Journal of Personality and Social Psycliolog

1970, Vol. IS, No. 4, 283-293

ELICITATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION AND

SELF-SACRIFICING BEHAVIOR:
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF VOLUNTEERING
TO BE A BONE MARROW DONOR 1
SHALOM H. SCHWARTZ 2
Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin

It was hypothesized that self-sacrificing behavior is positively related to the

salience of consequences for others and to the salience of the actor's personal
responsibility in an appeal for help, and negatively related to the odds of
incurring costs. Theoretically, the former two variables promote activation of
moral norms, while the latter fosters neutralization of norms. These variables
were manipulated in appeals to 144 subjects in a field experiment to donate
bone marrow. Volunteering increased with responsibility (p < .02), and with
consequences under 1/1,000 odds ( / > < . 0 5 ) , but was unrelated to odds. The
relationship between volunteering and consequences under 1/25 odds was curvi-
linear, with high salience of consequences producing the lowest rate of volun-
teering. To explain this curvilinear relationship, it was proposed that psycho-
logical reactance is expressed overtly as refusal when pressure in an appeal
seems illegitimate. Volunteering was positively related to socioeconomic status
(p < .01). The strikingly high rate of volunteering is traced to the momentum
of compliance.

People have been called upon for simple
and even trivial self-sacrifices in the majority
of help-giving studies reported thus far. They
have been induced to donate money and gift
certificates, to make phone calls, to work
harder at a task, to return lost wallets, to
give up a few minutes or hours for an experi-
ment, to report the distress of a nonthreaten-
ing victim, or to offer him minimal help, etc.3
Participants in many of these studies were
expected to respond quickly to visual or audi-
tory stimuli indicating a need for help (e.g.,
1
This research was supported by Grant GS-204S
from the National Science Foundation. The assistance
of Stephen Loeb in running the experiment and the
contributions of Richard Tessler throughout every
phase of the research are greatly appreciated. The
author is indebted to L. J. Peterson, Administrative
Director of the Badger Regional Blood Center, and
to his entire staff for their cooperation and support,
and to H. Andrew Michener and Geraldine Tate
Clausen for their comments on an earlier draft of
the paper.
2
Requests for reprints should be sent to Shalom
Schwartz, Department of Sociology, University of
Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin 53706.
8
For example, Rosenhan and White (1967), Carl-
smith and Gross (1969), Berkowitz and Daniels
(1963), Hornstein, Fisch, and Holmes (1968), Horo-
witz (1968), and Barley and Latanc (1968), re-
spectively.
283
cries of distress) or to requests which treated
their decision as inconsequential or worthy of
little deliberation (e.g., "Do me a favor and
score some questionnaires while you wait").
Consequently, it is unclear whether these
studies have increased our understanding of
costly self-sacrificing behavior on behalf of
others and of behavior which follows upon
deliberate and momentous moral decisions.
The current study applies part of a framework
proposed by Schwartz (1970) to explain the
relationship between moral decision making
and behavior to an instance of help giving
involving substantial self-sacrifice: volunteer-
ing to serve as a donor for a bone marrow
transplant.
In this framework, Schwartz suggested two
preconditions for the influence of personally
held moral norms upon behavior. First, a
person must be aware that his potential
actions have consequences for the welfare of
another. Second, he must feel some capability
to control these actions and their conse-
quences—some degree of personal responsibil-
ity for them. When these two preconditions
are met, moral norms pertinent to the actions
and consequences are activated. The activa-
tion of moral norms is experienced subjec-
284 SHALOM H. SCHWARTZ
tively as a sense of moral obligation, a sense
that one should act in a particular manner
and that failure to do so will produce self-
criticism or loss of self-regard. In the situa-
tion in the current study, for example, people
who endorsed norms prescribing self-sacrifice
to save the life of another may have experi-
enced a sense of moral obligation to undergo
tests of compatibility with a patient who
might die unless a compatible bone marrow
donor was found for him.
When the behavior prescribed by a person's
activated norms entails costs (e.g., pain, time,
loss, risk of disease), however, he will also
be motivated not to comply with these norms
in order to avoid the costs. If the moral norms
can be neutralized, thereby reducing or elimi-
nating the sense of moral obligation, failure to
help will not result in self-criticism. When the
norms are neutralized, helping is unlikely ex-
cept in response to external pressures. When
the sense of moral obligation is maintained,
self-sacrificing behavior is more likely. This
research examined the effects on self-
sacrificing behavior of two situational factors
postulated by Schwartz to influence the ease
with which moral norms can be neutralized.
