#20 MARCH 2020

29 ARTICLES
214 PAGES OF PURE
TACTICAL ANLAYSIS,
SCOUTING AND COACHING
QUIQUE SETIEN: HIS
BARCELONA APPROACH

SCOUT REPORT: CHRISTOPHER NKUNKU’S RB

LEIPZIG RESURGENCE UNDER NAGELSMANN

ATALANTA: CAN THEY KEEP

THE MOMENTUM GOING?

AJAX: REPLACING
HAKIM ZIYECH

PLUS: NECO WILLIAMS - THE NEXT

1 TRENT ALEXANDER-ARNOLD?
2
 Dear subscribers,

Firstly, welcome to the March magazine - 2020 is gathering pace as we speak.

Secondly, I hope you are enjoying the new look totalfootballanalysis.com website. Hopefully, it
is making our articles even more enjoyable for you to read.

This magazine is our biggest ever - 29 pieces and 214 pages of content for you to devour.

The European season is moving to the business end of things whilst MLS is just getting under-
way in the US.

As a result, we have a nice mix of everything - men’s and women’s.

As they’ve made it on to the front cover, I’d naturally recommend taking a look at Carl Elsik’s
piece on Christopher Nkunku, Lee Scott’s piece on how Ajax can look to replace Hakim Ziyech
and Lorihanna Shushkova’s deep dive into Atalanta of Serie A this season.

That said, all 29 pieces are of the highest quality - covering scout reports, recruitment, coaching
and tactical theory.

Whilst I have your attention - don’t forget to subscribe (free) to our podcasts which are available
in all the usual places you’d expect to find such things. Right now, we have five going out each
week for you.

As ever, please enjoy and spread the word far and wide.

Thanks,
Chris Darwen // EiC Total Football Analysis

3
4
 CONTENTS
6 // Head Coach analysis: Alfred Schreuder
13 // Tactical Theory: The tactical flexibility of wide defenders
23 // Neco Williams: The next Trent Alexander-Arnold?
30 // Part Two: How to break common pressing strategies
37 // Scout Report: Christopher Nkunku’s RB Leipzig resurgence under Nagelsmann
44 // Tactical Analysis: How to beat Liverpool
51 // Jose Mourinho: Taking Spurs in the right direction?
60 // Dominik Szoboszlai: Is he ready for the next big move?
66 // Dimitri Payet: The tactics behind his Marseille revival under André Villas-Boas
73 // Oleksandr Zinchenko: Leading Ukraine’s Euros charge
79 // Goalkeeping: Coaching the block save
85 // Atalanta: Can they keep the momentum going?
93 // Red Star Belgrade’s new midfield: Njegoš Petrović and Veljko Nikolić
101 // Theory: The use of asymmetrical shapes in possession
106 // Werder Bremen: Where is it going wrong?
114 // Arsenal WFC: Analysis of their build out phase
121 // Scout Report: Maximiliano Moralez
127 // Tanguy Kouassi: PSG’s wonderkid centre-back
135 // Scout Report: Gabriel Martinelli
142 // Deportivo La Coruña: What’s sparked Fernando Vázquez’s remarkable recovery?
148 // Theory: The re-emergence of man-marking in a high press
158 // Tactical Analysis: Getafe’s time under José Bordalás
165 // Quique Setien: His Barcelona approach
172 // Ajax: Replacing Hakim Ziyech
178 // Thomas Muller: The renaissance
185 // Theory: Using rotations to create superiorities in build-up
192 // Arteta: How Arsenal have developed so far
199 // Rodolfo Pizarro: Inter Miami’s first talisman
206 // PSG: Can you have too many attackers?

5
Head Coach Analysis:

Alfred Schreuder

BY DAVID SEYMOUR // @davidsey

6
H aving been an assistant manager at FC
Twente, Hoffenheim, and Ajax under the
likes of Steve McLaren, Huub Stevens, Julian
Nagelsmann and Erik ten Hag, Alfred Schreuder
took over as Head Coach of Hoffenheim in the
summer, following Nagelsmann’s departure.
The man who has spent so much time as an
assistant has seemingly begun to find his feet
as a head coach, despite a very slow start to
the season, with just five points from their first
six games. Now Hoffenheim sit comfortably
inside the top half of the table and within
striking distance of the Europa League places.
Perhaps european qualification may be asking
a little much for Schreuder’s first season, baring
in mind the summer exits of first team regulars
Nadiem Amiri, Kerem Demirbay, Nico Schulz
and Joelinton, however, the Dutchman has
certainly begun to instil his own philosophy
to the team and they are a side with plenty of
potential to improve over time.
This tactical analysis of the Hoffenheim Head
Coach will give an in-depth analysis of the
tactics he has used throughout his first season
in charge.
Formations
and personnel
W hen discussing Schreuder’s Hoffenheim
it’s important to note that they have been
very flexible with their formations this season,
often changing week-to-week. When playing
four at the back we have seen them using a
4-1-4-1 and 4-2-3-1 and with three at the back,
a 3-4-3 or 3-5-2. As the season has worn on,
Schreuder has used a back three slightly less
than at the beginning, possibly down to the
decision to send Kevin Vogt to Werder Bremen,
who had previously been a mainstay as part of
the back three.
One of the quirkiest things about Schreuder’s
7
reign so far has been his decision to frequently
play players in different positions to what
they are used to. He has clearly been a little
disappointed with his squad depth and has
had a difficult time with injuries, so perhaps
Schreuder has done this to send a message to
the board.
Either way there have certainly been some eye-
raising decisions. Robert Skov scored 31 goals
and made nine assists for FC Kobenhaven last
season as a winger, but this season has seen
regular minutes as a left-back. He currently
has three goals and four assists for the
season. Florian Grillitsch has been impressive
in central-midfield this season, but has also
played as a centre-back, but more bafflingly,
his central-midfield teammate, Sebastian Rudy
has been deployed at right-back at times.
There are more examples of this with other
players but it demonstrates that Schreuder isn’t
necessarily just a tinkerer with formations.
Playing out
from the back
T he basics of Schreuder’s build-up play
is for a number six to drop deep and
create space in behind whilst supporting ball
progression themselves, as well as to have
options in wide spaces. He likes to see them
build play centrally, and if the opposition
defence gets too narrow then they have the
ability to hurt teams from these wide areas.
Their team crossing accuracy is 34.7% which is
the fourth-highest in the league, and other than
Eintracht Frankfurt, they have had the most
shots coming from headers this season.
The image below demonstrates what
Hoffenheim often look like when the keeper has
possession from a goal-kick. We can see the
number six is very deep as are the two centre-
backs, positioned either side of the goalkeeper.
It is normal for Schreuder to give the wing-
backs a lot of space on their flanks too, and
we are also able to see options beyond the
number six in central areas, staggered to aid
ball-progression.
Schreuder will encourage his side to build from
the back even when under pressure from a high
and intense press. Hoffenheim will happily draw
the opposition forward with passes between
the defenders and the pivot before looking to
hit the space in behind either with direct passes
into attacking midfielders or forwards’ feet, or
over the top in the channels for their forwards
to run onto behind the opposition defence.
When playing against similar strength or
possibly weaker teams Schreuder favours a
patient build-up approach and although his
side are no doubt encouraged to play forward
when they have the chance, it’s clear when
watching them that they’re in no rush to take
any risks doing so.
8
This patient approach is seen all the
way through the pitch with only Borussia
Monchengladbach and Hertha Berlin taking
less shots from outside the box than them this
year too.
When building up from the back in a more
advanced position, but still inside their own
half, they will have the central-defender from
their back three drop deep as a pivot. Dropping
deeper than his two teammates the central-
defender is used to orchestrate the build-up
play and circle the ball from side to side until
there is a clear opening to play forward.
When the ball is with the right-sided or left-
sided centre-back Hoffenheim don’t stretch as
far wide as some back three’s do. In the picture
below we can see that the right-sided centre-
back is relatively tight to the central-defender,
and that is perhaps down to Schreuder’s more
reserved approach than his predecessor and
by playing like this they are theoretically less
vulnerable to the transition, given the little
space between the back three.
This can vary based on the location of the
press. For example against Mainz, who pressed
very narrowly, their centre-backs would spread
wide. With their double pivot dropping deep to
offer support in the build-up, it brought Mainz
even more narrow and created easy passing
options out wide.
 midfielders in the image below doesn’t just
facilitate this forward passing option, but
also helps the back three play through the
opposition press. In the image below Werder
Bremen are blocking the lateral pass from
the left centre-back to either of his defensive
teammates. The two central-midfielders are
able to receive the ball and continue circling
the ball, playing back to one of the two open
central-defenders and breaking the press.

Nevertheless when playing the back three it’s

still wide enough where they can stretch the
opposition press whilst looking to have two of
their three central-midfielders drop in deep to
create space to play directly into the forward
line. The third central-midfielder that doesn’t
drop will be on whichever side the ball isn’t.
The image below shows the midfield three’s
stagger which provides wing-backs or central
defenders more passing options.

Having a single or double pivot drop deep

and then having a third midfielder sit higher is
something we see in lots of Hoffenheim’s build-
up under Schreuder. If they play with a midfield
four it will likely be a single pivot that drops
deep, and if with a midfield five then it may well
be a double.

As mentioned earlier Schreuder encourages his

players to be cautious with the ball. They will
work the ball until there is the option to to break
With the third midfielder taking a higher and
the lines with a high percentage through pass.
wider position than his two teammates he is
also able to offer support if the centre-forward
Hoffenheim average 8.53 through passes per
receives the pass.
game, above the league average of 7.59, and
have a 37.6% pass completion these which is
By playing directly from the defence into the
the second highest in the Bundesliga.
forward line it allows the central-midfielders to
offer an option to the centre-forward and they
Benjamin Hubner and Florian Grillitsch have the
can now receive the pass facing the opposition
first and second highest completion on through
goal, rather than with their back to it. Upon
passes in the league with 51.85% and 50%
receiving the ball they can drive into the space
respectively. Tied with Grillitsch in second is
created by the initial midfield box.
Phillipe Coutinho.

The deeper positioning of the two central-

9
The recipients of these through passes will
often be the wing-backs, centre-forwards or
the higher positioned midfielders operating in
the half-spaces as we can see in the image
below. They will have these options regardless
of formation. In the earlier example they were
playing a 3-5-2, but in the game against Bayern
below, they were playing a 4-1-4-1.
To continue to have these third man options in
more advanced areas, Schreuder will commit
plenty of players forward to open up space. In
the image below Hoffenheim have five players
further advanced than the player highlighted.
The back three are wide enough to stretch the
Mainz press and create space to play through
the lines to the midfielder.
Counter-attacking
T hese principles are evident in their counter-
attacking football too, which they have
used so effectively against the top teams in
the division where they have beaten Bayern
10
Munich, Borussia Dortmund, Schalke and
Bayern Leverkusen.
Against these stronger teams Hoffenheim
will drop considerable numbers back, whilst
leaving a forward up, but close enough to
receive a pass to feet as soon as they win
back possession. We will then see the simple
up, back, and through passing pattern which
they use regularly with their use of third man
runners.
In the image below as soon as the forward
receives the pass he has three central options
to play back to.
Hoffenheim work hard to commit numbers
quickly on the counter. The image below shows
how they will ensure the ball-carrier has two
options in more central areas on the counter,
but also a third-man option with the right-
winger in this case not moving centrally, but
ready to receive a through-pass should one of
the other arriving midfielders receive the ball
from the forward.
 Defensive shape
S chreuder doesn’t favour an intense press,
which is backed up by Hoffenheim’s 11.67
PPDA average this season. This isn’t to say
they will sit back and concede possession.
Against Bayer Leverkusen earlier this season
they showed that they could use a high press
successfully should their game plan require Schreuder uses a back three to allow him
this. to drop into a defensive five when out of
possession. As mentioned earlier they will
The image below shows how Schreuder set often leave one forward up, and therefore will
up to prevent Leverkusen’s midfield three drop into a 5-4-1 when defending deep. The
getting on the ball with man-marking, whilst wing-backs in the back five will be expected
Hoffenheim’s front three press Leverkusen’s to pressure opposition wingers should they
central-defenders to force them to either play receive possession, whilst the wing-back on
wide or long. the opposite side will tuck in to ensure they
keep a back four. Their midfield four will stay
narrow, again protecting the central areas,
forcing the opposition to play wide. Despite
them playing a back four more frequently
recently, we still seem them drop into a 5-4-
1 out of possession when defending deep.
To create the five either winger will drop in,
or Grillitsch will, who operates close to the
defence, acting as a screen in midfield. There is
an example demonstrating this shape against
Bayern Munich.
Protecting central areas is a recurring them in
their defensive shape though and they will look
to do this regardless of formation. In the below
example against Werder Bremen, where they
did play a 3-5-2 we can see their midfield three
in a narrow triangle, showing the opposition
ball-carrier away from the middle of the pitch.

One thing we see Hoffenheim do that other

back three/back five’s don’t do in quite the
same way, is how aggressive their defence
press the ball-carrier to push them backwards.

11
In the below example we see central-defender
Kevin Akpoguma and defensive-midfielder
Florian Grillitsch push forward to drive the ball-
carrier backwards. As this happens their left-
wing back tucks in to make sure they still have
a back three.
It is promising that Hoffenheim are challenging
for Europa League qualification whilst having
so many injury problems and next season, with
a chance to strengthen the squad and therefore
perhaps play his players in their favoured
positions next season, we may see Schreuder’s
Hoffenheim continue to grow into a top six
German side.

As Bremen play the ball backwards we can see

Akpoguma and Grillitsch are sat in front of a
back three.

Conclusion
T his year was always going to be a year of
transition for Hoffenheim with key players
and their manager moving on to pastures new.
However, Schreuder has perhaps surprised a
few people by ensuring the transition has been
relatively painless. He has instilled some of
his own ideas, particularly with a more patient
build-up phase than Hoffenheim fans will be
accustomed to, but also tried to keep elements
of Nagelsmann’s style intact (the up, back and
through passing pattern).

12
Tactical Theory:

The tactical flexibility of wide defenders

BY ABDULLAH ABDULLAH // @kunabd

13
T he role of wing defenders has been
prevalent in all of footbal providing
managers with new tactical options and
methods of attack. No longer are they
restricted to pure defensive roles, rather a focal
point of a team’s attacking structure in some
cases. Women’s football, in particular, has
seen some tactical innovations of their own in
recent years with coaches taking inspiration
from their male counterparts. Some of the
ideas are quite fascinating and it’s formed part
of the innovative thinking that has come into
the women’s game. The different uses that will
be discussed in this analysis alone form part of
the tactical complexity within these systems.
Over the last two seasons, we have seen
different teams employ tactics using their wide
defenders in defensive, offensive, and build-up
transitions.
This tactical analysis will look to explore the
different tactical setups and explore their
effectiveness. We will also analyse teams
using these aforementioned systems and how
they’ve implemented this into their structure.
Balanced full-back system
T here are several tactical reasons behind
this, namely opposition teams’ preference
to crowd and suffocate zone 14, forcing teams
to the wide areas. This simply reduces the
chances for a team to score from the central
areas. One of the most common uses of full-
backs has been the use of a balanced pair.
This essentially means that one defender will
be more attacking whilst the other remains a
bit more defensive. This tactic is used when a
team has a pair of full-backs that compliment
each other. One may be an excellent attacking
presence whilst the other remains more
defensively astute giving the manager a way
of bringing balance to their team allowing
other players in midfield and attack to flourish.
14
Choosing the right type of full-backs in this
situation becomes an important process.
Full-back pairings are entirely dependent
on the types of players available in a squad.
Many teams have converted wingers or central
defenders into full-backs to either provide
defensive solidarity or attacking thrust. Arsenal
Women, Paris Saint-Germain Feminine, and
France women’s national football team are
three notable examples of teams who possess
a mixture of different types of full-backs, but
more often than not keep two solid options out
wide.
The use of these types of full-backs can be
useful in games where teams are looking to
keep the opposition wingers contained whilst
retaining their attacking shape in regards to
having two similar full-backs. Arsenal, for
example, utilise different pairings for different
tactical reasons. Viktoria Schnaderbeck, Lisa
Evans, Leonie Maier, and Katie McCabe are
their four full-backs. In games where they want
to dominate possession, they will look to pair
a set of aggressive full-backs who are both
equally as offensive and defensive. They used
McCabe and Maier against Manchester United
where they dominated 66% of possession
but had to be wary of their counter-attacking
potential. The tactical thinking behind this
was to use McCabe and Maier’s pace to track
back and defend but also use their attacking
prowess in combination with Danielle van de
Donk and Beth Mead in attacking positions.

Arsenal Women’s full-backs are aware of their
positions with the right-back slightly higher than
the left-back [Credit: Wyscout]
The main advantage of using balanced full-
backs is the opportunity to create numerical
superiority in midfield and attacking areas.
Taking a 4-2-3-1 formation as an example,
when a full-back is paired with a forward who
prefers to cut inside, it creates an almost 2-3-5
shape giving the attacking team an extra body
in attack. In doing so, the defending side are
overwhelmed, especially in the half-spaces,
and have to commit players from midfield to
support the overload. This, in turn, creates
space for the full-back to make an overlapping
run, leaving the centre-forward isolated with
the centre-back and gives late runners from
midfield a chance to attack the box. The
graphic below illustrates this scenario and the
spaces that open for the attacking team.
A tactical representation of the balanced full-
back system [Credit: Wyscout]
15
From a defensive perspective, the team is able
to provide enough cover to keep themselves
protected from a counter-attack. Just as
Arsenal use McCabe and Maier, teams use
their full-backs to drop back into a defensive
position to stop the opposition from exploiting
the centre-backs. Often teams will compensate
for a flying full-back by deploying a defensive
midfielder who will act as an anchorman or
half-back to cover the vacant space. This kind
of midfielder is one who remains disciplined in
their defensive tasks and will retreat to become
a third centre-back at times to maintain a back
four.
Paris Saint-Germain Feminine utilise a
combination of balanced full-backs and
midfield protection to create attacking
opportunities whilst remaining defensively
compact. They are a team that utilise their
full-backs extensively and adjust their tactics
depending on the type of opposition they face.
PSG are especially prevalent and disciplined
in their attempts to keep their shape and
compactness against top quality, possession-
dominant sides. Taking their league match
against Olympique Lyon as an example, PSG
employed a 5-3-2/4-3-3 with Grace Geyoro
deployed as the deepest midfielder playing as
a half-back. The two full-backs were cautious
and only attacked when the opportunity
presented itself. Both Perle Morroni and
Hanna Glas took a reactive approach lending
themselves to a defence first, attack later
mentality.
 space in behind Bacha.

PSG’s average positions [Credit: Wyscout]

This pass map shows the two full-backs’
deeper positioning close to the two centre-
backs. Doubling up was done to contain the
threat of Eugenie Le Sommer and Amel Majri.
Lyon concentrate their play through the wide
space making the two wide forwards extremely
dangerous to their attacking structure. Both
full-backs keep a close eye on the state of play
and anticipate their next move.
Glas can now put Paris Saint-Germain
Feminine in a very good position to threaten the
defensive line [Credit: Wyscout]
Glas interchanges play with her teammate
and runs into the vacant space behind Lyon’s
defensive line. We can see Glas in an advanced
position with no marker nearby. While there
are three covering defenders, Glas is in a great
position to put in a quick cross for Marie-
Antoinette Katoto and Kadidiatou Diani to latch
on to.

Asymmetrical
full-backs system
Hanna Glas reacts to the pass from Amel Majri
into Selma Bacha to put PSG on a counter-
F or more dominant, possession-based
systems, teams often deploy a more
aggressive shape and style to their tactics. Part
attack [Credit: Wyscout] of picking this tactic is once again based on the
playing squad and managers style. If there is
The most obvious tactical observation is PSG’s an outstanding candidate in the full-back areas
defensive shape. We can see that four of the then teams can play a more asymmetrical style
back five are in line creating a disciplined block to create a more lop-sided shape to leverage
with Glas stepping up to stop the attack. Whilst their attacking advantage on that flank. Teams
on the opposite side Morroni has maintained that have adopted a variation of this system
her location and held a defensive position in the have benefited from a few major advantages.
event Lyon win back possession. Majri’s pass
into Selma Bacha is intelligently anticipated The dominant full-back often excels in carrying
and intercepted by Glas. The Swedish right- the ball forward and interchanges play with
back takes advantage of this situation and their midfield teammates. Not only does this
puts PSG on the counter-attack, exploiting the transfer possession effectively through the

16
thirds but creates space in and around the
final third. This tends to switch the focus to the
busier side, leaving the opposite flank with a
bit more freedom for the winger to engage in
1v1 situations and late runs into the box. We’ve
seen this more so in three-man formations
where the opposite wing-back is able to make
late runs into the box. Marcos Alonso’s goal
against Tottenham Hotspur a few weeks ago
is a perfect example of how high-flying wing-
backs can effect the box offensively.
A tactical representation of the asymmetrical
full-back system [Credit: Wyscout]
The shape of the team is quite distinct in both
the offensive and defensive phases of play
involving both full-backs. Firstly, from an overall
shape perspective, it becomes a lot more
asymmetrical and lopsided. While one full-back
will spend most of their time higher up, the
other sits in a narrower position closer to the
central defenders to provide defensive cover.
In theory, the defensive full-back becomes
an auxiliary central defender when teams
counter-attack because of their deeper, slightly
narrower positioning. The above graphic
illustrates the team’s shape and gives us an
indication of the two full-back’s positioning.
You’ll usually find more defensive-minded
players being used in this position, in some
cases centre-backs being converted into full-
backs. The defending team is also subjected
to cover in the central area, consisting of up
to three players with the closest defensive
midfielder providing extra support.
17
From an offensive perspective, the team shape
becomes very one-sided. The attacking team
becomes much more potent down one side
of the pitch. As we discussed earlier, this is
often done to exploit and take advantage of
a players strength in an offensive capacity
and forcing the defending team to be much
more reactive on that side. Another reason
is to create balance in midfield. Often teams
will have at least two central midfielders who
would be playing on the left and right side of
midfield with the third midfielder predominantly
anchoring the midfield (if teams are playing
with three midfielders). The profile of the two
left and right sided midfielders could determine
how the wide spaces are shaped. The more
aggressive midfielder will often be paired with
the more defensive full-back and vice versa
giving the attacking team balance on both
sides. Especially given how most teams utilise
inside-forwards in the wide attacking roles, this
becomes even more significant. On the other
hand, having an overload on one side could
create space on the opposite flank for the other
winger to find space and openings when play is
switched to the opposite flank. The defending
team needs to become much more cautious
and proactive in this situation.
Arsenal Women’s average positions [Credit:
Wyscout]
Quickly going back to the Arsenal example
used earlier, Montemurro’s side doesn’t
necessarily employ the aforementioned
strategy regularly, but they have often
resorted to this tactic to aid their possession
dominance. When Arsenal want to keep a solid
defensive structure on one side they deploy
Schnaderbeck as the left-sided full-back giving
Evans the freedom to attack on the right just
as they did against Reading. The above pass
map shows the full-backs positioning from
the Reading game and the statistics to back
their intentions. The Gunners had an expected
goals (xG) of 2.39 with four counter-attacks
originating down the right with an xG of 0.67,
meaning that 66% of the counters were
courtesy of Evans and Beth Mead.
However, one team that has executed this
system is Manchester City Women. Alan
Mahon’s team has utilised this tactic with a
good degree of success albeit through forced
circumstances. Aoife Mannion was former
manager Nick Cushing’s right-back of choice
until an ACL injury in the Champions League
put her out for an extended spell. Even though
Matilde Fidalgo was available, Cushing chose
to alter his tactics instead and deploy natural
forward Janine Beckie at right-back.
Cushing changed his formation to a 4-2-2-2
system that morphed into an asymmetrical
shape with Beckie playing much higher on
the right side similar to an auxiliary winger.
The right-sided attacker in Ellen White would
position herself in and around the penalty area
then move into the wide areas giving Beckie
space to make marauding runs down the right
flank. The inside right midfielder - Jill Scott -
also plays much narrower as she is closer to
being an ‘8’ / ‘10’ hybrid than a wide player.
However, both players will try to interchange
and create passing options for Beckie to create
space and dribbling opportunities for her to
thrive. Defensively, Caroline Weir and Kiera
Walsh play as the double-pivot to give City
protection in midfield. Walsh and Scott were
tasked with providing extra cover on the right-
hand side giving Beckie the freedom to make
18
attacking runs down the flank.
The left-back - Demi Stokes or Meghan
Campbell - have played a more conservative
role and position themselves in an area that is
still wide enough to deal with the opposition
winger but narrow enough to become part of a
faux three-man defensive line along with one of
Weir or Scott slightly ahead to create numerical
superiority when the situation arises.
Manchester City Women’s average position.
Janine Beckie is further forward with Jill Scott
playing close to her to protect the space in
behind [Credit: Wyscout]
The pass map above illustrates Beckie’s
attacking intentions through her advanced
positioning. It’s clear to see the left-back sitting
much closer to the central defenders than
Beckie on the right side who is the primary
outlet. What is also vital to note is the presence
of the deeper double-pivot of Weir (#19) and
Walsh (#24) providing that protection from
central midfield. Weir’s positional awareness
allows her to roam midfield depending on the
situation given her ability to be at the right
place at the right time. They fill in the gaps
to give City their numerical superiority at the
back. Depending on the full-back that has gone
forward, Weir or Scott will slot into the wider
position. However, there are times when all four
defenders have lined up in this position.

Manchester City Women’s back three when
Chelsea Women counter-attack [Credit:
Wyscout]
The defensive foundations set by City
have been well implemented. Here we see
Chelsea look to counter-attack Manchester
City, however, the back four are already in
position and there are seven City players
back to overrun Chelsea’s counter-attack.
Guro Reiten’s pass to Bethany England limits
the space for Chelsea to progress the ball
forward. England’s only choice is to send in a
deep cross for the marked Sam Kerr on the far
side. Unless Stokes loses the aerial duel, this
attacking situation should be easily diffused.
C oaches have used full-backs in different
Janine Beckie interchanges play with Jill Scott
and runs into the vacant space to cross [Credit:
Wyscout]
The role of City’s midfielders is vital to their
build-up play. Weir and Scott’s intelligent
movement and understanding of space aid
City in attracting pressure and opening space
in other areas. Here we can see Beckie’s pass
into Scott attracts two Chelsea Women players
19
leaving Beckie with space and time to cross
when the ball is returned.
Lauren Hemp is unmarked at the far post
[Credit: Wyscout]
The core fundamental result of City’s attacking
intention is seen in this image above. It’s clear
to see Lauren Hemp in an advantageous
position over Maren Mjelde. Hemp is able to
make a blindsided run in behind to latch onto
the cross. While Beckie’s cross was cut out by
Chelsea, this move personified the ideology
behind City’s attacking movement.
The 'i nverted'
full-back system
ways as we’ve seen in the above two
case studies, however, Olympique Lyon have
used their full-backs in a slightly unorthodox
manner in some of their matches across the
last two seasons. While we’ve talked about full-
backs in a range of formations, this is different
because no other team usually employs this
sort of system. We will analyse and understand
how Lyon have adapted their 4-2-3-1 to allow
their full-backs to help create goal-scoring
opportunities. Essentially, Jean-Luc Vasseur
has shown his tactical ingenuity by moving his
full-back into a midfield position during build-
up and transition, specifically, right-back Lucy
Bronze. The system aims to create space in the
wide areas for the attacking wide forward to
send in a cross or get closer to the penalty area
to create a goal-scoring opportunity. How is
this achieved? The answer simply put, is down
to Bronze’s movement from right-back into a
central midfield position whilst Alex Greenwood
or Bacha provide width on the left side.
A tactical representation of Lyon’s shape in
build-up [Credit: Wyscout]
Bronze can be found in this position under
two circumstances. The first when Lyon are
trying to build out from the back and are faced
by the opposition’s medium to low block. The
full-back looks to drive into midfield pulling
the defending team into a narrower position
to free up the right-winger and allow one of
the defensive midfielders to move out wide.
The second circumstance is during opposition
counter-attacks. The full-back will attempt to
add an extra body in midfield to support the
double-pivot and try to restrict any forward
passes or movement turning it into a Lyon
counter-attack.
20
Lyon’s average positions against Fortuna
Hjørring. Bronze (#2) is much closer to midfield
than Bacha (#4) [Credit: Wyscout]
This pass map displays the average positions
of Lyon’s players against Fortuna Hjørring in the
Champions League. What immediately stands
out is Bronze’s (#2) positioning, which is slightly
narrower closer to the central midfielder whilst
Bacha (#4) remains in a wide left position to
attack down the flank. The left-winger is sitting
in a much narrower position whilst Shanice
van de Sanden (#11) is playing much further
forward. Being a natural winger she will tend to
favour pushing out into the wide areas to cross
or cut back inside. Additionally, on both sides,
Lyon have tried to create numerical superiority
to overcome any opposition resistance and
give themselves insurance against any potential
counter-attacks through the middle.
Bronze’s inward movement allows Delphine
Cascarino space on the right to drive [Credit:
Wyscout]
As we’ve discussed earlier in this section,
Bronze’s move into midfield can help create
space in the wider areas. Here we can see
Bronze trying to find a way through a tough,
compact team by making a narrow move
into central midfield. This has attracted the
attention of the two highlighted midfielders
giving Delphine Cascarino a free run down
the right. Bronze’s idea is to pass into
Dzsenifer Marozsán and play a one-two pass
combination to move the defending team out
of position. Not only has this given Cascarino
space but also an option for Lyon to pass into
creating space centrally.
Lucy Bronze tracking back in midfield to
intercept Soyaux’s counter-attack [Credit:
Wyscout]
Bronze’s positional awareness and ability
to track back to stop counter-attacks is
impressive. The Lioness’ right-back is
seen here running back to try and stop the
Soyaux attacker. Being able to intercept and
dispossess the player allows Bronze to initiate
a counter-attack putting Lyon in a 6v3 situation.
G iven the number of systems we’ve
[Credit: Wyscout]
21
At left-back, Greenwood plays an equally
important role by providing width, staying
as wide as possible to create deep crossing
opportunities for the dynamic Ada Hegerberg.
The Norwegian striker is an excellent complete-
forward and thrives on both through passes
and crosses. Greenwood is a much more
effective in the final third than defensive third
and Lyon’s playing style suits her game. The
former Manchester United Women left-back’s
movement allows Le Sommer to drift centrally
closer to Hegerberg giving Greenwood space
to create crossing opportunities.
[Credit: Wyscout]
Here it’s important to see the positioning of
both full-backs. Up against a compact Dijon
side, Lyon were given the wide areas. Both
Bronze and Greenwood are in acres of space
but the right-back is in a slightly narrower
position, which naturally meant Greenwood
would stay wide. Receiving possession from
Marozsán gave Greenwood enough time to aim
for the three Lyon attackers making an attempt
to find space in the box.
Final Remarks
discussed, it is clear to see how important
full-backs are and the tactical flexibility they
provide. Every situation we’ve seen here clearly
shows how full-backs are used in different
formations and the way they attack or defend
can help define a team’s playing style. Each
team has a distinct style and uses different
types of full-backs to help stop opposition
teams’ most dangerous players. Even teams
playing with the same formation can have
different profiles of full-backs who can provide
different types of output. As we’ve seen with
Arsenal and PSG, both teams can attack
differently and affect their team’s movement at
both ends of the pitch. Women’s football will
continue to grow and the tactical complexity
we see here can only improve as more and
more teams continue to invest in the game.

22
Neco Williams:

The next Trent Alexander-Arnold?

BY ARTYOM OSIPOV // @Artyom7Osipov

23
T rent Alexander-Arnold is one of the finest
Liverpool academy products in recent
years, and we already can compare his
success to the likes of Michael Owen, Steve
McManaman, Jamie Carragher, and many
others, who also made their way through the
ranks of Liverpool academy.
However, Trent didn’t have a proper back-up
N eco Williams has been putting up solid
last season and seemingly this season as well,
and many Liverpool fans were worried about
the potential consequences of losing him
because of injury. Especially this season, after
a great start it looked like if Trent was out, then
the big part of Liverpool’s creative force would
be eliminated.
Fortunately for them, it didn’t happen and
Liverpool are marching the league with 22
point gap (at the time of writing), the biggest in
competition history.
Even more than that, this season gave us
another promising Liverpool youngster for the
right-back spot - Neco Williams, the 18-year-
old Welsh full-back, whom Ryan Giggs is likely
to approach for the national team call-up this
March. His amazing displays in both English
cups showed that Jürgen Klopp probably
doesn’t have to worry about a back-up right-
back this summer.
Before Neco was seen in the public eye, Joe
Gomez and James Milner were the candidates
for that position, now the Welshman can
cement that spot for the next season. Having
begun to train with the first team at Melwood,
Williams himself says that he learns as much as
he can from his forerunner, Alexander-Arnold.
In this scout report, we will look at Neco
Williams’ best qualities and compare them to
Trent’s, to understand if he is ready to step
into the first team and compete with TAA, what
future role can he play in this Liverpool squad,
24
and also will dive into some areas where he
needs to improve.
Statistical overview
numbers this season. Despite the statistics
being available only for both English cups and
Champions League U19 matches (plus some
U19 international games), from these games,
we still can draw some conclusions about his
overall performance.
Let’s begin with his defensive stats. Williams
makes 5.78 interceptions per game, which
is very important for a full-back, as he has to
prevent through balls behind the backline,
and this also tells you that he understands the
game on a decent level already. Along with
that, Williams is making 8.34 recoveries per
game, and 31.3% of those take place in the
opposition half. Considering his headers and
aerial duels, he has them on average around
three times in every game, winning 54.5% of
them, which is a good number. Sadly, there
is little data on tackles and other defensive
statistics, but, hopefully, the stats listed above
gave you the sense of Williams’ defensive
output. As we will see in the following section,
Williams is a good defender, which is important
for Klopp and any other manager, even though
in Jürgen’s football the full-backs are not
tasked with many defensive responsibilities.
Moving on to his attacking statistics, Williams
makes 5.45 dribbles per game with 61.2% of
successful actions. In terms of his passing,
he hits on average 8.12 long balls with 43.8%
accuracy and also he makes 4.95 crosses
and 31.5% of them actually lead to a shot.
These are really good numbers for a full-back
with great attacking involvement, and a good
completion percentage of all those actions
on the pitch shows that he has the ability to
produce scoring opportunity on a continuous
basis, switch play, always be a threat from the
wing and so on.
If we look at his xG and xA metrics, his
combined expected goals and assists
(xG+xA) equal 0.24 per game. Of course,
it is important to take into account that he
mostly played in Premier League 2 (U21) and
in U23 competitions, but he is only 19 and
can improve to perform like this on a higher
level, and matches with Arsenal and Everton in
Carabao and FA cups show that.
Next, we will look at his positioning during
the match. First of all, this is a heatmap of
Alexander-Arnold for this season.
[Credit: Wyscout]
Trent occupies almost all the right side of the
pitch, and in the opponent’s half too, as many
teams that faced Liverpool this season are
using medium/low block and Trent positions
himself closer to the final third during the build-
up.
25
In comparison, this is Neco’s heatmap this
season:
[Credit: Wyscout]
You can tell the obvious similarity in the
positioning of these two players. Even though
Williams doesn’t spend as much time on the
ball as Trent does, his positioning is pretty
identical and he covers the same areas on the
pitch.
Just like Trent, he is a very attacking full-
back, and having those stats proves that he
has a similar playing style and also has all the
attributes for further development.
Passing
T he keynote of this scout report/tactical
analysis will be around Williams’
comparison to Alexander-Arnold. Not only
because he has the skill set for that and
Liverpool’s current style of football demands
such qualities as Trent has from any full-back,
but because Neco already showed his class
and his ability in some big games for the
Liverpool first team.
However, in this section, we will dive into his
passing patterns, and the main point I’ve
observed from watching these two play is
that Neco is not taking as many risks as his
21-year-old teammate does.
He opts to pass the ball to the nearest central
defender or a central midfielder much more,
especially if he is receiving the ball in his own
half. Trent is playing in the dominating side that
is arguably the best football side in the world at
the moment, and he is one of the most creative
players, and that has a big influence.
I believe that will most definitely change when
Williams finally makes his way to the first team
on a continuous basis, and with time we surely
will be able to see Williams play in a more
creative manner. Currently, Williams’ passing
approach is a little more conservative than that
of TAA.
Considering his passing play at the beginning
of the attack, during the build-up play, Williams
tends to play to one of his nearest teammates
and keep the ball for his team. It helps to turn
the attack in the other direction and to keep
possession. However, that doesn’t mean that
Williams doesn’t play dangerous passes to help
his team break the opponent’s press.
On the contrary, he can play forward passes
and help his team move the ball forward, like
in the image below. There to pick up the ball
on the right flank, he sees one of the attackers
opening himself up and freeing from the
defender, and makes an accurate pass to him.
26
[Credit: Wyscout]
In terms of long passing, Williams excels here
as well. As we saw in the statistical section,
he makes around four long passes per game.
Most of them are vertically-oriented balls
behind the defence or in the penalty area, it is
approximately 74% out of all his long passes.
He can switch the play too, making the passes
to the other full-back or winger, even though
they do not happen as often.
In the last paragraph of this section let’s look
at the passing map of some of his matches.
This image helps to highlight the main patterns
of his passing play (the blue arrows mean
completed passes, the grey ones represent
unsuccessful ones). As I wrote in the beginning,
the majority of his passes are short/middle
passes to the centre or backwards. Also, you
can see a couple of long passes to the other
side of the pitch. However, the main takeaway
is his forward vertical passes to the final third
or the penalty area.
He does them a lot and a handful of them are
unsuccessful. My main impression is that even
though he plays more conservative passes than
Alexander-Arnold, he manages to produce a
lot of aggressive passes. If he plays in the first
team, that number will only increase and that
shows that his playing style is a lot like TAA,
and it is great both for the player and for Jürgen
Klopp.
[Credit: Wyscout]
Overall, with some subtle differences, Williams
can fill in Trent’s shoes if necessary even now,
as he plays a lot like him passing-wise. With
Liverpool full-backs being the main force of the
creative play, this is a huge benefit for Neco,
because he can continue to evolve under the
same circumstances, principles and patterns of
play. He needs to hone his skills and if he does
that, he will thrive at Liverpool for sure.
Crossing
A lexander-Arnold’s famous crossing ability
demands at least fit crossing techniques
from the potential contender, and Williams
possesses that. Many of his crosses made a
huge difference for Liverpool advancing to the
Round of 16 in the FA Cup and to the quarter-
finals of the Carabao Cup. His assist against
Arsenal in the extra-time, his two crosses
against Shrewsbury that lead to two own goals,
one of which was the match-winner. All of
this happened only in a couple of cup games,
which tells you how productive and involved he
is in the attacking department.
27
[Williams crosses under pressure in the final
minutes against Arsenal, and this cross results
in Origi’s equaliser and subsequent win (Credit:
Wyscout)]
Williams can perform all kinds of crosses: low-
driven and over the defence. Below you can
see the area from where he puts his crosses in.
[Credit: Wyscout]
Nonetheless, despite all the contributions he
already made for the first team this season,
he has to improve his crossing. He is a good
crosser of the ball, and many people when they
saw him play immediately started comparing
him to Trent. Even though all the praise and
comparison are well-deserved, Williams still
has to improve in terms of his crossing.
Crossing is unsuccessful more often than
not, but when everything works out, the
attacking team ends up with a goal. But, even
considering that, I believe that Neco hits too
many crosses wide. The majority of the crosses
are either overhit and the ball goes out of
play or they are intercepted by the opposition
because they were on a too low level.

