LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGEST

Textbook/Reference:
- any textbook in Legal Ethics
-Part V of the Revised Rules of Court :
a. Rule 135 Rules of Court- Powers and duties of Courts and Judicial Officers (1-1-
64)
b. Rule 137 Rules of Court – Disqualification of Judicial Officers (1-1-64)
c. Rule 138 Rules of Court,  Attorneys and Admission to the Bar (1-1-64)
d. Rule 138-A Rules of Court, Law Student Practice Rule (12-18-86)
e. Rule 139-A Rules of Court, Integrated Bar of the Phil. (1-16-73)
f. Rule 139-B Rules of Court, Suspension, Disbarment and Discipline of
Attorneys (1-1-88)
g. Rule 140 Rules of Court, Discipline of Judges of Regular and Special
Courts and Justices of CA and Sandiganbayan
-Code of Professional Responsibility (6-21-88)
-The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary , A.M.
No. 03-05-01-SC
-A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Rules on Notarial Practice, 2004.
-Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)

I. LEGAL ETHICS
-Definition & Features

II. THE LEGAL PROFESSION-(Rule 138 Rules of Court)

A.PRACTICE OF LAW: What constitutes Practice of Law
Legal Profession as distinguished from Business

1. CAYETANO VS. MONSOD, G.R. No. 100113, 201 SCRA 210, Sept. 1991 (Note:
See also dissenting opinion of Justice Padilla)

Practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.

Taking into consideration the modern definition of practice of law and the liberal
construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, verily more than satisfy
the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.

Facts: On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the

nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took
his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the
COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments

of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpaper, filed the instant
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also
been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years.

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar. Atty.
Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank
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Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in
Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of
member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project
work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the
Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and
subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As
former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of
NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He
appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field
of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the
Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the
under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating,
lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and
lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as
a member of the Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission
(1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for
which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-
Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with
individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the
House of Representative."|

Issue: W/N Atty. Monsod possess the required qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.

Held: Practice of law means:

(a) any activity, in or out of court,
(b) which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
(c) knowledge, training and experience.

"To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill."||| x x x Interpreted in the light of the
various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the modern concept of
law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by
the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor —
verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.||| 

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Teodoro R. padilla –

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to

the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere
possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary
action. To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or
pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or
customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the
tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A
certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his
profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a
business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a
Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be
in the practice of law.

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2. RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTY. CRESENCIO P. CO UNTIAN,
JR., A.C. No. 5900, April 10, 2019

Lawyers carry the burden of living up to the ethical standards of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility because
public confidence in law and in lawyers may be tainted by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of members of the Bar. Those privileged to practice the legal
profession are expected to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency,
but also of morality considering that they are always under the watchful public
eye scrutinizing them both in their public and private lives.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) provides that a lawyer
shall not engage in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. On the
other hand, Canon 7 mandates that lawyers shall, at all times, uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Further, Rule 7.03 of
the CPR commands lawyers not to engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, or behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
Facts: Subject of the case is an Anonymous Complaint against Atty. Cresencio P.
Co Untian, Jr. for his alleged sexual harassment of students of Xavier University,
Cagayan de Oro City namely Antoinette Toycom Christina Sagarbarria and Lea
Dal.
Toyco claimed that respondent initially expressed amorous interest when he sent
her flowers anonymously through another law student, would often text her
romantic messages, poems, love notes and sweet nothings. Respondent also
invited her to go to Camiguin with another law student but she turned it down.
Toyco explained that while she was never sexually assaulted, respondent's
unwelcome advances made her feel degraded as she could not easily ignore
respondent for fear of reprisal.
On the other hand, Sagarbarria narrated that respondent showed her a
photograph revealing only the face of a woman and asked her if she knew who
the woman in the picture was. After she realized that the woman in the picture
looked like her, respondent revealed the entire photograph revealing a naked
woman and teased her within hearing distance of other law students.
Sagarbarria denied that she was the woman because she had a distinctive mark
on her back for the past six years. She averred that the incident caused her
depression, fearing what other law students may think of her. Sagarbarria
highlighted that she was unable to participate in a scheduled moot court
competition because she broke down in the middle of practice and cried
uncontrollably.
Meanwhile, Dal recounted that in one of her recitations during respondent's
class, she clarified a question propounded to her saying "Sir, come again?"
Respondent retorted "What? You want me to come again? I have not come the
first time and don't you know that it took me five minutes to come, and you want
me to come again?" She later learned that respondent would narrate the said
incident to almost all of his classes. Dal felt offended that she was subjected to
such sexually charged language and the fact that her embarrassment was retold
in other classes.
Respondent claimed that the complaints were made by disgruntled students who
failed their classes. He also denied sending flowers and text messages with
romantic undertones to Toyco. He highlighted that it was in fact her who gave
him gifts during Valentine's Day in 2002. Respondent added that he texting "luv
u" and "miss u" are friendly text messages sent without malice especially
considering that they were misspelled.
As to Sagarbarria's allegations, respondent countered that he confiscated the
photograph from another student and jokingly showed it to her in the spirit of
their open and uninhibited relationship. He noted that Sagarbarria is his niece
and they were previously close as they would oftentimes exchange discussions

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 on sensitive and mature matters as adults without any malice. Respondent
claimed that she was never humiliated when he showed her the photograph
because she even gamely lowered down her pants to prove that it was not her in
the photograph because unlike her, the naked woman did not have any tattoo.
On the other hand, respondent explained that Dal answered disrespectfully
when she was called for recitation uttering "Come again?" He posited that to
inject humor during class, he responded "Never use slang language in my class
because you might be misinterpreted. What do you mean by 'come again?' It
takes me several minutes before I come again." Respondent expounded that the
joke was directed at himself and that Dal never showed any resentment or
showed any sign of humiliation as she even laughed at the joke and continued to
sit in front of the class.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Co Untian should be suspended from the practice of
law.

Held: Yes. Respondent’s conduct towards Sagarbarria, Dal and Toyco created a
hostile and offensive environment which has no place in a learning institution.
Clearly, respondent abused the power and authority he possessed over the
complainants. What makes respondent’s act of sexual harassment even more
reprehensible is the fact that he is both a professor and a member of the legal
profession.

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character,
but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. ||| 

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Cresencio P. Co Untian, Jr. is SUSPENDED from

the practice of law for five (5) years and ten (10) years from teaching law in any
school effective upon the finality of this Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.||| 

3. ALAWI V. ALAUYA, A.M. SDC-97-2-P/268 SCRA 639, February 24, 1997

The title of “attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary
degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in
good standing: and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.

Facts: Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4 th Judicial Shari’s
District in Marawi City. A complaint was filed against him by Sophia Alawi with
the Supreme Court seeking his dismissal from the service. Alawi’s complaint is
anchored on Alauya’s “malicious and libelous charges” resulting in undue injury
to her honor and reputation, contained in letters sent to E.B. Villarosa and
Company and Home Mortgage Finance Corporation. In his letter to the Asst. Clerk
of Court, Atty. Marasigan, Alauya signed his name with the prefix “Atty.”

Issue: As an officer of the Shari’a court, is Alauya entitled to use the title
“Attorney”?

Held: As regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,” this Court had already the
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari’s Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari’a courts.
While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been
admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered “counselors,” in the sense
that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an
“attorney.” The title of “attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and

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 remain members thereof in good standing: and it is they only who are authorized
to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, “counselor” or “counselor-at-law,”
because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is
confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not,
is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of “counselor” does not warrant
his use of the title of attorney.

4. ATTY. MARCIAL EDILLON, A.M. No. 1928, Aug. 3, 1978

Requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable

fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they
belong is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. Such compulsion is justified
as a valid exercise of the police power of the State over an important profession.

Facts: Respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney

in the Philippines. He, stubbornly, refused to pay his membership dues to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines alleging that the provision containing
the obligation to pay membership dues constitutes an invasion of his
constitutional right in a sense that he is being compelled, as a precondition
to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of
the IBP and he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
granted to him by the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar may be compelled to

pay the required membership fee in IBP.

Held: Yes. An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every

lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by
individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the
Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives
of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities.
Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an
official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They
are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the
Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for
the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar xxx.

The Court sees nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under
its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar
(Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the
respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class,
such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses
of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent
that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise
funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. Such
compulsion is justified as a valid exercise of the police power of the State
over an important profession.

5. ULEP vs. LEGAL CLINIC, INC, Bar Matter 553, 6-7-93

Legal Clinic, Inc., has for its main purpose, to serve as a one-stop shop of sorts for
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
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documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Respondent thus,
could not advertise because it was in the practice of law.

Facts: Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of
the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise
of the law profession other than those allowed by law.” The advertisements
complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

Please call: 521-0767,

LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave. zLEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy

CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251522-2041; 521-0767

Petitioner submit that the advertisements are champertous, unethical, demeaning

of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession,
he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought.

Respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance,

but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of
"legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines.

Issue: Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
advertised by it constitutes practice of law.

