European Politics and Society

Brexit Outside of UK Politics: The Case of Czech Eurosceptics

Petr Kaniok, Vít Hloušek

Abstract: How do soft and hard Eurosceptics differ from each other? This question has
become more salient in recent years, as party-based Euroscepticism has been affecting daily
mainstream European politics. This article explores this question through an examination of
the impact of Brexit outside the United Kingdom. Using the Czech Republic, a country with a
strong tradition of party-based Euroscepticism, we analyse representatives of both
categories in the context of pro-EU parties. Using official party reactions to Brexit, we argue
that the reactions of both camps substantially vary. While soft Eurosceptics consider Brexit to
be an opportunity to reform the EU, hard Eurosceptics see Brexit as a call to destroy the EU.
Moreover, the position of soft Eurosceptics is closer to the stance of pro-EU parties than to
that of hard Eurosceptics. Our research thus contributes to a greater understanding of party-
based Euroscepticism and to forming a clearer conceptualization of it.

Key words: Brexit, Czexit, EU, Euroscepticism, Czech Republic

Authors details:

Petr Kaniok (corresponding author), kaniok@fss.muni.cz, tel.: +420 549 493 571

Faculty of Social Science, Masaryk University

Vít Hloušek, hlousek@fss.muni.cz, tel.: +420 549 494 761

Faculty of Social Science, Masaryk University

The paper is a part of the research project of the Grant Agency of Masaryk University
“Europe in Changing International Environment IV” (MUNI/A/0834/2017).

1
1 Introduction

“Euroscepticism is everywhere”: this is how the title of the famous song “Love is
Everywhere”, by Caught in the Act, could be paraphrased when describing the current reality
in the EU. The extensive and intensive presence of Euroscepticism in daily politics has been
reflected by political science research to the same degree. Increased attention paid to EU
opposition can especially be found in connection to the Eurozone crisis. Since 2008, the
number of articles, monothematic journal issues 1 and books (Fuchs & Berton & Roger, 2009;
Leconte, 2010; Topaloff, 2012; Brack & Costa, 2012, Leruth & Startin & Usherwood, 2017)
dealing with various expressions of Euroscepticism has noticeably increased The motivations
for Eurosceptic attitudes, the numerous forms of Eurosceptic parties, and public
Euroscepticism are major topics for this “second Eurosceptic wave”. Euroscepticism seems
to have become a part of the political mainstream, both in terms of elites´ attitudes and
public opinion (Brack & Startin; 2015). Using a metaphor, Euroscepticism has moved from
the corridors to the salons. And apparently this will be the case for the long term future.

No matter if one celebrates or regrets such developments, one has to ask whether and to
what extent this is still the same Euroscepticism as defined at the beginning of the 21 st
century. Many recent articles have looked at how Euroscepticism has spread across the
continent, how it has shaped public opinion or even the behaviour of EU institutions. Few
studies have tried to analyse how (and whether) Eurosceptic political success has
transformed the phenomenon itself. This is quite striking if one takes into account recent
developments in the EU. The multiple crises that the EU has been facing since 2008 have
opened a “window of opportunity” for Euroscepticism. The June 2016 referendum in the
United Kingdom, which led to the anticipated withdrawal of that nation from the EU (Brexit),
can in this context be regarded as the greatest victory Euroscepticism has achieved so far.
But it is not the only one. In recent years, Eurosceptic parties have been represented in the
executive branch in several EU Member states, which has enabled them to influence the EU
agenda and EU priorities. The question therefore is what does this substantial change in
political “empirics” mean for the traditional conceptualization of party-based Euroscepticism
which divides this approach into soft and hard categories. In light of the current “explosion”
of EU critique, it is important to return to the conceptualization of the term in order to deal
with it. As one can hardly expect that negative stances towards the EU will disappear from
the political scene, the saliency of this problem appears to be persistent.

Our aim is to test how Brexit has influenced soft and hard Eurosceptic political parties in one
EU Member state. We selected the Czech Republic as the object of our research. The reasons
why we limit our analysis to just one case are as follows. First, we consider our article as a
pilot study on “Eurosceptic success impact on Euroscepticism” research. Thus, our goals are

1
For example, the special issue of International Political Science Review 36(3) or the special issue of Journal of
Common Market Studies 51(1).

2
mainly exploratory. Exploring the Czech case will help us to formulate further problems to be
addressed on a richer set of cases. Second, there has been a long tradition of party-based
Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic. This tradition has been constantly manifested both at
the national and the European level, and in many aspects has been remarkably stable.
Although the Czech political parties in the period after 2004 stressed the EU mainly as a
source of external funding through cohesion and other funds (Havlík & Havlík 2018), they
began to deal with EU-related issues in a more serious way as they were increasingly
Europeanized by both their experience with EU membership and contacts with their peer-
parties abroad. This applies to both the Czech pro-European and Eurosceptic parties (Havlík
et al. 2017). Therefore, the Czech “European” debate somehow lost its original post-
communist flavour and its analysis brings generalizable results. Third, there has been a long
tradition of public scepticism towards the EU, as the results of Eurobarometer survey show.
For example, in November 2017, the economically booming Czech Republic public level of
distrust in the EU was 56 per cent. This level equals that of Cyprus and France, which
struggled with heavy economic problems. Only the departing UK and economically troubled
Greece showed higher levels of distrust (European Commission 2017: 14-17).

Our study has the following goals. First, we would like to reveal whether soft and hard
Eurosceptic parties differ in their approaches towards Brexit. Second, we would like to find
out if there have been any changes in these approaches during Brexit negotiations. This
means that our aim is to understand if Brexit has changed the relation between soft and
hard Eurosceptics. We expect they should be different in two ways. Soft and hard
Euroscepticism as two categories of one basic attitude should use similar tools, differing in
depth and scope only. However, if we admit that soft and hard Euroscepticism represent two
distinct approaches, their discourses on Brexit should differ in substance. In such a case, soft
Eurosceptics should use Brexit as a call for EU reform in more intergovernmental and flexible
organization, while hard Eurosceptics should perceive it as a chance to completely dismantle
the EU. Our point of departure is the conceptualisation which stresses that soft and hard
Euroscepticism represent two distinctly different approaches. Therefore, there won´t be any
changes towards mutual convergence, particularly in the sense of soft Eurosceptics adopting
the hard Eurosceptic discourse on Brexit.

The paper is organized as follows. We depart from a brief overview of the theoretical debate
on Euroscepticism. In this section, we also review literature on the relationship between
Euroscepticism and Brexit. After that, we present our method and data. The next section
contains the analysis and findings, stating that a) there is a clear difference between soft and
hard Eurosceptics in their approach towards Brexit, and b) in the Brexit debate, soft
Eurosceptics are closer to the pro-European line than hard Eurosceptics arguments. The last
part of the article discusses conclusions in light of the state of art. We argue that our findings
help us to understand party positions towards the EU in clearer way and suggest future
research using a policy approach basis.

