. [G.R. No. 236020. January 8, 2020.

PAPERTECH, PINC. APERTECH, INC.,

p e titio n e r ,

v s . v s . JOSEPHINE P. KATANDO JOSEPHINE P. KATANDO ,

respondent.

DDECISION ECISION

CCARANDANG ARANDANG, J p: This is a Petition for Review on C e r tio r a ri 11 led by petitioner

Papertech, Inc. (Papertech) assailing the Decision 22 dated August 18, 2017 and Resolution 33 dated
December 1, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 142250. The CA reversed and set aside
the Decision 44 dated May 25, 2015 and Resolution 55 dated June 30, 2015 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), which armed the Decision 66 dated January 30, 2015 of Labor Arbiter
Nicolas B. Nicolas (Labor Arbiter Nicolas), insofar as it ordered the payment of separation pay to
respondent Josephine P. Katando (Katando) in lieu of her reinstatement. AAntecedents ntecedents On
June 6, 1996, Papertech hired Katando as a machine operator 77 in its oce at 835 Felipe Pike Street,
Bagong Ilog, Pasig City. 88 In 2007, Katando and other employees of Papertech led a Petition for
Certication Election. 99 They conducted a picket in the company on February 28, 2008. 110 0 This
prompted Papertech to le a Complaint for Illegal Strike 111 1 against Katando and the other participants
in the picket on May 24, 2008. Papertech prayed that the participants be declared to have lost their
employment. 112 2 Labor Arbiter Thomas T. Que, Jr. (Labor Arbiter Que) ruled in favor of Papertech on
May 30, 2008, but his ruling was reversed by the NLRC on appeal in its Decision on May 29, 2009. 113 3
The NLRC ordered the reinstatement of Katando and her fellow employees. The ruling of the NLRC was
upheld by the CA and this Court, and became nal and executory on September 2, 2011. Upon motion of
Katando and the other employees, Labor Arbiter Que issued a Writ of Execution on April 17, 2013
ordering their reinstatement at Papertech's premises in Pasig City. 114 4 On May 14, 2013, Papertech
sent a notice to Katando and other employees ordering them to report to various posts in Cagayan De
Oro, Davao City, Cebu City, Iloilo City, and Pangasinan, under pain of removal in case of non-compliance.
They led a Manifestation with Urgent Motion to Cite Respondent Company in Contempt and to Order
Payment of their Salaries. 115 5 On August 5, 2013, Labor Arbiter Que denied their manifestation with
motion, so they led a veried petition for extraordinary remedies before the NLRC. The NLRC granted it in
its Resolutions dated September 30, 2013 116 6 and November 29, 2013 117 7 and declared the Order
118 8 dated August 5, 2013 of Labor Arbiter Que null and void. The NLRC ordered Labor Arbiter Que to
resolve the issues on the salaries as contained in Katando and her co-respondents' manifestation with
motion, and to proceed with the execution of the NLRC Decision dated May 29, 2009 without delay. 119
9 Papertech assailed the NLRC Resolutions before the CA. 220 0

On December 14, 2013, Katando received a memorandum from Papertech stating that due to urgency of
business, she will be transferred to its Makati oce. 221 1 The memorandum states that she will still be
under the same employment terms and conditions but will be tasked to clean the area. 222 2 Three days

1
later, Katando received another memorandum asking her to explain why she should not be subjected to
disciplinary action for failing to sign the December 14, 2013 memorandum, for her refusal to transfer to
the Makati oce, and for shouting at Papertech's representative. Papertech sent Katando a memorandum
on December 26, 2013 imposing a seven-day suspension upon her for her disrespectful behaviour to her
fellow employees and officials of the company. 223 3 Katando served her suspension. However, she was
suspended yet again for one week for her disobedience or refusal to transfer as directed. Katando then
led a complaint for illegal suspension before the NLRC. 224 4 Papertech issued a memorandum dated
February 6, 2014 to Katando reiterating her transfer to its Makati oce. 225 5 Thereafter, Papertech
issued a notice to Katando requiring her to explain within 48 hours why she refused to receive the
February 6, 2014 memorandum. Katando submitted her explanation. 226 6 Papertech issued another
notice to Katando on February 17, 2014 directing her to explain why she should not be administratively
charged for refusing to transfer to its Makati oce. Despite submitting her explanation, Papertech issued
a notice on February 24, 2014 dismissing Katando for her insubordination. Katando led a complaint for
illegal dismissal, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees against Papertech 227 7 and its
Chairman of the Board of Directors, Alexander Wong, and Human Resource Manager Joan M. Balde. 228
8 On May 26, 2014, Labor Arbiter Rosalina Maria O. Apita-Battung issued a Decision 229 9 finding that
Katando's suspension was illegal. 330 0 RRuling of the Labor Arbiter uling of the Labor Arbiter On
January 30, 2015, Labor Arbiter Nicolas issued a ruling in favor of Katando in this case, to wit:
WWHEREFORE HEREFORE, premises considered, complainant is declared illegally dismissed.
Accordingly, respondent Papertech, Inc. is ordered to pay her backwages, other benets, separation pay
plus attorney's fees, in the total amount of P429,258.72 as computed in this decision. Other claims are
denied for lack of merit. SSO ORDERED. O ORDERED. 331 1 Labor Arbiter Nicolas held that there was no
just cause for Katando's termination. Papertech failed to prove the existence of a legitimate urgency
justifying her transfer to the Makati oce. In fact, they did not disprove the certication from the Makati
City Business Permit Oce that it is not a registered entity in Makati City. 332 2 Thus, Labor Arbiter
Nicolas ordered Papertech to pay Katando backwages from the time that she was illegally dismissed
until the nality of its decision based on her daily wage plus allowance amounting to P480.00. However,
Katando's prayer for reinstatement was not granted. Instead, Papertech was ordered to pay her
separation pay of one month pay for every year of service from the commencement of her employment
on June 6, 1996 until the nality of its decision. According to Labor Arbiter Nicolas, "[t]he ling of the
instant case and the attempts of the Papertech to transfer the complainant have brought about
antipathy and antagonism between them, thereby resulting to strained relationship." 333 3 With respect
to the claim for damages, it was, likewise, denied due to Katando's failure to discuss or pray for it in her
position paper. Labor Arbiter Nicolas granted attorney's fees because Katando was forced to litigate.
Katando partially appealed to the NLRC. 334 4 RRuling of the NLRC uling of the NLRC On May 25, 2015,
the NLRC denied the partial appeal but ordered Papertech to pay Katando her backwages from the time
that she was illegally dismissed on February 25, 2014 until the nality of its decision, and separation pay
computed at one month pay for every year of service up to the finality of the decision. 335 5 The NLRC
agreed with the Labor Arbiter that separation pay should be given to Katando in lieu of her
reinstatement. The NLRC cited several cases involving Papertech and Katando, namely: (1) Papertech's
complaint in 2008 for illegal strike; (2) Katando's veried petition for extraordinary remedies in
September 2013; (3) Katando's complaint for illegal suspension in February 2014; and (4) Katando's

2
complaint for illegal dismissal on April 24, 2014. The NLRC held that these cases created an atmosphere
of antipathy and antagonism. 336 6 According to the NLRC, "separation pay is the better alternative as it
liberates Katando from what could be a highly hostile work environment, while releasing respondents
from the grossly unpalatable obligation of maintaining in their employ a worker they could no longer
trust." 337 7 Katando appealed to the CA. Meanwhile on November 9, 2015, the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No.
135557, 338 8 nullied the Resolutions dated September 30, 2013 and November 29, 2013 of the NLRC
and directed Katando and her co-respondents to report back to work in the place designated by
Papertech per notice of job assignments dated May 4, 2013, or if they obstinately refuse such
assignment, ordered Papertech to pay them separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every
year of service, as fraction of at least six months being considered as one whole year. 339 9 The CA held
that Papertech was able to prove that it could no longer reinstate Katando and her co-petitioners to
their previous positions. The abolition of these positions in its premises in Pasig City and the employees'
reassignment to its provincial plants were a valid exercise of its management prerogative. 440 0 Should
the employees refuse their reinstatement to an equivalent position, the CA held that the payment of
separation pay is a viable remedy. 441 1 This Court upheld the ruling of the CA in Our Resolution 442 2
dated August 15, 2016, which became final and executory on November 21, 2016. 443 3 RRuling of the
CA uling of the CA On August 18, 2017, the CA granted Katando's petition and ordered Papertech to
immediately reinstate her to her previous position without loss of seniority rights in addition to the
award of backwages. 444 4 The CA ruled that the doctrine of strained relations cannot apply to Katando
as she is part of the rank and le workforce and does not occupy a managerial or key position in the
company. She even asked for her reinstatement. In addition, there is no proof of strained relations
between her and Papertech. 445 5 It is not sucient that the parties were involved in several cases
because no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's right. 446 6
Papertech led a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA. Thus, it led a petition for review
on c e r tio r a ri before this Court seeking the reversal of the ruling of the CA. In compliance with the
Resolution of this Court, Katando led her comment and/or opposition to Papertech's petition. IIssue
ssue Whether the CA erred in ordering the reinstatement of Katando instead of granting her separation
pay. RRuling of the Court uling of the Court We grant the petition. The doctrine of strained relations was
rst introduced in the case of B ala q u e z o n E m p lo y e e s & W o r k e r s T r a n s p o r t a tio n U nio n
v. Z a m o r a . 447 7 In B ala q u e z o n , the Court awarded backwages as severance pay based on
equity. The Court explained, "[t]his means that a monetary award is to be paid to the striking employees
as an alternative to reinstatement which can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time or
because of the "realities of the situation." 448 8 After B ala q u e z o n , the Court further expounded on
the doctrine of strained relations in the case of G lo b e - M a c k a y C a b le a n d R a d io C o r p . v. N a
tio n al L a b o r R ela tio n s C o m mis sio n , 449 9 wherein We discussed the following considerations in
applying the doctrine of strained relations: (1) the employee must occupy a position where he or she
enjoys the trust and condence of his or her employer; 550 0 (2) it is likely that if reinstated, an
atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the eciency and
productivity of the employee concerned; (3) it cannot be applied indiscriminately because some hostility
is invariably engendered between the parties as a result of litigation; and (4) it cannot arise from a valid
and legal act of asserting one's right. 551 1 After G lo b e - M a c k a y , We claried that the doctrine
cannot apply when the employee has not indicated an aversion to returning to work, or does not occupy

3
a position of trust and condence in, or has no say in the operation of, the employer's business. 552 2 In
addition, strained relations between the parties must be proven as a fact. 553 3 Although Katando does
not occupy a position of trust and condence as a machine operator, the circumstances of this case
nonetheless calls for the application of the doctrine of strained relations. It is true that litigation
between the parties p e r s e should not bar the reinstatement of an employee. However, as observed
by the NLRC, this is not the only case involving Papertech and Katando. They have been in conict since
2008, or for 11 years now. In the case of Dig it al T ele c o m m u nic a tio n s P hilip p in e s, I n c . v. Dig it
el E m p lo y e e s U nio n , 554 4 We held that the length of time from the occurrence of the incident to
its resolution and the demonstrated litigiousness of the parties showed that their relationship is
strained. Similarly, the protracted litigation between the parties here suciently demonstrate that their
relationship is strained. It is notable that Papertech has not even bothered to appeal the ruling of the
Labor Arbiter, and even stated that "in order not to prolong the proceedings, and for both parties to
peacefully move on from this unwanted situation, Papertech is willing to pay the judgment award of
separation pay." 555 5 Clearly, Papertech does not want Katando back as its employee. Moreover, the
CA stated in its nal and executory November 9, 2015 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 135557, wherein
Katando was one of the respondents together with Papertech's other employees, that what remained in
Papertech's Pasig City premises was its sales, marketing, and distribution operations. In that case, the CA
held that the transfer of Papertech's manufacturing and production departments to its provincial plants
was valid. Consequently, the positions held by Katando and her co-respondents in Pasig City were
abolished. 556 6 Bearing this in mind, Katando's reinstatement as a machine operator in Papertech's
Pasig City premises is no longer possible. Thus, separation pay is the only viable option for Katando.

In addition to the monetary awards to Katando, legal interest to be counted from the time of
extrajudicial or judicial demand, if the amount was established with reasonable certainty, or otherwise
from the date of judgment of the court which quantied the amount until full payment, may also be
imposed. However, the imposition of legal interest is subject to the discretion of the court. 557 7
Considering that Papertech was willing to pay Katando's backwages and separation pay after Labor
Arbiter Nicolas rendered his Decision, 558 8 We nd that the imposition of an interest in this case is not
warranted. Papertech should not be penalized for the delay in payment of the monetary awards
because it was Katando who opted to elevate the case before the NLRC and the CA. WWHEREFORE
HEREFORE, the petition is GGRANTED RANTED. The Decision dated August 18, 2017 and the Resolution
dated December 1, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142550 are hereby RREVERSED
EVERSED and SSET ASIDE ET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 25, 2015 and the Resolution dated June 30,
2015 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR Case No. 04-04837-14 are RREINSTATED
EINSTATED. SSO ORDERED.

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 42. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER vs. NLRC

[G.R. No. 147080.  April 26, 2005]

FACTS:

The petitioner’s refusal to negotiate for a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) resulted in a union-led
strike. The Sec. of Labor and Employment rendered a decision Directing the management of the Capitol
Medical Center to negotiate a CBA with the Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of
Filipino Workers, the certified bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees. Pursuant thereto, the
Union requested for a meeting to discuss matters pertaining to a negotiation for a CBA but was refused.

Instead of filing a motion with the SOLE for the enforcement of the resolutions of Undersecretary
Laguesma as affirmed by this Court, the Union filed a Notice of Strike on October 29, 1997 with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), serving a copy thereof to the petitioner.  The Union
alleged as grounds for the projected strike the following acts of the petitioner: (a) refusal to bargain; (b)
coercion on employees; and (c) interference/ restraint to self-organization.

Petitioner asserted that the strike was illegal that no voting had taken place on November 10, 1997;
moreover, no notice of such voting was furnished to the NCMB at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to
the intended holding of the strike vote.

ISSUE: Whether or not the strike was valid.