For example, in the image below you can see
that Williams is about to cross, and he has at
least three players in the box to aim for. Either
a pass to Harvey Elliot, who is right around the
edge of the penalty area, or to cross to three
players who are running toward the six-yard
box. Williams tries to make the second variant
happen, but fails, hitting the ball so it ends up
on the roof of the goal, above the keeper.
[Credit: Wyscout]
This is one of the things that Williams has to
work on to reach Alexander-Arnold’s levels,
but he is still very young and has a lot of time
to improve in this aspect of his play. He has
already shown his abilities previously this
season, and if he continues to improve, he will
be a great weapon to have down that right
flank.
Defending
Iam going to start this section of this analysis
by saying that Williams is very good at
defending, especially for a right-back. He is
great at many things that are important for any
defender: reading the game, winning aerial
duels, right positioning, tackling and so on.
As we discussed earlier, his aerial duels win
percentage is slightly above 50%, but in-game
it seems that he is winning much more. As
full-backs at Liverpool usually tend to push
28
up during the attacks, or even if they are
defending, opponents oftentimes try to target
the area behind the full-backs with long-balls.
For example, in the game against Arsenal,
there were episodes when Saka, who was
playing left-winger in that game, was running
in behind Williams, and Arsenal defenders
and midfielders tried to exploit that space
behind Liverpool’s defensive line. However, for
the most part, it didn’t work out for them as
Williams was controlling the air and not letting
Saka get behind him.
Usually, when the ball is in the air and his
opponent is staying still, Williams tends to
get in front of him and prevent any danger by
clearing the ball. He is 6’0’’ feet tall, and that
helps him tremendously, it is very hard to beat
him in the air.
In terms of interceptions and reading the game,
he is good at that too. He sometimes uses a
similar strategy as with aerial balls and gets in
front of the attacker to intercept the ball. He
is checking the positioning of the opponents
behind him and thus he can cut the passing
lanes. In the image below, Chambers is trying
to make a through ball to Willock, but Williams
sees that run, intercepts and gets the ball.
[Credit: Wyscout]
He clears most of the through and long balls
that go into his area, so it is always hard to
break Liverpool from his flank. Below you can
see the map showing the pitch distribution
of his interceptions, and they are happening
across the right side of the pitch. His reading
of the game, height, speed and quick decision-
making help him defensively, especially with
interceptions.
[Williams’ interceptions distribute almost
evenly across the right, showing that he works
defensively everywhere (Credit: Wyscout)]
When he has to follow his opponent or
tackle them, Williams shows himself as a
very tenacious player. He usually runs after
his opponent until he loses the ball himself
or Williams has to tackle him. In the image
below an Arsenal player is receiving the ball
on the right flank and he puts his back against
Williams to protect the ball. Williams puts
pressure on him and eventually tackles him.
[Credit: Wyscout]
He is good at every component of the
defensive play and I believe that he is level with
Trent in terms of defending. He is taller, has
nearly the same amount of pace, great with
29
tackles and interceptions, excellent at aerial
duels. From a defensive standpoint, he is a
great player, but of course he can improve even
more in the future.
Conclusion
T he future of Neco Williams at Liverpool
seems bright, but it will be very interesting
to see how everything will play out for him.
Being in the Liverpool system since he was a
six-year-old, making it through the ranks of the
Liverpool academy and already conquering
the hearts of Liverpool supporters - the
circumstances can hardly be any better.
If Williams follows Trent’s footsteps in terms of
progress, accommodating these two players
on the pitch will not be an easy task for Jürgen
Klopp to solve. With Nathaniel Clyne most
definitely leaving in the summer and Gomez
cementing his spot as a first-choice centre-
back, the Williams candidacy for the back-up
right-back seems the most obvious.
However, Williams has the experience of
playing further forward, as a right midfielder or
as a winger, so that is another option. As is the
potential for Trent’s position switch, moving
to the midfield and filling Gerrard’s shoes.
Even though Trent is happy where he plays
and Williams is currently content with his role,
Klopp’s problem of finding the back-up full-
back solved itself but caused other questions.
How will it play out? Only time will tell.
 Part Two:

How to beat common pressing strategies

BY CAMERON MEIGHAN // @cam_meighan

30
In last month’s magazine, I looked at three
common pressing strategies and the patterns
of play and structures that could be used
to break them, and thanks to an excellent
response as you can see, we’re onto part two.
In this tactical analysis, I’ll outline three more
pressing strategies, including my preferred
system in an ideal world, and look at how the
use of various principles of patterns can allow
these presses to be broken. As with last time,
M y first solution is very much centred
there is a short disclaimer with regards to how
this is structured, with probably a bit more
pragmatism than in the first article, however for
every press I have attempted to use a standard
4-3-3 build-up shape at some stage.
3-4-3
T he first pressing strategy we will look at is
a 3-4-3, with an emphasis on cutting the
passing lanes to the full-back, and therefore
forcing the team building up through the
middle. We can see here the pressing winger/
inside forward (number ten) presses inwards on
the centre back, while cutting the passing lane
wide. The striker covers the pivot if there is one
and is also in a position to press the goalkeeper
while keeping the pivot in their cover shadow if
the ball goes back.
The main difference between this, and
Liverpool’s 4-3-3 which I mentioned in the
previous analysis, is the permanently high
positioning of the wing-back/winger (number
31
three). In theory, Liverpool’s press could look
like this at times if one full-back advances and
the other tucks in.
How to break it
around vertical passing and does
admittedly require players to drop deep, but
if support can be provided to these vertical
passes, they could be effective. We can see a
slightly emphasised picture of a potential way
to break this type of pressing below, where
we look to challenge them in their attempts
to play down the centre. Here we are using a
midfield box kind of concept, with the central
midfielders acting as decoys and staying
extremely centrally, looking to create space and
occupy the central midfielders of the pressing
team. Here, the attacking team needs to look to
disguise the pass inside by feinting using body
position to play inside and into the half space.
The main difficulty surrounding this is drawing
that wing-back into a wide enough area to
open up this passing lane, and so the build-
up side’s wing-back needs to stay as wide as
possible, in order to maximise the pressing
distance and force the opposition player to
adjust.
Below we can see an alternative method that
relies less on the ill-discipline of the opposition.
As seen in the Liverpool’s 4-3-3 section of my
previous piece, here we look at overloading the
striker, by placing a double pivot on them. In
this freeze frame, we can see the basic ideas
behind the shape, but this won’t be how it
plays out positionally. The number eleven and
ten pin back the pressing team’s number eight
and seven, while the double pivot drops to
create problems for the striker.
This next image shows the likely reaction the
pressing side will have, with the winger tucking
in to help the striker and protect the passing
lane to the number eight. When this winger
does tuck in, this is a trigger for the centre back
to move slightly wider, and for the number eight
to push on.
By moving this winger inside, we increase
the pressing distance between them and the
centre back (number four). As a result, this
centre back will be able to receive the ball and
pick a pass, which again will depend on the
movement of the opposition. With the lane from
centre back to wing-back no longer covered by
the winger due to them tucking in, you would
expect the pressing wing-back to move higher
32
and tighter to the opposite wing-back. If the
nine can’t get across to cover the passing lane
into the central midfielder, then the first line of
the press is overcome, and the second line is
further back thanks to the pinning done which
was mentioned earlier.
If the ball goes to the number four, and the
striker does tuck across, this scenario below
could occur. It is unlikely that the pressing
winger can cover the inside lane alone to the
now more advanced number eight, and so the
striker may come across to cover this lane,
which then leaves the central centre back
open. From here, the other winger now has
the decision of tucking in or staying with the
defender, with again the pressing distance
between the two sides’ central midfielders too
large now. If the winger tucks in, the left-sided
centre back is open, and has acres of space
to drive into and attract a press from a player
outside the first line of the press. The rest of
the team can then push forward and progress
up the pitch, with three players already in very
advanced positions.
 Four at the back
with Tim Walter principles
T his next way to break this specific 3-4-3
press involves a back four, with the rest of
the team pushed higher and isolating the first
line of the press to create a 5v3. The back four
in a narrow shape forces the wingers to tuck
and press the centre backs, with the striker no
longer having a pivot to mark. This could see
4-2-3 -1
them instead take up a freer role and look to
press the goalkeeper quickly, but this shouldn’t
make too much difference to the pattern.
T he next pressing scheme we will look at
is a 4-2-3-1, which is slightly different to
the flat 4-4-2 previously discussed due to the
differing roles of the number ten player. Within
The centre back will be pressed upon receiving this system the wingers look to protect the
the ball from the goalkeeper. And one winger inside lane while keeping an optimal distance
will tuck across to cover the other centre back. between themselves and the full-back. The
This pass back to the goalkeeper should act number ten will usually mark the pivot, with the
as the trigger for the number five to move out striker pressing the nearest centre back. If the
wide, and the quicker they can move out the ball is switched across, the number ten and
better, in order to create separation between nine swap roles.
themselves and the winger.

From here, depending on optimal the angle can

be made, the number five can then progress
play into the advancing number six, with the
pressing number nine being too far away to
run with him as he had previously pressed the
other centre back.
How to break it
T he key to breaking this press in my opinion
is the transition that occurs between the
pressing number nine and ten. If we carry on
from the situation highlighted above, we see
that the nine presses and forces a lateral pass
across the line. Upon this pass being played,
the number ten pushes across to press the

33
centre back, and the number nine recovers to
mark the pivot, as we can see below.
Therefore, if we can maximise the distance
between the pivot, and the initial pressing
number nine, you can create a free man. So,
when the ball is beginning to look as though it
is going to be played across, this should act as
a trigger for the number six to move away from
the number nine who will be approaching. The
higher central midfielder (number seven) can
look to pin back his opposite central midfielder
and create space for the six to progress into.
Again, the wider the full-back stays, the more
space there is for a central pass.
It would be the best-case scenario for the
number seven to move inwards, as this suits
the body orientation that the number six will
have when running from facing his own goal
into this area quickly. This creates a 2v1 on the
central midfielder and therefore allows the team
to progress. If the winger does a good enough
job of cutting the lane to the six, the full-back
can be used and an overload is still present.
34
Using a back
three to beat a 4-2 -3 -1
A method of beating the first line of a press
which I have discussed often this season
is the use of a back three. In the previous
example using a back four, we can see the
struggles that can be seen when relying on
lateral passes with centre backs, as in a back
four, the centre backs have to stay closer
together to increase the speed of the pass and
prevent interceptions. In a back three, there is
an extra player in the chain, which therefore
allows for better coverage of the back line.
We can see below that this is very effective
against a 4-2-3-1, as this formation can often
have a one-man first line of the press. If you
stretch the pitch and use a back three, it forces
the wingers to press the wide centre backs,
therefore meaning nobody is a good distance
away to press the wing-back.
Borussia Mönchengladbach used this system
extremely effectively against RB Leipzig’s 4-2-
3-1 press, with the ten occupied and the winger
being forced to press the wide centre back.
If we compare this to the previous solutions
involving a back four, the winger is pressing
between the full-back and central area. Leipzig
are forced to commit a full-back forward to
try and deal with the press, but the pressing
distance is large and so Gladbach repeatedly
exploited this kind of build-up and scored a
goal directly from it.
3-4-1-2
T he 3-4-1-2 formation matches up very
well against a 4-3-3 build-up structure,
with the pivot, full-backs and centre backs all
equal numerically for both sides. We can see
the pressing structure outlined below, with
the number ten marking the pivot and a 3v3
in midfield, while the two centre backs are
continually pressed by the strikers, and the full
backs covered by the pressing wing backs.
W e’ve discussed the benefits of a back
How to break it
A gain, if we carry on from the previous
image, we can see a potential way to
bypass the press. The pressing distance
between the wing-back and full-back is large
enough to allow the full-back to get it out
of their feet, and if the centre backs space
35
correctly, space for the inside pass can be
created. Therefore, we need to try and create
some numerical superiority, so once the ball is
played wide, the pivot and number eight move
across to the inside space but may potentially
be followed in a man-orientated way. If this is
the case then a pass down the line may be an
option to the winger, with support provided on
that side by the two nearby central midfielders,
but in terms of body orientation it benefits
teams to play diagonally and into the centre, as
there are more passing options from a central
area facing the opposition goal than in a wide
area facing your own.
If the midfielders are followed, there is a
potential for the number seven to quickly drop
into the pivot and the ball to go back into them,
as some separation between them and the
marker should be created.
Using a back three
three and we can use this principle again
here, with a bit of patience, combined with
a midfield box in order to create space and
directly access the third line (attack). We can
see below that the right-sided centre back
will be pressed by one of the strikers, with
the other coming across to mark the central
centre back. The number seven stays with the
pressing number ten to occupy him, and the
goalkeeper is used to create a 4v2 in the first
line of the press. to the central positioning of the two central
midfielders.
If stretched enough and played quickly enough,
the pressing distance between the pressing
number nine and the far centre back should be
large enough to allow some forward passing,
and so space should be occupied effectively
in order to make the most out of this forward
passing opportunity.

We can then go back to one of the early
concepts used in a midfield box, with the
number seven having now moved to occupy
a central midfielder and remains in the centre.
The wing-back looks to stay wide enough to
create space in the half-space, and the wing-
back should look as though they want to
receive to attract the attention of the opposition
wing-back.
Conclusion
T here are a number of patterns, structures
and strategies in order to beat pressing
schemes, but when pressing schemes are
broken down in this way you hopefully start to
see that regardless of what numbers come up,
the differences between them are fairly minute,
and so it is more about the role each player
plays within a press that decide how to break it.
Tactical flexibility I believe will be the next trend
within football over the next few years, and so
we may see more of these personalised build-
up shapes to counteract an opposition press.

We can see below, RB Leipzig using this shape

against Tottenham in a 4-4-2 in a higher area,
but with the same principles applying. Width
is needed to create space in the middle, and
the half spaces are occupied and freer due

36
 Scout Report:

Christopher Nkunku’s RB Leipzig resurgence under Nagelsmann

BY CARL ELSIK // @_elsik

37
C hristopher Nkunku’s first season in
the Bundesliga has seen him become
an incredibly important part of Julian
half are completed at a success rate of 92.4%,
which makes him a dangerous option for RB
Leipzig.
Nagelsmann’s RB Leipzig, who are pushing for
the title despite this being Nagelsmann’s first In terms of his defensive contribution, an often
year at Leipzig. Nkunku came to RB Leipzig derided subject, Nkunku averages 4.77 duels
from Paris Saint-Germain for a reported $15 won for every 90 minutes played, while also
million in July, joining a contingent of young earning 4.21 recoveries in his opponent’s half.
French players in the squad. Nkunku’s time at He also has an interception rate of 2.39 passes
PSG, despite coming through their youth ranks, per 90 minutes played, clearly indicating his
was not filled with triumphs -- he featured in defensive struggles are much exaggerated.
29 matches for PSG across all competitions,
scoring four goals and registering two assists
under Thomas Tuchel. While Tuchel is known
for his tactical acumen, the 22-year-old’s time
under Julian Nagelsmann has brought about a
burgeoning talent: Nkunku has made 30 total
appearances, scoring four goals and providing
a total of 15 assists so far this season. This
scouting report looks to provide some analysis
as to how Julian Nagelsmann has helped the
young Frenchmen grow into a key component
of Leipzig’s success. Nkunku’s tactical flexibility in Julian
Nagelsmann’s system has helped him develop
as a player this year. The Frenchman has
Performance Overview played a total of seven different positions,
with his primary role being a left winger or an

N kunku’s progression this season has been

a joy to watch as he has helped lead RB
Leipzig’s surprising success. His attacking
attacking midfielder. That being said, he has
also featured almost everywhere else in the
attack from most of the forward positions,
statistics support the notion that he has been except as the main striker, to any of the roles in
a key contributor, as he leads the team with his the midfield, except for the holding midfielder.
11 assists in the Bundesliga, currently putting One of the main keys to his success is his
him in third in the entire league behind Jadon ability to create and find space for himself to
Sancho and Thomas Müller. He also averages receive the ball in dangerous positions.
2.8 key passes per game, meaning he creates
almost three potential scoring opportunities for
every 90 minutes he plays. Nkunku’s longer key
passes double those of his closest teammate
Spacing to score
(Marcel Sabitzer), indicating his ability to see
space farther in front of him into which he can
play the ball. He’s also created nine more key
H is ability to exploit space makes Nkunku
an exciting option as a goalscorer. While
he has only scored four this season, the way in
passes than Sabitzer, despite playing almost which he gets involved makes him a wonderful
600 fewer minutes in the Bundesliga this option, especially for coaches who are looking
season. His forward passes in his opponents for players who can find and exploit space.

38
Against Mainz, Nkunku had a wonderful goal
just outside the box on the left side. Timo
Werner, on the left side of the pitch, received
the ball at his feet from a cross.
As he did, Mainz’s defensive block shifted over
as a unit. As they shifted, Nkunku scanned the
area four times to take in as much information
as possible, where he recognised that their
primary focus was to stay compact. As they
came across to the left, Nkunku drifts in the
opposite direction, causing defenders to have
to “pass” him off to one another. After moving
right, he then took a few steps back, finding
himself at the top of the box with no defender
in sight. When he receives the ball from Werner,
Mainz’s defender rushes out to block his shot,
but it’s too late: Nkunku lasered it into the back
of the net.
His goal against Leverkusen earlier this season
also highlights his ability to manipulate space
to his advantage. His first movement in the
goal highlighted his intelligence as he looked to
force defenders to make decisions: something
that makes their job much more challenging.
39
As his teammate gained possession in the
midfield, Nkunku checked into the space
between the lines of defenders. While he
didn’t instantly receive the ball, he remained
patient and allowed for the play to build. As
the ball was sent out wide to Werner, Nkunku
didn’t sprint ahead to try and get into the
box immediately; instead, he allowed his two
central teammates in front of him to draw the
attention of the Leverkusen defenders.
With those two defenders being occupied,
Nkunku found himself between the two lines
with no one around him, as the Leverkusen
midfielders had failed to drop off and mark
him. By the time they realised that he was wide
open, it’s too late. Werner crossed the ball, and
Nkunku, despite his awkward first touch, is
able to finish the chance and bring RB Leipzig
level.
His goal versus Union Berlin also demonstrated
his ability to create space by making a series
of runs that move defenders out of the way.
This manipulation of the opponent becomes
incredibly useful for a team when other players
can recognise what their teammate is doing, as
it opens up areas for them to attack.

ball leads to chances
C hristopher Nkunku’s manipulation of space
Nkunku’s movements set up his goal, as his
teammates were able to take advantage of
the space he created. First, Nkunku checked
towards the ball, dragging the centre back with
him. As the centre back followed, the ball was
sent into the space that the defender had just
left. Marcel Halstenberg, the man highlighted
in yellow, ran into that space, and the centre
back was forced to recover back towards
Halstenberg with a longer sprint.
As Halstenberg received the pass, Nkunku
began his run towards him, bringing the other
central defender along with him. Because of
his proximity to the goal, the defender had no
choice but to follow him, which opened up
space on the far post where two RB Leipzig
players were waiting. Halstenberg sends the
ball across the box to Marcel Sabitzer. The
defender that had just been dragged towards
the left side of the pitch now focuses on
marking Yussuf Poulsen, who was directly in
front of him. This allowed Nkunku to essentially
walk to the back post completely unmarked to
receive Sabitzer’s headed cross, which gave
40
Leipzig their fourth goal of the match.
Patience on the
makes him a threat to score, but he causes
significantly more problems for opponents
with his distribution of the ball. Nkunku is
responsible for a majority of the free kicks and
in-swinging corners from the left side of the
pitch for RB Leipzig, which some would argue
helps enlarge his assist numbers, which is of
course true. His delivery is so consistent that
it’s no wonder that RB Leipzig have scored the
second most set-piece goals in the Bundesliga
so far this season. While his ability to provide
quality service is demonstrated consistently,
His patience on the ball, quite the significant
attribute for a 22-year-old, makes him a
constant threat when the ball is in play.
Nkunku has demonstrated his unique ability to
utilise the football made famous by footballers
like Andres Iniesta, Xavi Hernandez, and Johan
Cruyff: “La Pausa.” The use of La Pausa or
“The Pause” simultaneously allows the game
situation to develop while the ball carrier
attracts defender(s). While Christopher Nkunku
didn’t develop at Barcelona’s La Masia, he
has clearly developed this particular skill and
uses it to create opportunities and devastate
opponents.
The first instance he demonstrated this skill is
against Schalke 04, a match in which Nkunku
had a total of four assists. His last assist to
Emil Forsberg was a beauty.

Nkunku received the ball at his feet after Yussuf
Poulsen laid it off. Poulsen then made the run
in red, where he appeared to have already
beat his man with his speed. Nkunku could
have played the through ball in an attempt to
put Poulsen through. Instead, he executes La
Pausa perfectly. Poulsen made his run, and
as he did, he brought his defender with him.
Nkunku even feigned the pass to Poulsen to
freeze defenders; as he did, space opened up
for Emil Forsberg to make his run. Nkunku split
two defenders with his pass, and Forsberg was
through on goal.
Nkunku also used La Pausa earlier this season
against Bayern Munich, where he drew two
defenders towards him at the edge of the box,
allowing his teammates to adjust their runs to
get open for a cross that was eventually put
over the bar.
Nkunku used a similar move to create a chance
against Lyon in the Champions League. Again,
his patience on the ball allowed his teammates
to adjust their movement and find space to
receive the pass.
41
The play started off with Nkunku driving
towards the centre of the pitch, forcing
defenders to recover at speed. He then slowed
his touch down and essentially stopped as
Lyon continued to recover, leaving him in a
lot of space by himself. As he stopped, his
forward, Yussuf Poulsen, was initially calling for
the ball in the centre of the pitch, right where
all the Lyon defenders were standing. Nkunku
recognised the space available between the
outside back and centre back, and directed
Poulsen there. In the image, you can actually
see him pointing to where he wanted Poulsen
to go. Instead of attracting attention, Nkunku
used La Pausa to free himself from defenders,
and then slotted a pass to his teammate, who
ultimately shot the ball wide of the net.
Nkunku’s ability to read his teammates’
movements and see space to be exploited
make him one of the best young players in the
game. He demonstrated his ability to do so
against Zenit in the Champions League when
setting up a teammate with a quick reading of
the game.
Dayot Upamecano, another young talent for RB
Leipzig, progressed the ball up the pitch. As he
did, Emil Forsberg checked out of the space in
the centre of the pitch, dragging his defender
with him. Executing a perfect rotation, Nkunku
timed his run well and checked into the space
that was no longer occupied. What’s important
about this image is that as Nkunku checked the
space, he had his head turned to see where his
teammates and opponents were located. Even
though the ball was on its way to him, Nkunku
took a quick snapshot of what was in front
of him; when he received the ball, he already
knew where he wanted to put it. All it took for
him was one touch to control Upamecano’s
pass, and then he played a perfectly weighted
ball to Forsberg, whose shot was blocked by
the Zenit goalkeeper.
Defensive responsibilities
O ne final thing to be addressed about
Nkunku is his defensive work. Statistically,
people will write him off as not being the
strongest defensively. This must be taken
into consideration with the position that he
plays, as well as the team in which he plays.
His position, normally as a winger or a centre
midfielder, doesn’t provide him with a lot of
opportunities to get stuck in to tackles. Instead,
most of the time he is used as an attacker
whose primary function is not to win back balls
for his teammates that high up the pitch. It’s
also important to consider the team he plays
for, as Julian Nagelsmann has traditionally
liked to play with a high press in an attempt to
either force their opponents to turn possession
over in their own half, or to result in a long
pass in the air, which then gives Leipzig a solid
statistical opportunity to win back possession.
That being said, Nkunku’s role in RB Leipzig’s
high press is incredibly important in their ability
to dominate opponents. Nkunku’s positioning
often requires more brain power than anything,
mirroring the defensive mantra of famed Italian
defender Paolo Maldini: “If I have to make a
tackle, then I have already made a mistake.”
42
In the image from the match against Borussia
Mönchengladbach, Nkunku’s positioning in
the centre of the press successfully eliminates
two players from receiving the ball by proper
use of his cover shadow, which means he is
blocking potential passing lanes. His spacing
is incredibly important: he’s close enough to
the man marked in yellow to intercept any
pass, although he seemed to be inviting that
pass by leaving some distance between him
and the Gladbach player. If the man on the
ball tried to squeeze in a pass, Nkunku was
there to intercept and attack, which would be
a devastating attack because of RB Leipzig’s
fantastic pressing positions. While baiting that
pass, Nkunku also gave himself enough room
to eliminate the man marked with red as a
passing option. If the Gladbach player tried to
play that longer pass, there was a good chance
Nkunku steps in and intercepts it, most likely
with devastating results.
Much like his ability to change attacking
positions, Nkunku can also perform defensive
coverage in the high press against multiple
styles of play when building out of the back is
concerned. In the UEFA Champions League
match against Tottenham, Leipzig didn’t
press often, as Mourinho looked to avoid any
potential errors by sending the ball longer in the
air. However, when they did press, Nkunku was
tasked with attempting to prevent play through
the middle of the pitch, despite the fact that the
two midfielders, in this case Harry Winks and
Giovani Lo Celso, had a numerical advantage
against him. season. If he continues to learn and grow under
Nagelsmann, it won’t be long before big-name
European clubs come in to pay a hefty price for
the young Frenchman’s services.

As Spurs tried to overload him, Nkunku

outwitted them and helped win possession
back for Leipzig. Nkunku began by closely
marking Lo Celso while keeping an eye on
Winks. As Winks moved out of Patrik Schick’s
cover shadow and into the space the Schick’s
left, Nkunku then decided to follow, knowing
that Schick was no longer preventing Winks
from receiving the ball. As Nkunku stepped to
Winks, he made sure to use his cover shadow,
effectively eliminating Lo Celso as a passing
option in this instance.

By constantly checking his shoulder, Nkunku

has demonstrated time and time again that
his positioning is some of the best in the
Bundesliga at the moment. By excelling at
this, he of course creates wonderful scoring
opportunities, but he also becomes a crucial
part of the high press that RB Leipzig play with
on a weekly basis.

Conclusion
C hristopher Nkunku is a talented young
man who has thrived under Julian
Nagelsmann’s leadership at RB Leipzig. The
22-year-old is having his best season yet in
football, despite it being his first one where
he sees regular game time. This consistent
playing time has led to what most would
consider to be a surprise success of Leipzig’s

43
Tactical Analysis:

How to beat Liverpool

BY DANIEL LUSTED // @DanielLusted

44
O nce every so often in football, a team
reaches its peak. A delicate aggregation
of experience and youth, flair and work-rate
pieces seamlessly together to complete the
perfect footballing picture. The result? A well-
oiled, match-winning machine destroying
everything in its path.
At this point in history, that team is Liverpool.
Their recent defeat to Watford put an end
to a remarkable unbeaten run of 44 Premier
League games. Within this tenure, Liverpool
won 18 games straight, securing three points
in 39 of the 44 games. This sequence of results
puts this Liverpool side amongst the greats,
comparable to legendary sides such as Milan in
the nineties, Guardiola’s Bayern and of course,
Arsene’s invincibles.
These runs inevitably come to an end, as
all must. For Liverpool, there’s no time for
reflection as an important period in the club’s
history looms. All thoughts must be focussed
on lifting the Premier League title. For others,
however, a dissection of the numbers can
begin; poking and analysing each game to
identify whether Watford have single-handedly
unveiled a design for beating the Merseyside
club, or whether, within the numbers, a
blueprint existed all along.
This analysis looks at the hidden numbers
behind Liverpool’s great run and attempts to
identify an answer to the question that has kept
managers awake at night; how do you beat
Liverpool?
Defensive Organisation
S uch is the firepower possessed by the
reds, that naturally the starting point for
the investigation is defending. Any manager
looking to beat this Liverpool side has to have a
clear defensive plan, balancing tactical risk and
45
space management with player responsibility
to keep the goal-hungry Liverpool at bay.
Outscoring this side is simply not an option.
As we know and are continuing to develop our
appreciation for, results and performance are
two vastly different measures. In my previous
article, I identified key matches in Liverpool’s
season where performance didn’t match
the expected result, due to expected goals
variance. This means looking only at Liverpool’s
defeats is futile. Not just because there are so
few, but because the result doesn’t necessarily
reflect whether a team deserved to win or not.
The first graph looks at the formations used by
each side against Liverpool in the 44 Premier
League games. The formations used have been
tested against the Expected Goals Against
(xGA) each side subsequently achieved in the
game. By cross-referencing these numbers we
aim to establish which shape is best for our 11
players to start in.
A wide range of systems were used in an
attempt to stop Liverpool, from 5-4-1 to 3-5-
2 and everything in between. It’s no surprise
that the more adventurous shapes were
unsuccessful. For example, 4-4-2 and 4-3-1-
2, both of which don’t provide an additional
man to the defensive line, meaning more space
for Liverpool’s front three, conceded an xGA
of 2.24 and 2.34 respectively. Conversely, the
systems where additional defensive support
was provided helped blunt Liverpool’s attack.
Looking at 3-5-2 and 4-2-3-1 which achieved hope to find a suitable level of pressure to use
an xGA of 1.3 and 1.47 respectively, we can against Liverpool.
see that robust systems found some success in
reducing the likelihood of conceding. Note: To measure the tactical success opposed
to that of a team, where Liverpool have faced
There are too many caveats to this test to draw a team multiple times, I have labelled them
conclusions. Firstly, the test doesn’t take into separately.
account the quality of each player, potentially
skewing how effective a team’s shape is. For
example, a 4-4-2 of Atletico Madrid is likely
more robust than one implemented by West
Ham. Secondly, tactics are often variable
and fluid so just by reviewing shape we get
no clear indication of the system behind
each team’s approach. Finally, the data set is
spread too thinly across too many formations
to definitively say how successful each shape
was. There is also the added point that xGA
only shows a team’s success in defending
and not the success of the tactic as a whole.
I need a metric that incorporates the success
of both the attack and defensive strategy into
one metric. Here I turned to Expected Points
(xPTS).

In order to really see how to beat Liverpool,
I dug deeper into the numbers and came
up with three charts, which I think most
clearly demonstrate an effective way to keep
Liverpool at bay. Looking at the fundamentals
of defending, I considered what are the key
components of a defensive system. Once
identifying these I measured them against the
level of success achieved when facing Klopp’s
side, to see if a defensive blueprint emerges.
Aggression was the first pillar I believed to be
important. The degree of pressure by which a
team imposes on their opponent in possession
is a cornerstone to how they will operate in all
four phases. To measure this I have used the
passes per defensive action (PPDA) stat, which
provides a single number that can be used to
gauge the level of pressure imposed by a team.
By cross-referencing PPDA against xPTS, I
The results are not as expected. Before the
test I imagined teams that sat off the ball -
opting for a containing system as opposed
to an aggressive one would yield the best
results. However, as we can see above from
the regression line, the opposite is true. Teams
that have got in the faces of Liverpool with high
intensity and aggression achieved the highest
amount of xPTS.
It is clear from the graph that there is a fine
balance between aggression and risk. Teams
with the most success are ‘Wolves 3’ and
‘Leicester’, whose PPDA’s are 16.57 and 17.52.
This shows that an ultra high-press, other than
for the very best teams, can potentially result
in disaster. This is proved by ‘Leicester 3’,
where ‘Leicester’ attempted a more aggressive
approach but achieved an xPTS of just 0.01.

46
Now we have identified we need our team
to operate in a controlled aggressive system
looking for an optimum PPDA of 14-16, I
moved onto the next pillar. Compactness was
the next principle I considered vital. This is a
difficult metric to assign a numerical value to,
so I looked at a by-product of compactness for
the answer. A team that is compact, reduces
spaces through their structure, in order to
prevent passes from penetrating. It’s logical
then to assume that a more compact team will
make more interceptions per match, due to the
higher difficulty the opponent faces of passing
through congested passing channels. By cross-
referencing a team’s interception frequency
against their xPTS, I hope to find a level of
compactness that yields success against the
Merseyside club.
This test wasn’t as successful. There is minimal
correlation between the level of interceptions
made and the xPTS generated. Some teams
were particularly good at intercepting, however,
achieved a low xPTS - Aston Villa, for example,
made 83 interceptions but amassed just 0.38
xPTS. A team’s ability to block passes through
their shape is offset by what they do with the
ball once they’ve regained possession, and
47
as a result, we cannot see any clear patterns
emerging by looking at this metric.
Perhaps this is due to interceptions not being
a direct measure of a team’s compactness. A
more insightful figure to use would be a team’s
average defensive width throughout the game
and compare this to their xPTS.
The final principle I deemed a key measure
was control and restraint. A higher line leads
to a more advanced team unit, which leads
to recoveries in more advanced positions of
the pitch. Therefore, by looking at how many
recoveries each side made in the final third
versus Liverpool and cross-referencing it with
their xPTS, we can demonstrate the tactical
risk undertaken and use it to understand what
level of restraint is required to take points from
the soon to be champions.
Based on what we learned from the levels
of aggression required to beat Liverpool,
the results are as expected. We know that
aggression is vital if you want to earn points,
but the control and restraint test measures
where it is best to confront Liverpool. We can
see from the graph that there is a correlation
between the number of high recoveries made
by a team and the likelihood of winning.
‘Wolves 3’ made 14 recoveries in the final third,
which yielded them an xPTS of 1.83. What is
noticeable is the large cluster of teams that
have decided to allow Liverpool possession
by sitting deeper, in an attempt to close off the
spaces in behind. Though this seems a logical
tactic, we can see that by doing so Liverpool
are more likely to be victorious.
Attacking Organisation
Ihave identified the key concepts of attacking
and looked to find metrics that underpin
these fundamentals. From this point, I have
compared each team’s metrics from their
matches against Liverpool in the 44-game
streak and measured it against the levels of
success they achieved. This is all in the hope
of identifying an attacking blueprint that can be
used to win.
The first fundamental concept of attacking
is mobility. A team’s ability to be fast, fluid
and incisive is paramount to their success
as an attacking entity. I considered the most
appropriate underlying metric to measure
mobility was counter-attacking success. The
counter-attack is a demonstration of a team
in peak mobility. It comes in the transition
phase between defending and attacking, so
speed, accuracy and decision making are
vital components. Therefore, I have used each
team’s counter-attacking frequency in their
matches against Liverpool and measured it
against their xPTS.
48
The graph shows there is merit in opting to
transition quickly aginst the reds, despite
their notorious counter-press. The teams
that achieved the highest levels of success
were Leicester who counter-attacked 4 times.
The graph shows there’s a balance required
between countering at every given opportunity,
which would leave you susceptible defensively,
and countering at the opportune moments.
By countering between 3-6 times per match
we can see teams have yielded a good level
of success, demonstrating the ability to
pick the right moments to commit players in
transition. Teams who have tipped over the
balance such as ‘West Ham’, who attempted
10 counter-attacks, suffered with their xPTS.
This, however, is not as detrimental as the
teams who offered no counter-attacking threat.
A large percentage of teams - but for a few
outliers - that countered under 2 times in a
match, saw themselves overcome too easily
and achieved meagre xPTS as a result.
The second pillar of a good attacking team is
width. A well-known rule of football is to make
the pitch as wide as possible when in attack,
and as small as possible when defending. To
find a metric that reflected a team’s ability to
create width, I turned to crossing frequency.
Again, this metric is not a perfect reflection
of this pillar, due to the fact that a team can
tactically create width to create spaces or
overloads elsewhere on the pitch. However, to
demonstrate this using one numerical figure,
crossing frequency was the most appropriate
statistic available.
Once again, the correlation is clear. The graph
shows crossing is linked to a team’s success
against the North-Western club. From the 44
games, the more crosses teams have chosen
to deliver, the more points you will earn against
Liverpool.
What we can also take from this graph is that
there’s a balance to crossing frequency. Too
many ineffectual crosses means handing the
ball back to Liverpool, and therefore being
at risk of conceding. Too few crosses allow
Liverpool to be comfortable in their defensive
shape, not having to deal with deliveries into
their area. Where the graph lacks information,
and this is due to us using it for an indication of
width, is from where the crosses are taken. This
information would give a better understanding
49
of the optimum frequency a side would need
to cross, and from where to be most effective.
From this graph alone, however, we can
deduce that the more width a team operates
against Liverpool - despite the obvious risks -
is the more xPTS a team will achieve.
The final facet to a successful attacking team
is penetration. This is a metric that’s also
complicated to measure by using just one
value. Penetration is the ability a side possess
in breaking through the defensive lines of their
opponent. A team that can penetrate more
easily will inevitably see better chances at goal,
due to their ability to get closer. As a result, I
opted to use the average shot distance (metres)
as the measure for penetration.
The results are as expected. Teams who are
taking fewer shots and waiting for opportunities
closer at goal are seeing better success.
The graph shows that the additional tactical
flexibility and risk required in order to penetrate
more effectively is beneficial to the likelihood
of winning. We can see above that too often
teams are under committing players forward,
and therefore being reduced to longer efforts at
goal. Whilst this may seem like a safer option
that will leave your team more defensively
secure, it’s actually a false economy and teams
end up with fewer xPTS to show for it. The
graph tells us to take risks against Liverpool,
as it will result in additional penetration (closer
shots at goal) and ultimately garner more points
in the long run.
So what have we learned?
frequently, which improves their chance of
winning.
Ultimately, there’s no one specific way to beat
Liverpool. All managers can do is interpret
the numbers that are put in front of them and
come to their own conclusions about the
optimum way to win. What we have done here,
is show that blueprints can be created from the
hidden numbers and answers are often more
complicated.

W e have looked at the defensive DNA a

team requires to be effective against
Liverpool by using metrics that underpin
the cornerstones of defending. From this,
we can deduce that a starting point for our
defensive tactics is aggression as opposed
to a containing, passive system. We can then
progress this to say that the risk levels of being
aggressive higher up the pitch outweigh the
safety of dropping off and defending deep.
We have also learned that interceptions -
though not the best measure of compactness
- shows little correlation to xPTS, and is likely
outweighed by what is done with possession
once it’s been recovered.

After establishing our defensive philosophy, we

looked at the attacking organisation required
to beat Liverpool. The statistics show that a
decisive counter-attacking system must be
implemented in order to hurt Liverpool and
not allow them to become too comfortable
in possession - otherwise, xPTS plummet.
Over countering is an issue, committing too
many players too often reduces the chances
of winning as the offensive/defensive balance
becomes one-sided. Width is also key to the
attacking blueprint when facing Liverpool.
By delivering more crosses and operating
from a more offensive, wide shape, teams are
generally earning more xPTS. Finally, we’ve
seen that when teams do allow for offensive
flexibility by incorporating risk in their systems,
that they are able to penetrate Liverpool more

50
Jose Mourinho:

Taking Spurs in the right direction?

BY DOMAGOJ KOSTANJSAK // @BarcaFront

51
N ow that Jose Mourinho has been in charge
of Tottenham Hotspur for just over three
months, it’s once again time to look at the work
he’s doing and if the team is going in the right
direction with him at the helm.
Of course, the situation seems at least a bit
better than it was in Mauricio Pochettino’s final
days, as we will discuss further down the line
of this tactical analysis, but things are far from
perfect in Mourinho’s part of London and we’ll
be looking through some of the issues he is
currently facing.
A lot of that is simply due to his squad being
extremely thin in some parts of the pitch but
they still have more than just a solid base for
the not so distant future. So without further
ado, this tactical analysis will now shift towards
Tottenham Hotspur’s attacking and defensive
tactics, identifying some of the most prominent
strategies the Lilywhites are using but also
some of the areas that are still lacking.
Attacking style of play
Long ball routines
M ourinho has never really been known
for his exemplary attacking tactics and
even though we’ve seen some improvements
in Spurs’ general success, including their
offensive strategies, this is the part his team
still struggles with the most.
As a general rule of thumb, the Special One
is more precautious and pragmatic when
attacking, which has become even more
emphasised with the long-term injuries to both
Harry Kane and Heung-Min Son, and will adjust
his offensive tactics in such a way that they
never leave him too open or too exposed.
52
In 2019/20 and especially under their new
coach, Tottenham Hotspur have mostly set up
in a 4-2-3-1 system, favouring it in 33% of all
the games played throughout the campaign
and across all competitions.
When attacking, Spurs rely heavily on their
full-backs to provide width but interestingly
enough, Mourinho uses a lopsided 4-2-3-1,
meaning that one of the full-backs, usually the
left-back, will stay behind in attack, while the
other will burst forward and get into the final
third. You can see how exactly that looks like in
the image below.
Even though it is a 4-2-3-1 on paper and that’s
usually how Spurs would start their games but
once they get into possession, this system
changes to a 3-2-5 or a 3-2-4-1 formation,
with the left-back – in this case, Ben Davies
– staying behind to form a back three and the
right-back – usually Serge Aurier – will step
forward into the midfield or even as high as the
wingers.
This all highly depends on the personnel
Mourinho chooses. Ben Davies and Jan
Vertonghen are more defensive-minded so
that makes the left more pragmatic in the first
place. Aurier, on the other hand, is a much
more attacking-minded player and the coach
is using his skill set quite well. However, if
Japhet Tanganga is picked ahead of him,
that immediately affects the whole flank as
the youngster is not as aggressive as his
teammate.
Still, it does seem like Mourinho is still
experimenting with his squad but generally, he
favours a more direct approach that completely
bypasses the middle of the park and aims to
advance through the flanks for the majority
of the time. This could be due to a couple of
reasons.
Firstly, his pivot duo choice affects this
massively – at the moment, only Harry Winks
seems like a certain pick for the coach while
his partners will change from Eric Dier, Tanguy
Ndombele and recently even Giovani Lo Celso.
Of course, once again, injuries have played a
part here as Ndombele has rarely been fit for
long enough to feature consistently.
But depending on the choice of that second
midfielder, Spurs possess or don’t possess
a dose of press-resistance in their pivot line.
Winks can carry the ball forward and spray it
wide if necessary but Dier is not as comfortable
in possession and can be forced into mistakes.
This might have prompted Mourinho to look for
other solutions and resort to directly switching
the play to the wings.
Notice below how a somewhat usual scenario
for Tottenham Hotspur’s build-up tactics
might look like. The play is usually focused
on one flank where Spurs can either establish
a numerical superiority or just invite pressure
while their right-back, Aurier, hugs the touchline
on the opposite side and waits for a long ball
over the top.
53
And this was especially true for Mourinho’s
early days at the club when he would look to
send long balls from his defensive line into the
unoccupied space up front where his advanced
full-back would lurk.
In the example above, we can see Tottenham
Hotspur inviting pressure on the left just so they
can switch the play onto the right side when
the chance appears. The likes of Vertonghen
are key with these particular tactics, however,
as the centre-back is good enough on the ball
to make the switch successfully.
But the role of the double pivot is also
particularly important and Mourinho seems to
like them extremely close to the backline, as a
way of solidifying the defence but also in order
to create space in the middle of the park for,
once again, a potential long ball all the way
from the back.
Let’s observe another way of attacking from
the back that Tottenham Hotspur use under
Mourinho in the following graphic. Sometimes,
when they are pressurised, Spurs will drop
deeper with their five-man defensive squad but
the forwards, often Lucas Moura and whoever
ends up being picked next to him - could be
the likes of Lo Celso or Erik Lamela – push
the opposition’s defensive line further forward,
creating a gap in the middle that can be
exploited.

