The Use of "Comrade" As A Political Instrument in The Chinese Communist Party, From Mao To Xi

The Use of “Comrade” as a Political
Instrument in the Chinese Communist

Party, from Mao to Xi
Paul Joscha Kohlenberg*
ABSTRACT
The mandate that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members should “address each other as
comrades, not by official rank” (hu cheng tongzhi, bu yao jiao guanxian 互称同志, 不要叫官衔)
as an expression of equality and shared values has been reemphasized by the Party leader-
ship time and again. This article shows that relations within the Party are also sometimes
deliberately fraught with tension, and as a result, the word “comrade” has been used during
intra-Party conflicts with the aim of creating status uncertainty among cadre ranks. This
strategic use of “comrade” emerges in purges, campaign politics, and anticorruption efforts.
It allows the highest leaders to consolidate their power under the linguistic umbrella of sol-
idarity and to inculcate doubt about personal loyalties among Party factions.
“ C O M R A D E” A S A FO R M O F A D D R E S S
he Chinese term for “comrade,” tongzhi 同志, originated as a word compound
T literally meaning “common aspiration.” Just as in English, the notion con-
notes an attitude of joint struggle. It has been employed to foster shared identities
in various contexts ranging from the revolutionary anti-Qing rhetoric of Sun
Yatsen or within the wary alliance in the 1920s of Communists and Nationalists
(Kuomintang). As the Communist Party’s revolutionary struggle progressed to-
ward victory, “comrade” came to be more closely associated with the Communist
cause. In a narrow sense, the term has since referred to official members of the
Party. To this day, state media continue to use this term when referring to indi-
vidual Party leaders.
* I wish to thank Tristan Evans, Anita Chan, Jonathan Unger, and the reviewers for their helpful com-
ments. I am also grateful for the suggestions made by the participants of the December 2015 GEAS/URPP
Asia and Europe Workshop at the University of Zurich, where I presented an earlier version of this article.
Electronically published September 26, 2016

The China Journal, no. 77. 1324-9347/2017/7701-0004. Copyright 2016 by The Australian National University. All rights reserved.
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The Use of “Comrade” as a Political Instrument in the CCP • 73
The revolutionary triumph of the Party made affiliation with the Communist
cause generally desirable for all Chinese people on the mainland. As Ezra Vogel
put it, the term “comrade” turned into a moniker describing “the relationship
of one person to another in their role as fellow citizens.”1 Comrade also clearly
“denoted a revolutionary tone” under Mao’s leadership.2 As a result, “comrade”
became a common form of address, signifying membership in two different in-
groups: the CCP and the Chinese public in which Party members are naturally
embedded. Having thus become a rather commonplace address, it became diffi-
cult to differentiate between its uses in a wide (societal) or narrow (Party) sense.
Yet this “ethic of comradeship”3 among citizens disintegrated by the early 1980s.
As stated by Tom Gold in a pivotal 1985 article on personal relations in the 1980s,
comradeship had vanished as a central ethic holding the fabric of Chinese society
together.4 Both traditional Confucian and market-driven values, Gold argued,
quickly overwhelmed the social imperatives springing from the “universalistic
morality” of political comradeship that Vogel had described in 1965.5
Echoing Gold’s conclusion, Chinese linguists have pointed out that the general
use of “comrade” as a term of address “progressively withdrew from the stage of
history” over the course of the post-Mao period.6 Yet while this is true for Chi-
nese society at large, questions regarding its use within the Party (i.e., among
more than 80 million Party members) have not been studied. “Comrade” contin-
ues to be an officially sanctioned form of address, though some Party officials are
unhappy with the policy. At the beginning of the Hu Jintao era, for instance, Peo-
ple’s Daily reprinted an article from a Jiangsu Party journal citing an anonymous
cadre’s opinion: “In present-day official circles, [even if you] beat me to death, I
would still not dare to address any leader as ‘comrade.’” The article then asks the
rhetorical—but pertinent—question, “Who, when meeting leaders in positions of
power on whom one’s future career depends, dares call them ‘comrade’?”7 On
Chinese microblogging sites, netizen reactions to Party propaganda also display
a deep sense of wariness. “The salutation of comrade hasn’t been that popular for
1. Ezra F. Vogel, “From Friendship to Comradeship: The Change in Personal Relations in Communist
China,” China Quarterly, no. 21 (January–March 1965): 46–60, at 54.
2. Yuling Pan and Daniel Z. Kádár, “Historical vs. Contemporary Chinese Linguistic Politeness,” Journal
of Pragmatics 43, no. 6 (2011): 1525–39, at 1534.
3. Vogel, “From Friendship to Comradeship,” 59.
4. Thomas B. Gold, “After Comradeship: Personal Relations in China since the Cultural Revolution,”
China Quarterly, no. 104 (December 1985): 657–75.
5. Vogel, “From Friendship to Comradeship,” 46.
6. Meng Wang and Bingyan Li, “Xiandai Hanyu shehui chengwei yu quewei xianxiang yanjiu” [The phe-
nomenon of omission of social address forms in modern Chinese], Xiandai Yuwen (Yuyan Yanjiu Ban)
[Modern Chinese (Language studies edition)], no. 9 (2015): 130–32, at 131.
7. “Rang ‘tongzhi’ mingzhishigui” [Let name and essence of “comrade” return], Renmin ribao [People's
daily], September 9, 2003, 13.

74 • T H E C H I N A J O U R N A L , No. 77
many years” one netizen remarked and added: “If uttered thoughtlessly, one may
blunder and be treated with disdain, or even gets a scolding.”8
Yet advocacy for the use of “comrade” continues to resurface in Party publi-
cations. In October 2015, Study Times (Xuexi shibao), a biweekly newspaper pub-
lished by the Central Party School, devoted an article to the topic of how Party-
state officials should address each other and stated that “comrade”—rather than
titles based on official rank (guanxian 官衔)—should be the salutation among all
Party members.9 The article emphasized that this was a Party regulation that has
been repeatedly decreed, in 1959, 1965, 1978, and 1980. This kind of reminder is
not unusual in Party publications, and the article was widely republished across
China’s media platforms. The article appeared in conjunction with a discussion
of the “four comprehensives” (sige quanmian 四个全面), Xi Jinping’s trademark
axiom of domestic politics. This juxtaposed the objective of “comprehensively
strengthen Party discipline” (quanmian congyan zhidang 全面从严治党, one of
the four comprehensives) with the idea of upholding intra-Party political proto-
col (dangnei yao jiang zhengzhi guiju 党内要讲政治规矩) and singled out the
comrade address as an “important political protocol of the Party.”
Why does the Party leadership care about address forms? Are current efforts
to reintroduce the Party’s traditional salutation nothing but a hopelessly futile
attempt to exert some discipline on cadres in the face of shifting linguistic cus-
toms?
T H E S I G N I F I C A N C E OF S A L U T A T I O N S I N S O C I A L I N T E R A C T I O N S
Much implicit information is transmitted by choosing one address form over an-
other. Forms of address operate as indicators of social distance, hierarchy, and
respect. Indeed, one “basic function of greeting and parting rituals,” Raymond
Firth argued, was “creating occasion for establishment of relative status posi-
tions.”10 Along similar lines, Erving Goffman deemed it evident that greetings
“serve to clarify and fix the roles that the participants will take during the occa-
sion of talk and commit participants to these roles.11 A similar perspective is of-
fered by scholars interested in the social psychology of politeness. Thomas
Holtgraves, for instance, emphasizes that “politeness level is informative about
8. Online comment by user “Diedie Weng” on Weibo.com (microblogging website) in reaction to a

Xuexi Shibao (学习时报) [Study times] article on “comrade” as Party salutation, October 21, 2015, http://
www.weibo.com/p/1005052546136573/.
9. Yan Chen, “Dangnei hu cheng tongzhi shi dang de youliang chuantong” [Addressing each other as
comrades is a splendid tradition of the Party], Xuexi shibao, October 19, 2015, 3.
10. Raymond Firth, “Verbal and Bodily Rituals of Greeting and Parting,” in The Interpretation of Ritual:
Essays in Honour of A. I. Richards, ed. Jean Sybil La Fontaine (London: Routledge, 1972), 31.
11. Erving Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays in Face to Face Behavior (New Brunswick: Aldine Trans-
action, 2005), 41.

