BIODIVERSITY CASE DIGEST

BY: 
LEGAL RESEARCH AND OPINION DIVISION( LROD)
AND 
GENERAL SANTOS CANCELLATION AND REVERSION TEAM (GSCRT)

BIODIVERSITY INTRODUCTION 
AND ITS SCOPE OR 
RELATED LAWS

1.

CASE TITLE: The Chairman and Executive Director, Palawan Council for
Sustainable Development and The Palawan Council for Sustainable Development
vs. Ejercito Lim, Doing Business as Bonanza Air Services, as Represented by His
Attorney-in-Fact, Capt. Ernesto Lim. (G.R. No. 183173, 24 August 2016)

FACTS:
The Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD) is the government agency
responsible for the governance, implementation, and policy direction of the Strategic
Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan. Its public officials, Winston D. Arzaga and Vicente A.
Sandoval (Petitioners) were tasked with the duty of executing and Implementing A.O. No. 00-05
and the Notice of Violation (NOV) and Show Cause Order (SCO). Ejercito Lim (Respondent)
was the operator of a domestic air carrier doing business under the name and style Bonanza Air
Services which primarily transports live fish from Palawan to fish traders.

A.O. No. 00-05 provides that that the transport of live fish from Palawan would be allowed only
through traders and carriers who had sought and secured accreditation from the PCSD. The Air
Transportation Office (ATO) informed PCSD that its authorized carriers, including Respondent,
are common carriers that should be exempt from this requirement. Thus, Respondent continued
its trade without the accreditation.

Allegedly, Petitioners started harassing Respondent’s clients by issuing Memorandum Circular

No. 02, Series of 2002 which imposed sanctions on the availment of transfer services from
unaccredited carriers. Due to this, Respondent sent a grievance letter to the Office of the
President (OP). Respondent continued his operation until a customer showed him the NOV and
SCO which directed him to explain his actions, otherwise he would suffer a fine of
Php50,000.00. Respondent maintained that he had not received the NOV and SCO.

Respondent filed a Petition for Prohibition in the Court of Appeals (CA), which issued a TRO,
and subsequently, a writ of preliminary injunction against Petitioners. The CA then issued the
assailed Decision declared null and void A.O. No. 00-05 and the NOV and SCO. Hence,
Petitioners filed this Appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in nullifying A.O. No. 00-05, the NOV and the SCO for having
been issued in excess of PCSD’s authority.

RULING:
Yes. A.O. No. 00-05, the NOV and the SCO were not issued in excess of PCSD’s authority

Republic Act (RA) No. 7611 has adopted the Strategic Environmental Plan
(SEP) for Palawan consistent with the declared policy of the State to protect, develop, and
conserve its natural resources. The SEP is a comprehensive
framework for the sustainable development of Palawan to protect and enhance the Province's
natural resources and endangered environment.

Towards this end, the PCSD was established as the administrative machinery for the SEP's
implementation. The creation of the PCSD has been set forth in Section 16 of RA No. 7611, to
wit:

SEC. 16. Palawan Council for Sustainable Development. — The

governance, implementation and policy direction of the Strategic
Environmental Plan shall be exercised by the herein
created Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD),
hereinafter referred to as the Council, which shall be under the Office of
the President…

The functions of the PCSD are specifically enumerated in Section 19 of R.A. No. 7611, which
relevantly provides:

SEC. 19. Powers and Functions. — In order to successfully implement

the provisions of this Act, the Council is hereby vested with the
following powers and functions:

xxx

8. Adopt, amend and rescind such rules and regulations and impose
penalties therefor for the effective implementation of the SEP and the
other provisions of this Act;

Accordingly, the PCSD had the explicit authority to fill in the details as to how to carry out the
objectives of RA No. 7611 in protecting and enhancing Palawan's natural resources consistent
with the SEP. In that task, the PCSD could establish a methodology for the effective
implementation of the SEP. Moreover, the PCSD was expressly given the authority to impose
penalties and sanctions in relation to the implementation of the SEP and the other provisions
of RA No. 7611. As such, the PCSD's issuance of A.O. No. 00-95 and Resolution No. 03-211
was well within its statutory authority.