RULING:

No. A union is mandated to notify the NCMB of an impending dispute in a particular bargaining unit via a
notice of strike.  Thereafter, the NCMB, through its conciliator-mediators, shall call the parties to a
conference at the soonest possible time in order to actively assist them in exploring all possibilities for
amicable settlement.  In the event of the failure in the conciliation/mediation proceedings, the parties
shall be encouraged to submit their dispute for voluntary arbitration.  However, if the parties refuse, the
union may hold a strike vote, and if the requisite number of votes is obtained, a strike may ensue.  The
purpose of the strike vote is to ensure that the decision to strike broadly rests with the majority of the
union members in general and not with a mere minority, and at the same time, discourage wildcat
strikes, union bossism and even corruption. A strike vote report submitted to the NCMB at least seven
days prior to the intended date of strike ensures that a strike vote was, indeed, taken.  In the event that
the report is false, the seven-day period affords the members an opportunity to take the appropriate
remedy before it is too late. The 15 to 30 day cooling-off period is designed to afford the parties the
opportunity to amicably resolve the dispute with the assistance of the NCMB conciliator/mediator, while
the seven-day strike ban is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected
strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members.

The requirement of giving notice of the conduct of a strike vote to the NCMB at least 24 hours before
the meeting for the said purpose is designed to (a) inform the NCMB of the intent of the union to
conduct a strike vote; (b) give the NCMB ample time to decide on whether or not there is a need to

5
supervise the conduct of the strike vote to prevent any acts of violence and/or irregularities attendant
thereto; and (c) should the NCMB decide on its own initiative or upon the request of an interested party
including the employer, to supervise the strike vote, to give it ample time to prepare for the deployment
of the requisite personnel, including peace officers if need be.  Unless and until the NCMB is notified at
least 24 hours of the union’s decision to conduct a strike vote, and the date, place, and time thereof, the
NCMB cannot determine for itself whether to supervise a strike vote meeting or not and insure its
peaceful and regular conduct.  The failure of a union to comply with the requirement of the giving of
notice to the NCMB at least 24 hours prior to the holding of a strike vote meeting will render the
subsequent strike staged by the union illegal.

In this case, the respondent Union failed to comply with the 24-hour prior notice requirement to the
NCMB before it conducted the alleged strike vote meeting on November 10, 1997.  As a result, no strike
vote meeting ever took place and the strike staged by the respondent union was illegal.

43. PAL vs PALEA,

Philippine Airlines Incorporated vs Philippine Airlines Employees Association

Employees who ceased to work but are still deemed employees

FACTS:

Appeal by certiorari , by PAL from an order of the CIR (Court of Industrial Relations) the dispositive part
of reads:

WHEREFORE , THE Philippine Air Lines is hereby ordered to pay the four claimants, Messrs. Fortuno
Biangco, Hernando Guevarra, Bernardino Abarrientos and 140 days each, sick leave which the two may
use or enjoy according to existing company rules, and regulations regarding this privilege, and to allow
the four claimants the enjoyment of their earned and accumulated free trip passes both here and
aboard subject to the above-mentioned plan the company may adopt. In order to effect early payment
of the Christmas bonus, the Chief Examiner of the Court or his duly authorized representatives is hereby
directed to examine; pertinent records of the company, to compute and determine the Christmas bonus
due each of the four claimant and to submit a report therefore immediately upon completion of the
same.

On May 4, 1950, PAL dismissed its above named four (4) employees, who are members of PALEA. On
July 13, 1954, the CIR en banc passed a resolution, directing the reinstatement of said employess "to
their former or equivalent position in the company, with back wages from the date of their
reinstatement, and without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges. This was affirmed
by the SC.

Said employees were reinstated and subsequently their backwages, computed at the rate of their
compensation at the time of the aforementioned dismissal, less the wages and salaries earned by them

6
elsewhere during the lay-off period, were paid to them. PALEA moved for the execution of the CIR
resolution of July 13, 1954, as regards the "other rights and privileges" therein mentioned, referring,
more specifically to: (1) Christmas bonus from 1950 to 1958; (2) accumulated sick leave; (3)
transportation allowance during lay-off period; and (4) accumulated free trip passes, both domestic and
international. By an order dated October 8, 1962, the CIR granted this motion, except as regards the sick
leave of Onofre Griño and Bernardino Abarrientos, and the transportation allowance, which were
denied.

PAL maintains that the CIR has erred in acting as it did, because : (1) the aforementioned privileges were
not specifically mentioned in the CIR resolution of July 13, 1954; (2) the order of the CIR dated October
8, 1962, had, allegedly, the effect of amending said resolution; and (3) the clause therein "without
prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges" should be construed prospectively, not
retroactively.

ISSUE:

1. WON PAL’s contentions are meritorious.

HELD:

1. NO. Citing Republic Steel Corporation vs. NLRB the court held: To reinstate the striking employees
without prejudice to their seniority or other rights or privileges means that upon reinstatement, the
employees were to be treated in matters involving seniority and continuity of employment as though
they had not been absent from work, and hence the reinstated employees are entitled to the benefits of
the employer's vacation plan for the year in which they were reinstated and subsequent years upon the
basis of continuity of service computed as though they had been actually at during the entire period
from the date of strike to the date of reinstatement.

As a consequence, the employees involved in the case at bar are entitled to the Christmas bonus that
PAL had given to all of its employees during said period, for said bonus, having been paid regularly, has
become part of the compensation of the employees. Said employees are, likewise, entitled to
transportation allowance and the corresponding sick leave privileges. These sick leave privileges are
subject, however, to the following qualifications, namely: (1) that the accumulated sick leave cannot
exceed 140 days, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the PAL and the PALEA,
effective in 1959; and (2) that, pursuant to the same agreement, which denies sick leave privileges to
retired employees, Onofre Griño and Bernardino Abarrientos, who have retired, are not entitled to said
privileges.

The PAL's appeal as regards the free trip passes is, however, well taken, for the employees had no
absolute right thereto, even if they had actually rendered services during the lay-off period. The free trip
passes were given, neither automatically, nor indiscriminately. The employees had to apply therefore
and their applications were subject PAL's approval.

7
RULING:

Wherefore, except as to the free trip passes for the lay-off period, which should not be deemed included
in the "rights and privileges" awarded in the resolution of July 13, 1954, and subject to the qualification
that the accumulated sick leave privileges cannot exceed 140 days, the appealed resolution of October
8, 1962, is hereby affirmed in all other respects, without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

44. Lapanday vs NLRC

Lapanday vs NLRC

1995 Sept 07

Facts:   Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (LADECO) and Cadeco Argo Development
Phils Inc. are sister companies engaged in the production of bananas. Their agricultural establishments
are located in Davao City. They agreed to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) covering the period
from December 5, 1985 to November 30, 1988 with Lapanday Workers’ Union (Union). Said union  is the
duly certified bargaining agent of the rank and file employees and is affiliated with the KMU-ANGLO.

Before the expiration of the CBA, the management policies were initiated by the sister companies  which
changed the relationship of the parties:

Sister companies contracted with Philippine Eagle Protectors and Security Agency, Inc., to provide
security services. But there was an allegation that guards intimidated and harassed the union members.

Seminars on Human Development and Industrial Relations (HDIR) for their managerial and supervisory
employees and the rank-and-file were conducted which the Union claimed that the ANGLO (Alliance of
Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization) was considered belonging to other outlawed labor
organizations such as the National Democratic Front or other leftist groups.

A  labor-management meeting was held on August 2, 1988 where the labor group  represented by its
President Arquilao Bacolod, and its legal counsel raised unfair labor practices such as coercion of
employees,  intimidation of the union members and union busting. They agreed to allow its members to
attend the seminar for the rank-and-file employees.  But,  the Union directed its members not to attend
the seminars and picketed the premises of the Philippine Eagle Protectors to show their displeasure on
the hiring of the guards.

The Union filed on August 25, 1988, a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) accusing the company of the same issues raised during the August 2, 1988 labor-
management meeting. A conciliation conference was called for where it was agreed that union officers

8
would attend the HDIR seminar deleting the discussion on KMU-ANGLO and guidelines governing the
guards would be established.

On September 8, 1988, Danilo Martinez, a member of the Board of Directors of the Sister companies
charged the Union with economic sabotage through slowdown to which they filed charges against the
Union and its members for illegal strike, unfair labor practice and damages, with prayer for injunction.

City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte intervened but the dialogues proved fruitless as sister companies refused to
withdraw the cases earlier filed with the Union. Thereafter, a strike vote was conducted among the
members of the Union and those in favor of the strike won overwhelming support from the workers.
The result of the strike vote was then submitted to the NCMB on October 10, 1988. Two days later, or
on October 12, 1988, the Union struck.

The gunman was later identified as Eledio Samson, an alleged member of the new security forces of
sister companies. This incident resulted to:

most of the members of the Union refused to report for work

they did not comply with the “quota system” adopted by the management to bolster production output

there were allegations that the Union instructed the workers to reduce their production to thirty per
cent (30%).

Tomas Basco and 25 other workers, filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal suspension
against LADECO.

Another complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal was filed by the Union, together with
Arquilao Bacolod and 58 other complainants. These cases were heard by Labor Arbiter Newton Sancho.

With the case filed by the sister companies, Labor Arbiter Antonio Villanueva ruled that the Union
staged an illegal strike and declared the employees listed as respondents in the complaint to have lost
their employment status with Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation and Cadeco Agro
Development Philippines, Inc.; and ordered respondents (petitioners in this case) to desist from further
committing an illegal strike.

Petitioners appealed the Villanueva decision to public respondent NLRC.

Before the NLRC could resolve the appeal on the Villanueva decision,  Labor Arbiter Sancho rendered a
decision in the two (2) cases filed by the Union against private
respondents LADECO and CADECO declaring LADECO and CADECO guilty of unfair labor practices and
illegal dismissal and ordered the reinstatement of the dismissed employees of private respondents, with
backwages and other benefits. It considered the refusal of the workers to report for work on September
9, 1988, justified by the circumstance then prevailing which is the killing of Danilo Martinez on
September 8,1988.

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NLRC upheld the decision of Labor Arbiter Villanueva. The Union filed its MR but to no avail. Hence, this
petition claiming that NLRC gravely abused its discretion in: a) declaring that their activities, from
September 9, 1988 to October 12, 1988, were strike activities; and b) declaring that the strike staged on
October 12, 1988 was illegal.

ISSUE: Whether strike staged on October  12, 1988 illegal

HELD:  Yes, as it was held within the seven (7) day waiting period provided for by paragraph (f), Article
263 of the Labor Code, as amended. The haste in holding the strike prevented the Department of Labor
and Employment from verifying whether it carried the approval of the majority of the union members. 
Hence, there was no grave abuse of discretion committed.

RATIO: The applicable laws are Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. No. 111,
dated December 24, 1986. 

Paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. 111, provides:

(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file anotice of
strike or the employer may file, notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30 days before the intended
date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly
certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor
organization in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers
duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting
where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-daycooling-off period shall not apply and the
union may take action immediately.

xxx xxx xxx

(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A
decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of the
corporation or association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting
called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially
the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The Ministry may, at its own
initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of secret balloting. In every
case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the votingat least seven (7) days
before the intended strike or lockout subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.

Article 264 of the same Code reads:

Art. 264. Prohibited activities. — (a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout
without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having
filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first
having been obtained and reported to the Ministry.

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xxx xxx xxx

. . . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer
who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost
his employment status: Provided that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not
constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by
the employer during such lawful strike. (emphasis ours).

DISPOSITIVE: The petition is dismissed for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
public respondent. Costs against the petitioners.

45. UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES vs. NLRC AND NESTLE

Gr. No. 91025, December 19, 1990

Facts:
On June 22, 1988, the petitioner Union of the Filipro
Employees, the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank
-
and
-
file employees of Nestle Philippines, (private respondent) filed a
Notice of Strike at the DOLE raising the issues of CBA deadlock
and
unfair labor practice. Private respondent assailed the legal
personality of the proponents of the said notice of strike to
represent the Nestle employees, before the NCMB. This
notwithstanding, the NCMB proceeded to invite the parties to
attend the concili
ation meetings and
to which private
respondent
failed
to attend contending that it will
deal
only with a
negotiating panel duly constituted and mandated in accordance with
the UFE Constitution and By
-
laws.
Thereafter, Company terminated from employment al
l
UFE Union officers, and all the members of the negotiating panel for
instigating and knowingly participating in a strike staged at the

11
Makati, Alabang, Cabuyao and Cagayan de Oro on September 11,
1987 without any notice of strike filed and a strike vote
obtained for
the purpose. The union filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA
upheld the validity of the dismissal; NLRC en banc affirmed.
Subsequently, company concluded separate CBAs with the general
membership of the union at Cebu/Davao and Cagayan de
Oro units;
Assailing the validity of these agreements, the union filed a case of
ULP against the company with the NLRC
-
NCR Arbitration Branch
Efforts to resolve the dispute amicably were taken by the NCMB but
yielded negative result. Petitioner filed a mo
tion asking the
Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the dispute of
deadlock in collective bargaining between the parties.
On October 28, 1988, Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon
“certified” to the NLRC the said dispute between the UFE and
Nestle,
Philippines.. which reads as follows: “The NLRC is further
directed to call all the parties immediately and resolve the CBA
deadlock within twenty (20) days from submission of the case for
resolution.” Second Division of the NLRC promulgated a resolution
granting wage increase and other benefits to Nestle’s employees,
ruling on non
-
economic issues, as well as absolving the private
respondent of the Unfair Labor Practice charge. Petitioner finds said
resolution to be inadequate and accordingly, does not agr
ee
therewith. It filed a motion for reconsideration, denied. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not
the respondent nlrc seriously erred in
holding that the cba to be signed by the parties shall cover solely the
bargaining unit consisting of all re
gular rank
-
and
-
file employees of
the respondent company.