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent
constitute practice of law.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation,
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients
and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law."

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 The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can
neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by
respondent's own description of the services it has been offering. While some of
the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical
and technical know-how, such as the installation of computer systems and
programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of
research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the
general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information
to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-
diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example,
about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of
this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law,
furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore.
With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to
the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of
action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be
paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of
law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation
does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority
holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research,
giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth. That fact that the corporation
employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is
that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it
renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions
against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now
assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the legal profession condemn the
lawyer's advertisement of his talents. (See CANON 2)

Character and conduct as best advertisement. The canons of the profession tell
us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of
character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That
publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A
good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of
able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.

6. Phil. Assoc. of Free Labor unions (PAFLU), Enrique Entila & Victoriano Teneza
vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar co., G.R. No. L-23959, Nov. 29, 1971

Section 24, Rule 138, Rules of Court imports the existence of attorney-client
relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney’s fee. Such relationship
cannot exist unless the representative is a lawyer. Since respondent Muning
is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique
Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover
attorney's fees.

Facts: PAFLU et al were complainants in "PAFLU, et al, vs. Binalbagan-Isabela

Sugar Co., et al." The Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision in favor of
Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas ordering their reinstatement and
backwages. Cipriano Cid & Associates (30% of the total backwages), counsel of
record for the winning complainants and Atty. Atanacio Pacis (reasonable amount)
filed a notice for attorneys’ lien. Complainants filed a manifestation indicating
their non-objection to an award of attorney’s fees of 25% of their backwages.
However, Quintin Muning (20% of the backwages) also filed a “Petition for Award

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 of Services Rendered” which opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates on the ground
that he is not a lawyer.

The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano
Cid & Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in
Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the complainants were at first by
Attorney Pacis and subsequently by Quintin Muning.|||

Issue: Whether or not a non-lawyer may recover attorney’s fee for legal
services rendered.

Held: No. In Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial

Relations, et al., it was stated that an agreement providing for the division of
attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said
fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and
cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in
the absence of a contract, as in the present case.

The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 provides that, "In the
proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be
required to be represented by legal counsel . . ." is no justification for a ruling that
the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations,
even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section adds
that, "it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine
and cross examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly
presentation of evidence." thus making it clear that the representation should be
exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.

The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in

the said court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the
representative to compensation for such representation. As Section 24, Rule 138,
Rules of Court imports the existence of attorney-client relationship as a condition
for the recovery of attorney’s fee. Such relationship cannot exist unless the
representative is a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot
establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victo.

B. QUALIFICATIONS FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE- (Rule 138, Sec. 1)

-Citizenship- -1987 Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. 14
-Residency
-Age-at least 21 years of age
-Good moral character
-Education- ROC, Rule 138, Sec. 6 /-Republic Act No. 7662 Legal
Education Act
- BAR EXAMS. CHED exercises regulatory power over
private law schools.

7. In re: CUNANAN , 94 Phil 534, March 18, 1954

By its declared objective, Republic Act No. 972 is contrary to public interest

because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate
preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal
in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of the legal profession
adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problems evolved by
the times become more difficult.||

Facts: Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the “Bar
Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then

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 passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of
72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent. 

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for
admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision
of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an
additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply
the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question.
To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No.
972.

Issue: WON RA No. 972 is consistent with the requirement under the Rules of
Court governing the admission to the bar.

Held: No. RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the
Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and
inadequate preparation. 

By its declared objective, Republic Act No. 972 is contrary to public interest

because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate
preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this
Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of the legal
profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal
problems evolved by the times become more difficult.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of
the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function
and responsibility.

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of
law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the
matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix
the minimum conditions for the license.

8. DACANAY VS. BAKER & MCKENZIE, A.C. No. 2131, May 10, 1985

Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines
(Sec.1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their
memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in
Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world.
Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the
firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker &
McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they
could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business
enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment.”. This is unethical
because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practice law here.

Facts: Atty. Dacanay sought to enjoin Juan Collas and nine other lawyers from
practicing law under the name Baker and McKenzie, a law firm organized
in Illinois. In 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres used the letterhead of Baker &
McKenzie which contains the names of the ten lawyers asking Rosie Clurman for
the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel,
a client. Atty. Dacanay replied denying any liability of Clurman and asking the
lawyer his purpose of using the letterhead of another law office.

Issue: Whether or not respondents should enjoin from practicing law under the
firm name Baker & McKenzie.

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 Held: YES. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the
Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

 Who may practice law. -  Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of

the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this
rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation

that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest
quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade
and investment" which the Court finds unethical because Baker & McKenzie is
not authorized to practise law here.

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm
name Baker & McKenzie. 

9. NARAG VS. NARAG, 291 SCRA 451, A.C. No. 3405, June 29, 1998 & Resolution
A.C. No. 3405, March 18, 2014

Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the

bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the
Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law.

A.C. No. 3405, June 29, 1998

Facts: Atty. Dominador Narag was alleged to have abandoned his family for his
paramour who was once his student in tertiary level. The administrative complaint
of disbarment was filed by her wife, Mrs. Julieta Narag. Respondent filed motion
to dismiss because allegedly the complainant fabricated the story as well as the
love letters while under extreme emotional confusion arising from jealousy. The
case took an unexpected turn when another complaint was filed, the wife as again
the complainant but now together with their seven children as co-signatories.
After several hearings, the facts became clear, that the respondent indeed
abandoned his family as against morals, based on testimonial evidences. In
addition, the assailed relationship bore two children.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality and for having
violated and the Code of Ethics for Lawyers culpable for disbarment.

Held: YES. Respondent disbarred.

The complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
respondent breached the high and exacting moral standards set for the members
of the law profession.

Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but
a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.

CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Undoubtedly, the canons of law practice were violated.

Resolution A.C. No. 3405, March 18, 2014

10
Petition for Readmission to the practice of law by Dominador M. Narag.

Facts: The respondent filed the instant petition for reinstatement to the Bar. He
alleged that he has expressed extreme repentance and remorse to his wife and
their children for his misgivings. He claimed that his wife Julieta and their
children had already forgiven him on June 10, 2010 at their residence in
Tuguegarao City. He also presented an undated affidavit prepared by his son,
Dominador, Jr., purportedly attesting to the truth of the respondent's claim.

The respondent averred that he has been disbarred for 15 years already and that
he has been punished enough. He alleged that he is already 80 years old, weak
and wracked with debilitating osteo-arthritic pains. That he has very limited
mobility due to his arthritis and his right knee injury.

He further claimed that he enlisted in the Philippine Air Force Reserve Command
where he now holds the rank of Lieutenant Colonel; that as member of the Reserve
Command, he enlisted in various rescue, relief and recovery missions. The
respondent likewise submitted the various recommendations, testimonials and
affidavits in support of his petition for readmission

Issue: Whether or not the applicant should be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.

Held: The extreme penalty of disbarment was meted on the respondent on

account of his having committed a grossly immoral conduct, i.e., abandoning his
wife and children to live with his much younger paramour. Indeed, nothing could
be more reprehensible than betraying one's own family in order to satisfy an
irrational and insatiable desire to be with another woman. The respondent's act
was plainly selfish and clearly evinces his inappropriateness to be part of the
noble legal profession.

More than 15 years after being disbarred, the respondent now professes that he
had already repented and expressed remorse over the perfidy that he had brought
upon his wife and their children. That such repentance and remorse, the
respondent asserts, together with the long years that he had endured his penalty,
is now sufficient to enable him to be readmitted to the practice of law.

The respondent's pleas, however, are mere words that are hollow and bereft of any
substance. The Court, in deciding whether the respondent should indeed be
readmitted to the practice of law, must be convinced that he had indeed been
reformed; that he had already rid himself of any grossly immoral act which would
make him inept for the practice of law. However, it appears that the respondent,
while still legally married to Julieta, is still living with his paramour — the woman
for whose sake he abandoned his family. This only proves to show that the
respondent has not yet learned from his prior misgivings.

That he was supposedly forgiven by his wife and their children would likewise not
be sufficient ground to grant respondent's plea. It is noted that only his son,
Dominador, Jr., signed the affidavit which was supposed to evidence the
forgiveness bestowed upon the respondent. Thus, with regard to Julieta and the
six other children of the respondent, the claim that they had likewise forgiven the
respondent is hearsay. In any case, that the family of the respondent had forgiven
him does not discount the fact that he is still committing a grossly immoral
conduct; he is still living with a woman other than his wife.|||

Likewise, that the respondent executed a holographic will wherein he bequeaths

all his properties to his wife and their children is quite immaterial and would not
be demonstrative that he had indeed changed his ways. Verily, nothing would stop
the respondent from later on executing another last will and testament of a
different tenor once he had been readmitted to the legal profession.
In fine, the Court is not convinced that the respondent had shown remorse over
his transgressions and that he had already changed his ways as would merit his

11
 reinstatement to the legal profession. Time and again the Court has stressed that
the practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is enjoyed only by those who
continue to display unassailable character.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Reinstatement to the Bar filed by Dominador

M. Narag is hereby DENIED||

10. OLBES VS. DECIEMBRE, 457 SCRA 341, A.C. No. 5365, April 27, 2005

Good moral character is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the
practice of law. It is equally essential to observe this norm meticulously during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty. No moral qualification for bar membership is
more important than truthfulness and candor. The rigorous ethics of the profession
places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior. Lawyers must
be ministers of truth. Hence, they must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled
by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith. 

