Electoral Systems and Party Systems:

Which is the Cause and which is the Consequence?

Mette Bakken
August 20081

Abstract: Electoral systems research can be divided into two main branches: the study of electoral system consequences and
electoral systems as consequences. Whilst aiming to explain different causal processes with the former treating electoral systems
as an independent and the latter as the dependent variable, the two areas are intimately linked by the way in which electoral
system choices are political constructs maintained or changed by democratically elected politicians. This paper explores the
relationship between electoral systems and party systems: does electoral system determine party system or is it the other way
around? More specifically, it centers on the impact of change and persistence. Two hypotheses can be formulated: changes in the
party system provoke electoral system reform (H1) and reforms subsequently trigger party system change (H2). Where party
configurations are stable, electoral reforms are not expected and where no reforms are introduced, existing party systems are
anticipated to endure. The paper is constructed in four parts. The first section reviews the “Duverger tradition” and the “new
agenda” literature with particular focus on their views as regards the electoral system – party system relationship. Part two and
three presents the theoretical framework of analysis and provides an overview over data and methodology used. Part four
analyzes the impact of party system developments on electoral system reform – and vice versa. The consistency between
theoretical expectation and empirical evidence is discussed and the relevance of the two theoretical perspectives is compared in
the conclusion.

(Work in progress – do not quote)

1 Mette Bakken is a PhD candidate at the European University Institute (contact: mette.bakken@eui.eu).
This paper was prepared for the ECPR Graduate Conference in Barcelona 25-27 August 2008.

1. Previous research: the Duverger tradition and the new agenda

Duverger’s seminal work represents the starting point of modern electoral system research. At the core of his work
are the famous propositions on the relationship between electoral systems and the number of parties:

“(1) Proportional representation tends to lead to the formation of many independent

parties… (2) the two ballot majority system tends to lead to the formulation of many
parties that are allied with each other, … (3) the plurality rule tends to produce a two-
party system” (quoted in Duverger 1986, 70).

According to Duverger, two factors account for the reductive and multiplying effects of plurality and proportional
electoral systems, respectively. First, the mechanical effect of the plurality formula and single-member districts
directly affects the number of parties by producing highly disproportional results in favour of the bigger parties and,
on the contrary, disfavouring the smaller ones. Second, the electoral system influences party system development
indirectly through the psychological effect operating on two levels: within the political elite and the electorate.
Under single-member district plurality rules, strategically minded voters will refrain from wasting their votes on
parties and candidates that are not likely to make it to the top and thereby to reduce their numbers. Moreover, parties
are encouraged to consolidate in two “blocks”: parties considered to be “out of the race” are persuaded to withdraw
their candidates and to support any of the two main parties to prevent the least favourable candidate or party from
winning.
Under more proportional electoral systems, the mechanical effect is reduced and, consequently, also the
psychological reductive effect. Hence, such systems tend to increase the number of competitors. Being among the
most well-known and cited assertions in comparative politics, Duverger’s propositions have been the subject of
considerable theoretical and empirical examination and revision. In the most “pure” Duvergian tradition, Lijphart
(1994), Rae (1976), Sartori (1997) and Taagepera and Shugart (1989) have studied the relationship between
electoral system and the number of parties from a comparative empirical perspective. In the attempt to discover what
properties within the electoral systems that contribute to the reductive or multiplying effects of various systems,
special attention has been given to the effects of district magnitude, electoral formula and thresholds. Alongside the
“third wave” of democratization, the geographical scope of similar studies has expanded to the “new” democracies
in Eastern Europe (Moser 1999; Birch 2003), Latin America (Jones 1993) and Africa (Lindberg 2005). Others have
focused more exclusively on the anticipated psychological aspect of various electoral system designs such as
electoral system effects on internal party development (Bogdanor and Butler 1983; Katz 1980), voter turnout (Blais
2000; Downs 1957; Dhillon and Peralta 2002) and strategic voting (Fisher 2004). Finally, attention has been given
to the interactive effects of the party and voter level strategic behaviour (Blais and Carty 1991). A subfield worth
mentioning in this respect is studies of electoral system consequences on women representation (Ballington and
Karam 2005; Matland and Tylor 1997; Zimmerman and Rule 1994) and the representation of minority groups
(Lijphart 1991a, 1991b; Horowitz 1991; Reilly 2002) in the legislatures.