2 Research on Euroscepticism and policy based Euroscepticism

3
Euroscepticism has been as a topic for political science research for at least the last two
decades. During this period, various models have been created (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008;
Kopecký & Mudde, 2002; Vasilopoulou, 2009 etc.). The typology that distinguishes between
hard and soft versions of Euroscepticism (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2008) can be seen as the
most successful of these models. We define hard Euroscepticism as “principled opposition to
the project of European integration as embodied in the EU, in other words, based on the
ceding or transfer of powers to [a] supranational institution such as the EU” and soft
Euroscepticism occurs when “there is not a principled objection to the European integration
project of transferring powers to a supranational body such as the EU, but there is opposition
to the EU's current or future planned trajectory based on the further extension of
competencies that the EU is planning to make.” This binary typology is the result of the
intensive theoretical discussion that occurred in the first decade of the 21 st century (Taggart,
1998; Kopecký & Mudde, 2002; Conti, 2003; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2003; Conti and
Verzichelli, 2004; Riishøj, 2004; Flood, 2002; Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008a). Probably the
most promising effort to conceptualize party-based approaches towards the EU, apart from
Taggart and Szczerbiak’s approach, was the Kopecký & Mudde (2002) typology. Based upon
two principles – support or opposition with ceding sovereignty from national states towards
the EU and support/opposition with further extension of EU sovereignty – they created the
four following categories. First, Euroenthusiasts agree with both principles and stand as the
most pro-EU type. Second, Europragmatists are against the principle of ceding sovereignty,
but agree with current EU trajectory, i.e. with the extension of EU powers. Third, what
Kopecký & Mudde call Euroscepticism is an approach combining support for the principle of
ceding sovereignty, but opposing further increase of EU powers. Fourth, Eurorejects, as the
clear antitype to Euroenthusiasts, oppose both the founding principle of European
integration as well as any plan to extend EU sovereignty.

Apart from this attempt, political science has also attempted to articulate other, more or less
sophisticated typologies (Flood, 2002; Riishøj, 2004; Conti & Verzichelli, 2004; for overview
see Crespy & Verschueren, 2009). Their influence in empirical research is – as is the case of
the Kopecký & Mudde typology – marginal, however, as were attempts to introduce new
terminology and to replace the term Euroscepticism (Crespy and Verschuren, 2009, p. 382).
Taggart and Szczerbiak´s resulting typology divides Euroscepticism between its soft and hard
forms. However, this “canonical” version suffers from several major problems.

The first problem was pointed out by Crespy and Verschueren (2009, p. 382). They state –
using Sartori´s work (1970) – that a typology should rather distinguish between the
categories instead of differentiating within the categories. Moreover, Szczerbiak and Taggart
´s typology is not a typology as it hardly encompasses multiple ideal types, each of which
represents a unique combination of the organizational attributes that are believed to
determine the relevant outcome (Doty & Glick 1994). Their conceptualization of
Euroscepticism is rather an umbrella term whose misleading character has been illustrated
by several studies (e. g. Boomgarten et al, 2011; Artner & Róna, 2012). Crespy and

4
Verschueren (2009, p. 383) also claim that Euroscepticism as a term has negative
connotations, making it a strongly normative concept which can be misused in political
struggles, as the distinction between soft and hard Euroscepticism has fundamental
consequences (Neumayer, 2007). Soft is, in the logic of language, the preliminary stage of
hard, from which follows their affinity. In other words, support for a slower tempo of
European integration and emphasis on the importance of its intergovernmental character
thus becomes associated with a principled refusal of European integration as such. A
constituent part of European integration – intergovernmental cooperation – is thus seen as a
first step towards a principled refusal of integration. Second, the hard Eurosceptic parties are
mostly considered extremist (De Vries & Edwards, 2009; Crum, 2007). In political reality, the
ranking of soft and hard Eurosceptics alongside one another renders problematic the
position of the former, who are typologically put into one imaginary camp with the latter
(Katz, 2008, p. 155). The consequences of this association include reduction in discussion and
a refusal of soft Eurosceptic arguments as non-democratic, due to their association with hard
Eurosceptics.

Even though the theoretical debate has been re-ignited in recent years 2, new
conceptualizations of Euroscepticism have not emerged. This is quite striking because the
recent spread of critical stances on the EU across mainstream parties promoting different
ideologies, for example, suggests that critical approaches towards the EU do not necessarily
denote various categories of one stance but several different positions. As Usherwood claims
(2016), Euroscepticism hardly constructs a positive ideology and is rather used as a proxy for
other discontents. But there are still groups who consider the EU to be the whole problem.
Even though they can be counted on the fingers of one hand, they exist and as such and they
differ from those using Euroscepticism as a proxy.

What is interesting in this sense is that the content of a particular EU policy does not play
much of a role. The aspect of EU performance has been taken into account only nominally,
without being based upon any rigorous analysis. Remarks on "policy-based" Euroscepticism
can be found mainly in the context of theoretical work. Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008, p. 249-
251) argue that if a party does not agree with the transfer of competencies in one or two
policy areas, it does not necessarily mean that such a party manifests Euroscepticism.
Concerning the EU membership issue – which is particularly important in the context of
Brexit – Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008, p. 251) explicitly mentioned that they never regarded
opposition towards EU enlargement as evidence of Euroscepticism. In their view, opposition
to widening the EU contains no necessary assumptions about the current or future trajectory
of the European project. They claim it can be argued that widening and deepening European
integration may have conflicting logics so Eurosceptics can support the enlargement process
in the belief that it helps to dilute the EU. This assumption, pointed out also by Baker et al
(2002), was empirically tested by Kaniok & Hloušek (forthcoming). They found that a) soft

2
See for example the already discussed special issues of the Journal of Common Market Studies and the
International Political Science Review.

5
and hard Eurosceptic MEPs substantially differ in voting on EU enlargement proposals, and
b) there is a corresponding difference to the rhetoric of the respective parties. Brexit as an
issue has thus far not played any role in the debate on defining Euroscepticism. Only Taggart
and Szczerbiak (2016) suggest that Brexit could help to increase the chances of hard
Eurosceptics on the continent, as the exit scenario has become a real option. At the same
time, they claim that Brexit sends a bad message to soft Eurosceptics, as it has confirmed the
limitations of attempts to reform the EU in a more inter-governmentalist, soft Eurosceptic
direction. This could push some soft Eurosceptics in a hard Eurosceptic direction.

In the following parts of the paper, we will test this on the Czech case. Somewhat opposing
Taggart and Szczerbiak’s assumption on the convergence of soft Eurosceptics with hard
Euroscepticism, we expect that the differentiation between these two ideal types will be
manifested in the stances of the political parties on Brexit and we will be able to claim at the
end of our research that soft and hard Euroscepticisms imply different treatment of the
Brexit issue. This means that our basic hypothesis is that, contrary to assumptions made by
Taggart and Szczerbiak, “soft” Eurosceptic Czech parties haven’t moved closer to a “hard”
Eurosceptic position as a result of Brexit. There hasn’t been a ‘domino effect’ of Brexit, at
least in the Czech case.