Two primary modes for neutralizing moral
norms are to ignore or deny the consequences
of potential actions for others, and to deny
one's personal responsibility for these actions
and for their consequences. Schwartz has sug-
gested that the ease with which consequences
for others can be ignored or denied depends
upon the extent to which the consequences of
action or inaction are spelled out in the
decision-making situation. The more fully
that consequences for others are spelled out
in an appeal for help (i.e., the greater their
salience), the greater the opportunities for the
decision maker to become aware that one or
more of his self-accepted moral norms are
pertinent to his choice. Although an unusually
sensitive person might speculatively elaborate
consequences that activate a large number of
his norms, the probability that most people
will experience a sense of moral obligation is
increased by drawing their attention to spe-
cific consequences. Of special importance for
this research, the person who presents the
request provides a social validation for the
particular consequences he mentions, which
makes denial of their reality or significance
more difficult.
The second factor that may influence the
ease of neutralizing moral norms is the sali-
ence of the actor's personal responsibility in
the decision situation. An appeal to a person
for help usually implies that he has both the
freedom to choose and the ability to perform
what is requested. While the very act of ap-
pealing places direct responsibility on the
person who is addressed, the salience of his
responsibility can be increased by emphasizing
his freedom and the unique qualifications to
help that he possesses. The more salient his
personal responsibility is made in a situation,
the more difficult it is for the person to per-
suade himself that he is constrained by exter-
nal forces, to deny to himself that he is
capable, or to ascribe responsibility for acting
away from himself and onto others. Hence
increasing the salience of personal responsi-
bility in an appeal is expected to impede the
neutralization of moral norms, thereby con-
tributing to the maintenance of a sense of
moral obligation.
Since salience of consequences for others
and of personal responsibility are thought to
contribute to the continuity of activation of a
sense of moral obligation to help, it was hy-
pothesized that these two variables are posi-
tively related to helping behavior.'1 Presumed
to intervene between the awakened sense of
moral obligation to help and overt behavior
is a process of weighing anticipated guilt or
self-criticism for refusal and anticipated pride
or heightened self-regard for helping. This
process can be expressed as a problem in at-
tribution of causality and inferences about the
self for the decision maker. By knowingly
choosing to comply with or to refuse a legiti-
mate request for help that he is competent
to give, a person creates a situation in which
it is reasonable to attribute causality to him-
4
Schwartz (1970) hypothesized that salience of
consequences and of responsibility interact in their
influence on compliance with moral norms, because
failure cither to attend to consequences or to accept
personal responsibility is sufficient alone to neutralize
moral norms. Here, where a direct appeal for help
was made, however, no interaction effect was ex-
pected, because the appeal would probably elicit a
minimum initial awareness of consequences and of
personal responsibility even in low-salience conditions.
 MORAL OBLIGATION AND SELF-SACRIFICING BEHAVIOR
self and hence to infer positive or negative
self-attributes. If he can dismiss the conse-
quences of his choice or his personal responsi-
bility (i.e., neutralize moral norms that have
been activated), then attribution of causality
to the self for failure to help is no longer
appropriate, and negative self-inferences can
be avoided (cf. Kelley, 1967, for a related
argument).
Positive relationships between compliance
with requests for help and prior transgression,
interpreted by the researchers as evidence
that guilt arousal facilitates helping behavior,
have been reported in several experimental
studies (Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Darlington
& Macker, 1966; Freedman, Wallington, &
Bless, 1967; Wallace & Sadalla, 1966). The
current research differs from the earlier studies
in two important respects, even if one accepts
the guilt interpretation of their findings which
Brock (1969) has questioned. First, in this
earlier research, prior transgressions rather
than the appeal for help presumably produced
the guilt. Here, it is the anticipation of future
changes in self-regard (e.g., guilt) that pre-
sumably is manipulated, and this is done in
the appeal for help itself.
Further, in the earlier studies guilt was
conceptualized as having drive properties: its
arousal impels a person to perform guilt-
reducing acts such as helping. There is no
presumption in the present study that the
intensity of emotional arousal is a crucial
mediator of self-sacrificing behavior. Rather,
it is postulated that the cognitive appraisal
of consequences and responsibility leads to the
activation of moral norms. Variations in overt
behavior depend upon the content of the
norms activated, the costliness of the behavior
they prescribe, and the success or failure of
attempts to neutralize these norms. While
emotional arousal often occurs in conjunction
with the activation of norms and the anticipa-
tion of changes in self-regard, it may have
little influence on the probability of self-
sacrificing acts except when extremely low or
high levels of arousal are experienced. This
view is similar to Levinthal's (in press) analy-
sis of the relation of fear arousal to change in
attitude and behavior.
In a study somewhat more closely related
to the present research than the transgression-
285
compliance studies, Zemach (1966) examined
the relationship between the extent to which
people were held personally accountable for
the violation of Negro civil rights and
volunteering to sign up for civil rights activi-
ties. She found that an appeal using a
medium level of personal accountability was
more effective than either a high- or a low-
accountability appeal. Zemach (1966) and
Janis (1967) interpreted the accountability
variable as a guilt-arousal manipulation, They
argued that the study demonstrated a curvi-
linear relationship between guilt arousal and
conformity to recommendations due to the
interfering effects of high arousal. We do not
view the level of emotional arousal as the key
mediator of volunteering in Zemach's study.