Once that gap appears, Dele Alli can drop and
collect the ball and then progress it forward
in a swift transition. Of course, this is easier
said than done and one of the problems Spurs
are currently facing is successfully avoiding
the press and advancing the ball when pinned
down in their own half.
We’ve seen that in their clash against Chelsea
when Frank Lampard’s troops squeezed the
life out of them and practically limited them to
moving strictly inside their own backyard. But
even in such a difficult situation, gaps appeared route towards the opposition’s goal, they do
for them to exploit.
Notice in the image below how Spurs are one
pass away from completely leaving Chelsea in
the dust but a last-ditch tackle from the Blues
saves the day. This is partly on Lampard’s
tactics as well as his midfield was sometimes
not optimally organised and gaps like that one
appeared due to their own mistakes. But it’s
also because Spurs managed to create them in role.
the first place.
Generally speaking however, this transition
towards a more direct approach can be seen
in the stats as well. Spurs have averaged 43.58
long balls in Pochettino’s first 12 games in
charge in 2019/20 while they now sit on 50.25
under Mourinho.
Similarly, they are now deploying fewer passes
per possession: 4.95 under Pochettino and
4.36 under Mourinho in four games more so far
in the ongoing campaign. Another indication
might be their 481 passes on average in
2019/20 as opposed to their 516 throughout
2018/19.
Overloads and
space creation
E ven though we can often see Tottenham
Hotspur under Mourinho prefer that direct
have a couple of tactics in their arsenal that
make for some interesting positional play.
In Kane, of course, Spurs have a rather unique
striker who is heavily involved in the build-
up and can often be seen dropping deep to
smoothen the link-up play and successfully
create overloads. In his absence, however,
Mourinho has mostly chosen Moura to do that
Similarly to the English striker, Moura will
also regularly vacate his position and drop off
to help progress the ball. Notice below how
his movement into the midfield poses a real
conundrum for the opposition as they suddenly
don’t know who to mark in this situation.
54
And due to that, Spurs can advance the ball
to a higher platform through the Brazilian
who then has the ability to carry it upfield and
into the final third, ultimately generating a big
chance for his team.
Once again, Spurs will utilise his movement to
create space behind the opposition’s backs
and will then send a through ball into the final
third and into the path of a sprinting teammate.
Notice in the example below as they create the
very same thing from a throw-in routine.
The forward drops deeper, pulling his marker
with him and that creates space behind them.
Upon receiving the ball from the throw-in, he
immediately sends it over the top and into the
path of the player who’s already on his way
into the gap that suddenly appeared in their
opposition’s backline.
This is a strategy commonly used by Spurs
under Mourinho and it usually involves Moura
himself. Take a look at another perfect example
down below where exactly the same thing
happens once again.
55
The defender is dragged away from his
standard position and Spurs can immediately
send a long ball over the top to find a runner
who’s now in acres of space behind the enemy
lines. It’s a simple technique that’s utilised by
many teams but it works like a charm when
executed properly.
And just as they use the long balls from their
defensive line to find teammates in space on
the other side of the pitch, they tend to use the
pace of their forwards almost as much. The
likes of Bergwijn and Son, when he’s fit, have
that burst of speed that can be utilised for off
the shoulder runs in behind the defence.
One of the problems, however, that have
somehow crept in as of late seem to be
connected to Tottenham Hotspur’s lack of
width in general but especially on the left side
of the pitch. We’ve mentioned at the very
beginning of this tactical analysis that Mourinho
is often using a lopsided system that sees one
side be more attacking than the other.
But if his forwards who either start the attack
out wide or who sometimes drift out there
decide to cut inside, this leaves Spurs without
any personnel on that flank and their actions
suddenly become too central and can easily be
defended against.

Note in both examples above how once Moura
cuts inside from the left, Chelsea can basically
disregard the whole flank since Davies doesn’t
move past the halfway line. While a lopsided
formation makes defensive transitions easier
to execute since there won’t be two full-backs
caught too high up the pitch in case of a
turnover, it does mean that the emphasis of
their attack can often be too focused on just
one of the flanks.
Defensive style of play
L et’s move to the defensive style of play
of Tottenham Hotspur under Mourinho.
Generally speaking, both the defensive and
offensive tactics have been improved under the
Portuguese manager despite hiccups in both
phases of play.
But one big change that we have seen in Spurs
ever since Mourinho has taken over the team
is the reduction in pressing tactics. The Special
One prefers a solid and compact defensive unit
56
over a high-pressing one that tries to win the
ball higher up the pitch.
As a result, upon losing possession and during
the opposition’s build-up play, Spurs will mostly
drop into their usual 4-4-2 defensive shape that
can turn into a 4-3-3 once the ball is recycled
towards the wings and low pressure is applied
on the ball-carrier. You can see an example of
that in the image below.
This is a stark difference from the system
Pochettino preferred as his team was always
adamant in trying to recoup possession higher
up the pitch and pressed rather intensely. At
the moment, this is pretty evident in their PPDA
values (passes allowed per defensive action)
which stands at 12.49 and is higher than in any
of Pochettino’s previous years in charge.
But Pochettino has also been conceding
more goals than Mourinho as his pressing
mechanisms were far from perfect and the
opposition would consistently find gaps in their
approach. This resulted in 1.41 conceded goals
in his last 12 Premier League games in charge
while Mourinho is now on 1.37 in his 16 games
in the league.
As opposed to expanding in their search of the
ball, Spurs will now often turtle up in their own
half and move as a compact unit, hunting for
loose balls in their own backyard and deploying
collapsing tactics once the opposition enter
certain zones on the pitch.
Usual triggers for collapses are either to eject the pacy players as soon as possible.
miscontrol of the ball or the opposition
positioning themselves in the wider areas
where it’s easier to press them. In those
instances, we can see them try to recover the
ball at a high pace.

But generally speaking, and even though it may

You can see an example of a combination
of zonal and man-marking in the advanced
areas of the pitch in the image above. Spurs
have forced their opposition into an awkward
position on the pitch and then aim to cut off all
of their passing lanes to recover possession in
their half of the park.
Additionally, the sheer compactness and the
fact that some of their pacy players such as
Alli, Moura or Bergwijn can stay higher up the
pitch means that it’s far easier to construct
a successful counter-attack and Spurs
have made that a formidable weapon under
Mourinho.
In that instance, upon retrieving the ball, the
goal is to expand as quickly as possible,
moving in various different directions so as to
dismantle the opposition’s compact defensive
shape and open gaps through which a ball can
be played through.
seem like they are still conceding a lot, stats
do suggest an improvement is taking place.
Pochettino registered 1.66 xGA (expected
goals against) in his last 12 games while
Mourinho is currently on 1.49 xGA after 16
games.
Still, their defensive organisation is not without
fault and we’ve seen some of their biggest
weaknesses exposed against Chelsea and
RB Leipzig respectively. Spurs were on the
backfoot in both games and similar mistakes
crept in that gave their opposition multiple
openings.
In both cases, their goal was to overcrowd
the middle of the pitch, which also seems like
something Mourinho likes to do in order to stop
the progression of the ball. Against Leipzig,
however, they failed to cover their half-spaces
successfully and it led to their opposition
constantly exploiting that area.

Observe an example of that below as Spurs

snatch the ball away around the halfway of the
pitch and immediately the wide players burst
forward and the central ones – who all stay
relatively close to each other – combine quickly

57
You can see how that looked like on the pitch
in the graphic above. While Spurs manage to
cage the opposition’s midfield, their narrow
and compact positioning means that the
half-spaces are left wide open and Leipzig
constantly progressed the ball through those
channels.
Against Chelsea, however, we saw two different
issues primarily come to light. Mourinho once
again decided to sit deep and overcrowd the
middle of the park in hopes of squeezing the
ball away from the Blues and striking on the
counter. But at times, they would commit
men forward and actually be proactive in their
approach.
Unfortunately, it seems that their pressing
tactics are still somewhat lacking, as was the
case with Pochettino at the helm and that
might actually be a reason why Mourinho is
opting against them in the first place.
Spurs were not compact enough when
pressing Chelsea and huge gaps between their
lines appeared in the process, leaving the Blues
with multiple dangerous options to exploit while
playing from the back. You can see an example
of a disjointed press by Spurs in the following
example.
Their first two lines of the pressing squad
charge forward but the backline doesn’t follow
suit and is late to react, leaving Chelsea’s
player in a really dangerous position in the
58
opposition’s half, totally unmarked.
Additionally, and this is through no fault of
Mourinho’s, without Kane in the front, Spurs are
still lacking a focal point in attack and a proper
target man who can increase their chances
of winning the first ball and then successfully
laying it off to his teammates. When you’re
defending deep and are depending on having a
clear target for those long balls, the absence of
such a player can hurt the team massively.
So far, Moura has been doing that job decently
but with the eventual return of the Englishman,
their improvement should be more than just
evident.
Final remarks
I t does seem like Mourinho is steadily
improving Spurs even though results are far
from ideal. The team is sitting in eighth with
40 points under their belts at the moment of
writing this tactical analysis but their expected
points tally says they should only have 36.6
and be sitting in 11th.
Similarly, they are overperforming their xG
values as well with 41.11 and 46 goals scored
in the process. It’s the same story with their
defence since they have conceded 39 goals
while they should’ve allowed 43.96 according
to the xG map.
Overall, however, and especially since his
team is largely plagued by injuries, it seems
that Mourinho is coping decently well with the
resources he has. They are still creating more
chances and conceding less than they have
under Pochettino and that’s a great sign for the
squad.
But there are still issues that have to be ironed
out if this team is to tango with the best of
them. Their lacklustre pressing tactics, no
proper target man for transitions, lack of any
width in the pragmatic approach and gaps they
leave in their defensive shapes have already
cost them quite a lot in the ongoing campaign
and will definitely have to be taken care of in
the not so distant future.

At times it feels like Mourinho is failing at who

he’s supposed to be and that’s the rigid master
of defensive tactics who’s able to create the
most stable and compact units that have
graced the pitch. But so far, we’re yet to see
that kind of resolute performances from his
Spurs team and a lot more will be expected
from the Special One in the future.

59
Dominik Szoboszlai:

Is he ready for the next big move?

BY FELIX PICHLER // @FelixPichler3

60
D ominik Szoboszlai is currently the most
valuable player in the Austrian Bundesliga
with a market value of £13.5million at the age
of 19. The Hungarian was one of the great stars
of the 2018/19 season, while in this season he
doesn’t play that often under the new coach
Jesse Marsch. In the opening 20 league games
of this campaign, he was part of the starting
eleven just seven times.
Of course, he’s still one of the best RB Salzburg
and Austrian Bundesliga players, and due to
that, he’s already for some time a target of
several big clubs in Europe. The big question
is, if he is ready for the next big step in his
career to join a bigger club outside of Austria.
In this tactical analysis in the form of a scout
report, we’ll take a closer look at his abilities
and tactics to additionally discuss if he is ready
to leave Salzburg in the summer of 2020.
Positioning and movement
M arsch mainly used either a 3-4-1-2/3-1-4-
2 or a 4-4-2 this season. In which the two
wingers cut inside and occupy the half-spaces.
Szoboszlai can play as a winger, but also as an
offensive midfielder. Due to that, he is either in
the centre behind the strikers when they used
a formation with a back three or played as a
winger when the American coach lined his
team up in a 4-4-2. Since then the wingers cut
in to play more centrally, Szoboszlai is mostly in
the half-spaces when his team is in possession
of the ball.
The young Hungarian usually is permanently
looking for free spaces in the left half-space
to then provide vertical passing options for
his teammates. This can also be seen in the
heatmap for his appearances in the Austrian
Bundesliga during the season 2019/20 which is
shown below.
61
Salzburg dominate their opponents in almost
every single game in the Austrian Bundesliga
and have more possession while the opponents
sit back and defend in a low block. As soon as
Marsch’s team get near the zone 14, they try to
use the combination of short passes with deep
runs and through passes to get in the space
behind the last line of the opposing defence.
In these situations, Szoboszlai is important for
his team as he is already mostly positioned in
the half-space and additionally, his technique is
outstanding as we will see later in this tactical
analysis.
The 19-years-old Hungarian understands that
it’s sometimes not useful to position inside the
oppositions block, as there he can’t receive
many passes and rarely gets on the ball. Due
to that, one of his typical positions is outside
of the formation of the opposition on the left
side, as we can see in the shot below. In these
situations, he creates space for himself to pick
up speed as soon as he receives the ball. Also,
it has to be mentioned that Szoboszlai is a
young player who loves to have the ball at his
feet and gets frustrated when he rarely is on the
ball. Due to that, he loves to drop a bit deeper
on such occasions, since then he is an easier
option for his teammates and receives the ball
more frequently.

As we will see in the next paragraph of this
tactical analysis, Szoboszlai has a great vision,
which is usual for an offensive midfielder.
However, he doesn’t just make use of that
quality when he is on the ball, but exploits his
abilities during his off-ball movements. The
19-year-old has a good feeling for when he has
to start a sprint to get into a free space and
when he should stop his movement.
In the example below, Salzburg are currently
on a counter-attack. During the first stage of it,
Szoboszlai doesn’t sprint at full speed to avoid
his opponents tracking his run, but he was still
fast enough to keep up with the player on the
ball. As Takumi Minamino was almost in the
position for a cross, Szoboszlai starts his sprint
to get in the right position, receives a great
cross and scores the goal with a volley with his
first touch.
62
Vision and
understanding of the game
V ision and a feeling when to play which pass
are probably two of the most underrated
abilities in football. Even though Szoboszlai’s
decision-making is sometimes not the best as
we will see later on, in other moments he sees
a passing lane which probably nobody else saw
at this moment. In some situations, you wonder
how he was able to track the movement of his
teammate and play the pass in such short time
while just a few moments later you wonder why
he hasn’t played that logical pass, but we’ll get
at this when we talk about his weaknesses.
In general, the Hungarian’s vision and creativity
are surely two of the biggest reasons why
reportedly Arsenal and Serie A champions
Juventus wanted to sign him during the
summer transfer window of 2019.
In his usual position at which we already
looked earlier, Szoboszlai has several passing
options as he can go short with a pass to the
left wide-area which is usually occupied by
Andreas Ulmer or can try to find a teammate in
the centre with a vertical or diagonal pass. The
third option which the 19-years-old chooses
quite regularly is the long ball to the other wing
as there is mostly a lot of free space since the
opponents want to stay horizontally compact
against Salzburg. So, they shift over as a team
so as to not give away any space in the centre,
but this creates space on the far side which
Szoboszlai looks to exploit with a long ball.
In the image below, we see such a typical
example as he receives a short pass and
switches the side with his first contact. He’s
able to do so as he scanned the pitch before
he has received the ball and tracked the deep
run of his teammate Rasmus Kristensen.
RB Salzburg are a team which has enormous
strength in the moments of transition (offensive
and defensive). As they have fast players who
are perfect for utilising the free space during
N ow, we’ll look at the moments in the game
a counter-attack or the unorganised formation
of the opposition after successful counter-
pressing. However, you don’t only need players
in your squad who are fast enough but also
ones who can play the necessary passes to
make use of their pace.
Szoboszlai is exactly such a player as he
identifies free spaces, movements of the
opponents, and runs of teammates to then
select the correct pass. In the image below,
Salzburg have just won back the ball with
a counter-pressing and the ball went to the
19-years-old. As St. Pölten won the ball just
moments before, they weren’t in their usual
defensive shape and Szoboszlai, as well as
Hee-chan Hwang, are completely free. The
Hungarian finds his South-Korean teammate
with a first time through pass over the top of
the defenders. In this situation, he once more
demonstrated his vision and understanding of
the game.
63
Abilities on the ball
in which the Hungarian is probably the
most dangerous: when he is on the ball. The
young offensive midfielder loves to be on the
ball to then create something dangerous. Of
course, his vision and understanding of the
game are great and help him to get in the
moments where he can utilise his technical
abilities, but the important aspect about his
style of play is how strong he is on the ball.
Szoboszlai stands at 185 cm which is quite tall
for an offensive midfielder and winger. Even
though he’s not a player with outstanding
physical strength, he still knows when and how
to make use of his body to protect the ball and
get himself between the opponent and the ball.
As we can see in the example below, he shields
his opponent off to stay on the ball and get into
the free space ahead of him.
The following aspect of his game is probably
the one which stands out the most when
you watch a game in which the Hungarian
plays as he often shows tricks to get past his
opponents. If there is the chance to get into a
one-on-one situation, then Szoboszlai tries to
take on his opponent and get past him with a
dribble.
Sometimes, this can be a bit dangerous as
he often also wants to do is in his own half,
but in general, his technique is so good that
he can take on any opponent to dribble past
him, but we’ll see in the next section of this
tactical analysis that this can sometimes cause
problems.
W hen you consider all these aspects
The 19-years-old is already quite important
for the build-up and creation of goalscoring
chances during Salzburg’s periods of
possession as he plays on average 46.84
passes per game. Of which 6.02 are to the final
third.
As we already saw earlier in this scout report,
the Hungarian has decent vision to detect the
movements of his teammates to then find them
with good through balls or to switch the side.
All this mental and technical abilities combined
make him a modern offensive-minded player
who can create dangerous situations against
almost every defence in the world, even against
the best one as we can see below. In the UEFA
Champions League group stage fixture against
Liverpool who were then in outstanding form,
Szoboszlai still managed to put his teammates
64
in good positions with through passes as we
can see in the following example.
Weaknesses
above and note that the Hungarian is
still just 19 years old, but already showed great
performances in the UEFA Champions League
and the UEFA Europa League, then you could
easily answer the question in the headline by
yourself: Yes, Szoboszlai is ready for the next
big move to join a club outside of Austria.
However, there is still another side of the coin
as Szoboszlai is not always able to show off his
talent and performs in this season pretty weak
in some games. That’s totally understandable
since it’s almost impossible for a player at
his age to perform every single game on the
same high level. Let’s take a look at two of his
biggest weaknesses.
First of all, he needs to work on his sloppiness
which brings him and his team sometimes in
bad situations, as it easily allows the opposition
to get into possession. We can watch in
several situations how it seems as the young
Hungarian would care more about his style of
play and how his actions look like instead of
their efficiency.
We can see this in an example below as he
plays a lobbed short ball to his teammate
Zlatko Junuzović who instantly is surrounded
by several Liverpool players who can start
the counter-pressing since just moments ago
Soboszlai won back the ball for RB Salzburg.
As the pass is lobbed, and not that clean and
easy to control it, Junuzović has problems
with it and Jürgen Klopp’s team can retain
possession. In this situation, the lobbed ball
isn’t necessary at all and brings his teammate
in an extremely difficult situation.

His second big problem is that he often misses

the right moment release the ball. Of course,
he is a great dribbler and extremely strong on
the ball, but in some situations, it would be
more effective to play the ball to a teammate.
C onsidering all the aspects which were
Instead, he stays on the ball to take on several
opponents and loses it or can’t continue the
attack with the same pace. This is also the
main reason why his success rate for dribbles
is 49.1% which is okay but could be much
better if he wouldn’t stay that long on the ball
in several situations, as in the example below.
In this situation, Erling Haaland and Sékou
Koïta support him and provide him options for
passes, but Szoboszlai stays on the ball to then
be alone against four opponents and has to
pass the ball back.
Conclusion
described in this tactical analysis,
Szoboszlai is definitely ready for the next step
in his promising career and should join a bigger
club. However, he clearly needs to work on his
sloppiness and decision-making as he often
stays too long on the ball. However, he’s one
of the most promising players in the Salzburg
squad and already has got the attention of
bigger clubs in Europe.
The Hungarian has the potential to be one of
the best players his country has seen in the last
few years, but must continue to improve his
mental and technical qualities. As he’s ready for
a transfer in the summer, it will be interesting to
see where he will go and how he’ll perform at
his new club (if Salzburg lets him go).

65
 Dimitri Payet:

The tactics behind his Marseille revival under André Villas-Boas

BY FINTAN O’REILLY // @FiontanOR

66
F ollowing a disappointing run of six straight
seasons without Champions League
football, André Villas-Boas faced an uphill Payet's positioning
battle to try and put Marseille’s name amongst
Europe’s elite once again for the 2020/21
campaign, upon being appointed the club’s
within Marseille's system
manager in May 2019. However, with 27 games
played, Villas-Boas’ Marseille side sit in second
place in the Ligue 1 table, eight points ahead of
L ast season, under former manager Rudi
Garcia, Marseille generally played with a
4-2-3-1 shape. Within this shape, Payet usually
third-placed Rennes. occupied the central ‘10’ role, playing behind
the centre forward as a base position.
The Portuguese manager’s tactics have played
an important role in helping his side to become However, the playmaker enjoyed plenty of
the ‘best of the rest’ in Ligue 1 this season, freedom of movement within Garcia’s 4-2-3-1
behind PSG. One of the key elements to Villas- shape. Rather than just sitting centrally, Payet
Boas’ success thus far with Marseille, has been often drifted into the half-spaces or even as
the resurgence that has been seen in the form far wide as either wing, to link up with his wide
of 32-year-old playmaker Dimitri Payet this teammates, over the course of 90 minutes.
season.

Payet has been far more of a key figure for Les

Olympiens throughout the 2019/20 campaign
thus far than he had been last season. The
32-year-old has currently made the joint-
highest number of assists that have been made
by any Marseille player in Ligue 1 this season,
with four. Payet is also currently Marseille’s
second-highest Ligue 1 goalscorer this season,
scoring a total of eight goals, which is already
twice as many goals as the playmaker scored
last season.
In this tactical analysis piece, we will examine
how Villas-Boas’ tactics have been set-up to
get the best out of Payet this season. We will
provide a tactical analysis of how Payet has
benefitted from Villas-Boas’ usual system of
play, as well as how the Portuguese manager
has been able to highlight Payet’s main
attributes to make him a key man this season.
The image above shows us Payet’s heatmap
from the 2018/19 season. Here, we can see
an example of how varied the 32-year-old’s
positioning was last season across the width
of the pitch. As is evident by this image, Payet
spent the majority of his time on either wing
last season.
We can also see that the attacking midfielder
did frequently occupy the central attacking
midfield zone last season, which is where
he started a lot of games out within Garcia’s
4-2-3-1 shape. While we can see a slight bit
of colour in some deeper areas, this heatmap
shows us that Payet primarily spent his team
in more advanced areas of the pitch during the

67
2018/19 campaign.
This second image shows us Payet’s heatmap
from the 2019/20 season. This heatmap shows
us that Payet has been far less active on the
right-wing this season, while he has spent the
vast majority of his time on the left side of the
pitch. This can be attributed to a change of
position for the playmaker, as new manager
Villas-Boas has introduced a change of system
this season at Marseille.
While Payet generally played in the central
attacking midfield position of Garcia’s 4-2-3-1
shape last season, the 32-year-old has usually
occupied the left-wing position in Villas-Boas’
preferred 4-3-3 shape throughout the 2019/20
campaign thus far.
This heatmap shows a lot of colour as far wide
as the touchline on the left-wing. This indicates
that Payet has often been taking up quite wide
positions this season, orientating himself to
stretch the play and take advantage of the full
width of the pitch.
Furthermore, this season’s heatmap shows
us that Payet has also spent a fair amount of
time occupying a deeper position on the left
side of the pitch. While Payet spent plenty of
time spread across the width of the pitch last
season, he has been exploring the depth of the
pitch to a greater extent throughout the current
campaign.
68
As previously mentioned, Payet’s heatmap
from the 2018/19 campaign showed a slight
bit of colour in deeper areas, however, the
playmaker’s heatmap from the 2019/20
campaign indicates that he has been spending
much more time positioned deeper in his own
half this season, compared to last season.
Payet’s role for Marseille has changed this
season, along with the change in manager for
Les Olympiens. Villas-Boas has preferred to
play Payet on the left-wing of a 4-3-3, whereas
Garcia gave the player freedom to roam across
to either wing from a central position in his
4-2-3-1 shape. However, under Villas-Boas,
Payet’s positioning has varied by depth to a
greater extent this season. Payet’s positioning
within Villas-Boas’ system may be playing an
important role in his improved form this season.
Left-wing overloads
T his season, Marseille frequently create
overloads on the left-wing versus the
opposition full-back. This is often done
via attacking runs from a full-back, either
overlapping Payet, thus allowing him to shift
more centrally into the left half-space, or
underlapping him, allowing him to maintain the
team’s width and create from a wider position.
Alternatively, another way that Marseille
frequently create wide overloads versus the
opposition full-back is through wide, outward,
diagonal runs from the left central midfielder.
Morgan Sanson frequently plays on the left side
of Marseille’s midfield three and can often be
seen making these outward diagonal runs from
the centre of the pitch out to the left-wing to
create support for Payet.

This image above, which is taken from
Marseille’s recent Coupe de France quarter-
final game versus Lyon, shows us an example
of Sanson making one of these outward,
diagonal runs from central midfield out to the
left-wing in support of Payet.
Here, we can see the 32-year-old playmaker
in possession of the ball just inside his own
half. Payet’s ball-playing quality makes him a
creative threat for the opposition, even from a
deep position, such as the one he’s occupying
in this image. As a result, he attracts the press
of the Lyon right-back, Kenny Tete, who we can
see moving out of the defensive line to close
Payet down, here.
The right-back’s movement creates a large
amount of space between him and his nearest
centre-back. Furthermore, as Tete presses
Payet, he allows a large amount of free space
to be created behind him on the left-wing.
As we can see in this image, Sanson quickly
breaks from central midfield to make a run
through the large gap that has been created
between Tete and Lyon’s right centre-back,
Joachim Andersen, in order to try and exploit
the free space that has been created behind
Tete on Marseille’s left-wing.
The central midfielder’s run creates a 2v1
advantage in favour of Marseille on the left-
wing. Sanson’s movement gives Payet the
option of playing a through ball to him down
69
the left-wing, as well as creating time for
Payet on the ball as the right-back now has
two players to worry about and subsequently
hesitates to continue pressing the dangerous
playmaker Payet.
Marseille’s creation of overloads on the left-
wing, in a variety of different ways, help to
create more options, time, and playmaking
opportunities for Payet in his wide position.
Payet’s passing and dribbling quality help
him to be a dangerous creative outlet for
Les Olympiens once they create these wide
overloads.
Deep playmaking quality
A s we previously discussed, Payet often
finds himself occupying deeper positions
more frequently this season. In the previous
image, we saw an example of how Payet can
be dangerous from these deeper positions
when pressed by the opposition right-back.
However, Payet has shown himself to be
capable of posing just as much danger to
the opposition from these deep positions this
season when not being aggressively pressed,
through his long-passing quality.
This image shows us an example of how
Payet has operated effectively as a deep-lying
playmaker from a wide position this season.
Just prior to this image, the 32-year-old
playmaker dropped deep to collect the ball
from the centre-backs. As we can see here,
Payet is effectively occupying a position one
would typically associate with a left-back, in
possession of the ball.
Meanwhile, Marseille’s actual left-back Jordan
Amavi can be seen higher up on the left-wing
here, making a run in behind the opposition’s
last line of defence, after having effectively
swapped positions with Payet.
Payet is given far too much time on the ball
here before an opposition player presses him,
which results in the 32-year-old skilfully picking
out Amavi’s run with an outside of the boot
long-ball that beats the opposition right-back,
who decided to remain in a deeper position
here. This ball effectively sets Amavi off down
the left-wing, where he can subsequently drive
at the opposition defence.
This next image provides us with another
example of how Marseille’s wide overloads
help Payet to find space to get onto the ball in
deeper positions, where he can subsequently
find more advanced teammates with his long-
ball playing ability.
Here, we can see Payet shifting into a slightly
more central and deeper position on the left
side of the pitch. The playmaker can effectively
shift into this position due to the overlapping
run of Amavi, on this occasion.
As Amavi advances down the left-wing, Payet
70
drifts inside, opening up space in front of
the attacking left-back, in addition to making
himself a potential passing option between the
opposition’s midfield and defensive lines.
This next image shows us how Payet’s
movement helps him to get into a position to
create from deep, as this play unfolds. The
left centre-back finds Payet dropping into the
midfield. The playmaker subsequently receives
the ball well and manages to quickly turn
towards goal, get his head up and spot the run
being made by centre forward Dario Benedetto,
who we can see Payet picking out with a long-
ball, as he makes a run in behind Nantes’
backline.
On this occasion, Payet’s pass is ultimately
intercepted by a defender, however, this
passage of play shows us another example
of Payet’s effectiveness as a playmaker when
operating from a deeper position.
Effective and
unpredictable dribbling
V illas-Boas has been successful at
effectively making greater use of Payet’s
dribbling ability this season than Garcia
was last season. According to Wyscout, the
Marseille playmaker has attempted a total of
133 dribbles in Ligue 1 this season, completing
a total of 63 successful dribbles throughout the
2019/20 campaign so far, having played a total
of 1988 minutes of Ligue 1 football.
Meanwhile, Payet attempted a total of 59
dribbles over the entire course of the 2018/19
Ligue 1 season, successfully completing just 36
of them in 2005 minutes of Ligue 1 game time.
These stats show us that Payet’s dribbling
has been a much more important tool in
Villas-Boas’ system this season than it was in
Garcia’s system during the 2018/19 campaign.
This image above shows us an example of how
Payet uses the full width of the pitch to put
himself in a good position to receive the ball
in advanced areas. Marseille’s opponents can
be seen retaining a narrow defensive shape in
this image, as they were attempting to defend a
crowded central zone just prior to this image.
Payet, who kept himself positioned out wide,
is subsequently found with a pass. As the ball
is played to Payet, the opposition right-back
is quick to make an attempt at closing down
the Marseille wide man. However, when put in
a 1v1 dribbling situation and given time and
space on the ball, Payet is usually reliable to
beat his man and the 32-year-old successfully
drives down the left-wing with the ball here.
In addition to impressive technical dribbling
ability, Payet carries somewhat of a sense of
unpredictability with him when carrying the ball
forwards on the left-wing. The wide playmaker
71
cuts inside onto his right foot frequently, in
addition to driving down the outside, as he
does in this particular passage of play. This
may make the 32-year-old a difficult and
unpredictable dribbler to defend against for the
opposition.
As this particular play unfolds, Payet drives
towards the byline, before using his speed
and agility to quickly cut back inside onto his
right foot. Payet can often be seen making this
particular quick movement to cut inside when
driving down the wing. This can often be seen
effectively helping the 32-year-old to breeze
past defenders.
However, instead of subsequently playing the
ball into one of the attackers who can be seen
waiting inside the box, on this occasion, Payet
cuts the ball back onto the outside again,
further demonstrating his unpredictability on
the ball. The 32-year-old playmaker goes onto
put the ball into the back of the net himself
from a tight angle to complete this passage of
play.
Payet can often be seen receiving the ball
in wide and deep areas this season, where
he often enjoys time and space to carry the
ball forward and carve out opportunities
for teammates, in addition to himself, as
this passage of play shows. The Marseille
playmaker’s role within Villas-Boas’ system has
helped him to make greater use of his dribbling
quality this season.
 Conclusion
T o conclude this tactical analysis piece,
it may be fair to say that Payet has been
used in a more effective way by Villas-Boas this
season, than he was by Garcia last season.
Payet has benefitted greatly from Marseille’s
change in manager and subsequent change
in system, which has seen him go from
playing more centrally and with more freedom
horizontal of movement, to playing far more
exclusively on the left-wing, with more vertical
freedom of movement. This has seen Payet
showcase his ability as a wide deep-lying
playmaker to a greater extent, this season.

In addition to that, Payet has benefitted from

his wider positioning by making the most of
his freedom to stretch the play within the final
third. When pressed, Payet’s 1v1 dribbling
subsequently ability helps him to drive at
opposition defences to carve out opportunities.
The improved form of the 32-year-old under
Villas-Boas has been one of the key elements
to Marseille’s impressive season.

72
Oleksandr Zinchenko:

Leading Ukraine’s Euros charge

BY GAVIN FORD // @realgavinford

73
A s we approach the summer, there is still
plenty to be decided in Europe’s domestic
leagues. Most are still extremely close, and
specifically in Italy, Germany, and Spain, we
are seeing some fantastic title races. On the
horizon, though, is Euro 2020. Europe’s best
players are going through the business end
of the season knowing there is that little extra
motivation on the end, to cement their place in
their national sides this summer.
One of Europe’s surprise packages has been
Ukraine. Andrei Shevchenko’s side blitzed
their qualification group, surprising the likes of
Portugal along the way. One of the key players
to this Ukraine side has been Manchester City
left-back Oleksandr Zinchenko. The 23-year-
old has reinvented himself for the English
juggernaut in this role, but for Ukraine, he is
used in a different way. Shevchenko deploys
the player in a more natural position for
Zinchenko in midfield. Here, we have seen the
brilliance of the man City brought in in 2016.
In this tactical analysis scout report, we will
look at how Zinchenko is used in Ukraine’s
Euro push. The midfielder is not only able to
use his defensive abilities we see on a regular
basis for his club, but he is able to showcase
his attacking senses that are more often
contained due to his defensive responsibilities.
This analysis will look at the tactics used by
Ukraine, and how we are seeing the best out of
Zinchenko as a result of them.
Zinchenko for
Manchester City
M ost people will know Zinchenko well
from his time with Manchester City. The
Ukraine international was brought in during
the summer of 2016 for £2 million. In his first
year, he was loaned out to PSV and had mixed
74
success at the Dutch club. When he returned,
he stayed in and around the squad. It turned
out that City’s troubles at left-back gave the
natural midfielder a chance to make his mark
on the side.
In this position, Zinchenko has become an
important piece in City’s dominant side over
recent years. This is due to his abilities that
have worked extremely well with the need for
City. Pep Guardiola has often used tactics
involving inverted full-backs in his time in
Manchester. We have seen this with an array
of different players since his arrival at the club,
but Zinchenko, in particular, has excelled in this
role. This has majorly been down to the Ukraine
international’s midfield ability, as City spend
most of the time in possession.
There are times where Zinchenko’s one-v-one
defending ability has come under scrutiny, but
for the most part he is able to make a major
impact on the side using his attacking abilities
from this area. Above you can see a pass map
from one of City’s matches. In this, the inverted
nature of his role in the side is evident, and his
presence here is essential in City’s build-up and
attacking phase.
For his national side, however, Zinchenko
is used in a different role. Before looking
specifically at Zinchenko’s role for Ukraine,
we will look at their midfield structure under
Shevchenko.

Ukraine's midfield
T ypically, Shevchenko sets his Ukraine side
up in a 4-3-3 formation. His midfield three
shape will depend on the opposition and style
of play they will be looking to implement in
this match. Against sides who look to be more
dominant, Ukraine will set their midfield up with
a double pivot. This adds an extra defensive
solidity, which we saw in their 2-1 victory over
Portugal. One midfielder will then sit slightly
ahead of the two and look to lead the side on
the break when possession is regained.
When Ukraine utilise the double pivot,
Zinchenko is normally deployed in the left
O ut of possession, Ukraine’s midfield drops
defensive midfield position. Here, he is able to
use both the attacking and defensive qualities
of his game extremely well. When his side are
defending, the 23-year-old is equally adept at
holding space in front of the defensive line and
slotting into the defensive line on either side of
the left-back.
Otherwise, Zinchenko occupies one of the
eight roles. Typically on the left, however,
he is equally able to play on the right side,
he is a near-perfect box-to-box midfielder
in Shevchenko’s system. In matches where
Ukraine can implement their style more, this
shape is different. Shevchenko opts for a
single pivot at the base of the midfield, and two
number eights who are given license to move
75
forward and combine with the three attackers.
Defensive solidarity
right in front of their defensive line to block
off central space for the opposition to operate
in. Zinchenko specifically will usually occupy
the half-space in between the left-back and
left centre-back. Here he uses his defensive
awareness to cut out any passes into this area,
while also slotting into the defensive line when
necessary. During Ukraine’s Euro qualifiers,
Zinchenko has averaged 5.64 interceptions
and 7.25 defensive duels per 90, while having a
55.6% completion rate in the latter.
This position suits Zinchenko as he is able to
use his defensive awareness to look to cut
out attacks, but has less specific defensive
responsibility as he does when he plays
left-back for Manchester City. His average
interception count shows his intelligence
in reading play in front of him, and this is a
massive part of Ukraine’s defensive structure.
For the majority of matches, Zinchenko will
hold this position ahead of the defence. At
times, however, we will drop into the defensive
line to aid his teammates. This happens in
two different instances. The first we saw in
Ukraine’s match against Portugal. With their
side leading 2-0 midway through the first
half, Ukraine took a slightly more defensive
approach, while looking to catch Portugal out
on the counter from there on out. In doing this,
Zinchenko actually dropped into the defensive
line along with one other midfielder, and they
formed a line of six. Here, Zinchenko switched
between occupying the outside most position
and coming inside with the left-back. Below
you can see an example of this set-up.
This tactic is plausible due to Zinchenko’s
flexible ability. His defensive awareness has
been heavily improved upon in his time at
Manchester City, and Shevchenko is reaping
the benefits with the national team.
Zinchenko also provides the left-back
specifically more freedom. Having a player
such as the City star that is able to fill in at left-
I n an attacking sense, this is where we are able
back allows him to be more adventurous going
forward, and also able to track an opponent
deeper into their own half, knowing Zinchenko
is capable of slotting into this position
extremely well.
In this example above, you can see Lithuania
76
with possession coming towards Ukraine’s left
side. When the winger receives possession,
the Ukraine left-back steps forward to press
the opposition. This forces them backwards.
The left-back continues to follow and apply
pressure long after the opponent has turned to
move back.
Here you can see that as the left-back presses,
Zinchenko identifies this and moves to slot in
as the left-back in the defensive line.
Attacking flair
to see the greatest difference with Zinchenko
compared to his role at Manchester City. The
23-year-old grew up primarily operating as an
attacking midfielder, so he has the ability to
have an impact in multiple areas of the pitch.
Below you can see Zinchenko’s heat map
during Ukraine’s Euro qualification campaign
so far. You are able to see that for the majority
of the time, the midfielder is deployed in higher
positions up the pitch in one of the number
eight roles.

In these positions, Zinchenko is able to use all
of his abilities to truly shine. It is normal to see
him consistently acting as the metronome for
this Ukraine side. The image below is the side’s
pass map in their victory over Serbia. You can
see the influence Zinchenko has on the side,
positioned directly in the centre of midfield with
strong passing links to all of his teammates
around him.
Zinchenko averages 70.93 passes per 90,
completing 90.2% of them. Of these passes,
10.61 are into the final third with an even better
91.1% completion rate. It is normally in these
areas where Zinchenko is pulling the strings
from deeper positions that he is at his best.
As well, when he is in these areas he is well-
positioned to defend when possession is lost.
Zinchenko’s best asset in midfield is his ability
to see the entire pitch at any time. Below you
can see an image of Zinchenko occupying a
higher space as his side is in possession. As
his teammate comes to this right side of the
pitch, the midfielder acknowledges the lack of
77
attacking routes in this area. Zinchenko quickly
identifies a pocket of space to burst into to
provide a passing outlet.
As he provides support, he is looking for the
next place to play possession into. Quickly, he
recognises the space his left-back is in on the
far side of the pitch. Once Zinchenko receives
the pass, he takes a quick touch to set himself
and plays a pass through the lines and into the
channel for his teammate to run in behind.
Alternatively, Zinchenko also looks to get
forward at the opponent’s backline himself at
times. Once again, the Ukrainian uses his great
intelligence to find little pockets of space in
these areas to make himself available to receive
possession from teammates. He directly
contributes 1.34 shots per 90, alongside
assisting another 1.61. These often come when
he makes forward runs into the last third.

In the image you can see above, Zinchenko has
identified an opportunity to move forward into
the final third. As his side builds possession
on the right side, he drifts into a typical centre-
forward area and waits for an opportunity to
present itself.
considered a serious dark horse to make a run
in the competition is Ukraine. Shevchenko’s
side is in top form after blitzing their qualifying
group and will be full of confidence as they
head into the tournament. This will be the first
main stage that will get to witness Zinchenko’s
midfield ability. The Ukraine international has
made a name for himself with Manchester
City at left-back, but here he will have the
opportunity to prove why he should be
considered as a midfield option going forward
for the English side, or even why another top
side should look at him as a midfield option this
summer. This analysis has given you a look at
what you can expect from this Ukraine side in
the midfield, and specifically what we can see
from Zinchenko as he looks to lead his national
side to an impressive Euro run.