one’s (presumed) status and relationship with the other”12 and cites empirical ev-
idence that people displaying a high level of politeness “tend to be perceived by
others as being relatively low in status.”13
An influential model of address forms and politeness pronouns was developed
by Brown and Gilman in 1960. Analyzing contrasting pronouns in European
languages (e.g., Latin tu vs. vos), they argued that nonreciprocation of address
pronouns indicated a lack of solidarity as well as an unequal power relationship,
while reciprocal usage—of the tu pronoun in particular—was seen to indicate
(and instill) solidarity.14
In the Chinese context, Gu Yueguo argues in an article on politeness in mod-
ern Chinese that polite behavior hinges less on rational-instrumental consider-
ations and more on cultural norms. Gu states that speakers of modern Chinese
act in accordance with a number of cultural politeness maxims—such as “self-
denigration” and the “address maxim”—which constrain individual behavior ac-
cording to societal status.15 The maxim of self-denigration specifies that speakers
“take the first chance to elevate the other person”16 and denigrate oneself. Com-
pared to English, for instance, the Chinese more rarely take an initiative to intro-
duce themselves but instead often use very polite ways to inquire about the name
(guixing 贵姓) of their interlocutor.17 Second, the address maxim relates to the
speaker’s recognition of the “specific status or role” of the interlocutor.18 Gu of-
fers a number of variables that govern appropriate address choice, among which
are “politically superior or inferior,” “interpersonally familiar or unfamiliar,” and
“on a formal or informal occasion.” Significantly, he adds that “a failure to use an
appropriate address term is a sign of rudeness, or a signal of a breakdown of es-
tablished social order.”19
Gu refers to “comrade” as an expression of solidarity among all Chinese in-
cluding those working for the government (he defines comrade as a “solidarity
booster”20) but also describes it as a state-mandated strategy of “exploiting ad-
dress terms to manipulate social distance.”21 However, against the backdrop of
12. Thomas M. Holtgraves, Language as Social Action: Social Psychology and Language Use (Mahwah,
NJ: Erlbaum, 2002), 76.
13. Ibid.
14. Roger Brown and Albert Gilman, “The Pronouns of Power and Solidarity,” in Style in Language, ed.
Thomas A. Sebeok (New York: MIT Press, 1960), 253–76.
15. Yueguo Gu, “Politeness Phenomena in Modern Chinese,” Journal of Pragmatics 14, no. 2 (1990):
237–57.
16. Ibid., 246.
17. It has been observed that most traditional self-denigrating nouns have disappeared from colloquial
Chinese language (e.g., Pan and Kádár, “Historical vs. Contemporary,” 1534).
18. Gu, “Politeness Phenomena,” 249.
19. Ibid., n. 2.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.

a culture and a bureaucracy that is extremely status-conscious, Gu does not elab-

orate what type of politeness is marked by “comrade” and whether solidarity is
primarily attained between the interlocutors themselves or at a greater societal
level. Put differently, the “comrade” address sits rather uncomfortably in the gen-
eral politeness framework he elaborates on and raises the question of whether a
mandatory reduction of linguistic distance necessarily results in feelings of soli-
darity.
Along Gu’s line of reasoning, other scholars also assume that—within the
modern-day Party—“failure to address a fellow member as comrade is still seen
as a subtle but unmistakable sign of disrespect and enmity.”22 However, this over-
emphasizes the interpersonal solidarity emanating from the address of “com-
rade.” Chinese officials are not excluded from the normative forces and expecta-
tions of the conventional etiquette of society at large. According to Gu’s categories
of appropriate address choice, a cadre talking to a supervisor might feel that var-
iables such as interpersonal unfamiliarity or political inferiority are most relevant
for the speech situation at hand.
Following Norman Fairclough’s influential synthesis of research on language
and power, one may expect that personal relations at intra-Party meetings and
discipline inspection visits are “formal situations [which] are characterized by
an exceptional orientation to and marking of position, status, and ‘face’; power
and social distance are overt, and consequently there is a strong tendency towards
politeness.”23 However, in the context of Chinese Party politics, this dynamic is to
some degree inverted. While the use of “comrade” is denoted as a formal address
form, it is actually a de facto suspension of addressing superiors by their official
status in honorific addresses such as “Bureau Chief Zhang” or “Director Wang”
that are more habitually used. This means that intermittent political campaigns,
which remind all cadres to abstain from references to official rank, actually put
lower ranking cadres at a communicative disadvantage and deprive them of a ha-
bitual mode of demonstrating deference.24 In all but the most formal of Party
contexts, using the “comrade” address when talking to a fellow cadre can be seen
as a conscious decision against alternative address forms, which may well be con-
sidered more appropriate and polite.
If one follows the proposition that appropriate address forms depend on rel-
ative status positions, then it also matters whether the hierarchically superior or
inferior person initiates the use of salutations in a verbal exchange. In fact, both
Brown and Gilman’s model of address pronouns,25 as well as Gu’s framework of
22. Pan and Kádár, “Historical vs. Contemporary,” 1533.

23. Norman Fairclough, Language and Power (Harlow: Pearson, 2001), 55.
24. Relative to other Asian languages, such as Japanese or Korean, noun honorifics are arguably even
more important in Chinese because there are fewer ways to express politeness through grammatical struc-
tures.
25. Brown and Gilman state that “the right to initiate the reciprocal T [tu] belongs to the member of the
dyad having the better power-based claim to say T without reciprocation” (“The Pronouns,” 261).

cultural maxims, stress this point.26 If an inferior person initiates a verbal ex-
change using an inappropriate, that is, equalizing address form, it would be con-
strued as either impolite toward the superior or even “as a challenge of the latter’s
social position.”27 Yet a superior does not share these concerns and is less likely
to be perceived as impolite when he or she opens a conversation with a tu pro-
noun or, for that matter, with “comrade.”28 All this of course should not be taken
to mean that social positions cannot be challenged from an inferior position. In
fact, sociolinguistic scholarship of address forms has increasingly come to accen-
tuate such motives of social action. This means that address is seen as a “dynamic
resource for negotiating and establishing social relationships in interaction.”29
Such research therefore suggests that the long-standing CCP rule of “call-
ing each other comrade”—and its accompanying requirement of skipping official
titles30—puts very different pressures on Party members depending on their rel-
ative status positions.31
The remainder of this article has two different objectives: first, to elucidate the
strategic facets of using “comrade” in the context of intra-Party politics; and sec-
ond, to refute the notion that the custom of calling each other “comrades” has
merely “lost its popularity in recent years,” given that it needs to be perpetually
reinstated by the Party.32 Traditional Chinese imperatives of respect and polite-
ness were always amplified by the hierarchy of power inherent in a Leninist sys-
tem. This meant that—in the absence of propaganda efforts—Party members
quickly turned to other, rank-based salutations that seemed to them more appro-
priate.
Importantly, these findings do not contradict the parallel use of “comrade” as
a marker of in-group legitimacy, which has been a rather stable aspect of Chinese
political discourse. During the Cultural Revolution the pertinence of new forms
26. Hanguan Fang and J. H. Heng mention that “a staff member under a certain division chief ” would
generally tend to address his chief with reference to formal rank because otherwise “he might run the risk
of a rebuff ” (“Social Changes and Changing Address Norms in China,” Language in Society 12, no. 4
(1983): 495–507, at 499.).
27. Gu, “Politeness Phenomena,” 251.
28. Ibid.
29. Catrin Norrby and Camilla Wide, eds., Address Practice as Social Action: European Perspectives (Ba-
singstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), introduction, 2.
30. The requirement to skip reference to official rank is important to note because it delegitimizes the
possibility of address compounds such as “comrade director.” In this regard, a 1983 study on the use of
“comrade” among the general Chinese populace stressed the importance of such ambiguous compounds be-
cause it allows the speaker to “say what you want and still deny it.” See Carol Myers Scotton and Wanjin
Zhu, “Tóngzhì in China: Language Change and Its Conversational Consequences,” Language in Society 12,
no. 4 (1983): 477–94, at 490. With regard to modern-day Party affairs, this strategy (job title + comrade) is
sometimes still used to alleviate the potential awkwardness posed by the Party’s address regime.
31. This point is implicit in some observations made by Yueguo Gu as well as by Carol Myers Scotton
and Wanjin Zhu, but they do not directly discuss it.
32. Guochun Gao, “Fayang ‘hucheng tongzhi’ de chuantong” [Carry forward the tradition of “calling
each other comrades”], Loudi Xinwen [Loudi news] online, April 19, 2012, http://news.ldnews.cn/shiping
/201204/110438.shtml.