3 Data and method

We take into account only those parties which have been represented in parliament, i.e. that
a party has gained seats either in the most recent national parliamentary election (2013), or
in the 2014 European election. This has led us to include the Civic Democratic Party (ODS),
which was successful in both elections. The same is true for the Czech Communists (KSČM).
The Party of Free Citizens (Svobodní) was only successful in the 2014 EP election and Dawn
of Direct Democracy (Úsvit) gained parliamentary seats only in the 2013 national election. As
the party fell apart in May 2015, we included both succeeding movements – Freedom of
Direct Democracy (SPD) and Dawn – National Coalition (Úsvit – Národní koalice). In order to
evaluate any difference between soft and hard Eurosceptics, we have decided to also include
pro-European parties and their positions on Brexit; in this case, Czech Social Democrats
(ČSSD), Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL), the conservative-liberal Tradition-Prosperity-
Responsibility 09 (TOP 09) party and the liberal movement Action of Dissatisfied Citizens
2011 (ANO 2011). This last party defines itself vaguely as pro-European. Moreover, its
representatives were responsible for the governmental EU policy in the 2013-2017
parliamentary period, which is defined as pro-European as well. Inclusion of pro-European
positions is necessary also from a theoretical point of view, as it makes it possible to set up
soft and hard Eurosceptic arguments in the continuum.

Table 1: Analysed political parties

Party EU Approach
ODS Soft Eurosceptic

6
 Svobodní Hard Eurosceptic
KSČM Soft Eurosceptic
Úsvit – Národní koalice Hard Eurosceptic
SPD Hard Eurosceptic
ČSSD Pro-European
TOP 09 Pro-European
ANO 2011 Pro-European

In order to help the reader understand the context, we present basic information on the
current state of the Czech party system. It has been, in the long-term perspective, assessed
as one of the most stable systems in Central and Eastern Europe (Hanley 2012) but it has
undergone profound changes since the parliamentary elections in 2010 (Havlík 2015). The
first change trend is seen in the increasing fragmentation of the party system. After the 2010
elections, there were five parties represented in the lower house of the Czech Parliament,
seven parties after the 2013 elections and nine parties after the elections held in November
2017. The traditionally dominant parties, the right wing ODS and the left-wing ČSSD, have
faced big losses of electoral support, which applies to a lesser extent to other parties
operating since the early 1990s, like the KSČM and KDU-ČSL. The third trend is the
emergence of the new political parties, connected with the rather swift replacement of
relevant parties as well as with new organisational forms of parties, namely the
entrepreneurial parties. In 2013, two new parties entered the lower house of the Czech
parliament. Currently the strongest political party in the Czech parliament, with almost 30
per cent of the vote, is ANO, founded and led by tycoon of Slovak origin Andrej Babiš. This is
a classic example of an entrepreneurial party similar to Berlusconi´s Forza Italia (Hloušek &
Kopeček 2017). In 2013, Tomio Okamura´s party entered the Czech Parliament; it represents
a type of entrepreneurial party which uses very populist and far right appeals (Kopeček &
Svačinová 2016). Despite the internal feuds described below, Okamura is still reinforcing the
Eurosceptic wing present in Czech politics.

If we look at the profile of voters supporting particular Czech parties, the left-right cleavage
still matters the most (Havlík & Voda 2016). The Communists and Social Democrats are
attracting voters who are typically from the working class and lower middle class.
Communist voters are more sceptical towards European integration, but even the Social
Democratic voters do not belong to the most pro-integration part of the Czech society.
Stance towards the EU is an important feature that distinguishes the voters of ODS and
TOP09. The voters of both parties are right-wing oriented in terms of their economic
preferences, yet they differ in their pro- or anti-EU stances. TOP 09 has the most pro-
European voters among the major political parties, and they tend to be liberal inhabitants of
big cities, who are also liberal in terms of their cultural values. ODS voters, on the other
hand, are typically more conservative people from smaller towns. Tomio Okamura´s parties
have attracted lower classes of protest-oriented voters, while Babiš´s ANO is preferred by

7
middle-class voters who claim to belong to the political centre and who are dissatisfied with
the formerly dominant parties such as ODS and especially ČSSD.

When it comes to the data, we have focused on official documents articulating party
positions towards Brexit. As such, we have identified press releases, commentaries available
on parties´ websites as well as interviews with party leaders and other media entries that
were published under the parties´ logo on the parties´ websites. As Brexit does not refer
strictly to the referendum and subsequent debate, we have taken into account all relevant
documents starting in May 2015 when David Cameron announced the UK government
intension to hold the EU membership referendum. The last month included is June 2017.

Regarding the compilation of data, we manually scanned the websites of analysed parties
covering the period from May 2015 to June 2017. We assume that materials published on
official party websites represent official party stances. This search produced 225 items that
were sorted by respective political party. Of the 225 entries, 153 can be assigned to
Eurosceptics, whereas the pro-European parties produced 72 entries.

These data have been analysed using interpretative content analysis with an open coding
approach that is partly based upon on existing definitions of Euroscepticism. The reasons for
this methodological choice are as follows: First, when it comes to the pro-EU parties, there is
no standard definition of pro-European stance that could be operationalized. Pro-European
stance is often equated with nominal or mere expression of support for the EU or European
integration as it currently exists. Hence, applying open coding makes not only practical but
also theoretical sense.

In terms of soft and hard Euroscepticism, we can´t simply follow Taggart and Szczerbiak´s
2003 definitions since neither the soft nor the hard category of the revised typology pays any
attention to the membership issue. This turned our interest back to Taggart & Szczerbiak’s
initial attempt which uses approach towards EU membership as a cut-off point between hard
and soft Eurosceptics. Here we expect that hard Eurosceptics will clearly welcome the Brexit
decision. They will try to sell it as an argument for EU disintegration, particularly
strengthening the need to hold a similar referendum in the Czech Republic. Generally,
membership should be interpreted as a bad thing. We thus expect to see claims supporting
Czech withdrawal from the EU or support for other exits. Arguments claiming that the EU
can´t be reformed may also be present.

When it comes to soft Eurosceptics, our extended definition – if operationalized for the
purpose of Brexit research – means that Czech EU membership won´t be challenged. Brexit
should be used as a call for substantial EU reform strengthening the intergovernmental
aspects of cooperation. Attempts to empower the EU at the cost of the Member states
should be rejected.

However, apart from these predefined arguments, we were interested in additional

arguments related to the Brexit issue. Our first aim here was to define which arguments soft

8
and hard Eurosceptics use in debate. Then, our second aim was to evaluate whether soft
Eurosceptic Brexit argumentation is closer to pro-European argumentation or to the hard
Eurosceptic line. Additionally, we wanted to reveal whether there were any changes in the
arguments used by soft Eurosceptics that would reflect a shift towards the hard Eurosceptic
position. Therefore, we analysed all parties in three periods. The first was labelled “pre-
Brexit”. It contained entries produced between May 2015 and May 2017. The “Brexit” phase
consisted of June and July 2016, i.e. one month when the referendum took place and one
month when we could expect intensive reactions to its result. Then, the third phase, “post-
Brexit”, was bounded by August 2016 and June 2017.