When possession is moved centrally, the

Lithuania defence tries to step forward.
Zinchenko uses this movement and moves
forward onto the shoulder of the last defender.
His teammate recognises the movement
into this position and finds him with a ball in
between the centre-halves. Zinchenko has
found a pocket of space that leaves him all
alone to easily slot in Ukraine’s opening goal in
this match.

Conclusion
W ith the Euros right around the corner,
players will have little time after their
club campaigns are over before heading out
on international duty. One team that should be

78
 Goalkeeping:

How to coach the block save

BY JAMIE BRACKPOOL // @jamiebrackpool

79
W hen speaking about the evolution of
modern goalkeeping, many fans and
pundits will point towards the reliance on
incredible performance against Tottenham
Hotspur, Manchester United’s shot-stopper
utilised a plethora of different futsal techniques
goalkeepers in their team’s buildup. The to deny Mauricio Pochettino’s men. In the 65th
Brazilian duo of Alisson and Ederson are minute, De Gea found himself 1v1 with an
perfect examples of goalkeepers being given oncoming Dele Alli.
a bigger responsibility when their team is in
possession. However, the evolution of modern
goalkeepers goes much further than this.

The increased pace of the game has forced

goalkeepers to become more creative with
their shot-stopping tactics. David de Gea, who
was at one point seen as the best goalkeeper
in the world, is renowned for pulling off
miraculous saves with his feet. While many of
the Spaniard’s incredible saves can look like
last ditch efforts to throw his body in the way of
shots, there is much more technique involved
than what first meets the eye. Techniques,
such as the lateral split save, have origins from
football’s sister sport, futsal.
Another one of these techniques is the block
save, also known as the ‘K’ save. This tactical
analysis will briefly explain the block save and
provide the readers with the resources needed
to successfully coach this technique.
What is the block save?
As Alli’s approach brings him closer to the goal,
De Gea would have been looking for one of
two things. The first thing would be a heavy
touch from Alli. Had the Tottenham midfielder
taken a heavy touch out of his feet, there may
have been an opportunity for the goalkeeper
to come off his line and win the ball with his
hands.
The second thing De Gea would have been
looking for was an indication that Alli was
getting ready to shoot. As the Englishman put
his head down to shoot, De Dea reacted by
getting into the block save stance.

T he block save is a technique used by

goalkeepers during 1v1 scenarios when
there is little opportunity for the goalkeeper to
win possession of the ball. What I mean by this
is that the goalkeeper is unlikely to win the ball
outright and retain possession for his team,
by successfully catching the ball when making
the save. The objective of the block save is to
simply position their body between the shooter
and the net as effectively as possible.
Let’s take a look at De Gea’s shape from a
As he was mentioned before, De Gea is a different angle. From behind we can see all
perfect example to look at. During last season’s the elements of a good block save. The knee

80
closest to the near post is up, the trailing
leg is closing the gap between his legs and
he is keeping a relatively flat chest which is
perpendicular to the shooter.
We can see De Gea utilising the same
technique against Manchester City. Instead
of dropping his right knee, as he did against
Tottenham, he drops his left knee. This is for
two reasons. Firstly, he is travelling to his
right, and dropping his left knee is much more
naturally. Secondly, De Gea wants to take away
B efore a goalkeeper sets themselves into the
the near post shot.
Kevin De Bruyne opts to shoot across the
face of goal, however, De Gea makes the save
with his trailing leg. It may appear as if there
is a copious amount of the net for De Bruyne
to shoot at. But if we look at the frame right
before the Belgian shoots we can see how
much bigger De Gea makes himself by utilising
the blocking technique.
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The rest of this analysis will break down
the various elements required to coach this
technique and outline a session that coaches
can utilise to coach this technique. Let’s take a
look at coaching points to focus on first.
The approach
block save shape, they must ensure that
they are set central to the net. This helps them
ensure that they are limiting how much surface
area of the goalmouth the shooter has to aim
at.
The goalkeeper’s approach isn’t as simple as
just setting themselves in the middle of the net.
The approach to their set position is equally
as important. While it may not be utilised by
every goalkeeper in every situation, a curved
approach can improve a goalkeeper’s chances
of success.
When attempting to make a save, there is
always a level of unpredictability as to where
the shooter is aiming. A talented goalkeeper
might be able to predict the target of a shooter
by looking at the striker’s body position,
however, there are other ways for a goalkeeper
to control the predictability of the shooter.
When approaching the ball, a slightly curved
run can take away a back post shot, giving
the shooter a false belief that they must shoot
at the near post. The goalkeeper can then, in
theory, step into the path of the shooter and
take away a near post shot at the last second.
This kind of approach is especially useful when
an attacker is making a run towards the net
from an angle.
A curved approach is not always necessary, or
useful. It depends on the distance and angle
of the striker’s approach. A goalkeeper should
only force the near sided shot if they are able
to quickly and effectively step into the path
of the shooter. I recommend encouraging this
approach on close distance shots from the
angle.
While the angle of approach is important, so is
the speed of the approach. A goalkeeper must
quickly close down the angle before getting
into the appropriate set position. This is true
whether the player is attempting to make the
block save or attempt a traditional 1v1. A quick
approach will also assist the goalkeeper if the
shooter takes a heavy touch out of their feet.
The Stance
H ow the goalkeeper is positioned during this
encounter is very important. This section
will outline the different aspects of the block
save and why they are so important.
As mentioned above, the goalkeeper must
ensure that they are positioned with one knee
up, with the trailing leg tucked dropped to
take away the space between their legs. Their
trailing leg’s knee must not be planted on the
ground, however. They must keep their arms
spread out wide, pointed down, and must keep
their chest perpendicular to the shooter. Let’s
take a look at an effective block save stance
below.
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This position helps take away as much of
the net as possible. It is important that your
goalkeeper understands which knee must stay
up and which one must stay down. The near
side post must be covered by the upper knee.
Keeping their chest perpendicular to the
shooter will increase the surface area the
shooter must avoid when attempting to hit the
net. Depending on the angle of the shooter
and the distance between the goalkeeper and
the shooter, an effective block save can make
scoring with a direct shot nearly impossible.
This is why keeping the dropped knee off
the ground is important. Should the shooter
attempt to take a touch and change the angle,
or pass the ball to a teammate, the goalkeeper
must be mobile enough to change their set
position. Dropping the bottom knee all the way
to the ground limits the goalkeeper’s mobility
while keeping it up increases their ability to
recover quickly. We will discuss this more in the
next section of this analysis.
Coaches must help their goalkeepers
understand how to quickly get into the block
save position by coaching each element
individually. Attempting to overload your
keepers with too much information all at
once will likely lead to them forgetting certain
elements. Be patient with your keepers
and encourage them if they don’t get the
technique right away. These techniques are
rarely perfected right away. It may take your
goalkeepers multiple practices before they are
proficient and confident enough to utilise this
technique during games.
Recovery
Start by having your goalkeeper in the net. Set
up two lines of attackers to the right and left of
the posts on the 18 yard box. The objective is
simple. You, or an assistant, will feed balls into
the box for the attacker to run onto. Change
up the weight and angle of each path to create
unique scenarios for your goalkeeper(s) to deal
with. We can see this setup below.

I n the above section, I mentioned that the

goalkeeper shouldn’t drop their trailing leg’s
knee to the floor. The reason for this is to
maintain maneuvrability. Should the goalkeeper
drop their knee to the floor, they limit their
ability to get back to their feet quickly. By
keeping both feet on the floor, the goalkeeper
is able to quickly recover to their regular set
position.

After the goalkeeper makes the save from the
block save they must quickly react to where
the ball has been deflected. Remember, the
goalkeeper won’t catch the ball during the
block save, so the ball will either deflect out for
a corner or back out into the field of play.
When coaching the goalkeeper, don’t stop
the session after they have made the save.
Encourage the goalkeeper to recover to their
set position after making the save, or dive on
the loose ball if possible.
Activity
When the ball is played in, encourage the
attackers to shoot from various distances and
take multiple touches to provide the session
with a game realism. If you want to focus on
more specific scenarios you can restrict the
area the striker can shoot from or limit their
touches.
If you are looking for a way to speed up the
pace of the session you can introduce a
recovering defender to the session. As the ball
is played into the space, allow a defender to
press the attacker from behind, forcing him to
drive at the net and get a shot off quicker. This
also ensures the session is match realistic. An
example of what this might look like can be

Ishared a similar session to this back in

the second-ever edition of this magazine
(December 2018), but with a slight variation.
found below.

That session was designed to help incorporate

your goalkeeper into your team’s full session.
This session, on the other hand, is designed
specifically for the development of your
goalkeeper. After your goalkeeper has been
warmed up, we can get right into the session.

83
 and c) recovering quickly after making the save.

Hopefully this article has helped introduce

At the end of the day, this session is just one
of many that could be used to coach the block
save technique. You may want to initially coach
the technique in a more technical session
before jumping into something game realistic,
as shown above.
some readers to a new technique that they
can share with their goalkeepers. For analysts,
hopefully it has given them an insight into a
technique that is becoming utilised much more
frequently in the modern game. Next time you
are watching goalkeepers like David de Gea,
Kasper Schmeichel or Kiko Casilla, see if you
can identify them utilising this goalkeeping
technique during 1v1 scenarios.

The most important thing, however, is ensuring

the goalkeeper understands the technique
and feels comfortable utilising it. Once the
technique itself is mastered, the goalkeeper
must be exposed to using it in match
scenarios.

Conclusion
W hen introducing this technique to your
goalkeeper, make sure they understand
that it is not the correct technique to use in
every 1v1 situation. The distance of the shooter
to the goalkeeper and the angle and speed
of their approach are all important factors.
Encourage them to experiment with this
technique in sessions to become comfortable
with the stance and success rate of this
technique is certain scenarios.

The repetition of this technique’s use will be the

best way for them to learn. The goalkeeper will
begin to learn when and where they should be
using it. However, they must be guided by the
coach to ensure that they are a) approaching
the save the correct way, b) in the correct
position and shape when completing the save,

84
 Atalanta:

Can they keep the momentum going?

BY LORIHANNA SHUSHKOVA // @LorihannaSh

85
A talanta have become one of the most
exciting teams to watch, not only in Serie
A, but also in Europe. Their creative attacking
style of play that combines good team play, but
also outstanding individual skills, has turned
out to be difficult to resist for many of their
opponents throughout the season.
Scoring five and more goals in their games on
multiple occasions has proved they not only
tend to get the job done but have fun while
doing it. The Atalanta players’ confidence on
and off the ball is impressive and resulted in
some outstanding performances this term.
The manager Gian Piero Gasperini was judged
for sticking to one formation, thinking he
doesn’t have any backup plans. He, though,
proved that working precisely on building a
constant approach could be rewarded, whilst
coming up with a few in-game decisions
showed his and his squad’s versatility. The
more impressive thing in these games was that
he wouldn’t change the scheme but would
assign new roles to some of the players which
would change the dynamics in the blink of an
eye.
Atalanta are the leaders in Serie A when it
comes to goal scoring – having 70 goals in 25
games so far. Similarly to last season, they aim
to stay in the top four, securing a European
spot and settling as one of the contenders in
the league. Despite their solid performance,
their ability to continue the uprise is often
doubted due to the lack of squad depth and
new additions.
This tactical analysis aims to look into their
tactics and see what Gasperini’s secret squad
weapons are.
86
Tactical approach
and current squad
Goalkeepers: Pierluigi Golini; Marco Sportiello;
Francesco Rossi;
Defenders: Robin Gosens; José Luis
Palomino; Berat Djimsiti; Rafael Tolói; Mattia
Caldara; Hans Hateboer; Lennart Czyborra;
Timothy Castagne
Midfielders: Ruslan Malinovskyi; Mario Pašalić;
Remo Freuler; Marten de Roon; Adrien Tameze;
Attackers: Josip Iličić; Alejandro Gómez; Luis
Muriel; Duván Zapata;
A s mentioned Gasperini has a clear vision
of how he wants to see his team on the
pitch. His favoured 3-4-1-2/3-4-2-1 formation
serves his approach perfectly so far. Relying
on creating lots of opportunities by using
strong off the ball movement and passing
combinations in the opposition half has proved
to be successful enough to trouble the best
defences in the league.
They often tend to shoot from distance too,
since they are constantly looking to penetrate
different defensive set-ups. Their attacking
ventures don’t end with their open play efforts.
The team is very strong in taking set-pieces
which adds to their efficiency immensely,
resulting in them sending 19 shots on average
per game.
Their midfield is supporting the frontline well,
with the intense contribution of the wing-backs
who would often do rotations on the flanks.
Atalanta would most frequently attack through
the flanks and use those player rotations to
either stretch defences in efforts to open
spaces or allow the wing-backs to cut inside
and add an additional threat in the box.
The midfield players have a huge role in
creating counter-attacks. By creating 3,48
counters on average per 90 minutes they
are able to break perfectly structured low
blocks. The internal players help in retaining
possession since La Dea are a team that likes
to control the tempo mostly in the opponents’
half.
Image 1: Gómez would cover the half-spaces.
Meanwhile, above, Hateboer moves off the ball
so he’d be a passing option on the wing.
The connection between the lines and the
players’ constant aim to win the ball back is
why they do well defensively too. They do
have some defensive insecurities though. Their
back-three defensive structure expectedly
holds some risks. Although one of their most
consistent solid performers is a defender
(Palomino), they often fall victim to poor
work under pressure and are unable to avoid
individual errors. Similarly, to their approach of
stretching the opposition defence, they also
tend to get dragged out wide and get exposed.
87
Image 2: Their effort to put pressure on the
ball carrier, left Higuain uncovered. The team
occasionally fails to cover everyone properly in
the box.
What are their
options in attack?
A talanta’s attacking players are among the
best yet underrated in Serie A. Scoring 70
goals is impressive but making it look effortless
is what makes the difference and sets the
team for a brighter future. The only problem
in this growing fairy-tale is that two of their
creative forces and top scorers Papu Gómez
and Josip Iličić are 32-years-old and their
future in football starts getting a little uncertain.
Especially when it comes to Atalanta relying
mostly on their efforts in attack.
Their current approach upfront relies on
player movement, passing skills and precise
finishing. Iličić is the team’s leading goal scorer
with 15 goals (and five assists), whilst Gómez
contributed with 10 assists and six goals.
Gómez has the ability to create goalscoring
opportunities using lots of perfectly measured
through balls. Despite his most frequent
position behind the two strikers, he moves all
around the final third in search of free spaces.
His versatility has helped for building a strong
partnership with all three regular strikers Iličić,
Zapata and Muriel.
 aerial presence has been key for the team too
both when attacking and defending set-pieces.
He lacks the ability to hold on to the ball,
but that’s what Muriel could assist with. His
dribbling allows him to take on his opponents
and advance the ball.

Image 3: Atalanta’ tend to switch play often in

order to break through low blocks. Juventus
failed to cover the wings and couldn’t resist
Gómez’s smart movement.

This connection often results in impressive

rotations in and around the box, serving for
dragging players out of position and exploiting Image 4: Atalanta’s attacking players moving
spaces. Additionally, his positional awareness fluidly together.
complements the midfielders’ movement
in the half-spaces, increasing the team’s
explosiveness in attack. Ilicic is also quite
versatile when it comes to positioning and
picking up the ball which is the perfect addition
to his precise finishing. He doesn’t limit his
movement and strolls all the way back to the
half-line seeking the ball.

Their absence would affect the team’s

performance and decrease their effectiveness
upfront. Gasperini has other good performers
though. He has played Zapata and Muriel next
to each other on a few occasions and with
adjusting the strategy to their strengths it could
be a successful partnership, considering Iličić
is gone.
Both Zapata and Muriel have proved to be
key players for the team replacing each other
on the left side of the attack when needed.
They have scored 24 goals combined which
is impressive having in mind they both haven’t
been regular starters throughout the season.
Zapata is strong in providing key passes and
through balls, hence creating goal-scoring
opportunities, but also at finishing them. His
Image 5: The attacking players are always
committed to applying high press and winning
the ball back in the opposition half.
When it comes to having a creative force
behind them, they could rely on Ruslan
Malinovskyi. The Ukrainian has performed
solidly so far, despite getting fewer playing
minutes. Gasperini often uses him as an
attacking boost when things go wrong, and
the players have proved he deserves a chance
even as a starter. He covers wide areas and
supports the forward actions with key passes,
although much less than Gomez. Malinovskyi’s
impact often shows when the team tries to
commit more players in and around the box,
against teams with well-structured defences.

88
Image 6: Atalanta committed more players
upfront whilst Malinovskyi is trying to advance
the ball. They tried to numerically match and
engage the Cagliari defenders and force them
into mistakes.
Image 7: Against Inter, they had to switch
to a different game plan after the break and
committed more players up front. The key
additional man in the box was Malinovskyi
who was brought in and increased the team’s
explosiveness.
The coach has some additional attacking
options in the face Musa Barrow who is on
loan at Bologna. He joined the team during the
winter transfer window and has performed well
under Siniša Mihajlović so far scoring three
times and assisting once in seven games. He
is most frequently used as part of the attacking
midfield.
89
Image 8: Juventus’ defensive line allowed to
be dragged on the right, which left Hateboer
completely uncovered and allowed Barrow to
show off his positional awareness and move
freely towards the box too.
Adrien Tameze arrived at Atalanta on loan from
OGC Nice with an option to buy but is yet to
play for the team.
Is their midfield
versatile enough?
A talanta’s midfield has proved to be well
balanced, managing to support both
the team’s attacking and defensive actions.
As mentioned, the wing-backs Gosens and
Hateboer are greatly contributing to the final
third actions. The German has scored seven
goals and assisted five more this term. His
runs to the box and strong positioning often
put their opponents under pressure. He serves
both as threat and distraction which adds to
the team’s explosiveness.

Image 9: Gosens’ run to the box gave the ball
carrier additional option to finish the attack.
Gosens eventually scored. His contribution
from behind has proved to be very successful
for the team.
Hateboer also cuts inside occasionally, but
he is mostly responsible for advancing the
ball through the right flank and crossing it. He
also takes part in attacking triangles on the
wings, where the team executes short pass
combinations, combined with off the ball
movement.
That is one of the areas where Gasperini lacks
depth. The only replacement for both Gosens
and Hateboer is Timothy Castagne. He initially
plays on the left, but as we already saw during
the season, he replaced Hateboer on the right
on a few occasions.
Image 10: Atalanta circulating the ball on the
right via short pass combinations. This way they
drag the defenders towards them and leave the
others side of the pitch uncovered. That’s when
they quickly switch play and penetrate.
90
Castagne is a quite solid option since he is able
to focus more on his defensive responsibilities
and have higher success than Hateboer. His
ability to hold on to the ball and distribute it
in the best possible way is key. That doesn’t
mean that Atalanta are safe. Lacking depth
in one of the most active positions holds
risks, and if the team want to remain in the
top position in Serie A, they need to find an
alternative.
Image 11: Hateboer positioning deep in the
opposition half stretching the defence out.
Image 12: That immediately opened space for
his teammates to exploit and finish the attack.
When having everyone up and running,
Atalanta’s centre midfield is well covered. One
of the most valued players, who is key for their
transitions is Pašalić. Apart from his passing,
the Croatian contributes well defensively and
is a great counterattack threat. Due to his key
position, he helps the team in their defensive
transition as well as in their build-up. What
could be used more often in the future is
using him in more in the role of an attacking
midfielder, since his flair and finishing could be
crucial in the box.
The other two additions in the central areas
Remo Freuler and Marten de Roon are also
key for the team. On most occasions Freuler is
used as a second option for both left and right
central midfield, depending on the opposition
and Gasperini’s approach. That is due to De
Roon’s and Pašalić’s more active contribution
in both phases.
It is the same case scenario as on the flanks.
If the coach wants to continue improving and
dream of the title, he definitely needs to add to
his squad.
Defensive stability
C onsidering their three-man backline
Atalanta perform well defensively. They
aren’t though versatile when it comes to playing
in a different than the 3-4-2-1 formation.
Defensively they also lack squad depth,
which would affect their overall performance
immensely in case of injury or suspension. The
regular starters Djimsiti, Palomino and Tolói
have built a strong partnership and the only
available replacement that got some playing
minutes is Mattia Caldara, whose decision
making and work under pressure are yet to be
developed.
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Image 13: Atalanta’s 5-3-2 in defence with the
attackers dropped deep to be able to counter-
attack immediately they get the ball back.
Lennart Czyborra joined from Heracles during
the winter transfer window but he was mostly
used in back-four formations in the role of
a left full-back. That means that he is more
likely to be available as a replacement of the
wing-backs rather than as a central defender.
Having in mind that Atalanta’s only noticeable
vulnerability is at the back, this leaves them in a
bad position, especially with other teams’ more
aggressive attacking strategies.
Czyborra is good at stealing the ball from the
opposition and dribbling past his opponents
which at least makes him a good option for the
flank, where he could help in the build-up or in
counterattacking.
On the agenda in the summer should be
bringing defensive players, since both Toloi
and Palomino are already 30-years-old and
Gasperini needs to start involving new players
so the transition, later on, could be smoother.
Final thoughts
A talanta have had loaned some of their
players, but none of them is contributing
to their new teams, which most likely means
they are not going to be relied on in the future.
With the increasing expectations and their
contribution in the European competitions, it
is most likely that the team are going to have
struggles keeping the high tempo. Using the
same starting XI will affect their performance at
some point, and whilst Gasperini has options
in some positions, he quickly needs to find
solutions for others.

Whilst he is good at making in-game changes

in their approach, it’s a good idea to start
building a different strategy, especially
against teams that tend to use skilful players
in attack. Atalanta might fall victim to that
due to individual errors. When it comes to
their attacking approach, as long as they
stick to their off the ball movement and
creativity, despite being quite predictable, their
opponents might not be able to resist.

92
Red Star Belgrade's
new midfield:

Njegoš Petrović and Veljko Nikolić

BY MARKO JOVIĆ // @zoze_marinjo

93
R ed Star Belgrade is at the new beginning.
After the lucrative bunch of years under
Vladan Milojević, this winter they went for a
future transfer windows.

staff change and appointed club and Serbian

football legend Dejan Stanković as their new
manager. The switch in the managerial position
expectedly brought with it some modifications
in style of play and usage of individuals,
resulting in a complete change of approach
after the month of their work together.
The biggest news for the Red and Whites are
the promotions of youngsters into the important a manager switch. After Stanković came, it was
first-team roles, starting with Željko Gavrić and clear that they will focus more on possession-
Strahinja Eraković who spent the first part of
the season in their filial Grafičar in the Serbian their young midfielders, so Petrović and Nikolić
Second division. Also, the young players who
were in the squad during the autumn got their
minutes and responsibilities in Stanković’s
system and now are the key players for his
tactics to succeed.
Veljko Nikolić and Njegoš Petrović are the two
players who made the biggest leap under the
new coach as they got the chance to become
regular starters and carry the team’s ideas as,
what seems like, the main catalysts of Red
Star’s new game.
High positioning and
the "in-between" play
I
n the past three years, Serbian champions got
their good results playing the well-organised
defensive football with discipline as their
number one idea during the time and it was
obvious that that will change after they went for
based football, trying to utilize the potential of
got their chances to show what they got.
The likes of Marko Marin and Rajiv van la Para,
who were the highest-paid players of Red Star,
exited Rajko Mitić stadium and opened up the
spots for fresh blood who came in the form of
the two midfielders. They did a great job during
the winter preparations and locked themselves
in the starting lineup, with Njegoš Petrović
playing in the box-to-box role, while Veljko
Nikolić is the true embodiment of the “number
ten” we used to love.

The two 20-year-olds are compatible

midfielders with two different skillsets and they
open up the space for each other which allows
them to play together and bring their side’s
play on a whole new level. If they continue
their development in the same manner as they
started from the beginning of the second part
of the season, they will easily become key guys
in Serbian football, and high-value targets for
Europe’s top-flight teams.
Here we can see the standard initial setup of
This tactical analysis scout report will show you Red Star’s tactics with Petrović at the right
what are Nikolić and Petrović’s roles in the new defensive midfielder position and Nikolić
manager’s tactics and what are their biggest starting higher and closer to his forwards.
strengths that bring the spotlight to them and Although that is the most commonly their
point them out as the possible hottest goods in opening idea, this formation goes through a

94
lot of modifications throughout the match and
usually looks a little bit different with both of
the youngsters positioned higher in the half-
spaces, but with different tasks.

It is common for them to switch sides and don’t

play that strict in the left or right inner corridor.
Keeping everything in mind, Nikolić is time and
again the one player who comes to position
himself closer to the ball in the gaps on the
overloaded side due to his positioning skills
and good passing game. Meanwhile Petrović
goes to the further half-space from where he
provides an in-deep option or support to his
teammate.
In the picture above, there is an example of
their good cooperation in the high zones of the
pitch. They both tend to operate in the gaps
between the lines, with Nikolić feeling more
comfortable when his job is to assist from
these areas, and Petrović trying to run-in and
endanger the opponent’s goal. That leads to
the first of two playing mostly as a supportive
player who tracks down the actions of his team
brilliantly and provides his attackers with a non-
stop passing option after which he gets the
keys of the play progress to himself.

While the two of them are mostly close to the

action, wingers play widely and wait for them to
isolate them with passes from the midfielders.
The two young Serbs are good under pressure
and often manage to find forward passes when
they are in tough positions which enables Red
Star to play in the tight zones thrive.
Nikolić and Petrović often “work for each
other”, opening the passing lanes for one
another by dragging the opposition’s attention
to themselves. Those setups frequently happen
in the final third of the pitch where highly
positioned Njegoš commonly tries to occupy
the half-space in order to call defenders to
guard him while his playmaker breaks open in
the same position on the opposite side.
The number 22 senses the free space between
the opposition’s lines and comes closer to the
action so he could enable their attack to move
forward. He is also good at winning the second
balls out of similar setups. Whilst he still has
a lot to work on his physicalities, he has good
timing and doesn’t step up from the duel
against tougher players.
As we mentioned a few times before, Petrović
isn’t the player whose main strength is the
passing game - although he is not bad in it -

95
but it is the perfect sense for space and ability
to overlap down the full length of half-spaces
which makes him a great box-to-boxer. He,
on the other hand, has remarkable physical
skills and has a long step that enables him
to conquer the field both on and off the ball.
When positioned higher, he tends to go for the
space between the full-back and centre-back,
allowing his side an extra-option in the closing
stages of attacks.
R ed Star’s build-up play also changed with
Petrović’s body orientation helps him gain an
advantage in those situations. He positions
himself on the defender’s closer shoulder and
does a fast turn from where he goes directly
in the empty space in full steam leaving the
direct guard behind him and going into the
opportunity. A similar thing happens when he
is positioned even higher and waiting for the
long ball from his defenders. The midfielder
tries to gain an initial advantage by opening up
his body and sitting at the edge of an offside,
timing his run perfectly and getting the in-deep
balls in wider positions from where he mostly
goes for the inwards pass.
96
As we can see, Petrović created an advantage
over the direct guard in the half-space and
goes for a wide run to the flank from where
he’ll commonly provide assistish passes. The
defensive line is not perceivable in this image,
but the player is onside and waits for the right
moment to run-out, while we can also see
Nikolić dropping lower (no. 22) in order to drag
midfielders higher.
Midfield rotations
the manpower switch in the midfield as
they are now a more possession-oriented team,
although that claim is now only based on the
matches against weaker opponents they have
in the Serbian Super Liga. One way or another,
the “new wave“ midfield enabled them to play
more through the ground and to rely less on
their defensive block, but still keeping the good
work in the second-ball segment.
Their possession play is based on the midfield
rotations, with a clear pattern of midfield
line circulation. The main idea for Serbs is
to occupy inner corridors and set their play
through the half-spaces, with Petrović and
Nikolić playing the key parts positioning in
those areas after their initial setup goes into the
first transformation.
We have mentioned earlier in the analysis how
the roles of the two are different in the same
areas and here we can see their regular setup
against the teams that tend to defend against
them in the low block. Nikolić is often the one
that finds his track in those restricted zones,
from where he is the main supplier to both
Petrović and attackers.
The situation changes when the opposition
doesn’t sit that low on the pitch while off the
ball, and that leads Red Star into the second
tactics transformation, once again directed
by the youngster duo. The rotation that takes
place in those settings is seen as the line-
switching of their midfield players as the two
defensive midfielders move higher out of initial
setup (shown in the first picture in the analysis),
while the attacking midfielder drops lower in
order to become a deep-lying playmaker.
This is the pattern they use most commonly in
the build-up phase of the pitch, mostly because skillsets. We have pointed out clearly that
of Nikolić’s tendency to get involved in all the Nikolić is the one who pulls the creative strings
action around the field. He’s the guy who likes
to be in control and wants to take responsibility to exploit wounds in the opposing team’s
but also has a good penetrating pass which
makes him useful in those situations. On the
other hand, this setup allows Petrović to play
a little bit higher and wider in cooperation with
the winger and to come to his “favourite” zone
easier while not that guarded as he is when
he’s in the more central position.
In the picture above, it is clearly shown how
Nikolić’s motion triggers Petrović to go deeper
and wider. The attacking midfielder gets the ball
in a good situation to open up the progressive
attack, while the rotational movements of both
of them confuse the defence and leave both
of the midfielders free to get the ball. Petrović
then is a great forwarding option both with
regular or through-pass and Red Star’s game
thrives due to quite simple manoeuvres.
Midfield cooperation
in possession
T
wo young players brought the sunlight
to the variety of midfield options for Red
and Whites and supplied them with different
weapons in the offence due to their diverse
of his team and Petrović is the one who tries
structure with his runs and sense for space,
finally getting time and again in good goal-
threatening positions.
The youngsters communicate pretty well
and they know how to make the best of
their possibilities keeping, relying on their
strengths and covering weaknesses so the
number 22 mostly enters the gaps between
the midfield and defensive line of the rivals
attracting defenders’ attention to himself,
97
which commonly opens room for his mentioned
teammate to run in and get the ball in
dangerous zone.
As we can see, Petrović senses the space
at the edge of the box and utilizes Nikolić’s
well-timed pass after he’s made the surplus
situation for his side by dragging players to
guard him. The box-to-boxer of Red Star often
goes with shots from distance out of those
situations and that are some of the brightest
moments for their side because of his powerful
shot.
Although we said that Petrović’s passing game
isn’t his main weapon, he is arguably good
in that segment and knows how to break the
lines of the opponent’s defensive structure,
but doesn’t do it that often. If the situation
opens up for him to get the ball with no guards
around him, he loosens up a bit and gets
more creative, with the final intention of going
forward and being included in the action-
finishing.
98
Njegoš positions himself as shown above from
time to time and mostly plays a one or two-
touch game in those setups. His main idea is to
get the ball to his higher teammates - usually
Nikolić - and to continue his motion towards
the final third where he expects a return-ball,
or just goes as a help provider. He goes around
the opponent who comes to attack him, like it
is pointed out, and pulls up great supportive
runs from those settings.
The cooperation of the two happens mostly in
the areas similar to the one in the picture, and
they try to break the opponents through the
central corridor with direct forward passes. In
those scenarios, Petrović is commonly the one
who sends line-breaking passes and Nikolić
positions himself higher and tries to enable
forward play with his fast turns, due to his good
ball control and quick feet, or to play a fast
pass that will allow their action to continue.
In the image, Njegoš finds Nikolić in a position
in which he has a difficult possible 3v1
matchup, but trusts his teammate because he
knows his skills. Nikolić does a fast turn which
leads him into the open position between the
lines and thrives Red Star’s progressive play.
The two of them brought a lot of surprise
factors to Stanković’s tactics and made it
possible for the team to sometimes rely on
individual skills of players, and not only on
tactical patterns.
 in those corridors. However, he often creates
defensive surpluses with his teammates on the
Defensive inclusion flanks by coming closer and doing pretty much
the same motions to stop the backward play.

A fter changing the manager, Red Star went

through the biggest identity switch when
it comes to defensive action. Under Milojević,
they felt comfortably defending in the low block
and relying on fast transitions as their main
weapons, especially in international games.
But, today it seems that they’ve changed the
approach and went to defending in a central
block with a tendency to go higher, in the
structure in which midfield duo plays a huge
role.
Nikolić from time to time creates 3v1 situations
In those setups, Nikolić plays as an “opposition together with winger and Petrović in the shown
progress director”, who channels the player areas of the pitch, basically caging the player
with the ball to go into well-organised traps set with the ball and leaving him with no options.
up by the lower teammates and himself. He Petrović’s motions are of great importance in
mostly calls the centre-back to enter the higher these positions as he provides the trio with
zone with the ball at his feet, by closing him necessary help while still keeping an eye on the
the potential wide-option and letting him feel player who tries to run behind him.
comfortable in the first few steps, after which
he covers him from behind, while Petrović and Also, in the opening stages of opposition’s
other midfielder do the “dirty job” of tackling. attacks, oftentimes happens that the two of
them guard the “first-pass” of the opposing
team by closing down the passing lanes
towards the defensive midfielders who will
enable forward play.

Here we can see how Nikolić’s motions close

down the possible flank progress for the
opposition and force defenders to enter the
trap zone where the other two midfielders are
waiting, prepared to outnumber technically In the image above we see a pattern of their
weaker opponents. These scenarios habitually defending in those scenarios. Nikolić goes
happen in the central areas of the pitch with low-level pressure on the player with the
because Red Star’s playmaker usually operates ball closing his first progress option with his

99
shadow and forcing him to turn to the central ones to hold Serbia’s national team midfield for
areas for his next pass, whilst Petrović goes the years to come.
aggressively in high-speed pressure towards
the other midfielder leaving him no room in the
short amount of time after he went for pressing.

Those movements are well-planned and the

two youngsters repeat them frequently closing
down the potential progress for opponents.
Their inclusion in out-of-possession play is
different because Nikolić is more of a “hook
thrower” for a player with the ball as he forces
him to go into the traps, while Petrović is the
muscles due to his physical abilities, well-timed
tackles and aggressiveness.

Conclusion
D ejan Stanković brought new ideas to
Serbian Marakana and set his tactics in
order to profit from the youngsters. That made
a huge room for the inspiring duo of Veljko
Nikolić and Njegoš Petrović to show all they
got and get the action they needed for a long
time. On such short notice, they’ve shown how
good they are and, more importantly, how good
they could become, pointing out that Red Star
has two possibly very lucrative gems in them.

They fit each other because of their different

skillsets and complement each other’s flaws,
which makes them interesting to analyse.
With the add-on of one responsible defensive
midfielder, their biggest strengths would
become even clearer and they will thrive, which
will possibly lead Red Star to become one of
the most exciting teams to watch in this part of
Europe.

If they continue their development in the same

way they started it, the two midfielders could
easily become the next big transfers coming
out from the academy that created Luka Jović
and Marko Grujić, and also they could be the

100
 Theory:

The use of asymmetrical shapes in possession

BY MAX BERGMANN // @MaxBergmnn

101
F ootball offers a lot of different attacking
tactics, and whereas the concept of
overloads and the approach of positional play
have become quite popular, asymmetrical
shapes are a less popular phenomenon
although they do offer some potential.
Asymmetrical shapes are often used as a
combination of positional play and overloads.
In this case, the overloads are not created
through heavy shifting towards a certain area,
but the shape creates a natural and constant
overload in a certain area of the pitch.
This tactical analysis deals with the
advantages and disadvantages of the usage
of asymmetrical shapes. Therefore, we are
going to reveal the tactical consequences of
asymmetrical shapes and take a look at some
teams, such as Peter Bosz’s Bayer Leverkusen
using this concept.
often lineup so-called hybrid players taking
over a different position during the attacking
phase, then when defending or vice versa.
A common example for a hybrid player
are wingers who act as central offensive
midfielders in possession. Although pressing
and defending out wide, they move inside
during the possession phase. Tottenham’s
Christian Eriksen is one example. Eriksen’s
playmaking abilities can help Tottenham in
possession. Therefore, the Danish attacking
midfielder acts centrally during the attacking
phase. In Tottenham’s Champions League final
against Liverpool, this created an asymmetrical
shape as can be seen below.

Asymmetrical shapes
with hybrid players
T here are several reasons for the usage of
an asymmetrical shape. One of the most
common reasons is the fact that a team is lined
Whereas their left side was occupied by two
players, their right side was only occupied by
right-back Kieran Trippier as Eriksen moved
up with different player types. For instance, inside.
while one full-back might like to move forward
on the wing during the attacking phase, the As a consequence, Tottenham overloaded
other one might be a better build-up player the centre of the pitch and Liverpool had to
in deeper areas. As a consequence, it can be heavily shift in order to defend Tottenham
sensible to avoid forcing players into roles when they attacked down their left side. In this
they are not able to fulfil and instead use their particular case, the outcome was not great
strengths by giving them a role that suits their since Liverpool are following a ball-oriented
skill set. defending approach anyways, and Trippier was
not a big threat after switches.
Often, asymmetrical shapes are used to define
the area of action for full-backs and wingers.
Whether they mainly act within the half-space
or on the flank can make a huge difference.
When teams use asymmetrical shapes, they

102

Against a space-oriented
defending approach
A ny action in football is followed by a
consequence. The same goes for the
usage of asymmetrical shapes. If the attacking
side deploy an asymmetrical structure, the
defending side are forced to a reaction. Either
they will attempt to adjust their shape in order
to still gain a numerical superiority or at least
equality in certain areas, or they will have
to defend with fewer numbers. A change in
shape is not always made by the coach but
can also happen due to the players’ behaviour.
A central midfielder, for instance, could shift
further towards one side intentionally due to the
positioning of the opponents.
When using an asymmetrical shape against a
space-oriented defensive side, the opposition
might not adjust their defensive shape
though. As a result, it is possible to create
natural overloads on one side while having an
underload on the other side. Below, we can
see how the team in possession have a 4v3
numerical superiority on the ball side. This is
a result of their asymmetrical shape with two
wide players on the left and only one player on
the right side.
Depending on the opposition defending
qualities, one can then either play into the area
103
with a numerical advantage straight away or
attempt to decoy the opposition by playing
into the underloaded area followed by a quick
switch of play.
Against a man-oriented
defending approach
T he more man-oriented the defending
approach though, the bigger is the impact
on the defensive shape. Logically, when
defending man-to-man, the defending players
follow their direct opponent. As a result, they
automatically mirror the opposition shape,
whether asymmetrical or not and therewith
create a numerical equality in most areas of the
pitch (most sides provide one more player than
the opposition within the backline).
So why should asymmetrical shapes be
advantageous against man-oriented defending
approaches then? Simply because one can
provoke isolated 1v1 situations, ideally with
so-called “mismatches” within certain areas.
A “mismatch”, in this context, means that one
player is clearly superior to his direct opponent.
If deploying a skilful and fast winger on one
side of the pitch, it can be advantageous to
drag opponents to the other side in order to
isolate the 1v1 with the biggest “mismatch”.
Although the man-oriented defending approach
can lead to more space for the mismatch,
the creation of a “mismatch” also works
against a space-oriented defending approach.
Leverkusen against Werder Bremen, for
example, deployed Karim Bellarabi (#38) wide
on the right side with right-back Lars Bender
(#8) staying deep during the build-up. As the
graphic below proves, Bellarabi received a lot
of passes near the touchline. This allowed the
fast winger to utilise his dribbling abilities in a
“mismatch” against Bremen’s left-back.

Especially in build-up against a man-oriented
pressing, asymmetrical shapes can be very
useful. By keeping one full-back deeper, the
opposition winger will need to move higher
during the press.
As displayed in the graphic above, this creates
more space out wide and might even open up
diagonal passing lanes towards the winger.
Possible disadvantages
As we have already discussed the advantages
of asymmetrical shapes, it is quite obvious
where the disadvantages of this concept
lay. The advantage of having a numerical
superiority in one area of the pitch can
quickly turn into the disadvantage of being
outnumbered in another area. This can lead
to the struggle to sustain possession in the
underloaded area or the threat to be caught
with inferior numbers in a certain area after
losing the ball. Therefore, it is not a big surprise
that most sides using asymmetrical shapes
are dominant in possession and often possess
superior individual players.
104
Moreover, the success of an asymmetrical
shape is dependent on the opposition. By
lining up another defender than expected,
for instance, the opposition might turn a
“mismatch” around.
Depending on how the asymmetrical shape is
formed, it could also decrease space.
Leverkusen’s shape against RB Leipzig, for
example, did not offer enough width. With
no real left-winger, Leverkusen had no option
to switch play and therefore struggled to
penetrate a centrally focused Leipzig side.
As one can see on the graphic above,
Leverkusen’s shape against Leipzig did not
provide a left attacking side. That led to a
predictability and a reduction of space which
made it difficult for them to overcome Leipzig’s
pressing.
Conclusion
A ll in all, asymmetrical shapes can create a
huge advantage. The concept enables to
use players in their preferred roles while also
holding the advantage to purposefully create
numerical superiorities or inferiorities in certain
areas of the pitch.
Nevertheless, the usage of a constantly
asymmetrical shape requires the ability to
sustain possession as it also possesses
weaknesses with its underloads in certain
areas. Therefore, it is a tactical tool which is
mainly utilised by top sides and which is more
complex than the positional play or attacking
overloads.