Table 1. Pragmatic Effects of Intra-Party “Comrade” Salutation
Direction of “Comrade” Salutation Pragmatic Effect
Top-down Expression of solidarity; emphasizing informal power relations

Bottom-up Expression of solidarity; potential challenge of social positions
of exaggerated accusatory monikers meant that the subtler strategic dimensions

of the “comrade” address became superfluous while its in-group connotations
turned into an extremely serious matter. However, generally speaking, by period-
ically re-mandating rules for salutations, the Party leadership has repeatedly gone
far beyond the semantic construction of “comrade” as an expression of in-group
solidarity and has made strategic use of the differing top-down and bottom-up
effects of the term’s usage in the context of strict hierarchy (see table 1).
This has affected leading officials below the level of the top leadership. For
these elites, prohibiting (mutual) hierarchy-based addresses accentuates the fee-
bleness of their official position vis-à-vis the top leadership whose informal power
is paramount. Furthermore, forcing their lower level underlings to drop their usual
expressions of deference is intended to inculcate uncertainty about long-standing
personal loyalties within their respective intra-Party factions. Overall, this results
in the creation of status uncertainty under the linguistic umbrella of solidarity.
This is significant, for instance, during Party discipline inspection visits, in which
local leaders generally want to ensure that their own underlings stay loyal and
keep secrets from outside inspection teams. In such a situation, a mandatory shift
in address creates a sudden lack of publicly displayed deference toward a leading
cadre and signifies a relative elevation of subordinates’ status position in relation
to their unnerved superiors under investigation.
That the creation of status uncertainty can be in the interest of the Party center
has been frequently pointed out,33 most significantly by Party leaders themselves,
such as Liu Shaoqi. In devising their notion of democracy in the context of intra-
Party struggle sessions, they emphasized the need to ignore seniority and address
all Party members as “comrades.”34 Some of these mechanisms have endured.
Even in the Hu and Xi eras, periodic internal criticism of higher ranks is continu-
ing to play a key role in the context of anticorruption campaigns.35
33. For an early enumeration of “devices by which Mao sought to control the CCP,” including “periodic
status reversal for cadres” as well as “internal criticism of upper ranks by lower ones (e.g., PLA ‘democracy’),”
see Chalmers Johnson, “China: The Cultural Revolution in Structural Perspective,” Asian Survey 8, no. 1
(1968): 1–15, at 4.
34. ‘Hu Qiaomu huiyi Mao Zedong’ bianxiezu [Compilation team of “Hu Qiaomu remembers Mao Ze-
dong”], “Hu Qiaomu huiyi Yanan zhengfeng (xia)” [Hu Qiaomu remembers Yan’an rectification (2nd
part)], Dang de wenxian [Documents of the Party], no. 2 (1994): 59–71, at 66.
35. For a discussion of intra-Party rectification mechanisms under Hu Jintao, see David Shambaugh,
China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 129.

The highest leader’s use of the mutual comrade address during a purge or a
nationwide campaign emphasizes informal power relations, by which all Party
members below the highest leadership are framed as potentially equal before
the menacing disciplinary mechanisms of the CCP. As will be shown in more de-
tail, the mutual address of comrade can thereby serve as a reminder of the loom-
ing informality of power in the background. This also is the reason why in recent
years, forcing other leaders to publicly avow the importance of this address form
has been a strategic way to force public acknowledgments of altered power rela-
tions in the process of leadership consolidation.
The following sections will trace the history of the “comrade” address rule and
compare instances as well as reasons why it was re-mandated.
MAO ’S M A N D A T I N G O F “ C O M R A D E ”
Why did Mao urge the use of “comrade”? Having to run a huge bureaucracy, the
Party, entering its second decade of ruling China, had gravitated toward explicit
recognition of administrative ranks, which contrasted with practices during the
Yan’an era, prior to revolutionary victory, when the “comrade” address had been
a hallmark of many Party meetings. Yet this contrast alone hardly explains why
Mao thought it was necessary to suddenly reinstate this tradition. Mao personally
mandated the use of “comrade” as a Party salutation in a number of instances,
such as August 1959,36 December 1963,37 and December 1965.38 Each time, he
aimed to emphasize the status uncertainty of his alleged foes. In 1959, the target
audience was not the Party at large but high-level leaders. In 1963, Mao issued the
“comrade” instruction as an internal comment (pishi 批示) to a military leader,
and in 1965—although this time published as a central government directive—
there was hardly any public reporting of it. Though Mao had reason to believe
that his ordinances would trickle down the hierarchy, his instructions first and
foremost aimed to govern the upper echelons of the Party.
Though issued over the course of six years, the circumstances that surrounded
Mao’s decrees on the use of “comrade” were remarkably similar. At these times,
as Frederick Teiwes has pointed out, “Mao perceived—incorrectly—a challenge
to his power” and prepared to change leadership personnel.39
36. In August 1959, Mao expressed this request in personal correspondence to Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai,
Peng Zhen, and Yang Shankun. See Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji [Selected correspondence of Mao Zedong]
(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983), 565.
37. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao dishi ce [Mao Zedong's manuscripts since the establishment of the
PRC, Vol. 10] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1996), 462.
38. Nanjing junqu zhengzhibu zuzhibu bian [Organization department of the political division of the Nan-
jing military region ed.], Zuzhi gongzuo wenjian huiji dier ji dangwu gongzuo bufen [Collection of organiza-
tional work documents second series party-work section] (Nanjing: Junqu zhengzhibu zuzhibu, 1980), 501.
39. Frederick Teiwes, “Mao and His Lieutenants,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, nos. 19/20
(1988): 1–80, at 73. Teiwes also argued that “once he had determined by early 1965 that Liu had to go, Mao
undertook a concerted effort to eliminate Liu in a planned, step-by-step manner” (23).