Facts: Complainants were government employees. Through respondent, Lourdes

renewed a loan application from Rodela Loans Inc., in the amount of P10,000.00.
She issued and delivered 5 PNB blank checks, which served as collateral for the
approved loan as well as for the future loans. Lourdes paid respondent
P14,874.37 intended to the loan plus surcharges, penalties, and interests, for
which the latter issued a receipt. Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan,
respondent filled up the blank checks entrusted to him by writing on those checks
amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and deposited the same checks
which were dishonored upon presentment because the account is already closed.
Thereafter, he filed a criminal case against complainants for estafa and for
violation of B.P. 22. Thus, complainants filed a verified petition for the disbarment
of Atty. Deciembre and charged the respondent with willful and deliberate acts of
dishonesty, falsification and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar.

Issue: Whether or not respondent lawyer is guilty of gross misconduct and

violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held: YES. Respondent lawyer violated Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for he seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of
filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon
at all and despite full knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the
checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial
document, resorted to for his material gain. Respondent is clearly guilty of serious
dishonesty and professional misconduct. He committed an act indicative of moral
depravity not expected from, and highly unbecoming a member of the bar. His
propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His
misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is
loathsome.

Respondent is hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED from the practice of law.

11. In the matter of the Petition for Disbarment of TELESFORO DIAO vs.
MARTINEZ, A.C. No. 244, 3-29-63

As provided by the Rules, the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under
oath that previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily
completed the required pre-legal education (A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of
Private Education.” Further, passing the Bar examination is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal
study in the regular manner is equally essential.

Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false
representations, he was allowed to take it and passed it, and was thereafter
12
 admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses
must be, and is hereby revoked.

Facts:
In 1953, Telesforo Diao was admitted to the Bar. About 2 years later, Severino
Martinez charged him having falsely represented in his application for such Bar
examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The Solicitor
General investigated and later recommended Diao’s name to be erased from the
roll of attorneys because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination
in this Court, Diao had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required
pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially
in the following particulars:

(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma
therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his
application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion
of the "required pre-legal education".

Diao admits the first charge, but claims that although he had left high school in
his third year, he entered the service of U. S. Army, passed the General
Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high
school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities
considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school. As
to the second charge, he asserted he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano
University in April 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion,
as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.

Issue: Whether or not Diao should continue practicing law despite not completing
the prelaw requirements. (NO)

Held: Diao’s explanation is not acceptable since the “error” or “confusion” was of
his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from
Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April 1949,
thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948- 1949) six
months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree, and then he would not have
been permitted to take the bar tests because the Rules provide, and the applicant
for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of
law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal
education (A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education.”

Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false
representations, he was allowed to take it and passed it, and was thereafter
admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses
must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing such examination is not the only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular
manner is equally essential.

12. In re: Application of ADRIANO M. HERNANDEZ, Official Gazette, Sept. 6, 1993

(Resolution of Court En banc July 27, 1993)

Facts: Adriano Hernandez, a Filipino citizen, a degree holder of Juris Doctor from
Columbia Law School in New York and a bar passer in NY in year 1990 took bar
subjects in Ateneo Law School and 5-month bar review course there. He sought
the Supreme Court and prayed to allow him to take the bar exam in the
Philippines

Issue: Whether or not Hernandez should be allowed to take the bar examination
even if he is unable to present requirements under Sec. 5 and 6 of Rule 138

13
 Held: The Supreme Court ruled to allow the applicant to take the 1993 Bar
Examinations with high regard of Filipinos with same case in which the court
allowed to take the bar examination. Non-graduates of Philippine law schools have
also been allowed to take the bar examination. However, the court held in this
resolution that in the following year, all applicants for the bar must comply with
the requirements stipulated in Sec. 5 and 6 of Rule 138 including the completion
to studying law in any of the Philippine law schools.

13. In re: ARGOSINO, A.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997-

The lawyer's oath is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every
lawyer should at all times weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he
makes when taking the lawyer's oath.

In re: ARGOSINO 246 SCRA 14 (1995)

Facts: On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others, was charged with
the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan. The
death of Camaligan stemmed from the affliction of severe physical injuries upon
him in course of "hazing" conducted as part of the university fraternity initiation
rites. On February 11, 1993, the accused were consequently sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day to four (4) years.Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed
an application for probation with the lower court. The application was granted on
June 18 1993. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him. Less
than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to take the bar exam. He was allowed
and he passed the exam, but was not allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On April 15, 1994, Argosino filed a petition to allow him to take the attorney's
oath and be admitted to the practice of law. He averred that his probation period
had been terminated. It is noted that his probation period did not last for more
than 10 months.

Issue: Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of attorney and be
admitted to the practice of law

Held: Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court evidence that he may now be
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed
upon those who are seeking admission to the bar. He should show to the Court
how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the
family of the deceased student and to the community at large. In short, he
mustshow evidence that he is a different person now, that he has become morally
fitfor admission to the profession of law.
He is already directed to inform the Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of
the names of the parents or brothers and sisters of Camaligan from notice.

NOTES:
 The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral
character, with special education qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
 Requirement of good moral character is of greater importance so far as the
general public and proper administration of justice is concerned.
 All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of
those seeking admission to the Bar.
 Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who wouldseek
admission to the bar must be a necessity more stringent than the norm of conduct
expected from members of the general public.
 Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul
Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally
irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was
possessed of good moral character.

14
  Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be
demonstrated at the time of the application for permission to take the
barexaminations and more importantly at the time of application for admission to
the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

In re: ARGOSINO, A.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997-

Facts: Petitioner Al Argosino passed the 1993 bar examinations but was deferred
his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting
to Homicide.

Issue: WON respondent be permitted to take the lawyer’s oath.

Held: Yes. The Court is persuaded that petitioner has exerted all efforts to atone
for the death of Raul Camaliagn. “Every lawyer should at all times weigh his
actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer’s oath,”
the Court stressed.

Petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by

among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of
religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship
foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim,
through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal
case.

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer' s oath, the Court recognizes that Mr.
Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various
certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic
duties and public service.

14. BENITO B. NATE VS. JUDGE CONTRERAS, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2406; Feb. 18,
2015

While we agree with her that clerks of court are allowed to perform the notarial act
of copy certification, this act must still be connected to the exercise of their official
functions and duties — meaning to say, it must be done in connection with public
documents and records that are, by virtue of their position, in their custody.

Respondent herself admits that the document was filed before the National Labor
Relations Commission in Naga City, not the RTC-Iriga City. Thus, in the regular
course of her duties, she would not have come across, encountered, or been in
custody of the document.

Facts: Judge Lelu P. Contreras allegedly committed three counts of grave

misconduct while she was still holding the position Clerk of Court VI of the RTC
Iriga City. Respondent allegedly notarized an administrative complaint; certified a
document (a labor complaint) as a true copy of the original; and appeared as
counsel for her father in a hearing before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP). Clerks of court are indeed authorized to act as ex officio notaries public
under the Administrative Code of 1987 in relation to the 2002 Revised Manual for
Clerks of Court. On the other hand, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees prohibit public officials and employees from
engaging in the private practice of their profession. The 2004 Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice were not yet in force
when respondent committed the purported offenses.

Issue: W/O Judge Contreras engaged in an unauthorized practice of law.

Whether Contreras is administratively liable for the following acts:

1. Affixing her signature to the jurat portion of the administrative complaint
prepared by her father (YES)

15
 2. Authenticating documents as genuine copies of the original labor complaint
(YES)
3. Appearing as counsel before the IBP on behalf of her father (NO)

Held:
1. Proceeding now to the first act complained about, we agree with the OCA
findings that respondent's act of affixing her signature to the jurat portion of the
administrative complaint prepared by her father had no direct relation to her work
as the then clerk of court of RTC-Iriga City. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court, the proceedings involving the disbarment and discipline of attorneys shall
be conducted before the IBP. This means that clerks of court are not among the
touchpoints in the regular procedure pertaining to complaints against an attorney.
Neither may a pleading in a case involving lawyers be filed with the RTC.

2. We apply the same legal reasoning to the second act of respondent being
complained about; that is, her certification of a copy of her sister-in-law's labor
complaint. Respondent herself admits that the document was filed before the
National Labor Relations Commission in Naga City, not the RTC-Iriga City. Thus,
in the regular course of her duties, she would not have come across, encountered,
or been in custody of the document. While we agree with her that clerks of court
are allowed to perform the notarial act of copy certification, this act must still be
connected to the exercise of their official functions and duties — meaning to say, it
must be done in connection with public documents and records that are, by virtue
of their position, in their custody.