Methodologically, the Duverger propositions have been attacked from two main quarters. First, Wildavsky (1959)
has pointed towards the “logical fallacy” of Duverger’s argument in that, while acknowledging peripheral factors as
to explain for the “failure of reality”, he nevertheless refrains from recognizing the effects of such factors, thereby
rejecting a multi- causal approach and firmly defending the exclusive explanatory power of electoral system on
party system development.2 Second, and more relevant here, it has been suggested that Duverger mistook the
direction of causality and that it is party systems determine electoral systems rather then vice versa (Farrell 2001;
Grumm 1958; Sartori 1997). Empirical investigations have challenged the conventional causal relationship between
the two factors.

Rokkan (1970) suggested that the shift from majoritarian to proportional electoral systems in continental Europe in
the beginning of the 20th century came about as a strategic response on part of the bourgeois parties threatened by the
introduction of the universal suffrage, the emergence of new political parties, and, in length, the prospects of
becoming in a minority position. Boix (1999) has developed and formalized the “Rokkan hypothesis”. In “Setting
the rules of the game”, he concludes that “[t]he selection (or preservation) of different electoral rules can be traced
to the strategic decisions made by the current ruling parties, foreseeing the coordinating consequences of different
electoral systems, to maximize their representation in parliament” (Boix 1999, 621). Further investigations carried
out by Colomer (2005) suggest that party system expansion usually have preceded shifts to more proportional
electoral rules. Based on these findings, Benoit (2007: x) asserts that “[t]he influence of electoral system on party
systems cannot be established independently (…) because the causal relationship is bi-directional, or at worst,
reversed entirely”.
Notwithstanding early calls for further investigations of the causal direction of Duverger’s propositions (1976;
Rokkan 1970), research taking electoral system as the dependent rather than the independent variable remained
largely disregarded. In the beginning of the 1990s, however, the major changes undertaken in established
democracies such as New Zealand, Italy and Japan refuted the idea that electoral systems “tend to be very stable and
resist change” (Lijphart 1994: 52) and that “fundamental changes are rare and arise only in extraordinary historical
situation” (Nohlen 1984: 218). Moreover, the fall of the authoritarian and communist regimes in Latin America,
Africa and Eastern Europe generated extensive activity in the field of electoral system design as these countries
embarked on writing new democratic constitutions. Together with a general trend in comparative politics towards
explaining institutions, this contributed to the vitalization of the new agenda within electoral system research
focusing on how electoral systems themselves come into being, are maintained and changed.

Whilst a theoretical model of electoral system choice, persistence and change has not yet been developed,
researchers have covered substantial ground over the past fifteen years. The first distinction can be made between
interest-based and none-interest-based choice. Interest- based explanations take the expected consequences of
electoral system as the point of departure and are therefore intimately linked with the Duverger research agenda.
Owing to the distinct character of electoral systems – in particular with reference to its reflexive and redistributive
characteristics whereby i) it is the politicians, who are in the end most directly affected by the system in place, who
determine the rules by which they themselves will be elected in the future and ii) the game of choosing among rules
is played out in a sum-zero way which means that some can only win on the expense of others – self-interest based
explanations for change have attracted considerable attention among researchers. Self- interests can be based on the
particular interests of the politicians, the parties and/or the existing party system (see e.g. Benoit 2004). It should be
noted that self-interests in terms of a politician’s career-opportunities, the party’s seat-or policy-maximizing
objectives and party systems cartel-protection may create coordination problems when it comes to identifying self-
interest based outcomes of electoral system choice.
The more credible interest-based explanation takes into account the wider implications of electoral system choice on
democratic development. By indirectly affecting and structuring numerous aspects of political life, such as
representation and accountability, types of government and government stability, party system development, conflict
management and the like, electoral systems have been described as “the cogs that keeps the wheels of
democracy properly functioning (Farrell 2001: 2). General-interest based (or democracy- maximizing) explanations
assume that politicians act on the basis of the logic of appropriateness and genuinely strive to put in place the most
truly democratic electoral system (see e.g. Blais and Massicotte 1997). With its reliance upon the altruist virtues of
the politicians, the general-interest perspective represents the polar opposite to the models based on “egoistic” self-
interests of the decision-makers. None-interest-based explanations, on the other hand, emphasize factors that affect
electoral system choice beyond intentional design based on expected outcomes. These explanations refer to
institutional constraints, historical, economic and political aspects and dynamics, regional and temporal diffusion, as
well as idiosyncratic factors and accidents. Thus, the key feature distinguishing interests-based explanations from
none-interest-based explanations refers to the extent to which the alternatives are systematically evaluated on the
basis of their consequences or rather products of convergent contextual forces (Benoit 2004). Figure 1 provides a
typology over the mentioned explanations for electoral system choice.

