given makes oom for the constitution of the subject. The given is no longer given co a subject; rather, the subject constitutes itself in the given. Hume's merit lies in the singling out of this empirical problem in its pure state and its separation from the eanscendental and the psychological But what isthe given? It is, says Hume, the flux of the sensible, 2 collection of impressions and images, ot a set of perceptions. It is the tality of that which appeass, being which equals appearance: iis also movement and change without identity or law. We use the terms “imagination” and “mind noe to designate a faculey or a prin- ciple of organization, but rather a particular set ora particular col- lection. Empiricism begins from the experience of a collection, oF from an animated succession of distinct perceptions. It begins wih them, insofar as they are distinct and independent. In fat, its prin- ciple, that i, the constiutive principle giving a status to experience, is not chat “every idea derives from an impression” whose sense is only regulative; bur rather that “everything separable is distinguish- able and everything distinguishable i different." This isthe principle of difference. “For how is it posible we can separate what isnot distingvishable, o distinguish what is not dif- ferent? Therefon, experience is succession, or the movement ofEMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY separable ideas, insofar as they are different and diferent, insofar as they are separable. We must begin with this experience because itis theexperience. I¢ docs not presuppose anything else and nothing else precedes it. Its not the affection of an implicated subject, nor the ‘modification or mode ofa substance. If every discernible perception isa separate extencs, ft has] no need of any thing to suppor [ts] ‘The mind is identical to ideas in the mind. If we wish co retain the term “substance,” to find a use for it at all costs, we must apply it correctly not to'a substrate of which we have no idea but eo each individual perception. We would then claim that “every perception is a substance, and every distinee part of a perception a distinct, substance."* “The mind is nota subject, nor does it requite a subject whose it would be. Hume's entice critique, especially his critique of the principle of sufficient reason in its denunciations of sophisms and contradictions,” amounts to this: i the subject is indeed thae which transcends the given, we should not initially attribute to the given, the capacity to transcend itself, ‘On the other hand, the mind is not the representation of nature cither. Not only are perceptions the only substances, they ate also the only objects. The negation ofthe primary qualities corresponds ow to the negation ofthe principle of sufficient reason: perception, gives us no difference between two kinds of qualities. The philos- ophy of experience is not only the critique of a philosophy of sub- stance bat also the critique of a philosophy of nature. Therefore, ideas are not the representations of objects, but rather of impressions: as for the impressions, they ate not representative, nor are they ad ventitious rather, they are innate." Undoubtedly, there isa nature, there are real operations, and bodies do have powers. But we must restrict “our speculations to the appearance of objects to our senses, without entering into disquisitions concerning che real natute and operation..." And this skepticism is not so much a renunciation 5a requirement identical to the preceding one. The two critiques, infact, merge to the point where they become one. Why? Because the question of a determinable relation with nature has its own conditions: iis not obvious, its not given, and itcan only he posited by a subjece questioning the value of che system of his juukeonenty, thar is, the legitimacy of the transformation to whiel he subjects [EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY the given, or the legitimacy of the organiation which he attributes to it. Therefore, the real problem would be to eink, at the right ‘moment, ofa harmony between the unknown powers on which the given appearances depend and che transcendent principles which determine the consteation of a subject within the given. The real problem would be to think of a harmony between the powers of hare and the subject. As forthe given, in itself and as such, itis neither the representation of the fist nor the modification of the second ‘We might say that che given is a least given to the senses and that ie presupposes organs and even a brain, This is true, but one must always avoid endowing, in the beginning, che organism with an organization, an organization that will come about oaly when the subject itself comes to mind, that is, an organization that depends fn the same principles s the subject. Thus, in a central passage, Hume envisages a physiological explanation of association and sub- Jectiviy: “... upon our conception of any ide, the animal spitts run into all the contiguous traces, and rouze up the oxher