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MISCHIEF RULE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

The Mischief Rule was laid by the Barons of the Exchequer in the Heydon's case in 1584 as
follows, namely-

"That for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial,
restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered:

(1) What was the common law before the making of the Act?

(2) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?

(3) What remedy the Parliament have resolved and appointed to cure the defect?

(4) The true reason of the remedy and then the office of all the judges is always to make such
construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.

The Mischief Rule is a certain rule that judges can apply in statutory interpretation in order to
discover Parliament’s intention. The application of this rule gives the judge more discretion than
the literal and the golden rule as it allows him to effectively decide on Parliament’s intent. It can
be argued that this undermines Parliament’s supremacy and is undemocratic as it takes law-
making decisions away from the legislature. Legislative intent is determined by examining
secondary sources, such as committee reports, treatises, law review articles and corresponding
statutes. This rule has often been used to resolve ambiguities in cases in which the literal rule
cannot be applied.

In India the rule was explained by the Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar.
This rule was again applied in Goodyear India Ltd. v. State of Haryana. In CIT v. Sodra Devi,
the Supreme Court (Bhagwati J) expressed the view that the rule in Heydon's case is applicable
only when the words in question are ambiguous and are reasonably capable of more than one
meaning. Gajendragadkar J in Kanailal Sur v. Parmanidhi pointed out that the recourse to
consideration of the mischief and defect which the Act purports to remedy is only permissible
when the language is capable of two constructions. The Supreme Court in P.H.K. Kalliani Amma
(Smt) v. K. Devi, referred extensively to the rule in Heydon's case and to the opinions of
Bhagwati J. and Gajendragadkar J. Thus in the construction of an Act of Parliament, it is
important to consider the mischief that led to the passing of the Act and then give effect to the
remedy as stated by the Act in order to achieve its object. This has its drawbacks; the language of
the statute may have inadequately expressed the objective intended to be achieved.

Thus, the mischief rule is applicable where the language of the statute is capable of more than
one meaning. When the question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision in a statute it is
proper to read that provision in its context. The context means the statute as a whole, the
previous state of law, other statutes in pari material, the general scope of the statute and the
mischief that it was intended to remedy.

Case Laws

1. Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661


This case involved the construction of Article 286 of the Constitution of India. In this
case, after referring to the state of law prevailing in the provinces prior to the Constitution
as also to the chaos and confusion that was brought about in inter-state trade and
commerce by indiscriminate exercise of taxing powers by the different provincial
legislatures, SR Das, CJ, stated, “The purpose of Article 286 was to cure the mischief of
multiple taxation and to preserve the free flow of inter-state trade or commerce in the
Union of India regarded as one economic unit without any provincial barrier.”

2. RMDC v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628


Mischief rule was applied in the construction of Section 2(d) of the Prize Competitions
Act, 1955. This section defines ‘prize competition’ as meaning any competition in which
prizes are offered for the solution of any puzzle based upon the building up arrangement,
combination or permutation of letters, words or figures. The question was whether the
Act applies to competitions which involve substantial skill and are not in the nature of
gambling. The Supreme Court referred to the previous state of law, mischief, etc, and
held that having regard to the history of the legislation, the declared object thereof, and
the wording of the statute, we are of the opinion that that the competitions which are
sought to be controlled and regulated by the Act are only those competitions in which
success does not depend on any substantial degree of skill.

3. CIT, MP v. Sodra Devi, AIR 1957 SC 832


In this case, Section 16(3) of the Income tax Act, 1922 was interpreted. This sub-section
read that, ‘In computing the total income of any individual for the purpose of assessment,
there shall be included, (a) so much of the income of a wife or minor child of such
individual as arises directly or indirectly.’ In order to resolve this ambiguity, the SC
referred to the state of the law before the enactment of the provisions, the mischief for
which the law did not provide, the remedy which the legislature resolved and appointed
to cure the defect, and the true reason of the remedy. The evil which was sought to be
remedied was the one resulting from the widespread practice of husbands entering into
nominal partnerships with their wives and fathers and admitting their minor children to
the benefits of the partnerships of which they were members. If this background of the
enactment of section 16(3) is borne in mind then there is no room for any doubt
howsoever, the only intention of the legislature in doing so was to include the income
derived by the wife or the minor child, the husband or the father as the case may be.

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