Empirical research in the area of electoral system choice has expanded significantly over the past fifteen year period.
Numerous single-country studies have accounted for modes of change and the factors that determine outcomes in
established democracies as well as democratizing and transitional states (see i.e. Bawn 1993; Benoit and Hayden
2001; Benoit and Schiemann 2001; Brady and Mo 1992; Denemark 2001; Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2001;
Donovan 1995; Hooghe, Maddens, and Noppe 2006; Kaminski 2002; Nagel 1994; Navarra and Sobbrio 2001;
Remington and Smith 1996; Vowles 1995). Larger editorials such as Shugart and Wattenberg’s Mixed Member
Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds (2001), Colomer’s Handbook of Electoral System Choice (2004d) and
Gallagher and Mitchell’s The Politics of Electoral Systems (2005) have contributed with additional and updated case
studies of electoral system change and persistence. The influx of case-studies in the area has, with thick descriptions
of socio-political context within which the process of change take place, provided an ample ground for comparative
investigations (Birch 2005; Birch et al. 2002; Colomer 2004b; Colomer 2005; Croissant, Bruns, and John 2002;
Gallagher 2005, Katz 2005), although still remaining few in numbers.

2. Theoretical framework of analysis

“... clearly the study of origins – and of reciprocal effects between the correlates of electoral-system selection and subsequent
effects of the chosen system – is a research frontier for the twenty-first century” (Shugart 2005, 51).

Building on previous research, particularly the study on electoral reforms in Latin America
carried out by Karen Remmer and published in Party Politics earlier this year, and following
up on Shugart’s quest above, this study aims to look into the dynamics between party systems and electoral systems
in the European context. The two main theoretical statements that will be scrutinized are:
H1: Electoral system affects party system development H2: Party system affects electoral system choice

The research question can be formulated as follows: How does change in the electoral rules affect party system
development and how does change in the party system affect electoral system choice? Analyses will be based upon
the three key variables of electoral system choice, party system fragmentation and electoral volatility, all of which
are recognized as central in electoral system research. Following in the footsteps of Duverger and his followers, it is
expected that when the electoral system is changed, the party system will change accordingly. Thus, ex-ante shifts
towards more proportional systems are anticipated to be followed by party system fragmentation whereas
majoritarianizing electoral system reforms are likely to produce reductions in the number of parties. The central
logic adheres to the psychological and mechanical effects of the electoral rules. By lowering the barriers for new
entry, proportionalizing reforms are likely to trigger new party participation, to lower strategic voting in the
electorate and in extension increase party fragmentation in the legislature. Majoritarianzing reforms works the other
way around: higher thresholds of representation will keep newcomers away from the election, increase tactical
voting and thereby produce fewer parties in the parliament. The first hypothesis can thereby be re-formulated:
H1: The probability of party system fragmentation increases with the introduction of proportionalizing electoral system reforms and, conversely, the
likelihood of party system consolidation increases with the introduction of majoritarianizing reforms.
In accordance with the new agenda within electoral system research, on the other hand, it is expected that ex-ante
shifts in the party system will be followed by electoral system change that seeks to reinforce the current trends in the
party system development (Remmer 2008). When the party system becomes more fragmented, the electoral system
will become more proportional as a consequence of the fact that a) smaller parties, which will benefit from more
proportional rules, are increasingly empowered and in position of pushing for such reforms and b) larger parties
usually advantaged by more majoritarian (or stronger) electoral systems faces increasing uncertainty about their
future fortunes. Conversely, when the number of parties is decreasing, the gains enjoyed by the winning parties are
likely to translate into majoritarian reforms to further consolidate their position. Thus, the second
hypothesis can be re-written:
H2: The likelihood of proportionalizing reform increases when the number of parties represented in the legislature rise and, conversely, the probability of
majoritarianizing reforms increase when the number of parties decline.