12
Held:
No.
The Court is convinced that the public respondent
committed no grave abuse of discretion in resolving only the sole
issue certified to by the Secretary and formulating a CBA which
covers t
he bargaining units consisting of all regular rank
-
and
-
file

employees of the respondent company at Makati, Alabang and

Cabuyao only.
In its assailed resolution, public respondent stated:
"A perusal of the records and proceedings of this case
reveals that after the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of his Order
dated 28 October 1988 certifying the dispute to Us, the Union filed
an Urgent Manifestation seeking the modification of the certif
ication
order to include the Cebu Davao and Cagayan de Oro divisions, the
employees/workers therein being all bonafide members of the
Union which is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all
the regular rank
-
and
-
file workers of the company na
tionwide. Their
non
-
inclusion in the certification order, the union argues, would give
premium to the alleged unlawful act of the Company in entering into
separate 'Collective Bargaining Agreements' directly with the
workers thereat.
"In the same vein, the
union manifested its intention to
file a complaint for ULP against the company and its officers
responsible for such act, which it eventually did.
"Considering that the Union had reserved the right to
prosecute the Company and its officers responsible fo
r the alleged
unlawful execution of the CBA directly with the union members in
Cagayan de Oro and Cebu/Davao units, as it has in fact filed a case

13
which is now pending with our Arbitration Branch, the issue as to
whether such acts constitute ULP is best he
ard and decided
separately from the certified case, not only because of the
evidentiary need to resolve the issue, but also because of the delay
that may ensue in the resolution of the present conflict.
"Furthermore, the consolidation of the issue with t
he
instant case poses complicated questions regarding venue and
joinder of parties. We feel that each of the issues propounded by
the parties shall be better dealt with separately according to its own
merits.
"Thus, We rule to resolve the sole issue in dis
pute certified
to this Commission, i.e., the deadlock in the collective bargaining
negotiations in Cabuyao/Alabang and Makati units." (Rollo, pp. 174
-
176)
We agree. Public respondent's resolution is proper and in
full compliance with the order of the Secre
tary of Labor. The
concomitant delay that will result in resolving petitioner's motion for
the modification of the certification order to determine whether to
include Cebu/Davao and Cagayan de Oro Divisions or not will defeat
the very purpose of the Secret
ary of Labor's assumption of
jurisdiction and his subsequent certification order for compulsory
arbitration.
The assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor
over labor disputes causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispen
sable to the national interest is in the nature of a
police power measure. It cannot be denied that the private
respondent is engaged in an undertaking affected with public
interest being one of the largest manufacturers of food products.
The compelling co
nsideration of the Secretary's assumption of
jurisdiction is the
fact that a prolonged strike or lockout is inimical to
the national economy and thus, the need to implement some
measures to suppress any act which will hinder the company's
essential product
ions is indispensable for the promotion of the
common good. Under this situation, the Secretary's certification
order for compulsory arbitration which was intended for the
immediate formulation of an already delayed CBA was proper

14
 46.
TABANGAO SHELL REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION 
vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION
G.R. No. 170007, 7 April 2014
FACTS:

On the parties’ 41st meeting, the company proposed the declaration of a deadlock and re
commended that the help of a third party be sought. The union filed a Notice of Strike in 
the NCMB, alleging bad faith bargaining on the part of the company. The NCMB immedi
ately summoned the parties for the mandatory conciliation-mediation proceedings but t
he parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. The DOLE-Sec assumed jurisdiction o
ver the dispute of the parties. The Secretary ruled that the company is not guilty of barga
ining in bad faith and also proceeded to decide on the matter of the wage increase and ot
her economic issues of the new CBA.

The union questioned the Secretary’s assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute b
etween the union and the company on the ground that the “Secretary erred in assuming 
jurisdiction over the ‘CBA’ case when it is not the subject matter of the notice of strike” b
ecause the case was “all about ‘ULP’ in the form of bad faith bargaining.” For the union, 
the DOLE-Sec should not have touched the issue of the CBA as there was no CBA deadlo
ck at that time, and should have limited the assumption of jurisdiction to the charge of u
nfair labor practice for bargaining in bad faith

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Secretary of Labor and Employment’s assumption of jurisdiction is li
mited to the subject of strike.

RULING: No. The labor dispute between the union and the company concerned the unr
esolved matters between the parties in relation to their negotiations for a new CBA. The 
power of the DOLE-Sec to assume jurisdiction over this dispute includes and extends to 
all questions and controversies arising from the said dispute, such as, but not limited to 
the union’s allegation of bad faith bargaining. It also includes and extends to the various 
unresolved provisions of the new CBA such as compensation, particularly the matter of 

15
annual wage increase or yearly lump sum payment in lieu of such wage increase, whethe
r or not there was deadlock in the negotiations.

As there is already an existing controversy on the matter of wage increase, the DOLE-
Sec need not wait for a deadlock in the negotiations to take cognizance of the matter. Th
at is the significance of the power of the DOLE-Sec under Article 263(g) of the Labor Co
de to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or locko
ut in an industry indispensable to the national interest. Article 263(g) is both an extraor
dinary and a preemptive power to address an extraordinary situation – a strike or locko
ut in an industry indispensable to the national interest. This grant is not limited to the g
rounds cited in the notice of strike or lockout that may have preceded the strike or locko
ut; nor is it limited to the incidents of the strike or lockout that in the meanwhile may ha
ve taken place. As the term “assume jurisdiction” connotes, the intent of the law is to giv
e the Labor Secretary full authority to resolve all matters within the dispute that gave ris
e to or which arose out of the strike or lockout; it includes and extends to all questions a
nd controversies arising from or related to the dispute, including cases over which the la
bor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.

47. Zamboanga Wood Products Inc vs NLRC

GR No. L-82088, Oct 13, 1989

FACTS: Dionisio Estioca was first hired by the petitioner in May 1977 as
a clerk in its personnel department. In 1980, he rose to become a
personnel aide. On July 1, 1981, he became the Personnel Supervisor, a
supervisory and/or managerial position, next in rank to the Personnel
Manager.

On March 5, 1982, the National Federation of Labor (NFL) of which

Estioca was president, filed a petition for direct certification as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative of all the monthly-salaried
employees (90 more or less) of the Company “composed of
administrative and supervisory personnel which is an appropriate
bargaining” unit (See petition in G.R. No. 67343).

Over the Company’s opposition, the Med Arbiter on August 23, 1982,
directly certified the NFL as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of all the monthly-salaried employees of the Company.
The Company appealed but it was dismissed by the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR). It filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court

16
(G.R. No. 67343). The petition was dismissed for lack of merit on July
16, 1984.

On or about April 2, 1982, Estioca posted an announcement on the

bulletin board of the employees’ coffee shop criticizing the Company for
having earmarked the sum of P250,000 for the inter-department athletic
tournament (which he called “a farce and baloony”) to be held that year,
instead of using the money to pay the employees’ claims for living
allowance. He urged the employees to boycott the sports event

It turned out that Estioca’s figures were incorrect for the athletic meet
budget was P54,000 only.

Estioca received the letter on April 26, 1982. He answered it on April 27,
1982. On April 30, 1982, he was notified  that the Company was
terminating his service as personnel supervisor for loss of trust and
confidence in him. The termination was duly reported by the Company to
the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE).

ISSUE: Whether or not the Estioca was illegally dismissed.

Ruling:

 We hold, however, that the illegal dismissal of Estioca  and the

Company’s union-busting efforts were legal grounds for the strike.

In fact, the Company did not deny the charge of union busting levelled by
the respondents. The NLRC found that —

…, as testified to by Estioca, which was not rebutted by respondent, Celso

Abastillas and Lilio Navarro, Comptroller and Production Manager,
respectively, called the employees on separate occasions sometime in
April 1982 and asked them to withdraw their membership from the
union. (p. 38, Rollo.)

Union busting, or interference with the formation of a union, constitutes

an unfair labor practice (Art 248, subpar. 4, Labor Code), hence a valid
ground for the declaration of a strike.

17
The Company’s refusal to accept the striking workers when they returned
to work as directed in the Labor Secretary’s return-to-work order dated
August 18, 1982, was unjustified. For that reason, the Company is liable
to pay the workers backwages. However, in view of the admission in the
private respondents’ comment that in August 1984 the 81 striking
workers were readmitted by the Company (p. 65, Rollo), they are
entitled to backwages for the period when they presented themselves
for work until they were accepted by the Company in August 1984.

48. SARMIENTO VS TUICO 162 SCRA 676 (1988)

FACTS:

Asian Transmission Corp (ATC) terminated the services of Catalino Sarmiento,VP of the Bisig ng Asian
Transmission Labor Union (BATU), for allegedly carrying a deadly weapon in the company premises.
BATU filed a notice of strike, claiming that ATC had committed an unfair labor practice. ATC, then, filed a
petition asking the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the matter or
certify the same to NLRC for compulsory arbitration. MOLE issued an order certifying the labor dispute
to NLRC.

At the same time, it enjoined the management from locking out its employees and the union from
declaring a strike or similar concerted action. Proceedings could not continue in the NLRC, however,
because of the acceptance by Pres. Aquino of the resignations of 8 of its members, leaving only the vice-
chairman in office. MOLE set aside the previous orders and directly assumed jurisdiction of the dispute,
at the same time, enjoined the company to accept all returning workers. This order was later set aside
upon motion of both BATU and ATC in view of the appointment of new commissioners in NLRC. MOLE
then returned the cases to NLRC and directed it to expedite the resolution of all issues relating to the
dispute. Conformably, NLRC issued on Jan 13, 1987 a resolution, which it affirmed in its resolution of Feb
12, denying the motion of reconsideration.

Three criminal complaints were filed against the workers, two by the personnel administrative officer of
ATC and the third by Philippine Constabulary. The first two complaints were for ―Violation of Art 265
par 1, in relation to Art 273 Labor Code. The third was for coercion. In all 3 complaints, the defendants
were charged with staging an illegal strike, barricading the gates of the ATC plant and preventing the
workers through intimidation, harassment and force from reporting for work.

Respondent Judge Orlando Tuico issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioners and committed 72 of
them to jail although he later ordered the release of 61 of them to the custody of the mayor of Calamba.
The petitioners had earlier moved for the lifting of the warrant of arrest and the referral of the coercion

18
charge to NLRC and later, for the dismissal of the criminal cases on the ground that they came under the
primary jurisdiction of the NLRC.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a return-to-work order may be validly issued by the National Labor Relations
Commission pending determination of the legality of the strike; and

2. Whether or not, pending such determination, the criminal prosecution of certain persons involved in
the said strike may be validly restrained.

HELD:

The authority for the order is found in Art 264(g) Labor Code, as amended by BP blg. 227, which
provides:

When in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely
affecting the national interest, such as may occur in but not limited to public utilities, companies
engaged in the generation or distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and export oriented industries,
including those within export processing zones, The Minister of Labor and Employment shall assume
jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the commission for compulsory
arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended
or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption order. If one has already taken place at the
time of assumption or certification, all striking our locked out employees shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or
lockout. The minister may seek the assistance of law-enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with
this provision as well as such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.

There can be no question that MOLE acted correctly in certifying labor dispute to NLRC, given the
predictable prejudice the strike might cause not only to the parties but more especially to the national
interest. Thus, the return to work order was equally valid as a statutory part and part of the certification
order issued by MOLE on Nov 24, 1986. The challenged order of NLRC was actually only an
implementation of the above provision of the Labor Code and a reiteration of the directive earlier issued
by MOLE in its own assumption order of Sept 9, 1986.

It must be stressed that while one purpose of the return to work order is to protect the workers who
might otherwise be locked out by the employer for threatening or waging the strike, the more important
reason is to prevent impairment of the national interest in case the operations of the company are
disrupted by a refusal of the strikers to return to work as directed. More particularly, it is the national
economy that will suffer because of the resultant reduction in our export earnings and our dollar
reserves, not to mention possible cancellation of contracts of the company with foreign investors.

It is also to emphasize that the return to work order not so much confers a right as it imposes a duty;
and while as a right it may be waived, it must be discharged as a duty even against the worker‘s will.
Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option but of obligation. The suspension of

19
proceedings in the criminal complaints filed is justified on the ground of prematurity as there is no
question that the acts complained of are connected with the compulsory arbitration proceedings still
pending in NLRC.

The 3 criminal cases should be suspended until the completion of the compulsory arbitration
proceedings in the NLRC, conformably to the policy embodied in Circular no.15, series of 1982 and
Circular no. 9, series of 1986, issued by the Ministry of Justice in connection with the implementation of
BP 227. These circulars require fiscals and other government prosecutors to first secure clearance of
MOLE and/or Office of the President before taking cognizance of complaints for preliminary
investigation and filing in court of the corresponding informations of cases arising out of or related to a
labor dispute, including allegations of violence, coercion, physical injuries, assault upon a person in
authority and other similar acts of intimidation, obstructing the free ingress to and egress from a factory
or place of operation of the machines of such factory, or the employer‘s premises.

It does not appear from the record that such clearance was obtained, conformably to the procedure laid
down to attain the industrial peace which is the primordial objects of this law.

Accordingly, the Court holds that the return-to-work order should benefit only those workers who
complied therewith and, regardless of the outcome of the compulsory arbitration proceedings, are
entitled to be paid for work they have actually performed. Conversely, those workers who refused to
obey the said order and instead waged the restrained strike are not entitled to be paid for work not
done or to reinstatement to the positions they have abandoned by their refusal to return thereto as
ordered.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. In G.R. No. 77567, the petition is DENIED and
the challenged Orders of the NLRC dated January 13, 1986, and February 12, 1986, are AFFIRMED as
above interpreted. The temporary restraining order dated March 23, 1987, is LIFTED. 2. In G.R. Nos.
75271-73, the temporary restraining order of August 12,1986, and September 21, 1986, are CONTINUED
IN FORCE until completion of the compulsory arbitration proceedings in the NLRC.

49. 666 Phil. 477

ABAD, J.:
These cases are about the need to clearly identify, for establishing liability,
the union officers who took part in the illegal slowdown strike after the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Secretary assumed
jurisdiction over the labor dispute.

20
 The Facts and the Case

On April 30, 2002 the three-year collective bargaining agreement or CBA

between the union Bukluran ng Manggagawa sa Monterey-Ilaw at Buklod
ng Manggagawa (the union) and Monterey Foods Corporation (the
company) expired.  On March 28, 2003 after the negotiation for a new CBA
reached a deadlock, the union filed a notice of strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).  To head off the strike, on April
30, 2003 the company filed with the DOLE a petition for assumption of
jurisdiction over the dispute in view of its dire effects on the meat industry. 
In an Order dated May 12, 2003, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction
over the dispute and enjoined the union from holding any strike.  It also
directed the union and the company to desist from taking any action that
may aggravate the situation.