LUSHAN 1959
During the 1959 Lushan Conference, the perceived challenge came from Marshal
Peng Dehuai 彭德怀, who, to Mao’s fury, had written a bold letter to the chair-
man trying to alter the policy of the Great Leap Forward. Mao received Peng
Dehuai’s letter on July 14, 1959,40 but it was not until July 23 that Mao showed
how much the letter had aggravated him.41 In an emotional speech he went as
far as to claim that he would assemble a new Red Army if the PLA (People’s Lib-
eration Army) was to disavow his leadership. For scholars of China’s political
elites, this has been described as a quintessential—yet unwarranted—moment
of Mao’s sensitivity to questioning of his policies.42 After receiving the letter,
Mao quickly started scheming for Peng’s removal. Mao apparently felt that Peng
carried enough political prowess and revolutionary status that his purge had to
move incrementally.
On August 3, the second day of the conference’s Central Committee Plenum,
Mao pointed out in a letter to Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Peng Zhen, and Yang
Shankun that habitual rank-based appellations needed to be uprooted, and
Mao requested the formal address of “comrade” be used by all participants: “I
suggest to address everybody without exception as so-and-so comrade. For ex-
ample: the Chairman [shall be] addressed as Comrade Mao Zedong; the Premier
as Comrade Zhou Enlai; commander Lin, commander Peng, and commander He
shall be addressed as Comrade Lin Biao, Comrade Peng Dehuai, and Comrade
He Long. Everyone else also in this fashion.”43 Chinese authors in the field of
Party and military history have—in passing—offered varying explanations. One
view is that Mao was actually reacting to an earlier slight by Peng Dehuai: that
Mao’s letter was written against the backdrop of Peng having insolently stated
that he could not get used to the address of “Chairman” (vis-à-vis Mao).44
Another view is that Mao became displeased that Peng Dehuai continued to
be addressed in a respectful, deferential manner even after he had become sub-
jected to intense criticism. A 2008 article describes how, during subcommittee
sessions intended to criticize Peng, leaders such as Zhu De 朱德 and Kang Sheng
康生 persisted in referring to the alleged transgressor as “commander Peng.”45
40. Peng Dehuai zishu [The autobiography of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1981), 275–76.
41. As Teiwes points out, Mao probably harbored other long-standing grudges against Peng. Teiwes,
“Mao and His Lieutenants,” 32.
42. Ibid., 31.
43. Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, 565.
44. Xiaokang Su, Wutuobang ji yijiuwujiu nian lushan zhi xia [Epitaph of utopia, the Lushan summer of
1959] (Beijing: Zhongguo xinwen chubanshe, 1988), 279; Luozheng Su, Qiyue fengbao [July storm] (Haikou:
Hainan sheying meishu chubanshe, 1994), 254; Jiamin Yin, “Lushan: lishi de chaqu” [Lushan: An interlude
of history], Dushu wenzhai, no. 2 (2013): 2–12, at 10.
45. Yuanming Cao, “Mao Zedong de lushan zhi xia” [The Lushan summer of Mao Zedong], Yanhuang
zongheng, no. 9 (2006): 8–12, at 12.

Indeed, as one of the most celebrated veteran generals of the PLA, Peng Dehuai
was often publicly referred to as “old commander Peng” (Peng laozong 彭老总),
which was not only a signifier of seniority and battle-earned respect but also an
endearing nickname.46
These two explanations are not mutually exclusive. It is also possible the chair-
man was trying to give an impression of consensual politics. Such a conclusion
would sit well with Lowell Dittmer’s claim that Mao “tried to maintain the im-
pression that there had been full and free debate even at Lushan.”47 Yet the
course of events at Lushan points to a different logic. Precisely because Peng
had felt that he could not speak about important issues at the small group meet-
ings at the beginning of the conference, he decided to write his fateful letter to
Mao.48 Then on the very day before ordering the use of “comrade,” Mao opened
the Eighth Central Committee Plenum with a vitriolic speech, lambasting Peng’s
earlier complaints about the meeting’s undemocratic atmosphere. “They want
freedom of speech. . . . They want freedom of speech to wreck the general Party-
line.”49
Mao subsequently derided Peng in a “be careful what you wish for” tone. As
the meeting of the Central Committee now had many more attendees than the
previous Politburo meetings, he requested that the attending cadres provide a
bigger sort of democracy entailing criticism and struggle.50 In this context,
Mao apparently sensed what the anthropologist Raymond Firth has called an
“occasion for [re]establishment of relative status positions” by barring all cadres
in the struggle sessions from addressing anybody—including the designated ob-
jects of criticism—by seniority or rank.51
These events at Lushan foretold the way Mao would strategically deploy
“comrade” as a political instrument vis-à-vis military leaders whom he felt dis-
obeyed his authority. Thus, those who intended to project obedience by address-
ing Mao as “Chairman” could be attacked for it. In 1963, he disparaged General
Mo Wenhua 莫文骅, who had already been subjected to Mao’s criticism, for his
“indecent habit of using official rank as a salutation.”52
46. As a 1949 People’s Daily article explains, the moniker “old commander Peng” was an appellation
used by soldiers to express both affection and respect toward their deputy commander in chief
(“Zhanshimen dui Peng fuzongsiling qinjing de chenghu”). Yang Lin, “Zhandou jushe huoyue zai xibei
qianxian” [The battle theatre troupe active in the northwestern front], Renmin ribao, June 15, 1949, 4.
47. Lowell Dittmer, “Chinese Informal Politics,” China Journal, no. 34 (July 1995): 20–21.
48. Yan Wang, ed., Peng Dehuai nianpu [Chronicle of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1998),
740; cited in Yunfeng He, “Cong zhengzhi goutong de shijiao kan Peng Dehuai shijian” [The Peng Dehuai
incident from the view of political communication], Shixue yuekan [Journal of historical science] 5 (2008):
86–90, at 86.
49. Xianzhi Pang and Chongji Jin, eds., Mao Zedong zhuan 1949–1976 [Biography of Mao Zedong,
1949–1976] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2013), 1964.
50. Ibid.
51. Firth, “Verbal and Bodily Rituals,” 31.
52. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao dishi ce, 463.

SHANGHAI 1965
A few years later, on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, in December 1965, an
expanded Politburo meeting was called in Shanghai to address the alleged revi-
sionism of the military leader Luo Ruiqing 罗瑞卿. Even though Luo was, at first,
neither informed about nor allowed to participate in the eight-day meeting, after
his eventual arrival in the city,53 the central government issued directive 715
(1965) “concerning some issues of salutation between comrades inside the Party:
Since Liberation many people [cadres] gradually lost this good tradition, and
[currently] greet each other based on official positions. . . . Now comrade Mao
Zedong’s [1959] instruction is particularly re-emphasized. All personnel holding
any Party office must from now on address each other as comrades.”54 Mao may
have intended to idealize the intra-Party struggles as a democratic process. In this
context, mandating the use of “comrade” meant leveling the playing field. Yet,
while his own status and authority were beyond challenge, Mao sought to turn
the playing field into a slippery place for everybody else. While superficial refer-
ences to comradery had the advantage of giving an impression of Party unity, it
also signaled the vulnerability of those in elevated positions.
This directive was most likely sent from Mao’s desk. Only a few weeks earlier,
as Macfarquhar and Schoenhals have pointed out, the chairman had dismissed
the leadership of the Party center’s General Office, which “controlled the paper
flow of the Central Committee,” and Mao henceforth almost never allowed
others to issue top-level (zhongfa 中发) directives.55
Too little is known about the proceedings in Shanghai to argue that directive
715 was issued in anticipation of direct struggle against Luo Ruiqing. However, it
is clear that there were linked contexts for both the 1959 and 1965 decrees. As
John Gittings noted, “the political thread of internal Party struggle which would
be publicly unravelled in the Cultural Revolution can thus be traced precisely to
Mao’s obstinacy in the Peng Dehuai affair” and “a separate thread of connections
leading back to Peng Dehuai was unravelled in the PLA, where Lin Biao first dis-
posed of the Chief of Staff Luo Ruiqing.”56 In both instances, Mao was sensitive
to perceived challenges from military leaders. Parallels to 1959 were so obvious
that even before Luo was fully briefed about his impending ordeal, he was first
53. Luo Ruiqing probably arrived in Shanghai on December 11, 1965. See Yao Huang, “1965 nian Luo
Ruiqing mengyuan zhenxiang” [The facts about the 1965 injustice (against) Luo Ruiqing], Wuhan wen shi
ziliao [Wuhan literature and history materials], 7 (2010): 4–14, at 8.
54. Nanjing junqu, Zuzhi gongzuo wenjian, 501. (“Jiefang yihou, xuduo ren jianjian diule zhege hao
chuantong, er yi zhiwu xiang chencheng. Xianzai te zai chongshen Mao Zedong tongzhi de zhishi, jinhou
dui danren dangnei zhiwu suoyou renyuan, yilv hucheng tongzhi.”)
55. Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2009), 19.
56. John Gittings, The Changing Face of China: From Mao to Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005), 47–48.