We analysed each article piece by piece, extracting the main arguments related to Brexit.
Each article´s title was entered into an Excel sheet, with the exact date when it was
published. We recorded also a direct web link to it. After that, we went through each piece
looking for a) arguments related to either soft or hard Euroscepticism, and b) any other
references to Brexit which did not fit into either category. This enabled us to construct how
particular parties – including those that are pro-European – perceived Brexit in all of the
periods.

4 Analysis

Even though our goal is not to analyse the Czech Brexit discussion in its entirety, a
distribution of analysed entries across parties and across time can offer some interesting
insights. Table 2 also reports the distribution of articles before, during and after the Brexit
referendum.

Table 2: Analysed political parties

Party 5/2015 – 5/2016 6-7/2016 8/2016 – Total

7/2017
ODS 14 30 31 75
Svobodní 15 12 20 48
KSČM 0 8 9 17
Úsvit – Národní koalice 0 4 1 5
SPD 1 3 5 10
ČSSD 4 7 7 18
TOP 09 4 14 13 31
KDU-ČSL 1 6 8 15
ANO 2011 0 5 1 6
Total 39 91 95 225

Table 2 suggests that there is great variety when it comes to the interest of Czech
Eurosceptic and non-Eurosceptic parties in Brexit. This variety is seen not only in the number
of entries, but also in the different activity levels of the parties in various periods. Before the
referendum, the Brexit issue was driven particularly by ODS and Svobodní. They continued

9
to lead the debate both during and after voting, although their activity changed over the
course of time. While in the “pre-Brexit” phase, the most vocal party was Svobodní, during
the vote and after it ODS took over leadership. This could suggest that a battle over the
Eurosceptic ownership of Brexit took place. ODS was the most active party during the whole
period, producing almost 50% of all Eurosceptic entries and around 44% of all entries. The
second strongest “producer” here is Svobodní, representing almost 1/3 of Eurosceptic
entries. The remaining parties became active only during and after the vote. Generally, their
coverage of the issue is substantially lower than either Svobodní or ODS.

If we split the number of entries by month (Figure 1), we see that the interest of the Czech
parties was driven particularly by external events. The peak of interest around the Brexit
referendum and its aftermath is an obvious and quite expected case (June and July 2016),
but a similar influence can be found repeatedly. For example, a similar impact was seen
when the European Council discussed British demands for renegotiated membership in
February 2016, or when, in January 2017, Theresa May announced that the United Kingdom
would seek a hard Brexit. This external influence shaped the behaviour of all analysed
parties, including ODS whose interest in Brexit seems to be the most continuous.

10
 Entries on Brexit broken down by months/parties
25

20

15

10

0
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
/ 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20 / 20
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

ODS Svobodni KSCM Usvit SPD CSSD TOP 09 ANO KDU-ČSL

11
Four parties represented the pro-European stance in our analysis. Three of them – the Social
Democrats (ČSSD), the Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) and the movement ANO 2011 – were
parts of the coalition government, whereas the fourth, TOP 09, remained in opposition.
Interestingly, of all of the pro-European parties, TOP 09 was the most interested in Brexit
and its position can be regarded as the most developed as well. TOP 09 also followed the
issue in the most continuous way, whereas the governmental parties substantially increased
their interest during and after the referendum.

TOP 09 started to follow Brexit before the referendum, although the number of comments it
produced was small when compared to the other two periods. In the pre-referendum
period, Brexit was depicted as a threat to the EU and to Czech national interests. A possible
British leave would destabilize the EU and open the gate for populist Eurosceptic politics.
The main attention (45 % of all entries) was paid to Brexit in June and July 2016. In the view
of top politicians of the party, Brexit remained a threat and an opportunity to weaken the EU
in the sphere of international politics. At the same time, Brexit offered an excellent
opportunity to reform and strengthen the EU. In general, TOP 09 did not call to revert any
substantial policies back to the member states, but they remained cautious about supporting
further integration. According to TOP 09, Brexit showed that EU citizens did not understand
the actions of their leaders, and therefore, further deepening of the EU must proceed one
step at a time and very carefully. In the last period we cover, Brexit remained a threat for
TOP 09 but some more subtle details emerge that are related to the future of EU-UK
relations. In general, the main arguments and elements of the discourse remain the same:
Brexit weakens the EU but offers a chance to reform it at the same time. The reform was to
increase the coherence and capacity of the EU in its economic, foreign and security
dimensions. The Czech Republic needed to move to the “core”, including entering the
Eurozone. The UK was not to be punished for Brexit, and close economic and political ties
were to be maintained as much as possible.

Among the ruling parties, the Social Democrats were the most interested in Brexit. Before
the referendum, ČSSD focused on negotiating between the United Kingdom and the EU. The
Social Democrats repeatedly emphasized the protection of Czech citizens´ rights in the
United Kingdom as a key issue, particularly specifying social benefits and the protection of
workers. The party also explicitly supported future British EU membership. The key pro-
European Brexit argument – the rights of non-UK citizens in the United Kingdom – remained
important even after the referendum. Key socialist politicians, such as the party leader
Bohuslav Sobotka and Foreign Minister Lubomír Zaorálek, argued that this was the most
important priority for Brexit negotiations. The referendum outcome itself was seen as a
“chance” for European integration, which “has to change its course”. While the immediate
reactions did not specify how this change should happen – the only visible narrative was the
“EU has to deliver concrete and identifiable outcomes that bring benefits to the citizens” – in
the following weeks the content of this “change” developed. According to the Social
Democrats, the future course of the integration process should focus on more intensive

12
cooperation in security issues, and the promotion of the social dimension of the EU. Here
the party advocates the existence of minimal guaranteed social standards across the EU,
European investment in industry and more intensive cooperation in energy policy. The Social
Democrats never mentioned any spill-back of a possible return of power from the EU to the
Member states. On the contrary, ČSSD rejected the concept of differentiated integration.
Thus, the pro-European vision of the change can be interpreted as a strengthening of EU
competences in areas where the party believes the EU can deliver visible solutions. When it
comes to the Brexit negotiation process, the Social Democrats advocated a non-punitive and
rather constructive approach. They followed and supported the EU negotiation tactics.

The Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) produced approximately the same amount of entries on
Brexit. The party politicians focused particularly on the referendum and its outcome and the
subsequent negotiations between the EU and the United Kingdom. Regarding the former,
Brexit was perceived as a decision, and this held negative consequences both for the EU and
for the United Kingdom. The Christian Democrats, however, repeatedly called for a
constructive “divorce” that would facilitate positive future relations between both parties.
This argument was visible immediately after the British decision and even more emphasized
during the negotiation phase. In both periods, the party was remarkably silent on how Brexit
could change the EU. Party politicians repeatedly claimed that a multispeed EU was a reality,
admitting that the Czech position was in the “core”. However, such a core was defined in a
very general way. The Christian Democrats perceived the core to be more intensive
cooperation in areas such as defence policy or security, leaving aside policies such as tax
harmonisation or social policy. The call for strengthening security cooperation apparently
relates to a strong party interest in the EU migration crisis issue. It was very intensively
covered by the Christian Democrats in the analysed period.