2.
CASE TITLE: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the REGIONAL
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR, REGION VI, ILOILO CITY, vs. VALENTINA
ESPINOSA, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
LEONILA CALISTON, AND SPOUSES DIOSCORO & ESTRELLA ESCARDA (G.R.
No. 186603, April 5, 2017)

FACTS:
On October 26, 1955, Cadastral Decree No. N-31626 was issued to Valentina Espinosa
(Espinosa) in Cadastral Case No. 39, L.R.C. Cadastral Record No. 980, covering a 28,880-
square meter lot located at Lot No. 3599 of Cadastral Record No. 980, Poblacion, Sipalay City,
Negros Occidental (subject property). By virtue of the said decree, Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 191-N was issued on October 15, 1962 in the name of Espinosa. Espinosa then sold
the property to Leonila B. Caliston (Caliston), who was later issued Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-91117 7 on June 29, 1976.

On January 13, 2003, the State, represented by the Regional Executive Director (RED) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VI, Iloilo City, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint for annulment of title and/or reversion
of land with the RTC, of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental. The State claimed that the
property is inalienable public land because it fell within a timberland area indicated under
Project No. 27-C, Block C per Land Classification (LC) Map No. 2978, as certified by the Director
of Forestry on January 17, 1986.

Spouses Dioscoro and Estrella Escarda (spouses Escarda) then intervened, alleging that they
have been occupying the subject property since 1976 on the belief that it belongs to the State.
They likewise prayed that Caliston be ordered to cease and desist from ejecting them. In answer,
Caliston countered that the property is not timberland and claimed that spouses Escarda did not
have the capacity or personality to intervene because only the State may initiate an action for
reversion. She also alleged that the spouses Escarda cannot claim a better right as against her
because she merely tolerated their occupancy of the property until their refusal to vacate it.

In its Decision dated May 12, 2004, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) relied on LC Map No. 2978,
and ruled in favor of the State. It ordered the reversion of the property to the mass of the public
domain.

Upon Appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) modified the Decision of the RTC and dismissed the
reversion case filed by the Republic of the Philippines against Espinosa and Caliston. Aggrieved,
the State filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to nullify the CA Decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the State has sufficiently proven that the subject property is part of inalienable
forest land at the time Espinosa was granted the cadastral decree and issued a title.