An alternative interpretation can be offered
for her findings, however, which also sug-
gests that in our study, salience of conse-
quences and responsibility may be related in
a curvilinear manner to helping behavior.
Zemach noted that the manipulations that
led to reduced willingness to sign up for civil
rights activities were accompanied by in-
creases in annoyance, complaints, and aggres-
sion toward the communication and its source.
If Zemach's personal accountability manipula-
tion is viewed as a manipulation of the magni-
tude of pressure to comply, then these nega-
tive reactions may indicate that the decrease
in compliance at high levels of pressure was
a manifestation of "psychological reactance,"
an attempt by subjects to reassert their
threatened behavioral freedoms (Brehm, 1966).
As Brehm asserted: "The magnitude of
reactance aroused . . . is a direction function
of , . . the magnitude of the pressure to
comply [pp. 118-119]."
In the current study, compliance with a
bone marrow appeal probably threatened a
range of very important behavioral freedoms.
Psychological reactance might therefore be
expected if increases in the salience of conse-
quences and responsibility in the appeal are
experienced by subjects as increases in the
magnitude of pressure to comply. To probe
the possibility that the mounting of reactance
might generate a curvilinear relationship with
helping, three levels of the salience of conse-
quences variable were included in the appeal.
286 SHALOM H. SCHWARTZ
To summarize, it is hypothesized that
volunteering to be a bone marrow donor varies
positively with the following elements in the
appeal for help which are postulated to elicit
a sense of moral obligation and to impede its
neutralization: (a) the salience of the conse-
quences of the decision for others and (b)
the salience of the actor's personal responsi-
bility for these consequences. The alternative
possibility that increases in pressure have
a curvilinear effect on volunteering is also
considered.
The third variable manipulated in this
study was the probability that significant
costs would be incurred by agreeing to the
request for help. As noted above, it is the
anticipated costs of complying with acti-
vated norms that motivate persons to neu-
tralize these norms, and the cost considera-
tions may override the inclination to meet
one's felt moral obligation. Some of the im-
portant costs one might anticipate when
agreeing to tests of compatibility are the pain,
anxiety, and inconvenience associated with
hospitalization for drawing the bone marrow.
The probability of incurring these costs was
manipulated by varying the odds quoted to
subjects that they might be found compatible
with the patient and therefore actually be
expected to donate marrow. It was hypothe-
sized that the greater the perceived proba-
bility that a volunteer may in fact be called
upon to donate marrow, the less likely people
are to volunteer to be donors.
METHOD
Subjects
One hundred and forty-four community members
were recruited as subjects while they relaxed in the
canteen of the local Red Cross center after giving
blood during the weekly blood bank hours. Potential
subjects were approached in the order that they
entered the canteen, and more than 80% agreed to
spend 15-20 minutes talking with the interviewer.
The sample had the following demographic charac-
teristics: 76% male; 78% married; 32% 18-29
years, 28% 30-39 years, and 40% 40 years or older;
28% upper-white-collar, 44% lower-white-collar, 19%
upper-blue collar, and 9% lower-blue-collar.
Design
Subjects were randomly assigned to 1 of 3 levels
of salience of consequences (low, moderate, high),
to 1 of 2 levels of salience of personal responsibility
(low, high), and to 1 of 2 levels of odds (1/25,
1/1,000), to form a 3 X 2 X 2 factorial design.
Since the interviewer could not be blind to the
subject's experimental condition, it was important
to check whether variations in volunteering were
a function of experimenter bias. For this pur-
pose a graduate business student who was totally
unfamiliar with experimental methods was employed
as one of the interviewers. He was led to believe that
the appeal situation was a prelude to the main
study, a follow-up in-depth interview with the same
subjects, and that variations in the appeal were of
no consequence. Discussions with this interviewer
after the study were completed verified that at no
point did he suspect that the variations in the appeal
were important, or that the aim was to explain
variation in volunteering. Two other interviewers
who were familiar with the hypotheses were also
used. Subjects were assigned at random to one of
the three interviewers. 5
Procedure
The interviewer introduced himself to potential
subjects as a medical sociologist from the University
of Wisconsin who was trying to talk with everyone
giving blood that day. He invited the subject to join
him at a table by the side of the canteen, and sug-
gested bringing along some refreshments. When sub-
jects were seated, the interviewer asked for and
recorded background information. He then continued:
I am talking with the people giving blood today
because I would like permission to do some special
tests on part of the blood you have given. Before
asking you to say yes or no I want to make clear
what the tests are all about. Have you heard any-
thing in the news about bone marrow transplants?
After recording the answer to this question, he
continued:
I'm working with a team at the UVV hospital that
is doing bone marrow transplanting. Bone marrow
is the soft substance that produces new blood. In
blood diseases like leukemia, a person's bone mar-
row produces an excessive number of white blood
cells. Even with the best drug treatment we
eventually get to the point where the patient is
unlikely to survive for more than a few months.