105
 Werder Bremen:

Where is it going wrong?

BY NIKLAS HEMMER-HILTENKAMP // @NiklasHemmer

106

“We want to
go to Europe.”
T
his quote comes from Werder Bremen’s
sporting director Frank Baumann at a
press conference before the start of the
season. Despite the loss of key player Max
Kruse, Werder Bremen started with ambitious
goals into the season and wanted to qualify
for the Europa League next year with attractive
offensive football. However, after the worst
first half of a season in their history and a bad
start into the second half, relegation is closer
than ever. It’s everything but an exaggeration
to say that Bremen’s season has gone from
unlucky to very, very ugly. This didn’t happen in
the blink of an eye but was the result of many
circumstances and bad developments. Even
Florian Kohfeldt, Germany’s highly praised
coach of the year 2019, seems to be helpless.
The question that arises: What’s going wrong at
Werder Bremen and how could things turn out
so dramatically?
What actually happened?
A fter an exciting season with many
highlights, Werder Bremen just missed
out on 7th place in the 2018/2019 season,
which would have entitled them to the Europa
League. The squad of Florian Kohfeldt
performed an entertaining offensive football,
not comparable to their rudderless style a year
before. Kohfeldt showed his tactical versatility
by using a 4-diamond-2, 3-5-2 or his preferred
4-3-3. Many players like Maximilian Eggestein,
Milot Rashica or even Max Kruse have seen
massive improvements under him.
However, despite their good season, Bremen
107
had a very tough summer. With Max Kruse
they lost not only their captain but the decisive
player of the team - the linchpin of their attack.
The whole system of Kohfeldt was designed
around him as the focal point. What made it
even worse: They didn’t get anything in return
as he left on a free transfer. And after nine years
without income from European competitions,
Werder just didn’t have a lot of money to
spend.
While Michael Gregoritsch was identified
as their favoured successor of Kruse, they
eventually couldn’t afford him. Consequently,
they decided to not buy another player, but
stick with those at hand and hope that Yuya
Osako can make the next step in a new
role. And this is – in many ways – where the
problems started.
Osako was just one of many players that
suffered from injuries throughout the first half
of the season. Already at the beginning of the
season, Kohfeldt had to constantly reorganise
his team. This also led to the last-minute
transfers of Leonardo Bittencourt and Michael
Lang.
Among so many injury problems, Kohfeldt’s
squad has never looked less cohesive. The
coach tried to focus on what was happening
on the pitch. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied
that injury problems played a significant role
throughout the season. Especially in defense,
he was struggling to field a consistent side
because his players were dropping like flies.
In addition, many players were running after
their form for a long time as there were no
alternatives. The best example for that is
Eggestein, who was one of the rising stars
last year. Having played the U21-European-
Championship in the summer, he hasn’t
had much time to recover and could rarely
convince.
What Expected Goals say
E ven though Werder Bremen lost their
first two matches of the season against
Düsseldorf and Hoffenheim, their start, in
general, was actually not that bad. They quickly
recovered from these losses and established
themselves in the lower midfield of the league
table. They were far from touching upon the
Europa League ranks, but few could have
guessed that the situation would deteriorate so
dramatically.
With that in mind, it might make sense to look
at Bremen’s season from two perspectives.
During the first 13 matches of the season,
Bremen have a slightly positive xG-Difference
(0.26). During the ten matches since then,
their xG-Difference is -10.94. Having been
unlucky at the beginning of the season, they
have become really, really bad. In their last
ten matches, they were outscored by every
opponent according to xG. The opponents
during this period included almost all direct
competitors such as Mainz 05, Paderborn or
Düsseldorf.

Defensively, one can also spot a difference

When looking at the development of their comparing the first 13 and the next ten
league position, it’s apparent that it was after matches. However, the difference is not that
the match against Wolfsburg where things significant as offensively and strongly affected
started to rattle. Bremen just got a highly by the humiliating losses against Bayern and
important win at Wolfsburg after eight matches Mainz. Using the xG-metric, it becomes clear
without a win. Up next, they had to face that Bremen have actually defended even
Paderborn and wanted to build upon this result, better than the raw numbers suggest. In fact,
finally starting to climb up the table. As we now they have the 11th lowest xGA-figure in the
know, this didn’t work out but ended up in a league with 35.24. The numbers show: Bremen
last-minute win for Paderborn – their first of the have conceded almost 18 goals more than
season. expected, which points down to a mix of bad
luck and very efficient opponents.
This development can be illustrated very well
by taking a look at their Expected Goals and
Expected Goals Against trendlines as shown
below. While everything looked alright at first,
things became apparently worse after a while.

108
 defensive stability.

The match, where this approach became really

visible for the first time was against Cologne.
What happened was a very deep-lying Bremen
team, which only focused on defending. This
resulted in a partly bizarre first-half, in which
Cologne - at that time also strongly in danger
of relegation – had temporarily 89% ball
possession.
Offensively, the decline is even more significant:
While they scored 1.35 xG/game before the
match against Paderborn, they only averaged
0.67 xG/game since then. In addition, they only
created two chances, that can be considered
as high-quality ones (>0.3). One might
speculate that these numbers are presumably a
result from the shift in focus - trying to stabilize
the defense - and the increased uncertainty
within the club.

In the winter, sporting director Frank Baumann

Defensive struggles made an effort to address that issue with
the acquisition of former Hoffenheim captain

W erder Bremen have traditionally never

been very good defensively. It might
sound counterintuitive, but based on the
numbers we just discussed, Bremen have
actually never looked that bad defensively this
season. In 2018/2019, they averaged 1.58 xGA/
game, which means that they were even better
for most parts this season. Don’t get me wrong:
Even 1.58 xGA/game last year was everything
but a good figure, but maybe things have been
slightly overrated.
Kevin Vogt. With this transfer, Florian Kohfeldt
seemed to have settled on a 5-3-2/5-2-3 as the
new system to strengthen the defense.
In fact, their defensive structure in 2020 looks
very similar to the one we just saw. Especially
against individually stronger opponents,
Kohfeldt’s team tries to minimize the spaces in
the midfield and block the passing lanes into
central areas.

To point that out further, we have to look back

at the first half of the season. Until the win
against Wolfsburg, they conceded 1.32 xGA/
game. They were just unlucky and suffered
from individual mistakes, having actually
conceded 2.15 goals/game. When the heavy
defeats against Bayern and Mainz came on
top of that, Kohfeldt and his team felt forced
to change something and focused solely on

109
In some ways, this “Safety-First” approach
has worked so far. For the most part, Bremen
defends solidly, with good distances between
defense and midfield. It’s quite remarkable
that in 6/7 matches in the second half of the
season, Bremen didn’t concede a goal within
the first 45 minutes. However, as soon as an
opponent exerts considerable pressure, you
can see the uncertainty within the team that
leads to them dropping too far and acting
too passively. The example below against
Augsburg illustrates that. They ultimately
conceded two goals and lost the game despite
their lead at half-time.
As we’ve just seen, Werder have been
consistent in conceding significantly more
goals than expected this season. It’s possible
that much of this is the fault of Jiri Pavlenka,
who has never looked impressive in the shot-
stopping numbers. Instead, his numbers this
season make for ugly reading. Pavlenka ranks
second to bottom among Bundesliga starting
goalkeepers for overall save percentage
(56.7%). This means a drastic decrease
compared to last year (71.2%). It gets even
worse when looking at his post-shot expected
goals minus goals allowed. According to this
figure, he is the worst goalkeeper in the league,
having allowed 11.8 goals (0.51 per game)
more than the average goalkeeper would have
been expected to. To put it differently: in every
second match, he concedes a goal through a
shot he should have saved.
110
Talking about Bremen and their defensive
issues, one inevitably comes across their high
susceptibility at set-pieces, a major concern
throughout the season. Bremen conceded 18
goals after set-pieces - most in the Bundesliga.
Whether it was man marking, zonal marking or
a mixture of both: they tried it all, but nothing
helped. However, set pieces have essentially
nothing to do with the general approach of
a team. This leads us again to the question
whether it was even necessary to focus so
much on defense and neglect the offensive
part. Furthermore, this is a problem that can
only be attributed to Florian Kohfeldt to a
limited extent. It is usually the assistant coach
who takes care of set pieces and Werder hired
Ilia Gruev specifically for this before the season.
Offensive struggles
A s indicated, it’s the attacking side, though,
where it looks really dramatic. One goal
(Rashica against Bayern) in the last ten games
clarifies the issue. In 2020, Bremen haven’t
scored a goal at all but profited from two own
goals against Düsseldorf and Augsburg. In
other words: they didn’t score a goal for 784
minutes. If we think of the relatively good xG-
numbers at the beginning of the season this
is surprising in many ways and leaves one
wondering.
Bremen’s approach under Kohfeldt is usually
very much focused on central areas of the
pitch. Whenever Kohfeldt opts in for three
strikers, it’s mostly Yuya Osako who plays as
a false nine and drops deep to support the
build-up. The other strikers position themselves
relatively narrowly so that a 4-3-3 can quickly
become a 4-diamond-2. The picture below
stems from the first match of the season
against Düsseldorf.

Despite the switch to three at the back, their
build-up-approach has only slightly changed.
Now, they frequently line up in 5-2-3 in
possession. However, this can vary at times,
when one of the strikers drops deep to form a
triangle in midfield.
Their general approach in possession still
remains very similar – even in those difficult
times. The main problem of Kohfeldt’s squad,
however, are the offensive transition moments.
Their style of play is no longer designed to act
out of possession but to use quick counter-
attacks to exploit the opponent’s defense. That
being said, Bremen are currently far too rarely
able to implement these tactics and find the
right balance between offense and defense.
These problems could be seen in the game
against FC Augsburg when they took the lead
but were way too passive in the second half,
lacking any offensive action. We’ve already
seen the example below, but it perfectly
illustrates how deep Bremen dropped at times,
having all players within 30 meters in front of
111
their own goal. Thus, it was very difficult to do
anything offensively.
The next example also puts emphasis on
Bremen’s problems in transition moments: the
distances between the deep-lying midfield and
the relatively high-positioned strikers. As the
other players don’t support their attackers, they
are clearly outnumbered, eventually leading to
another harmless long-range shot from Milot
Rashica.
Rashica is a good example. It’s widely known
that he’s the most talented and apparently
most dangerous player, not only when it
comes to counter attacks. He’s speedy, good
at dribbles, and currently their most prolific
goal scorer. This brings us to the problem.
The Kosovan is a very good player, but he’s
certainly not the only player that you want to
rely on when it comes to scoring goals. He
only amasses 0.06 NPxG/Shot, which can be
explained by his strange shot locations.
Nonetheless, it would be too easy to blame
his shot selection solely on him. Especially in
previous games, it’s also a lack of support of
his teammates when Bremen tries to attack
as shown above. Still, it might not be the best
solution to always shoot from outside the box,
but given the circumstances, it can be partially
explained and is a general problem of Bremen.
The lack of creating high-quality chances at
all paired with the incapacity to convert the
chances at hand is further illustrated in the
graph beneath. Especially Bremen’s finishing
is horrendous, only converting 6.82% of their
shots.
Despite all justified criticism, however,
Bremen has also shown some quite decent
approaches. Especially against Leipzig, there
were some good moments in transition when
Osako was able to protect the ball upfront and
then pass to one of the wingers Rashica or
Bittencourt.
112
Also, the support of the midfielders was
appropriate in this situation. Thus, Bremen
were able to create numerical equality in the
penalty area and create a dangerous situation.
What about
Florian Kohfeldt?
T o understand things that are currently
going on in Bremen, one might need a bit
of background information about the club.
If you’re in your mid 20’s like me, you will
probably remember some of the legendary
European nights with players like Ailton, Johan
Micoud or Diego. However, the last European
Cup match of Bremen goes back to the 7th of
December 2010 when they beat Inter Milan 3-0
in their own stadium. Since then, Bremen has
been more concerned with the fight against
relegation in most seasons. Until Florian
Kohfeldt was promoted from the second team
to head coach in autumn 2017.
Now, for the first time since his promotion,
Kohfeldt’s position is being questioned and
potential successors are being discussed.
At least in the media. Within the club,
notwithstanding the bad results, he still enjoys
the confidence of sporting director Baumann
and the board around chairman Marco
Bode. Considering their league position and
especially the negative trend, this might seem
completely ridiculous to some people. Any
other coach would almost certainly have been
fired by now.
But the story with Kohfeldt is different – he is
the identification figure of Bremen’s upturn.
That’s not only because of his tactical qualities
as a coach but also because of his charisma
and his positive appearance. After years in the
no-man’s-land of the table, he has given the
club hope and confidence in a better future
like for many years in the 2000s under Thomas
Schaaf.
Nevertheless, at some point, he too will be
judged by the performance on the pitch and
the results. Florian Kohfeldt’s Werder always
stood for bold and attractive offensive football:
high pressing, sophisticated build-up through
the midfield, and quick combinations.
However, there is not much left of this style
and it seems as if Kohfeldt is still searching
for the right approach to turn things around.
Nevertheless, the coach still enjoys a high level
of trust and has shown, e.g. in the cup, that he
still has ideas and solutions.
1980. They’re simply not good enough right
now. This, to be fair and offer glimmers of hope
is also true to Fortuna Düsseldorf, their current
main competitor.
That being said, now it’s up to Florian Kohfeldt
and his squad to turn things around. For the
first time of the season, he finally got his whole
squad together, apart from the long-term
injured Niclas Füllkrug. This opens up new
opportunities. Much will depend on how they
manage to regain their offensive strength and
thus find the right balance between defensive
stability and quick transition moments. Another
glimmer of hope: They have already shown how
it can work when they beat Borussia Dortmund
in the DFB Pokal.
By the time this article is published, Bremen
will have already played against Hertha BSC
Berlin, a club that has to deal with their own
problems. The importance of this match cannot
be higher and will give us a clearer idea of the
direction Werder Bremen will take: Rescue or
Relegation?

Conclusion
F or a long time, Bremen seemed to be
a team that can be branded “too good
to go down”. However, based upon their
previous results – and, in particular, their poor
goalscoring numbers, Bremen are in real
danger to get relegated for the first time since

113
Arsenal WFC:

Analysis of their build out phase

BY MATT DORMAN // @coach_dorman

114
E xciting times are evident in the FAWSL,
average attendances have more than tripled
for the 2019/20 season compared to 2018/19
and three teams are currently in a 3-way battle
for the title. Arsenal are one of these three title
challengers, currently lying in third place with
36 points from 15 games, 4 points behind
leaders Manchester City and 3 points behind
second-placed Chelsea.
Arsenal are the FAWSL reigning champions
having lifted the trophy during the 2018/19
season with 54 points from the 20 games,
ending 7 points ahead of runners-up
Manchester City and 12 ahead of Chelsea.
Arsenal’s principles of play under Australian
born head coach, Joe Montemurro, are very
consistent and include looking to dominate
possession of the ball. Statistically, this is
demonstrated during the last four league
games with total possession statistics of 63.9%
(vs. Liverpool), 66.9% (vs. Manchester City),
56.9% (vs. Chelsea) and 71.1% (vs. Brighton
and Hove Albion).
In comparison to their opposition, Arsenal
attempt and complete substantially more total
passes. Here are the statistics: 603 passes
made at 78.8% accuracy vs. Liverpool who
made 333 at 68.2% accuracy. 633 passes
made at 82.3 accuracy vs. Manchester City
who made 424 passes at 78.3% accuracy. 526
passes made at 77.0% accuracy vs. Chelsea
who made 420 passes at 70.2% accuracy. 740
passes made at 86.9% completion vs. Brighton
& Hove Albion who attempted 382 passes and
completed only 71.5%. (source: wslstats.org).
Arsenal, therefore, provide a good opportunity
for tactical analysis during the build-out phase
in possession. This analysis piece will focus on
the system, tactics and individual player roles/
responsibilities of Arsenal when in possession
and attacking from the defensive and middle
thirds.
115
Arsenal: flexibility in
system, consistent in
principles of play
A rsenal traditionally implement a 1-4-3-3
initial system which is fluid in structure
allowing for one single or, depending on
the opposition and game situation, two
double central midfield pivots to support in
thebuild-outt phase. However, head coach
Joe Montemurro is also very flexible in using
alternate systems and the responsibilities for
each player. Although alternating systems,
Arsenal do not compromise on their principles
of play (tactics) and remain very consistent.
For example, against Chelsea, Arsenal began in
a 1-4-4-2 system with Jill Roord pushing higher
up the field to combine with Vivianne Miedema
when attacking and to be able to press with a
front two. In this game, the traditional #10, Kim
Little, was responsible for the left half-space in
the middle third, with width provided by the left
defender Katie McCabe. On the right, Danielle
van de Donk occupied a wider role within the
midfield four.
When facing Brighton, Arsenal implemented
an alternate 1-3-3-3-1 approach and finally,
vs. Manchester City a more ‘traditional’ 1-4-
3-3 (1-4-2-3-1) approach was taken with
high wide defenders, fluid midfield three
and wide forwards positioned in the interior
channels. The diagram below shows the
average positions of Arsenal vs Brighton and
Arsenal vs Manchester City, providing context
to the variations and flexibility in system
implementation. Leah Williamson has been a
specific player that has provided consistency
within these alternating systems with a team
high of 15 matches played with 15 starts.
 goal kick, the goalkeeper passing after making
a save, or with an outfielder in possession
after the team has won possession of the ball
(attacking transition). Arsenal during this initial
stage require a passing option to a player in
possession that can ‘ideally’ face forward, a
‘free’ player. For this to occur, Arsenal look
to create numerical superiority. This is when
Arsenal have one additional player in that
zone of the field compared to their opponents.
This is straightforward when attacking vs one
central forward. Arsenal split their central
defenders wide and a 3v1 is created, as evident
in the diagrams below.

Left 1-3-3-3-1 v. Brighton and right 1-4-2-3-

1 vs Manchester City. Comparative average
position (maps credit: wyscout).

What is the
build-out phase?
It is important to start with a clear definition
of the ‘build-out phase’ which will provide a
starting reference for analysis of the tactics
3v1 generating the first pass vs one central
forward (credit: wyscout).

employed by Arsenal. For the purpose of this

article the ‘build-out phase’ will be referred to
as any period where Arsenal are in possession
of the ball in their defensive half of the field
and are attempting to eliminate/progress the
ball past the first (oppositions attackers) or
second (oppositions midfield) lines of pressure.
The opposition can be either a) organized
(defending phase) or b) disorganized (during
negative transition phase). 3v1 generating the first pass vs one central
forward.

Generating the When playing against two central forwards

(1-4-4-2 pressing system), this can create an
first passing option initial problem as a 2v2 situation and numerical
parity is initially evident on the first line. An

T he initial stage of the buildup play can

include the goalkeeper passing from a
opposition can create two pressing forwards
in two different ways. Achieved by utilizing one

116
centre forward and a pressing central midfielder
(generally this is within a 1-4-3-3 system) or
two pressing natural central forwards (1-4-4-2
pressing system).
In order to combat this numerical parity,
Arsenal carry out several potential strategies.
One option Arsenal have implemented vs the
pressing front two is to position one central
defender into the central channel, with the
aim of ‘fixing’ one of the oppositions central
forward, flattening one wide defender and
essentially looking to build out with an initial
defensive line of three in an asymmetrical
build-up shape. This has the added benefit vs
a 1-4-4-2 system of potentially drawing of the
oppositions wide midfielder from a compact
midfield shape in order to eliminate the first line
of pressure and progress through the second.
A second option, as demonstrated vs Brighton
and in the diagram below, is to implement and
attack in a back three system. Both options
create a 3v2 situation against the first line of
pressure.
Generating the first pass vs two central
forwards – moving the central defender into
the central channel and dropping the wide
defender.
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Generating the first pass vs two central
forwards – implementing a back three system.
Ball progression
N ow that Arsenal have a player in
possession of the ball facing forward, the
next aim is to progress the ball and eliminate
opposition lines of pressure. This is achieved
through both positional rotations and positional
superiority.
Arsenal use their central forward effectively
during the build-out phase when the opponent
is marking player to player tightly through the
midfield. Arsenal draw out the midfield marking
players, open the passing line into the checking
forward and create an overload in midfield. This
not only provides a supporting passing option
but can also eliminate both the first and second
lines of pressure.
In the below diagram, Arsenal are attacking in
a 1-4-3-3 shape matched up against Liverpool
who are defending in a 1-4-3-3 shape with
tight marking in midfield. Jordan Nobbs,
Danielle van de Donk and Leah Williamson are
tightly marked in midfield but have opened the
passing line into the checking central forward,
Vivianne Miedema. This has created a passing
option for the central defender Louise Quinn
and drawn Liverpool’s central defender out of
compact shape.
 pressing strategy. If the opponent follows the
central midfielder into the outside channel,
this opens space centrally for another Arsenal
midfielder to receive. If they do not follow,
Arsenal can easily find this free rotating player
who can face forward and move the ball into
the next line of pressure.

Positional superiority refers to being ‘better’

Central forward checking into midfield to create positioned than the opponent in order to
an overload and provide a supporting passing progress the ball. The principles of play
option (credit: wyscout). implemented from Arsenal in order to generate
positional superiority include width, depth,
Another similar tactical positional rotation that height, support and spacing behind the
Arsenal implement is movement from the wide opponent. One of the examples of positional
forwards checking deeper and into midfield. superiority is provided by the width of the full-
This option is executed when the opposition backs. When facing an opposition wide player
wide forwards are defending outside and have that is positioned infield in order to deny a
left a passing lane open more vertical and into more vertical pass, Arsenal will position their
the interior channels. The diagram below shows wide defenders very high and wide in order to
Arsenals left central defender in possession be able to receive a diagonal pass behind their
passing into the left forward with 3v3 in central direct opponent.
midfield (tightly marked) and the oppositions
wide forward allowing the vertical pass. In the diagram, Arsenals wide defender Leonie
Maier has received a pass from Louise Quinn
behind the left forward of Liverpool due to her
positional play and can progress the ball past
the first line of pressure. The second diagram
is an example vs Brighton in which Leah
Williamson has been able to receive the ball
wide and high and thus eliminate the first line of
Brighton’s pressing.

Wide forward checking into midfield to provide

overload and supporting passing option.

Also observed is the rotation of one of the

central midfielders into the wide channel. This
occurs after the wide defender has emptied the
space of any opposition defenders by moving
higher up the field. When the central midfielder
rotates into the now free outside channel, Positional superiority of Arsenal right defender.
Arsenal have two options and the decision Able to receive ball eliminating Liverpool’s right
chosen will be based on the oppositions forward (Credit: wyscout).

118
Positional superiority of Arsenal right defender.
Able to receive ball eliminating the Brighton’s
right forward (Credit: wyscout).
Another example of positional superiority is
the positional play of the defensive midfielder
when Arsenal are attacking vs two pressing
forwards. The defensive midfielder will position
themselves behind the two pressing two
forwards and with the goalkeeper to create a
4v2 diamond shape. If the central defenders
have space and time to face forward, the
pivot player has the potential to receive the
ball unopposed. The problem is the pressing
forwards pressing shadow could eliminate this
passing option. Arsenals defensive midfielder
must, therefore, recognize the pressing shadow
and move underneath or ahead depending on
the angle of the press.
Positional superiority of Arsenal’s defensive
midfielder to receive behind the first line of
pressure.
119
Positional superiority of Arsenal’s defensive
midfielder to receive behind the first line of
pressure.
The third example of positional superiority is
provided by the role of the attacking central
midfielders. These players attempt to receive
the ball in between the oppositions defensive
and midfield line. This is a ‘blind spot’ for the
opposition’s midfielders. In the diagram, Jill
Roord is positioned to receive a pass from
Lia Walti with space to be able to turn, face
forward and attacking into the attacking half of
the field.
Positional superiority of Arsenal’s attacking
midfielders to position between the midfield
and defensive lines and be able to receive the
ball facing forward (credit: wyscout)
Struggles versus a 1-4-4-2
pressing diamond midfield
C helsea proved a very difficult opponent
for Arsenal to build out against and
initiate their attacking play. In their last FAWSL
meeting on Jan 19th, 2020, Chelsea ran out Pressing in a 1-4-4-2 Diamond (credit:
4-1 winners, racing 3-0 ahead inside the first 20 wyscout).
minutes.

In order to provide Arsenal problems during

the build-out phase, Chelsea utilized two
athletic central forwards in Sam Kerr & Bethany
England to apply high pressure to Arsenals
two central defenders, Louise Quinn and Leah
Williamson. This limited Arsenals ability to
create numerical superiority, a passing option
for the goalkeeper and to progress easily within
the first line of pressure. Pressing in a 1-4-4-2 diamond.

Key to Chelsea’s pressing strategy and

difficulty for Arsenal to break down was the
diamond midfield, using Ji So-yun onto the
single pivot, Lia Walti. The wide defenders,
Katie McCabe and Victoria Schnaderbeck were
covered by Chelsea wide midfielders, Guro
Reitan and Erin Cuthbert.
Although Arsenal had numerical superiority
in their own half of the field, the speed and
intensity of Chelsea’s pressing, the limiting of
the closest passing options and compactness
by moving the weak side midfielder infield
created numerous turnovers and lead to
Chelsea developing a lead that they could
hold for the rest of the game. The 1-4-4-2
diamond matches up well against Arsenal if the
players within this system are quick enough to
rotate into defensive shape and shift marks.
The diagram shows the closing down of the
closest passing options of Chelsea when facing
Arsenal
Conclusion
I n conclusion, this tactical analysis
has identified the system, roles and
responsibilities and provided a description
of the principles of play of Arsenal and head
coach Joe Montemurro during the build-out
phase. Arsenal build-out by attempting to
create numerical and positional superiorities
through spacing and positional rotations.
Arsenal have also implemented numerous
systems whilst maintaining their principles of
play (tactics). Chelsea and the 1-4-4-2 diamond
pressing system has been identified as the
most effective pressing strategy and system
in order to disrupt the positive play of Arsenal
during the build-out phase.

120
Scout Report:

Maximiliano Moralez

BY RICHARD SCOTT // @RichScott285

121
A fter almost a decade in South America
and Europe, 2017 saw New York City
Football Club acquire Maximilliano Moralez
from Mexican Club León on a free transfer.
What an incredible deal it would turn out to be
for NYCFC. Since his arrival into Major League
Soccer in 2017, Moralez has played almost Image: Richard-Scott-3
every minute available for the club and has
become pivotal to the team’s success, racking
up 100 appearances for the club by the end of Maxi Moralez heatmap for the 2019 MLS
the 2019 season. season shows large influence in the left half-
space.
During this tactical analysis scout report of
Maxi Moralez, we’ll take a dive into what makes Notice in the image below how Moralez is
the Argentine so important to NYCFC and what able to position himself behind the midfield
tactics he employed that led him to have the structure of Columbus Crew. With a direct pass
MLS highest number of assists in the 2019 from centre-back to centre-forward and some
campaign. well-timed movement to support underneath
the ball, Moralez and NYCFC are now able to
exploit space and get in-behind.
Positioning &
Areas of influence
W hat’s interesting to observe with Maxi
Moralez’s general positioning, is even
though he typically plays in a number 10
position, he shows ability to operate across
the full width of the pitch and can be incredibly
dangerous in wide areas. He is often looking Image: Richard-Scott-6
to take up positions behind the opponents’ Moralez getting on the ball between the lines
midfield line of pressure with an aim to get allows NYCFC forwards to make promising runs
on the ball facing the opposition’s goal. From in pursuit of scoring chances.
these higher positions on the field, Moralez
is able to pull strings in the game and unlock
defences. From the heatmap below of the MLS
2019 season, it can also be seen that Moralez
Key Passes
is comfortable dropping deeper in order to pick
up the ball which helps NYCFC in the build-up
phase.
W hen analyzing Moralez’ key passes in
the 2019 MLS season, it’s clear to see
that he can be dangerous from almost any
position in the attacking half of the pitch. One
factor that does influence Moralez’ ability to
be so dangerous is the relationship he holds
with Valentin Castellanos. The pair have an
understanding that when Moralez picks up

122
the ball, Castellanos runs which is incredibly
simple, yet effective for both players and the
overall team function. With well-timed and
well-shaped runs, this certainly helps Moralez
in his ability to pull strings and create key
opportunities for NYCFC to score goals.
Image: Richard-Scott-2
Maxi Moralez key passes in 2019 show how
dangerous he can be from a variety of positions
on the pitch.
Finding runners
behind the backline
In the world of coaching getting in behind the
opposition, in theory, is relatively simple. Play
through the opposition, around them, or over
them. Where the theory becomes challenging is
application to the game moment.
First, a player must perceive their environment,
taking in critical information, before choosing
the best option. Then timing becomes
essential. The timing, angle and shape of a
teammates run to get in behind, along with the
timing and quality of technical execution from
the ball carrier, add complexity to successfully
getting players in behind.
Through countless hours and years of
experience, Maxi Moralez has mastered the
art of timing, execution and deception, which
has enabled him to gain more assists in Major
League Soccer than any other player in 2019.
123
The following images illustrate Moralez’ ability
to play through, around or over his opponents
which are all executed with exceptional levels
of deception, speed, timing and trajectory
(when playing over).
In this first image below, Moralez’ has timed
his pass to perfection. While carrying the ball
towards goal, Moralez observes both the run
of his teammate, as well as the momentum of
the left-back who is his immediate opponent
at the time. When the left-back hesitates for a
brief second and ‘freezes’, momentum is able
to shift which is when Moralez is able to slip the
ball down the outside of the full-back. At this
point in time, there is no chance the full-back
can recover in time and NYCFC are able to play
around the defensive block.
Image: Richard-Scott-4
Moralez’ timing of release allows NYCFC to
get in-behind by playing around the defensive
block.
In this next image, Moralez helps NYCFC get
in-behind the backline of Columbus Crew by
playing through the defensive block. As he
takes the ball in his stride moving forwards,
Moralez slips the ball through pressure by
splitting two defenders and playing the pass off
the front-foot. This allows him to apply disguise
to his pass and ultimately thread the ball
through the eye of a needle.
Image: Richard-Scott-5 Image: Richard-Scott-7

An excellently timed run and perfectly threaded Moralez is given time and space on the ball to
pass allowed NYCFC to get in-behind pick out a pass that unlocks Columbus.
Columbus.

During this tactical analysis scout report, one of

the most enjoyable aspects of Moralez’ game
to observe is his ability to clip a ball in behind
an organized defence and unlock the door for
NYCFC. Castellanos is always a willing runner
which helps Moralez significantly, however,
being able to get the trajectory of the pass to Image: Richard-Scott-8
be correct, along with applying disguise, is no
easy task. Having this ability is something that Again, Moralez unlocks an organized defence
very few players in the game possess, which is as he is given space on the ball facing forwards
what makes players like Maxi Moralez exciting with Castellanos eager to run in-behind.
to watch.

In the subsequent two images, Moralez unlocks

the door for NYCFC to get in-behind Columbus
Crew and Portland Timbers respectively. In
both situations, Moralez shows his exceptional
technical competence as a two-footed player,
playing both balls in-behind left-footed. A
nuance here is that before clipping the ball
over the backline, Moralez is moving laterally
across the field which enables him to play what
seems like almost a reversed pass. This adds
complexity to the technical execution which
makes it even more impressive to observe.
In addition, also notice how both teams are
relatively high in terms of the depth of the
backline which also helps Moralez.
Influencing play
from wide areas
A n area of Maxi Moralez game that is
somewhat non-traditional of a number 10
is how much to analyze how much influence
he has in wide areas. Typically attacking
midfielders would place more emphasis on
getting in the box and looking to add to the
scoresheet. Moralez, on the other hand, seems
more interested in delivering stunning balls into
the box and adding to his impressive assists
numbers.
With the ability to deliver high-quality crosses
into the box with either foot, Moralez has
become one of the leagues most dangerous
players from wide areas. With the tendency

124
to drift into the channels in search of crossing
opportunities, Moralez also helps NYCFC to
create numerical advantages in wide areas
while also pulling opponents out of areas they
are comfortable operating in.
Image: Richard-Scott-1
Maxi Moralez crosses during the 2019 MLS
season.
Putting the ball into ‘an area’ is the main focus
when delivering crosses for many players.
Maxi Moralez, on the other hand, is much
more deliberate than that. A part of how he
has become so influential in wide areas lies in
his ability to pick out key players or key areas
which help him to eliminate multiple defenders.
In the image below, Moralez identifies an area
with three NYCFC teammates inside of the
box as Sporting Kansas City are caught out
of balance and puts in a fantastic cross that
eliminates five opponents.
Image: Richard-Scott-9
An out-swinging right-footed cross proves
difficult to deal with for defending players and
Sporting KC’s goalkeeper alike.
125
The next image illustrates a different phase of
play as NYCFC develops an attack in open
play. Again Moralez has had his head up and
is able to identify space and the late-arriving
teammate on the top of the box. As Los
Angeles Football Club are retreating to protect
their goal, this cut-back cross helps to use the
defending players’ momentum against them
as they’re unable to change direction and
attack the ball before a shot is taken. The area
that Moralez puts the ball makes for another
excellent scoring chance for NYCFC.
Image: Richard-Scott-10
A cut-back cross to the top of the box makes
for an excellent scoring chance from an xG
perspective.
This next image focuses on vision. The black
radar shows how Moralez again plays with
his head up before looking to cross the ball
into the box. A perfectly executed cross leads
to another high-quality scoring chance for
NYCFC.
Image: Richard-Scott-11
Moralez again picks out a teammate with an
out-swinging cross against Columbus Crew.
 Defensive channelling
I t won’t be too much of a surprise to see that
where Moralez is not particularly strong is
in defensive actions. Traditionally, creative
attacking midfielders are not particularly
strong in defensive actions, however, the game
continues to evolve and the demand on players
in all phases of the game continues to increase.
For the Argentine, he wins only 12.7% of 1v1
defending situations and 19.2% of defensive
duels based on his 2019 WyScout report.
What Moralez does do, however, is help
NYCFC to direct play by preventing opponents
from playing through key players in the middle
of the pitch. Since Moralez’ defensive statistics
are not particularly strong, a tactic that could
be employed against NYCFC is to give the ball
to whoever Moralez is pressing and trust that
players’ ability to be press resistant in order to
help carry the ball out from the back.
Notice in the below image how Moralez
arrives late to put pressure on the opponents’
defensive midfielder. Teams who play into these
areas quickly may have an opportunity to build
out against Moralez with little pressure. Even if
Moralez was tighter, if teams can trust players
to take the ball in these situations against
Moralez, a successful duel would leave plenty
of space behind to exploit and could take
multiple NYCFC players out of the game.
126
Moralez arrives late to put pressure on the
defensive midfielder but is still successful in
deflecting play as the ball rotates back through
the goalkeeper before playing long.
Conclusion
A
lthough his size and brute strength may not
be qualities that Maxi Moralez possesses,
what the Argentine has been able to do in
Major League soccer is to prove his dominance
in very different ways. From his positional play
and game intelligence to the technical mastery
and ability to find the killer pass, Moralez has
all the qualities needed to take NYCFC on
another successful season.
As with all players who perform at a high level
in the game, a constant challenge for Moralez
lies in continuing to find ways to be effective
in the game. Knowing that teams will place
a larger emphasis on preventing him from
getting on the ball, there is always a possibility
of NYCFC adapting their system to create
advantages in different areas of the field.
After being knocked out of the MLS Cup to
Toronto in the 2019 post-season, the challenge
for Moralez and head coach Ronny Deila is to
take NYCFC all the way in 2020. With some key
additions to the squad in the off-season, 2020
looks to be another exciting campaign.
 Tanguy Kouassi:

PSG’s wonderkid centre-back

BY MUHAMMAD ROFIQ NAUFAL // @rofiq_naufal

127
L igue 1 leaders Paris Saint-Germain have
been very solid in defence this season,
especially in Ligue 1. They have conceded only
24 goals which is the joint second least goals
conceded this season alongside Rennes, while
David Guion’s Reims currently lead with only 21
goals conceded.
However, to play in Thomas Tuchel’s system,
the centre-back must possess more than
just defensive prowess and physicality, but
also impeccable technique on the ball as
well as superb game intelligence and tactical
understanding. These attributes are certainly
what this season’s debutant, Tanguy Kouassi
possesses. Though not quite a polished player
yet, the 2002-born centre-back has been highly
impressive this season whenever he has gotten
the opportunity to play. He certainly shows he’s
already ready to play at a high level and he
might well develop into a word-class centre-
back in the future if nurtured properly.
With Abdou Diallo, Thilo Kehrer, Marquinhos,
Thiago Silva, and Presnel Kimpembe often
missing out games due to injuries as well
as struggling with fitness, Kouassi has been
brought up to cover the hole. And having
played extremely well lately, Tuchel decided to
let him stay in the first-team and rotate with the
regulars, giving him very much-needed game
time and experience.
In this tactical analysis scout report, we’ll get a
deeper understanding about the PSG centre-
back’s attributes and how he fits in Tuchel’s
tactics.
Physicality
K ouassi is 1.87m (6’2”) tall with a lean body
build. Overall, the young centre-back has
decent strength and is usually able to use his
body well to protect the ball if necessary. He
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can hold himself up in both ground and aerial
duels against most players. However, stronger,
bulkier players still give him a lot of trouble in
physical duels.
Aside from that, Kouassi is not particularly
quick over short range nor agile. He does seem
to possess good pace once he reaches his top
speed and he’s able to quickly cover ground
due to his long strides. However, his slow
acceleration and rather poor agility makes him
quite vulnerable against explosive and agile
opponents who are quick on the turn. This is
why Kouassi tends to use his smart positioning
and good anticipation to defend against these
players which will be talked about in more
detail later in this tactical analysis scout report.
Kouassi’s aerial prowess is particularly
impressive and he has proven his proficiency
in the air numerous times this season. Two out
of his three senior goals this season are from
headers. His height combined with jumping
power helps him reach good vertical distance
when leaping. To add to that, Kouassi has
good positioning and anticipation. He knows
where the ball is going to be, he knows where
to position himself and when to jump. He is a
bit aggressive when contesting for aerial balls
which is certainly positive although there’s risk
of conceding a foul. Nonetheless, he always
focuses on getting his head on the ball and
often wins the ball without conceding a foul.
Aside from his lack of explosiveness and agility,
Kouassi has another weakness in his physical
attributes: stamina.
Despite already possessing decent power
and physical strength (which may grow
even more in the future), Kouassi hasn’t yet
particularly developed his endurance. This, of
course, can be seen by his body language and
tendencies in the game as well as a slight, but
nevertheless, visible drop of performance late
in the game.
As a centre-back, it’s a bit hard to spot his
lack of stamina due to him not having to cover
a lot of ground throughout the game and he
doesn’t have to push forward and track back a
lot in transitions. However, when playing as a
defensive/central midfielder, his lack of stamina
can be seen.
shows calmness and confidence even under
pressure. Though Kouassi would mainly look to
not dwell on the ball and immediately move the
ball after receiving it, he’ll look to drive forward
with the ball before distributing it if given
opportunity or if forced to do so. This can be
seen in the two pictures below.

Kouassi is forced to be creative with near

options and passing lanes being marked but
Kouassi struggling to quickly track back after sees the opportunity to drive forward.
committing himself forward.
Above you can see that Kouassi received a
Usually if PSG lose the ball in an advanced pass from the left-back. Dijon looked to press
area, the second line will push up to compress with two players upfront with one staying close
space and press instead of dropping deep. to the right-sided centre-back and one pressing
However, if the opposing team manages to Kouassi while putting the left-back in his cover
escape the counter-press, the second line will shadow. The nearby central options were
have to quickly track back to recover. When marked which means that progression through
playing as a defensive/central midfielder, the middle would be more difficult and riskier.
Kouassi can be seen struggling to quickly track
back to recover. He’d often opt to jog rather
than sprinting with full-speed to get back into
position which means either he’s trying to
conserve stamina or he’s already out of breath.
The same thing can also be seen in offensive
transitions. Kouassi often seems to be reluctant
to join the counter-attack and will opt to jog
forward.

Kouassi exploits the gap between the two

Ball-playing ability pressing strikers and drives forward with the
ball.