Data and methodology

The analysis explores the relationship between party system and electoral system choice in 29 European countries
over 60 years covering the period 1945 to 2005. The theoretical perspective studied guides the further case selection:
only democratic countries – where democratically elected politicians have the chance to make deliberate choices
upon which electoral rules to use, are included. Thus, for western European the whole period is covered
whilst for the southern and eastern parts of the region, party system change and electoral system choices are
analyzed from the second democratic election (1970s and 1990s, respectively). The unit of analysis is legislative
periods during which electoral system choices are made (before an election) and during which the electoral system
proves to have had an effect (after an election).

The two primary variables are i) electoral system choice, ii) party system fragmentation. Electoral system choice is
operationalized according to persistence versus change which is subsequently operationalized into majoritarianizing
versus proportionalizing electoral reforms thus comprising three categories (persistence, proportional reforms and
majoritarianizing reforms). Persistence or change as well as the direction of reforms are based upon three variables
well-known in conventional electoral system research: assembly size, district magnitude and electoral formula with
one additional element which has become increasingly relevant in particular with the introduction of mixed member
electoral system but also within the proportional representation family: tiers. A fifth variable – threshold – will be
included at a later stage but is currently missing in the data set. The conventional 20 percent criterion for change is
applied for assembly size and district magnitude latter variables. Party system fragmentation is measured according
Laakso and Taagepera’s effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP).

Both bivariat and multivariate techniques are utilized to explore the relationship between the two core variables:
party system and electoral system change. The latter analysis utilize Remmer’s set-up and thereby includes, in
addition to electoral system reforms, party system change and volatility, the following controls: the number of
parties, GDP, democratic age and year (see Remmer 2008 for details). The analysis first explores the bivariat
relationships between party system and electoral system change. Second, multivariate techniques are utilized to
further analyze the relationship between the two variable so of interest. The two equations can thereby be presented
as follows:
Party system = election system + lagged ENPP + lagged GDP + democratic age (+ year) Electoral system = lagged ENPP + lagged ENPP + lagged EVS +
lagged GDP + democratic age (+ year)

Data on electoral system reforms has been based on Golder’s dataset on electoral systems in the world for the period
up to 20003 whilst the last five-year period comes from different sources ranging from journal articles to official
websites of electoral management bodies, government websites, electoral laws and the like. Statistics related to
ENPP and volatility comes from M. Gallagher’s and P. Mair’s collections4 whilst GDP and democratic age come
from the Polity IV project.5

4. Analysis
Table 1 below provides a summary over electoral system reforms in democratic Europe in the period 1945-2005.
There have been six major changes, defined as reforms introducing large-scale change from one system to another,
and 28 minor changes or modifications of the existing system in use. In total, eleven reforms were of the
majoritarianizing kind whereas 23 went in the proportionalizing direction. Looking at changes in the lower or only
tier more in detail, it has been six changes in assembly size, 19 changes in district magnitude and 22 changes in the
electoral formula. Finally, there are six modifications of the number of tiers. Table 1 summarizes the type of reforms
that were undertaken.

2 Hence, Duverger reduces the importance of societal cleavages on party system development, as emphasized by Lipset and
Rokkan (1967), to a “residual error, something that might perturb a party system away from its central tendency defined by
the electoral law (Cox 1997). According to Wildavsky (1959: 303, “methodological inadequacies [therefore] prevent
Duverger from fulfilling (…) his stated objective of presenting a general theory of parties”

Figure 1: Explaining electoral system choice: a typology.

Explanations for electoral system choice Interest-based explanations Non-interest-based explanations Self-interests General interests History
Socio-political and economic context Randomness/ accidents Diffusion Seat-maximization Policy maximization Career opportunities Cartel preservation
Fair representation Government effectiveness Accountability Prevent conflict Institutional constraints

3
3 http://homepages.nyu.edu/~mrg217/elections.html
4 http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/
5 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm

Table 1: Electoral system reform in democratic Europe 1945-2005.