In these cases we are now trying to replace dis-
eased bone marrow with healthy transplanted
marrow. This is a somewhat experimental pro-
cedure, but it is worth while since otherwise the
patients really have no hope. The transplant is like
a blood transfusion. Marrow is drawn from the
donor's hip bones and later it is injected into the
recipient. This leaves the donor with some soreness
in the hips for a couple of days, but there are no
permanent after-effects, since the body quickly
replenishes its supply of bone marrow. By now
3
Analysis of the volunteering scores revealed no
interviewer main effect and, more importantly, no
interactions of interviewer with any of the experi-
mental variables. The interviewer variable is therefore
not considered further in this report.
 MORAL OBLIGATION AND SELF-SACRIFICING BEHAVIOR
we have perfected the process so that there is
almost no danger to the donor. The donor enters
the hospital in the evening; early the following
morning marrow is drawn under general anaes-
thesia; and he may leave the hospital that after-
noon. The major problem is getting a good match
between donor and recipient so that the transplant
isn't rejected. Members of the immediate family
usually serve as donors, because their blood and
other characteristics are the closest match with
the recipient's.
At this point, the interviewer turned over the top
index card of a randomly ordered pile and delivered
the appeal typed on it.
Independent Variables
Salience of consequences. This variable was ma-
nipulated by spelling out in greater detail at each
level the harm to others that would ensue from
failure to perform a successful bone marrow trans-
plant. The interviewer continued as follows:
[Lmv] But right now there is a 30-year-old female
at the hospital who might be helped by a trans-
plant, and there is no possible matching donor
from her family.
[Moderate] But right now there is a young mother
at the hospital in need of a transplant, and there
is no possible matching donor from her family.
[High] But right now there is a young mother at
the hospital in need of a transplant, and there
is no possible matching donor from her family.
. . . Without a match, survival for this woman
is very unlikely. And of course losing their
mother will be a tragedy for her kids, what with
the emotional shock and the hardship of growing
up without her.
Note that subjects had been told already that bone
marrow transplants were performed only in life or
death cases. Hence dependency of the patient on
potential donors was very great, even under low
salience of consequences.
Odds. The probability that a volunteer would actu-
ally be called upon to donate marrow was manipu-
lated in the sentence following the first sentence of
the salience of consequences manipulation: "We know
that fay chance about 1 in every [1,000, 25] members
of the population at large could provide an adequate
match as a transplant donor."
Salience of personal responsibility. This variable
was manipulated by suggesting to the subject either
that there were many potential donors from whom
to draw—all equally qualified—or by suggesting that
he was one of a limited and uniquely qualified pool.
This manipulation was administered after the above
in the following manner:
[Low] So in searching for a suitable donor for our
patient we are turning to the general public. We
are running ads for potential donors in news-
papers across the state; and we are also asking
people at blood centers around Wisconsin to let
287
us test a small part of the blood they have given
to see if they might possibly match with our
patient.
[High] So in searching for a suitable donor for
our patient we are turning to people like you
who are giving blood today rather than to the
general public, because your blood is available
so we can get the tests started right away and
we know you meet the minimal health standards.
So I'm asking people to let us test a small part
of the blood they have given to see if they
might possibly match our patient.
Dependent Variable
Commitment to serving as a bone marrow donor
was measured on a 4-point scale, generated by re-
sponses to three sequential requests. The first request
followed immediately after the manipulation of
salience of responsibility:
Agreeing at this stage doesn't commit anyone actu-
ally to donating bone marrow. Should there be a
match, further tests of compatibility would be
required. What I guess I'm asking you is, would
you be willing for us to test some of the blood
you have just given?
The interviewer waited for a reply without further
pressuring the subject. Questions from subjects were
answered using information already given, except in
a very few instances where additional medical facts
were sought. Subjects who agreed to testing of the
available blood sample were then asked for a stronger
commitment:
Carrying out these tests is a pretty complicated
and expensive business for us in the lab, so we
don't want to go ahead with them unless we know
there is at least a SO/SO chance you would consider
donating marrow if you turned out to be com-
patible. . . .
Again the interviewer waited for a response without
pressuring the subject. Subjects who refused either
of these first two requests were assured by the
interviewer that he certainly could understand their
position.
All subjects were then asked to answer a few
questions to help the interviewer learn if he was
succeeding in getting across the information he
wanted to convey without misleading people. These
questions checked on the success of the manipulations
and probed how well subjects had grasped what a
transplant involved for a donor. Subjects who had
said they were unwilling to have their blood tested
were thanked and dismissed after answering these
questions.
Those who had agreed to the second request were
asked to fill out a "Blood Sample Testing Checklist,"
needed to insure that there were no substances in
the blood sample they had given which would pre-
clude accurate testing for compatibility. The check-
list was contrived so that various answers could pro-
vide the interviewer with reasonable excuses for
saying that accurate tests could not be performed.