3. With regard to the third act, we reiterate that the primary employment of court
personnel must be their full-time position in the judiciary, which is the chief
concern requiring their dutiful attention. Nevertheless, we recognize that the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees does allow
for limited exceptions. Section 7 (b) thereof in relation to Rule X, Section 1 (c) of its
implementing rules, provides that public officials and employees are prohibited
from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution, law, or regulation; and under the condition that their practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions.

Respondent has satisfactorily proved that she was granted authority by this Court
to "represent her father in Administrative Case No. 6089 provided that she files
the corresponding leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing of the case
and that she will not use official time in preparing for the case." We thus agree
with the OCA recommendation that she did not commit any irregularity when she
represented her father before the IBP.

C- OATH- Sec. 17

D. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE THAT ONLY LAWYERS CAN APPEAR IN

COURT:
Rule 138, Sec. 33 & 34
Rule 115, Sec 1 (c)
Rule 116, Sec. 7
Rule 138-A, Sec. 1
Act 2259 Sec. 9

F. RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE OF 2004, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, 

15. SICAT VS. ARRIOLA (A.C. 5864, 4-15-05), 456 SCRA 93

The Court was emphatic that lawyers commissioned as notaries public should not
authenticate documents unless the persons who signed them are the very same
persons who executed them and personally appeared before them to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein. The Court added that notaries public

16
 must observe utmost fidelity, the basic requirement in the performance of their
duties, otherwise the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds and
documents will be undermined.||| 

Facts: Arturo Sicat, Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Rizal

charged Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola of committing fraud, deceit, and falsehood in
notarizing a Special Power of Attorney (SPA). Said SPA was purportedly executed
by Juanito Benitez, of the JC Benitez Architect and Technical Management. Said
company had a contract with the Municipality of Cainta for the construction of
low cost houses. What is fraudulent about it is the fact that the SPA was notarized
more than 2 months after the death of Benitez, the person who supposedly
executed it. P3,700T was paid to JC Benitez Architect and Technical Management
for services not rendered (as consultants). Ariola claims that the document he
notarized was superfluous and unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, and therefore
he should be exonerated – the document was cancelled the same day he notarized
it, hence legally there was no public document that existed.

Issue: W/N Ariola violated the Notarial Practice Law.

Held: Yes. Notaries public should not authenticate documents unless the persons
who signed them are the very same persons who executed them and personally
appeared before the notary, to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein. His assertion of falsehood in a public document contravened one of the
most cherished tenets of the legal profession and potentially cast suspicion on the
truthfulness of every notarial act. Ariola is disbarred, and not merely suspended
for a year.

16. JANDOQUILE VS. REVILLA, A.C. No. 9514, 4-10-13

Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A "jurat" refers to an act in
which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary
public and presents an instrument or document; (b) is personally known to the
notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity; (c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and (d)
takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or
document. Atty. Revilla, Jr. knows the affiants personally so he was justified in no
longer requiring them to show valid identification cards. But he is not without fault
for failing to indicate such fact in the "jurat" of the complaint-affidavit. Thus, liable
for violating the disqualification rule.

Facts: Atty. Revilla, Jr. notarized a complaint-affidavit signed by Heneraline

Brosas, Herizalyn Brosas-Pedrosa and Elmer Alvarado. Heneraline Brosas and
Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa are sisters-in-law while Elmer Alvarado is the live-in
houseboy of the Brosas family.

Jandoquile complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. is disqualified to perform the notarial
act3 per Section 3( c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, viz: “Notary
public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he is a spouse, common-law
partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the
principal4 within the fourth civil degree.”

Jandoquile also complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not require the three affiants
in the complaint-affidavit to show their valid identification cards. Hence, this
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Revilla Jr.

Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not deny but admitted Jandoquile’s material allegations. The
issue, according to Atty. Revilla, Jr., is whether the single act of notarizing the
complaint-affidavit of relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity and, at the
same time, not requiring them to present valid identification cards is a ground for
disbarment. Atty. Revilla, Jr. submits that his act is not a ground for disbarment.
He also says that he acts as counsel of the three affiants; thus, he should be

17
 considered more as counsel than as a notary public when he notarized their
complaint-affidavit. He did not require the affiants to present valid identification
cards since he knows them personally.

Issue: Whether or not notarizing a document of relatives within the fourth civil
degree of affinity and, at the same time, not requiring them to present valid
identification cards is a ground for disbarment.

Held: Atty. Revilla, Jr. violated the disqualification rule under Section 3(c), Rule IV
of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. However, his violation is not a sufficient
ground for disbarment. Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not commit any deceit, malpractice,
gross misconduct or gross immoral conduct, or any other serious ground for
disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice clearly disqualifies him
from notarizing the complaint-affidavit, from performing the notarial act, since two
of the affiants or principals are his relatives within the fourth civil degree of
affinity. We cannot agree with his proposition that we consider him to have acted
more as counsel of the affiants, not as notary public, when he notarized the
complaint-affidavit. The notarial certificate at the bottom of the complaint-affidavit
shows his signature as a notary public. He cannot therefore claim that he signed
it as counsel of the three affiants.

Atty. Revilla, Jr. also cannot be held liable in not requiring a valid identification
cards since he personally knows the affiants as supported by the definition of a
“jurat” under Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 on notarial Practice.  A "jurat" refers to
an act in which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before
the notary public and presents an instrument or document; (b) is personally
known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity; (c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the
notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such
instrument or document. In this case, Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Atty.
Revilla, Jr.’s wife; Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa is his wife’s sister-in-law; and Elmer
Alvarado is the live-in houseboy of the Brosas family. Atty. Revilla, Jr. knows the
three affiants personally. Thus, he was justified in no longer requiring them to
show valid identification cards. But Atty. Revilla, Jr. is not without fault for failing
to indicate such fact in the "jurat" of the complaint-affidavit. No statement was
included therein that he knows the three affiants personally. 7 Let it be impressed
that Atty. Revilla, Jr. was clearly disqualified to notarize the complaint-affidavit of
his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. While he has a valid defense
as to the second charge, it does not exempt him from liability for violating the
disqualification rule.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr., is REPRIMANDED and DISQUALIFIED

from being commissioned as a notary public, or from performing any notarial act if
he is presently commissioned as a notary public, for a period of three (3) months.
Atty. Revilla, Jr. is further DIRECTED to INFORM the Court, through an affidavit,
once the period of his disqualification has lapsed.

17. SALES VS. CA, 211 SCRA 858, 865 G.R. No. 40145, July 29, 1992

But more revealing is the fact that the deed of sale itself, specifically the notarial
acknowledgment thereof, contains a statement that its executors were known to the
notary public to be the persons who executed the instrument; that they were
"informed by me (notary public) of the contents thereof" and that they acknowledged
to the notary public that the instrument was freely and voluntarily executed. Thus,
the stark denial of the petitioners, specially Sales, that he executed the deed of sale
pales in the face of Malazo's testimony because the testimony of the notary public
enjoys greater credence than that of an ordinary witness.

18
 What is important under the Notarial Law is that the notary public concerned has
authority to acknowledge the document executed within his territorial jurisdiction. A
notarial acknowledgment attaches full faith and credit to the document
concerned. It also vests upon the document the presumption of regularity
unless it is impugned by strong, complete and conclusive proof. Such kind of
proof has not been presented by the petitioners.

Facts: Severo Sales owned an unregistered parcel of land in Pangasinan which he

mortgaged to Faustina P Agpoon and Jose Agpoon to secure the payment of a
loan. More than a year later, Sales donated a portion of the said property to his
daughter. The duly notarized deed of donation was presented to the Assessor's
Office on the day of its execution. Hence a new Tax Declarations are issued to his
daughter and the remaining portion in his name.

Agpoon then set the foreclosure of the mortgaged property of the Sales. Due to the
request of the Sales spouses, their friend Ernesto Gonzales paid the indebtedness
to the Agpoon spouses. After which the Sales sign a document transferring the
mortgage to Ernesto Gonzales. They then received a copy of the DOS stating that
they had sold the land to Leonilo Gonzales, son of Ernesto Gonzales.

Leonilo Gonzales then filed an action for illegal detainer against the Sales. The
spouses Sales along with their daughter the filed a complaint for annulment of the
DOS b/w Sales and Gonzales on the ground of fraud. Consequently the Illegal
detainer proceedings were suspended pending the outcome of the annulment case.