ideas, that are related co it” 3 himself presents this explanation as “probable and plao- bur, as he say, he neglects it willingly. When he appeals to it, itis notin onde to explain association, but rathe, in ordct 0 account for the etrors resulting from the association. For if such an organization of the brain provides us with a physiological model applicable tothe associative proces, it nonetheless presupposes the principles upon which this model depends and for which it cannot account. In short, the organism and is senses do not immediately and in themselves have the characteristics of human nature or of a subject; chey must acquite these somewhere else. The mechanism of the body cannot explain the spontaneity of the subject. By itself and in itself, an organ is merely a collection of impressions considered in the mechanism of cheir appearance: “External objects are seen, and felt, and become prescut to the mind: that is, ehey acquire such 4 relation co a connected heap of perceprions...."” In a word, we always return to the same conclusion; the given, the mind, the col lection of perceptions cannot call upon anything other than themselves ‘Bat as it calls upon itself, what exactly is i ealling upon, since the collection remains arbitrary, since every idea and every impres-[EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY sion can disappear or be separated from the mind without contra- diction? How can we discuss the mind of the given in general? What isthe consistency of the mind? Afterall, iis not under the category of quality that we must consider the mind as mind but rather form the viewpoint of quantity. It is not che representative ‘quality of che idea but rather is dvisbiiey tha interests us at eis stage. The fundamental principle of empiri, the principle of difference, had elready stated this; such was its meaning. "The mind's constant is not a particule idea, but rather the smallest idea. An idea may appear ‘or disappear, I can always discover others; but sometimes smaller ideas cannot he found. “In rejecting the infinite capacity ofthe mind, swe suppose it may arrive at an end in the division of is idea.” ‘What is essential in am idea isnot that ie represents something, but rather that i is indivisible: “When you tell me of the thousandth and ten thowsandeh patrof gran of snd, Ihave a distinct idea ofthese numbers and of ther different proportions; but the sages, which I form in my mind co represent the things themselves, are nothing different form each other, or inferior to thatimage, by which I represent the grain of sand itself... Bue whar- cree we may imagine of the thing, the idea ofa grain of sand isnot distinguishable, nor separable into twenty, mac Tess into thousand, oan infinite numberof diferent ideas We call “moment of the mind” the reflection that relates ideas or impressions" to the criterion of division of ideas. The mind and the given are not derived form such-and-such an idea but rather from the smalles idea, whether it is used to represent the grain of sand o7 a fraction of it. This i why, finaly, the problem of the status of the mind isthe same a the problem of space. On one hand, swe ask whether of not extension is infinitely divisible. On the othe hhand, the indivisible ideas, to the extent chat they are indivisible, constitute ina certain way extension, Hume presents these two theses as the two intimately connected parts of the system. Let us consider the fist part2° To say that che mind has 2 finite capacity is to say that “the imagination teaches 2 minimum." Hume calle chis minimum “anity"® “indivisible point,” atoms or corpuscles,” “terminating idea.” Nothin impression of smaller exis EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY and by “nothing” we should understand not simply “no other idea,” bat also “no other thing in general." The idea-limie is absolutely indivisible, I is in itself indivisible to che extent that it is indivisible for the mind and because itis an idea. Existence itself belongs to the unit This is why the mind possesses and manifests objectivity. Hume's entite theme reconciles the defects of the senses and che objectivity of the given as follows: undoubtedly there are many things smaller chan the smallest bodies that appear to our senses; the face is, chough, that there is nothing smaller than the impression that we have of these bodies or the ideas thar we form of them." ‘As forthe second part ofthe thesis, we can see that itis deter= ‘mined by the first, The smallest impression is neither a mathematical nor a physical point, bu rather a sensible one.