The ANO movement was the most silent of the coalition when it comes to Brexit. With the
exception of one entry produced in December 2016, ANO produced only immediate
reactions to the referendum outcome. Their message was very unified and simple – the EU
had to be reformed (in an unspecified direction), Brexit was a serious warning and basically
bad news for the Czech Republic, as it would affect the amount of money the country would
receive from the Structural Funds. ANO did not comment much on the broader implications
of Brexit for the EU and limited itself to very pragmatic and practical comments. The only
exception was ANO leader Andrej Babiš’s speech delivered to the ALDE Congress in
December 2016. On this occasion, Babiš, while regretting the UK decision, blamed the EU,
citing the lack of efficiency of EU institutions and the legitimacy crisis. In this speech, Babiš
simultaneously offered his vision of the EU as an “Asterix village” – a self-sufficient and well-
protected community where simple and logical rules apply. Those who want to be let in have
to respect these rules and only those who want to contribute to the community welfare
should be allowed to join.

If we sum up the positions of the Czech pro-European camp, the similarities prevail over the
differences. Brexit was predominantly seen as having a negative impact. There was also
13
agreement on its reform message for the EU – however differences appeared in the details
of how such a reform should look. Unanimity was also reached regarding the negotiation
process and the future approach towards the United Kingdom. Even though ANO,
particularly, was quite critical of EU performance, none of the parties questioned the
existence of the EU or Czech EU membership.

The most outspoken soft Eurosceptic party was ODS. The party followed the Brexit issue
intensively through all analysed periods. ODS interest was quite visible and constant even
during the “pre-Brexit” phase, during which ODS produced 22 entries related to Brexit. The
party consistently supported the position of the British government and its demands. ODS
used two arguments for its support. First, the party itself advocates more flexible and less
supranational integration, thus it logically welcomed the British vision as being compatible
with the ODS approach towards the EU. ODS frequently claimed that a more flexible EU
would be in line with Czech national interests and that it could ensure the sustainability of
the integration project. At the same time, ODS warned that Brexit would be bad for the
Czech Republic as well as for the EU. Regarding the former, ODS warned against
strengthening the role of Germany and its EU policy. The EU would be thus more centralized,
without any chance of being reformed. Particularly in the last stage of negotiations between
the EU and the United Kingdom, the EU was repeatedly blamed for causing problems and
thus being responsible for the possible negative result of the June referendum. Even though
this position, which can be expressed by the slogans “support for UK demands – more
flexible EU – Brexit is a bad solution”, was shared by a substantial majority of the party
establishment, a few dissent voices advocating (rather implicitly) Brexit appeared.

The Brexit referendum and its outcome did not affect the party´s approach. Immediately
after the results were announced, ODS translated them as a “last chance to reform the EU”.
In the following weeks and months, the party elaborated its vision of reform. In a nutshell,
ODS called for dropping the “ever closer Union” dogma and replacing it with flexibility and
differentiation. Moreover, the party suggested that Czech EU membership should be
renegotiated – as a part of Brexit negotiations – with the aim of obtaining exemptions to the
obligation to join the Eurozone and from the EU common asylum system. As a tool for such
reform, party politicians frequently suggested that the EU treaties should be revised. ODS
often played the “blame” card, claiming that Brexit was a mistake resulting from Brussels
politics and not an erroneous decision made by UK citizens. This motive also had a personal
dimension, as ODS – particularly in the early post-Brexit weeks – called for Jean Claude
Juncker’s resignation.

When it comes to the domestic impact of Brexit, top party politicians repeatedly and
explicitly rejected the idea of Czexit or of holding a referendum on EU membership. On the
other hand, ODS used Brexit statements in its opposition activities as it frequently criticized
the Czech government for its approach. ODS repeatedly made negative comments on the
government’s copycatting of EU officials, its unwillingness to use Brexit negotiations as
possible “window of opportunity” (to obtain exceptions e. g. from the Eurozone) and for the
14
makeup of the expert group on Brexit. The party repeatedly suggested holding negotiations
between the government and the opposition on Czech national Brexit priorities – such a
meeting finally took place in February 2017. Regarding the general Brexit negotiations
process, ODS consistently advocated a non-punitive, constructive and rational approach.

The Communist party held quite a broad position on Brexit. Even though it emphasized
rather neutral or soft Eurosceptic arguments, claiming that the EU had to be reformed, it
also issued some hard Eurosceptic messages such as, for example, “Brexit is a chance for an
authentic Left”. This amplitude corresponds with the existence of several factions within the
party. Particularly, the conservative wing heavily criticizes the very substance of European
integration. The soft Eurosceptic majority, represented for example by party leader Vojtěch
Filip or MEP Kateřina Konečná, used Brexit as an example of how European integration was
on the wrong track. The general tune of prevailing party rhetoric can thus be characterized
as critical. When speaking about EU reform, the Communists required a substantial EU re-
orientation towards the working class, social security and a rejection of its “neoliberal
course”. The Communists failed either to elaborate on this position or to describe how such
reforms would look, however, and their arguments on this point remained superficial.
Although communist soft Eurosceptics portrayed the EU in a very negative light, they did not
use Brexit as an inspiration for Czexit. The party argumentation saw moderate rather than
radical developed over the course of time. Party leaders did not pay specific attention to the
EU or Czech positions on Brexit negotiations. These issues were substantially downplayed.

Even though the soft Eurosceptic group consists in the Czech case of only of two parties, it is
almost impossible to come up with some reasonable summary. Interest and coverage of
Brexit by ODS outweighs that of KSČM not only in terms of quantity, but also in the scope
and details that are covered. The only issue that connects both parties is a call for EU reform.
However, when moving to the details of this reform, KSČM was very vague – and almost
silent – while ODS managed to present a detailed position. Therefore, rejection of Czexit and
call for a profound reform of the EU, no matter how vague in the case of the Communists,
are the only two hallmarks of the Czech soft Eurosceptic position. These two issues were,
however, emphasized long before the idea of Brexit dawned on David Cameron (Havlík et al.
2017: 92ff). Brexit only helped these two parties stress the importance of action and brought
new food for the soft Eurosceptic thought.

The hard Eurosceptic camp was foremost represented by Svobodní. Like ODS, Svobodní
covered Brexit during the whole period. The party and its key politicians commented on
every important step, starting with the British general elections in May 2015. Despite a
broad range of speakers responsible for Svobodní´s statements, there is remarkable
consistency in the party´s approach. This is not only true of the arguments used, but also of
the general rhetorical tone.