K ouassi is quite neat on the ball and

distributes the ball well. The young talented
centre-back has good control of the ball and
Kouassi, of course, could play the ball long
or loft it diagonally towards the right-back

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who sat high up the pitch. However, in this
case, he chose to drive forward with the ball,
exploiting the gap between the two pressing
Dijon strikers. His progressive run attracted
pressure from the first and second line of Dijon
who aimed to compress space in the middle
third. His progressive run and the reaction from
Dijon allowed PSG players to occupy the space
between the second and third lines of Dijon.
From here, Kouassi could play a pass towards
a player between the lines or exchange short
passes with the central players and progress
through middle.
Statistically, Kouassi averages only 0.77
progressive runs as well as 0.81 dribbles
(82.4% success rate) this season which
accurately represents his style and tendency
as explained in this tactical analysis scout
report. Despite his lack of agility as mentioned
previously, Kouassi still possesses decent body
balance and coordination which gives him the
advantage on the ball, making him a tad bit
more difficult to shrug off when in possession.
Kouassi distributing the ball towards the flank.
When it comes to distribution, Kouassi prefers
playing short passes. This is why even when
under pressure and with nearby options
marked/blocked, Kouassi looks to drive
forward to open up space and passing lanes
instead of lofting the ball forward. This is also
mainly due to PSG’s possession-based system
where players are encouraged to exchange
quick short-medium range passes as they
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work their way into the box rather than a direct
approach even when under pressure.
Kouassi tends to progress the ball by playing it
towards the flank where the nearest wide player
(usually the full-back) can receive it instead
of playing it centrally between the lines of the
opposing team. This happens much more
often when PSG are playing against teams with
compact and narrow defence who don’t allow
central progression. Having said that, it doesn’t
mean that Kouassi is incapable of delivering
accurate and perfectly-weighted passes
between the lines.
Kouassi seeing an opportunity to progress the
ball centrally and he takes it.
Above you can see Kouassi delivering a pass
towards a player sitting in a pocket of space
between the second and third line of Amiens’
defence. In this situation, Kouassi received the
ball from his left side and then turned to the
right side, making himself look like he’s going
to pass the ball towards the right-back who’s
sitting in an abundance of space on the right
flank. However, it was a disguise. Kouassi
chose to play the ball into the right-winger who
positioned himself in the pocket of space to
receive the ball. You can see from the body
orientation of the Amiens players that they
were all anticipating a pass towards the wide
player and were all looking to move their block
towards the either side of the pitch.
This move shows that the player has not only
game intelligence as well as good perception
and awareness, but also bravery and
confidence to execute a rather risky move that
demands good technique.
Statistically, Kouassi records an average of
55.3 passes per game with 92.8% success rate
which is pretty impressive. He also averages
18.21 progressive passes per game with 87.1%
success rate. The high success rate, of course,
is partly also due to his tendency to play
short passes rather than long as mentioned
before in this tactical analysis scout report.
Understandably, Kouassi has a rather low
average of long-passing attempts per game
with only 1.77 with a rather low success rate of
48.6%.
Tactical tendencies in PSG
and defensive prowess
K ouassi plays mainly as a centre-back in
a ball-playing role. Sometimes he is also
played as a defensive/central midfielder in a
4-4-2 system.
Kouassi’s heatmap this season.
Above you can see Kouassi’s heatmap this
season. Despite the aforementioned lack of
stamina, Kouassi is still clearly a very active
player, contributing a lot around the defensive
and middle third. He contributes mainly
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defensively, but he does get involved in the
build-up by helping the team combine and
progress the ball. His creative contributions
are rather limited though. This is due to his
tendency not to take risks, but to give the ball
towards more creative players instead and play
it safe whenever he gets the ball. However,
understandably, his coverage is rather limited,
even as a defensive/central midfielder. The
talented centre-back usually looks to stay in
the middle third (when playing as a defensive/
central midfielder) with a tendency to push
up to press in defensive transition as well as
drop even deeper when the opposing team
is deep inside PSG’s half. Kouassi offers
less flexibility and creativity when played as
a defensive/central midfielder (unlike Marco
Verratti or Leandro Paredes, for example) but
offers excellent defensive solidity and good ball
progression.
Kouassi in a rather advanced position when
playing as a defensive/central midfielder.
Above is an image when Kouassi played as
a left-sided defensive midfielder in a 4-4-2
system in the Monaco vs PSG match in Ligue
1. As you can see, Kouassi sat rather high in
the left half-space but still around the middle
third.
This was because when the team was deep
inside the opposing half, he’d tend to hold
position around the middle third with the
tendency to shift wide a little bit to offer
support and create overload (if the ball was
moved wide).
Kouassi pushing up and pressing in defensive
transition.
With a rather high positioning, he could also
help recover the ball in defensive transition by
pushing up and pressing or marking the nearby
options as well as help his team recover and
recycle possession after a failed attack in the
final third before then restarting the attack as in
the picture above.
Perhaps Kouassi’s main weakness in when
playing as a defensive/central midfielder is his
inability to play or combine in tight spaces.
He seems to be lacking awareness of where
his opponents are and how close/far are they
from him, especially when he’s playing with
his back facing the opposing goal. It’s not that
Kouassi doesn’t scan before receiving. He
does quickly look around him before receiving
but he seems to not gather enough perception
and information of his surroundings, rendering
him unaware of opponents who sit in certain
positions or distance from him.
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Kouassi losing the ball right after receiving it.
As you can see above, Kouassi lost the ball
right after receiving it. He was unaware that
one Monaco player was coming at him from
behind his back and his opponent managed to
steal the ball away from him before he could
comfortably control it.
This is quite understandable though as
Kouassi is mainly played as a centre-back who
usually orients his body forward and has good
perception of the pitch rather than playing with
his back facing the opposing goal. He may
improve a lot in this area in the future though as
he gains more experience and as he gets used
to playing in that position.
What stands out the most in Kouassi’s game
is his defensive prowess. Especially his
intelligence, anticipation, and decision making
in defence. Kouassi is not an aggressive ball-
winner who loves to get stuck in and commit
slide tackles. He prefers to stay on his feet
when tackling rather than committing a slide
tackle unless really necessary and there’s
an opportunity to do so which is why his
tackles are mostly clean and well-timed. He’s
always alert and focused and rarely commits
reckless and careless actions in defence. This
is why he’s quite difficult to beat in 1v1 duels.
He’s patient and keeps good distance to his
opponent while steering him outside, tightening
the space around him, closing his options, and
forcing him to make a mistake. Once he sees
an opportunity to steal the ball, then he will
commit a tackle.

Aside from his ball-winning and 1v1 ability,

Kouassis is also a smart marker. He’s good at
keeping distance with his direct opponent or
good positioning himself to block a passing
lane, once again showing his intelligence and
defensive awareness.

In the picture above, for example, Kouassi

initially marked and then immediately pressed
Amiens striker, Serhou Guirassy, when the
latter received the ball. However, he saw the
space on the right flank and the right-back was
nowhere to be found. If he kept on pressing
and staying close to Guirassy, Amiens winger
Fousseni Diabaté would then be able to receive
Kouassi staying tight with his opponent. a pass in an abundance of space and he
could explode forward and potentially create a
Kouassi usually maintains a moderate distance dangerous threat deep inside PSG’s half.
with the player he’s supposed to mark. Not
staying too close so that he doesn’t get beaten
too easily on the turn due to his lack of agility
and explosiveness as mentioned previously.
But not too far either so that the opponent
is not given too much space and freedom to
move around. Once the ball is played towards
the player he’s supposed to mark, then Kouassi
will immediately close him down and press
him. This usually surprises the ball-receiver
and renders him to receive in an uncomfortable
position. However, Kouassi decided to leave Guirassy
and moved to cover the space on the right
Kouassi’s exceptional defensive intelligence flank. Another PSG player then proceeded to
and awareness can also be seen through his close down Guirassy.
decision making.

133
Guirassy then tried to deliver a through pass
into space behind PSG’s defence but Kouassi
was able to read it and intercept it before
Diabaté could get his foot on the ball.

Conclusion
K ouassi is very young, yet already shows
maturity beyond his years. The 2002-born
centre-back is not quite fully-polished yet but
he does show superb potential. He certainly
has a very high ceiling and it will be very
interesting to see where he’ll go from here.
With Thiago Silva looking like he’s already in
decline, Kouassi could be the perfect long-term
replacement for PSG. That is, of course, if they
can keep him in Paris for a while. He has been
very impressive despite only playing in a few
games in his debut season, but many big clubs
from around Europe will certainly be paying
close attention to him in the near future.

134
 Scout Report:

Gabriel Martinelli

BY PETRICK SINURAYA // @sinurayapetrick

135
T he great Arsenal ex-manager Arsène
Wenger once said that South America is
the best part of the world in producing elite Superb spatial awareness
forwards. In his reign, the Gunners had a
deadly attacker who came from that region;
the man being Alexis Sánchez. The Chilean
produced 80 goals and 45 assists in just 166
D espite being only a teenager, Martinelli
is already blessed with good spatial
awareness as well as trailblazing speed. Either
games for the London club before joining playing as a centre-forward or a left-winger,
Manchester United in 2018. Martinelli can both attack the space and make
a room for himself.
After 18 months without a South American
forward, Arsenal landed another one last
summer. He goes by the name of Gabriel
Martinelli. At that time, he just turned 18 years
old, making him almost unknown for the fans.
Today, Martinelli is successfully catching the
world’s attention with his brilliant performances.
Without further ado, this tactical analysis will
inform you about the promising youngster.

The youngster attacks the gap between

Player profile Liverpool’s centre-backs with his diagonal run.

M artinelli is originally a centre-forward. A

versatile forward himself, Martinelli can
also play in both flanks, mainly as a left-winger.
In fact, from all 26 games he has played this
season until March 4, Martinelli started as the
main striker in only five matches. However,
the positional shift according to Mikel Arteta’s
tactics didn’t reduce his impact. So far, he
has made ten goals and four assists in all
competitions. That’s more than one goal In this sequence, Martinelli finds a gap between
contribution every two matches on average. Standard Liège defenders.

As an attacker, Martinelli is very active inside
the box. His smart positioning and off-the-ball
movements are almost second to none at his
age. Those traits mean Martinelli only needs
a few touches to make a shot, and further, to
score. Per the statistics, the Brazilian scored
seven out of his ten goals so far with one-touch
finishes.
Mainly, Martinelli likes to attack the gap
between the opponents’ centre-backs. His
main tool is the diagonal run. Sometimes he
will drift slightly to pull a defender to his side
before attacking the gap with his lightning
speed. By making a diagonal run, Martinelli
could confuse the defenders on who needs to
close him down. Not only to attack space in
between defenders, but the Brazilian’s pace is
also useful to make runs in behind.

136
Coming from the left flank, Martinelli attacks Martinelli stops his run and makes ample space
the gap behind Sheffield United’s central for himself. However, Mesut Özil doesn’t play
defenders. him in this sequence.

Clever attacker
H is good spatial awareness doesn’t stop
there. Martinelli also knows how to open
space for his teammates. Usually, he would
drift away from his area to allow his teammate
behind him to attack the vacated space. By
drifting away, most likely the Brazilian would
Playing in the left flank, Martinelli’s pace is also pull his marker with him. As a result, a
handy to make darting runs in behind. fellow Gunner could fill the gap and continue
the attack.
A smart attacker himself, Martinelli can also
make space for his sake. To do that, he would
let the opponents’ backline make a retreating
run deep inside their box. Then, the youngster
would do the opposite in the last second.
Martinelli would decelerate — even stops his
run if needed — to create the room. Such a trait
would allow him enough time to make a goal-
scoring attempt.

By drifting to the left flank, Martinelli pulls two

Sheffield defenders with him. This gives Özil
huge space to roam into centrally.

137
 to attack the ball. Such rapid change usually
confuses his marker and allow Martinelli to be
free in space.

In this image, Martinelli moves centrally and

pulls Mërgim Vojvoda with him. This allows
Lucas Torreira to find marauding Kieran Tierney
in the wide area.
Despite being 12 centimetres shorter than
Martinelli also has a good vision in his armoury. Zinho Vanheusden, Martinelli beats him in
He could locate his teammates in behind with this aerial duel. The reason is because of his
an incisive pass in behind, or a smart cross unpredictable curved run to beat the defender.
into the box. The statistics show that Martinelli
has averaged 1.8 key passes per 90 minutes
in the Europa League. Furthermore, such
number helps him to create three assists in the
competition so far.

Martinelli makes a fake run to the far post

before making a sharp turn to the opposite way.
This clever run allows him to freely attack the
cross.

The Brazilian finds overlapping Calum On top of that, the Brazilian is also very good
Chambers in behind. at reading the situation around him. This allows
Martinelli to position himself in the best goal-
scoring spot possible. No wonder the teenager
Great nose for goals has made seven one-touch-finish goals until
this very moment.

A s mentioned previously, Martinelli is very

active inside the box. He constantly makes
sharp movements off the ball to free himself
from his marker. To do that, Martinelli tends
to make curved runs to get away from the
defender’s eyesight. Furthermore, the Brazilian
would often make a last-second sharp turn

138
Credit to his good game-reading ability, Martinelli often offers himself at the far post as
Martinelli can attack Torreira’s deflected additional crossing target.
attempt.

Again, Martinelli reads the game brilliantly and
attack the deflected ball. Notice the positional
rotation between him and Alexandre Lacazette.
Defensively sound
B eing a happy-scoring forward doesn’t mean
Martinelli is a lazy player. The youngster
is very keen to help the defence. Mainly, he
likes to press the opponents up to their penalty
box; even closing down the goalkeeper.
Such aggression is useful to force the on-ball
opponent to make an error; thus giving away
the ball for Arsenal.

Such a great nose for goals can also be seen

when he’s playing as a winger. When deployed
on the flank, Martinelli likes to make a diagonal
run into the box. The objective is to offer
himself at the far post as Arsenal’s additional
crossing target. Not only that, his penalty-box
activeness would ensure his team to always
have one player in the goalmouth area. This is Martinelli presses Liverpool’s backline, even to
important because Lacazette — Arsenal’s first- their goalkeeper.
choice striker — tends to drop a bit to combine
with his attacking comrades.

139
In this sequence, Martinelli presses Vanheusden
aggressively. As a result, the defender is forced
to make a poor pass.
Martinelli also likes to get involved in
backwards pressing. This means he would step
down from his forward position to press the on-
ball opponent from their rear side. By doing so,
Martinelli could further surprise the opponent
and help his midfield line to win the ball back.
The stats show that Martinelli averages 2.7
tackles per 90 minutes in the Premier League.
The number is even higher in the Europa
League. By the stats, he makes 2.9 tackles per
90 minutes in the competition.
Martinelli back-presses Adam Lallana and help
Bukayo Saka to win the ball back.
140
Playing as a right-winger, Martinelli actively
back-presses Djibril Sow and help his team to
regain possession.
Not only in the more aggressive high pressing
system, but Martinelli is also sound when
defending deeply. As a left-winger, Martinelli
can often be found tracking the opponents’
full-back or wing-back run. To do that, he could
even drop next to Arsenal’s backline. Such
defensive diligence is almost second to none
compared to his forward teammates.
Martinelli drops very deep to close down
George Baldock’s run. Notice that he is the only
attacker to drop that deep in this sequence.
Again, Martinelli retreats deeply. This time he
intercepts Mateo Kovačić’s diagonal pass to
overlapping César Azpilicueta.
Potential issues
In this part of the scout report, we are going to
take a look at Martinelli’s potential problems.
Physically, Martinelli stands at 175 centimetres;
regular size for a footballer. Despite his not-so-
special size, Martinelli is not shy to make aerial
duels. The young forward has been able to
compensate that with his high offensive IQ. For
a fact, he has scored three goals with his head.
However, he needs to build more muscle in the
upcoming years; especially if he wants to excel
as an all-around centre-forward.
Martinelli’s biggest issue is not his size. It’s his
on-ball ability. Quite often the 18-year-old got
nullified in one-versus-one duels due to his lack
of creativity. Martinelli tends to be very one-
footed when dribbles the ball; which makes
him rather predictable for the defender. Despite
being a Brazilian, Martinelli doesn’t have many
tricks yet under his sleeve. At best, he would
use his pace as well as utilising the space to
beat his opponent.
141
Even with huge space around him, Martinelli
can’t beat Baldock in this one-versus-one duel.
Notice his tendency to use only his right foot.
The youngster is also not very good in tight
spaces. Due to his one-footed tendency and
minimum maneuvres, Martinelli tends to play
safely in such a situation. In today’s football,
press-resistance is a highly valuable asset,
especially for an attacker. If he wants to be a
world-class versatile forward, Martinelli needs
to improve on his on-ball ability. Failing to do
so could hurt his career in the future.
Conclusion
T he 18-year-old Martinelli has been a
revelation for the Premier League side so
far. His great spatial awareness and positional
versatility make him an important part for Arteta
and his tactics. Not only that, but the Brazilian
also possesses a solid defensive work rate
which helps Arsenal heavily.
However, Martinelli is still a bit one-dimensional
as an attacker. He relies a lot on his movements
and positioning but lacking quality with the
ball. To be a much better forward, Martinelli
needs to add that particular trait to his bag.
Fortunately, Martinelli has big names like Özil,
Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang, and Lacazette to
help him grow. It will be very interesting to see
what he can offer in the upcoming years.
Deportivo La Coruna:

What’s sparked Fernando Vázquez’s remarkable recovery?

BY SAM LEVERIDGE // @samleveridge

142
D ominating Spain and Europe just 20
years ago, Deportivo La Coruña became
somewhat of a yo-yo club between Primera
turn Depor from relegation certs to play-off
outsiders.

and Segunda División in Spain in the 2010s.

Yet as the decade came to an end, Depor were
at their lowest ebb. Stranded at the bottom of
Segunda, they had been in the relegation zone
for all but two matchdays since matchday four,
having been bottom for nearly two months by
the time Fernando Vázquez returned to the club
as the team’s third managerial appointment of
the season.
It was an appointment which baffled many.
Whilst it excited many fans who had fond
memories of Vázquez’s first stint in charge,
he was very much a journeyman coach with
a reputation for a style of football which is far
from easy on the eye. His reputation precedes
him, falling out with boards and fans alike over
his defence-first approach, he rarely lasts long
in a single job.
So much so that from 1998 until 2004 he had
six different jobs, one per year. A three year
stint as Celta Vigo manager saw him out of
the game from 2007 until he joined Deportivo,
overseeing their relegation for the final few
months of his first game only to bring them
back to the top flight at the first time of asking
in 2014, only to be sacked after criticising their
signing policy. A one year stint at RCD Mallorca
followed but he would then face more than
three years out of employment before returning
to Estadio Municipal de Riazor.
This tactical analysis will consider the tactics of
Vázquez and provide analysis of the remarkable
turnaround he has achieved. Just two league
wins all season before he arrived, including an
opening day 3-2 victory over Real Oviedo with
a last gasp winner, it’s fair to say that Vázquez
had his work cut out. However, his tactics have
turned things around, securing six consecutive
victories in his first six league games to
The 5-4-1
F rom the moment he took charge, Vázquez
implemented his 5-4-1 system in order to
shore up in defence. Having recorded four
clean sheets through four 0-0 draws before
Vázquez arrived, it was clear that there was
potential in this system to build a strong
defence, as long as Vázquez put his attention
into the defence.
One of the keys to building that strong
defensive record has been consistency. From
his first game, Vázquez has looked to deploy
the same backline. Eneko Boveda and Salva
Ruíz act as the athletic wing-backs who often
drop in to form more natural full-backs. In
between them are Mujaid Sadick, Michele
Somma and Francisco Montero.
Key to their organisation is the role played
by Dani Giménez in behind. Boveda is the
only man in the defence above the age of 24,
leaving a lack of leadership to coordinate the
defensive unit. Whilst Somma, in particular,
has stepped up to the plate, operating as the
central figure in the three central defenders,
the shot-stopper is often the one to command
them and organise the defence. That allows
Boveda more freedom to move forward and
press into midfield when required when in
possession.

143

In midfield, Vázquez may have been a little
lucky to find players so well suited to his
system. One more than any other seems a
natural fit in the form of Atlético Madrid loanee
Víctor Mollejo. Built into the Diego Simeone
system of a wide midfielder who gets forward
without forgetting his defensive responsibilities,
Mollejo offers the kind of flexible connection
between midfield and attack. On the other
flank, Ager Aketxe is perhaps less of a natural
fit given his more offensive style, but does
offer more in experience and in terms of how
developed his play is.
In between the two wingers, Gaku Shibasaki
and Peru Nolaskoain are the two first-choice
options, with Alex Bergantinos offering a more
defensive alternative and Emre Colak bringing
in a more offensive option. Gaku and Peru both
come from sides, Getafe and Athletic Club,
with similar approaches to grinding out results
in a physical midfield battle. Well-stocked
in this area of the squad, Vázquez has the
flexibility to adapt.
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In attack, Sabin Merino leads the line. A
versatile target man, he’s good in the air
despite using his pace and movement more
than his physicality. He offers an option for the
long ball and an escape route, but not in the
mould of Borja Bastón as was the case during
Vázquez’s previous stint at the club. Rather
than being a more stationary figure, his role is
built around his mobility and chasing the ball
into wide channels and over the top, with the
wingers then overlapping to provide cover.
All focus on defence
D espite the fantastic results since Vázquez’s
appointment, they have never come
through prolific attacking play. The 5-4-1
formation has given his team an impressive
defensive ability which has helped them to see
out results. In such a rigid structure, the team
are very hard to break down which represents
one of the fundamental pillars that Vázquez has
looked to build this team around by ensuring
that they can maintain their shape at all times,
dropping deep when required and only pushing
up when in possession and safe to do so.
As can be seen here from this example
against Lugo, Vázquez’s men have no
problem dropping into a deep possession.
Their challenge intensity of 6.2 duels, tackles
and interceptions per minute of opposition
possession is among the lowest in the league,
reflecting the way in which they frequently
revert to 10 men in their own final third, often
almost all of them being in their own penalty
area, set up and ready to defend by frustrating
the opposition and allowing them to have the
ball and try to find a space which doesn’t exist.

This is of particular importance when they
take the lead, often late on in games with the
majority of the goals in Vázquez’s reign (64%)
having come in the second half. Deportivo
are more than capable of sitting deep in a low
bloc to see out a result. The win over Cadíz,
the leaders of the division at the time, was
the perfect example. After Merino opened the
scoring after 65 minutes, the team sat back
into their own third for almost the entirety of the
remaining 35 minutes of the game.
At the same time, it is worth noting that there is
an offensive role played by the defence. When
on the ball and moving forwards, the formation
resembles more of a 3-4-2-1 shape. The two
full-backs press on to act as wing-backs, with
the wingers from the midfield block drifting
centrally in order to provide greater support to
Merino and get in and around the box. Boveda
is Deportivo’s most frequent crosser since
Vázquez’s arrival and that is entirely down to
this role, bypassing the midfield to receive the
ball from the back three, burst down the line
and put a cross into the box.
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This focus makes sense for Vázquez, building
a side around solid foundations. In order to
regain confidence, it was the logical approach.
Instilling a sense of discipline into a side with
an incredibly young defence is no easy task,
but with experienced figures in goal and in
midfield has made it a much easier task.
Capitalising on chances
In January, Vázquez made it clear that his team
needed a centre-forward. Lacking the kind
of target man that his style demands, he was
reliant upon Mollejo playing out of position in a
central role in his debut fixture. That was a key
factor in what influenced the club to invest in
order to bring in Sabin Merino from Leganés on
a free transfer.
Merino came in and his role was immediately
clear. In his first four games, he scored four
goals and to date has registered four goals
despite having an xG as low as 1.81, reflecting
his clinical nature in front of goal. This reflects
the nature of Deportivo, who have outscored
their xG substantially since the arrival of
Vázquez, with 11 goals scored compared to
7.89 xG. In fact, since his appointment, the
team have only surpassed the season average
of 1.04 xG per game in three games.
To date, Deportivo have only registered more
shots than their opponents in two games
from 10, only one of them actually ending in
victory. That is not surprising given just how
reluctant the midfielders are to join Merino in
attack. Often he is an isolated figure expected
to hold up play and wait for a midfield runner,
typically a winger, to join him and support. It
is only truly when Deportivo are in possession and rivals alike. “The way we defend set pieces
and comfortable that they commit men to the is good because it produces statistically good
attack. results,” the coach insisted post-match.

And he’s right. Whilst those four goals did

lead to the loss of five possible points, their
return of four goals from such occasions in the
past eight games before that since Vázquez’s
appointment helped to secure an even more
impressive 15 points. Whilst the points lost may
be a concern, those gained more than make up
for it, particularly considering the nature of the
team climbing away from the bottom.

Whilst the one in attack formation may seem to

isolate Merino, it is not the case. As referenced
previously in this analysis, the full-backs play
a key offensive role. As such, the wingers have
greater freedom to move into the box and
attack the final third almost acting like a front
three. That means that by the time a cross
comes in, Depor are able to match the number
of defenders in the box with attackers, with
the front three often interchanging in order to
provide an unpredictability to their movement. It is worth noting here that Depor win more
corners than only two other teams in Segunda,
There is certainly nothing revolutionary but their way of making the most of them is
about Vázquez’s attacking approach, rarely impressive. Using a simple tactic of crowding
committing more than these three attackers to surround every player in one single straight
to the final third, but it is one which is getting line on the penalty spot, they then spark
results. Sustaining this in the long term, as has their runs as the cross is delivered, creating
already been seen may be a challenge as the confusion and allowing the runners to mix and
goals have dried up for Merino, will be the true match their run each time and leave sides who
test of the quality of this side and Vázquez’s man-mark baffled.
system.
Capitalising on this strength is crucial as Depor
rank fourth for aerial duel wins in the division,
Set pieces with a 50.7% success rate, and corners reflect
a way that they can turn this strength into

P erhaps one of the most intriguing moments

of Vázquez’s reign since his return came
when the tide turned against Depor. A draw
goals. Vázquez has evidently identified that and
looked to make the most of it early on in his
reign at the club.
against Girona and defeat to Real Zaragoza
saw the team concede four consecutive goals
from set-pieces, which drew criticism from fans

146
 “When you play football, you play to win.
Then from there you look to improve. We’re
defensively strong, not so much in attack.
The objective is above the style, in general,
fans just want Depor to win,” Vázquez said,
summing up his approach perfectly. Yet that
quote came from his first stint in charge in
2014. A stint which ended with promotion. After
his impressive start this time around, already
seemingly having salvaged Deportivo from the
Their defensive vulnerabilities have been abyss, that may be the next target.
evident in recent games though. Their set-up
whilst defending corners and free-kicks has left
somewhat to be desired. As can be seen in the
example here against Girona, their defensive
line is so deep that Girona’s runners arrive
with the delivery on the edge of their six-yard
box with so much momentum that it is easy
work for them to convert. This was a repeated
feature both against Girona and Real Zaragoza,
which will give Vázquez a key area to work on
when at the training ground.

Conclusion
V ázquez’s Deportivo La Coruña are the
definition of clinical. Their early form under
their new coach has certainly shown all the
signs of a honeymoon period which can be
hard to maintain over a sustained period.
However, it has shown that Vázquez has given
this side their belief back and has helped to get
the very best out of a somewhat limited group
of players.

His focus on 5-4-1 undoubtedly focuses on

the practical. This team is built to grind out
results. They don’t play attractive, eye-catching
football. They look to take a point and anything
extra is a benefit. When stuck in a relegation
battle as Deportivo have been all season, that
is just the approach that they have been crying
out for.

147
 Theory:

The re-emergence of man-marking in a high press

BY SCOTT MARTIN // @CoachScottCopy

148
A s football data continues to evolve, we’re
seeing that most goal-scoring actions are
produced with limited time in possession and
few passes. With the emerging trend of quick,
direct actions towards goal, top coaches are
looking for ways to force the opposition into
low losses.
At this point, most are aware that Jürgen
Klopp’s Liverpool averaged 7.81 seconds of
possession and an average of 2.51 passes en
route to a UEFA Champions League title. The
Champions League average of 12.50 seconds
and 3.89 passes per goal-scoring action are
indicators that most goals are the result of
mistakes in the defensive and middle third or
quick counterattacks.
With the game moving away from the “death
by a thousand passes” approach, the new
challenge is to create attacking conditions that
mirror that average goal statistics. One of the
re-emerging trends is man-marking in a high
press.
In this tactical analysis, we’ll engage in a deep
analysis of this philosophy, examining the
objectives, set up and cues. As with all tactical
models, analysis of what can go wrong and
the solutions to get out of trouble are also
explored.
Re-entries and baiting
G iven the large number of re-entries per
game, preparing the defensive tactics
for opposition goal kicks, deep free kicks and
throw-ins are an important means of gaining
an edge. As apply man-marking tactics in their
attacking third, one of the most important
concepts you’ll notice is the desire to make the
goalkeeper or a centre-back the playmaker.
While many modern goalkeepers are very
strong with their feet, effective pressing teams
149
can still force critical errors. When team man-
mark in the high press, they’re eliminating all
short options. If the goalie or centre-back looks
high up the pitch, if he even has the time to do
so, he’ll notice the opposition is usually plus
one at the back. The remaining options are
intermediate-range passes. The players offering
this outlet are under heavy pressure, so the
pass and first touch have to be perfect to keep
possession. That’s easier said than done.
One of the reasons is that high pressing
teams use the intermediate options to bait
the opponent into pressing traps. Since dead-
ball situations allow the defending team to
start from a highly structured set up, the onus
is on the attacking team to solve the press
and beat the trap. A common tactic among
teams that man-mark in the high press is to
give the wider options some space. That said,
someone is always close enough to quickly
close the gap, especially since the path to that
player generally requires a flighted ball. Those
passes are time-consuming and are quickly
pressured. With few teams willing to take that
risk, it’s common to see the attacking team
play centrally before playing wide. On the flip
side, that’s exactly what the defensive team
wants. Funnelling play centrally, especially with
intermediate and long-range passes better
suits the more compact shape of the defence.
With the intermediate and long-range passes
offering low-percentage outlets, the first few
passes generally go short. As pressure builds
on the centre-backs and goalkeepers, the
defending team readies itself to intercept the
progressive pass. Some of the best man-
marking, high press teams thrive in this
situation. For example, Bayern Munich easily
paces the Bundesliga with 63% possession
and ranks second in passes per defensive
action with a statistic of 7.54. The Bavarian
side wants to win the ball back as quickly as
possible, keeping the ball in the opposition half.
Since Bayern is so dominant in possession, it
has the fewest interceptions in the Bundesliga
(891). Winning the ball immediately after a
turnover and keeping possession are the clear
priorities for the club.
In Bayern Munich 5-0 home thrashing of
Schalke, the man-marking high press was
employed, including during Schalke goal kicks
and any deep re-entry. Schalke goalkeeper,
Markus Schubert, was left with two options.
First, risk a pass to Jonjoe Kenny, one that
safely cleared the presence of Ivan Perišić, but
also allowed Kenny to play around the pressure
of Alphonso Davies. Second, play short to one
of the centre-backs, which is ultimately what he
decided, sending the pass to Ozan Kabak. The
pass to Kabak was returned to Schubert as
Perisic pressured the defender.
As Perišić pressured Schubert, the keeper
opted to play long. Other than the long option,
you can see he had 2v1 on the right-side of
the pitch, but, with Thomas Müller lurking, any
pass into that zone comes with a great deal
150
of risk attached. In the clip, you can also see
Benjamin Pavard cheating forward to pressure,
much like we saw from Davies on the opposite
flank.
Jérôme Boateng won the header and
Leon Goretzka won the second ball. In this
sequence, Bayern effectively forced Schubert
to play into Bayern’s strength, Boateng’s aerial
battle against Rabbi Matondo. One other thing
to notice is the positioning of Joshua Kimmich.
He’s positioned behind Boateng, ready to clear
the danger and giving Bayern a plus one at the
back. His defensive coverage is critical to the
success of the man-marking tactic.
The roles of
counter-pressing and
deep distributions
I n open play, the transition from attacking
to man-marking in a high press is entirely
dependent upon the team’s ability to counter-
press. The PPDA statistic is a great measure of
a team’s ability to counter-press as it measures
defensive actions (tackles, interceptions,
challenges and fouls) in the highest 60% of the
pitch. We want to know how effectively a side
can win the ball before having to settle into a
low block.
First and foremost, a high PPDA requires a
mentally quick team that fluidly transitions
for attacking to defending. Those moments
immediately following a turnover are the key.
Given the opposition time and space and they’ll
bypass your numbers. Press them quickly and
you can influence their attacking decision.
The nearest player should always go pressure.
Some teams will send two, but the priorities
are immediate pressure on the ball-carrier,
identifying passing options and eliminating
those options through man-marking. In general,
the first defender will apply pressure while his
teammates set up the man-marking tactic.
priority. As a team, Real only rate 13th in La
Liga with 1,114 interceptions. That means
Casemiro accounts for 25% of the side’s
interceptions, showing why Zinedine Zidane
wants the opponent to play into the Brazilian.
The central recovery through Casemiro greatly
benefits the attack too. Since Madrid offers
the widest players a cushion, any recovery
sees them with a central numerical superiority,
offering progressive passes (Madrid rank third
in La Liga with 2,124 progressive passes) and
an immediate route to goal.

The role of the first defender is critical to the

success of the press. Not only does he have to
apply instant pressure on the ball carrier, but
he also needs to get the opponent to put his
head down, preferably to shield the ball and
turn towards his own goal. Getting him to play
backward into a scenario where his teammate
can’t immediately play forward is ideal. As the
first attacker is delayed and play goes negative,
the defending team has time to initiate the mar- In the latest edition of El Clásico, Isco’s poor
marking high press. touch of a Toni Kroos pass popped the ball
up in the air and was collected by Arthur. His
Real Madrid is one of the most effective man- touch led to a minor collision with Arturo Vidal,
marking high press teams in the global game. leading to the Chilean taking possession of the
Though its 8.83 PPDA rates only seventh in ball and driving up the pitch. Immediately after
La Liga, the objective is to force play all the the turnover, Dani Carvajal, Federico Valverde,
way back to a goalkeeper or centre-back. and Toni Kroos made a quick mental transition
Los Blancos want these players to make the to counter-press.
initial distribution from a deep area of the
pitch. Further, those negative passes allow
the attacking team to gradually get its more
expansive attacking shape. Once Madrid puts
the onus on the goalkeeper or centre-back
to play forward, the opposition generally has
to send an intermediate or long-range pass.
It should come as no surprise that Casemiro
leads La Liga in interceptions. With 281 to his
name, Madrid wants opponents playing into
him and the centre-backs. Eliminating the
passing lanes to the wide outlets is always a What we couldn’t see in the previous image is

151
that Casemiro and Sergio Ramos were man-
marking Antoine Griezmann and Lionel Messi
in the event of a turnover. Raphaël Varane
was in coverage, ready to use his blistering
pace to win any ball played in behind. With
Kroos cutting off the pass to Messi, Vidal
could only play Griezmann or risk a negative
turn into Madrid’s recovering defenders. He
decided to play the Frenchman, but Carvajal’s
tenacious recovery run allowed him to deflect
the pass and send Griezmann backward, which Given the distance of the aerial pass, Casemiro
is probably best as Casemiro was ready to had plenty of time to respond, winning the
claim the pass if it had been played to feet. header over the shorter Vidal. Now, and this
Griezmann collected the pass and simply is the critical moment for the Madrid attack,
played negative before providing the Barcelona Marcelo, while man-marking Nelson Semedo,
attack with some width. has the inside lane on his nearest opponent.
Casemiro’s header and Marcelo’s positioning
allowed the outside-back to collect the ball in
space and attack the Barcelona backline. The
wide players always want the inside positioning
on their marks for two reasons: 1) defensive
coverage if a teammate is beat and 2) winning
the second ball with space to progress forward.

One thing to notice is that, after a successful

counter-press forced Barcelona backward,
each Real Madrid player found a mark,
eliminating short and intermediate options.
15 seconds and several passes in the left-
wing and half space later, Barcelona was
unable to progress due to the aggressive
Real Madrid counter-press. Force to play
backward in order to maintain possession, a
pass to Samuel Umtiti was quickly pressured
by Karim Benzema, forcing play to the feet of
Marc-André ter Stegen. Again, Benzema was
quickly on the scene, applying pressure to the
goalkeeper while taking away the return pass to
Umtiti. Ter Stegen looked to use his distribution
ability to play forward to Vidal, sending a
35-metre pass in the central channel.
With Marcelo able to run at the backline and
Semedo out of position to slow his attacking
action, Barcelona’s players positioned between
the ball and the goal had to quickly improvise
to slow the Madrid attack. They were unable to
do so as Marcelo picked out the run of Vinícius
Júnior into the left-half space. With three
Madrid attackers in that area, Barcelona was
forced into a quick recovery into that section
of the pitch. With the defenders’ momentum
drawing them closer to the ball, Vinícius Júnior

152
set the ball back to Kroos, who’s shot for inside
the 18 was uncharacteristically poor, going well
over the bar. Even still, Madrid’s quick counter-
press, ability to force Barcelona backward,
and patience to make ter Stegen play long
from deep in his box opened up an excellent
attacking opportunity. The nature of the
turnover meant Barcelona was in an expansive
attacking shape, allowing Real Madrid to run at
a disorganized defence.
typically smaller attacking midfielders have to
then hold possession against bigger defensive
midfielders or a free centre-back. If the man-
marking team is able to use this advantage
well, a direct route to goal awaits them,
generally in a numbers up situation.

How a man-marking
high press transitions
to attack Now, over in the Ukrainian Premier League

O ne of the benefits of man-marking in the

high press is the ease of transitioning
to the attack. I alluded to Real Madrid’s tally
of progressive passes. That’s enabled by the
number of options available upon regaining
possession. Since the current tactical trend is
to attack the goal quickly with a limited number
of passes and time, recovering the ball high up
the pitch is a priority for the top teams.
Since all man-marking, high press teams offer
the high and wide opposition players a little
bit of a cushion, the defending team controls
the middle and half spaces. Whether the side
has recovered the ball or simply won an aerial
duel, it’s well placed to offer a penetrating pass
or win the second ball. Controlling the second
ball is a major priority. If the defending team
can claim it, options for central penetration are
immediately available.
is a small club by the name of Zorya. In
league play, no Ukrainian team can match the
counter-pressing ability of this squad. The
club averages a staggering 5.33 passes per
defensive action. For comparison, Getafe is
currently the best pressing team from a top-
five league in Europe, averaging 7.13 PPDA. In
this instance, an intense matchup against the
Ukrainian powerhouse, Shakhtar Donetsk, saw
the underdogs stay true to the club philosophy
of high-pressing with man-marking.
After a turnover, Zorya quickly set out to
counter-press the opponent. Funnelling play
wide, Zorya appeared to give Shakhtar an
outlet to the middle. With no other options
available, the pass was made into a supposed
2v1 scenario. He took the bait.