RULING:
No. The State failed to prove that the property was classified as forest land at the time of the
grant of the cadastral decree and issuance of title to Espinosa.
In land registration proceedings, the applicant has the burden of overcoming the presumption of
State ownership. It must establish, through incontrovertible evidence, that the land sought to be
registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the government. Since cadastral
proceedings are governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure, and evidence, a cadastral
decree and a certificate of title are issued only after the applicant proves all the requisite
jurisdictional facts — that they are entitled to the claimed lot, that all parties are heard, and that
evidence is considered. As such, the cadastral decree is a judgment which adjudicates ownership
after proving these jurisdictional facts.
Here, it is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a cadastral decree and was subsequently issued
OCT No. 191-N, the predecessor title of Caliston's TCT No. 91117. Having been granted a decree
in a cadastral proceeding, Espinosa can be presumed to have overcome the presumption that the
land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. This means that Espinosa, as the
applicant, was able to prove by incontrovertible evidence that the property is alienable and
disposable property in the cadastral proceedings.
This is not to say, however, that the State has no remedy to recover the property if indeed it is
part of the inalienable lands of the public domain. The State may still do so through an action for
reversion, as in the present case. Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the
Regalian doctrine, seeks to revert land back to the mass of the public domain. It is proper when
public land is fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations. There
are also instances when reversion is granted on grounds other than fraud, such as when a
"person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which
cannot be registered under the Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not have
jurisdiction over the same because it is of the public domain."
In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General, alleges neither fraud nor misrepresentation
in the cadastral proceedings and in the issuance of the title in Espinosa's favor. The argument
for the State is merely that the property was unlawfully included in the certificate of title because
it is of the public domain.
Here, the State hinges its whole claim on its lone piece of evidence, the land classification map
prepared in 1986. The records show, however, that LC Map No. 2978 was not formally offered in
evidence. When evidence has not been formally offered, it should not be considered by the court
in arriving at its decision. Not having been offered formally, it was error for the trial court to
have considered the survey map. Consequently, it also erred in ordering the reversion of the
property to the mass of the public domain on the basis of the same. Moreover, even assuming
that the survey can be admitted in evidence, this will not help to further the State's cause. This is
because the only fact proved by the map is one already admitted by the State, that is, that the
land was reclassified in 1986. This fact does not address the presumption/conclusion that
Espinosa has, at the time of the cadastral proceedings conducted in 1955, proved that the land is
alienable and disposable, as evidenced by the decree issued in his favor in 1962.
As part of fair play and due process, the State is as bound by the rules on formal offer of
evidence as much as every private party is. More, the State's subsequent reclassification of the
area where the property is situated cannot be used to defeat the rights of a private citizen who
acquired the land in a valid and regular proceeding conducted 24 years earlier.
The result would have been different had the State proved that the property was already
classified as part of forest land at the time of the cadastral proceedings and when title was
decreed to Espinosa in 1962. However, it failed to discharge this burden; the grant of title which
carries with it the presumption that Espinosa had already proved the alienable character of the
property in the cadastral proceedings stands. To grant the reversion based on a subsequent
reclassification, more so on lack of evidence, would amount to taking of private property without
just compensation and due process of law.
3.
AURELIA NARCISE, GLORIA A. DELA CRUZ, MARITESS O. GARCIA, PHILIP
FALCON, ENRICO M. VITUG, LYNETTE C. PONTRERAS, BONIFACIO
BARRAMEDA, RAMON S. MORADA, MANUEL G. VIOLA, ZENAIDA LANUZA,
CIRILO G. SALTO, TEODORO DEL ROSARIO, NANCY G. INSIGNE, MELANIE G.
VIANA, ROMEO TICSAY, AMY J. FRANCISCO, MARIE J. FRANCISCO, ZENAIDA
LANUZA, MIGUELITO B. MARTINEZ, APOLONIO SANTOS, MARIVIC TAN, JANE
CLOR DILEMA, VALENTINO DILEMA, JOSE L. PANGAN, ANTONIA M.
MANGELEN, IMELDA MANALASTAS, TEODORICO N. ANDRADE, AIDA L. CRUZ,
MANUEL YAMBOT, JAIME SERDENA, ARIEL PALACIOS, EVE BOLNEO,
LIBETINE MODESTO, MA. AILEEN VERDE, BENNY ILAGAN, MICHELLE
ROMANA, DANILO VILLANUEVA, LEO NALUGON, ROSSANA MARASIGAN,
NELIE BINAY and ISABELITA MENDOZA, vs. VALBUECO, INC.
[G.R. No. 196888. July 19, 2017.]

FACTS:
On March 8, 2005, respondent Valbueco, Inc. filed an action for Annulment of the Free Patents,
Certificates of Title and Damages, against petitioners Narcise, et al., the Department of Natural
Resources (DENR) and the Register of Deeds of Bataan before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Balanga City. In said Complaint, respondent alleged that it is the possessor of the subject
properties in an actual, peaceful, adverse and peaceful possession since 1970. It likewise averred
that from 1977 until 1999, Original Certificates of Title, Free Patents and Transfer Certificates of
Title covering the lots in question were issued in the name of petitioners.

Instead of filing their respective Answer, petitioners filed several Motions to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of cause of action, failure to state cause of action, defect in the certificate of non-
forum shopping and prescription.

On December 7, 2006, the RTC issued an Order, granting petitioners' motions, and ruling that
the instant case is an action for reversion because petitioners are not qualified to be issued said
free patents. As such, the land must revert back to the State. Thus, it is the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) who is the real party-in-interest, and not the respondent. Aggrieved, respondent
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC.