® A physical point is already extended and divisible; a mathematical point is nothing. Between the ewo there is a midpoint which is the only real one. Between real extension and nonexistence there is real existence ‘chore extension will be precisely formed, A sensible point or atom isvisibleand tangible, colored and sold. By itself, thas no extension, and yet it exists. Te exists and we have seen why. In the possibiliey ofits existence and in the reason forts distinct existence, empiricism clscovers a principle. Ie is not extended, since no extension is itl andatom, a corpuscle, 2 minimurn idea ora simple impression. “Five notes play'd on a flte give us the impression and idea of time; tho” time be not a sixth impression, which presents itself tothe hearing ‘or any other of the senses" Similarly, the idea of space is merely the idea of visible or tangible points distibuted in a certain order. Space is discovered in the arrangement of visible ot tangible objects, just as time is discovered in the perceptible succession of changing ‘object. "Thus the given is not in space che space isin the given. Space and time are in the mind, We should nonetheless note the diflerence between cime and space, for che latter can be given through two senses only, those of sighe and couch. In fac, forthe idea of space to exist it # necessary that the simple impressions, or the parts of ‘our impressions, he arranged in a way that is provided neither by the other senses nor, in the case of movement, by the impressions of the muscles.” Extension, therefore, is only the quality of certian peteeptions" This is not the case with time, which is effectively presented as the quality of any set of porceptions whatsorver.” “ForLEMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY wwe may observe, cae there is 2 continual sucesion of peresptions Jn our min: so thatthe idea of time being forever present with ‘We must then define the given by ewo objective characteristic indvisibilty ofan element and distribution of elements eto and structure. As Laporte obsceved, its entirely incorrect to say thatthe ‘whole, in Home's stomism, i nothing but the sum ofits parts, since the pats, considered together, are defined, rather, according 0 their mode of temporal, and sometimes spatial, appearance. This i an objective and spontancous mode, by no means indebted to eeflection for to construction. Infact, Hume makes this point about space in a text whose second sentence should noche forgoten: “The perception consists of pats. These parts ates situated, as to afford ws the notion of distance and contiguity, of length, breadth, and thickness." We must now mise the question: what do we mean when we speak of the subjee?” We mean that the imagination, aving bec 3 collection, becomes now a faculty; the distributed collection becomes, row a system. The given is once agin taken up by a movement, and in movement that transcends i. The mind becomes human nature. The subject invents and believes; ii synthe of the mind. ‘We formulate thee problems: what are the characteristics of the subject in the case of belief and invention? Second, by means of what Pnciples is the subject consitated in tis way? Which factors have 2cted in transforming the mind? Finally, what are the various stages of che synthesis that is brought about in the mind by the subject? ‘What are the rages ofthe system? We begin with the fst problem. Since we previsly studied the mind from thrce points of view— in relation to itself in relation tothe organs of the senses, and in relation to time—we must nov ask what becomes of these three instances when the mind itself becomes a subject. ing, in elation to time. The mind, considered from the view= point ofthe appearance of ts perceptions, was essentially succession, time, To speak of the subject now isco speak of daration, custom, habit, and anticipation. Anticipation is habit, and habit i anicipa- tion: these two determinationsthe thrust ofthe past and the clan toward the furure~are, atthe center of Hume's philosophy, the ewo ‘aspects of the same fundamental dynamism. 1 is not nccessry to force the texts in order to find in the habitanticipation must ofthe characteristics of the Bergson dane or memory. Habit is dh co [EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY ‘titative root of the subject and the subject, at roo, isthe synthesis of time—the synthesis of the present and the past in light of che future. Hume demonstrates this clearly when he studies the wo operations of subjectivity, namely, belief and invention. We know ‘what is involved in invention; cach subject reflects upon itself, that is, transcends its immediate partiality and avidity, by insicuing rules of property which are institutions making possible an agreement among subjects. But what is it, in ehe nature of the subject, that ‘rounds this mediate agreement and these general rules? Here, Hume retarns toa simple juridical theory which will aso be developed by the majority ofthe utilitarians each man expects to conserve what he already possesses? The principle of frustrated ancicipation will play che role of the principle of contradiction in the logic of property, that is, the role of a principle of synthetic contradiction, We know that, for Hume, there are many states of possesion which are determined through complex relations: actual possesion before the esablishment of society: occupation, prsctip- tion, accession, and succession, aftr the establishment of society. Yet only che dynamism of hab and