When it comes to the arguments, there are several points which can be labelled as major
claims. Svobodní perceived Brexit as a positive decision from the very start. When David

15
Cameron announced that there would be a referendum on British EU Membership, the party
already interpreted it as the first step towards the future dismantling of the EU. This framing
of Brexit was consistently used in all periods, particularly emphasizing Czexit as a next step.
In this context, Svobodní consistently used Brexit as an argument for having a similar
referendum in the Czech Republic. This idea was promoted as one of the party´s priorities
for the national election scheduled for October 2017.

Consistency can also be identified in Svobodní’s Brexit rhetoric. The EU was frequently
portrayed as close to collapse, harming Czech national interests and unable to transform
into an acceptable organization. Not surprisingly, the EU was blamed for Brexit, as it was a
non-democratic super-state whose political regime was in conflict with British democracy.
Czech EU membership was repeatedly illustrated as having a negative effect on every part of
the Czech political system. A future outside the EU, on the other hand, was always presented
as a purely positive scenario.

Just as Svobodní was interested in all steps and phases of Brexit – for example, it made
several comments on the February 2016 European Council meeting – its interest remained
high also during the post-referendum negotiations. Here Svobodní explicitly – and again
repeatedly – preferred hard Brexit as the way the United Kingdom should leave the EU.
Svobodní also repeatedly warned the EU not to try to punish the United Kingdom for its
decision.

Even though Svobodní reflects the hard Eurosceptic tenor of the Czech public debate, it is
not the only voice. There are also two smaller parties, both of them originating from the
movement Úsvit Přímé Demoracie (Dawn of Direct Democracy), that got 14 seats in the 2013
early elections. However, this protest movement disintegrated due to internal conflicts in
2015. Two succeeding movements were then established – SPD around former Úsvit leader
Tomio Okamura and Úsvit-Národní koalice gathering a majority of former Úsvit MPs.

SPD can be regarded as the more successful of the two post-Úsvit movements. While it used
a limited amount of arguments when discussing Brexit, two major arguments can be
identified. The first was a call for a Czech EU membership referendum, which implicitly and
explicitly stated that such a referendum would have the same result as Brexit. The second
key claim conceptualized the EU as a totalitarian tyranny in which the Czech Republic exists
as a “colony” or “second-rank member”. SPD thus used Brexit as a tool for promoting its own
domestic goal, i.e. contesting Czech EU membership. It held a hard Eurosceptic stance during
the whole period, without any change in party rhetoric or arguments.

The second offshoot of Úsvit – Úsvit-Národní koalice – had a very similar approach towards
Brexit. As Úsvit-Národní koalice coverage of the issue was quite small (there were just 4
entries found), one major Brexit argument could be identified: Úsvit repeatedly called for a
referendum on EU membership. In their comments, the party openly advocated Czexit as its

16
preferred outcome. Hence, even though there is limited data, it can be concluded that Úsvit-
Národní koalice had a very similar – even if not identical – hard Eurosceptic approach as SPD.

Even the hard Eurosceptic camp can be hardly characterized as a genuinely homogenous
group. However, there are more shared features here than among the soft Eurosceptics.
First, Brexit is treated as a positive step and an inspiration for the Czech Republic. The
second argument that can be found across parties is the use of Brexit as a pretext for a
Czech EU membership referendum. Third, all parties advocated the Czech withdrawal from
the EU. Fourth, the EU is described as a totally negative organization harming Czech national
interests. Even though the intensity of coverage varies among parties, there is a remarkable
consistency in the arguments used and the rhetoric applied.

Even though a great variety can be found across parties when it comes to the issues
discussed in the Brexit context, several key dimensions and topics can be picked up. Table 3
presents a summary, and parties are sorted according to their (non-)Eurosceptic affiliation.

17
Table 3: Summary of party position on key Brexit issues

Party Brexit Brexit EU impact Brexit domestic Source of ideas Perception Coverage Change
perception impact of EU
ČSSD Warning for EU reform in a “more Part of EU Brussels downloading Goal Driven by None
EU EU” direction mainstream external
events
TOP 09 Threat to EU reform in a “more Part of EU Own ideology Tool to goal Driven by None, turn
the EU EU” direction mainstream external to technical
events issues after
the British
referendum
KDU-ČSL Warning for EU reform admitting NA Own ideology Tool to goal Driven by None
EU both flexibility and external
more EU in certain events
areas
ANO Warning for EU reform in “Asterix NA NA Tool Driven by None
EU village” direction external
events
ODS Warning for EU reform in Exceptions, New Own ideology Tool Continuous None
EU “flexibility” direction deal
KSČM Critical EU reform, unspecified NA Own ideology NA Driven by None
external
events
Svobodn Positive EU disintegration Czexit, referendum Own ideology, Enemy Continuous None
í inspired by UKIP
Úsvit-NK Positive EU disintegration Czexit, referendum Inspired by others Enemy Driven by None

18
 (UKIP, FN) external
events
SPD Positive EU disintegration Czexit, referendum Inspiration by others Enemy Driven by None
(UKIP, NF) external
events

19
Our overview suggests that there is a great variety across Czech Eurosceptic parties no
matter which group they belong to. Even though hard Eurosceptics seem to be more
coherent, important differences can be identified there as well. Soft Eurosceptics differ in
almost all aspects save the desire to reform the EU profoundly instead of dismantling it. A
comparison of both groups – even though their internal coherency proved to be very
problematic – suggests that they express substantial differences. This concerns all important
dimensions and topics. First, the general perception of Brexit makes one cutting line. While
the whole hard Eurosceptic camp welcomed it as a positive process and decision, soft
Eurosceptics perceived it negatively. The same applies to the impact of Brexit both for the
EU and for Czech politics. When it comes to the former, hard Eurosceptics explicitly call for
EU disintegration, while soft opponents use Brexit as call for EU (even if substantial) reform.
Concerning the latter, hardliners translate Brexit as a signal for a Czech referendum on EU
membership and suggest Czexit, whereas soft Eurosceptics reject both. The remarkable
similarity between ODS and Svobodní regarding the intensity of interest in Brexit can be
explained by Czech internal party dynamics and presumably has nothing to do with parties’
EU positions. For the ODS, the EU agenda is one of the topics which defines party identity.
Interest in Brexit thus seems to confirm this. Additionally, ODS’s intensive interest is caused
by the fact that it competes with Svobodní. Both parties are often seen as Eurosceptic and
their representatives are often invited to comment on EU related issues. It would be
particularly uncomfortable for ODS if it was not perceived as the main owner of the issue.
Svobodní’s intense activity, therefore, has to be followed by at least similar coverage by
ODS. Moreover, it seems that a similar competition takes place between ODS and TOP 09.
Both parties manifest very similar positions on many economic issues while they
fundamentally differ in their views on the EU. The remarkable amount of Brexit entries
produced by TOP 09 (the biggest producer in the pro-EU camp) as well as by ODS (the
biggest producer in the Eurosceptic group) suggest that the EU agenda – here manifested by
the Brexit issue – has potential for Czech right wing parties.