informed that the Shanghai meeting was “a type of Lushan.”57 Yet the meeting in
Shanghai did not reach any clear conclusion about Luo Ruiqing.58 MacFarquhar
and Schoenhals infer that this result “may have reflected general uneasiness
about a case against a four-star Long March veteran, based on flimsy evidence.”59
In late 1965, Mao’s fear of revisionism or a coup d’etat60 was projected onto a
broader number of senior Party leaders whom Mao intended to replace. Since
the summer of that year, the rank system of the army had been partially sus-
pended,61 and Mao’s “learning from the PLA” campaign was ongoing. Overall,
as Mao’s plans to attack Beijing Party leaders were in full swing, he aimed to create
a tenser atmosphere conducive to internal criticism of Party elites with high for-
mal rank.
In May 1966, after weeks of intense criticism from the military establishment,
the final report on Luo Ruiqing’s case (circulated as zhongfa 66) no longer re-
ferred to Luo as “comrade.” (Previous internal reports had still done so.) This
concluded the gradual transition from marshal to outcast and preceded the vio-
lence he was to experience during the ensuing public mass struggles of the Cul-
tural Revolution. Twice his fate was linked to the salutation of “comrade”: first,
prior to his purge from higher office when rank-based address forms were no
longer recognized and he had to be called “comrade,” and then again when even
the address of “comrade” was revoked.
In the ensuing months, as the Cultural Revolution unfolded, these strategic
deployments of “comrade” became increasingly redundant against the backdrop
of exaggerated accusatory monikers—such as “capitalist roader.” In such circum-
stances, to be called “comrade” by Mao meant that someone was not to be at-
tacked. For instance, in his autobiographical account of the Cultural Revolution,
General Chen Zaidao 陈再道 tells the story of how a written remark by Mao,
which added “comrade” to Chen’s name on a key document, saved him from be-
ing struggled to death. “If it had not been for those two characters [同志] by Mao,
Lin Biao and his followers would have squashed me.”62
57. Huang, “1965 nian,” 8.

58. Hui Zhang, “ ‘Wenge’ qianxi pipan Luo Ruiqing de jige tedian” [Some peculiarities of the criticism
toward Luo Ruiqing on the eve of the Cultural Revolution], Dangshi bolan [General review of the Commu-
nist Party of China] 7 (2014): 30–34, at 31.
59. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, 26.
60. Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun, The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger during the Cultural
Revolution, 1966–1971 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996), 61–62.
61. Echoing the effect outlined in table 1 (i.e., strengthening of informal power relations), Kenneth
Lieberthal has asserted that this measure “may in some degree have strengthened Lin [Biao]’s hand within
the PLA. It meant, essentially, that a former officer’s power now derived solely from his actual operational
assignment.” Kenneth Lieberthal, “The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Ya’an Leadership, 1958–
1965,” in The Politics of China: Sixty Years of the People’s Republic of China, 3rd ed., ed. Roderick
MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 128.
62. Chen Zaidao, Haojie zhongde yi mu: Wuhan qi ershi shijian qin liji [One act within a catastrophe:
my personal record of the Wuhan July 20th incident] (Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1989), 120.

RECREATING ORDER AFTER MAO

In the post-Mao period, it took years of what the US-based scholar Tu Weiming
called “ordinary practical living” to overcome “the psychology of suspicion, lin-
guistic violence, verbal aggressiveness, insensitivity in interpersonal communica-
tion, and an inability to be decent or polite in social relations.”63 The “comrade”
address had played a part in this violence because the in-group legitimacy it orig-
inally connoted—both national camaraderie and Party membership—had been
largely reframed in relation to the individual’s role within the Cultural Revolu-
tion.64 This vagueness meant that hardly anyone could take the moniker for
granted and would be equally careful before extending it to others.
Yet, while many Chinese citizens thus preferred to avoid overtly political vo-
cabulary altogether, the Party pushed to retain and expand the comrade nomen-
clature. In 1978, the watershed Third Plenum report re-mandated that cadres
should address each other as comrades and make “no reference to official rank”
(bu yao jiao guanxian 不要叫官衔). This emphasis on the salutation was consis-
tent with the objective of unsettling the hierarchical status quo to expedite the
reinclusion of Party members who had fallen from grace.
However, Wang Meng, one of China’s eminent novelists, in his 1979 short
story “the Barber's Tale” (Youyou cun cao xin 悠悠寸草心), depicts a scene in
which the story’s protagonist observes how “even though both the press and of-
ficial documents had repeatedly stressed that all personnel in the Party should
address each other as comrade, most people still found omitting official rank a
very difficult thing to do.”65 In mid-1979, People’s Daily bemoaned that “during
meetings of the Party organization or in daily interactions, addressing each other
by rank and position are still the norm; very rarely does one hear ‘comrade.’”66
Even the Party-controlled media printed a number of short jokes on the matter.
One involved three cadres enthusiastically and affirmatively discussing the re-
newed requirement to omit hierarchical references while constantly referring to
each other by rank: “Calling ourselves comrades is much better, don’t you agree
Director Shang?”67
63. Wei-Ming Tu, “Destructive Will and Ideological Holocaust: Maoism as a Source of Social Suffering
in China,” Daedalus 125, no. 1 (1996): 149–79, at 177.
64. The widely distributed 1966 red-guard pamphlet “100 Examples of Destroying the Four Olds and
Cultivating the Four News” stressed that everybody “except the five black categories” (hei wu lei chuwai) of
pre-Liberation landlords, capitalists, counterrevolutionaries, etc., should be addressed as “comrade.” See
Mao Zedong zhuyi xuexiao [school of Maoism], “Pojiu lixin yibai li” [100 examples of destroying the old to
make way for the new], pamphlet, August 1966, reprinted in Zhongguo wenhua dageming wenku [The Chi-
nese Cultural Revolution database], ed. Song Yongyi et al. (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2013).
65. Meng Wang, “Youyou cun cao xin” [The barber's tale], Shanghai wenxue [Shanghai literature] 9
(1979): 4–16, at 11.
66. Li Zhiyuan, “Heshi tingdao cheng tongzhi de shengyin?” [When (can one) hear the sound of the
“comrade” address], Renmin ribao, May 22, 1979.
67. Xie Xu, “Hu cheng tongzhi” [Addressing each other as comrades], Renmin ribao, July 14, 1979, 6.

The 1978 media campaign to promote the use of “comrade” also targeted the
general public. In fact, despite the ordinary populace’s preference not to use it,
the Party leadership pressed for “comrade” to be the salutation used to address
all people. While the 1965 edition of the authoritative Cihai Dictionary (辞海),
published by the Zhonghua Book Company, had defined “comrade” as referring
to people of shared political ideals and members of the same party, the 1979 ver-
sion added to this definition that it was also “the general form of salutation be-
tween PRC citizens.”
Yet once the Deng-era policies of economic reform were underway, “com-
rade” did not establish itself as a lasting form of address among the public. There
are many overlapping reasons for this, which Chinese commentators have ana-
lyzed in depth.68 Some argued that “comrade” no longer functioned in the increas-
ingly diverse web of social relations in the reform era.69 By the end of the 1980s,
“comrade” was largely seen as a rather off-putting address, especially among the
young people of the post–Cultural Revolution generation. As one linguist ob-
served at the time, “comrade” was now “confined to the realm of middle-aged
and older cadres.”70 Appropriately, a 1989 new edition of the Cihai Dictionary de-
fined comrade as “the standard form of salutation between citizens in socialist
countries,” omitting the prior reference to the People’s Republic.
During most of the 1980s and 1990s, questions about intra-Party salutations
were not regarded as significant.71 While the Party embraced market reforms and
economic growth, the Party media published only sporadic reminders for Party
members to abstain from directly transplanting into Party affairs customs from
the business world (i.e., calling one’s superior “boss”) and to observe the tradition
of comrade as an intra-Party form of address. However, such articles were usu-
ally relegated to back pages.72
68. For a Chinese scholar writing in 1988, the conceptual expansion of “comrade” to include people out-
side the Party was exactly the reason why “comrade” was depleted of its cordial connotations and thus lost
popularity. See Yuhua Wang, “ ‘Tongzhi’ ‘shifu’ yanbian xi” [An analysis of the changes of “comrade” and
“master”], Hanyu xuexi [Chinese language learning], no. 3 (1988): 46–47.
69. Yanping Xu, “ ‘Tongzhi’ zaijian” [Goodbye “comrade”], Sichuan wenxue [Sichuan literature], no. 2
(2005): 67.
70. Wang, “ ‘Tongzhi’ ‘shifu,’ ” 47.
71. One exception, foreshadowing later developments, was a 1996 directive on the use of comrade passed
by the organization department of the municipal government of Shanghai. At the time, Jiang Zemin’s
“Three Stresses” campaign (三讲 on study, politics, and virtue) was shaping up, and officials from Jiang’s
powerbase in Shanghai were eager to present quick measures of implementation. This initiative, however,
went by largely unnoticed. Incidentally, by 2000, Chinese linguists discussing address forms among Chinese
officials were able to do so without a single mention of “comrade.” See Yuhua Hu and Fanzhu Hu,
“ ‘Wangju’ ‘Zhangchu’ ‘Like’ shi xi guanchang yi zhong xin de chenghu yu de yuyi neihan ji yuyong tiaojian”
[“Wang-office” “Zhang-bureau” “Li-Division”—a preliminary analysis of content and use of a new address
form in the bureaucratic field], Xiuci xuexi [Studies in rhetoric], no. 4 (2000): 10–11.
72. See, e.g., Anzhu Zhang, “Buyi cheng lingdao ganbu wei laoban” [Calling a leading cadre “boss” is not
appropriate], Renmin ribao [People’s daily], September 9, 1996; Li Huang, “Duo cheng ‘tongzhi’ shao jiao
‘laoban’ ” [Saying more “comrade” and less “boss”], Jiancha shijian [Prosecutorial practice], no. 4 (2002): 79.