anticipation transforms these states ino titles of property. Hume's originality lies in the theory of this dynamism, Anticipation isthe synthesis of past and present brought ahout by habit. Anticipation, oF the future is the synthesis of time constituted by the subject inside the ming. Such is the effet of custom, that i not only reconciles us to anything we have long enjoy'd, but even gives us an af fection for it, and makes us prefer it co other objects, which say be more valuable, but ae less known to us.” Prescription i the privileged example inthis respect. In this ease, it is not merely through a synthesis of time that the subject erans- forms the state of possession into a title of property but rather the state of possession is itself time and nothing else Bur a ‘is certain, that, however every thing be produc'd in time, thee is nothing rea, that is produe'd by time; ie fol- lows, that property being produe'd by cime, i nor anything. alin the objects, but is tae offspring of the sentiments, on ‘which alone time is found to have ay influence.[BMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY This isthe mos fective way to sy that ime and sajet ae in toch a cation ith respect eachother tha he sbje presents the synthesis of times and tht only thi sys prc, crete, and iret “The fame apples to belie: We know that ble only a vivid iden connect: by means ofa eau relation, t0 3 presen impres Son. Bella fecing ora prt: way of ening eae Bei isthe idea the vivid enc fl her than conceived"? "Therefore if we wiht analyze ths fein, we mist ives the cual relation, since the later conan the vvdnes of the present impression tothe ten. In shit analy, fing revel insure’ once mores is mance a the result of the sytbesis Of time need, what i che cal relation ini sence? eis Nhe propensiy which cstom pcs, pas from an objet tothe ide of ts wl aendane™ We rediscover, therefor, this ‘ynamie wity of habit and tenency this yas of paw and resent which consis the fare, and hissy Ment of st experience and ofan adaption to the present ‘Custom, then is the great guide of human life... Without the influence of custom... we should never know how to adjust means to ends, of to employ our natural powers in the production of any effet. There would bean end at once ‘ofall action, 36 well 3¢ the chief pate of speculation.” In short, the synthesis posts the pase as a rule for the future. With respect to belief, as with property, we always encounter the same transformation: time was the structure of the mind, now the subject is presented as the synthesis of time. In order co understand the meaning of this transformation, we must note that the mind includes memory in Hume's sense of the term: we distinguish in the collection of perceptions sense impressions, ideas of memor as of imagination, according to their degrees of vividness. ‘Memory isthe reappearance of an impression in the form of an idea that is still vivid. Bur, in fact, memory alone does not bring about a synthesis of time: i does not transcend the structure, its essential tole becomes the reproduction of the different structures of the given.” It is rather habit which presents itself ay a synthesis, and habit belongs to the subject. Recollection isthe ob present, no he [EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY past. We should call “pase” not only that which has been, but aso that which determines, acts, prompts, and catties a certain weight In ths sense, not only is habit co memory what the subject is tothe ‘mind, but also habit easily does without eis dimension of the mind whieh we call“ habie has no need of memory, it does ‘without it ordinarily, in one way or another, Sometimes no evocation ‘of memories accompanies it* and sometimes, there is no specific ‘memory that it could evoke In a word, the past as such is not siven. It is consticuted through, and in, a synthesis which gives the subject its eal origin and its source ‘We are thus led to specify how we mast understand this synthesis of past and present, for this is not clear. Obviously, if we give ready made the past end the present to ourselves, che synthesis is made on its ‘own; it is already formed and, therefore, no longer a problem, Also, since the future i constituted through ehis synthesis of the past and the present, it is no longer a problem either under these conditions. ‘Thus, when Hume says that the most diffcule thing is to explain how we are able to constitute the past asa rule for the Future, itis not easy to sce where the difficulty ies. Hume himself fels the need to convince us that he is not trying to create paradoxes. In vain do you pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your past experience. Their secret nature, and conse _qvently all thee effects and influence, may change, without any change in thei sensible qualities. This happens some fimes, and with regard to some objects: Why may it not happen always, and with egard tall subjects? What logic, what process of argument secures you agains this suppo- sition? My practice, you say, refaes my