On May 21, 2003 the union filed a second notice of strike before the NCMB
on the alleged ground that the company committed unfair labor practices. 
On June 10, 2003 the company sent notices to the union officers, charging
them with intentional acts of slowdown.  Six days later or on June 16 the
company sent new notices to the union officers, informing them of their
termination from work for defying the DOLE Secretary's assumption order.

On June 23, 2003, acting on motion of the company, the DOLE Secretary
included the union's second notice of strike in his earlier assumption order. 
But, on the same day, the union filed a third notice of strike based on
allegations that the company had engaged in union busting and illegal
dismissal of union officers.  On July 7, 2003 the company filed a petition
for certification of the labor dispute to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration but the DOLE Secretary
denied the motion.  He, however, subsumed the third notice of strike under
the first and second notices.

On November 20, 2003 the DOLE rendered a decision that, among other
things, upheld the company's termination of the 17 union officers.  The
union and its officers appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA).

On May 29, 2006 the CA rendered a decision, upholding the validity of the
company's termination of 10 union officers but declaring illegal that of the

21
other seven.  Both parties sought recourse to this Court, the union in G.R.
178409 and the company in G.R. 178434.

The Issues Presented

The issues these cases present are:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that slowdowns actually

transpired at the company's farms; and

2. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that union officers committed

illegal acts that warranted their dismissal from work.

The Rulings of the Court   

First. The law is explicit: no strike shall be declared after the Secretary of

Labor has assumed jurisdiction over a labor dispute.  A strike conducted
after such assumption is illegal and any union officer who knowingly
participates in the same may be declared as having lost his employment.
[1]
 Here, what is involved is a slowdown strike.  Unlike other forms of strike,
the employees involved in a slowdown do not walk out of their jobs to hurt
the company.  They need only to stop work or reduce the rate of their work
while generally remaining in their assigned post.

The Court finds that the union officers and members in this case held a
slowdown strike at the company's farms despite the fact that the DOLE
Secretary had on May 12, 2003 already assumed jurisdiction over their
labor dispute. The evidence sufficiently shows that union officers and
members simultaneously stopped work at the company's Batangas and
Cavite farms at 7:00 a.m. on May 26, 2003.

The union of course argues that it merely held assemblies to inform

members of the developments in the CBA negotiation, not protest
demonstrations over it.  But as the CA correctly observed, if the meetings
had really been for the stated reason, why did the union officers and
members from separate company farms choose to start and end their
meetings at the same time and on the same day?  And if they did not intend
a slowdown, why did they not hold their meetings after work.  There is no
22
allegation that the company prevented the union from holding meetings
after working hours.

Second. A distinction exists, however, between the ordinary workers'

liability for illegal strike and that of the union officers who participated in
it.  The ordinary worker cannot be terminated for merely participating in
the strike. There must be proof that he committedillegal acts during its
conduct.  On the other hand, a union officer can be terminated upon mere
proof that he knowingly participated in the illegal strike.[2]

Still, the participating union officers have to be properly identified.[3]  The

CA held that the company illegally terminated union officers Ruben
Alvarez, John Asotigue, Alberto Castillo, Nemesio Agtay, Carlito Abacan,
Danilo Rolle, and Juanito Tenorio, there being no substantial evidence that
would connect them to the slowdowns. The CA said that their part in the
same could not be established with certainty.

But, although the witnesses did not say that Asotigue, Alvarez, and Rolle
took part in the work slowdown, these officers gave no credible excuse for
being absent from their respective working areas during the slowdown. 
Tenorio allegedly took a break and never went back to work. He claimed
that he had to attend to an emergency but did not elaborate on the nature
of such emergency.  In Abacan's case, however, he explained that he was
not feeling well on May 26, 2003 and so he decided to take a two-hour rest
from work. This claim of Abacan is consistent with the report[4] that only
one officer (Tenorio) was involved in the slowdown at the Calamias farm.

At the Quilo farm, the farm supervisor did not include Castillo in the list of
employees who failed to report for work on May 26, 2003.[5]  In Agtay's
case, the evidence is that he was on his rest day.  There is no proof that the
union's president, Yolito Fadriquelan, did not show up for work during the
slowdowns.  The CA upheld his dismissal, relying solely on a security
guard's report that the company submitted as evidence.  But, notably, that
report actually referred to a Rolly Fadrequellan, another employee who
allegedly took part in the Lipa farm slowdown.  Besides, Yolito Fadriquelan
was then assigned at the General Trias farm in Cavite, not at the Lipa farm. 
In fact, as shown in the sworn statements[6] of the Cavite farm employees,
Fadriquelan even directed them not to do anything which might aggravate
the situation.  This clearly shows that his dismissal was mainly based on his
being the union president.

23
The Court sustains the validity of the termination of the rest of the union
officers.  The identity and participations of Arturo Eguna,[7] Armando
Malaluan,[8] Danilo Alonso,[9] Romulo Dimaano,[10] Roel Mayuga,
[11]
 Wilfredo Rizaldo,[12] Romeo Suico,[13] Domingo Escamillas,[14] and
Domingo Bautro[15] in the slowdowns were properly established. These
officers simply refused to work or they abandoned their work to join union
assemblies.

In termination cases, the dismissed employee is not required to prove his

innocence of the charges against him.  The burden of proof rests upon the
employer to show that the employee's dismissal was for just cause.  The
employer's failure to do so means that the dismissal was not justified.[16] 
Here, the company failed to show that all 17 union officers deserved to be
dismissed.

Ordinarily, the illegally dismissed employees are entitled to two reliefs:

reinstatement and backwages. Still, the Court has held that the grant of
separation pay, instead of reinstatement, may be proper especially when as
in this case such reinstatement is no longer practical or will be for the best
interest of the parties.[17]  But they shall likewise be entitled to attorney's
fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award for having been
compelled to litigate in order to protect their interests.[18]

WHEREFORE,the Court MODIFIES the decision of the Court of

Appealsin CA-G.R. SP 82526, DECLARES Monterey Foods Corporation's
dismissal of Alberto Castillo, Nemesio Agtay, Carlito Abacan, and Yolito
Fadriquelan illegal, and ORDERS payment of their separation pay
equivalent to one month salary for every year of service up to the date of
their termination.  The Court also ORDERS the company to pay 10%
attorney's fees as well as interest of 6% per annum on the due amounts
from the time of their termination and 12% per annum from the time this
decision becomes final and executory until such monetary awards are paid.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Nachura, Peralta, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

50. UST Faculty Union vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 89885 August 6, 1990

24
Facts: Professor Tranquilina Marino was a member of the Faculty of
Pharmacy of UST, upon reaching the age of 65, UST allowed her to
continue teaching for the school years 1986-1987 and 1987-1989. However,
UST denied her extension of tenure for the school year 1988-1989. Several
other professors from other colleges of UST were also denied extension of
tenure upon reaching the age of 65.
The UST Faculty Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and
against UST with the NLRC, alleging that it violated Sec. 1, Article XII of the
CBA, entered into in 1986, which provides among others: a) that upon
reaching the age of 65 years they may be granted extension of tenure unless
they are manifestly inefficient or incompetent or are otherwise removed for
cause; and that b) they shall continue to enjoy the usual benefits and
privileges until the extension of their tenure is validly denied by the
university in consultation with the Union or until they are separated from
service. The NLRC dismissed the case for lack of merit. The Union filed an
appeal which was also denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON UST committed ULP in denying the extension of service of
Prof. Marino.
Held: No. It is important to state that upon the compulsory retirement of
an employee of official in the public or private service his employment is
deemed terminated. The matter of extension of service of such employee or
official is addressed to the sound discretion of the employer. It is a privilege
only the employer can grant.
The required consultation with the Union as provided in the CBA should be
interpreted to mean as one which is advisory in character and as such, the
opinion of the Union is not binding on the UST authorities. The final say as
to the denial of extension of a retiree still rests with the employer, UST.

51. Manila Diamond Hotel Employee Union vs CA

OCTOBER 23, 2012  ~ VBDIAZ

25
 Manila Diamond Hotel Ee Union vs CA
GR 140518
Facts:
The Union filed a petition for a certification election, which was dismissed by the
DOLE. Despite the dismissal of their petition, the Union sent a letter to the Hotel
informing the latter of its desire to negotiate for a collective bargaining agreement.
The Hotel, however, refused to
negotiate with the Union, citing the earlier dismissal of the Union’s petition for
certification by DOLE.

Failing to settle the issue, the Union staged a strike against the Hotel. Numerous
confrontations followed, further straining the relationship between the Union and the
Hotel. The Hotel claims that the strike was illegal and dismissed some employees for
their participation in the allegedly illegal concerted activity. The Union, on the other
hand, accused the Hotel of illegally dismissing the workers.

A Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code was
later filed by the Union before the Secretary of Labor. Thereafter, Secretary of Labor
Trajano issued an Order directing the striking officers and members of the Union to
return to work within twenty-four (24) hours and the Hotel to accept them back under
the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike.

After receiving the above order the members of the Union reported for work, but the
Hotel refused to accept them and instead filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Secretary’s Order.

Acting on the motion for reconsideration, then Acting Secretary of Labor Español
modified the one earlier issued by Secretary Trajano and instead directed that the
strikers be reinstated only in the payroll.

26
Issue: WON payroll reinstatement is proper in lieu of actual reinstatement under
Article 263(g)
of the Labor Code.
Held:
Payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement is not sanctioned under the
provision of the said article.

The Court noted the difference between UST vs. NLRC and the instant case. In UST
case the teachers could not be given back their academic assignments since the order
of the Secretary for them to return to work was given in the middle of the first
semester of the academic year.
The NLRC was, therefore, faced with a situation where the striking teachers were
entitled to a return to work order, but the university could not immediately reinstate
them since it would be impracticable and detrimental to the students to change
teachers at that point in time.

In the present case, there is no similar compelling reason that called for payroll
reinstatement as an alternative remedy. A strained relationship between the striking
employees and management is no reason for payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual
reinstatement.

Under Article 263(g), all workers must immediately return to work and all employers
must readmit all of them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the
strike or lockout.

The Court pointed out that the law uses the precise phrase of “under the same terms
and conditions,” revealing that it contemplates only actual reinstatement. This is in
keeping with the rationale that any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular
industry can be inimical to the
national economy.

27
The Court reiterates that Article 263(g) was not written to protect labor from the
excesses of management, nor was it written to ease management from expenses,
which it normally incurs during a work stoppage or slowdown. This law was written
as a means to be used by the State to
protect itself from an emergency or crisis. It is not for labor, nor is it for management.

Petition granted.

52. UNIVERSITY OF IMMACULATE CONCEPTION v. OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF

LABOR, GR NOS. 178085 - 178086, 2015-09-14
Facts:
These consolidated cases stem from the labor dispute between petitioner University of the
Immaculate Conception (UIC) and respondent UIC Teaching and Non-leaching Employees
Union — FFW (the "Union") dating back to 1994.
UIC is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution with campuses at Fr. Selga and
Bonifacio Sts., Davao City. Private respondent [the Union] is the certified sole bargaining
agent of UIC's rank and file employees.
On 20 June 1994, the Union filed a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock
and unfair labor practice. On 20 July 1994, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) called the parties to a conference where they agreed that an increase be granted
to the... workers in the amount equivalent to: seventy-five percent (75%) of increment on the
tuition fee for the first year, eighty percent (80%) for the second year, and eighty percent
(80%) for the third year.
On the same occasion, the UIC demanded the exclusion of secretaries, registrars,
accounting personnel and guidance counselors from the bargaining unit, on account of their
being confidential employees. When the parties agreed to submit this particular issue to
voluntary... arbitration, the arbitration panel sustained the UIC on 08 November 1994. The
Union's motion for reconsideration thereto was denied by the arbitration panel on 08
February 1995.
Accordingly, the UIC gave the affected employees namely: Melanie de la Rosa, Angelina
Abadilla, Jovita Mamburan, Zenaida Canoy, Gemma Galope, Paulina Palma Gil, Lelian
Concon, Mary Ann de Ramos, Alma Villacarlos, [Leah] Cruza, [Ofelia] Diapuez and Josie
Boston [collectively,... except Jovita Mamburan, the "Respondent Employees"] the option to
choose between keeping their positions or resigning from the Union. When they elected to
keep both their positions and their union membership, UIC sent them notices of termination
on 21 February 1995, which... led into a notice of strike filed by the Union on 10 March
1995.

28
In an Order dated 28 March 1995, the [Secretary] suspended the effects of the said
termination pending the determination of its legality and ordered QIC to reinstate the
respondent employees under the same conditions prevailing prior to the labor dispute. This
Order was later... modified by the [Secretary] directing the payroll reinstatement of the
respondent employees, instead of physical reinstatement. On 15 September 1995, the UIC
filed a petition for certiorari on the said payroll reinstatement. The Court of Appeals denied
the same in its 08 October
2001 Decision and 10 January 2002 Resolution. These were affirmed by the Supreme
Court on 14 January 2005 [448 SCRA 190],... On 20 June 2006, the [Secretary] issued a
Resolution ruling that the respondent employees were illegally dismissed and directed UIC
to reinstate them (except for Jovita Mamburan who died on 18 October 2003) and to pay
them backwages and other benefits. UIC's motion for... reconsideration thereto was denied
by the [Secretary] on 18 September 2006.
Meanwhile, on [20 January I995],[2] the Union filed its second notice of strike mostly on the
grounds of bargaining deadlock on the issues of computing the seventy percent (70%)
incremental proceeds and unfair labor practices. On 23 January 1995, the
[Secretary] assumed jurisdiction over the dispute, issued a Return-to-Work Order and
enjoined the parties to desist from all acts which might exacerbate the situation.
On 08 October 1998, the [Secretary] issued an Order directing the parties to execute a
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) embodying all items agreed upon by the parties and
the salary increases consisting of the following: lst year - 75% of increment... increase of
tuition fee; 2nd year — 80% of increment increase of tuition fee; and 3rd year -80% of
increment increase of tuition fee. The [Secretary] likewise upheld the validity of the strike
declared by the Union on 20 January 1995.
This Order was challenged by UIC before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court,
both of which affirmed the same. The fallo of the Supreme Court decision reads:
On 21 April 2004, UIC and the Union signed an Agreement (21 April 2004 Agreement
hereafter) before the DOLE, the second paragraph of which provides:
["The parties agreed that all issues in this particular case have been settled, except the
issue on whether the full settlement clause in the CBA to be signed by the parties bars the
filing and/or continuation of alleged illegal dismissal cases which arose in the... year 1994
and which the Secretary of Labor had ruled not to have been subsumed by the Assumption
of Jurisdiction case pending with the Office of the Secretary which is agreed upon to be
submitted for voluntary arbitration before the Honorable Secretary of Labor.]
["Likewise in the interpretation and implementation of the full settlement clause,][3] the
parties agree that the net incremental proceeds for the five [5] school years of the CBA
(1995-1996 to 1999-2000) will be computed and compared with the actual amount...
distributed to the employees for each of these five [5] years. If the amount distributed in any
of these 5 school years is less than what is provided in the CBA, the University shall pay the
deficiency. If the amount distributed in any of these 5 school years is more than what... is
provided in the CBA, the excess shall be chargeable to the [seventy percent] 70% share of
the employees in the school year 2004-2005.