Issue: Whether or not the “Deed of Sale” between Severo Sales and Leonilo
Gonzales was valid even if it is notarized outside the city of the subject property.
(YES)

Held: The deed of sale itself, specifically the notarial acknowledgment thereof,

contains a statement that its executors were known to the notary public to be the
persons who executed the instrument; that they were "informed by me (notary
public) of the contents thereof" and that they acknowledged to the notary public
that the instrument was freely and voluntarily executed. The notary public Atty.
Malazo also testified that he knows Mr. Severo Sales and he appeared before him
when he notarized that document and that the document speaks for itself and the
witnesses were there and those were the persons present. Thus, the stark
denial of the petitioners, specially Sales, that he executed the deed of sale pales in
the face of Malazo's testimony because the testimony of the notary public enjoys
greater credence than that of an ordinary witness. ||| 

Also, while the Deed of Donation was not registered, the Deed of Sale was
registered as evidenced by the notation made by the
Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan and the official receipt issued by the
Registry of Deeds.|

The extrinsic validity of the deed of sale is not affected by the fact that while the
property subject thereof is located in Bugallon, Pangasinan where the vendors also
resided, the document was executed in San Manuel, Tarlac. What is important
under the Notarial Law is that the notary public concerned has authority to
acknowledge the document executed within his territorial jurisdiction. A notarial
acknowledgment attaches full faith and credit to the document concerned. It also
vests upon the document the presumption of regularity unless it is impugned by
strong, complete and conclusive proof. Such kind of proof has not been presented
by the petitioners.|||

G. DUTIES OF A LAWYER-Rule 138, Sec. 20

- “FOUR –FOLD DUTIES” of a lawyer

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

19
18. Banogon VS. Zerna- 154 SCRA 593 (1987)

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper

administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions
that only add to workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened
enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when
a case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already
congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by
commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the
courts.

Facts: The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court way
back on February 9, 1926, sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that decision
was filed on March 6, 1957, thirty one years later. This was followed by an
amended petition for review of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an
opposition thereto on March 26, 1957. On October 11, 1971, or after fourteen
years, a motion to dismiss the petition was filed. The petition was dismissed on
December 8, 1971, and the motion for reconsideration was denied on February 14,
1972. The petitioners then came to us on certiorari to question the orders of the
respondent judge. The petitioners argue that the judgment had not yet become
final and executory because the land in dispute had not yet been registered in
favor of the private respondents. The said judgment would become so only after
one year from the issuance of the decree of registration.|

Issue:
Whether or not laches already operated against the petitioners.

Held:
Laches bars their petition now. They should not have delayed in asserting their
claim of fraud. Their delay was not only for thirty one days but for thirty one
years.
One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some
of them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to
achieve their purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the
same time lessen popular faith in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of
the law. While this is not to say that every wrong interpretation of the law is to
be condemned, as indeed most of them are only honest errors, this Court must
express its disapproval of the adroit and intentional misreading designed
precisely to circumvent or violate it. 
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper
administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless
petitions that only add to workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which
is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should
advise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to
merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the
cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of
merit do not deserve the attention of the courts. 
The petition is DISMISSED with costs against the petitioners.

19. BAR MATTER NO. 702, May 12, 1994

(In the Matter of Petition to authorize Sharia'h District Court Judges to Appoint
Shari'a Lawyers as Notaries Public, Atty. Royo M. Gampong, petitioner)

The authority conferred by the Notarial Law upon judges of the Regional Trial Court,
in their respective provinces to appoint notaries public cannot be expanded to cloth
the judges of the Shari’a District Court with the same statutory authority.

Facts:
20
 Petitioner Royo M. Gampong, a Bachelor of Laws (LIB) graduate of Notre Dame
University who was admitted to the Philippine Shari'a Bar on October 7, 1991,
filed the instant petition to the Supreme Court to issue an order, after due notice
and hearing, authorizing all Shari'a District Court Judges to appoint Shari'a
Lawyers who possess the qualifications and none of the disqualifications as
notaries public within their respective jurisdictions. The petitioner claimed that
Shari'a District Courts are co-equal with the regular Regional Trial Courts in the
hierarchy of the Philippine Judicial System, hence, Shari'a District Court Judges
may be authorized to appoint the members of the Philippine Shari'a Bar. He
further claims that notarial work is indispensable and imperative in the exercise of
his profession.

Issue:
Whether or not Shari'a District Court Judges shall be authorized to appoint
Shari’a Lawyers as notaries public.

Held:
The Supreme Court did not agree. The Notarial Law provides that “Judges of Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in the respective may appoint as many
notaries public as the public good requires, and there shall be at least one for every
municipality in each province”.

Regional Trial Court is not co-equal with the Shari'a District Courts. Strictly
speaking, Shari'a District Courts do not form part of the integrated judicial system
of the Philippines. The Shari’a Courts are not regular court like the Regional Trial
Court. The latter is a court of general jurisdiction, i.e., competent to decide all
cases, civil and criminal, within its jurisdiction while Shari'a District Court is a
court of limited jurisdiction, exercising original only over cases specifically
enumerated in Article 143 of Presidential Decree No. 1083. In other words, a
Shari'a District Court is not a regular court exercising general jurisdiction within
the meaning of Section 232 of the Notarial Law. Furthermore, the qualifications for
appointment as a judge of a Shari'a District Court are different from those
required of a judge of a Regional Trial Court under Section 15 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129. Thus, the authority of RTC cannot be expanded to cloth the judges of the
Shari'a District Court with the same statutory authority.

In view of the foregoing, Shari'a District Court Judges are NOT authorized to
appoint Shari’a Lawyers as notaries public.

20. Ledesma v. Climaco- 57 SCRA 473 (1974)

It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such

counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid
by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his
best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He
is to render effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due
diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. . . . For, indeed a lawyer who is a
vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social
conscience and a little less of self-interest.

21
 Facts: Petitioner Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de
oficio alleging not in a position to devote his full time to the defense of the two
accused to to his appointment as Election Registrar by the COMELEC. Before his
assumption as Election Registrar, he was counsel de parte for one of the accused
and subsequently designated as counsel de oficio for the accused. Petitioner asked
for the postponement of the case for at least eight (8) times. The court noted in the
order that there was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the
accused and to the court and his position as Election Registrar of the COMELEC.
What is easily discernable was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with
the responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio.

Issue: Whether or not there is a difference between counsel de oficio and counsel
de parte in discharging the duty of a lawyer.

Held: "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such
counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid
by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his
best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He
is to render effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due
diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. . . . For, indeed a lawyer who is a
vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social
conscience and a little less of self-interest." Petition for certiorari is dismissed with
costs against petitioner.||| 

21. Guevarra v. Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala, A.C. No. 7136, Aug. 1, 2007

Facts: Complainant Guevarra filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Eala
for “grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer’s oath.” Atty.
Eala, who is married and with three children, had an affair with Complainant’s
wife, Irene, before their wedding and continued the affair after their wedding. After
complainant’s confirmation of the affair and confrontation with Atty. Eala and
Irene, Irene left the conjugal dwelling and later on became pregnant which Atty.
Eala never denied being the father of the child. Complainant’s confirmation of
Atty. Eala and Irene started from sweet messages sent by Atty. Eala to Irene,
frequent Irene’s late at night or not going home from work, seeing them together
on two occasions, Irene’s celebrating her birthday with Atty. Eala with family and
friends, and a folded social “I LOVE YOU” card later on discovered from the
master’s bedroom dated on the day of their wedding made by Atty. Eala confessing
his undying love to Irene.

Atty. Eala denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship because he

maintained a low profile relationship and known only to the immediate members
of their respective families. He also denies having abandoned his own family
claiming that his relationship with Irene is not under scandalous circumstances
and that his wife is aware of his special friendship with Irene. Atty. Eala later on
filed a motion to dismiss due to the pendency of a civil case filed by complainant
for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery
against Atty. Eala and Irene.

During the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP Commissioner,
Atty. Eala filed a Manifestation informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's petition
for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted and that the
criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent and Irene
"based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending
review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had
been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Eala’s conduct is tantamount to grossly immoral
conduct.

22
 Held:
Yes. The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a
married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried
out discreetly. Citing Vitug  v. Rongcal:
x x x While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere
fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient
to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so
with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity .Even if not all
forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual
relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay  v. Atty. Tucay: 
x x x carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a
grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard
for the fundamental ethics of his profession.This detestable
behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the
treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him.
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared
void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the
marriage was declared null and void. As a lawyer, respondent should be aware
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are
presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial
declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite
respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held
sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer. 
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant
complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent
and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for
adultery were filed in court, the same would not have been a bar to the present
administrative complaint. 

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral

conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

LAWYER’S DUTIES TO SOCIETY:

CANON 1 - A. UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW:

“ A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal process”.

22. Re: Financial Audit of ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO, A.M. No. P-06 2177/ 4-19-07

“Any act or omission contrary to law is unlawful. It does not necessarily imply the
element of criminality although it is broad enough to include it. Thus, the presence
of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential in order to bring his act or
omission within the terms of Rule 1.01 which specifically prohibits lawyers from
engaging in unlawful conduct.”

Facts: Atty. Raquel G. Kho, a former clerk of court of the RTC, a government
lawyer, failed to make a timely remittance of P65,000 judiciary funds for over a

23
 year in his custody. Atty. Kho did not deny the act but maintained that he kept
the money in the court’s safety vault and never once used it for his own benefit.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Kho is guilty of unlawful conduct.