Ironically, during this period the address of “comrade” became a shared mon-
iker among homosexuals across China (initially meant semihumorously, and to-
day said more seriously).73 In popular culture, terms arose such as “comrade lit-
erature” (tongzhi wenxue 同志文学) and online “comrade communities” (tongzhi
shequ 同志社区), which may sound political but in reality have nothing to do
with the Party per se. These new uses of “comrade” have only increased the un-
willingness of Party members to use this form of address among themselves.
H U J I N T A O T A K E S O F F I C E , AN D S H A N G H A I’S
G A N G O F C OM R A DE S R E S P O N D S
In late March 2003, the Shanghai Party issued a directive that re-mandated the
old rule,74 and as a result, a number of other provinces and localities produced
similar circulars demanding the use of “comrade.”75 There was a frenzy of reports
on this in the mass media, and the topic was eventually even referred to as “the
media-hyped comrade-salutation phenomenon.”76 Overall, these directives and
the accompanying propaganda quickly gained traction because they were an easy
way for Party theoreticians and propaganda writers to put some meat on the
bones of Hu Jintao’s inaugural work-style campaign stressing cadre humble-
ness.77 Nonetheless, the Shanghai Party directive had less to do with propaganda
but was a response to mounting pressure on the Shanghai Party to display alle-
giance to the new Hu Jintao leadership.
The moment the Shanghai Party branch chose to issue its 2003 directive is sig-
nificant. While Hu Jintao had already been named China’s Party secretary at the
end of 2002, the Tenth National People’s Congress in mid-March 2003 saw him
also taking over the PRC presidency from Jiang Zemin and—more significantly—
73. Tze-lan Deborah Sang, “Feminism’s Double: Lesbian Activism in the Mediated Public Sphere of Tai-
wan,” in Spaces of Their Own: Women’s Public Sphere in Transnational China, ed. Mayfair M. Yang (Minne-
apolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 140.
74. “Zhonggong Shanghaishi bangongting ‘guanyu jin yi bu jicheng he fayang dangnei hu cheng tongzhi
youliang chuantong de tongzhi’ ” [Shanghai municipal party office “circular regarding further carrying on
the splendid tradition of calling each other comrades within the Party”], Jiefang ribao [Liberation daily],
March 24, 2003, 1.
75. Other localities include Ningxia (April 2003), Hubei (May 2003), Heilongjiang (June 2003), Jinan
(February 2004); see Dafa Gong, “Hubei shengwei chongshen dangnei yilv cheng ‘tongzhi’ ” [Hubei CCP
Committee reiterates ‘comrade’ as intra-Party salutation for all], Renmin ribao, May 22, 2003; Junxiao Du,
“Ningxia dangnei xingwen he chenghu cheng tongzhi” [Ningxia, “comrade” must be used in intra-Party
documents and salutations], People’s Daily, April 11, 2003.
76. “Rang ‘tongzhi’ mingzhishigui,” 13. Under Hu Jintao, scholarly reflections on intra-Party democracy
were encouraged. Eventually an increasing number of publications addressed the deeper roots of hierarchical
Party culture, some arguing that “no matter how many documents [about address terms] are issued, it re-
mains idle strategizing.” Guzuo Wang, “Hu cheng tongzhi nan zai nali?” [Where is the difficulty of address-
ing each other as comrades?] Jiangnan shibao [Jiangnan times], April 20, 2005, 3.
77. For other examples of cadre humbleness propaganda from Shanghai, see Wangda Lu, “Shanghai:
Changdao lingdao ganbu chang cheng gongjiao che” [Shanghai: Advocating leading cadres to frequently
take the public bus], Renmin ribao [People’s daily], January 28, 2003, 1.

the retirement of a number of senior Party leaders who still held top posts during
the waning months of the leadership transition period. The composition of the
new Politburo was a product of long and strenuous power-brokering, and uncer-
tainty remained whether factional battles could emerge between Hu Jintao’s
camp and the “Shanghai gang” around Jiang Zemin. This was mainly because
Jiang had been able to place his supporters, such as young Shanghai Mayor Chen
Liangyu (who had only been acting mayor for one year), into the Sixteenth Po-
litburo. It was thus an open question whether there eventually would be a “polit-
ical backlash against favoritism.”78
The Shanghai Party issued its directive on the use of “comrade” a few days af-
ter the National People’s Congress had concluded and Hu Jintao became presi-
dent of China. For more than two weeks after it was issued, the Shanghai direc-
tive was not mentioned in the central Party media outlets,79 indicating that it was
neither coordinated with nor particularly welcomed by the central Party media in
Beijing. Likewise, one week after the directive, Qiushi, the Central Committee’s
magazine on ideological matters, published its first issue after the leadership
transition of the Tenth National People’s Congress. The new issue included a
contentious one-page article titled “Guard against Underworld-like Behavior
within the Party” (dangnei qieji jianghuqi 党内切忌江湖气).80 The article was
the first instance in years that high-level Party media addressed the matter of
intra-Party salutations.
Chen Liangyu and the Shanghai Party had reason to assume that they were
targets of this oblique polemic against underworld-like behavior. It stated that
“those loyal to their master are showered with special treatment and even given
promotions in violation of Party discipline.” The article used the issue of im-
proper address forms to point to Party factionalism and particularly lambasted
“some leading cadres using social gatherings of people from their hometown,
old schoolmates or army buddies to wantonly expand their net of relationships
and set up family ties and gangs.”81
Keeping in mind that contributions in an important ideological magazine
such as Qiushi need a round of approval by various desks to be signed off, it is very
possible that the Shanghai Party directive was drafted in response to the Qiushi
78. Cheng Li, “The ‘Shanghai Gang’: Force for stability or cause for conflict,” China Leadership Monitor,
no. 1, pt. 2 (2002): 1–16, at 2.
79. Only the Shanghai-based regional supplement of the People’s Daily and a number of southern news-
papers carried the story. See “Cong ‘laoban’ dao ‘tongzhi’ ” [From “boss” to “comrade”], Renmin ribao,
huadong xinwen [People’s daily, eastern China edition], March 24, 2003; “Shanghai shiwei yaoqiu shuli
zhengque de quanliguan dangnei hu cheng tongzhi bu han zhiwu” [Shanghai municipal committee requires
correct attitudes on power; within the Party “comrade” and not job positions should be mutual address],
Nanfang ribao [Nanfang daily], March 24, 2003.
80. Meiping Yao, “Dangnei qieji jianghuqi” [Guard against underworld-like behavior within the Party],
Qiushi, no. 7 (2003): 47.
81. Ibid.