288 SHALOM H. SCHWARTZ
After explaining why tests could not be performed,
he continued with the third request, intended to tap
the highest level of commitment to donating:
This has happened several times before because
people haven't been warned in advance. We can't
carry out adequate tests on the sample of blood
that is available. One of our colleagues, Dr.
Coopersmith, is trying to avoid this problem of
finding donors at the last minute. She's gathering
a pool of people who are willing to be on call
should they be needed to donate marrow for a
patient in the future. She is testing their blood
and setting up a file with their characteristics. This
isn't at all urgent, so there is no pressure to get
involved. But if you would like, I could arrange to
have her call you to discuss joining this pool.
Subjects who replied affirmatively were asked for
their telephone number, thanked, and dismissed.
Those who replied negatively or who hesitated more
than 5 seconds without answering were also thanked
by the interviewer at this point and dismissed. The
5-second limit was used to increase the probability
that affirmative responses signified an existing com-
mitment to donating rather than a reaction to added
pressure. The list of volunteers was indeed given to a
doctor who was assembling the pool of potential
donors and who would contact them individually.
In sum, four levels of commitment to serving as
a bone marrow donor were possible. Scores were
assigned to these levels as indicated: not willing to
have blood tested for compatibility—0; willing to
have blood tested, but less than SO/SO chance would
donate—1; at least 50/50 chance would donate,
but not willing to be on call for future trans-
plants—2; at least SO/SO chance would donate and
willing to be on call for future transplants—3.
Willingness to join the general donor pool was
treated as the highest level on the commitment scale
based on inferences from experience with pretest
subjects, even though the manipulations of salience
of consequences and of responsibility related directly
only to the case of the woman currently in the
hospital and not to the pool. It was apparent that
the 33 pretest subjects who agreed to the second
request could be further differentiated by level of
commitment into those who had serious doubts that
they would be willing to donate but decided after
wavering that there was a SO/SO chance, and those
whose ready agreement signified virtually certain
commitment to donate if found compatible. The
former were generally relieved when told tests of
compatibility could not be performed on the blood
sample that was available. The latter were often dis-
appointed when told the tests could not be per-
formed, and some volunteered to come in specially
to give another blood sample. Responses to the
request to join the donor pool, both in the pretests
and in the main experiment, appeared to discriminate
well between subjects who were uncertain whether
they would actually donate if found compatible and
those who were fully committed to helping the
patient in the hospital.
RESULTS
Checks of the Appeal and the Experimental
Manipulations
Several indicators testify that subjects
found the appeal plausible and convincing.
Numerous subjects telephoned the blood
center in subsequent weeks to inquire after
the patient who needed a transplant, and
several who returned to donate blood while
the research was still under way asked the
interviewers how she was faring. Six subjects
were interviewed in depth some 2 weeks after
exposure to the appeal. All of them stated
that they had suspected nothing, and they
found it difficult to believe even then that the
encounter at the blood center had not been
what it appeared to be. During the appeals
themselves, subjects responded with serious-
ness and candor.
The information conveyed in the appeal and
the effectiveness of the experimental manipu-
lations were checked by the questions pur-
portedly intended to tell the interviewer how
clear he had been. Most subjects assimilated
the key facts in the explanation of the trans-
plant process. Eighty-three percent of the
subjects mentioned hospitalization, 74% men-
tioned soreness in the hips, and almost half
also mentioned the use of anaesthesia and the
absence of permanent aftereffects. There were
no differences across experimental conditions
in the accuracy with which subjects recalled
what transplants involved for the donor or in
their perception of dangers to the donor.
The effectiveness of the salience of conse-
quences manipulation was affirmed by a
comparison of the number of distinct conse-
quences recalled by subjects in each of the
salience of consequences conditions: .71 were
mentioned in the low condition, 1.27 in the
moderate, and 2.81 in the high (F — 70.33,
d f = 2/141, p < .0001). While there was no
direct information on whether the manipula-
tions of salience of responsibility influenced
subjects' feelings of personal responsibility,
there was evidence that the content of the
manipulations was perceived accurately. In
response to the question "How are we going
about trying to find a suita.ble donor?" 83%
of those in the low salience of responsibility
condition correctly recalled that we were turn-
 MORAL OBLIGATION AND SELF-SACRIFICING BEHAVIOR
ing to the general public or running news-
paper ads, while none in the high condition
gave this answer. In the high salience of
responsibility condition, 86% of the subjects
mentioned that we were asking donors at the
blood center, and 51 % further noted the spe-
cial qualifications of this group, while only
6% of those in the low condition mentioned
donors at the center.
