QUASI-DELICT

1. SINGSON v. BPI
FACTS:
 BPI received a writ of garnishment. Thus, the clerk of the bank, without reading the full text of the writ, froze
Singson’s account and sent a notice to the latter informing him of the garnishment.
 Subsequently, Singson issued two checks and found out that his account was frozen.
 Singson sent a letter to the bank, asserting that the writ of garnishment did not include his account.
 Singson commenced the present action against the BPI and its president for damages in consequence of
said illegal freezing of his account.
 President Santiago Friexas of BPI apologized to Singson and rectified the mistake immediately.
 Still, Singson filed a claim for damages which was denied on the ground that damages for quasi-delict
cannot be sustained because the relationship between the parties is contractual in nature.
ISSUE: Whether the existence of contractual relation bars the commission of a tort by one against the other and the
consequent recovery of damages.
HELD: No. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against
the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefore. Here, although the relation between a passenger and a
carrier is contractual both in origin and nature, the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.

2. BARREDO v. CA

FACTS:

 An accident transpired involving a taxicab owned by Barredo and a carretela.

 Two days after, the passenger of the carretela died.

 The taxicab driver who is an employee of Barredo was prosecuted for the crime and was thereafter
convicted.

 When the criminal case was instituted, the parents of the deceased reserved their right to institute a
separate civil action for damages.

 Subsequently, they instituted a civil action for damages against Barredo.

 Barredo: My liability is only subsidiary as governed by the Revised Penal Code. SInce no civil action has yet
been filed against his emoployee for their claim, plaintiffs cannot go after the employer.

 CA: granted the claim for damages against Barredo. It ruled that the civil obligation did not arise from delict
but from Barredo’s negligence in selecting and/or supervising his employee.

ISSUE: Whether Barredo is primarily liable for the civil liability arising from quasi-delict.

HELD: Yes. The civil liability of Barredo arose from quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from a delict as contemplated in the Revised Penal Code. The Court explained that Barredo has two liabilities,
i.e., the subsidiary liability or that which arises from criminal negligence committed by his employee and the primary
liability of Barredo as an employer under Article 1903.
The option as to which liability to enforce is on the plaintiffs.

3. CALALAS v. SUNGA
FACTS:

 This case arose from an accident involving a jeepney driven by Calalas and a truck driven by Verena and
owed by Salva.
 Respondent got off the jeepney to give way to a passenger as she was just sitting on a stool at the back of
the door at the rear end of the jeep since the jeep was already at its full capacity.
 While getting off the jeepney, the truck bumped the same, resulting to respondent’s injuries.
 Consequently, respondent then filed a complaint against Calalas for violation of contract of carriage.
 In turn, petitioner filed a third-party complaint against Salva.
 Trial Court: Salva is liable, while petitioner is absolved from liability, taking cognizance of another civil case
for quasi-delict wherein Salva and Verena were held liable to petitioner.
 CA: Reversed. Calalas is liable to respondent for breach of contract of carriage.

ISSUE: Whether the decision in the case for quasi-delict between petitioner Calalas and Salva and Verena
constitutes res judicata to the issue in this case.

Whether respondent Sunga is bound by the ruling in the civil case finding Salve and Verena liable for quasi delict.

HELD: No. Sunga was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply.
Moreover, the issues in the earlier civil case and in the present case are not the same. In the first case, the issue is
whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. As to
the present case, between Calalas and Sunga, the issue is whether petitioner is liable for breach contract of carriage.
Hence, the first case is based on culpa aquilana that is the source of liability is the negligence of the tortfeasor. On
the other hand, the cause of action of the second case is based on culpa contractual or the negligence in the
performance of a contractual obligation.