doubts. But you misake the purport of my question. As an egent, Lam quite satis in the point but as philosopher, who has some share of carsity, L will not aay ception, F want to lean the foundation of this In practic, there i no problem, for, once the past and the present are given, the synthesis is given at ehe same time, But, in fact, che problem is elsewhere. Present and past, the former understood as the starting point of an clan and the latter as the object of an ob- servation, ane not characteristics of time. ft would he better to sayLEMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY that they are the products ofthe synthesis rather than is consicutive clements. But even this would not be exact. The truth of the matter is that past and present are constituted within time, under the in- fluence of certain principles, and that the synthesis of time itself is nothing bue this constitution, organization, and double affection. ‘This then is the problem: how are a present and a past consicuted within time? Viewed from this angle, the analysis of ehe causal relation in is essential duality acquires its fll meaning. On one hand, Hume presents experience as a principle which manifests a multipliciey and a repetition of similar eases; literally eis principle affects the span of the past. On the other hand, he finds in habit another principle inciting ur to move from one object to a second which follows it— a principle which organizes time asa perpetual present ro which we can, and must, adap. [Now if we consult the distinctions established by Hume in his analysis of “the inference from the impression to the idea,"** we could offera number of definitions. The understanding isthe mind itself which, under the influence of experience, reflects time in the form of a past entity subject to its observation. The imagination, under the influence of the principle of habit, is also the mind which reflects time asa determined future filled with ts anticipation. Belief isthe relation between these two constituted dimensions. As he gives the formula of belief, Hume writes: [the ewo principles conspiring] to operate upon the imagination, make me form certain ideas in 2 ‘more intense and lively manner, than others, which are not attended with the same advantages.""” ‘We have just seen how time is transformed when the subject is ‘constituted in the mind. We can now move on to the second point: what happens to the organism? Eatlier, the organism was presented as the mechanism only of distince perceptions. Now, to say that the subject is constituted in the mind amounts to saying that, under the influence of principles, the organism takes on 2 dual spontaneity Fins, ittakes on a spontancity of elation"... [U}pon our conception of any idea che animal spirits run into all the contiguous traces and rouze up the other idea, that are related co i! We have already ssid that forthe animal spirits to find, in the teighhoring traces into which they fill, ideas which ate ted tothe one thatthe mind wanted to seo, itis, fire, necessary that the ideas themselves he associated inhe mind. Ieis necessary that the mechanism of dstinet perceptions [EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY bbe divided again, in a certian way, within the body itself through a physical spontancity of relaions—a spontaneity of the body that de- pends on the same principles at subjectivity. Baler, the body was merely the mind, that is, the collection of ideas and impressions envisaged from the point of view of the mechanism of thet distinct production. Now, the body is the subject itself envisaged from the viewpoint ofthe spontaneity of the relations that, under the influence of principles, it establishes between ideas. On the other hand, there isa spontancity of disposition, We have seen the importance that Hume places on the distinction between ‘wo kinds of impressions, namely.those of sensation and chose of reflection. Our entre problem depends on this, since che impressions of sensation only form the mind, giving ic merely an origin, whereas the impressions of reflection consticate the subject in the mind, di- versely qualifying the mind as subject. Undoubtedly, Hume presents these impressions of reflection as being part of the collection, but, fist ofall, they mast be formed. In their Formation, they depend on a particular process and on principles of subjectivity... [Nor can the mind, by evolving over a thousand times al its ideas of sensation, ever extract from them any new original idea, unless nature has fam’d its culties, shat it fels some new original impression arise from ‘uch a contemplation.” ‘The problem, thus, is knowing which new dimension the prin- ciples of subjectivity confer upon the body when they constieute impressions of reflection in the mind. The impressions of sensation ‘were defined by means of a mechanism, and referred to the body as 2 procedure of this mechanism. The impressions of reflection are 4efined by means of a spontaneity or a disposition and ate referred to the body 2s the biological source