If the attacking team manages to work the

ball into the wings, one thing you’ll often see
is the man-marking team try to bait a central
pass. Again, since the centre of the pitch is
largely inaccessible, those central passes
are usually played into heavy traffic. Further,

153

However, Joel Abu Hanna anticipated the
central pass, stepping forward to poke the ball
free to his teammate, Vladyslav Kabayev. He
immediately set back to the oncoming run of
Vladislav Kochergin.
Kochergin ran at the first defender, pinning him
to set up the pass to Bogdan Lednev. A nice
turn into space opened up a shooting lane. His
shot was parried by Ukrainian international,
Andriy Pyatov, giving the home side a corner.
One thing to notice in this sequence is the
compact defending eliminating short options.
Further, the pressure on the ball carrier
limits his ability to play long, meaning the
intermediate-range pass is the only option.
With the backline ready to step forward, this
pressing trap allows Zorya to attack centrally
in numbers. A quick route to goal limits the
defensive ability of Shakhtar and opens
space for combination play and running at the
defence. Had Lednev worked to pin the next
defender and either play in a teammate or get
into the box on the dribble, Zorya would have
used its numerical superiority more effectively
154
and created better shooting conditions.
When it goes wrong
You need a well-disciplined team to make
man-marking work. The list of the best man-
marking, high press teams in the world includes
sides like Real Madrid, Bayern Munich, Getafe,
LASK, Zorya and Leeds. You probably noticed
that all those teams rank in the top four of
their league, at least at the time of writing. One
reason for the effectiveness of the tactic is that
it pits a superior athlete and player against a
lesser opponent. In cases like Getafe’s, what
makes the system work is intelligent fouling.
The side leads La Liga with 493 fouls and 90
yellow cards. If an opponent beats the first
wave of pressure, they won’t have a chance
to beat the second. Getafe’s hard-nosed
approach also sees it lead La Liga, and all the
top five leagues in Europe, with a 7.13 PPDA.
Systematic fouling is a necessary part of the
man-marking, high press approach.
What breakdowns have to occur before the
foul? Glad you asked. First and foremost,
the immediate threat of losing a 1v1 battle.
Opponents cannot turn on a defender or
receive behind them. Second is losing the first
or second ball. Aerial dominance and numbers
to claim the second ball are critical. Lose those
end the opposition has a chance to play in
behind.
Another issue is allowing a penetrating central
pass that allows the opponent to turn and
play a wide outlet. Since these man-marking
systems cheat centrally knowing they have time
to pressure a long, any wide pass generally
breaks pressure and allows the winger to run at
or play behind the backline.
Finally, creative movements and patterns off
the ball while the attacking team connects
short passes can cause issues. If even one
player switches off and loses track of his mark,
the whole system can be blown wide open. If
any of these situations occur, a tactical foul is
the best means of preventing a dangerous ball
behind the backline.
Going back to El Clásico, ter Stegen had
more success breaking down the Real Madrid
defence after the intermission. One of the
reasons is that he managed to receive the ball
higher up the pitch in the very centre of the
field. With more time and space to play out, he
was able to utilize his distributing abilities, often
feigning long-range distribution out wide. That
moved players away from the centre of the
pitch. Barcelona would then play inside before
quickly playing wide. Before moving to the next
picture, notice how Messi has dragged Ramos
into the midfield and the ter Stegen faking a
wide pass created central space for Arthur. The
switch from Kroos and Casemiro wasn’t clean,
so the Barcelona midfielder received more time
as a result of the error.
155
As Semedo received the pass, he took a touch
and then played Martin Braithwaite behind the
defence with a sumptuous curling effort. Notice
Ramos is still trying to recover his ground. He’s
behind the play and unable to help Marcelo.
Varane was busy man-marking on the right,
meaning Braithwaite was able to use his
speed without concern of running into a cover
defender.
Courtois came out and made the angle tight,
saving Real Madrid, who would go on to score
the winner in the following minutes. Still, with
Braithwaite behind the Madrid backline, this
goes to show the necessity of forcing the initial
distribution from a deeper area and of the plus
one in defence. Without it, one pacey player
can break the system.
After the pass
out of pressure
L et’s say the opposition does make a pass
out of pressure and connect with a higher
positioned player, but the defending team has
the numbers back to cope with the lapse. In
this instance, winning the ball is still an option,
so a tactical foul isn’t necessary. What needs
to happen is the closest defender needs
to go press while funnelling away from the
opponent’s nearest passing options. If he’s
leaving an attacker, his run should cut out the
passing lane as well.
If numbers and the defenders’ positioning
enable the first defender to pressure with
adequate coverage, he should apply pressure.
If the nearest defender hasn’t quite arrived,
perhaps he’s making a recovery run; the
defender should delay the attack while awaiting
help. If the nearest help is a recovery defender,
turning this 1v1 into a 2v1 is beneficial.
The conditions surrounding the attack are
highly variable, so it’s impossible to address
every scenario, but, if possible, funnelling the
attack into the wings is the ideal route is the
first wave of defence is broken. Reduce the
opposition’s options and attempt to trap them
out wide. If the opponent is able to win a 1v1
dribbling duel, fouling is the obvious solution.
Otherwise, limiting his passing options and
range of ball striking options makes play more
predictable. If he’s stuck on the wing, he only
has so many options to play out of pressure.
If the defending team has numbers behind the
ball, forcing a rushed, undesirable action from
the attacker is the best-case scenario.
In the Austrian Bundesliga’s biggest match of
the season, Red Bull Salzburg hosted LASK
with the winner taking control of the league
table. This scenario saw LASK lose possession
deep in the Salzburg end. Facing heavy
pressure, Maximilian Wöber decided to bypass
the LASK lines, playing the pass high and wide.
You can make an argument that a pass to
Enock Mwepu, who’s between the LASK lines
at the corner of the box, is the better option.
156
Even in that scenario, he’d face heavy pressure
from Peter Michorl. With Wöber off-balance,
there’s no guarantee he’s able to put enough
pace on the pass to give Mwepu the necessary
conditions for a successful action.
Masaya Okugawa claimed the pass and
headed back to the run of Mwepu. Michorl
was quick to close him down, funnelling the
Zambian wide and preventing the ball over the
top to Hwang Hee-Chan. Notice Patson Daka’s
run forward. With Hwang moving into the left-
half space, the central channel opened up for
Daka. If not for the immediate pressure on the
ball, Mwepu would have played Daka through
to goal. Great pressure on the ball carrier
delayed the attack and allowed the LASK
midfield to recover its ground.
LASK is still in recovery mode and trying to
contain the Salzburg attack. It no longer has
the plus one at the back, but the key is close
proximity to Mwepu. Denying him the time
and space to play his top option with the right
technique was critical. Further, he really only
has one option; the through ball to Daka. With
Philipp Wiesinger intelligently taking away the
touchline pass to Okugawa, Gernot Trauner
was able to cheat centrally in anticipation of
the through ball. That movement led to his
interception, starting the next wave of the LASK
attack. Even though LASK’s lines were bypass
with the first ball and Salzburg controlled
the second, a commitment to recovery and
pressure on the ball carrier denied Red Bull
the opportunity to play the killer pass. With
the attack suitably delayed and attacking
options restricted, LASK made the play
more predictable and was able to claim the
attempted through ball.
direct, quick-strike opportunities to goal,
coaches must look to create attacking
conditions from defensive dominance. Man-
marking in a high press is currently one of
the most effective means of creating ideal
attacking opportunities. Most teams struggle
to overcome the press and, even if they do,
a tactical foul will nullify the attack. Given the
huge upside of the man-marking high press
model and limited downside, expect more
clubs to apply this defensive tactic in the near
future.

Conclusion
A s this analysis shows, the upside of man-
marking in a high press gives the top clubs
a significant edge. When the press works,
routes to goal are more open and the side will
have a numerical superiority while advancing
to the opposition’s box. Additionally, a strong
counter-press and focused approach after a
loss allows the man-marking sides to effectively
force the opposition to initiate the attack from
weaker starting points.

There are some downsides to man-marking

in a high press. As with any man-marking
system, the first defender cannot afford to
lose his individual battle. If that happens, the
opposition can have a run at the next line of
defence. Since that line is also man-marking,
the opposition can attack in a numerical
superiority or even numbers (supposing the
backline has maintained its plus one). However,
we’ve discussed some of the solutions applied
by the top man-marking teams. Whether
funnelling play to the wings, delaying the attack
or fouling, there’s a way out of most problems.

With the game favouring teams that create

157
Tactical Analysis:

Getafe’s time under José Bordalás

BY SUDESH BANIYA // @SudeshBaniya10

158
T he Estadio Coliseum Alfonso Pérez fell to
tears after Getafe, one of the youngest
sides in the Spanish top-flight, dropped to
Segunda División ending their 12 years of
LaLiga action in 2015/16. Struggling on their
return to the Segunda too, Getafe had other
plans- a managerial switch - appointing
Spaniard José Bordalás.
Bordalás, former Spanish forward forced to
retire following an injury at a mere age of 28,
has made a name for himself - the man behind
Getafe’s rise from the ruins. José Bordalás’s
appointment turned into a ‘Herculean’ decision
for the Azulones, who’ve come a long way to
the brink of Champions League qualification
this season and are currently fourth on the
table. For a young club seeking identity from
the capital of Spain, Bordalás has become
an idol, that took them to an 8th-place finish
on their return to Liga and finished 5th the
following 18/19 season.
For a side that has started to believe, we’re
here to discuss José Bordalás’ tactics that
have worked for Getafe. Fasten your seat belts,
this tactical analysis is going to be as ‘anti-
football’ as it gets.
4-4-2: The Jose
Bordalas Way
J osé Bordalás has been rigid about how his
teams occupy the pitch ever since he has
made his way to the Spanish capital. Getafe
under Bordalás are seen lining-up in a 4-4-
2 or occasionally 4-4-2 with a double pivot.
Bordalás’ emphasis on maintaining his side’s
structure to ultimately accomplish his side’s
dominance off the ball makes him tactically
stubborn. Bordalás sticks to his original plans,
forcing the opponent to adapt to his side’s
rigid structure based on the small integration
159
of players within smaller areas in the pitch.
Rather than adapting themselves, they seem
to strangle the opponents and have been
successful in forcing sides out of their comfort
zone.
Image 1: The recent Getafe line-up in a 4-4-2
formation. [Whoscored.com]
Getafe has largely been about creating mini-
combination of players within the broad
formation they have while retaining the
originality. Bordalás uses this method to create
numerical superiority in his side’s favour,
which we will discuss throughout this article.
With a positional sense of advancement
and discipline, Bordalás manages to create
advantage on the attack, on the press, and on
the defence as well. Getafe have been able to
create mobile situations for forwards to receive
passes in attacks, 2 vs. 1 situation while the
opposition has the ball on the press and
chances for the defenders to close in on the
ball-carrying player while defending.
These attributes have become peculiar
characteristics of Getafe ever since José
Bordalás took over the struggling side after
managing 12 sides in succession. The
formation often termed to be a defensive one
and outdated has seen a massive boost with
Bordalás trusting his players to execute in the
system. Four defenders, Four midfielders, two
strikers. 4-4-2: José Bordalás’ way.
 Defence- the beginning
of Getafe's attacks
B reaking the apparent stereotype - Getafe’s
defence is much more than just rough plays
and fouls. While it might seem to be a rather
rustic approach, Bordalás’ sides are tactically Image 3- Getafe’s defensive shape, with an
stout and defend with confidence on the tactic extra midfielder on defense.
that their coach puts on papers.
In the instance above, one central midfielder
The most prominent feature of Getafe’s defence drops down to fill the void between the
under Bordalás lies in their formation itself. center-backs. In order to compensate for the
Getafe create two lines of 4 players behind drop, Jaime Mata drops down to the middle,
their forwards, which itself becomes hard to balancing the number of midfielders that go for
penetrate for the sides that build-up centrally. the ball.

Similarly, Getafe have managed to be alright

Image 2- The two 4-men layers, with mobile
forwards that can help in defense and press.
even after the departure of Carbera. The back
two of Etxeita and Dejene have been recovering
balls outside the box, dealing with the aerial
balls quite well and complimenting each other’s
style of play. Bordalás has been able to make
the most out of the defensive players that he
has. The process can be seen in the following
instance, where two center-backs close in after
detecting the opposition’s run into the void.

Bordalás’ team creates a numerical advantage

on defense with the midfielders dropping
deep. Central midfielders with the likes of
Mauro Arambarri and Nemanja Maksimović
are frequently used as a double pivot to assist
the back two of Djené Dakonam and Xabier
Etxeita. This makes Getafe comparatively intact
and less-vulnerable of open spaces that can be
capitalized centrally. Image-4: The striker’s direction of run towards
the void.

The two players, who seem to be marking their

own opposition players, now combine to close
in at the run, ultimately recovering the ball

160
without letting the player take advantage of the
situation:
Image-5: The close-in, successful defending
partnership.
The transition from
defence to attack -
Getafe's two engines
G etafe might seem like a team that likes
to sit back and defend most of the
time based on the papers but in reality, they
are a threatening side once they get hold
of the ball. After a successful defensive
recovery, Bordalás’ Getafe uses two engines-
Maksimović and Arambarri to quickly transform
defense into an attack. First things first, the
presence of a double pivot enables the side to
defend effectively from the center.
Image-6: Two cases of the pivotal movements
that Getafe show- indicated by black and red
separately.
161
When one of the double pivots drops down to
cover the void, the other one occupies a more
central role - in order to track for the extra
attacking player and then provide a transition
for an attack in case of a recovery.
Maksimović and Arambarri have been very
effective in this module. Maksimović has turned
himself into an ideal modern-day box-to-box
midfielder, supporting the team in both attacks
and defense. Arambarri has been a perfect
companion to what Maksimović possesses,
using his pace to cancel out opponent counters
and using it for counter-attacks as well.
Image 7: Maksimović recovering a ball, spots
Arambarri’s run. The move creates a counter-
attacking situation.
One of the major reasons for Bordalás being
able to hit back on the opportunities that
Getafe get without being on possession
is the presence of a tactically sound and
complementing central midfielders in
Maksimović and Arambarri. Rightly said, the
two are the ‘engines’ of Bordalás’ journey so
far and will be looking forwards.
Getafe's s' mart' pressing
I n modern-day football, pressing high and
recovering the second balls are more closely
linked to sides that are comfortable with the
ball and are focused to build-up from the back
dominating the possession. Getafe, however,
press high but are comfortable without the ball.
It all comes down to Bordalás’s approach of
pressing high and when necessary, forcing the
opponents to change their style of play.
Getafe press aggressively with a compact
structure. Higher up the pitch, Getafe use their
inverted fullbacks and wide midfielders to press
against the opposition fullbacks and limiting
their passing options nearby to increase the
chances of errors while they attempt to send
the ball to the other flank or pass wrong.
Image 8: A Module of Getafe (Black) pressing
the opposing full-back (blue) with the ball.
Similarly, Getafe tend to outnumber their
opponents on the press as well, often closing
in on a 2 vs 1 situation. This helps to create
enough pressure on the opposition player to
make quick decisions and create a greater
margin of error.
Image 9: Two players- a forward and a wide
player pressing the opposition recovery.
162
In the instance shown, the opposition center-
back recovers the ball and attempts to make
a run from the wider side of the pitch. The
forward comes in support of the wide player to
provide a numerical advantage to recover the
ball. At the end of the move, Getafe nullify any
chance of a build-up and network of passes
through intact discipline between two players
involved in the press.
Inverting players
and smart movements
O ne thing that seems to bother Getafe’s
opponents, often sides that choose to play
on possession is their ability to play their own
brand of football limiting the opponents on their
own half.
This is where Bordalás’ uniqueness comes out
on top. Bordalás frequently opts to invert his
wide players, making Getafe more advanced
than a contemporary 4-4-2 playing side. As a
result, the inverted wingers come to help out
with the center backs to defend. For this very
reason, Getafe start with full-backs as wide
midfielders occasionally, provided that they
know exactly when to make runs, move and
when to defend and trackback.
Image 10: A demonstration of Getafe (Black)
wide players inverting and moving to cover
each other in the wide side of the pitch.
Generally, Getafe’s wider players are seen
to have a healthy work rate under Bordalás.
Bordalás occasionally opts to play Allan Nyom
both as a right-back and a right midfielder out
wide. This ability to be able to invert positions
during play and make smart movements
depending upon the tempo of the opponent
has been groomed by Bordalás a lot and is vital
to his side’s success.
Attacks- the
two-striker advantage
T he Bordalás chasm of attack is driven by
a Spanish duo of Jaime Mata and Jorge
Molina. Both players, struggling to make a
name for themselves some years ago, have
absolutely thrived under Bordalás. Bordalás
here, in the forward partnership duo, tries to
outnumber the opponent centre-backs using
the two mobile forwards upfront.
Image 11: Two Getafe forwards, one draws the
marker whereas other contemplates the space.
Jaime Mata often makes the forward runs,
with the support of Getafe’s wide players while
Jorge Molina is often seen dragging defenders
with his movements to create a space for an
attack.
163
Image 12: Mata’s run and Molina’s off the ball
movement to draw defenders.
On the occasion shown above, Mata’s run is
complemented by Molina’s off-the-ball deep
movement to draw defenders towards him.
This creates a two-way opportunity, either for
Mata to cut back and take a shot or enable the
arriving player to occupy a central role to take
a shot off Mata’s pass. Bordalás has made
the pair cover for each other’s weaknesses in
attributes with their own.
Getafe’s bench of Ángel Rodríguez and
Deyverson too is strong looking at the fact that
Angel has scored 8 out of 10 matches he’s
started on the bench. Deyverson, on the other
hand, has been an effective option in place of
Jorge Molina.
Anti-football?
A s Bordalás has been saying time and
again, his brand of football is not played
to please everyone and many have claimed it
to be frustrating to watch. Getafe, however, are
making a mark of themselves and especially
Bordalás, who’s become an example for
managers who play pragmatic football to
counter possession-based sides.
Bordalás’ tenure so far with Getafe has been
heroic as the man has been able to deliver and
able to spark hope to players. Maksimović
and David Soria, both termed misfits in their
previous tenures are finding their own identity
and there are a lot of players that have stuck to
Bordalás’s side, permanently committing to the
club. As Bordalás has extended his contract for
a further three years, big things will come for
Getafe, provided that José Bordalás continues
his footballing emblem - anti-football as they
call it.

Because there’s a new José in town, and it’s

Bordalás. José Bordalás.

164
Quique Setien:

His Barcelona approach

BY MAK PAKHEI // @MakPakhei

165
D espite staying in major competitions and
top of La Liga in the new calendar year,
Ernesto Valverde was sacked by Barcelona on
13th January. His replacement was former Real
Betis manager, Quique Setién. The 61-year-old
was famous for his intense pressing strategies
at Heliopolitanos, including a tremendous 4-3
victory at Camp Nou last season.
Given the injuries to Luis Suárez and Ousmane
Demebélé, the options of Setién have been
limited. So far, in 12 matches under the new
manager, Barcelona have recorded eight wins,
one draw and three losses, scoring 22 goals
and conceding 11. In the Copa del Rey, they
were knocked out by Athletic Club; they sit
second on the table, one point behind Real
Madrid after the loss in El Clásico; in the
Champions League, they secured a 1-1 draw
against Napoli at Sao Paulo.
In this tactical analysis, we will show you the
pressing of Barcelona and their strategies to
control the game. It is an analysis that focuses
on Setién’s tactics.
High press
T o begin with, we plotted a graph which
demonstrated the pass allowed per
defensive actions (PPDA) indexes (only
included La Liga and the Champions League).
As shown by the statistics below, the press
of Barcelona remained in a consistent level,
remained between 4.68 and 11.78. The average
PPDA per game was 7.43, it hinted that they
were pressing intensively on most occasions.
166
Setién deployed a high pressing tactic,
instructed his players like Sergio Canales,
Giovani Lo Celso and Loren Morón to man-
mark the opponents tightly. However, in
Barcelona, he had a very different team,
especially with a bunch of attacking talents,
Lionel Messi and Antoine Griezmann.
Therefore, the Spaniard could not replicate
everything to this squad, he had to
accommodate based on the individuals.
Setién clearly understood that it was unwise
to spend Messi’s energy in the high press, the
Argentine should preserve his stamina in the
offensive phases. On occasions, Messi was
exempted in the high press, thus, affecting the
pressing shape of Barcelona. It was between a
4-4-2 and 4-3-3 formation.
Barcelona could only achieve partial man-
marking in the high press. They were limited
by the insufficient mobility of ageing players
such as Messi and Sergio Busquets. In general,
they commit one midfielder from the trio to
join the press at the frontline, depending on
the positions of the ball. Even though they
could not win the ball high, they still wished
to force the oppositions to play long to reach
their backline. In those cases, Barcelona had
an experienced centre-back, Gerard Piqué,
who had the ability to deal with most long
balls. The Spaniard achieved remarkable
defending stats under the new manager, he
had 4.88 interceptions and 11.25 recoveries on
average. In his recent eight appearances under
Setién, the success rate of his defensive duels
and aerial duels were 79.38% and 71.75%
respectively.

This was an example from the game at Sao

Paulo. In this scene, Barcelona tried to man-
mark Napoli players to disrupt the build-
up play, with Ivan Rakitić controlling Diego
Demme. When Messi was approaching
Konstantinos Manolas, Arturo Vidal already
began his run to close David Ospina. His run
also cut the passing lane to Nikola Maksimović.
Since there was a yellow shirt around Demme
and Giovanni Di Lorenzo, Manolas played
back to the keeper, and, under pressure
from Vidal, the Colombian had to kick long
instantaneously.
You can see in this image, we drew the lines
to connect the pressing shape of Barca liked
a 4-4-2, but you can also consider Frenkie
de Jong as one of the front three as he was
close to Griezmann, then it was a 4-3-3. What
matters was the timing of the marking. By
stepping out early, Setién wanted his team to
shut the free player in the build-up phase as
early as possible, which forced the oppositions
to play long.

Under early pressure from De Jong, Carvajal

returned the ball to Varane, then, the
Frenchman played long.

Below was another example from El Clásico. As

Madrid had Toni Kroos in the half-spaces as an
extra man in the build-up, Arthur Melo stepped
out to stay close to the German. Meanwhile, his
teammates picked the corresponding targets
(Vidal – Marcelo; Messi – Sergio Ramos).
Griezmann tried to keep both Raphaël Varane
and Daniel Carvajal under control by staying
between them. Compactness
In this case, Ramos still passed to Kroos.
However, the build-up was disrupted under the
pressure from Arthur, who made a foul to stop
M aintaining a compact shape is the key to
success for all defences. Given the limited
mobility of individuals, Barcelona were not
the German. doing well in this criterion, it also affected the
quality of the press.

On some occasions, it was a structural issue

167
when Barcelona were pressing in a 4-3-3.
They were overloaded in midfield. As shown
in this image, Betis stretched the defence of
Setién’s men, and the second layer of Barca’s
defence was overloaded by five players. It
was impossible for the midfield three to cover
huge spaces, especially in the wide areas. In
this scenario, Barcelona lacked compactness
vertically; the horizontal coverage of the
midfield was insufficient. As a result, Joel
Robels found Carles Aleñá with a comfortable Below was another example. Barcelona had
ground pass. enough numbers in the press and achieved
partial man-marking out wide (Semedo – Roger
Martí; Busquets – José Campaña). Again,
the block lacked compactness as the front
players did not compress space. As a result,
Gonzalo Melero was free to receive the pass
from Campaña and Levante broke the press of
Barcelona. Again, it was the spacing issue at
the half-spaces that let Barça down.

De Jong and Busquets were almost

irreplaceable under Setién, the choice of the
remaining quota was rotating between Rakitić,
Arthur or Sergi Roberto. These midfielders had
good techniques on the ball, but they lacked
pace and stamina to sprint during the press.
When Barcelona were pressing out wide, they
were too slow to shut the half-spaces and
those areas allowed the opponents to escape
the press.
In this example, Napoli utilised their strength:
combinations on the flanks to break the press.
Barcelona were pressing high, but the players
were separated in two segments. In this case,
Mário Rui carried the ball within the block to
progress the attack.
For the Barcelona defenders, it was awkward
to set the height of their defensive line.
They lacked pace and were exposed when
defending high. On most occasions, they
stayed behind the midfield line, which was far
away from the midfielders. Then, the block was
not compact vertically.
In this scenario, though De Jong was
approaching Carvajal, his run was too direct.
Therefore, the Real Madrid right-back easily
opened his body shape. Busquets was too
far from the Dutchman and the defenders.
Therefore, Karim Benzema exploited those

168
spaces and Madrid’s attack progressed.
As mentioned, the coverage of Barcelona
midfielders was insufficient during the press,
hence, the intensity was weak. This example
demonstrated the issue. Barcelona were man-
marking Betis (De Jong – Canales; Busquets
– William Carvalho; - Roberto – Álex Moreno),
but De Jong failed to win the ball from Canales.
Though it was a good pressing trap as the
pressing players were staying close to each
other, Barcelona still failed to win the ball high.
In one v one situations, it seemed Setién’s
pressing troops also lacked physicality and
intensity to win the ball.
Counter-pressing
I f possible, Barcelona also tried to counter-
press the ball once they lost it. It was a man-
marking scheme, which usually happened
when they were overloading a certain area.
Therefore, Barcelona did not isolate Messi
in the offensive phases as they needed to
169
counter-press in case the ball loss. This is
part of their reason to stay close to each other
offensively which we will elaborate on in the
coming sections.
In this scenario, Messi loses the ball in a
dribble but he had Arthur and Vidal behind him
to provide an immediate counter-press. Both
of them picked the closest option around Isco
and dashed to mark the targets. This delayed
the counter-attack, as Isco returned the ball to
Thibaut Courtois after evaluating the risks of
passing into the Barcelona block.
During the offensive phases, Setién had both
full-backs attacking high on the pitch. This was
not merely an offensive consideration, it was
also a plan to increase the effectiveness of the
counter-presses. Since the full-backs stayed
high on the pitch, they could quickly join the
press.
This was an example. Vidal loss the ball and it
rolled to Maksimović’s feet. As long as the ball
was out wide, it triggered the counter-press
from Barca. Meanwhile, Rakitić was man-
marking Piotr Zieliński. When Semedo dashed
to Maksimović in full speed, the Serbian had
to pass the ball away quickly, which triggered
Rakitić to leave his position to approach
Demme. These defensive actions successfully
denied a quick counter, it was even better as
Semedo intercepted Demme’s return pass and
Barcelona regained the ball in the opposition
third.

Control of the game
S ince Barcelona were offensively better than
defending, also, their press lacked intensity
and compactness, Setién had to find a way to
balance both ends. He could not fully replicate
his man-marking scheme in this team. In hope
of reducing the time defending, his team had
to dominate the ball. The idea was simple, the
longer period you keep the ball, the shorter you
were defending. Barcelona were trying to avoid
losing the ball by taking the safer option.
Below is a graph showing the possession
of Barcelona in La Liga and the Champions
League. Apart from the Real Madrid game,
Barcelona enjoyed more than 60% of the
possession in all of them, and even reaching
78.8% in the first game against Granada. The
average possession of these eight games was
68.64%.
In order to control the flow of the game better,
Barcelona liked to overload the central areas.
170
Despite playing in a 4-3-3, both wingers tended
to invert and roam the positions. It was more
commonly seen when they were playing a
midfielder, Vidal, as the right-winger.
This system helped Barcelona to counter-press
more efficiently. You can see the shape from
Barcelona below, four layers at the centre and
a pair of spared wide players. For the wide
players, as explained, they were released and
became the fresh legs to participate in the
counter-press.
Apart from the offensive perspective,
positioning large numbers at the centre
was conducive to the counter-press. First,
Barcelona’s counter-press could start from
different height; second, they caged Madrid
players even when they lost the ball.
Below is an example. When Barcelona lost the
ball in the middle, given the density of central
players, they could immediately counter-
press. Setién’s men quickly pushed forward in
a compact manner to approach Carvajal and
Varane. Meanwhile, Casemiro and Kroos were
caged within the block as well. This showed
how the overload at the centre could turn into a
counter-press.

Apart from the counter-pressing strategies,
Barça kept the ball by avoiding bold actions.
They tended to pass to a visibly free option,
leaving the difficult jobs to Messi. Setién’s team
could not frequent ball loss and large scale of
defence in a game. Therefore, we seldom see
Barcelona attempt risky passes.
In this situation, you can see Busquets tried to
break into the final third. He had some options,
including De Jong, who was running into the
huge spaces between defenders. It was a
slightly risky pass as it required appropriate
weight and direction, or else the keeper will
come out to claim the ball, possibly leading
to a Valencia counter-attack. Despite being
an experienced passer, Busquets carried the
ball and gave up the idea to pass to De Jong.
Eventually, he found Semedo, who was totally
free out wide. It was a suboptimal option but
the risk is lower as well.
Another part of the control of game was
reflected on the wing. Barcelona had the width
to attack the flanks, but they seldom tended to
171
move the ball back to the centre when the wide
channels were unavailable. Despite possessing
young and pacey players liked Ansu Fati,
they were reluctant to exploit the one v one
opportunities, unless that was Messi.
This was an example. Despite Barcelona
having Semedo and Roberto on the right, they
showed no incentives to combine and attack
down the flank. A possible explanation was the
presence of Betis players, as Barcelona wanted
to control the game better, they chose to return
the ball back and reorganise the attack away
from the pressure.
Conclusion
I t is not an easy job for Setién at Barcelona.
He does not have the type of players he seeks
in the team currently, so it has forced him to
adjust his tactics a bit. Despite the pressing
and counter-pressing elements remaining in
the team, the more important point was to
control the game. It is of the essence to be the
dominant team, although this approach may
slow down their attack. In order to increase
the physicality and defensive coverage, Vidal
was used as a right-winger instead of Ansu
Fati in big games. This was a tough season
for Barcelona, still in both La Liga and the
Champions League, and Setién has to find a
way to maximise their strengths and cover the
weaknesses as much as possible.
 Ajax:

Replacing Hakim Ziyech

BY LEE SCOTT // @FMAnalysis

172
O n the 23rd February 2020, it was
announced that the Moroccan
international Hakim Ziyech had agreed to a
at players with at least 1500 minutes and that
have played across the midfield.

deal to leave Ajax and join Chelsea. That this

move was announced without incessant media
speculation was indicative of the player. Whilst
on the pitch Ziyech is a creative force he is
a team player off of it. Even when he moved
to Ajax, following the relegation and financial
issues faced by his previous club FC Twente,
Ziyech had not agitated for the move and the
Twente fans loved him for it.

Chelsea are getting a player who is capable

of playing centrally or wide on the right but
beyond the positional versatility, they are
getting a player who stands out in terms of his
creative and attacking output.
First of all, we have charted players by the
The purpose of this tactical analysis is to, number of passes they play into the penalty
first of all, understand exactly what kind of area per 90 minutes and their expected assists
player Hakim Ziyech is before identifying three per 90 minutes. As you can immediately see
potential replacements that Ajax could turn to. Ziyech is the clear outlier. He is registering over
We will examine one player who is already at 11 passes to the penalty area per 90 minutes
the club, one who is based in Holland, and one and an xA of just under 0.75 per 90.
from elsewhere in Europe.

Hakim Ziyech, the

output machine
T his season we had seen Ziyech play mostly
from the right of the three-man attack. He
is naturally left-footed and this lends itself to
Ziyech coming inside when in possession of
the ball. He has a passing range that allows
him to access all areas of the field from the
right-side and his diagonal passes often create
goalscoring opportunities. It is interesting to
consult data when considering the output of
a player of this type. This allows us to get a This time we are taking the same data set and
better understanding of how they perform on examining the number of shots per 90 that a
the pitch. I have gathered data from the top player takes and his progressive passes per 90
five leagues and the Dutch top-flight looking minutes. Once again we can clearly see that

173
Ziyech is a standout. He has a tendency to
shoot from range once he has cut infield and he
will often shoot from distance. This goes some
way to explaining the fact that he is averaging
over five shots per 90 minutes.
Finally, we are looking at shots per 90 minutes
and expected goals per 90 minutes. Once
again Ziyech impresses with his amount of
shots at goal but those shots also carry a
genuine threat as he has just under 0.40 xG per
match.
If we put all of that together then we can build a
fuller picture of the profile that Ziyech presents
and this, in turn, shows us what Ajax will have
to try to replace. Ziyech is a progressive passer
who creates chances for his teammates but he
is also a volume shooter who carries a genuine
threat from range. In short, Ziyech is a key
player in the Ajax attacking game model. He
will be a genuine loss for the team.
174
Abdulkadir Omur
the replacement from
abroad
T he first of the players that I would
recommend as a potential replacement for
Ziyech is Abdulkadir Omur of Trabzonspor and
Turkey. The 20-year-old attacking midfielder
has been labelled the Turkish Messi by some
and that alone gives some insight into his
playing style.
The first thing that we need to make clear
is that to an extent the variances in output
from player to player is partially down to the
differences in playing style between various
sides. Ajax are possession heavy and play on
the attack a lot of the time. Trabzonspor, on the
other hand, are a side who play in transition a
lot of the time with less time on the ball for their
attacking players.
One of the first things that stands out when
watching Omur play is his ability to beat a man
in dangerous areas before finding passes to
teammates in advanced positions.
We see an example of this above as Omur
picks up possession of the ball in the central
areas. He beats a defensive player, as the
defender commits himself, and then drives
forward into a pocket of space. As he beats
the midfielder there is a wide player who
makes a forward run to stretch the play. Omur
is intelligent enough to hold on to possession
of the ball until another defender moves to
engage him. He then plays a well-weighted
pass out to the wide man before continuing his
run to support the play centrally.
Omur is extremely creative around the penalty
area and he consistently finds angles of passes
that create chances for teammates. We see an
example of this above as the ball is played into
Omur from the wide area. He takes possession
just outside the penalty area and calmly lifts the
ball over the defensive line for the forward to
take a shot at goal.
Omur plays either from the right-hand side
or centrally and he stands out when taking
up intelligent positions between the lines. He
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constantly looks to drift off of the shoulder of
defensive players into areas that are difficult
to defend. In the example above we see Omur
receiving the ball in one of these pockets.
Here he takes possession on his back foot
and immediately turns to put pressure on the
defensive line.
Calvin Stengs
the domestic replacement
A Z Alkmaar have been one of the most
impressive teams in Holland recently.
Their willingness to blood and develop young
players while favouring attacking football has
caught the eye of many onlookers. One of their
key players in the last two seasons has been
their attacking midfielder Calvin Stengs. Like
Hakim Ziyech the 21-year-old Stengs plays
predominantly from the right side of a front
three and like Ziyech he is also predominantly
left-footed.
Stengs is an excellent progressor of the ball
either when dribbling or playing forward into
dangerous areas. His ability to drift past
defensive players and then find passes into the
penalty area is extremely reminiscent of Ziyech.
Stengs is a creative passer who finds angles
to access the penalty area whenever the
opportunity presents itself. In the example
above we see Stengs in possession wide on
the right with two defenders close by. One
player is making a run towards the ball and this
drags another defensive player out of position.
The right-back is then able to make an inverted
run into the penalty area. Stengs plays the ball
around the corner with the outside of his left
foot to find the run of the fullback.
Stengs is also an effective dribbler with his
ability to beat defensive players when going
either outside or inside. We see an example of
this here as Stengs takes possession with only
one defender between him and the goal. As
the defensive player moves across to challenge
for the ball Stengs drifts away from him easily
while cutting inside. He then curls the ball into
the far post.
Here again, we see how dangerous Stengs is
when driving inside in possession of the ball.
This time, in the match against Ajax, we see
176
him take possession of the ball outside before
driving inside. There are three players who drop
back to try to close down space but Stengs is
confident in his own ability. He accesses the
central space before getting a dangerous shot
on goal.
Ryan Gravenberch
the in-house replacement
T he third and final suggestion that I have in
terms of a replacement for Ziyech is a bit
more of a stretch positionally but it would be
one that would cost the club nothing. Ryan
Gravenberch is only 17-years-old but he has
been at the club since he was 9. The youngster
is a regular fixture in the Jong Ajax side that
plays in the Dutch second tier but this season
has seen him start to make a genuine impact at
first-team level.
Gravenberch plays most often as an ‘8’ in the
centre of the midfield but he profiles as a player
who could perform the same role as Ziyech
currently does for the first team. Gravenberch
carries the ball extremely well and regularly
beats players in central areas. He also has a
real ability when progressing the ball forward
and breaking lines with his passing.
Similar to Ziyech we often see Gravenberch
display the range and depth of his passing
to access the runs of teammates. We see
an example of this above with Gravenberch
in possession centrally. With opposition
midfielders trying to close him down and a
runner on the far side of the field, we see the
ball moved accurately and quickly across the
shoulder of the opposition fullback. This pass
allows the wide player to take possession and
threaten the final third.
For a player who is so young Gravenberch is
also extremely confident when carrying the ball
and committing defensive players. Here we see
him collect the ball wide on the right-hand side
with a group of defensive players between him
and the penalty area and no immediate support
from teammates. In these circumstances,
young players will look to play a difficult pass.
In this instance, however, Gravenberch slows
the game down before quickly accelerating
and moving past the defensive players into the
highlighted space. He then plays a superb pass
across the face of the goal that nearly ends in
an easy chance for a teammate.

Conclusion
For any side, in football, there are few more
difficult tasks than replacing a key player.
Hakim Ziyech is such an effective component
of this Ajax side that it is difficult to see how
As well as having great range with his passing they can source a direct replacement. Of the
Gravenberch is also very creative in tight three players mentioned above, I believe that
spaces. He often plays either one touch or even Calvin Stengs represents the most intelligent
with a half touch as he allows the ball to run replacement although the cost to get him away
before flicking it into the feet of a teammate. from AZ Alkmaar would be prohibitive.
We see an example of this creativity above as
the young midfielder takes possession of the Chelsea fans should be excited at the prospect
ball at the edge of the penalty area. He allows of having a player of Ziyech’s attacking ability
the ball to run past him and then flicks it with joining the club in the near future.
his heel past the defender for the attacking
player to have a strike on goal.

177
 Thomas Muller:

The renaissance

BY THANOSHAAN THAYALAN // @Thano_Thayalan

178
T homas Müller established himself as one
of Germany’s best young talents in the
2009/10 season under Louis van Gaal at
Bayern Munich. His stock rose after he won
the Golden Boot at the 2010 World Cup at only
20-years-old. He was becoming an integral part
of Bayern’s team and was crucial in Die Roten’s
historic treble campaign in the 2012/13 season.
The following summer, he scored five goals to
help Germany lift their fourth ever World Cup.
During this time, he was regarded as one of
the best players in the world and became
the inventor of a new footballing role – the
‘Raumdeuter’. Müller’s eccentric style of play
caught the attention of the world as he was
able to find space and use his high footballing
IQ to have a positive effect on his team. He
continued to flourish under Pep Guardiola
contributing to a lot of goals and cementing
himself as a legend at the club he grew up
supporting.
Consistent position
T he 30-year-old has played in a lot of
different positions throughout his career
and the same goes for this season, which
showcases his tactical flexibility and highlights
his footballing IQ. Under Niko Kovac, Müller
was mostly deployed as either a centre-forward
or an attacking midfielder behind Robert
Lewandowski. During the Croatian’s short stint
this campaign, Müller only contributed to four
goals in ten games. Meanwhile under Flick, the
German has an incredible goal contribution tally
of 17 in 14 Bundesliga games. This is partly
down to Müller featuring more often as a right-
winger – his preferred position.

However, following Germany’s shocking

group stage elimination in the 2018 World
Cup, questions were being asked of whether
the versatile attacker could still deliver at
the highest level. Die Mannschaft’s manager
Joachim Löw axed him from the national team
squad just a couple of months later and Müller
later also found himself out of favour at club
level under Niko Kovac.

This season, following the dismissal of Kovac,

Müller has proved his doubters wrong with
Hansi Flick managing to get the best out of one
of football’s most unique players. This tactical
analysis will look at Müller’s renaissance under
the new coach and how he is once again, a key
player for the reigning Bundesliga champions.
The heat map is what you would expect from
a winger but there are some interesting signs.
There is quite a lot of action in the box for
someone who is supposed to be playing out
wide. In addition to that, the map also shows
that Müller likes to drift into the right half-
space, which usually occurs when Benjamin

179
Pavard pushes forward from right-back. When
he is in that half-space, he likes to make a
darting run in behind the defence into the
opposition box and then look for a cutback to
Lewandowski or onrushing midfielders. Since
Pavard is the defensive full-back out of him
and Alphonso Davies, it gives Müller a lot of
space to work with on the right-hand side. The
right-wing position also takes advantage of the
forward’s ability to deliver great crosses into the
box. This is important for Bayern as they lost Here, Müller is able to find a large amount of
one of their key creators in Joshua Kimmich space in front of the Köln defence. Thiago
who was able to garner a lot of assists from plays the ball into his feet, which attracts the
right-back but has now moved to central opposition defender to Müller because of his
midfield to give Bayern balance in the middle of imminent threat. Unfortunately for the defender,
the park. the German was one step ahead and noticed
Robert Lewandowski’s movement. He played
the ball into the path of the striker who moved
The 'Raumdeuter' role into the space that the defender vacated and
scored the opener.

M üller is the inventor of the Raumdeuter role

which is a German term that translates to
space investigator due to his superb ability to
Müller is able to find pockets of space in
between the lines especially when playing
create and move into space. Over the last few as an attacking midfielder. However, he finds
years, Müller himself admitted that he was not space more often by drifting into half-spaces
able to find space as he used to but Bayern’s and capitalising on the opposition defence’s
system under Hansi Flick has allowed the lapse in concentration.
30-year-old to rediscover his ability. Flick was
Joachim Löw’s assistant manager for Germany
and thus, knows Müller’s strengths and
weaknesses as a player. As mentioned earlier,
the manager deployed the versatile forward as
a right winger, which allows him to have a little
more space to work with. However, such is
Müller’s ability to play the Raumdeuter role and
Bayern’s fluidity in their attack, the German is
able to find and create space in the final third
with relative ease.
In this example, Müller drifts into the half-
space from a deeper wing position and is able
to wedge himself between two defenders and
make a darting run. His run attracts the last
defender, circled, leaving a lot of space in the
area for Lewandowski to attack. In the end,
Benjamin Pavard’s through ball went too wide

180
meaning that the keeper was able to get to
Müller’s cross before Lewandowski. Müller’s
combination play with the right-back when he
is in the right half-space is one of Hansi Flick’s
go-to combinations in Bayern’s attacking build-
up.
Here is another example of how Bayern use
Müller’s ability to drift into the half-space. The
German is able to get into the area without
being noticed by the opposition as their
defenders are all focused on David Alaba
who has the ball. The makeshift centre-back
recognises Müller’s movement and is able to
find him with a great long ball. Müller takes
advantage of the space and is able to control
the ball and lay it off to Kingsley Coman.
However, the Frenchman was unable to
connect with the cross. Under Flick, Die Roten
are fantastic at creating chances with Müller
one of the key players given his brilliance at
playing the Raumdeuter role.
Müller is also able to find space all over the
pitch and can be a useful counter-attacking
181
threat as shown above. Despite his lack of
pace and dribbling ability, his positioning and
movement make up for it. In the example
above, he quickly transitioned from helping
the team defensively to finding space behind
defenders who are focused on the ball. Joshua
Kimmich is able to find Müller via a long ball
and the attacker is able to progress the attack.
Given his advantageous position, no Dortmund
defender is able to get close to him without
leaving Bayern players open. Müller takes
full advantage of this and proceeds to play in
Serge Gnabry who scores Die Roten’s second
of the night.
Movement and Intelligence
T here are only a few players able to play
the Raumdeuter role in world football and
two key attributes a player who plays in such a
role requires are movement and intelligence –
traits that Müller has in abundance. He makes
a variety of movements making it very hard
to mark him. He likes to make runs off the
shoulder of the last defender to go through on
goal or drop in little pockets and link-up with
his teammates.