Country Year Reform Direction Magnitude 1971 L: increased district magnitude and formula shift from Droop to Hare H: decreased number of districts (for rem. seat
allocation) + Min. Austria 1994 Increased number of tiers from 2 to 3 L1: lower district magnitude H1: resembles previous L (rem. seat allocation) H2: increased
district magnitude (number of districts from 2 to 1) + Min. 1995 Decreased assembly size (+) Min. Belgium 2003 Increased district magnitude and abolishing upper
tier + Min. 1953

L: Increased district magnitude and formula shift from d’Hondt to modified St. Laguë + Min. Denmark 1971 L: Increased district magnitude + Min. 1951 From PR to
PR-conditional - Min. 1958 From PR conditional to TRS - Maj. 1986 From TRS to PR + Maj. France 1988 From PR to TRS - Maj. 1953 Increased assembly size and
increased upper tier seat share H: increased district magnitude + Min. 1957 H: Increased district magnitude + Min. Germany 1990 H: Formula shift from d’Hondt to
Hare, size etc… + Min. Greece 1959

Looking into the first hypotheses, treating the party system as the dependent variable, it is expected that the number
of parties will increase after a proportionalizing reform and decrease after a majoritarianizing reform, whilst the
changes will be insignificant when the status quo system is kept in place. The mean comparison analysis lend
support to the traditional Duvergian thinking: in the first elections after a majoritarianizing change, the number of
parties was reduced by on average 0.67 whereas the number increased slightly by 0.13 for proportionalizing reforms
with the mean party system change is smallest where no electoral system reform was introduced Table 2). Notably,
mean differences are modest and not statistically significant. The means associated with the second hypothesis and
new agenda theoretical framework suggests that minor changes in party system fragmentation is associated with
electoral system persistence with the mean being only slightly higher prior to the proportionalizing reforms (Table
3). The most surprising results is found in the group of cases that introduced majoritarianizing reforms which on
average had experienced an increase of 0.67 parties in the last election before the reform was introduced.

Looking more detailed into the interaction between the number of parties and party system
change on the one hand and electoral system choice on the other, the results shows
significant ambiguity.
Figure 2a: Party system and electoral system choice in
Scandinavia, 1945-2005.

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12
With the exception of Finland, the Scandinavian countries have introduced a substantial
number of reforms, all of the proportionalizing kind (marked with red circles by the
parliament that introduced the new laws) (Figure 2a). In three out of ten cases of electoral
system change, proportionalization was against the expectations followed by declining
number of parties in the parliament. Thus, the expectations were met six of the cases, with
one reform rendering no change. Looking into the matter of the reversed relationship, party
system fragmentation preceded proportionalizing reforms in three whereas the opposite is
true for four cases. Taking the overall picture into account, the modest changes in the party
system and electoral system persistence in Finland seem to have reinforced each other thus
creating conditions for institutional equilibrium.
Also in Austria and
Germany, the two reforms
undertaken in each country
have been of the
proportionalizing
nature
(Figure 2b). In Austria, the
reform adopted in 1970 was
neither preceded nor
succeeded by party system
change thus rendering
support to none of the
hypotheses outlined. The
second reform, however,
goes hand in hand with both theories as it was introduced by a parliament that had
experienced substantial fragmentation and was followed by additional fragmentation. As far
as Germany is concerned, the initial proportionalizing reform resulted in, contrary to the
expectations, a substantial decrease in the number of parties. The relationship between party
and electoral system as regards the second reform is harder to interpret since this indicates
the electoral system put in place for the first election after Germany once again became a
unified state. Notwithstanding substantial fluctuation in the party system configurations
since the mid-1980s, no reforms have been ensued.
Figure 2b: Party system and electoral system choice in the Austria,
Germany and Switzerland, 1945-2005.
Figure 2c: Party system and electoral system choice in the
Benelux countries, 1945-2005.