Held: Yes.
CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL
PROCESSES.
RULE 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
As servants of the law and officers of the court, lawyers are required to be at the
forefront of observing and maintaining the rule of law. They are expected to make
themselves exemplars worthy of emulation. This, in fact, is what a lawyer's
obligation to promote respect for law and legal processes entails.
The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from engaging
in unlawful conduct. By definition, any act or omission contrary to law is
unlawful. It does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although it is
broad enough to include it. Thus, the presence of evil intent on the part of the
lawyer is not essential in order to bring his act or omission within the terms of
Rule 1.01 which specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful
conduct.
Atty. Kho's conduct was not only far from exemplary, it was unlawful as well. For
this, he must be called to account. However, his candid and repentant admission
of his error, his lack of intent to gain and the fact that this is his first offense
should temper his culpability considerably. Atty. Raquel G. Kho is found GUILTY
of unlawful conduct in violation of the Attorney's Oath, Section 20(a), Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is ordered to pay a FINE of P5,000.

23. Soriano v. Dizon- A.C. No. 6792, 1-25-06

"Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the
crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by
every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular
conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently
depends on all the surrounding circumstances."

The circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his
unworthiness to practice law. Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he
pursued and shot complainant when the latter least expected it. Under the
circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the
lawyer's assault. The Court also consider the trial court's finding of treachery as a
further indication of the skewed morals of respondent.

Facts: Atty. Dizon was driving his car along Abanao Street in Baguio when a taxi
driver, Soriano, overtook the car driven by Dizon who was under the influence of
liquor. Incensed, Dizon tailed the taxi, pulled it over, and berated Soriano and
held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, Soriano forced open his door
causing the accused to fall to the ground. Soriano got out of his car to help him
get up. But Dizon, now enraged, stood up immediately and boxed Soriano on the
chest. Dizon fell down a second time, got up again and was about to box Soriano,
but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. Soriano held on to
Dizon until he could be pacified and then released him. Dizon went back to his
car and got his revolver. As Soriano was handing the eyeglasses of Dizon which
fell on the ground, Dizon fired and shot him on the neck. Soriano was brought to

24
 the hospital and would have surely died had he not received timely medical
assistance.

Dizon was eventually convince of frustrated homicide, but was granted

probation, conditioned of payment of civil liabilities. However, according to
Soriano, Dixon still has yet to fulfill his obligation to pay such liability. Soriano
then filed a complaint for disbarment against Dixon before the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline to which the Commission recommended Dizon’s disbarment for
having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and for violating Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR.

Issue: Whether or not the crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude.
(In this case, (YES)

Held: Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to
justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."

In International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC, the Court explained that it
had the discretion to determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude. As
further explained, "Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending
on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act
and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but
whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of
fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances."

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such
conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration
of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character. In the instant
case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final
judgment, of frustrated homicide.

As the IBP correctly found in the present case, the circumstances clearly evince
the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law. Atty.
Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when
the latter least expected it. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable
actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyer's assault. The Court also consider
the trial court's finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals
of respondent.

24. Stemmerik v. Mas- A.C. No. 8010, 589 SCRA 114 , 6-16-09
All lawyers take an oath to support the Constitution, to obey the laws and to do
no falsehood. That oath is neither mere formal ceremony nor hollow words. It is
a sacred trust that should be upheld and kept inviolable at all times. 
Lawyers are servants of the law and the law is their master. They should not
simply obey the laws, they should also inspire respect for and obedience thereto
by serving as exemplars worthy of emulation.

Facts: The complainant was a foreigner, and in one of his visits in the
Philippines, he consulted with the respondent, who was a lawyer in the
Philippines, regarding ownership of real property in the said country, the
respondent assured the complainant that he could legally acquire and own legal
property.

Complainant then proceed with the purchase of land and entrusted the
respondent for the procedure. After awhile the complainant returned to the
Philippines and was devasted upon knowing that he can’t own a land in the
Philippines, for the reason that he was a foreigner.
25
 Complainant filed a disbarment case against the respondent. Respondent failed
to file his answer and position paper despite service of notice at his last known
address. CBD ruled and recommended the disbarment of the respondent

Issue: Whether or not the respondent did not uphold the noble profession of a
lawyer, thus should be disbarred from IBP.

Held: Yes, respondent did not uphold the noble profession and should be
disbarred from the IBP.

Lawyers, as members of a noble profession, have the duty to promote respect

for the law and uphold the integrity of the bar. As men and women entrusted
with the law, they must ensure that the law functions to protect liberty and not
as an instrument of oppression or deception. Respondent has been weighed by
the exacting standards of the legal profession and has been found wanting.
Respondent committed a serious breach of his oath as a lawyer. He is also
guilty of culpable violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the code
of ethics of the legal profession.
All lawyers take an oath to support the Constitution, to obey the laws and to do
no falsehood. That oath is neither mere formal ceremony nor hollow words. It is
a sacred trust that should be upheld and kept inviolable at all times. 
Lawyers are servants of the law and the law is their master. They should not
simply obey the laws, they should also inspire respect for and obedience thereto
by serving as exemplars worthy of emulation.

25. De Ysasi III v. NLRC-231 SCRA 173, (1994)

Both counsels may well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to
represent their clients with zeal goes beyond merely presenting their clients'
respective causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not more
importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably
out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate
consanguineous ties between their clients.

The Court reiterated that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct
litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding
suit. A lawyer should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise,
rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.

Facts: Petitioner was employed by his father, herein private respondent, as farm
administrator of Hacienda Manucao which employment include a salary and
other allowances. Petitioner has a previous experienced as sales manager and
operations manager of other companies.

As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily

activities and operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation,
planting, weeding, fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters
relating to the hacienda and attending to such other tasks. During his
employment, he suffered several ailments wherein private respondent took care
of his medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation.
Afterwards, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's
salary despite oral and written demands. Thus, petitioner filed an illegal
dismissal complaint against private respondent. The NLRC dismissed his
complaint and his motion for reconsideration was denied hence this petition. The
Court later ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed, since there was no
abandonment of the job: First, petitioner's absence and his decision to leave his
residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his illness and strained family
relations. Second, he has some medical certificates to show his frail health.

26
 Third, once able to work, petitioner wrote a letter informing private respondent of
his intention to assume again his employment. Last, but not the least, he at once
instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal when he realized he was unjustly
dismissed. All these are indications that petitioner had no intention to abandon
his employment.

Issue: W/N the counsels of both parties failed to settle this case out of court,
thereby violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held: Yes, both counsels miserably failed to perform their function of advising
settlement.

Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a)
lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement."

In this case, both counsel herein fell short of what was expected of them, despite
their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that they
took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between
their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not
but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the
equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.

Hence, for violating the code of professional responsibility, the Supreme Court
reminded them of their functions.

Both counsels may well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to
represent their clients with zeal goes beyond merely presenting their clients'
respective causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not more
importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts,
preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and
immediate consanguineous ties between their clients.

The Court reiterated that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct
litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding
suit. A lawyer should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise,
rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.

The court rendered judgement that the decision of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission is SET ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay
petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years, without
qualification or deduction, and, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months
being considered as one (1) whole year.

26. Cordon v. Balicanta-A.C. No. 2797, 10-4-02

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty
to society, the obligation to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes. Specifically, he is forbidden to engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. If the practice of law is to remain an
honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should
not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord
continuing fidelity to them. Thus, the requirement of good moral character is of
much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession
of legal learning. 

Facts: A complaint for disbarment was filed by herein complainant against

respondent Jesus Balicanta, complainant's legal counsel in the settlement of the
estate of her deceased husband. Among others, it was alleged that the
respondent enticed complainant and her daughter to organize a corporation; that

27
 respondent, through deceit and machinations, convinced complainant and her
daughter to assign their real properties to the corporation and to execute a voting
trust agreement; that the respondent single-handedly ran the affairs of the
corporation in his capacity as Chairman of the Board, President, General
Manager and Treasurer; that the respondent succeeded in making complainant
sign a special power of attorney to sell and mortgage some of the parcels of land
she inherited from her deceased husband; that using spurious board resolutions,
respondent contracted an LBP loan, mortgaged the properties of the corporation,
sold to another the right of redemption over the foreclosed properties and sold
the complainant's ancestral home; that the respondent failed to account for the
proceeds of the loan and the sale; that the respondent failed to render an
accounting of the records and revenues of the corporation.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Balicanta is guilty of grave and serious misconduct
that casts dishonor on the legal profession.|

Held: Yes, respondent committed grave and serious misconduct that casts
dishonor on the legal profession. His misdemeanors reveal a deceitful scheme to
use the corporation as a means to convert for his own personal benefit properties
left to him in trust by complainant and her daughter.
Not even his deviousness could cover up the wrongdoings he committed. The
documents he thought could exculpate him were the very same documents that
revealed his immoral and shameless ways. These documents were extremely
revealing in that they unmasked a man who knew the law and abused it for his
personal gain without any qualms of conscience. They painted an intricate web of
lies, deceit and opportunism beneath a carefully crafted smokescreen of
corporate maneuvers.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty
to society, the obligation to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes. Specifically, he is forbidden to engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. If the practice of law is to remain an
honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should
not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord
continuing fidelity to them. Thus, the requirement of good moral character is of
much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the
possession of legal learning. Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of
morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal
career, in order to maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and honored
fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character.
Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right
and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so
because "vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of
unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client's property, reputation,
his life, his all." Atty. Balicanta is hereby disbarred.
27. Arcatomy Guarin vs. Atty. Christine Limpin, A.C. No. 10576; Jan. 15, 2015

A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the
law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer. In filing a
GIS that contained false information, Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1 and Rule
1.01 of the CPR. Moreover, in allowing herself to be swayed by the business practice
of having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of the
Corporation despite the rules enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to the
election of such officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR.