29
In a separate comment filed by the Respondent Employees, they claim that they have the
right to maintain their union membership not for the purpose of collective bargaining, but for
legal representation in dealing with the employer; thus, there is no legal justification for...
their dismissal.[16] They further assert that the matter of back wages and other monetary
benefits is already barred by res judicata since the Secretary's award merely complied with
our ruling in G.R. No. 151379[17] affirming... the payroll reinstatement of the Respondent
Employees
Issues:
Aggrieved, UIC filed the present petition, where it essentially raises the same arguments
with respect to the Secretary's creation of the tripartite committee, computation of net
incremental proceeds, finding of illegal dismissal, and award of back wages.

Ruling:
counters
In its comment, respondent Union counters that it was constrained to file an urgent motion
with the Office of the Secretary for the creation of a tripartite committee because there was
no other way to solve the issue on computation of the incremental proceeds, considering
that
UIC had ignored and rejected the existence and efficacy of the CBA.[13] On the issue of the
computation of the net incremental proceeds, the Union maintains that the parties had
mutually agreed on the manner of computing the same.[14]
With regard to the Illegal Dismissal Case, the Union points out that the Respondent
Employees were dismissed on the same date that the termination notices were sent, in
violation of their right to due process.
The resolution of the Illegal Dismissal Case rests upon the determination of whether or not
a confidential employee's refusal to vacate his or her union membership is a valid ground
for dismissal. The Secretary and the Court of Appeals believe it is not. We reverse.
As a preliminary matter, we clarify that the issue of whether or not the Respondent
Employees are confidential employees has long been settled and its reexamination is
already barred by res judicata. In VA Case No. XI-354-02-94 (the "Arbitration Case"), the
panel... of voluntary arbitrators had already determined that the Respondent Employees are
confidential employees who must be excluded from the bargaining unit. The panel's
decision dated November 8, 1994[43] and resolution of the motion for reconsideration dated
February 8, 1995[44] became final and executory after we dismissed the Union's petition for
certiorari on June 21, 1995[45] without any further incidents. The Arbitration Case having
attained finality, the issues resolved... therein may no longer be disturbed or modified.
A
The just causes for terminating an employee, confidential or not, are numerated in Article
282 of the Labor Code:

30
Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of
the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or
duly authorized representative;
(d)  Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer
or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
UIC cites willful disobedience and "loss of confidence" as the grounds for dismissing the
Respondent Employees. In its termination letters dated February 21, 1995, UIC informed
the Respondent Employees that because of their continued union membership
notwithstanding the... voluntary arbitration decision, "management no longer has any trust
and confidence in you in the delicate, sensitive and confidential position you hold."
Nonetheless, employers do not have unbridled authority to dismiss employees by simply
invoking Article 282(c). The loss of confidence must be genuine and cannot be used as a
subterfuge for causes which are illegal, improper and unjust.[51] "Loss of... confidence as a
ground for dismissal has never been intended to afford an occasion for abuse by the
employer of its prerogative, as it can easily be subject to abuse because of its subjective
nature.[52]
In Cruz v. Court of Appeals,[53] we summarized the guidelines when loss of confidence
constitutes a valid ground for dismissal:
[T]he language of Article 282(c) of the Labor Code states that the loss of trust and
confidence must be based on willful breach of the trust reposed in the employee by his
employer. Such breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely,
without... justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly,
heedlessly or inadvertently. Moreover, it must be based on substantial evidence and not on
the employer's whims or caprices or suspicions otherwise, the employee would eternally
remain at the mercy... of the employer. Loss of confidence must not be indiscriminately
used as a shield by the employer against a claim that the dismissal of an employee was
arbitrary. And, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must
be work-related and shows that... the employee concerned is unfit to continue working for
the employer. In addition, loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment
is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of responsibility, trust
and confidence or that the employee... concerned is entrusted with confidence with respect
to delicate matters, such as the handling or care and protection of the property and assets
of the employer. The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense for which an
employee is penalized
As a rule, loss of confidence may only be invoked by the employer against an employee
occupying a position of responsibility, trust and confidence[57] — hence, the first requisite.
Ordinarily, this would require us to make a determination with regard to the... true nature of

31
the Respondent Employees' positions. But given the facts of this case, noting in particular
the final and executory decision in the Arbitration Case which deemed Respondent
Employees as confidential employees, we only now need to determine whether
confidential... employees hold positions of trust and confidence.
The leading case explaining what is a "position of trust and confidence" is Mabeza v. NLRC,
[58] where we held that:
[L]oss of confidence should ideally apply only to cases involving employees occupying
positions of trust and confidence or to those situations where the employee is routinely
charged with the care and custody of the employer's money or property. To (he first class...
belong managerial employees, i.e., those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay
down management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge,
assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions; and to
the second class... belong cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc., or those who, in the
normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of
money or property. ..
Bristol Myers and subsequent cases[60] essentially follow the same formula by subdividing
positions of trust and confidence into two classes: managerial employees and fiduciary
rank-and-file employees. Respondent Employees fall under the latter... category.
We understand that Mabeza's failure to specifically mention the category of "confidential
employees" may cause some confusion, at least superficially, with respect to the
applicability of Article 282(c) to this specific class of employees. For the sake of avoiding
any... future misperception, we rule that confidential employees must perforce hold
positions of trust and confidence. Mabeza's silence regarding confidential employees may
simply be attributed to the fact that confidential employees do not constitute a distinct
category of employees... based on the plain text of the Labor Code. But jurisprudence
recognizes the existence of such category,[61] and it has been held that confidentiality may
attach to a managerial, supervisory, or rank-and-file position.[62] As the... commentator
Azucena aptly notes:
... Confidentiality is not a matter of official rank, it is a matter of job content and authority. It
is not measured by closeness to or distance from top management but by the significance
of the jobholder's role in the pursuit of corporate objectives and strategy.
In principle, every managerial position is confidential — one does not become a manager
without having gained the confidence of the appointing authority. But not every confidential
employee is managerial; lie may be a supervisory or even a rank-and-file employee.
Confidentiality, in other words, cuts across the pyramid of jobs from the base to the apex,
from messengerial to managerial.[63]
A confidential employee is defined as one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or
with the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer's property.[64] For all
intents and purposes, the terms "confidential employee" and "employee... holding a position
of trust and confidence" are synonymous. Fundamentally, the two categories mentioned in
Mabeza are simply subcategories of the broader category of confidential employees.
The essence of the second requisite is that the loss of confidence must be based on a
willful breach of trust founded on clearly established facts.[65] Here, it is not disputed that

32
the Respondent Employees refused to resign from the Union, notwithstanding... the
decision in the Arbitration Case. Respondent Employees do not claim that they were
coerced into retaining their union membership; in fact, they even insist upon their right to
join the Union. The voluntariness of Respondent Employees' refusal to vacate their union
membership
— which constitutes the "willful act" — is therefore unequivocally established.
We hold that the willful act of refusing to leave the Union is sufficient basis for UIC to lose its
trust and confidence on Respondent Employees. There was just cause for dismissing the
Respondent Employees. Our conclusion follows the same reasoning why we finally adopted
the... doctrine that confidential employees should be excluded from the bargaining unit and
disqualified from joining any union:[66] employees should not be placed in a position
involving a potential conflict of interests.[67] In this... regard, the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that Respondent Employees are allowed to join the Union.[68] If Respondent
Employees were allowed to retain their union membership, UIC would not be assured of
their loyalty because of the apparent conflict... between the employees' personal interests
and their duty as confidential employees. Such a result is likely to create an atmosphere of
distrust between UIC and the confidential employees, and it would be nigh unreasonable to
compel UIC to continue in employment persons whom it... no longer trusts to handle
delicate matters.
Finally, the Secretary cites Article 248 of the Labor Code to support his conclusion that
Respondent Employees were illegally dismissed.[69] Article 248(a) considers as unfair labor
practice an employer's act of interfering with, restraining or coercing... employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization. However, it is well established that the right to
self-organization under the Labor Code does not extend to managerial[70] and confidential
employees,[71] while supervisory... employees are not allowed to join the rank-and-file
union. In view of the limitation imposed upon these specific classes of employees, Article
248(a) should therefore be interpreted to cover only interference with the right to self-
organization of bona fide members of the... bargaining unit. The provision finds no
application in this case which involves confidential employees who are, by law, denied the
right to join labor unions.
Although there is just cause for dismissing the Respondent Employees, we find that UIC
failed to comply with the mandatory two-notice due process requirement. Under our labor
laws, the employer has the burden of proving that the dismissed employee has been served
two written... notices: (a) one to apprise him of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought, and (b) the other to inform him of the employer's decision to dismiss
him.[73] The first notice must state that the employer seeks dismissal for the act... or
omission charged against the employee; otherwise, the notice does not comply with the
rules.[74] The records show that UIC sent only one such written notice to Respondent
Employees on February 21, 1995, i.e., a notice of termination effective at... the close of
business of the same date.[75] We do not agree with UIC's submission that the agreement
to arbitrate and the request to comply with the arbitration decision constitute the "first
notice" required by law,[76] considering... that UIC was unable to establish by substantial
evidence that these categorically contain what is legally required to appear in the first
notice. In fine, we agree with the observation of the Court of Appeals that the Respondent
Employees were hastily terminated.[77]

33
 53. G.R. No. 167401: July 5, 2010

BAGONG PAGKAKAISA NG MANGGAGAWA NG TRIUMPH

INTERNATIONAL, represented by SABINO F. GRAGANZA, Union
President, and REYVILOSA TRINIDAD,Petitioners, v. SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and
TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL (PHILS.), INC., Respondents.

BRION, J.:

FACTS:

The union and the company had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that
expired. The union seasonably submitted proposals to the company for its
renegotiation. The negotiations reached a deadlock, leading to a Notice of Strike
the union. The National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) exerted
efforts but failed to resolve the deadlock.

The company filed a Notice of Lock-out for unfair labor practice due to the
unions alleged work slowdown. The unionwent on strike three days later.
Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma (Labor Secretary) of the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute, pursuant
to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code.The Labor Secretary directed all striking
workers to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the
assumption order, while the company was directed to accept them back to work
under the same terms and conditions existing before the strike.

Several employees attempted to report for work, but the striking employees
prevented them from entering the company premises. The union and the officers
filed a petition to cite the company and its responsible officers for contempt, and
moved that a reinstatement order be issued. They claimed that: (1) the company
officials violated the Labor Secretarys return-to-work order when these officials
placed them under preventive suspension and refused them entry into the
company premises; (2) the company also violated the March 9, 2000 order of the
Labor Secretary when they were reinstated only in the payroll; and (3) the
company committed unfair labor practice and dismissed them without basis.

The Labor Secretary resolved the bargaining deadlock and awarded a wage
increase of P48.00 distributed over three years. The unions other economic
demands and non-economic proposals were all denied. The union elevated the
34
case to the CA, through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The CA found the petition partly meritorious. It affirmed the Labor
Secretary's wage increase award, but modified his ruling on the dismissal of the
union officers. On the wage issue and related matters, the CA found the Labor
Secretary's award legally in order.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the award of P40.00 wage increase of the Labor Arbiter is proper?
HELD:

LABOR LAW

The conclusions of the Labor Secretary, drawn as they were from a close
examination of the submissions of the parties, do not indicate any legal error,
much less any grave abuse of discretion. We accord respect to these conclusions
as they were made by a public official especially trained in the delicate task of
resolving collective bargaining disputes, and are on their face just and
reasonable. "[U]nless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, this
Court cannot, and will not, interfere with the labor expertise of the public
respondent Secretary of Labor," as the Court held in Pier Arrastre and
Stevedoring Services v. Ma. Nieves Roldan-Confesor, et al.

LABOR LAW

We agree with the CA's conclusion that the Labor Secretary erred, to the point of
abusing his discretion, when he did not resolve the dismissal issue on the
mistaken reading that this issue falls within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.
This was an egregious error and an abdication of authority on the matter of
strikes the ultimate weapon in labor disputes that the law specifically singled out
under Article 263 of the Labor Code by granting the Labor Secretary assumption
of jurisdiction powers. Article 263(g) is both an extraordinary and a preemptive
power to address an extraordinary situation a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest. This grant is not limited to the grounds
cited in the notice of strike or lockout that may have preceded the strike or
lockout; nor is it limited to the incidents of the strike or lockout that in the
meanwhile may have taken place. As the term "assume jurisdiction" connotes, the
intent of the law is to give the Labor Secretary full authority to resolve all matters
within the dispute that gave rise to or which arose out of the strike or lockout; it
includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising from or related to
the dispute, including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive
jurisdiction.

LABOR LAW

35
Under the law, the Labor Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction over the dispute
or its certification to the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory
arbitration shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout and all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions before
the strike or lockout. The union and its officers, as well as the workers, defied the
Labor Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction, especially the accompanying return-
to-work order within twenty-four (24) hours; their defiance made the strike
illegal under the law and applicable jurisprudence. Consequently, it constitutes a
valid ground for dismissal. Article 264(a), paragraph 3 of the Labor Code
provides that "Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike
and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of
illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status."