Respondent then filed an Appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA). In a Decision dated
December 21, 2010, the CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC. The CA maintained that
respondent alleged all the facts necessary to seek the nullification of the subject free patents.
Petitioners, in turn, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied. Hence,
they filed this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the instant case is actually a reversion case, and not a case for annulment
of free patents and certificates of titles;
2. Whether or not Respondent is the real party-in-interest; and
3. Whether or not the case had already prescribed.

RULING:
The petition is denied.

1. An action for reversion, a remedy provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141, seeks to cancel
the original certificate of registration, and nullify the original certificate of title, including the
transfer of certificate of title of the successors-in-interest because the same were all procured
through fraud and misrepresentation. In cancelling and nullifying such title, it restores the
public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the
mass of public domain. Such action is filed by the OSG pursuant to its authority under the
Administrative Code.

On the other hand, an action for annulment of free patents and certificates of title also seeks for
the cancellation and nullification of the certificate of title, but once the same is granted, it does
not operate to revert the property back to the State, but to its lawful owner. In such action, the
nullity arises not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the director of the Land
Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to bestow title; hence, the issued patent or certificate of
title was void ab initio.

Thus, the difference between them lies in the allegations as to the character of ownership of the
realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in
the complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed land, while in an action for
annulment of patent and certificate of title, pertinent allegations deal with plaintiff's ownership
of the contested land prior to the issuance of the same as well as defendant's fraud or mistake in
successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.

A careful perusal of respondent's complaint reads:

3. That the herein plaintiff has been in the actual, peaceful,

adverse, continuous and peaceful possession since sometime in
1970 and up to the present time, by itself and its predecessor-in-
interest, some of which it acquired by transfer of rights, claims,
interest as evidence [sic] by the documents x x x and the rest by
occupation and planting of root crops and other including trees x x
x.

4. That the plaintiff and its workers and employees of its ranches
and the cultivation and planting of different root crops and trees
were always in the premises since 1970 or thereabouts, and their
presence were never disturbed nor molested by anybody until
sometime in the year 2000 x x x.

In this view, the Supreme Court held that the action is one of annulment of patents and titles.
The allegations in the complaint show that respondent asserts its ownership over the subject
properties by acquisitive prescription.

Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership of a real or immovable property by

possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must
be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. The possession contemplated
as foundation for prescriptive right must be one under claim of title or adverse to or in
prescription.
On this note, acquisitive prescription may either be extraordinary, which requires uninterrupted
adverse possession for 30 years, or ordinary, which requires possession in good faith and with a
just title for a period of ten years.

2. Without going into the merits of the case, the Supreme Court held that the allegations in the
complaint sufficiently show that respondent claims its ownership right by expounding on its
uninterrupted possession of the same for a period of at least 35 years. Also, respondent's claim
of its possession in a public, peaceful and uninterrupted manner constitutes an allegation of
ownership by acquisitive prescription.

Being an action for annulment of patents and titles, it is the respondent who is the real party-in-
interest for it is the one claiming title or ownership adverse to that of the registered owner.

3. The defense of prescription is evidentiary in nature which could not be established by mere
allegations in the pleadings and must not be resolved in a motion to dismiss. Such issue must be
resolved at the trial of the case on the merits wherein both parties will be given ample
opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses.

4.

MAYOR TOMAS R. OSMEÑA, in his capacity as City Mayor of Cebu, vs. JOEL
CAPILI GARGANERA, for and on his behalf, and in representation of the People of
the Cities of Cebu and Talisay, and the future generations, including the unborn.
G.R. No. 231164, [March 20, 2018])

FACTS:
On April 6, 1993, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) issued
an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) to the Solid Waste Sanitary Landfill Project at
Inayawan landfill proposed by the Metro Cebu Development Project Office (MCDPO). Said
landfill served as the garbage disposal area of Cebu City.

Sometime in 2011, the Cebu City Local Government resolved to close the Inayawan
landfill. Subsequently, a Sangguniang Panlungsod Resolution was issued to charge the amount
of P1,204,500 in the next supplemental budget to cover the cost in the preparation of closure
and rehabilitation plan of Inayawan landfill, and another Resolution was issued to proceed with
the bidding process. As a result, the Inayawan landfill was partially closed and all wastes from
Cebu City were disposed in a privately operated landfill in Consolacion. Through the City
Mayor’s directive, Inayawan landfill was formally closed On June 15, 2015.