Facts:
In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer
and thereafter as President of One Card Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy
Group of Companies. On August 11, 2008, he resigned and transferred to St.
Luke’s Medical Center. On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate

28
 Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), another corporation under Legacy Group, filed
with SEC a General Information Sheet (GIS) for LCI which identified Guarin as its
Chairman of the Board of Directors and President. Mired with allegations of
anomalous business transactions and practices, LCI applied for voluntary
dissolution on December 18, 2008. Guarin filed a complaint for disbarment with
the Integrated Bar of the PhilippinesCommission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD)
against Atty. Limpin for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. IBP CBD found that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and
Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the CPR and recommended that she be suspended from the
practice of law for three months.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02
of the CPR

Held: YES. Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
Members of the Bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of
procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes. A lawyer who assists a client
in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which
justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer. There is no indication that Guarin
held any share to the corporation and that he is ineligible to hold a seat in the BOD
and be the president of the company, It is undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and
certified that Guarin was a stockholder of the LCI in the GIS. Thus, in filing a GIS
that contained false information, Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01
of the CPR. Moreover, in allowing herself to be swayed by the business practice of
having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of the
Corporation despite the rules enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to
the election of such officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR

28. In re: Ramon E. Galang, A.C. No. 1164, Aug. 29, 1975

The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and
cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the
Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. Any request for re-
evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to
the Court.

The concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of

the fact that he had been with, or indicted for an alleged crime, as a ground for
revocation of his license to practice law, is well settled.

Facts: Oscar Landicho, who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar
Examinations, sent a confidential letter to the Court request dated March 29,
1972, inviting the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in
one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one
reason or another, before the bar results were released." This was confirmed,
according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian),
as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further stated "that there are
strong reasons to believe that the grades in other examination notebooks in other
subjects also underwent alternations — to raise the grades — prior to the release
of the results, without formal request or motion from the proper parties, contrary
to due process.

The Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the
grades in five subjects — Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law,
Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate
with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly
initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned.

29
The bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial
bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar
examinations. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%,
which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court as the passing mark for the
1971 bar examinations. Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five
examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the
respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the
circumstances under which the same was done and his reasons for doing the
same.

Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having
re-evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject
upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the
authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his
particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing, thus all of them did it
in good faith.

On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo
filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer,
stating that the number “954” is just a coincidence to pry into the notebooks in
question for being the first number that came into his sight as basis for buying a
sweepstakes ticket. Eventually, he bought a ticket whose last three digits
corresponded to "954" which sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was
"27". The significance of the number (27) was born out of some incidents in his
life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army, he was
stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized. (b) On February 27, 1946, he was
able to get out of the army byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27,
1947, he got married and his youngest child was born on February 27, 1957.

Upon checking the notebook bearing number “954”, impressed by the clarity of
the writing and language and the apparent soundness of the answers he set
them aside and later on took them back to the respective examiners for possible
review recalling to them the said Confidential Memorandum but leaving
absolutely the matter to their discretion and judgment.
Ramon Galang asserted that he is not acquainted with former Bar Confidant
Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before except once when, as required by the
latter respondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar
examinations.

An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request

of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer,
showed that Ramon E. Galang was previously charged with the crime of slight
physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de
Vera, another student of the same university, such information was not admitted
prior to his examinations.

By the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in

the five (5) subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original
average of 66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted
points.

Issue:
1. W/N former Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo shall be disbarred? YES
2. W/N Ramon Galang shall be disbarred? YES
3. Do the 5 examiners who re-evaluated his exam booklets merit a disciplinary
action? NO

30
 Held:
1. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and
cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the
Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. Any request for re-
evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to
the Court.

Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention
of betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar
Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he
singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more
than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9%
of which he was fully aware.

The strange story concerning the figures 954, serves to picture a man desperately
clutching at straws in the wind for support. The re-evaluation by the Examiners
concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in five (5) subjects,
as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any
authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by
the Court in him as Bar Confidant

2. Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection,

among others, with the character requirement of candidates for admission to the
Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must
be ... of good moral character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines."

Undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be in a
better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could not be
gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending
or terminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a
bearing upon his character or fitness for admission to the Bar.

Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently

concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical
injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966,
1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he
had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court that
he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed
unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was
allowed to take his oath.

3. All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation
and/or re-correction of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of
respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that
they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the
identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the
same without any consideration or expectation of any.
In the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners that their
actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five
(5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action.

Both VICTORIO D. LANUEVO and RAMON E. GALANG is DISBARRED AND their

NAME ALSO was ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

29. Royong vs. Oblena, G.R. No. 376, April 30, 1963

31
The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of
misconduct in either his professional or non- professional activities. The tendency of
the decisions of this Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory
grounds. Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically
any misconduct of a lawyer.

In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His
pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained
from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he
himself declared — and that he limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her
and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his
knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose. Moreover, his act
becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the niece of his
common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendency over her who looked up
to him as her uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage of his
moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as
an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a
sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), her
inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why she
could not resist him". Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the
complainant reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral
compunction for his acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability.
He has, by these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of
a member of the bar.

Facts: Josefina Royong, the complainant, testified that after lunch, Cecilia
Angeles, her foster mother, left her alone in their house and went down to the pig
sty to feed the pigs. While Josefina Royong was ironing clothes on the second floor
of the house, Ariston Oblena, the respondent entered. Suddenly he covered her
mouth with one hand and with the other hand dragged her to one of the bedrooms
of the house and forced her to lie down on the floor. She did not shout for help
because he threatened her and her family with death. He next undressed her as
she lay on the floor, then had sexual intercourse with her after he removed her
panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his fist to subdue her
resistance. After the sexual intercourse, her warned her not to report him t to her
foster parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family.

In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant
Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston Oblena, with rape allegedly
committed on her person in the manner described therein. Oblena, denied the
charge against him stating that after lunch on the date of the alleged rape incident,
he went to the Commission of Civil Service to follow up his appointment as
technical assistant in the office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record
of one of the cases assigned to him. Oblena, however, admitted that he had illicit
relations with Royong and that they had sexual intercourse for about fifty times.

During trial for the rape case, the Solicitor General discovered that although he did
not commit the alleged rape, he was nevertheless guilty of other misconduct.
Oblena’s own evidence shows that he has been living adulterously with Briccia
Angeles and at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the complainant
Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia. Briccia Angeles, however is still married to a
certain Arines Angeles who is from Camarines Sur and this fact was only made
known to Oblena when they were already cohabitating as husband and wife.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecuting Atty. Oblena should be disbarred. (YES)

Held: It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment

notwithstanding his illicit relatins with the complainant and his open cohabitation
with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has not been convicted of any
crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not been

32
 convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon
which the disbarment proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by
Section 24, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be disbarred.
But it has already been held that this enumeration is not exclusive and that the
power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is
inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; it may
be exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless
positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in any manner
that will give the party to be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be
heard.

The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of
misconduct in either his professional or non- professional activities. The
tendency of the decisions of this Court has been toward the conclusion that a
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer for other
than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to
cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer.

In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His
pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he
refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal
liability, as he himself declared — and that he limited himself merely to kissing and
embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together
with his knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was
the niece of his common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendency over her
who looked up to him as her uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took
advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis
(Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly
because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was
17 or 18 years old then), her inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is
not difficult to see why she could not resist him". Furthermore, the blunt
admission of his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to be
a person who would suffer no moral compunction for his acts if the same could be
done without fear of criminal liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself to be
devoid of the moral integrity expected of a member of the bar.

An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The noblest means he could
have employed was to have married the complainant as he was then free to do so.
But to continue maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and
simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's niece is moral
perversion that cannot be condoned. Respondent's conduct therefore renders him
unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legal profession.

30. Foronda vs. Atty. Alvarez, Jr. A.C. 9976, June 25, 2014

Atty. Alvarez’s unfulfilled promise to settle his obligation and the issuance of
worthless checks have seriously breached the complainant’s trust. "The relationship
of an attorney to his client is highly fiduciary. Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that ‘a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in
all his dealings and transactions with his client.’ Necessity and public interest enjoin
lawyers to be honest and truthful when dealing with his client."