The union officers were answerable not only for resisting the Labor Secretary's
assumption of jurisdiction and return-to-work orders; they were also liable for
leading and instigating and, in the case of Figura, for participating in a work
slowdown (during the CBA negotiations), a form of strike undertaken by the
union without complying with the mandatory legal requirements of a strike
notice and strike vote. These acts are similarly prohibited activities.

In a different vein, the union faulted the company for having dismissed the
officers, there being no case filed on the legality or illegality of the strike. We see
no merit in this argument. In Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. v. NLRC, we
held that "[t]he law, in using the word may, grants the employer the option of
declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his
employment." We reiterated this principle in San Juan De Dios Educational
Foundation Employees Union-Alliance of Filipino Workers v. San Juan De Dios
Educational Foundation, Inc., where we stated that "Despite the receipt of an
order from the SOLE to return to their respective jobs, the Union officers and
members refused to do so and defied the same. Consequently, then, the strike
staged by the Union is a prohibited activity under Article 264 of the Labor Code.
Hence, the dismissal of its officers is in order. The respondent Foundation was,
thus, justified in terminating the employment of the petitioner Union's officers."

DENIED

54. MEYCAUAYAN COLLEGE VS. DRILON G.R. No. 81144 May 7, 1990

36
Petitioner: MEYCAUAYAN COLLEGE Respondents: HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and MEYCAUAYAN COLLEGE FACULTY AND
PERSONNEL ASSOCIATION (MCFPA)

Ponente:C.J. FERNAN

Facts:

Petitioner is a private educational institution duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, and
operating in Meycauayan, Bulacan. On January 16, 1987, its board of trustees recognized the
Meycauayan College Faculty and Personnel Association as the employees union in the Meycauayan
College. Prior to said recognition or on July 17, 1983, petitioner and the union, then headed by Mrs.
Teresita V. Lim, entered into a collective bargaining agreement for 1983-1986. Article IV thereof
provides: SALARY SCALE IV. 4.0 ANG ANTAS NG PAGPAPASUWELDO SA MGA GURO SA MATAAS NA
PAARALAN AY UMAALINSUNOD SA PARAAN NG PAGRARANGGONG KALAKIP NITO BILANG "TAKDA" AT
AYON PA RIN SA SUMUSUNOD NA HALAGA NG PAGPAPASUWELDO (IPATUTUPAD SA AÑO-ESCOLAR
1983-1986): PAGSUBOK A (1-3 TAON) P51.50 KLASE 1 (4-5 TAON) P52.00 (6-8 TAON) P53.00 KLASE II (9-
12 TAON) P54.00 KLASE III (13-14 TAON) P57.00 KLASE IV (15-17 TAON) P60.00 KLASE V (18-21 TAON)
P63.00 (22 PATAAS) P70.00 When the collective bargaining agreement was entered into, the following
presidential decrees were in effect: (a) P.D No. 1389 dated May 29, 1978 adjusting the existing statutory
minimum wages; (b) P.D. No. 1713 dated August 18, 1980 providing for an increase in the minimum
daily wage rates and for additional mandatory living allowances, and ; (c) P.D. No. 1751 dated May 14,
1980 increasing the statutory daily minimum wage at all levels by P4.00 after integrating the mandatory
emergency living allowance under P.D. Nos. 525 and 1123 into the basic pay of all covered workers.
Wage Order No. 2 increasing the mandatory basic minimum wage and living allowance was also issued
on July 6, 1983 just before the collective bargaining agreement herein involved was entered into. During
the lifetime of the collective bargaining agreement, the following were issued: (a) Wage Order No. 3
dated November 7, 1983 increasing the minimum daily living allowance in the private sector; LABOR
STANDARDS AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW LSSL CASE DIGESTS Page
301 (b) Wage Order No. 4 dated May 1, 1984 integrating as of said date the emergency cost of living
allowances under P.D. Nos. 1614, 1634 and 1713 into the basic pay of covered workers in the private
sector; (c) Wage Order No. 5 dated June 11, 1984 increasing the cost of living allowance of workers in
the private sector whose basic salary or wage is not more than P1,800 a month; and (d) Wage Order No.
6 dated October 26, 1984 increasing the daily living allowances. The union admits herein that its
members were paid all these increases in pay mandated by law. It appears, however, that in 1987,
shortly after union president Mrs. Teresita V. Lim, who held the managerial position of registrar of the
college, had turned over the presidency of the union to Mrs. Fe Villarico, the latter unintentionally got a
copy of the collective bargaining agreement and discovered that Article IV thereof had not been
implemented by the petitioner. Consequently, on March 27, 1987, the union filed with the Department
of Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. III in San Fernando, Pampanga, a notice of strike on the
ground of unfair labor practice alleging therein violation of the collective bargaining agreement
particularly the provisions of Article IV thereof on salary scale.

37
Issue:

Whether increases in employees' salaries resulting from the implementation of presidential decrees and
wage orders, which are over and above the agreed salary scale contracted for between the employer
and the employees in a collective bargaining agreement, preclude the employees from claiming the
difference between their old salaries and those provided for under said salary scale.

Held:

Non-compliance with the mandate of a standards law or decree may give rise to an ordinary action for
recovery while violation of a collective bargaining agreement may even give rise to a criminal action for
unfair labor practice. And while the relief sought for violation of a standard law or decree is primarily for
restitution of unpaid benefits, the relief sought for violating a CBA is ordinarily for compliance and
desistance. Moreover, there is no provision in the aforecited Presidential Decrees providing that
compliance thereto is sufficient compliance with a provision of a collective bargaining agreement and
vice-versa. As correctly ruled by public respondent, a collective bargaining agreement is a contractual
obligation. It is distinct from an obligation imposed by law. The terms and conditions of a collective
bargaining contract constitute the law between the parties. Beneficiaries thereof are therefore, by right,
entitled to the fulfillment of the obligation prescribed therein. Consequently, to deny binding force to
the collective bargaining agreement would place a premium on a refusal by a party thereto to comply
with the terms of the agreement. Such refusal would constitute an unfair labor practice.

55. CIRTEK EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION-FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS v.

CIRTEK ELECTRONICS, GR No. 190515, 2011-06-06
Facts:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration
filed by respondent, Cirtek Electronics, Inc., of the Court's Decision dated November 15,
2010.
It goes on to aver that the Court erred in resolving a factual issue whether the August
24, 2005
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was validly entered into , which is not the office of a
petition for certiorari.
Respondent-movant further avers that the MOA[1] signed by the remaining officers of
petitioner Union and allegedly gratified by its members should have been given credence by
the Court.
Issues:
whether the Secretary of Labor is empowered to give arbitral awards in the exercise of his
authority to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes.

38
alleged disaffiliation of the Union from the FFW during the pendency of the case resulted in
the FFW losing its personality to represent the Union
Ruling:
Intertwined with the issue, however, is the question of validity of the MOA and its ratification
which, as movant correctly points out, is a question of fact and one which is not appropriate
for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The rule, however, is not... without
exceptions, viz
Generally, we are not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence'introduced in
and considered by the tribunals below.
When the  judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflating:
When the findings arc contrary  to those of , the trial court:
In the present case, the findings of the Secretary of Labor and the appellate court on
whether the MOA is valid and binding are conflicting, the former giving scant consideration
thereon, latter affording it more and the weight.
As for the contention that the alleged disaffiliation of the Union from the FFW during the
pendency of the case resulted in the FFW losing its personality to represent the Union, the
same does not affect the Court's upholding of the authority of the Secretary of Labor to
impose... arbitral awards higher than what was supposedly agreed upon in the MOA.
Contrary to respondent's assertion, the "unavoidable issue of disaffiliation" bears no
significant legal repercussions to warrant the reversal of the Court's Decision.
whether there was a valid disaffiliation is a factual issue.  Besides, the alleged disaffiliation
of the Union from the FFW was by virtue of a Resolution signed on February 23, 2010 and
submitted to the DOLE Laguna Field Office on March 5, 2010 two months... after the
present petition was filed on December 22, 2009, - hence, it did not affect FFW and its
Legal Center's standing to file the petition nor this Court's jurisdiction to resolve the same.
At all events, the issue of disaffiliation is an infra-union dispute which must be resolved in a
different forum in an action at the instance of either or both the FFW and the Union or a rival
labor organization, not the employer.
Indeed, as respondent-movant itself argues, a local union may disaffiliate at any time from
its mother federation, absent any showing that the same is  prohibited under its constitution
or rule.  Such, however, does not result in it losing its legal personality... altogether.  Verily,
Anglo-KMU v. Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawang Nagkakaisa Sa Manila Bar Spinning Mills
At J.P. Coats[11] enlightens
A local labor union is a separate and distinct unit primarily designed to secure and maintain
an equality of bargaining power between the employer and their employee-members. A
local union does not one its existence to the federation with which it is... affiliated.  It is a
separate and distinct voluntary association owing its creation to the will of its members.  The
mere act of affiliation does not divest the local union of its own personality, neither does it
give the mother federation the license... to act independently of the local union.  It only gives

39
rise to a contract of agency where the former acts in representation of the latter, (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

56. [G.R. No. 105775. February 8, 1993.] BENITO D. CHUA, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER BIENVENIDO V. HERMOGENES and NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
respondents.

Jose C. Espinas for petitioner. Siguion-Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako for private respondents.

SYLLABUS 1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; PROHIBITED ACTS: OBSTRUCTING FREE INGRESS TO OR
EGRESS FROM THE EMPLOYER'S PREMISES FOR LAWFUL PURPOSES; SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED IN CASE
AT BAR. — Petitioner's participation in the illegal strike and his commission of illegal acts while the strike
was in progress, i.e., he participated in the barricade which barred people from entering and/or leaving
the employer's premises, had been sufficiently established by substantial evidence, including the
testimony of Mr. Maniego, Personnel Supervisor at the Cabuyao Plant. Mr. Maniego testified, among
other things, that he was not able to report to work because of the presence of the barricade. The law
prohibits any person engaged in picketing from obstructing free ingress to or egress from the employer's
premises for lawful purposes (Article 264 [e], Labor Code). Since petitioner's participation in the
unlawful and violent strike was amply shown by substantial evidence, the NLRC was correct in holding
that the dismissal of petitioner was valid being based on lawful or authorized cause. 2. ID.; NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION; QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN THE DECISION THEREOF
DIFFERENT FROM THAT IN CRIMINAL; CASE AT BAR. — While the criminal complaint where petitioner
was included as one of the accused was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, the Court considers that
the dismissal of the criminal complaint did not preclude a finding by the competent administrative
authorities, that petitioner had indeed committed acts inimical to the interest of his employer. In Pepsi
Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines v. Guanzon, we held that: "Private respondent's guilt or
innocence in the criminal case is not determinative of the existence of a just or authorized cause for his
dismissal". This doctrine follows from the principle that the quantum and weight of evidence necessary
to sustain conviction in criminal cases are quite different from the quantum of evidence necessary for
affirmance of a decision of the Labor Arbiter and of the NLRC. 3. ID.; TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT;
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO EMPLOYEES; WHEN AVAILABLE IN CASE THEREOF; RULE. — This Court has
several times ruled that "financial assistance", whatever form it might assume, is permissible where the
employee has been validly dismissed, only in those instance where the cause of dismissal was something
other than serious misconduct on the part of the employee or other cause reflecting adversely on the
employee's moral character. Thus, in Cosmopolitan Funeral, Inc. v. Maalat, this Court clarified the
instance where "financial assistance" to an employee who had been dismissed for cause may be
awarded by the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC. The Court declared. "In Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT) v. NLRC, (164 SCRA 671 [1988]), this Court reexamined the doctrine in the aforecited
Firestone and Soco cases and other previous cases that employees dismissed for cause are nevertheless
entitled to separation pay on the ground of social and compassionate justice. In abandoning this

40
doctrine, the Court held, and we quote: '. . . We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as
a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes
other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid
dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit
sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee
separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social
justice. A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect of rewarding rather
than punishing the erring employee for his offense . . . .'" In the case at bar, petitioner's participation in
the unlawful and violent strike, which strike resulted in multiple deaths and extensive property damage,
constituted serious misconduct on his part; accordingly, the award of "financial assistance" was bereft of
basis and would moreover render the finding by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC of just or authorized
cause for termination of petitioner's services merely illusory.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J p: On 10 September 1987, the Union of Filipro Employees, of which petitioner Benito D.
Chua was a member, declared a strike against the private respondent company, Nestle Philippines, Inc.
During the strike, several of the striking employees threw stones at the trucks entering and leaving the
company premises. One truck. whose driver was rendered unconscious by a stone hitting him on the
head, rammed a private vehicle and crashed into a beauty parlor resulting in the death of three (3)
persons and extensive damage to private property. Consequently, a criminal complaint for multiple
murder and frustrated murder was filed against petitioner and several other employees who were
believed to be responsible for the stoning incident which resulted in the deaths and property damage.
The criminal complaint was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The strike itself was, however,
declared illegal in two (2) decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") which were
affirmed by the Supreme Court. 1 On 17 December 1937, the union and its striking members offered to
return to work and were readmitted by the company except sixty-nine (69) union officers and thirty-
three (33) union members, including petitioner. Subsequently, the union's counsel wrote to the private
respondent requesting the reinstatement of five (5) employees, including petitioner. The request,
however, was denied. On 5 February 1988, petitioner received a notice of dismissal from private
respondent for having participated in the illegal strike. Two days later, petitioner initiated a complaint
for illegal dismissal against private respondent company. On 22 September 1989, the Labor Arbiter
rendered a decision finding that petitioner had been validly dismissed. It was held that the evidence
introduced by private respondent, in the form of the testimony of Mr. Maniego, Personnel Supervisor of
its Cabuyao Plant, that he positively saw and identified petitioner as one of the union members who
actively participated and manned the barricades during the strike is "a concrete manifestation of an
illegal act that is frowned upon by law." At the same time, however, the Labor Arbiter awarded
petitioner "financial assistance" in the form of backwages from the time of his dismissal (in the amount
of P75,920 00) Plus separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service (in
the amount of P13,376.00). cdphil Wishing to be reinstated also, petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiter's
decision to the NLRC which, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter. In the present
Petition for Certiorari, petitioner argues that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering

41
its Decision dated 18 May 1992 which affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 22 September
1989, denying him reinstatement though granting him "financial assistance." Petitioner contends that no
substantial evidence exists on record to support the findings of the NLRC. We find this contention to be
without merit, Petitioner's participation in the illegal strike and his commission of illegal acts while the
strike was in progress, i.e., he participated in the barricade which barred people from entering and/or
leaving the employer's premises, had been sufficiently established by substantial evidence, including the
testimony of Mr. Maniego, Personnel Supervisor at the Cabuyao Plant. Mr. Maniego testified, among
other things, that he was not able to report to work because of the presence of the barricade. The law
prohibits any person engaged in picketing from obstructing free ingress to or egress from the employer's
premises for lawful purposes. 2 While the criminal complaint where petitioner was included as one of
the accused was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, the Court considers that the dismissal of the
criminal complaint did not preclude a finding by the competent administrative authorities, that
petitioner had indeed committed acts inimical to the interest of his employer. In Pepsi Cola Bottling
Company of the Philippines v. Guanzon, 3 we held that: "Private respondent's guilt or innocence in the
criminal case is not determinative of the existence of a just or authorized cause for his dismissal". This
doctrine follows from the principle that the quantum and weight of evidence necessary to sustain
conviction in criminal cases are quite different from the quantum of evidence necessary for affirmance
of a decision of the Labor Arbiter and of the NLRC.