of this spontaneity. As he studies the passions, Hume analyzes this new dimension of the body. The organism is disposed to produce passions. Ie has a disposition which is proper and specific to the passion in question, 25 an “original, incernal movement.” This isthe case with hunger, thirst, and sexual desire One could object, nonetheless, that not all passions are ike these. There are passions, such as pride and humility, love and hatred, love between the sexes, jay and sadness, co which no specific bodily «lisposition corresponds. in this ase, nature does not produce passions “hy itself immediatly,” but “mast be asisted by the co-operation ‘of oer causes." These eases are natural, yet not original Here,[EMPIRIGISM AND SUBJECTIVITY in other words, che role of the bodily disposition is only taken up by an external objece which will produce passions in natural and determinable circumstances, This means that, even in this case, we ‘an understand the phenomenon of the passions only through the corporeal disposition: “As nature has given to the body certain ap- petites and inclinations... she has proceeded in the same manner with the mind."™* Buc what is the meaning of disposition? Through the mediation of the passions, disposition spontancousdy incites the appearance of an idea, namely, an idea of the object corresponding to the passion" ‘We ate left with the lat, and more general, point of view: without any other criterion, we must compare the subject with the mind ‘But because this point is the most general, it already leads to the secon problems, mentioned earlier: what ate the principles consti- turing the subject in che mind? What factors will transform che mind? We have seen that Hume's answer i simple: whae transforms the mind inco a subject and consicutes the subject in ehe mind are the principles of human nature. These principles are of ewo kinds: principles of asucation and principles ofthe passions, which, in some Fespeets, we could present in the general form of the principle of uty. The subject isthe entity which, under the influence of the principle of uility, pursues a goal or an intention; i organizes means in view of an end and, under the influence of the principles of association, establishes relations among ideas. Thus, the collection becomes a system. The collection of perceptions, when organized and bound, becomes a system Let us examine the problem of relations. We should not debate farile points; we do not have to ask: on che assurapion that relations tho ot depend upon ideas, si spo certain that they depend on the subject? This is obvious. If relations do not have a their causes the properties of the ideas herween which they are established, chat is i they have other causes, then these other causes determine a subject which alone establishes relations. The relation of truth 10 subjectivity is manifested in che affirmation that a true julgesent is not a tautology. Thus, che tly fundamental propesition is that relations ate external to ideas. And if they are external, the problem of the subject, 28 i is formulated in empiricism, follows. Tes ee csary, in fact, to know upon what othce ees these welations EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY pend, that i, how the subject i constituted in the collection of ides. Re~ lations are external to their terms. When James calls himself a pluralist, he does not sy, in principle, anything else. This is also the case when Russel cals himself realist, We seein this statement the point common eo all empiricisms, I is true that Hume distinguishes berween two kinds of relations: “such as may be chang’d without any change in the ideas” (identity, temporal and spatial relations, causality), and those thar “depend entirely on the ideas which we compare together” (resemblance, contrariety, degrees of quality, and propositions of quantity and mum ber). Te seems that the latter are not, in this sens, external to ideas. And this is exactly what Kant believed, when he criticized Hume for taking mathematics to be a system of analytic judgments. But it 's nothing of the sore. Every relation is external to its terms. “..«[LJet us consider, that since equality isa relation its mot, strictly speaking, a property inthe figures themselves, butarises merely from the comparison, which the mind makes beewixt them.""" ‘We have seen that che ideas can be considered in two ways, col- lectively and individually, distributively and singly, in the deter- sminable collection where their own modes of appearance place chem, and in their own characteristics. This is the origin ofthe distinction beeween the two kinds of relations, But both are equally external to the ideas. Let us examine the firs kind, Spatial and temporal relations (distance, contiguity, anteriority, posteriorty, etc.) give us, in diverse forms, the relation of a variable abject with the totality within which itis integrated, or with the structure where its mode of appearance situates it. One might say, hough, that the mind as such already provided us with the notions of