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In the Benelux countries, the numbers of reforms are fewer (Figure 2c). The Netherlands
increased the assembly size from 100 to 150 in the beginning of the 1950, but the reform
was undertaken by a parliament that had not expected any changes as far as party system
change goes. Moreover, the reform did not lead to any increase but rather a slight decrease
in the number of parties in the subsequent election. In Belgium, two reforms were
undertaken in the 1990s. Against all expectations, as fragmentation was increasing and
reaching top levels, the parliament adopted a majoritarianizing reform (blue circle). After
having been in effect in two elections, the system was once again revisited and
proportionalizing measures were introduced with increased district magnitudes. This change
goes hand in hand with the theoretical expectations as regards party system effects on
electoral system whilst countering that of electoral system influence on party system
development. Luxembourg has the most modest party system changes of the three countries
thus supporting the equilibrium thesis about the relationship between party and electoral
system.
The established two-party
system in the UK has for
long been taken to account
for the lack of any changes
in the electoral rules,
notwithstanding
several
attempts over the years
(Figure 2d). As the party
system is moving in waves
towards
two-and-a-half
parties, the issue of
proportionalizing reforms is
likely to arise on the agenda
also in the future. Looking at the more truly stable two-party system of Malta, it is rather
surprising to find a proportionalizing reform – which goes again both the first hypothesis
regarding party system as a product of electoral system choice and the second hypothesis
regarding the electoral system choice as a product of party system developments. Notably,
Figure 2d: Party system and electoral system choice in the United
Kingdom, Ireland and Malta, 1945-2005.

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this reform was particular in its kind, only introducing a majority guarantee for parties that
are able to secure a majority of the votes in the backdrop of the experience where a party
twice had secured most seats in the parliament notwithstanding less votes then the runner-
up party. Ireland’s STV system has remained without change throughout the period despite
fluctuating more, by far, as compared to its neighbour and its STV companion. Notably,
fluctuations remains within the one-party range (between 2.5 and 3.5 parties).
France and Italy are known for being among the most electoral reform friendly countries of
the western European countries (Figure 2e), particularly so because they have tended to
introduce major changes to the systems – Italy 1992 and France 1958, 1986 and 1988.
Majoritarianizing reforms have on three out of five cases increased fragmentations in
parliament thus undermining the empirical evidence of Duverger. At the other side of the
coin, they have not either been preceded by any significant reductions. Quite on the
contrary, the two reforms of 1986 (return from PR to TRS) and 1992 (from PR to MM in
Italy) were both introduced by parliaments that have immediate experience of increased
fragmentation.
Looking
closer at the 1986 reform in
France, whereby it has been
claimed that the introduction
of PR was solely a strategic
choice by the Socialist party
facing severe electoral losses,
visualize the difficulty of
basing self-interests of
political parties on a priori
changes
rather
than
subsequent
electoral
expectations and underlines
the need for thicker analyses of the relationship between party and electoral systems not
being captured by large-scale statistical analysis.
Figure 2e: Party system and electoral system choice in France and
Italy, 1945-2005.
Figure 2f: Party system and electoral system choice in Greece,
Portugal and Spain, 1970s-2005.

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Looking at the southern European countries establishing democratic rules finally in the
1970s, a relatively stable party system – Greece after the first election, Portugal from the
mid-1980s and Spain throughout the period – may have justified the persistence of the
electoral rules in place (Figure 2f). The major fluctuations in Portugal in the earlier period,
however, remain unexplained. According to Geddes (1996), institutions are in flux during
periods of democratic change but this idea seems to be refuted as far as the electoral system
is concerned in the southern Europe.
Now moving to the most
recent democratic countries
in the Central and Eastern
Europe, Geddes’ suggestion
seems to become true: the
region has experienced an
extraordinary amount of
party and electoral system
changes (Figure 2g). The
four Visegrad countries
altogether six reforms have
been undertaken in the short
15 year period: three in
Poland, two in the Slovak and one in the Czech Republic with Hungary being the only
country without any reforms. Starting with the latter, the Hungary is also the one of the four
with the most stable party system thus supporting both hypotheses: no change in party
system renders no change in the electoral system and conversely no change in electoral
system produce no change in the party configurations. The Czech majoritarian reform was
introduced on the backdrop of declining party system fragmentation but did not produce
any significant change in the number of parties the first time it was put into use in 2002 thus
lending support to H2. The two cases of electoral reform in the Slovak Republic support
both hypotheses: the majoritarianizing reform undertaken by the first parliament led to a
reduction in the number of parties whereas the second proportionalizing reform was
adopted by a parliament experiencing increased fragmentation and was also succeeded by
Figure 2g: Party system and electoral system choice in Hungary,
Poland and the Czech and Slovak Republics, 1990-2005.