Since over 85% of the pretest subjects re-
called the exact odds that a member of the
population would provide an adequate match
as a donor by chance alone, subjects were
asked only for a subjective estimate of the
likelihood that they would turn out com-
patible in the main experiment. In each odds
condition, almost half of the subjects replied
that they had no idea, and about 20%
repeated the chance odds—giving no indica-
tion of their own estimate. Responses of the
3S% who did offer a subjective estimate were
coded blindly on a S-point scale from "no
possibility at all" that they would be com-
patible to "a good possibility." The mean
subjective estimate of comparability was sig-
nificantly higher among those replying in the
1/25 odds condition than in the 1/1,000 odds
condition ( £ = 2 . 9 9 6 , p < .01). Considering
that less than half of the subjects appear to
have thought in terms of their own chances,
however, there remains some doubt whether
the perceived probability of incurring costs
was manipulated effectively,
Results for Volunteering
A strikingly high proportion of subjects
agreed to all three requests. Fully 59% volun-
teered to join the pool of bone marrow donors,
indicating their willingness to be on call. An
additional 24%, who did not volunteer for the
pool, agreed that there was at least a SO/SO
chance they would be willing to donate
marrow to the patient in the hospital if they
were found compatible. Only 5% of the sub-
jects refused outright to have their blood
tested; and an additional 12 % indicated there
was less than an even chance they would be
willing to give marrow if tests showed they
were compatible.
To permit a more refined analysis of the
data, subjects were assigned 1 point for each
incremental commitment to volunteering
289
TABLE 1
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ZOR VOLUNTEERING
TO BE A BONE MARROW DONOR
Source df MS ;••
Salience of responsibility (A) 1 66.69 6.70**
Salience of consequences (B) 2 31.72 3.18*
Odds (C) 1 12.25 1.23
AXB 2 .34 <1
AX C 1 .05 <1
BX C 2 48.56 4.88***
AXBX C 2 1.80 <1
Within 132 9.96
Note.—Raw data were subjected to a square trans-
formation.
*i> <,05.
** f <.02.
*** p <.01.
which they made, as explained in the Method
section, The distribution of scores yielded by
this process was skewed markedly, and there
was a strong inverse relationship between the
condition cell means and their variances. A
square transformation of these scores was em-
ployed. This transformation yielded a more
normal distribution, reduced the relationship
between means and variances, and increased
homogeneity of error variances, without de-
stroying the psychological meaning of the
scale (see Kirk, 1968, pp, 63-67). The re-
sults of the analysis of variance for the trans-
formed volunteering scores are presented in
Table l.«
The main effect for salience of personal re-
sponsibility was significant, with greater com-
mitment to volunteering under high responsi-
bility (Z = 7.08) than under low responsibility
(3f=5.72). Computation of omega-squared
indicated that salience of personal responsibil-
ity accounted for approximately 4% of the
variance in volunteering. There was also a
significant main effect for salience of conse-
quences for the welfare of others. Commit-
ment to volunteering was highest under
moderate consequences (X = 7.23), somewhat
lower under high consequences (X = 6.38), and
lowest under low consequences (3? =5.60).
Before interpreting the apparent curvilinear
relationship between salience of consequences
and commitment to volunteering, however,
attention must be given to the significant
0
An analysis of variance of the untransfonned
scores yielded the same significant effects and no
others.
290 SHALOM H. SCHWARTZ
fa >—& 1/1000 ODDS
O 0 "25 ODDS
SALIENCE OF CONSEQUENCES
FIG. 1. Mean scores for volunteering to be a bone
marrow donor as a function of salience of conse-
quences and odds in the appeal. (Means having
different subscripts differ from each other significantly
(p < .05) by Duncan's multiple-range test. All means
arc based on n = 24, and represent square trans-
formations of the raw data.)
interaction between the consequences and odds
variables. Neither the odds main effect nor
any of the interactions with salience of
responsibility were significant.
The six means in the Consequences X Odds
interaction are presented graphically in
Figure 1. Inspection of the means suggested
that the following complex comparison might
encompass both the significant consequences
main effect and the significant Conse-
quences X Odds interaction effect:
r = -1 (fcLowCon-1/1,000)
+ 0 (/JVIodCon-1/1,000)
+ 1 (//HighCon-1/1,000)
-1 (/iLowCon-1/25)
+ 2 (/iModCon-1/25)
-1 (^HighCon-1/25)
This comparison permits a single, compre-
hensive a posteriori test of the hypothesis that
the relationship between volunteering and
salience of consequences is positive and linear
under 1/1,000 odds, and curvilinear under
1/25 odds.7 The comparison was significant
7
The comparison has four degrees of freedom, two
based on the consequences sums of squares and two
on the Consequences X Odds sums of squares. The
(F ~ 3,82, df = 4/132, p < ,01), while the
residual was not (F < 1).
The significance of the a posteriori com-
parison indicates that when potential donors
were told that the probability they would be
found compatible with the patient in the hos-
pital was only 1/1,000, the predicted positive
linear relationship between salience of conse-
quences and volunteering to donate bone
marrow was found. The significance of the
comparison also indicates that when a greater
probability that subjects would be compatible
was quoted (1/2S), a curvilinear relationship
between salience of consequences and volun-
teering was generated. The increase in salience
of consequences from a low to a moderate
level resulted in a significant increase in vol-
unteering, but further increasing the salience
of consequences produced a sharp drop in
volunteering, Approximately 7% of the vari-
ances in volunteering was accounted for by
this comparison.