In 2016, however, the City Government sought to temporarily open the Inayawan
landfill, through a letter dated by then Acting Cebu City Mayor Margot Osmeña (Acting Mayor
Margot) addressed to Regional Director Engr. William Cuñado (Engr. Cuñado) of the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR. In his reply letter, Engr. Cuñado
informed Acting Mayor Margot that although the EMB had no authority to issue the requested
notice, it interposed no objection to the proposed temporary opening of the Inayawan landfill
provided that the Cebu City will faithfully comply with all its commitments and subject to
regular monitoring by the EMB. Thus, the landfill was officially re-opened in July 2016.

Two months later, a Notice of Violation and Technical Conference was issued by the
EMB to Mayor Osmeña, regarding the operations of the landfill and its violations of the ECC. On
September 6, 2016, the Department of Health (DOH) issued an Inspection Report, wherein it
recommended, among others, the immediate closure of the landfill due to the lack of sanitary
requirements, environmental, health and community safety issues, as conducted by the DOH.

On September 23, 2016, Joel Capili Garganera for and on his behalf, and in
representation of the People of the Cities of Cebu and Talisay and the future generations,
including the unborn (Respondent) filed a petition for writ of kalikasan with prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) before the Court of Appeals
(CA). He asserted that the continued operation of the Inayawan landfill causes serious
environmental damage which threatens and violates their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology, and that the Inayawan landfill has already outgrown its usefulness and has become ill-
suited for its purpose.

Respondent further asserted that its reopening and continued operation violates several
environmental laws and government regulations, such as: R.A. 9003; R.A. 8749 or the
"Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999"; R.A. 9275 or the "Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004";
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 856 or the "Code on Sanitation of the Philippines"; and DENR
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2003-30 or the "Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
for the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System."

The CA, in a Resolution dated October 6, 2016, granted a writ of kalikasan, required
petitioner to file a verified return, and a summary hearing was set for the application of TEPO.

In its Decision dated December 15, 2016, the CA granted the privilege of the writ of
kalikasan which ordered Mayor Osmeña and/or his representatives to permanently cease and
desist from dumping or disposing of garbage or solid waste at the Inayawan landfill and to
continue to rehabilitate the same.

Mayor Osmeña filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA.
Hence, he filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the 30-day prior notice requirement for citizen suits under R.A. 9003 and R.A. 8749
is needed prior to the filing of the instant petition; and
2. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirements for the grant of the privilege of the writ
of kalikasan were sufficiently established.

RULING:
The petition is without merit.

1. No. In this case, the 30-day prior notice requirement is not needed prior to the filing of
the instant petition.

Petitioner argues that respondent brushed aside the 30-day prior notice requirement for
citizen suits under R.A. 9003 29 and R.A. 8749. Petitioner's argument does not persuade.

Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC), is

instructive on the matter:
 Section 5. Citizen suit. — Any Filipino citizen in representation of
others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an
action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws.
Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order
which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and
the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest
their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from
notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a
newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all
affected barangays copies of said order.

Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their
respective provisions.

Section 1, Rule 7 of RPEC also provides:

Section 1. Nature of the writ. — The writ is a remedy available to a

natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people's
organization non-governmental organization, or any public
interest group accredited by or registered with any government
agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

Here, the present petition for writ of kalikasan under the RPEC is a separate and
distinct action from R.A. 9003 and R.A. 8749. A writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy
covering environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It is designed for a narrow but special
purpose: to accord a stronger protection for environmental rights, aiming, among others, to
provide a speedy and effective resolution of a case involving the violation of one's constitutional
right to a healthful and balanced ecology that transcends political and territorial boundaries,
and to address the potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats.

Given that the writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy and the RPEC allows direct
action to this Court and the CA where it is dictated by public welfare, the Supreme Court is of
the view that the prior 30-day notice requirement for citizen suits under R.A. 9003 and R.A.
8749 is inapplicable. It is ultimately within the Court's discretion whether or not to accept
petitions brought directly before it.