Since petitioner's participation in the unlawful and violent strike was amply shown by substantial
evidence, the NLRC was correct in holding that the dismissal of petitioner was valid being based on
lawful or authorized cause. We disagree, however, with the award by the Labor Arbiter of "financial
assistance" to petitioner and with the NLRC's affirmance of that portion of the award. Under the
circumstances of this case, the Court considers that such award of "financial assistance" was obviously
unjustified. This Court has several times ruled that "financial assistance", whatever form it might
assume, is permissible where the employee has been validly dismissed, only in those instance where the
cause of dismissal was something other than serious misconduct on the part of the employee or other
cause reflecting adversely on the employee's moral character. Thus, in Cosmopolitan Funeral, Inc. v.
Maalat, 4 this Court clarified the instance where "financial assistance" to an employee who had been
dismissed for cause may be awarded by the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC. The Court declared.

"In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) v. NLRC, (164 SCRA 671 [1988[), this Court
reexamined the doctrine in the aforecited Firestone and Soco cases and other previous cases that
employees dismissed for cause are nevertheless entitled to separation pay on the ground of social and
compassionate justice. In abandoning this doctrine, the Court held, and we quote: '. . . We hold that
henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where
the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his
moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an
offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer
may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever
other name it is called, on the ground of social justice. A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly
argues, have the effect of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense . . . .'" 5

42
(Emphasis supplied) In the case at bar, petitioner's participation in the unlawful and violent strike, which
strike resulted in multiple deaths and extensive property damage, constituted serious misconduct on his
part; accordingly, the award of "financial assistance" was bereft of basis and would moreover render the
finding by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC of just or authorized cause for termination of petitioner's
services merely illusory. We are aware that in the instant case, private respondent did not appeal from
the decisions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Nevertheless, because the resolution of the issue of the
lawfulness of the award of "financial assistance" to petitioner is essential if this Court is to render
substantial justice as between the parties in this case, this Court feels compelled to pass upon that issue
and has ruled accordingly. 6 It is scarcely necessary to add that there is no legal impediment to the
private respondent making a grant on a voluntary and ex gratia basis, in any amount it CD Technologies
may feel appropriate, to petitioner. What the Court is stressing here is that, given the circumstances of
this case and under prevailing jurisprudence, the Labor Arbiter and NLRC had no authority legally to
compel the private respondent to pay to petitioner the "financial assistance" which they awarded.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for Certiorari for lack of merit. At the same
time, finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in affirming the Labor Arbiter's award of
"financial assistance" to petitioner, the Court Resolved to MODIFY the Decision of the NLRC of 18 May
1992 by deleting the portion thereof affirming the award of "financial assistance" by the Labor Arbiter,
without prejudice to private respondent's making a grant on a purely voluntary and ex gratia basis, to
petitioner. In all other respects, the NLRC Decision is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

57. [G.R. No. 92397. August 30, 1990.]

PPROGRESIBONG SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA ITM (PSM-ITM), ROGRESIBONG SAMAHAN NG

MANGGAGAWA SA ITM (PSM-ITM), EERASMO PALOMATA, ROBERTO CRUZ, LETICIA OXALLES,
SALVACION RASMO PALOMATA, ROBERTO CRUZ, LETICIA OXALLES, SALVACION BBAUTISTA,
FERNANDO DEL AGUA, and PRESCILLA CASTILLO AUTISTA, FERNANDO DEL AGUA, and PRESCILLA
CASTILLO, p e titio n e r s , v s . v s . HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR and IMPERIAL TEXTILE MILLS, INC.
HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR and IMPERIAL TEXTILE MILLS, INC., r e s p o n d e n t s .

A r m a n d o A. S a n A n t o nio for petitioners. B a tin o, A n g ala, S alu d & F a b ia L a w O f fic e s for

private respondent.

DD E C I S I O N E C I S I O N

GGANCAYCO ANCAYCO, J p: Once again the validity of the dismissal of union ocers arising from a strike is
brought to the attention of this Court. On September 11, 1989, the petitioner union led a notice of strike
against the private respondent citing the following grounds: 1. Violation of CBA; 2. Dismissal of Active
Union Members; 3. Indefinite Force (sic) Leave; 4. Non-remittance of SSS premiums and amortizations.
Several conciliation conferences were conducted by the Regional Branch No. 3 of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB-RB-III) aimed at effecting an amicable settlement between the
parties. All these efforts proved futile. Meanwhile, on September 15, 1989, petitioner union staged a
mass protest against private respondent alleging management's failure to release salaries of its workers.

43
After several hours they returned to work. On September 22, 1989, private respondent led a petition to
declare the September 15, 1989 mass protest illegal before the Regional Arbitration Branch No. 38, the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC RAB-III-09116389. cdphil On October 5,
1989, the petitioner union amended its notice of strike and alleged other issues. Private respondent in a
manifestation reiterated the relief prayed for in the petition of September 22, 1989. On October 26,
1989, the petitioner union staged a strike. They held picket lines and prevented, in t e r alia, company
vehicles from going in and out of the company premises as well as non-union employees of private
respondent.

On November 9, 1989, acting on a petition for injunction led by private respondent docketed as Case
No. 2012, the Third Division of the NLRC granted a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner
union from picketing the entrance way with its pickets and human blockades, blocking the egress and
ingress to private respondent's premises, and the use of threat or coercion or any unlawful obstruction.
Nevertheless, petitioner union continued with its picket. On December 27, 1989, labor arbiter Oswaldo
B. Lorenzo rendered a decision in NLRC Case No. RAB-III-09-1163-89 the dispositive part of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, this Oce nds the strike called by Respondent Union on 15 September 1989 illegal.
Accordingly, individual respondents having led that strike, are deemed to have lost their employment
status. The charges against the unnamed Board Members of PSM-ITM are hereby ordered DISMISSED."
11 On January 18, 1990, the NLRC Third Division granted the injunction prayed for by the private
respondent in said case. On January 22, 1990, petitioner union lifted its picket lines at private
respondent's premises. Thereafter, on January 26, 1990, the Secretary of Labor issued an order the
relevant portion of which reads as follows: "On December 27, 1989, NLRC-RAB-III, promulgated a
decision on the September 22, 1989 petition of the company the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Office finds the strike called by the Respondent Union of 15 September 1989, illegal.
Accordingly, individual respondents having led the strike, are deemed to have lost their employment
status. xxx xxx xxx Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. is engaged in an undertaking affected with public interest.
The company is one of the largest garment manufacturers and exporters. Moreover, it employs more
than 1,500 workers WHO ARE FULLY DEPENDENT ON THEIR LIVELIHOOD AND THAT OF THEIR
RESPECTIVE FAMILIES ON THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF THE FIRM. A PROLONGED WORK STOPPAGE
at the Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. would not only endanger the employment and livelihood of the more
than 1,500 workers and their families and those directly or indirectly dependent on them for support.
Such a WORK STOPPAGE would likewise have an adverse effect on the foreign exchange earnings vital to
the nation's economic recovery. At this point in time when a state of national emergency has been
declared throughout the Philippines, it is the OVERRIDING CONCERN OF THIS OFFICE TO AVERT THE
OCCURRENCE OF PROLONGED WORK STOPPAGES which impair the operations of among others,
businesses affected with public interest. (Capitalization ours). WHEREFORE, ABOVE PREMISES
CONSIDERED, this Oce hereby CERTIFIES the entire labor dispute at the Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. to the
National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration. In line with this certication, workers of
the company are hereby directed to lift their picket and return to work within twenty-four (24) hours
from receipt of this Order under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the work stoppage
EXCEPT THOSE WHOSE EMPLOYMENT HAS BEEN TERMINATED BY VIRTUE OF THE DECISION RENDERED
IN NLRC-RAB-III CASE NO. 09-1133-89 NAMELY: ERASMO PALOMATA, ROBERTO CRUZ, LETICIA OXALLES,

44
SALVACION BAUTISTA, FERNANDO DEL AGUA AND PRESCILLA CASTILLO. xxx xxx xxx" 22 On February 2,
1990, the individual petitioners led a motion for reconsideration of the said order. Because of said order
they were refused entry by private respondent and cannot report for work. On March 6, 1990, the
Secretary of Labor issued an order denying the said motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for c
e r tio r a ri wherein the petitioners raised the following issues: prcd " W H E T H E R O R N O T T H E H O
N O R A B L E S E C R E T A R Y O F L A B O R A N D E M P L O Y M E N T G R A V E L Y A B U S E D HIS D IS C
R E T IO N IN E X C L U D IN G IN T H E R E T U R N T O W O R K O R D E R T H E S IX ( 6 ) O F F IC E R S O F T
H E P E T IT IO N E R U NIO N N A M E L Y E R A S M O P A L O M A T A, R O B E R T O C R U Z, L E T ICIA O X
A L L E S, S A L V A CIO N B A U T IS T A, F E R N A N D O D E L A G U A A N D P R E S CIL L A C A S T IL L O, C
O N S ID E R IN G T H A T T H E D E CIS IO N ( A N N E X D ) S T A T IN G T H A T IN D IVID U A L R E S P O N
D E N T S A R E D E E M E D T O H A V E L O S T T H E IR E M P L O Y M E N T S T A T U S IS S T IL L P E N D
IN G A P P E A L . I. W H E T H E R O R N O T T H E S U B J E C T O R D E R ( A N N E X " C ") H A S N O F A C T
U A L A N D L E G A L F O U N D A T IO N A N D IN F R IN G E S T H E C O N S T IT U T IO N A L R IG H T S O F
T H E IN D IVID U A L P E T IT IO N E R S T O S E C U R IT Y O F T E N U R E, P R O T E C T IO N T O L A B O R,
S E L F -O R G A NIZ A T IO N A N D D U E P R O C E S S ." 33 which may be synthesized to the simple issue
of validity of the separation from the service of individual petitioners. The main thrust of the petition is
that there is no factual basis for the private respondent to include in the return-to-work order the
separation from the service of said petitioners. They contend that the decision of the NLRC RAB-III which
covered the removal of petitioners from employment was still due to be appealed by them and was in
fact appealed by them. The petition is devoid of merit. While it is true that the said decision dated
December 27, 1989 arising from the mass protest of a few hours that was staged by petitioner union on
September 15, 1989 was appealed by petitioners and is pending consideration, it was overtaken by the
subsequent events precipitated by the strike that was staged by petitioner union on October 26, 1989
which they continued up to January 21, 1990 despite the restraining order that the NLRC issued, thus,
obstructing the operations of the private respondent's business. Before the return-to-work order was
issued by public respondent, long and painstaking conciliation efforts were made but failed. Moreover,
at the time the subject order was issued, the nation was in a state of national emergency due to a
proclamation that was promulgated by President Aquino in view of the aborted December 1, 1989 c o u
p d'e t a t. This was another compelling consideration for the return-to-work order.

Further, it cannot be denied that the private respondent is engaged in an undertaking affected with
public interest being one of the largest garment manufacturers and exporters in the country. The long
work stoppage and negotiation meant enormous loss of foreign exchange so much needed in the
economic recovery of the country as it already suffered heavily due to the attempted c o u p d'e t a t.
The mass protest that was staged by petitioner could not have materialized without the leadership of
this individual petitioners. These refusal of petitioner union to respect the restraining order issued by
the NLRC can be attributed to petitioners who are the officers of petitioner union. When, therefore, the
Secretary of Labor issued the return-to-work order dated January 26, 1990, he considered not only the
work stoppage that was staged by petitioner union on September 15, 1989 but also the subsequent
mass protest and strike that they staged from October 26, 1989 up to the time they returned to work on
January 22, 1990. For these acts of the petitioners who are leaders of petitioner union obviously inimical
to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor properly and lawfully sustained and upheld their

45
separation from the service and their exclusion from the return-to-work order. They cannot claim denial
of due process because there were long conciliation efforts made towards the arbitration of the dispute
wherein they participated. In their motion for reconsideration they also reiterated their position on the
matter. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed as it has not been shown that public respondent
committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned orders dated January 26, 1990 and
March 6, 1990. SO ORDERED.

58. Santa Rosa Coca Cola Plant Employee Union vs Coca Cola Bottlers Phil
GR 164302-03

Facts:
The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) is the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of the regular daily paid workers and the
monthly paid non-commission-earning employees of the Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its Sta. Rosa, Laguna plant.

Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union informed the Company of its desire
to renegotiate its terms. The CBA meetings commenced on July 26, 1999,
where the Union and the Company discussed the ground rules of the
negotiations. The Union insisted that representatives from the Alyansa ng mga
Unyon sa Coca-Cola be allowed to sit down as observers in the
CBA meetings. The Union officers and members also insisted that their wages
be based on their work shift rates. For its part, the Company was of the view
that the members of the Alyansa were not members of the bargaining unit.
The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of employees of the Company in its various
plants; and is not a registered labor organization. Thus, an impasse ensued.