Of all the background variables, only
occupation was significantly related to volun-
teering to be a bone marrow donor (;• = .24,
/ > < . 0 1 ) . The higher persons were on the
occupational scale, the stronger the commit-
ment to volunteering they were likely to make.
Age, sex, marital status, number of children,
and number of times having donated blood
were all unrelated to volunteering. Occupation
contributed a significant increment to the
amount of variance accounted for by the ex-
perimental variables alone when added to
the multiple-regression equation for predict-
ing commitment to volunteering (F=5.25,
df= 1/127, p < .025).
DISCUSSION
The high rate of agreement to serve as a
bone marrow donor for a total stranger was
quite unexpected. The unusual nature of the
sample—over 80% were regular blood donors
—may partly account for the rate of agree-
ment. But the adequacy of this explanation
must be questioned in the light of the absence
comparison is orthogonal to odds: the products of
the weights assigned to the two levels of odds within
each level of consequences sum to zero. Scheffe's
method of a posteriori comparisons was used to test
the significance of the comparison (sec Kirk, 1968,
pp. 91-92.
 MORAL OBLIGATION AND SELF-SACRIFICING BEHAVIOR
of a relationship between commitment to
volunteering and number of previous blood
donations. Moreover, an even higher propor-
tion in a sample of first-time student blood
donors volunteered to join the bone marrow
pool (13 of IS). The rate of agreement might
also be explained if subjects had little incen-
tive to refuse because they perceived the costs
of volunteering to be minimal. Reactions of
subjects during the appeal, responses of those
who were interviewed later in depth, and com-
ments of people to whom the appeal was de-
scribed, however, suggest that the costs were
considered substantial. Subjects often debated
with themselves for 10-15 minutes while the
interviewer waited for their decisions; they
mentioned numerous costs to the interviewer;
and in the weeks following the encounter, they
sought social validation for the assessment of
costs they had made in deciding to agree or
refuse.
A clue to a more adequate explanation of
the rate of agreement is that people to whom
the appeal was described as a hypothetical
situation thought they probably would have
refused to be donors. An important aspect of
the experimental setting that was missing for
these people was the gradual building up of
compliant actions in which they were impli-
cated before the first request. In contrast, all
of the experimental subjects had already per-
formed two compliant acts: they had donated
blood and had agreed to leave their seats
and go over to the interviewer's table to talk
with him. As Freedman and Fraser (1966)
have shown, compliance with requests in-
creases after a person has complied with an
earlier request. Brock's (1969) interpretation
of this phenomenon may well describe what
happened at the blood center: "once a person
has become involved or taken action, it would
be psychologically inconsistent for him to re-
main inactive in a subsequent situation that
is interpersonally similar [p. 145]."
For the present subjects, agreeing to the
first request for testing the available blood
sample with no commitment to donate was
but a small increment in compliance. When
asked next for more substantial commitments,
the problem of justifying a refusal given their
three previous compliant acts was added to
their sense of moral obligation as a factor
291
promoting agreement. This interpretation of
the subjects' experience helps to explain the
behavior of several people who returned to
donate another pint of blood while the experi-
ment was still under way. When approached
the second time, all of these subjects declined
even to talk with the interviewer at his table.
One might infer that the combination of a
sense of moral obligation and the momentum
of compliance had led most of these subjects
to volunteer the first time despite motivation
to refuse; but they now intuited that acceding
even to the request to talk would again en-
snare them in a progression of compliance
from which it would be difficult to withdraw.
The rationales offered above for the predic-
tions involving salience of consequences and
of responsibility assume that for most people,
a sense of moral obligation to volunteer was
elicited by the appeal. The high rate of agree-
ment tends to support this assumption, and
it is further substantiated by two other find-
ings. First, in reply to a hypothetical ques-
tion, 83% of a survey sample (n — 64) with
background characteristics similar to the ex-
perimental sample said they would feel some
guilt or self-criticism if they refused to donate
bone marrow to a stranger, Second, many
experimental subjects, regardless of their de-
cision, made remarks to the interviewer indi-
cating that they felt it would be "wrong" for
a person not to help if he could (e.g., "You
can't let a person die if there's something
you can do.").
Based on the assumption that norms giving
rise to a sense of moral obligation were acti-
vated, the significant relationship between
volunteering and salience of personal re-
sponsibility in the appeal may be interpreted
as evidence that this situational variable in-
fluenced the ease with which the moral norms
could be neutralized. One alternative inter-
pretation is that the high salience of respon-
sibility manipulation raised the subject's sense
of competence and self-esteem by singling
them out as particularly fit to serve as donors.
(See Berkowitz & Connor, 1966, for evidence
that sense of competence and esteem affect
helping.) This seems improbable, however,
because subjects' status as blood donors was
mentioned in both responsibility conditions,
and the special reasons cited for selecting
292 SHALOM H. SCHWARTZ
blood donors in the high condition—the avail-
ability of blood samples and the donors'
minimal level of health—seem unlikely to
have had a strong, favorable impact on their
sense of competence or esteem.