2. Yes. The requirements for the grant of the privilege of the writ of kalikasan were
sufficiently established.

Under Section 1 of Rule 7 of the RPEC, the following requisites must be present to avail
of this extraordinary remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3)
the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.

The Supreme Court is convinced from the evidence on record that the Respondent has
sufficiently established the requirements for the grant of the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The record discloses that the City Government's resumption of the garbage dumping operations
at the Inayawan landfill has raised serious environmental concerns.

The air and water quality impact assessment of the EMB Compliance Evaluation Report
(CER) made remarks that the air quality poses a threat to nearby surroundings/habitat while
the water quality (leachate) poses threat of water pollution. The report also stated that the foul
odor from the landfill already reached neighboring communities as far as SM Seaside and UC
Mambaling which have disrupted activities causing economic loss and other activities for
improvement particularly for SM Seaside. Further, most of the conditions stipulated in the ECC
were not complied with. In addition, the EMB's findings is corroborated by 15 affidavits
executed by affected residents and/or business owners from Cebu and Talisay Cities. Moreover,
the DOH Inspection Report observed that the Inayawan landfill had been in operation for 17
years, which exceeded the 7-year estimated duration period in the projected design data. This
caused the over pile-up of refuse/garbage in the perimeter and boarder of the landfill. The
standard process procedure management was poorly implemented.

As to the health impact, the DOH found that the residents, commercial centers, shanties
and scavengers near the dump site are at high risk of acquiring different types of illness due to
pollution, considering the current status of the dump site.

The EMB, DOH, and the Cebu and Talisay residents are all in agreement as to the need
of closing the Inayawan landfill due to the environmental violations committed by the City
Government in its operation. The Court, while it have the jurisdiction and power to decide cases,
is not precluded from utilizing the findings and recommendations of the administrative agency
on questions that demand "the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.

5.

SEA LION FISHING CORPORATION vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

(G.R. No. 172678. March 23, 2011)

FACTS:
In response to fishermen's report of poaching off Mangsee Island in Balabac,
Palawan, a combined team of Philippine Marines, Coast Guard and barangay officials
conducted search and seizure operations therein. There they found F/V Sea Lion
anchored three nautical miles northwest of Mangsee Island, and beside it were five
boats and a long fishing net already spread over the water. The team boarded the vessel
and apprehended her captain, a Filipino, and a crew composed of three Filipinos and
three Chinese. Also arrested were 17 Chinese fishermen aboard F/V Sea Lion.

Various charges were thereafter filed as follows: (1) Violation of Section 97 of

Republic Act (RA) No. 8550 (Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998) against all those
arrested; (2) Violation of Section 90 of the same law against the captain of F/V Sea Lion,
the Chief Engineer, and the President of the corporation which owned said vessel; and
(3) Violation of Section 27 (a) and (f) of RA 9147 (Wildlife Resources Conservation and
Protection Act) and of Section 87 of RA 8550 against all those arrested and the
President of the corporation which owned the vessel.

While the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan dismissed some of the charges, he

nevertheless found probable cause for the charges only against the 17 Chinese
fishermen. This was after it was found out that the crew of F/V Sea Lion did not assent
to the illegal acts of said 17 Chinese fishermen who were rescued by the crew of the F/V
Sea Lion from a distressed Chinese vessel. The prosecutor concluded that the crew,
unarmed, outnumbered and hampered by language barrier, acted only out of
uncontrollable fear of imminent danger to their lives and property which hindered them
from asserting their authority over these Chinese nationals. Accordingly, corresponding
Informations against the 17 Chinese fishermen were filed in court. With the crew of F/V
Sea Lion now exculpated, petitioner Sea Lion Fishing Corporation filed before the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor an Urgent Motion for Release of Evidence alleging that it
owns the vessel. Thus, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued a Resolution
recommending the release of the vessel upon proper showing of evidence of ownership
and posting of a bond. Petitioner, however, failed to act in accordance with the
Resolution.