We have not found any evidence suggesting that soft Eurosceptics would try to copy hard
Eurosceptics’ rhetoric and arguments. Rather the contrary is true: Although we can identify –
both in case of the Communists and ODS – some dissent hard voices before the Brexit
referendum, in the later stages such positions were silenced and parties´ general approaches
were rather softened than hardened. This finding thus does not confirm Taggart and
Szczerbiak’s (2016) prediction that this development might occur. Moreover, soft
Euroscepticism suggesting EU reform does not seem to decline or lose its appeal as the same
scholars expected. On the contrary, what is called soft Euroscepticism seems to be
developing independent and (from a political perspective) interesting solutions offering up a
perspective on the process of European integration. One such solution, offered up by ODS, is
based upon flexibility, differentiation and more balanced power equilibrium between
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism.

20
If we compare what we found out about soft Eurosceptic attitudes towards Brexit with a pro-
European stance, we can conclude that soft Eurosceptics represent, in many aspects, a
different position than pro-European politicians. That is of course not surprising. However,
more similarities might be found between soft Eurosceptics and the pro-European stance
than between soft and hard Euroscepticism. The core of these “shared values” consists of a
rather negative perception of Brexit, its “call for EU reform” interpretation and non-
questioning of Czech EU membership. Even though the very content of these “values” differ
– for example, soft Eurosceptics prefer flexibility over further centralization of the EU or they
seek exceptions from several EU policies over becoming a part of the EU mainstream – the
distance is still smaller than the distance between soft and hard Eurosceptic solutions. This
conclusion is supported also by the positions of ANO and KDU-ČSL on the future of the EU.
As we have found, neither party shares TOP 09’s nor ČSSD’s support for further deepening
EU integration.

5 Conclusion

Existing theoretical research on party-based Euroscepticism usually departs from the

assumption that one general stance towards the EU can characterize a party position and
parties can be classified accordingly. Taking into account the variety of EU activities and
policies, we believe that this simple approach is misleading. Therefore, we attempted to
challenge the prevailing conceptualization of party-based Euroscepticism by conducting an
analysis of Eurosceptic attitudes on Brexit, which can be regarded as one specific and
important EU policy/event/issue. Our aim was to find out whether soft and hard
Eurosceptics have reacted in similar or substantially different ways to the United Kingdom’s
decision to leave the EU and whether there have been any changes in either camp over time.
Despite the obvious limitations arising from our research design and data used, we produced
some interesting and, in a way, provoking findings.

First, our findings point to the highly problematic internal coherence and ideal consistence of
the soft Eurosceptic party “family”. The stance labelled as hard Euroscepticism is clear, but
the label of soft Euroscepticism denotes, in the political reality, many different positions vis-
à-vis the recent state of the EU. Our analysis confirms that under the soft Eurosceptic label,
very different positions can be manifested. If there is space for a finer conceptualisation of
different ideal types of Eurosceptic political stances, it is in breaking the category of soft
Euroscepticism into different (sub)types or, more probably, substantially redefining the soft
Euroscepticism type.

This suggestion is supported by our second important finding. That is that our “Brexit-
impact” analysis puts forth that hard and soft Eurosceptics may have less in common than
soft Eurosceptics and pro-European parties. This means that soft Euroscepticism represents
a fundamentally different position than hard Euroscepticism. In other words, these two
independent stances are not a part of one continuum. Both soft Euroscepticism and the pro-
European approach share support for European integration but differ in how it should look.

21
On the contrary, hard and soft Euroscepticism share only one position, which is their
negative stance towards further EU centralization and deeper supranationalization. The
question arising here is if only support for the principle of an “ever closer Union” equals
support for the European project. Existing typologies – and particularly Taggart and
Szczerbiak’s concept of soft and hard Euroscepticism – at least implicitly build upon this
assumption. Even Kopecký & Mudde’s approach admitting that Eurosceptics, as a type,
support the principle of ceding sovereignty from national states to the EU does not accept
that any pro-integration approach other than agreement with an “ever closer Union” can
exist. Broad political reality as well as our findings suggest that when it comes to the critique
raised towards the EU, there can be two different positions. First, there is the hard
Eurosceptic line against the diverse set of stances more or less supporting European
integration. Second, there is the more or less critical view of its current condition. We would
therefore argue that the pro-EU approach should be clearly and convincingly defined before
opposition towards the EU is operationalized. Such a “pro EU concept” will be in any case
more or less a question of normativity and ideological preferences, particularly if support for
the EU is the same as support for the “ever closer Union” principle. Empirical reality, not just
in terms of events shaping EU politics in recent years, but also including the decades-long
story of the EU as a process of differentiated integration (Leuffen, Rittberger,
Schimmelfennig 2013), could probably lean towards a broader approach including many
thoughts and positions thus far classified as expressions of soft Euroscepticism.

One could of course argue that gradual scales (for example, the North Carolina School, see
Polk et al 2017) could be used to approach the problem, rather than developing new
typologies with new categories. However, this assumes that the approach towards the EU is
linear, beginning with a simple rejection of European integration and ending with support for
further supranationalization. Again, several question appear here. First, linking support for
continuous supranationalism with support for the process of European integration is a
normative and political choice, not a scholarly one. Second, where should preferences for
other integration modes (such as flexible or differentiated integration) be placed on such a
scale? In addition, why should they be treated as less pro-European than those advocating
further transfer of competences from Member states towards the EU centre? Moreover,
apart from these issues, efforts to operationalize soft Euroscepticism using this scale suffers
from several major problems, inter alia treating a neutral approach towards the EU as an
expression of soft Euroscepticism (Mudde 2012: 197).

The second possible way out of the soft Euroscepticism deadlock could be to resign
ourselves to the idea that a general stance towards European integration – particularly in
those several, qualified policy areas or principles that approach opposition – can reasonably
exist and brings valuable information. Modern European integration affects so many various
policies and activities that disagreement with some of them becomes an inevitable
consequence of this process. Opposition to or criticism towards political system performance
is a normal part of its functioning. If one puts aside the idea that Euroscepticism has to be

22
understood as “deviation from integration mainstream” (Kratochvíl & Kný 2015), particularly
its soft version(s) can in fact contribute to a better – and more standardized – working of EU
political discussion. We believe – and our findings suggest – that further thorough analyses
of what parties (thus far labelled Eurosceptic) think about particular EU policies could be a
very effective way to go in order to solve “soft Euroscepticism problem”.

References

Artner A. & Róna, P., 2012. Euros(c)eptic - The Theory of the Optimum Currency Area and
the Practice of the Euro. Romanian Journal of European Affairs, 12(2), 80-98.

Bomgaarden H. et al (2011). Mapping EU attitudes: Conceptual and empirical dimensions of

Euroscepticism and EU support. Europen Union Politics, 12(2), 241-266.

Brack, N. & Costa, O. (2012). Euroscepticism within the EU Institutions. Oxon/New York:
Routledge.

Brack, N. & Startin, N. (2015). Introduction: Euroscepticism, from margins to the

mainstream. International Political Science Review 36(3), 239-249.

Conti, N. (2003). Party Attitudes to European Integration: A Longitudinal Analysis of the

Italian Case. SEI Working Paper No 70.