On August 30, 1999, the Union, its officers, directors and six shop stewards
filed a “Notice of Strike” with the NCMB.

The Union decided to participate in a mass action organized by the Alyansa in

front of the Company’s premises. Thus, the Union officers and members held a
picket along the front perimeter of the plant on September 21, 1999. As a
result, all of the 14 personnel of the Engineering Section of the Company did
not report for work, and 71 production personnel were also absent. As a result,
only one of the three bottling lines operated during the day shift. All the three
lines were operated during the night shift with cumulative downtime of five
(5) hours due

46
to lack of manning, complement and skills requirement. The volume of
production for the day was short by 60,000 physical cases versus budget.

On October 13, 1999, the Company filed a “Petition to Declare Strike Illegal”

Issue: WON the strike, dubbed by petitioner as picketing, is illegal.

Held:

Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of

work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor
dispute. In Bangalisan v. CA, the Court ruled that “the fact that the
conventional term ‘strike’ was not used by the striking employees to describe
their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the
situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.”

Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the
employer, usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs
making known the facts involved in a labor dispute. As applied to a labor
dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or more

persons to observe and attempt to observe. The purpose of pickets is said to be

a means of peaceable persuasion.

The basic elements of a strike are present in this case. They marched to and
fro in front of the company’s premises during working hours. Thus, petitioners
engaged in a concerted activity which already affected the company’s
operations. The mass concerted activity constituted a
strike.

For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites provided by Art

263 of the Labor Code must be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with the
DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair
labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in
a meeting called for that purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of
the voting at least seven days before the intended strike. These requirements
are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply therewith renders the
47
strike illegal. It is clear in this case that petitioners totally ignored the
statutory requirements and embarked on their illegal strike.

Petition denied.

59. [G.R. No. L-10112. November 29, 1957.]

RRADIO OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES ADIO OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE

PHILIPPINES, p e titio n e r , v s v s .. PHILIPPINE MARINE RADIO OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, ET AL.
PHILIPPINE MARINE RADIO OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, ET AL., r e s p o n d e n t s .

J o s e R a v al for petitioner. M a ria n o B . T u a s o n, for CIR. Villalu z, Viola & A s s o cia t e s for Phil.
Marine Radio Officers' Association. R a f a el Din g la s a n and M a ria n o L a u r el for Compañi a
Maritima. B a u s a & A m p il for Madrigal Shipping Co.

SSYLLABUS YLLABUS

1. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; STRIKE AND LOCKOUT; CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT BETWEEN

EMPLOYERS AND STRIKE BREAKERS DURING STRIKE; RIGHT TO GO BACK TO OLD POSITION NOT LOST. —
The petitioner union's contention that by the mere contract of employment between the employers and
the strikers, the right of strikers go back to their positions should be deemed lost or waived especially as
in the case at bar; the strikers did not offer to go back to their positions is untenable. Such a contention
if adopted, would proscribe strike a legitimate weapon by which labor may enforce its just demands; it
would undermine the just principles as well as the policy, underlying the law recognizing labor's
legitimate rights and weapons. Besides, the rule is to the effect that "while out on strike it is not
considered that the strikers have abandoned their employment, but rather have only ceased from their
labor." (Keith Theatre v s . Vachon, et al ., a87 A. 692.) The declaration of the strike is not a renunciation
of the employment relation. (Rex Taxicab Co. v s . Court of Industrial; Relations, et al., 40 U.S. [13] 138.)
2. ID.; ID.; NATURE OF POSITION OR EMPLOYMENT OF STRIKE BREAKERS. — When a strike breaker
accepts the position of a striker, he should know that his employment is merely temporary in nature. 3.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; AUTHORITY OVER CASE CERTIFIED TO IT BY THE PRESIDENT. —
Where a case is certified to the Court of Industrial Relations by the President of the Philippines, by virtue
of the provisions of section 10 of the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act No. 875), the Court of Industrial
Relations is granted authority to find a solution to an industrial dispute and that solution which the
Court has found under the above authority and conformably thereto can not be questioned.

DD E C I S I O N E C I S I O N

LLABRADOR ABRADOR, J .: This case is intimately connected with G.R. Nos. L-10095 and 10115, which
cases were decided on October 31, 1957. The facts are fully stated in the said decision, and only those
necessary for the understanding of the case at bar will be set forth. The petitioner in this case appeared
as an intervenor in the cases already decided while the same were pending in the Court of Industrial
Relations. Petitioners represented its members who had been contracted by the Philippine Steam

48
Navigation Company and other shipping companies to serve as radio operators in their vessels after the
Philippine Marine Radio Ofcers Association (PHILMAROA) had called a strike. Before the strike took
place, and more specically on October 17, 1953, the PHILMAROA led a notice of intention to strike with
the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor, against the shipping companies afliated with the
Philippine Shipowners' Association and the Asociacion de Navieros. The parties having been called to a
conference on November 13, 1953, the parties agreed that the shipping companies be given six days
within which to answer the demands of the strikers. However, on November 16, 1953, without waiting
for the expiration of the period above granted, the PHILMAROA withdrew its members from the
Compañi a Maritima. On November 19, 1953, the Philippine Steam Navigation Company expressed
willingness to bargain with the union, provided the latter had the right to represent its employees. The
same day that this answer was received, the PHILMAROA declared a strike against the vessels of the
Philippine Steam Navigation. Strikes were also declared on or about November 24 against the others,
including Madrigal Shipping Co. The shipping companies promptly hired replacements out of members
of the petitioner herein, the Radio Operators Association of the Philippines. When the case was certied
to the Court of Industrial Relations by the President of the Philippines, the petitioner in this case was
allowed to intervene together with the Republican Federation, which signed an employment contract
with Madrigal Shipping Co. on November 29, 1953. The petitioner in this case seeks the reversal of that
order of the Court of Industrial Relations which allows the strikers to go back to their respective
positions occupied by them before the strike. As the strike was purely voluntary and as the same was
illegal and because there had been no act of unfair labor practices committed by their employers, the
members of the petitioner union claim the right to be retained in the employ of their employers. The
immediate reaction of en impartial and unprejudiced mind to the acts of the members of the petitioner
union in accepting the positions of the strikers is not entirely favorable to them. They apparently
showed disloyalty to the cause of brother laborers. The fact, however, that the positions involved were
in a public utility, the services of which cannot be disrupted or suspended without prejudice to public
interest, serves to mitigate their disloyalty to their colleagues. One question squarely presented before
Us is, Does the employment of strike breakers operate to destroy the right or privilege of strikers to go
back to work after the settlement of the strike? Another is, Is the Court of Industrial Relations deprived
of its jurisdiction, by reason of a voluntary employment of strike breakers by the companies, to order
the return of the strikers to their respective positions held by them before the strike? Our answer to the
rst question must be qualied. It depends upon the circumstances surrounding the strike, as well as the
legality or illegality or the good faith thereof. In the case at bar the strike was resorted to to secure
desired improvements in the pay of laborers and in the conditions of their employment. "It is
unquestioned that laborers have the right, through concerted action by means of strike, to attempt to
secure the attainment of any of the lawful objects for which they may combine. It is settled that
workmen have the right to organize for the purpose of securing improvement in the terms and
conditions of labor, and to quit work or to threaten to quit work as a means of compelling or attempting
to compel employers to accede to their demands for better terms and conditions. Indeed, the reason for
a strike may be based upon any one or more of the multifarious considerations which in good faith may
be believed to tend towards the advancement of the employees." (31 Am. Jur. 934.) That most of the
demands were rejected did not make the strike less legitimate, as they do not appear to have been done
in bad faith or for an unlawful purpose. (31 Am. Jur. 934-935.) While it may be true that the strike was

49
premature because the strikers did not wait for the expiration of the six-day period granted the
companies to answer the demands of the striking union, the rashness of the strikers may be excused by
the fact that their demands had been presented as early as August, 1953, and no answer thereto had
been obtained for a period of four months. We have agreed with the court a q u o that all that the
strikers have lost by reason of their premature strike was their right to backpay. ( s e e : The Phil. Marine
Radio Ofcers' Assn. v s . CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-10095 and Compañi a Maritima, et al. v s . Phil. Marine
Radio Ofcers' Assn. et al., ** G. R. No. L10115, promulgated October 31, 1957.) But even without the
circumstances, which in this case are favorable to the strikers, we cannot agree to the contention of
petitioner union that by the mere contract of employment between the employers and the strike
breakers during the strike, the right of the strikers to back to their old positions should be deemed lost
or waived, especially as in this case the strikers did not offer to go back to their positions. Such a
contention, if adopted, would proscribe the strike as a legitimate weapon by which labor may enforce its
just demands; it would undermine the just principles, as well as the policy, underlying the law
recognizing labor's legitimate rights and weapons. Besides, the rule is to the effect that "while out on
strike it is not considered that the strikers have abandoned their employment, but rather have only
ceased from their labor." (Keith Theatre v s . Vachon, et al., 187 A. 692.) The declaration of the strike is
not a renunciation of the employment relation. (Rex Taxicab Co. v s . Court of Industrial Relation, et al.,
40 Off. Gaz. [13] 138.) The contention of petitioning union is also without legal or moral justication.
When a strike breaker accepts the position of a striker, he should know that his employment is merely
temporary in nature, subject to the outcome of the strike. Such was our ruling in the case of National
City Bank of New York v s . National City Bank Employees Union, (98 Phil., 30, 52 Off. Gaz., [2] 799): "It
needs no argument to show that in the very nature of things the right of the striking employees to be
readmitted to their old position was to depend upon the results of the litigation or the finding of the
Court of Industrial Relations on the legality or illegality of the strike. On the other hand, the recruits as
well as the Bank should have understood that their employment was temporary in nature, because it
was only a provisional remedy calculated to minimize the injurious effects of the strike on the petitioner
and its clients as well as on the public. Certainly no permanent right to the positions temporarily
occupied could have been acquired by the recruits, or obligation on the part of the petitioner to retain
them therein implied therefrom. The modification thereof by the decision of the court after trial, and in
accordance with the results thereof, must be held to be perfectly proper, just and legal."

Our answer to the second question propounded must also be in the negative. The case at bar was
certied to the Court of Industrial Relations by the President of the Philippines, by virtue of the provisions
of Section 10 of the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act No. 875). Under the circumstances set forth
therein, the Court of Industrial Relations is granted authority to nd a solution to an industrial dispute
and that solution which the court has found under the above authority and conformably thereto can not
be questioned. The petition is hereby denied and the order subject thereof, affirmed. With costs

60. DANILO ESCARIO v. NLRC, GR No. 160302, 2010-09-27

50
Facts:
The petitioners were among the regular employees of respondent Pinakamasarap
Corporation (PINA), a corporation engaged in
They were members of petitioner Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Balanced
Foods (Union).
At 8:30 in the morning of March 13, 1993, all the officers and some 200 members of the
Union walked out of PINA's premises and proceeded to the barangay office to show support
for Juanito Cañete, an officer of the Union charged with oral defamation by Aurora Manor,
PINA's... personnel manager, and Yolanda Fabella, Manor's secretary
As a result of the walkout, PINA preventively suspended all officers of the Union
PINA terminated the officers of the Union after a month.
PINA filed a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP) and damages. The complaint was
assigned to then Labor Arbiter... who ruled in his decision... incident was an illegal walkout
constituting ULP; and that... all the Union's officers, except Cañete, had thereby lost their
employment.[4]... the Union filed a notice of strike, claiming that PINA was guilty of union
busting through the constructive dismissal of its officers.
The strike was held in the afternoon of June 15, 1993.
PINA retaliated by charging the petitioners with ULP and abandonment of work, stating that
they had violated provisions on strike of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA),... he
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) issued a temporary restraining order (TRO),
enjoining the Union's officers and members to cease and desist from barricading and
obstructing the entrance to and exit from PINA's premises
Labor Arbiter... rendered a decision... eclaring the subject strike to be illegal.
On appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding that the strike was illegal, but reversed the LA's
ruling that there was abandonment
Under Article 264 of the Labor Code, as amended, the union officers who knowingly
participate in the illegal strike may be declared to have lost their employment status.
However, mere participation of a union member in the illegal strike does not mean loss of
employment status... unless he participates in the commission of illegal acts during the
strike... the petitioners assailed the NLRC's decision through a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals (CA),  claiming that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in not
awarding backwages pursuant to Article
279 of the Labor Code, and in not declaring their strike as a good faith strike.
the CA affirmed the NLRC
In denying the petitioners' claim for full backwages, the CA applied the third paragraph of
Article 264(a) instead of Article 279 of the Labor Code, explaining that the only instance
under
Article 264 when a dismissed employee would be reinstated with full backwages was when
he was dismissed by reason of an illegal lockout; that Article 264 was silent on the award of

51
backwages to employees participating in a lawful strike; and that a reinstatement with full...
backwages would be granted only when the dismissal of the petitioners was not done in
accordance with Article 282 (dismissals with just causes) and Article 283 (dismissals with
authorized causes) of the Labor Code.
Issues:
The petitioners posit that they are entitled to full backwages from the date of dismissal until
the date of actual reinstatement due to their not being found to have abandoned their jobs.
They insist that the CA decided the question in a manner contrary to law and...
jurisprudence.
Ruling:
We sustain the CA, but modify the decision on the amount of the backwages in order to
accord with equity and jurisprudence.
Article 279. Security of Tenure. - In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this
Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled... to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time
his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual... reinstatement.
As a general rule, backwages are granted to indemnify a dismissed employee for his loss of
earnings during the whole period that he is out of his job. Considering that an illegally
dismissed employee is not deemed to have left his employment, he is entitled to all the
rights and... privileges that accrue to him from the employment... separation pay is made an
alternative relief in lieu of reinstatement in certain circumstances, like: (a) when
reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the passage of a long period of time or
because of the realities of the situation; (b)... reinstatement is inimical to the employer's
interest; (c) reinstatement is no longer feasible; (d) reinstatement does not serve the best
interests of the parties involved; (e) the employer is prejudiced by the workers' continued
employment; (f) facts... that make execution unjust or inequitable have supervened; or (g)
strained relations between the employer and employee.
WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision dated August 18, 2003 of the Court of Appeals,
subject to the modification to the effect that in lieu of reinstatement the petitioners are
granted backwages equivalent of one month for every year of service.

52