article even though it predates the latter by a week. This assumption is further
bolstered by the fact that on the day before Qiushi was finally published, the
Shanghai Party held an “organizational-life meeting of the special topic of
carrying-on and making full use of the ‘fine tradition of calling each other com-
rades,’”82 where Party Secretary Chen Liangyu spoke in favor of the comrade sal-
utation and stressed that “in Shanghai, no Party member should be outside the
boundaries of Party discipline and supervision.”83 On the very day of the Qiushi
magazine article, the Shanghai newspaper Liberation Daily titled a front-page ar-
ticle on the activities of the Shanghai Party “‘Comrade’ Strikes a Deep Chord in
People’s Hearts” (Tongzhi, zheng shenrurenxin 同志, 正深入人心).84
It seems certain that both the Shanghai directive and the Qiushi article were
issued in the context of the power politics of leadership transition and, as a by-
product, subsequently triggered a Party-wide pledge of comradeship, allegiance,
and cadre modesty under Hu Jintao’s new leadership. (Parenthetically, Chen
Liangyu ultimately was purged and jailed by Hu on grounds of corruption.)
XI J INPING ’S A N T I C O R R U P T I O N CA M P A I G N
When Xi Jinping came to power, he initiated an attack against the “four [bad]
work styles” (sifeng wenti 四风问题) of formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism, and
extravagance, which came to include the issue of intra-Party salutations.
In the summer of 2014, the Guangdong Discipline and Inspection Commis-
sion issued a “notification on strict salutation-discipline between Party and ad-
ministrative personnel.” This directive stirred up particular attention because it
did not mandate the use of “comrade” as had been normally the case, but rather
only ruled out the use of highly informal address forms such as “boss” (laoda 老大)
or “mate” (gemen 哥们).85 The next day, various authoritative Party-news web-
sites carried comments praising Guangdong’s decision to “avoid concrete guide-
lines for cadre salutations” as “rational and wise.”86 One article pointed out that
82. Qiang Dong, “Chen Liangyu zai suozai dang xiaozu zhuanti zuzhi shenghuohui shang diyi ge fayan
hu cheng tongzhi shi dangnei shenghuo zhunze” [Chen Liangyu’s first speech at the present Party small
group special meeting on organizational life; calling each other comrades is the standard for intra-Party life],
Jiefang ribao [Liberation daily], April 3, 2003, 1.
83. Ibid. (“Zai Shanghai bu yinggai you bu shou dangji yueshu, bu jieshou dangnei jiandu de
dangyuan.”)
84. Wenjing Zhou and Meifen Hong, “ ‘Tongzhi’ zheng shenrurenxin” [“Comrade” struck a deep chord
in people's hearts], Jiefang ribao [Liberation daily], April 1, 2003, 1.
85. “Sheng jiwei tongzhi yaoqiu yanming dangzheng jiguan gongzuo renyuan zhijian chenghu jilu” [Cir-
cular of provincial discipline inspection commission requests firm discipline regarding interpersonal address
forms in Party and government bodies], Nanyue qingfeng wang [Southern Guangdong integrity net], May 14,
2014, http://gdjct.gd.gov.cn/zhyw/21993.jhtml.
86. Lifeng Liu, “Rang ‘tongzhi‘ huigui xu xian pochu guanxin zuosui” [For “comrade” to return it is first
necessary to eliminate the malign official mentality], Dongnan wang [Southeast web], May 15, 2014, http://
www.fjsen.com/r/2014-05/15/content_14081155.htm.

the greeting of comrade “makes people feel behind the times and awkward” and
argued for a flexible system that allows shifting between salutations to fit the
situation. The same week, People’s Daily printed three letters to the editor that
noted that most cadres actually can’t get themselves (jiao bu chukou 叫不出口)
to address their supervisors as comrades, and that superiors were often too em-
barrassed to mention it.87
Conservative Party theoreticians were in no way pleased with this develop-
ment. A response to the Guangdong directive stated that the use of “comrade”
was “still not out-of-date”88 and that it would fall within the scope of the new
“three stricts, three honests” campaign (san yan san shi 三严三实) to “lead the
way for a healthy return of using comrade as an intra-Party salutation.”89 This
opinion seemed to echo the views of the Party leadership. A few days later, the
website of Qiushi magazine pointed out that the Party’s traditional salutation
had been “deliberately shunned” and emphasized that Xi Jinping had defined
the first of the “three stricts” as “self-cultivation” and first and foremost as “cul-
tivation of Party character.”90 In March 2015, this logic was explicitly included in
a maxim of cadre education—the “seven [things] not to fear” (qi bu pa 七不怕),91
which inter alia stipulated that leading cadres should not fear being regarded as
“too orthodox.” This document has since been used for Party study sessions
around the country.92 Its message is that “some people have poured scorn on or-
thodoxy as being stiff and rigid,” but “when we talk about orthodoxy it means we
87. “Chenghu yongsuhua, ruhe lai gen zhi” [The vulgarization of appellations, how to bring it under per-
manent control], Renmin ribao, May 19, 2014, 5.
88. “Wangyou reyi: Dangnei chenghu yongsuhua shi la bang jie pai dei guanchang jianghu qi” [Heated
netizen debate: Intra-Party vulgarization [to do with] the underworld-like atmosphere of forming cliques
and factions], Zhongguo Gongchandang Xinwenwang [CCP news web], May 15, 2014, http://cpc.people
.com.cn/pinglun/n/2014/0515/c78779-25022151.html.
89. See, e.g., Min Yang, “Rang ‘tongzhi’ jiankang huigui” [Let “comrade” healthily return], Jiangxi ribao
[Jiangxi daily], May 16, 2014, 2.
90. See “Xi Jinping tan san yan san shi” [Xi Jinping talks about three stricts three honests], Xinhua wang
[Xinhua online], March 9, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-03/09/c_119680052.htm; in 2015,
this understanding of self-cultivation as “cultivation of Party character” became even more pronounced. See,
e.g., “Wei guan bi xiushen” [Officials must self-cultivate], Renmin ribao [People’s daily], July 29, 2015, 7.
91. Wenxiu Xu, “Lingdao ganbu dang you qi bu pa” [Leading cadres ought to have “seven (things) not
to fear”], Renmin ribao, March 20, 2015, 4.
92. See, e.g., Lanli Xiang, “Guanling zhaokai ‘san yan san shi’ zhuanti xuexi hui” [Guanling opens “three
stricts three honests” special topic study session], Guizhou xinhuanet [Guizhou Xinhua online], June 23,
2015, http://www.gz.xinhuanet.com/2015-06/23/c_1115695352.htm; “Tahe si gao dang zong zhi lilun xuexi
zhongxin zu zhaokai 2015 nian di er ci zhuanti xuexi hui” [Tahe advanced (middle school) main Party
branch study center organizes second 2015 special topic study session], Tahe Si Gao [Tahe school website],
March 30, 2015, http://www.hnlhsg.cn/info_Show.asp?InfoIdp279&ClassIdp25; “Guo Zhichen
wei shi caizhengju dangyuan ganbu shang dang ke” [Guo Zhichen gives Party lecture to Party members and
cadres of city finance office], Jincheng zaixian [Jincheng online], April 3, 2015, http://xn–3dsxow27at3w.xn
–fiqs8s/Contents/Channel_7403/2015/0403/1184020/content_1184020.htm.