distance and contigu ity. This is true, but it was merely giving us a matter—not actual principles—to confont. Contiguous or distant objects do no in the least explain that distance and contiguity are relations. In the mind, space and time were only a composition. Under which influence (ex ternal tothe mind, since the mind undergoes i¢ a they do, and fds in its consteaint a constancy which it itself does not posses) do they ‘become a relation? ‘The originality of the rel-ion appears even more cleatly in the problem of identity. In fact, che relation here is a fction. We apply the idea of time to an invatiable object, and we compare the rep- resentation of the immutable object with the sequence of our per-LEMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY ceptions And even mare clearly we know that inthe ase of cus ‘Thy the clon is tansendece™ iyo the lation ofthe second Find tend tobe mare confsing, iis beease this second Kind relates cnly the charac of two or moe ideas being considered i Girly, Reemblance, in the nao sense of the em, compares palsies proportions compar quantte the degrees of quality oon fate intends. We should note surprised tha, im thi ae, he Fenions cannot change without [there beng change in the Hea Tn fcr, what cing Consdeed, what gies the comparison ft tube materi specie objectively dacemible en and oot patti cllcton,efectvely determinable bu alway arbi Thee relations ae no les external, The resemblance beeweeh fia Mess doc not expan tha semblance a elation that that an dea can evoke he appearance ofa ina ea in the mind The invtlny of dea docs ot expan tha he nies consti tuted by them chm be added, soberced, ade elo hat hey Can ene ito 2 aston of options. Nor docs texan tha the lengths which they compos invroc of ther rangement, an be rnd and ented, Here we conve the two dis poems ( citmesc and geometry. The aon always presipotes 3s then and nether the ies nor the mind ex account for fy The ‘ao ina way designates “tha pacar ccaratancein which "we may think proper co compare [owo ides" "To think per” the bet expression in fac, 9 normative expression. The pater ist ind the norme ofthis judgmenn, of this decion, 2nd the norm of suet. the lst analy we wll hae to ‘pes about Fume’ voluntary, been the problem would be chow the principles of ht wl which ae independent of he char Sete of the mind. “Thee princes a fit afl those of asoition: contig teen, and easly. Bede thee notions shoal be given iain diferent fom the one given eaten, when they were peccated ly se examples felon elaons are the feo he Principles of asocition. These pines naturalze and give com _Tacy tothe min, esc that cach of ther speiealy dred to on spect of the mid contiguity, o the senses asa, to tine veeeblance, co inaghaten™ Their common point the Gesignation of suai that leas the min natal om oe to another™ We aready know the meaning tat me mas ve [EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY the term “quality.” That an idea naturally introduces another is not a quality of the idea, but rather a quality of human nature. Only human natute is qualificatory. A collection of ideas will never explain how che same simple ideas ae regulary grouped into complex ideas. eas, “mast suited to be united in a complex idea,” muse be designated to each one of us. These ideas are not designated within che mind without the mind becoming subject—a subject to whom these ideas are designated, a subject who speaks, eas ae designated inthe mind at the same time that the mind itself becomes a subject. Inshore, the effects of the principle of association are complex ideas: relations, substances and modes, general ideas. Under the influence of the principles of association, ideas are compared, grouped, and evoked. ‘This telation, or rather this intimacy, between complex ideas and the subject, such chat one isthe inverse of the others, is presented tous in languages the subject, as she speaks, designates in some way ideas which are in torn designated to her Relations are external to their terms. This means that ideas do not account for the nature of the operations that we perform on them, and especially ofthe relations that we establish arsong them. "The principles of human natu, of the principles of association, are the necessary conditions of relations. But has the problem been re- solved? When Hume defines the relation a “this particular circum= stance for the sake of which we think proper to compare two ideas,” hhe adds: “even when the latter ate atbitrarily linked in the imagi- nation’”—that is even when the one does not naturally introduce the ‘other. In fact, association is insufficient to explain relations. Un dloubtedly, it alone makes them possible. Undoubtedly, it accounts entirely for immediate ot direct relations, chat is, chose that are cstablished between two ideas without the intervention of another idea of the collection. For example, it explains the relation between to, immediately adjacent shades of blue, or between two contiguous objects, ete. Let us soy that it explains that A~B and