Facts: Complainant Foronda is an overseas Filipino worker in Dubai. She returned

to the Philippines to institute a case for the nullification of her marriage. Foronda
engaged the services of Atty. Alvarez for a fee of P195,000.00. Foronda averred that
the Atty. Alvarez promised to file the petition after he received the full payment of
his attorney’s fee, or on June 11, 2008. In September 2008, the complainant
inquired about the status of her case and was allegedly told by the respondent that
her petition was pending in court; and in another time, she was told that a decision
by the court was already forthcoming. However, when she came back to the

33
country in May 2009, the respondent told her that her petition was still pending in
court and apologized for the delay.

Eventually, the complainant was able to get a copy of her petition and found out
that it was filed only on July 16, 2009. Foronda further alleged that Atty. Alvarez
invited her to be an investor in the lending business allegedly ran by the latter’s
sister-inlaw The respondent encouraged her to invest P200,000.00 which he said
can earn five percent (5%) interest per month. Thus, the complainant gave
P200,000.00 to the respondent upon the security of thirteen (13) United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) checks. Upon presentment of these checks, the drawee-bank
honored the first two (2) checks, but the rest were dishonored for being drawn
against a closed account.

When she brought the matter to Atty. Alvarez, he actually paid her certain
amounts as interest through her representative. Nevertheless, Atty. Alvarez failed
to pay the entire obligation as promised. Thereafter, the respondent issued eight (8)
Banco de Oro (BDO) checks as replacement for the dishonored UCPB checks.
However, the BDO checks were likewise dishonored for being drawn against a
closed account. Foronda filed a disbarment case against Atty. Alvarez. In his
Answer, Atty. Alvarez admitted that he filed the petition for annulment only in July
2009 but the delay was caused by the complainant herself who allegedly instructed
him to hold the filing of the said petition as she and her husband were discussing a
possible reconciliation. He further argued that the contract he executed with the
complainant was a mere contract of loan. Being a contract of loan, he cannot be
held guilty of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 since the checks he issued
were to serve only as security for it.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Alvarez violated the Canons of Professional

Responsibility (YES)

Held: "Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him."

"He is required by the Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake the task

with zeal, care and utmost devotion." "A lawyer who performs his duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client, he also serves the
ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession."

The respondent’s act of issuing worthless checks is a violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." "The issuance of checks
which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account
indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows
such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him
unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action."

It cannot be denied that the respondent’s unfulfilled promise to settle his obligation
and the issuance of worthless checks have seriously breached the complainant’s
trust. She went so far as to file multiple criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
against him. "The relationship of an attorney to his client is highly fiduciary. Canon
15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that ‘a lawyer shall observe
candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.’
Necessity and public interest enjoin lawyers to be honest and truthful when
dealing with his client." All told, this Court finds that the respondent is liable for
violation of Canons 15, 17, Rule 18.04, and Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Likewise, he is also liable under Rule 1.01 thereof. The complainant
seeks the disbarment of the respondent. However, "disbarment, jurisprudence
teaches, should not be decreed where any punishment less severe, such as
reprimand, suspension, or fine, would accomplish the end desired. This is as it

34
 should be considering the consequence of disbarment on the economic life and
honor of the erring person."

In the instant case, the Court very well takes note of the fact that the criminal
charges filed against the respondent have been dismissed upon an affidavit of
desistance executed by the complainant. The Court also acknowledges that he
dutifully participated in the proceedings before the IBP-CBD and that he
completely settled his obligation to the complainant, as evidenced by the
Acknowledgment Receipt signed by the complainant's counsel. Therein, it was
acknowledged that the respondent paid the amount of P650,000.00 in payment for
the: (1) P200,000.00 for the amount of checks he issued in favor of the
complainant; (2) P195,000.00 for the attorney's fees he received for the annulment
case; and (3) cost and expenses that the complainant incurred in relation to the
cases the latter filed against the respondent including the instant complaint with
the IBP. Unlike in Solidon where the respondent failed to file the required petition
and did not account for the money he received, the respondent was able to file,
albeit belatedly, the complainant's petition. In addition, he returned in full the
money he received as attorney's fee in spite of having gone through all the trouble
of preparing the required petition and in filing the same - not to mention the cost
he incurred for the purpose.

In light of the foregoing and the Court's rulings in the cases mentioned above, the
Court finds that the penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law is
commensurate, with a stem warning that a repetition of any of the infractions
attributed to him in this case, or any similar act, shall merit a heavier penalty.

CANON 2 – B. MAKING LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE

“A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and
convenient manner compatible with the independence, integrity and
effectiveness of the profession.”

CANON 4 – A lawyer shall participate in development of the legal system

by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of
the administration of justice.

CANON 5 – A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate

in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve highest
standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law
students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and
jurisprudence.
-Read B.M. 850, October 2, 2001 (MCLE)

CANON 6 – C. APPLICABILITY OF CODE TO GOVERNMENT LAWYERS

“These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official duties”.

31. Ramos v. Imbang- A.C. No. 6788, 8-23-07

Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. This undertaking includes the

observance of the prohibitions against private practice of government employees
which blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases
and received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently,
respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of
profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's counsel.

Facts: Complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose
R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Jovellanos. She

35
 gave respondent ₱8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for
₱5,000 only.

The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the
Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and
always told her to wait outside. He would then come out after several hours to
inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled. This happened
six times and for each "appearance" in court, respondent charged her ₱350.

After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She

personally inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Biñan and
San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any
case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public
Attorney's Office (PAO).

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Imbang (respondent) should be disbarred. (YES)

Held: Lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are
expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.

Respondent received ₱5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July
15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a
client establishes an attorney-client relationship. Respondent's admission that he
accepted money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of
an attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, the
receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a
government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private
practice of profession.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: A lawyer shall

uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the
law and legal processes.

Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. This undertaking includes the

observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent
when he accepted the complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in
consideration of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance of the
cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
because the prohibition on the private practice of profession disqualified him
from acting as the complainant's counsel.

Respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to
file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not
have done), respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really filed an
action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were
being tried and asked the complainant to pay his "appearance fees" for hearings
that never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the
lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.

Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath, Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ordered
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant
the amount of ₱5,000 with interest at the legal rate.

32. Catu v. Rellosa- A.C. No.5738 , 2-19-08

-Read RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Sec. 3(d); RA 6713 7(b)

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who
36
has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he
intervened while in said service."
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the
act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
||| 
Facts: Catu co-owns a lot and building and contested the possession of one of
the units in the said building by Elizabeth (sister in law of Catu) and Pastor, who
ignored demands to vacate the place. The parties went to the Lupon
Tagapamayapa to try to settle the issue amicably. Respodent Rellosa as Punong
Barangay presided over the conciliation proceedings. The parties failed to settle
their case, and the petitioner brought the case to court.

Surprisingly, Rellosa appeared in court as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This
prompted Catu to file an administrative complaint against Rellosa for his act of
impropriety.

IBP committee on bar discipline, after investigation, ruled that Rellosa violated
Rule 6.03 and RA 6713. The committee recommended Rellosa’s suspension from
practice for 1 month.

Rule 6.03 — A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
intervened while in said service.
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition
under Section 7 (b) (2) of RA 6713:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited
acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. — Public
officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized
by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; . . . (emphasis
supplied)
Issue: W/N Rellosa violated Rule 6.03

Held: Rule 6.03 applies only to a lawyer who has left government service.
Rellosa was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act
complained of.

As such incumbent, the proper law that governs him is RA 7160, which actually
allows him to practice his profession. However, being a public official, he is also
governed by Revised Civil Service Rules, which requires him first to obtain a
written permission from his department head who is the Sec. of DILG. This he
failed to do.

SC ruled that Rellosa violated the lawyer’s oath (to uphold and obey law), Rule
1.01 (lawyer shall not engage in unlawful conduct), and Canon 7 (lawyer shall
uphold integrity and dignity of the profession), for a lawyer who disobeys law
disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

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 SC punished Rellosa with 6 months suspension and strongly advised him to look
up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

33. PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, 455 SCRA 526 (2005)

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement
or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
said service. Here, the advice given by respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor
General on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Facts: Former Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI
praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in the GenBank’s
liquidation. Mendoza gave advice on the procedure to liquidate the GenBank.
Subsequently, President Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-
gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his family and cronies. The PCGG filed
with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting and damages against Tan, et al. and issued several writs of
sequestration on properties they allegedly acquired. Tan, et al. were represented by
former SolGen Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law. The
PCGG filed motions to disqualify Mendoza as counsel for Tan, et al., alleging that
then SolGen and counsel to Central Bank, “actively intervened” in the liquidation of
GenBank, which was subsequently acquired by Tan, et al.

Issue: Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to

respondent Mendoza. (NO)

Held: The “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved
in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said
bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of
Manila.” Said procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act
No. 265, section 29. Thus, the Court held that this advice given by respondent
Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated
by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Supreme Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a
litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of
competent legal representation - the danger that the rule will be misused to
bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork.

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