Considering the seeming obviousness of the
idea that helping is a function of the costs it
entails (see Wagner & Wheeler, 1969, for
experimental evidence), the absence of a main
effect for odds suggests that the investigators
did not effectively vary perceptions of the
costs associated with volunteering by varying
the probability of chance compatibility. As
noted above, fewer than half the subjects
appeared to have translated the odds for
chance compatibility into an estimate of how
likely they themselves were to be called upon
to donate. For some subjects, furthermore, the
odds may have represented the probability of
gaining rewards (pride, praise) rather than
incurring costs by volunteering. Ten percent
of the subjects explicitly indicated that they
hoped they would be compatible and have
the privilege of donating.
The significant a posteriori comparison re-
vealed that volunteering was positively related
to salience of consequences under 1/1,000
odds, and that under 1/25 odds it was posi-
tively related at low to moderate levels of
consequences, but became negatively related
as the consequences were made more highly
salient. Setting aside the findings in the high
consequences-1/25 condition for the moment,
these results support the view that the more
fully the consequences of action or inaction
for the welfare of others are spelled out in
the decision situation, the more difficult it
is to neutralize normal norms and hence to
violate them.
Only one aspect of the results contradicted
the hypotheses that situational factors which
contribute to the maintenance of a sense of
moral obligation by inhibiting neutralization
of moral norms are positively related to self-
sacrificing behavior. This was the significant
drop in volunteering from the moderate to the
high salience of consequences condition under
1/25 odds. That reactance due to increases
in pressure to comply might produce a curvi-
linear relationship between volunteering and
salience of consequences had been anticipated,
but the appearance of curvilinearity only
under 1/25 odds requires special explanation.
Strong pressure to comply was probably ex-
perienced in the high-consequences condition
because of the stress on the emotional shock
of the patient's death for her children and
the hardship of growing up without her. There
is no reason to believe, however, that the
pressure experienced was stronger under 1/25
than under 1/1,000 odds. Hence one would
expect approximately the same intensity of
reactance in both odds conditions.
Brehm (1966) has suggested that the legiti-
macy of a behavioral restriction creates re-
straints against direct attempts to restore
freedom when reactance is aroused. This in-
sight helps to explain the Odds X Conse-
quences interaction effect in the current study.
Manipulation of the odds for finding a com-
patible donor by chance may have affected
the legitimacy attributed by subjects to the
high salience of consequences appeal. Playing
upon emotions and exerting subtle but strong
pressure to volunteer may have seemed legiti-
mate when there was only a 1/1,000 chance
of finding a compatible donor, so that it was
important to test everyone for compatibility.
The legitimacy of this pressure to comply may
have restrained the expression of reactance
as refusal.
By contrast, the chances of finding a com-
patible donor under 1/25 odds were good, even
if some people refused to undergo testing. The
intensity of pressure may therefore have been
experienced as less legitimate, and reactance
may have been expressed more freely as re-
fusal. If the appeal was viewed as illegitimate,
the sense of moral obligation could have
been neutralized and negative self-attributions
avoided by denying that refusal had serious
consequences for others because another donor
would have been found, or by ascribing re-
sponsibility for any harmful consequences to
the interviewer's ineptness.
It is interesting to note that socioeconomic
status (SES), as indexed by occupation, was
more strongly associated with volunteering
than were any of the three experimental vari-
ables. The association may be traceable to
the positive variation of SES both with altru-
istic or self-sacrificing values (Kohn, 1969,
pp. 48-52) and with confidence in medical
innovation (Clausen, Seidenfeld, & Deasy,
 MORAL OBLIGATION AND SELF-SACRIFICING BEHAVIOR
1954), and familiarity with sophisticated
medical procedures. Regarding the latter
point, subjects in the experiment were more
likely to have heard about bone marrow trans-
plants before, the higher their occupational
status Gr= 13.43, dj = 6, p < .OS). While
the reasons for the relationship between SES
and volunteering are not yet established, the
finding itself should alert researchers to the
importance of considering SES in studies of
self-sacrificing behavior.
After the many disturbing natural and ex-
perimental demonstrations of man's capacity
to act against his fellow, it was heartening to
find that so many of the subjects were willing
to make a substantial self-sacrifice on behalf
of a stranger. Future studies will clarif}'
whether a high rate of voluntary self-sacrifice
requires that the appeal be made in a setting
in which a progression of compliant acts has
been established. It is also worth investigating
which of the other variables that have been
associated with less serious or deliberate types
of helping account for variance when the
stakes are higher and there is time to weigh
one's choice. The significant effects of the two
variables drawn from a consideration of the
process of moral decision making in the cur-
rent study suggest that selecting variables
with an eye to this decision-making process
may be a fruitful way to proceed.
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