Crespy, A. and Verschueren, N. (2009). From Euroscepticism to Resistance to European

Integration: An Interdisciplinary Perspective. Perspectives on European Politics and Society,
10(3), 377-393.

Crum, B. (2007). Party Strategies in Referendums on the EU Constitution. European Union

Politics, 8(1), 61–82.

Doty H. D. & Glick W. H., 1994. Typologies as a Unique Form of Theory Building: Toward
Improved Understanding and Modeling. The Academy of Management Review 19(2), 230-
251.

van der Eijk, C. & Franklin, M. N. (2004). Potential for contestation on European matters at
national elections in Europe. In G. Marks & M. R. Steenbergen (Eds.), European integration
and political conflict (pp. 32-50). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

European Commission (2017). Standard Eurobarometer 88. First Results. Brussels: European
Union.

FitzGibbon, J. & Leruth, B. & Startin, N. (2016). Euroscepticism as a Transnational and Pan-
European Phenomenon. The Emergence of a New Sphere of Opposition. Oxon/New York:
Routledge.

23
Flood, C. & Usherwood, S. (2005). Positions, Dispositions, Transitions: A Model of Group
Alignment on EU Integration. Paper presented at 55th Annual Conference of the Political
Studies Association, University of Leeds.

Fuchs, D. & Magni-Berton, R. & Antoine Roger, A. (2009). Euroscepticism. Images of Europe
among mass publics and Political elites. Opladen/Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich
Publishers.

Hanley, S. (2012). Dynamics of new party formation in the Czech Republic 1996-2010:
Looking for the origins of a 'political earthquake'. East European Politics 28(2), 119 - 143.

Havlík, V. (2015). Stable or not? Patterns of party system dynamics and the rise of the new
political parties in the Czech Republic. Romanian Journal of Political Science 15(1), 185-207.

Havlík, V. & Havlík, Vr. (2018). From the Return to Europe to Easy Money: Europeanization of
Party Manifestoes in the Czech Republic. Acta Politologica 10(1), 17–35.

Havlík, V. & Hloušek, V. & Kaniok, P. (2017). Europeanised Defiance - Czech Euroscepticism
since 2004. Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers.

Havlík, V. & Voda, P. (2016). The Rise of New Political Parties and Re-Alignment of Party
Politics in the Czech Republic. Acta Politologica 8(2), 119-144.

Hloušek, V. & Kopeček, L. (2017): Different Ways of Institutionalising Entrepreneurial Parties:

Czech Public Affairs Party and ANO. Czech Journal of Political Science – Politologický časopis
24(2), 92-115.

Katz, R. (2008). Euroscepticism in Parliament: A Comparative Analysis of the European and

National Parliaments. In A. Szczerbiak & P. Taggart (Ed.) Opposing Europe? The Comparative
Party Politics of Euroscepticism (pp.151-180). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Leuffen, D. & Rittberger, B. & Schimmelfennig, F. (2013). Differentiated Integration.

Explaining Variation in the European Union. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

Leruth, B. & Usherwood, S. & Startin, N. (2017). The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism.
Oxon/New York: Routledge.

Kopecký, P. & Mudde, C. (2002). The Two Sides of Euroscepticism. Party Positions on
European Integration in East Central Europe”. European Union Politics, 3(3), 297-326.

Kratochvíl, P. & Kný, D. (2015). Caught in the Deviation Trap. On the Fallacies of the Study of
Party-Based Euroscepticism. Czech Journal of Political Science – Politologický časopis 22(3),
pp.200-215.

Kopeček, L. & Svačinová, P. (2016). Between Organizational Extremes: Czech Parties after a
Political Earthquake. In K. Sobolewska-Myslik & B. Kosowska-Gąstoł & P. Borowiec (Eds.),

24
Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Central and Eastern European Countries (pp.
133-158). Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press.

Leconte, C. (2010). Understanding Euroscepticism. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lubbers, M. & Scheepers, P. (2005). Political versus Instrumental Euro-scepticism. Mapping

Scepticism in European Countries and Regions. European Union Politics, 6(2), pp.223-242.

Mudde, C. (2012). The comparative study of party-based Euroscepticism: the Sussex versus
the North Carolina School. East European Politics 28(2): 193-202.

Neumayer, L. (2007). Euroscepticism as a political label: The use of European Union issues in
political competition in the new Member States. European Journal of Political Research,
47(2), 135-160.

Polk, J. & Rovny, J. & Bakker, R. & Edwards, E. & Hooghe, L. & Jolly, S. & Koedam, J. &
Kostelka, F. & Marks, G. & Schumacher, G. & Steenbergen, M. & Vachudova, M. & Zilovic, M.
(2017). Explaining the salience of anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for political
parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey data. Research & Politics 4(1) pp.1-
9.

Riishøj, S. (2004). Europeanisation and Euro-scepticism. Experiences from Poland and the
Czech Republic. Středoevropské politické studie 6(4).

Rovny, J. (2004). Conceptualising party-based Euroscepticism: Magnitude and motivations.

Collegium, 29, pp.31-47.

Topaloff, L. K. (2012). Political Parties and Euroscepticism. Houndmills/New York: Palgrave

Macmillan.

Van Spanje, J. & de Vreese, C. (2011). So what's wrong with the EU? Motivations underlying
the Eurosceptic vote in the 2009 European elections. European Union Politics, 12(3), 405-
429.

Szczerbiak, A. & Taggart, P. (2003). Theorising Party-Based Euroscepticism: Problems of

Definition, Measurement and Causality. SEI Working Paper No 69.

Szcerbiak, A. & Taggart, P. (2008a). Introduction: Researching Euroscepticism in European

Party Systems: A Comparative and Theoretical Research Agenda. In A. Szczerbiak & P.
Taggart (Ed.) Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism.
Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives (pp.1-27). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Szczerbiak, Aleks & Taggart, P., ed. (2008b). Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party
Politics of Euroscepticism. Case Studies and Country Surveys. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.

25
Szczerbiak, A. & Taggart, P. (2008c). Theorizing Party-Based Euroscepticism: Problems of
Definition, Measurement and Causality. In A. Szczerbiak & P. Taggart (Ed.) Opposing Europe?
The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism. Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives.
(pp. 238-262). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Taggart, P., (1998). A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western

European party systems. European Journal of Political Research, 33(3), 363-368.

Usherwood, S. & Startin, N. (2013). Euroscepticism as a Persistent Phenomenon. Journal of

Common Market Studies, 51(1), 153-168.

Vasilopoulou, S. (2013). Continuity and Change in the Study of Euroscepticism: Plus ça

change? Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(SI), 153-168.

De Vreese, C. H. (2007). A Spiral of Euroscepticism: The Media’s Fault? Acta Politica, 47(2-3),
271-286.

De Vries, C. E. & Edwards, E. E. (2009). Taking Europe To Its Extremes: Extremist Parties and
Public Euroscepticism. Party Politics, 15(1), 5-28.

26