B=C; bat it slocs not explain that A—C or that distance itself is a relation.” Later, we wil ce that Hume calls chat which the association explains and that which it does not sufi to explain a ‘philosophical relation.” He insists heavily on this point: che char- actertic of nature is to he nataral, easy going, and immediate. In idness that i, its effet, Inter- it lous something of iself:EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY Where the mind reaches not its object with casiness and facility, che same principles have not the same effect asin a more natural conception of the ideas; nor does the imagi- tation feel a sensation, which holds any proportion with that which arises from its common judgments and ‘opinions. How can the mediations (or the relations that are established beeween the most remote objects) be justified? Resemblance, Hume claims, does not always produce "3 connexion or association of ideas. When a quality becomes very general, and i common to 4 great many individuals it lads not the mind direc t anyone of them; but by presenting ‘at once too great a choice, does thereby prevent the imagination rom fixing ‘om any single obj” Mose of the objections raised against asociationism amount co this: the principles of association explain, a bes, the form of chink ing in general and not its particular contents, Association explains coaly the surface or “the crust” of our consciousness. Writers 2s diffcene as Bergson and Freud converge on this point. Bergson, in a famous passage, writes: For we should seck in vain for two ideas which have not some point of resemblance, or which do not touch each ‘other somewhere. To take similarity fist: however profound ate the differences which separate two images, we shall a- ‘ways find, if we go back high enough, 2 common genus t0 which hey belong, and consequently 4 resemblance which ‘nay serve asa connecting link between them. ... This is as much as to say that between any two ideas chosen 3¢ random there is always 2 resemblance, and alseays, even, contiguity; so that when we discover atelation of contiguity ‘or of resemblance between two saccesive ideas, we have in tno way explainod why the one evokes the other. What we really need to discover is how a choice is affected among an infinite mumber of recollections which all resemble in son sway the present perception, and why only ome of chem this rather than that-emerges into the light of eomscious [EMPIRICISM AND SUBJECTIVITY ‘The least that we can say is that Hume though of i fis. his work, the association of ideas accounts effectively for habits of thought, everyday notions of good sense, cxtrnt ideas, and complexes of idows which correspond to the most general and most constant needs common tall minds and all languages" What it does not account for is the difference beeween one mind and another. The specific progress ofa mind must bbe studied, and there isan entice casistry to be worked out: why does this pereeption evoke a specif idea, rather than another, in a particular consciousness at 2 particular moment? The association of ‘ideas does not explain that this idea has been evoked instead of another. It follows that, from this point of view, we must define relation as“... that particular circumstance, in which, even upon the arbitrary union of two ideas inthe fancy, we may chink proper to com pare them.” If it is trae that association is necessary in order to ‘make all eclations in general possible, each particular relation is not in the least explained by the association. Circumstance gives the re- Tation its sufficient reason. ‘The nosion “circumstance” appears constantly in Hume's phi- losophy. Is at the center of history and it makes possible a science of the particular and a differential psychology. When Freed and Bergson demonstrate that the asociation of ideas explains only that which is superficial in us, thats, only the formalism of consciowsness, they mean, essentially, that only affecivity can justify the singular content, the profound and the particula. And they are right. But Hume has never said anything else. He merely thought that the superficial and the formal should also be explained, and that this task was, in a sense, the most important. And for the rest, he appeals to circumstance. This notion, for him, always refers co affectivity. We rust take literally the idea that affectvity is a matter of citcum- stances. These are precisely the variables that define our passions and ‘our interests. Understood in this way, a set of circumstances always lividuates a subject since it represents a state of its passions and needs, an allocation of it interests, a distribution of its beliefs and cetilarations As a result, we see that the principles of the passions rust be combined with the principles of association in order for the subject to constitute itself within the mind. Ifthe principles of a¢- sociation explain that ideas are associated, only the principles of the passions can explain that a particular idea, rather than another, is assorted at a yiven moment