Here are two examples showing Müller’s
striker’s instinctual movements that seem to
have been lost in previous seasons given the
decrease in his goal tallies over the years. The
German makes runs to be in great goalscoring
positions and his superb anticipation and
footballing IQ means he knows where the
passes are going to be. Both times, Leon
Goretzka puts the ball back across goal for
Müller to score. With Lewandowski the main
goalscoring threat and the likes of Goretzka
and Gnabry also able to score, Müller has been
given the task of being one of the creators
by Flick and is one of the reasons why he
has more assists than goals under the new
manager.
In this example, Müller showcases why he
has been able to produce 16 assists in the
Bundesliga. He plays a pass into Gnabry who
has a great amount of space to drive into and
does so often given his goalscoring nature.
Müller makes a great run and capitalises on
the opposition’s fatigue to ghost past the
defender, which gives Bayern a 2vs1 situation.
182
The ball is played back to Müller who himself
pulls it back to Joshua Zirkzee who scores a
crucial late goal. Normally the 30-year-old drifts
into position but he is also capable of making
great runs from a stationary position as shown
above.
This example encapsulates Müller’s football
brain as he is able to anticipate the move and
stay a couple of steps ahead of the opposition.
He already starts making a run when Alaba
passes the ball meaning that he is able to get
past his defender straight away. He moves into
the space that is occupied by the right-back,
annotated by a square, as he recognises that
he will press Gnabry who is the receiver. The
winger plays the pass into Müller who is now in
a great area of space. Then, Gnabry makes a
run into the space that Müller vacated but the
attack fizzles out. These type of movements
from the Bayern players and especially Müller
has been a key reason for how flexible their
attack has been under Flick – something that
was missing under previous manager Niko
Kovac.
Müller’s intelligence doesn’t just limit to his
movement as it is also evident in his decision
making. Here, he drops in between the
defence and midfield and finds some space.
Similar to the example prior, Müller recognises
Lewandowski’s run before receiving the pass
from Kimmich. His technical ability might not be
his greatest asset given his unorthodox style,
but he is still an incredibly gifted footballer and
is able to play a sensational first-time pass to
Lewandowski. The first-time pass is a staple In this example, it shows Bayern’s advanced
of Müller’s refined game and has been very and aggressive team press with Müller closing
effective this season. down the Schalke player with the ball. With
every passing option covered and Müller’s
willingness to press, the Schalke player tries
Defensive Contributions to go long only for his pass to ricochet of
the 30-year-old and go out for a throw-in.

B ayern Munich are blessed to have a lot of

great midfielders with the likes of Corentin
Tolisso, Thiago and Goretzka in their ranks.
Therefore, it must not come as a surprise that
Müller is involved in 5.31 defensive duels per
match.
They signed Philippe Coutinho on loan in the
summer and Niko Kovac refused to play both
Coutinho and Müller due to the lack of balance.
However, under Flick, they can both co-exist in
the line-up because of Müller’s contribution on
the defensive side whether that’s helping in the
team’s high and aggressive press or tracking
back.

Here, Bayern are doubling up on a Schalke

player with Müller and Gnabry to win the ball
back. Müller successfully manages to win the
ball back with Gnabry helping and running into
space to be a passing option.
In both of these occasions, Müller is able
to stop great goalscoring opportunities for
Borussia Dortmund by tracking back. Both
times, he is deep in Bayern’s half helping out

183
the defence despite being an attacking player.
In the first image, he is able to stop Axel Witsel
from having a chance on goal by tackling the
Dortmund player on the ball. Whereas in the
second image, he makes a great interception
so that Raphael Guerreiro can’t go through on
goal. Bayern’s defence is their weak point but
Müller’s desire to help in that area make him an
indisputable starter under Flick.

Conclusion
A fter being heavily linked with an exit
from his boyhood club just a couple of
months ago, Thomas Müller’s resurgence
under Hansi Flick has been a great sight to
witness. Contributing to five goals and 12
assists in just 14 Bundesliga appearances is
incredible but unsustainable. However, that
is not to say that he can’t be one of the top
contributors for Bayern Munich. With Flick
playing Müller in a role that best suits him, the
likes of Lewandowski and Gnabry will be huge
beneficiaries in the near future. His exceptional
footballing intelligence and movement are
assets that many top teams around the world
don’t have in players and thus, gives Flick and
Die Roten a competitive edge over their rivals.

184
 Theory:

Using rotations to create superiorities in build-up

BY TY LEVINSOHN // @TyLevinsohn

185
A s more and more teams start to adopt
a philosophy, tactics normally used
by ‘bigger’ sides have become more
commonplace among lesser sides. We’ve
seen newly promoted teams like Norwich and
Sheffield United sticking to their style of play,
with varying degrees of success. One of the
tactics that has become more popular over the
last few years is positional play. While some
coaches have built the majority of their tactical
system around complex positional play, an The above example shows how, despite not
increasing amount of coaches are beginning having a numerical superiority, the blue side
to incorporate positional play in their tactics have created a free man, and thus a positional
without integrating an entire positional play superiority due to the movement of the blue
system. In this tactical analysis, I’ll take a look #11, who frees themselves from their marker.
at one of these facets, using rotations to create
superiorities in the build-up. Usually, a numerical superiority will also lead
to a positional one, this is not always the
case, as shown in the below example, where,
Types of superiorities due to poor positioning, the blue team do not
have a positional superiority despite having a

In this analysis, I’ll be focusing on numerical

and positional superiorities. A numerical
superiority is simply having more players
numerical one.

than the opponent in a certain area, while

a positional superiority, is simply put, the
creation of a free man. The below two images
show examples of numerical and positional
superiorities, respectively.

The above examples are simple, idealised

In the above example, the blue team have
created 3 numerical superiorities, a 2v1 on
each wing and a 3v2 in the centre.
scenarios with no actual rotations being made.
Obviously, in an in-game scenario there are
many more variables to account for. The below
example shows a more realistic situation. The
red team are pressing in an aggressive 3-5-2,
which becomes a 3-3-4 to match up against
the blue team’s 4-3-3. At first sight, there are
no free men for the blue team to advance
possession through.

186
Due to the nature of football, the team in
possession always - in theory - have an
advantage, as they can play with all 11
players, while the defending team can only
press with 10, as pressing with a goalkeeper
is frankly suicidal. This advantage is enhanced
by pinning. If we take a closer look at the
above image, the blue wingers #7 and #11 are
unmarked, red #5 could press #11 but, should
#6 press #7, #9 can make a dangerous run in
behind, hence red #6 is pinned, and blue #7 is
truly open.
However, this doesn’t help the blue team all
that much as #7 is too far removed from the
area of build-up, but we can fix this by using
rotations. If one of the blue midfielders drops
to join their defensive line, one of the red
midfielders will be forced to follow them or else
a free man is created.
187
As a consequence of this movement, a gap is
created where the midfielders have vacated.
Which #7 can occupy, thus creating a free man
in midfield.
In the scenario just shown, the blue team used
a multitude of individual ideas and principles
to create a free man. Rather than focusing
on macro movements which have infinite
possibilities such as the one above, the rest
of this analysis will present some ideas, that,
when used in tandem will allow the team to
create superiorities.
For the purpose of this piece, I’ll be defining
a rotation as a player moving into a space in
which their position is not usually found, so
a central defender moving slightly laterally
will not be classified as a rotation, I’ll only be
dealing with more substantial movements.
Now that we’ve covered what superiorities and
rotations are, let’s take a look at some ideas.
 Creating superiorities
by rotating defenders
T he most simple way to create a positional
superiority in build-up is to utilise
movements made by defenders to create
space for themselves or others. Below I’ve
defined 3 ways in which defenders can rotate
to create superiorities Fullbacks: shifting
- Fullbacks/Wingbacks


- Inverting
- Shifting
A shifting movement is similar to inverting,
but it is when a fullback takes up a much
less advanced position, which is more akin
- Centre backs to a central defender’s position. In the below
- Forward movements examples, the blue team are in a 2v2 situation
centrally, but as the blue #3 shifts over, they
create a numerical superiority.
Fullbacks: inverting
A n inverted movement from a fullback is
from their natural position out wide coming
inside to a midfield position.

In the below examples, we see the left fullback

inverting creating space for himself and his
teammate in each example, respectively.

188
 Centre backs:
forward movements
U sing centre backs in rotations is extremely
risky, as it leaves the team extremely
exposed in defensive transition, however, it can
be very advantageous as a midfield overload in
build-up greatly increases penetration potential.
In the below example the centre back makes
a forward movement from his initial position,
overloading the midfield.
Creating superiorities
by rotating midfielders
U nlike rotating defenders, there are more
possibilities and less risk when using
midfielders, however, depending on how the
midfielders are utilised the team may sacrifice
central penetration. Below I’ve defined 7
ways in which (central) midfielders can rotate
depending on the structure of the midfield.
- Single pivot midfield structure
- Drop
- Provide width
- Double pivot midfield structure
- Staggering (1 drops)
- Staggering (1 provides width)
- Both provide width
- Both drop
- 1 provides width, 1 drops

Due to the obvious risk associated with using

a central defender in this way, it’s quite a rare
Single pivot: dropping
strategy, although it isn’t completely unheard
of, former Stuttgart manager Tim Walter was
known to use daring rotations such as these,
T his is one of the most common rotations in
modern football. It involves a sole defensive
midfielder dropping into the defensive line. In
which you can read about in the free TFA 2020 the below example, the defensive midfielder
magazine. drops into the back line, creating a 3v2
overload.
There are more ways in which defenders can
change their positioning to gain advantages,
such as a fullback taking up a more advanced
position, but as that is becoming more
commonplace among modern fullbacks
it doesn’t fit into our criteria for a rotation.
Only using defenders in rotations limits the
possibilities, as using midfielders and even
forwards is a much more risk free way to create
superiorities, while still maintaining numbers at
the back.

189
 in midfield.

Single pivot:
provide width
T his rotation involves a sole defensive
midfielder taking up a wide position to
provide width. This would be most effective
against teams who press in a narrow manner,
with the midfielder either creating an overload
out wide or acting as a passing option, which
the two examples below show.
Double pivot:
staggering
(1 provides width)
T his rotation also is very similar to its single
pivot counterpart, with the only difference
being one of the pivots remain in position,
which lessens the penetration deficit that
would normally happen if all deeper midfield
presence was vacated. In the below example
we can see this, with the blue #8 adding
width to the team while #6 maintains central
presence.

Double pivot:
staggering (1 drops)
T his is very similar to the single pivot
dropping, with the difference being that less
central penetration is sacrificed by still having
one of the midfielders hold their position. In the
below example, one midfielder drops while the
other holds their position, maintaining presence

190
 Double pivot:
both provide width
or both drop
T hese rotations are when we start to blur the
lines between practical and theory. Having
both midfielders provide width would seriously
detriment any type of central progression, the
only way I see this rotation being effective is
if the tea using it is playing with absolutely no
width in the build-up phase while having other
midfielders which can add some semblance
of penetration. In the first example we can
see that both midfielders have taken up wide
positions, leaving a gap in midfield.
In the second example below we can see that
both midfielders drop, creating 4 centre backs
in this case with almost no midfield presence.
191
Double pivot:
1 drops, 1 provides width
T his rotation is also not entirely practical,
but it can have some uses. If the team
is looking to progress play using width, the
dropping midfielder can create an overload vs
the opponent’s first line of pressure, while the
other midfielder provides a passing option out
wide. We can see this happening in the below
example, with the blue #8 providing a passing
option out wide while the #6 drops, overloading
the opponent in that zone with a 3v2.
Conclusion
A s more teams adopt high pressing
approaches, teams that intend to play out
from the back need to come up with solutions
to beat a press. Rotations are so efficient as,
when used effectively, they create a superiority,
either freeing up space for the player making
the rotation or a teammate.
 Arteta:

How Arsenal have developed so far

BY WILL SALE // @sale_will

192
I n December 2019, Arsenal appointed their
former player Mikel Arteta as their new
manager, following Unai Emery’s tenure. As
a player, he won two FA Cups in his five-year
spell with the club. Since 2016 Arteta had been
working as a coach under Pep Guardiola at
Manchester City. With no experience as a first-
team manager, it was uncertain as to what style
of play he would try and implement at Arsenal.
So far the Gunners have had mixed results with
a win against Manchester United and a ten- This did not work for Arsenal because it meant
game unbeaten run. They are currently 10th teams could move Arsenal players so they
in the Premier League, eight points off the top were left isolated. The example shows how
four and five points off 5th spot. a ball out to Ben Chilwell takes Alexandre
Lacazette out of the game. The full-back then
This tactical analysis will break down what has has space to drive into. This itself is a danger
changed at Arsenal. The analysis will look at to Arsenal but the other worry is that both
each area of the pitch as Arteta looks to build Arsenal defenders are left one vs one against
his style of football. The analysis will break Leicester’s attackers. This allowed Leicester to
down the tactics he uses and evaluates if move forward with the ball and they were able
he has improved Arsenal this season. In this to get in behind.
article, it will cover what Arsenal looks to do in
each area of the pitch. This was a risky way of defending especially
against Leicester as both James Maddison
and Harvey Barnes have quick acceleration
Defensive improvements enabling them to get away from defenders. The
Gunners lost this particular game 2-0 as they

O ne of Arsenal’s big problems was at the

back. On average they were conceding
1.33 goals per game. It is now 0.92 since Arteta
struggled to cope defensively. In this game
Leicester won 72.22% of aerial duels and
61.84% of defensive duels proving that this
was appointed. The Gunners have doubled the system was not working.
number of clean sheets in this period. It is an
impressive turnaround with the same squad.
Under Unai Emery, they often opted for a 4-2-
3-1. Arteta has kept to the same system but
has changed the way Arsenal play.

The 4-2-3-1 has its benefits as it means teams

can have 3 defensive lines. This can happen
as the two holding midfielders can sit in front
of the defence and provide cover. The three
attacking players can then cover the space in
front so that there are no gaps when defending.
It was how Arsenal used to defend under
Emery. This shows how Arsenal used to set up.

193
 How it transitions
to a 4-4-2
A s shown, defending with three defensive
lines was not working, therefore Arteta
opts for a different way of defending. The first
image below shows how Arsenal changes into
a 4-4-2 when defending. To do this it requires
the two wide players to drop back. In recent
weeks this has been Nicolas Pépé and Pierre-
How the press works
Emerick Aubameyang. Mesut Özil then moves
up into a forward position. This is because he
is most effective higher up the pitch and is,
T he tactical analysis has mentioned how
Arsenal looks to press the ball in groups.
This initially starts with the forwards staying
therefore, better off pressing the opponent’s central to try and force their opponents wide.
centre-backs to force the wide. Notice how It requires Arsenal players to be disciplined in
they are spread out across the pitch. This is their position and be ready to shift across when
important as it means they have players that others press.
can cover each segment of the pitch.
The image below shows an example of Arsenal
The other important feature to notice is the winning the ball back. Notice how each player
distance between the midfield and the defence. has a role in the press. Both Özil and Pépé’s
The second image illustrates the gaps in these job is to press the ball reducing the options the
areas. This is a deliberate tactic as around each player on the ball has. At the same time, Granit
of these gaps there are four Arsenal players. Xhaka is tight to the player in the middle taking
This means that if the ball does go into the away this option while Dani Ceballos covers the
gaps Arsenal has players that can quickly close ball in the middle. This ultimately ends up with
in on the ball without leaving their position. This Arsenal winning the ball back.
is effective for Arsenal as it means that only a
few players are pressing at a time allowing the
rest of the team cover space.

194
 able to hold up the attacker long enough for the
midfielders to get back into shape.
Long ball threat
S o far this tactical analysis has explored
the benefits of defending with two backs
of four. However, it does have its risks that
have caused Arsenal some issues. For the
press to work Arsenal need to maintain their
shape. They have to do this otherwise the gap
between the defence and midfield means it is
difficult for the Gunners to recover leaving them
exposed.

This example shows the risk as all it takes is a

long ball from Burnley to avoid the press. The
direct route means it takes Arsenal’s midfield
out of the game. Have a look at how much
space Jay Rodriguez is in. He has three players
to his left but instead opts for the shot. It does
force a fantastic save from Bernd Leno but
does show how teams can easily beat the
press.
Attack positioning
W hen defending Arsenal move to a wide
4-4-2. However, when attacking the
starting formation of 4-2-3-1 adapts so Arsenal
has five in Attack. This has led to expected
goals of 1.42 for Arsenal this is higher than their
opponents average. Similarly to the way the
midfield is split from the defence. There is also
a gap when attacking. This is because the four
of the five attacking players operate centrally
just on the edge of their opponent’s box.

They are able to do this because Bukayo Saka

pushes high up the pitch essentially playing
as a winger. In the picture below it shows four
Arsenal players in the box. It is a noticeable
tactical change from Arteta to get as many
players in the box as possible because it forces
teams back as they have to mark the players in
The gunners do struggle with aerial duels as these advanced positions.
they win 42.32% whereas their opponents on
average win 50.62%. In this particular game
against Burnley, Arsenal only won 34.09%.
This indicates it is a vulnerable area for Arsenal.
Burnley also plays with two strikers. This
means a long ball can create a two vs two.
This example highlights the danger as long ball
leaves only two Arsenal players back. Arsenal
survived this game because Burnley could not
capitalise on this and the centre-backs were

195
How the Gunners attack How the midfield is vital
O A
ne strength Arsenal does have is a
plethora of attacking talent. Aubameyang
is often the main threat. However one of the
most noticeable changes under Arteta is
Bukayo Saka’s involvement in the team. Saka
has made a few appearances before but under
Arteta, he is really starting to thrive. The player
is more typically played as a winger. However
with both Kieran Tierney and Sead Kolašinac
out injured. He got his chance at left-back.
Not only has he been a threat going forward
with three assists (only Pépé has had more
for Arsenal with six) but he has also helped
the gunners defence as he started in four
of Arsenal’s six clean sheets in the Premier
League. The tactical reason behind playing
Saka is it enables Aubameyang to operate
more centrally.
To get Saka as high up the pitch as possible it
requires one of the central midfielders to shift
across to the left-back position when attacking.
This does two things tactically as not only does
it cover Saka if the Gunners attack breaks
down but it also means the midfielder is in a
position to still control the game. Looking at the
image below it highlights that Xhaka has moved
across into a position where he can cover Saka
and pick the ball up from the centre back.
196
s mentioned in the tactical analysis there
is a gap between the midfield and the rest
of the team. This is so Arsenal spread the pitch
making it easier to transition from defence to
attack. To do this effectively the midfield pair
has to be close to each other in order to rotate
the ball quickly. In recent weeks it has been
Xhaka and Ceballos that have been working
effectively as a pair. This is a good combination
for Arsenal as Xhaka has the most tackles for
Arsenal this season with 37, whereas Ceballos
is technically good on the ball and is confident
driving forwards with it.
The image below shows just how close the
pair operates with each other. This is vital for
the team as the two provide a pivot in the
middle. As a pivot in the middle, it lets Arsenal
effectively get the ball out wide and back to the
middle. The illustration also shows the options
that the pair has, as they could drive forward
with the ball or get the ball out wide. Both
of these options advance Arsenal into more
threatening areas.
To illustrate this point look at Arsenal’s pass
maps from their wins over Newcastle and
Everton. It highlights the fact that most pass
combinations go through Xhaka and Ceballos.
With two pivots Arsenal can play combination
passes with the forwards on both sides of
the pitch. The pass maps also show how
far forward Saka operates. In a similar way
reiterates how wide Arsenal plays in order to
stretch their opponents.
How Arsenal use
their positioning
to build attacks
T he analysis has mentioned where Arsenal
likes to be positioned when attacking. This
means they are now set up to attack teams.
Initially, Arsenal will look to build from the back.
As the two centre-backs will spread wide. This
is because Arsenal look to build attacks by
using the midfield as a pivot for players to run
off.
This image shows how Arsenal started their
attacks. In this particular example, Xhaka has
dropped into the centre-back position and
plays the ball into Willock who is acting as the
197
pivot. The ball into Willock invites the press
from Olympiacos, which means there is space
behind them. Because of this Willock plays a
one-two with Saka to move into space. This
type of combination of passes enables Arsenal
to get into their opponents’ half.
Moving through
the thirds
O nce Arsenal have moved into their
opponents half they then try to utilise
the advanced positioning that the front four
provide. The width they have gives them two
options to open up their opponents. both have
the same objective of moving their opponents
to create space.
What Arsenal look to do is move the ball out
wide and quickly back inside and vice versa.
This is instead of trying to play combinations in
the middle or out wide. They play like this as it
stretches their opponents, giving the forwards
more space to play in. This is an example
of Arsenal starting outside to go inside. In
this example, Pépé plays the ball inside to
Willock, as Héctor Bellerín is holding the width
it stretches the gap between the Newcastle
defenders. This enables Pépé to run into the
gap. The move finishes with Arsenal’s fourth
goal of the game illustrating how effective it can
be.
 Nevertheless, this analysis has broken down
what Arteta is trying to do with this Arsenal
side and there are many positives to reflect
on. Excitingly for Arsenal fans, he is definitely
willing to give young players a chance with
players like Saka, Eddie Nketiah, Gabriel
Martinelli along others regularly getting first-
team experience. To conclude it does look like
Arsenal has found a manager to take them
forward.
Alternatively, with Özil, they have a player that
is good centrally. Özil is good at finding space
in between the lines which, therefore, gives
Arsenal the option to find a pass that will split
the lines. In this example it is Ceballos that
finds Özil. Due to Arsenal’s positioning he has
options out wide either side of him.

Conclusion
T his tactical analysis has looked at how
Arteta has stated to implement his style
on Arsenal. He has had success so far with
seven wins out of 13 games, losing only two.
One of those games, however, was in the
Europa league resulting in their exit from the
competition. This is not good for their season
as it was a good chance at Champions League
football. The Gunners are still in the FA Cup
and five points off 5th position; if they continue
their league form there is still a chance of
Champions League football, depending on
what happens with Manchester City.

198
Rodolfo Pizarro:

Inter Miami’s first talisman

BY WILL SINSKY // @WSinsky

199
A fter years of tried and failed attempts
to secure a stable situation for a Major
League Soccer franchise, former English
also coached Pizarro at Pachuca and later
at Monterrey, plans on utilising Pizarro’s ball-
carrying and chance-creating skillset in these
footballer David Beckham has finally attacking zones.
succeeded in the creation of a new team in
MLS: Inter Miami. The 25th MLS franchise
has just begun its inaugural season and has
brought in attacking midfielder Rodolfo Pizarro
to lead it. This tactical analysis will examine
Pizarro’s style of play and discuss how he will
fit in at Inter Miami.

Rodolfo Pizarro
R odolfo Pizarro graduated from the Pachuca
youth academy and made his senior team
debut at age 18 at right-back. He eventually
In Pizarro’s heat map at Monterrey last season,
we can see how Pizarro moves across all
attacking areas of the pitch. Also notice the
moved to the attacking positions and thrived faded areas behind the halfway line, as Pizarro
at multiple Liga MX clubs, winning the will consistently drop back in the half-spaces to
CONCACAF Champions League twice (once receive the ball during buildup.
with Guadalajara, once with Monterrey), and
the Liga MX Clausura three times (once with
Pachuca, Guadalajara, and Monterrey), all in
the past five seasons. Add in a 2017 Copa
MX title with Guadalajara, and even at only
26 years of age Pizarro is already one of the
more decorated players in North America. He
was finally signed by Inter Miami in February,
becoming the third-most-expensive signing in
MLS history.

Despite being controversially left out of
Mexico’s 2018 World Cup squad, Pizarro has
received regular call-ups from the national
team as of late, playing roles in the 2017 Gold
Cup, the 2019 Gold Cup, and the 2019/20
CONCACAF Nations League.
Positioning
P izarro’s primary positions are in the
attacking half-spaces and central attacking
areas. Inter Miami manager Diego Alonso, who
This is a common example of the positioning
Pizarro takes up to receive the ball. Often with
his back facing the opposing goal, Pizarro will
drop back at various lengths to receive the
ball in the buildup. Being the central attacking
figure on his side, he usually invites pressure.
Here, two players press him once he receives
the ball in the half-space.

200

Pizarro is excellent at evading pressure.
Using his ball control he dribbles past the two
pressing players and progresses the ball down
the half-space. The ball-side centre-back,
who was marking the left-forward, decides to
drop back slightly to help prevent Pizarro from
progressing any further. This allows Pizarro to
complete a pass from the advanced half-space
area into an open dangerous area in the box
after the forward gained separation from the
centre-back.
This is another good example of the positioning
of Pizarro off the ball, in this case in the wide
area. He drops back to receive a pass from the
backline and uses his body to shield the ball
from his defender. He is then able to smoothly
turn along the touchline with his body between
the ball and his man and continue progression
towards the opposing box, where space has
opened up.
Pizarro excels at receiving, turning, and
protecting the ball under pressure. Once
he gains possession, Pizarro uses various
201
methods to progress down the pitch.
Ball progression
T his 2019/20 Liga MX season (combining
Apertura and Clausura), Pizarro proved
statistically that he is among the best attacking
players Mexico has to offer. Before leaving
for MLS, he ranked seventh in the league in
progressive runs per 90 (3.1), ninth in through
passes per 90 (1.61), 10th in smart passes per
90 (1.55), and 23rd in key passes per 90 (0.6),
leading his club in the former three categories.
Alonso utilises counter-attacking as the primary
mode of attack, and this is a method Pizarro
has experience in.
During his time at Guadalajara under Alonso,
Pizarro generally played in a counter-attacking
setup. Here, he presses his man from midfield
in his own half at the right angle to intercept the
pass. From this press position, he can quickly
transition from defence to attack, igniting a 2v1
situation.
Here is another example of Pizarro on a quick
attacking transition. After the striker brings
down a long ball, Pizarro receives the short
back pass, maintaining space in front of the
front line. Using his technique he is then able to
complete a lofted pass over the backline to the
running striker.
Pizarro is especially skilled at evading pressure
and seeing space on the pitch. He often utilises
both these traits in his advanced positions to
progress the ball.
This is an example of Pizarro using his vision.
Once again, he receives the ball from the
backline under pressure after dropping back in
the half-space.
Pizarro is once again able to turn on the ball to
create separation. He sees the striker moving
inside parallel to his own run, which lures the
left-centre-back inside. This opens up a lane
for another attacker to run through, and Pizarro
sees this, completing the difficult pass.
202
In this scenario, Pizarro carries the ball down
the half-space towards the box. The two ball-
side defenders on the backline both step
forward to press the ball off Pizarro, who uses
his ball control to bypass the pressure. He
completes the progression on a pass between
the two defenders to a teammate making a run
into the box.
In another instance of Pizarro taking advantage
of pressure, he carries the ball forward down
the left wide area before being pressured by
three defenders. His close-footed ball control
again comes into play, as he avoids losing the
ball. Finally, he shows his ability to keep his
head up on the ball and completes a pass to a
teammate making a run down the half-space,
relieving the pressure and creating a 2v1 for his
fellow attackers.
Pizarro’s ball protection is superb. He is very
good at passing out of pressure, and this
press-breaking ability can be invaluable to a
side in any system. It has yet to be seen exactly
what tactical methods will be seen at Inter
Miami, as there has been debate that Alonso
may switch to a more possession-based side.
Regardless, Pizarro’s ball progression via his
ball control under pressure and his vision
should prove fruitful in either case.
Chance creation
and final ball
P izarro attempts to create opportunities
through all areas of the final third. He uses
similar tactics and techniques to those in the
central and deeper attacking areas of the pitch.
Above we see Pizarro in space between the
defensive lines after dribbling down the right
half-space. Across the pitch in the central area,
Pizarro can see an attacking teammate making
a driving run into the box, and another making
a run a few yards behind him. Pizarro expertly
completes a long horizontal pass into zone 14,
where the second runner has open space to
control the ball, as the first runner’s movement
drew the defender back into the box.
203
Another method Pizarro uses to aid in creating
chances is his ability to handle pressure. On
this designed throw-in, Pizarro receives the
ball with his back to goal. This movement
draws out two defenders, opening up space
just outside the box. Pizarro’s awareness and
technique allow him to complete a backheel
pass into this space to a teammate making a
run into said space.
Pizarro’s advanced skillset makes him
dangerous in any area of the pitch, be it in the
final third or in the central areas of the pitch.
Upon analysis of Pizarro’s pass map in Inter
Miami’s first match, we can see his passes
often came from deeper positions in the
attacking half. Pizarro completed 73% of his
passes, while also attempting a team-high four
shots.
Pizarro also has the ability to execute strong
finishes, as seen here on this goal from well
outside the box. While his primary thoughts are
to progress the ball in quick possession, we
could see an increase in shots from him due
to his role as the primary attacking cog in Inter
Miami’s setup.
Fitting in at Inter Miami
A s stated, Alonso’s preferred style of play is
pragmatic, counter-attacking football. Yet
the Inter Miami roster has a number of players
better suited for a possession-based system.
It wasn’t likely that the side would out-possess
the dominant Los Angeles FC hosts, but there
were moments which showed Pizarro’s ability
to lead in either system.
In this example, Pizarro’s wide positioning and
ball possession lure the defender towards him,
opening up space in the area along the box
behind the defender. This is a method Inter
Miami could use to get past lower defensive
blocks.
Late in the match, Pizarro showed resilience
in the press. Here he presses the ball off the
204
opposing midfielder and quickly launches a
long ball in a counter-attacking attempt.
Again in the last waning minutes of the game,
Pizarro receives the ball off a long pass. With
two defenders pressing him, he completes
a backheel pass into the attacking third to a
teammate. Unfortunately for Inter Miami, this
attack was lost shortly after on a poor pass.
It is clear early on that Inter Miami need a
consistent striker, and they have publicly stated
they plan on signing a “25-plus” goalscorer
in the near future. This could likely indicate a
popular name from Europe, such as former
Liverpool striker Daniel Sturridge or Colombian
forward Radamel Falcao. Someone with an
advanced technique and the spatial movement
to provide Pizarro with a quality goalscoring
outlet would bring a boost to this squad’s
attack and allow them to become more
dynamic in whichever tactical system Alonso
chooses.
Conclusion
Inter Miami lost a hard-fought 1-0 match to
2019 Supporters’ Shield winners Los Angeles
FC on matchday one of the MLS season.
Nevertheless, the Herons’ season will be
watched with much anticipation. Pizarro’s move
to MLS was unique; one of the overall best
players in Liga MX, not yet at the pinnacle of
his career, opting to move north of the border
as opposed to across the pond. He has already
shown flashes of his ball control, progression
in possession, and sharp attacking vision, all
of which will likely improve as he becomes
more acclimated to his new team. The playoffs
for the moment seem like the primary goal for
Inter Miami for now, but that could change
with new acquisitions in the near future and
the consistent, high-quality style of play from
talisman Rodolfo Pizarro.

205
PSG:

Can you have too many attackers?

BY YARA EL-SHABOURY // @yaraelshab

206
A nother season, another Ligue 1 title
for Paris Saint-Germain more or less
wrapped up by early March. Everyone knew Two Striker Approach
that going into this season, it was all about the
Champions League for the French champions,
and multiple signings were made in the
summer to better their chances of winning the
T uchel has lined his side up with two strikers
42% of the time this season. More often
than not it is a 4-4-2 shape.
competition, especially after the embarrassing
fashion in which they were eliminated by
Manchester United last season.

One of these signings was Mauro Icardi, who

joined the club on a one-season loan deal. The
signing came a bit out of left field, because
based on results from previous seasons, it
was clear that more strength was needed in
midfield and defence. On top of that, PSG are
seen as having one of the best attacks in world
football, with Neymar, Kylian Mbappe, and
Edinson Cavani. When Icardi was announced
as a new signing, it was difficult to imagine
how Tuchel would fit him into the system with
that front three along with players like Ángel Di
María, and Julian Draxler who would also be
expecting sufficient playing time throughout the
season.
PSG’s 4-4-2
Tuchel has always been a coach who has
experimented and tried different formations, The front four of this formation at its best is
both at his time at Mainz and at Borussia Neymar on the left-wing, Di María on the right-
Dortmund. At PSG, that has not changed. wing, and Mbappe up front, alongside Icardi.
However, with the signing of Icardi, we have
seen Tuchel experiment with formations that
involve two strikers, and formations that
involve one. These different approaches not
only affect PSG’s attack, but their midfield
and defensive display as well. It seems like
Tuchel has experimented with these different
formations solely for the reason of figuring out
what works best so that he can utilize them in
the Champions League.

207
 The basis of the 4-4-2
In attack, the 4-4-2 will often look like a 4-2-2-
2, or even a 2-4-2-2.
Prior to kick-off, PSG are in a 4-4-2 shape,
though slightly lopsided due to Di María
planning on pressing once kick off happens.
During a phase of attack, they switch to a 4-2-
2-2
Tuchel employs this shape for multiple reasons.
The first is so that the space in between PSG’s
lines is at a minimum, making it difficult for
a team to employ players there, and exploit
that space. A 4-4-2 while in defence is great,
because it allows for the team to be compact,
however, if PSG are in possession and then
lose the ball, the gaps in between the defensive
line and offensive line make it easy to be
exploited by the opposition.
208
PSG lose possession and there is ample space
for the Dijon players to exploit behind the line of
four in midfield.
Another reason Tuchel asks his players to
employ this 4-2-2-2 shape is simply because
it gives the opposition’s midfield more work to
do whilst out of possession. It is much easier to
defend against a stable bank of four rather than
two banks of two, as you constantly have to
be aware of what’s going on both in front and
behind you.
Dijon fail to defend against PSG’s two banks
of two, as Di María has tons of space he can
exploit.
The two-striker
approach in attack
T he biggest advantage of having two strikers
in attack is how much easier it is to pin
back and occupy the opposition’s central
defenders, especially if they are playing with
two centre-backs (rather than three in a back
five). It does not matter which two of Cavani,
Icardi or Mbappe are playing. They have the
role in essentially playing up against the two
centre-backs. This will then allow the two
wingers to cut inside, and the opposition’s
fullbacks then make one of two choices. The
first is that they either follow the two wingers,
giving PSG’s fullbacks ample space on the
flanks to exploit. The fullbacks will then utilize
this space and, if done correctly, the opposition
can find themselves in a 4vs6 battle, with
the two PSG fullbacks and the four attacking
players, who are now in and around the box.
The second choice is that the fullbacks choose
not to follow the wingers who cut inside and
position themselves narrowly. This then allows
PSG’s fullbacks to come and pin the opposition
fullbacks, occupying them. The wingers will
then use quick interplay and their ability to pick
passes to find one of the strikers.
209
Cavani, Icardi, and Mbappe all have different
skills that make them excellent strikers, but
one of the things they share in common is their
finishing skills. More often than not, regardless
of the angle, and the defenders’ position, once
they get into the box with the ball at their feet,
it’ll likely end up in the back of the net.
The two-striker
approach in defence
A s mentioned earlier, PSG will remain in a
4-2-2-2 when they lose possession, and
deal with offensive danger. Once the transition
is complete, and there is less danger, they will
fall back into a 4-4-2. Unlike a lot of top teams,
PSG are not always pressing to attempt to win
the ball back as quickly as possible. Instead,
they will slightly shift their 4-4-2 shape higher
up the pitch, as a collective, slowly forcing
the opposition back into their own half. PSG
will then rely on the opposition’s mistakes to
counter-attack.
One Striker Approach
T uchel has lined his side up with one striker
58% of the time this season. More often
than not it is a 4-3-3 shape.
The basis of the 4-33-
T he 4-3-3 sees one striker up top, combined
with two more traditional wingers, rather
than two strikers and two wingers in attacking
midfield roles. The 4-3-3 also sacrifices an
attacker for a more complete midfield three,
rather than a pivot of two in midfield.

PSG’s 4-3-3
the aggressiveness in the
one-striker approach
P SG are often much more aggressive when
playing a 4-3-3. A 4-3-3 almost always
guarantees very strong attacking play from the
start. PSG already almost always dominate
possession when playing, and the 4-3-3 takes
that up to another level. By having control in
midfield, they can go full throttle in attack and
essentially overwhelm the opposition rather
than focus on forcing the opposition into
areas and dragging them out of position. That
combined with the large amount of possession
PSG have, almost guarantees plenty of goal
scoring opportunities.
PSG are much more willing to press while
in this formation, their passes allowed per
defensive action (PPDA) is significantly lower
whilst in a 4-3-3 shape, rather than a 4-4-2.
The PPDA is calculated by dividing the number
of passes the team allows by the opposition
210
in their own half by the number of defensive
actions taken (interceptions, attempted tackles
and fouls). The average PPDA in their 4-3-3
shape is 8.06, whilst in a 4-4-2 it jumps up
to 15.10. When out of possession, PSG will
automatically attempt to win the ball back, as
quickly as possible.
As soon as PSG lose the ball, four players
press, and they successfully win it back within
seconds.
Playing out from the
back in the
one-striker approach
P SG also tend to play out from the back
more when playing a 4-3-3. The capabilities
of both the fullbacks and the wingers allow for
very smooth transitions from deep into PSG’s
own half to the opposition’s half. The centre-
backs will combine with the fullbacks, as they
slowly move up the pitch. Once space is found,
the ball will go to the midfield or out wide to the
wingers. If it is the first option, then the midfield
will use their passing abilities to attempt to find
the front three. Usually it is Veratti spraying long
passes forward, he completes 86% of his long,
forward passes.
The second option will often see Mbappe
receive the ball, who then uses his speed to
bypass his man. Defenders often get so close
to Mbappe, which is often a mistake, as he can
so easily feint, turn, and out run them. From
there, it is just a matter of getting the ball into
the right player’s feet, to create a goal scoring
opportunity.
Mbappe receives the ball from the fullback.
Mbappe travels up the pitch, and no defender
can get near him. Once he gets to the box, he
feints right and goes left, where he has loads of
space.
A combination of the
two vs Dortmund and
why it did not work
O ne of Paris Saint-Germain’s biggest
matches of the season came mid
February: the first leg against Borussia
Dortmund, Tuchel’s old club, in the Round of
16 in the Champions League. Any Champions
League match is important, especially the
knockout rounds that come after the group
211
stages, but there was definitely added pressure
on PSG. The French Champions have struggled
a lot when it comes to this competition and are
known for crashing out in spectacular fashion,
either by losing a marginal lead from the first
leg, losing against a much weaker team or
both. Coming into this tie, PSG were seen as
favourites because of their domination in their
own league, Dortmund’s inconsistent form as
of late and the fact that PSG are just seen to
have better players overall. However, none
of that seemed to matter, as Dortmund were
able to beat PSG 2-1. And while a one goal
deficit is not a bad result to take back to the
Parc des Princes, knowing PSG’s history in this
competition, it is nerve racking for them.
Tuchel decided to line his side up in a 3-4-3
formation. A system he has only used in 3% of
Paris’s matches this season, so far. The 3-4-3
is essentially a combination of the 4-4-2, and
the 4-3-3 discussed above. The three attackers
are present, but so is the midfield bank of four.
It seemed like Tuchel wanted to combine the
strengths of both elements. It did not work.
Why? It was clear the players were not 100%
used to the old system and kept going back to
old habits.
As mentioned earlier, the 4-4-2 system often
changes to the 4-2-2-2 because of the two
wide players tucking in. This play cannot work
then there is a bank of four behind the two
players tucking in - the pitch becomes too
congested. However, Neymar and Di María
kept doing it, and as a result all of PSG’s
players were way too compact and narrow.
The congestion in the middle of the pitch for
PSG vs Dortmund [via Wyscout].

This made it incredibly easy for Dortmund to

defend against them, as essentially, PSG were
just getting in each other’s way. They could not
maintain possession in the final third, because
the ball either kept easily being cleared away
by a Dortmund player or would awkwardly
bounce of the PSG teammates.

Tuchel needs to turn this around in the second

leg by playing either the 4-4-2, or the 4-3-3.
Tried and trusted will be the way to go for this
match, and Paris Saint Germain cannot afford
to be knocked out this early in the competition
again.

212
 Editor-in-Chief // Chris Darwen // @ronniedogchris
Lead Analyst // Lee Scott // @FMAnalysis
Magazine Design // Jamie Brackpool // @jamiebrackpool

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Niklas Hemmer-Hiltenkamp // @NiklasHemmer
Petrick Sinuraya // @sinurayapetrick
Rofiq Naufal // @rofiq_naufal
Richard Scott // @RichScott285
Sam Leveridge // @samleveridge
Scott Martin // @CoachScottCopy
Sudesh Baniya // @SudeshBaniya10
Thanoshaan Thayalan // @Thano_Thayalan
Ty Levinsohn // @TyLevinsohn
Will Sale // @sale_will
Will Sinsky // @WSinsky
Yara El-Shaboury // @yaraelshab

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