Before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the case for Violation of Section 97 of RA
8550 was docketed as Criminal Case No. 18965 while that for Violation of Section 87 of
the same law was docketed as Criminal Case No. 19422. The Chinese nationals entered
separate pleas of "not guilty" for both offenses. Later, however, in Criminal Case No.
18965, they changed their pleas from "not guilty" to "guilty" for the lesser offense of
Violation of Section 88, sub-paragraph (3) 20 of RA 8550. Hence, they were accordingly
declared guilty of said lesser offense. A Sentence in Criminal Case No. 19422 was also
issued on even date.

It was only after the issuance of the above Sentences that petitioner again made
its move by filing a Motion for Reconsideration. It prayed for the trial court to delete
from said Sentences the confiscation of F/V Sea Lion. Said Motion was opposed by the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Thus, the trial court denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.

Hence, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with the Court of
Appeals (CA). The latter denied the Petition ruling that there was no lack of jurisdiction,
excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court since it
had jurisdiction over the crimes as alleged in the Informations and the penalty for
violating the laws stated therein. Necessarily, it had the authority to seize the F/V Sea
Lion which was mentioned in the said Informations. Aggrieved, Petitioner filed this
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not F/V Sea Lion should be released to Petitioner.

RULING:
No. The vessel should not be released to Petitioner. The Petition is
unmeritorious.

Petitioner pursued an incorrect remedy when it sought recourse before the CA.
The filing of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA is
limited only to the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court. The CA did not find either lack or error of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion. There was no jurisdictional error because based on the
Informations, the offenses were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court. The penalties imposable under the law were also within its jurisdiction. As a
necessary consequence, the trial court had the authority to determine how the subject
fishing vessel should be disposed of. Likewise, no grave abuse of discretion attended the
issuance of the trial court's order to confiscate F/V Sea Lion considering the absence of
evidence showing that said vessel is owned by a third party. Evidently, the remedial
relief pursued by the petitioner was infirm and improper.

The Supreme Court agrees with the CA's observation that the trial court impliedly
recognized petitioner's right to intervene when it pronounced that petitioner failed to
exercise its right to claim ownership of the F/V Sea Lion. This being the case, petitioner
should have filed an appeal instead of a petition for certiorari before the CA. Under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, certiorari is unavailing when an appeal is the plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy. Even assuming that the CA may resolve an error of procedure or
judgment, there was none committed in this particular case.

Petitioner's claim of ownership of F/V Sea Lion is not supported by any proof on
record. The only document on record that is relevant in this regard is a request for the
release of the F/V Sea Lion based on petitioner's alleged ownership filed with the
Provincial Prosecutor. While the latter authorized the release of said fishing vessel, this
was conditioned upon petitioner's submission of a proof of ownership and the filing of a
bond, with which petitioner failed to comply. Even when judicial proceedings
commenced, nothing was heard from the petitioner. No motion for intervention or any
manifestation came from petitioner's end during the period of arraignment up to the
rendition of sentence. While petitioner later explained before the CA that its inaction
was brought about by its inability to put up the required bond due to financial
difficulties, same is still not a sufficient justification for it to deliberately not act at all.

Finally, petitioner's contention that it was deprived of its right to due process in
the confiscation of F/V Sea Lion has no factual basis. As correctly pointed out by the CA:

That the trial court concluded that no denial of due process

occurred is likewise legally correct, perhaps not in the exact
way expressed in the assailed order, but for what the reason
 articulated in the assailed order directly implies. As we
discussed above, the petitioner did not intervene before the
trial court to claim ownership of the fishing vessel, nor were
there records before the court showing a third-party claim of
ownership of the vessel; the formal introduction of evidence
that would have formally brought the third-party ownership
of the vessel to light was prevented by the plea of guilt of the
accused. There was therefore no third-party property right
sought to be protected when the trial court ordered the
confiscation of the vessel.

In fine, it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that F/V Sea Lion was
used by the 17 Chinese fishermen in the commission of the crimes. On the other hand,
petitioner presented no evidence at all to support its claim of ownership of F/V Sea
Lion. Therefore, the forfeiture of F/V Sea Lion in favor of the government was proper.