are passing on the splendid traditions of the past.”93 In other words, the stress on
proper address forms is part of a larger pedagogical effort of the Xi Jinping lead-
ership in fostering cadre self-cultivation. For this, the fact that the Chinese public
now customarily perceives “comrade” as outdated has dramatically intensified
the performative, speech-act quality of this traditional address in everyday Party
life. If used outside a formal Party setting, most cadres will wonder whether it is a
joke or whether it is used out of fear of an internal investigation or out of pure
orthodoxy in support of the central Party line.
Undoubtedly, very few in the Party seriously thought that it would be possible
to reestablish “comrade” as an everyday greeting in the Party. Instead, the moves
to reinstate “comrade” as Party salutation were a product of the overarching anti-
corruption campaign through which the new leadership, in the words of a
Hong Kong–based academic, has been sending “strong messages to stakeholders
and monopoly interests that Xi can remove them if they are deemed disloyal.”94
The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection issued province-level ordi-
nances on the proper use of address forms in Guangdong (2014) and Jiangxi
(2015) during the rounds of inspection tours in these two provinces. In all likeli-
hood, corruption inspection officials valued the address for similar strategic rea-
sons as Mao: the requirement to address each other and particularly “leading cad-
res” as comrades is intended to weaken the latter’s position.95
So, too, much as in Mao’s time, after an official has been purged, the unsettling
designation of “comrade” is removed to stipulate that the official is now cast out
and persona non grata. In Xi’s current anticorruption campaigns, reports on con-
victed transgressors are often juxtaposed with a headline asserting that the fallen
official could no longer be addressed as “comrade.”96
CONCLU SION
For Party members, addressing each other as comrades is a difficult rule to follow
and is thus habitually unheeded. Throughout PRC history, Party propaganda has
93. Xu, “Lingdao ganbu,” 4.

94. Hualing Fu, “Wielding the Sword: President Xi’s New Anti-Corruption Campaign,” in Greed, Cor-
ruption, and the Modern State, ed. Susan Rose-Ackerman and Paul Lagunes (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,
2015), 137.
95. The respective guidelines tend to emphasize the address rule with regard to conversations with lead-
ing cadres. See “Zhonggong Jiangxi shengwei guanyu jiaqiang zuofeng jianshe yingzao lianghao congzheng
huanjing de yijian” [Opinion of the Jiangxi Party committee on strengthening work style and creating a
sound environment in politics], Jiangxi ribao [Jiangxi daily], April 24, 2015, 1.
96. See, e.g., “Weihe bu zai cheng Zhou Yongkang ‘tongzhi’ ” [Why Zhou Yongkang is no longer ad-
dressed as “comrade”], Souhu xinwen [Souhu news online], July 19, 2014, http://news.sohu.com/20140729
/n402884693.shtml; “Tang Wuji: Weiji guanyuan buyi reng cheng tongzhi” [Tang Wuji: Inappropriate
to address discipline violating officials as “comrade”], Hebei xinwenwang [Hebei news online], July 14, 2014,
http://comment.hebnews.cn/2014-07/14/content_4036026.htm.

recurrently lamented that Party members turn to other forms of address. Tradi-
tional Chinese imperatives of respect and politeness were amplified by the power
hierarchy under which officials in the Leninist Party state had to work. This was
the case during Mao’s reign and remains true today. In most situations, cadres
addressed each other not in accordance with any official “comrade” rule but pri-
marily in accordance with the hierarchical Party culture. It is precisely against
this backdrop of general noncompliance that re-mandating the “comrade” ad-
dress has intermittently been strategically employed. With noncompliance the
norm in daily Party operations, this puts the Party leadership in the comfortable
position of projecting benevolent solidarity (or even faux equality) in order to
solicit nervous pledges of allegiance.
As has also been observed, even though “comrade” normally is supposed to
connote intra-Party camaraderie and shared ideals, the Party leadership from
Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping has also turned to the “comrade” salutation dur-
ing campaigns, inspections, and purges as a supplementary political tool. But
whereas Mao’s directives on Party salutations were sometimes issued with an im-
minent purge of particular figures in mind, the rule has in recent decades been
mandated more preemptively, as a proxy to confront alleged factionalism and
patronage networks.
The strategic facets of mandating “comrade” primarily manifest themselves
within the context of intra-Party politics. For that reason, depicting the use of
“comrade” as a political instrument does not contradict the notion’s parallel role
as a marker of in-group legitimacy. Neither does such a description refute that
comrade expresses solidarity. However, mandating the address connotes a depre-
ciation of formal Party hierarchy and a leveling of the playing field for those be-
low the apex of power; comrades are supposed to be “equals” in their joint strug-
gle to sustain the central Party line. This corresponds to what the Party’s early
theorists of intra-Party democracy, such as Liu Shaoqi, had in mind when they
wrote about the importance of this address.
At the level of communication, this redirection of solidarity is attained
through two particular pragmatic effects (see table 1). A potential challenge of
social positions is most forcefully conveyed when previously deferential under-
lings of Party elites are suddenly required to use an equalizing address form to-
ward their superiors. A second effect, emphasizing informal power relations, re-
sults from the fact that the personal authority of the highest leadership tends to be
much less grounded in formal posts than those of other Party officials. Once for-
mal rank-based address forms are no longer recognized, the leadership’s informal
power moves to the foreground.
While there has been a lot of recurrence in the ways the address has been stra-
tegically mandated throughout the outlined cases, it is also important to mention
that broader societal changes have gradually altered some of the address’s char-
acteristics. The disappearance of “comrade” as a form of address among the gen-

eral population and the subversive use of the term by the gay community have
increased the communicative force of the “comrade” salutation as a marker of
Party orthodoxy. Connected to this, even though Party propaganda often stresses
the term’s origins as a casual moniker among a revolutionary band of brothers,
“comrade” has become an ever more official address form. Since the reform pe-
riod, directives on “comrade” have even framed the address as distinctly profes-
sional, detached from interpersonal feelings. This is why, in recent decades, one
section of Mao’s 1965 directive on Party address terms has been deliberately de-
leted, but an altered form has been widely reproduced and presented as still-in-
force. The directive originally posited that besides “comrade” the Chinese people
would also feel “close and dear” to their local officials if they could “directly ad-
dress them as old Li or old Zhang.” In the new, abridged, version, this section is
withheld, and “comrade” is thus more clearly posited as an address form to be
used only among cadres in intra-Party affairs and—in contrast to overly person-
alized appellations—as conducive to orthodox professionalism.
Xi’s current campaign slogan of “comprehensively and strictly govern the Party”
(quanmian congyan zhidang 全面从严治党) is intended to instill fear among
leading cadres about the consequences of schmoozing and colluding with their
staff as well as to inculcate uncertainty about their subordinates’ personal loyalty.
Be it in formal corruption investigations or (less likely) in daily conversations, a
sudden switch from rank-based honorifics to the equalizing salutation of “com-
rade”—particularly if initiated by lower ranking cadres—indicates the possibility
of ignoring and realigning relative status positions. Forcing lower officials to dis-
play an orthodox mind-set vis-à-vis their immediate superiors is one of the core
purposes of intra-Party political campaigns. This speaks to studies of address
forms that perceive them as a “dynamic resource for negotiating and establishing
social relationships in interaction.”97 The theoretical contribution here is that
power holders can also strategically, and intermittently, mobilize the linguistic
resources of address forms.
97. Norrby and Wide, Address Practice as Social Action, introduction, 2.


The Use of "Comrade" As A Political Instrument in The Chinese Communist Party, From Mao To Xi

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The Use of "Comrade" As A Political Instrument in The Chinese Communist Party, From Mao To Xi

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The Use of “Comrade” as a Political

Instrument in the Chinese Communist

Electronically published September 26, 2016

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8. Online comment by user “Diedie Weng” on Weibo.com (microblogging website) in reaction to a

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a culture and a bureaucracy that is extremely status-conscious, Gu does not elab-

22. Pan and Kádár, “Historical vs. Contemporary,” 1533.

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Table 1. Pragmatic Effects of Intra-Party “Comrade” Salutation

Direction of “Comrade” Salutation Pragmatic Effect

Top-down Expression of solidarity; emphasizing informal power relations

of exaggerated accusatory monikers meant that the subtler strategic dimensions

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57. Huang, “1965 nian,” 8.

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RECREATING ORDER AFTER MAO

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93. Xu, “Lingdao ganbu,” 4.

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97. Norrby and Wide, Address Practice as Social Action, introduction, 2.

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