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further fragmentation. Finally, two out of three reforms supports the Duvergian line of
thinking: the majoritarian change reduced the number of parties dramatically in the 1993
election, and the proportional reform in the mid-1990s was succeeded by slight
fragmentation. Looking at the effect of party system change on electoral reform, the Polish
reforms fails to be explained by the self-interests of the parties in parliament.
Figure 2h: Party system and electoral system
choice in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, 1990-
2005.
Figure 2i: Party system and electoral system
choice in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia, 1990-
2005.
Reforms have also been undertaken in Bulgaria and Lithuania (Figures2h and 2i). In
Bulgaria, the mixed system used for the first election was replaced by full-blown PR.
Notwithstanding the change, the number of parties remained low, below two-and-a-half and
three for the subsequent decade. Before the 2001 election in Lithuania, the TRS formula was
replaced by the plurality rule in the first tier of the mixed system before being reversed
altogether prior to the subsequent election (2004). The first reform supports neither of the
hypotheses: it was neither preceded nor succeeded by declining fragmentation. The second
reform supports both by being introduced against the backdrop of a slight increased in the
number of parties and possibly contributing to furthering the tendency. Notwithstanding
substantial party system change, the founding electoral system has remained largely in place
in Estonia, Latvia, Romania and Slovenia.
Looking at the regression analysis results in Table 3, neither proportionalizing nor
majoritarianizing reforms have a significant impact upon legislative fragmentation. Taking
into consideration that the analysis is carried out on the whole population of electoral system

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choice in the period of interest, it can be pointed out that proportionalizing reforms seem, in
accordance with Duverger’s hypothesis, to result in increased fragmentation in the party
system that follows the first election after reform has been introduced. The effect of
majoritarianizing reforms is not only substantially smaller, but the direction is also reversed
as compared to the expectations. The lagged number of parties – which indicates the level of
fragmentation prior to the reform – is the one and only variable in the model that is
Table 3: Impact of electoral system
reforms on party system change
Proportionalizing
Note: Unstandardized coefficients with robust errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 0.05 level, ** significant at 0.01 level, *** significant at the 0.001 level.
For the multinominal regression analysis (Table 4), base category is “electoral system persistence”.
statistically significant with the remaining control variables having no impact on party system
change.

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Finally, neither party system change nor volatility has significant impact upon electoral
system change when controlling for the lagged number of parties and the contextual controls
included (Table4). The coefficients of the variables of primary interest are all positive. As
expected, volatility is associated with reforms of either kind. Contrary to the expectations,
however, increased fragmentation seems to attract changes in both proportionalizing and
majoritarianizing reforms.
5. Conclusion
In her study of the relationship between party systems and electoral systems in Latin
America, Remmer concludes that
“Reductions in party system fragmentation have led to the adoption of less permissive rules, indicating that as the
effective number of parties decline, winners attempt to consolidate their gains. Although increased fragmentation
does not yield symmetrical changes, the impact of electoral volatility on legislative electoral rules is consistent with
theoretical expectations. The greater the level of volatility, the higher the probability of both strong and permissive
electoral reform…“At the same time… the analysis offer surprisingly little evidence that electoral reform alter
party systems. Looking at the causes and consequences of electoral system reform in Latin America over the past
two decades, the findings indicate that party system change generates institutional change more predictably than
vice versa”(Remmer 2008: 24)
In Europe, however, the findings are less consistent. First, electoral system changes
are not associated with any significant changes in the party structure. These results
are thereby in harmony with Remmer’s findings. Notably, and also as noted out by
Remmer (2008: 22), when using regression techniques the changes are modelled to
take effect in the first election after an electoral reform has been adopted which may
be a false assumption. A later point in time could have been used thus to take into
account that it takes time for both parties and voters to adapt to the new rules.
Second, party system change is not significantly associated with electoral system change. Moreover, analysis shows
that party system fragmentation precedes not only proportionalizing but also majoritarianizing reforms thus standing
in sharp contrast to Remmer’s findings and the theoretical expectations of seat-maximizing political parties and
party systems.

A crucial difference between the study on Europe and Latin America is the historical contexts. In this study, both old
and new democracies have been included: western Europe from the post-WW2 period, southern Europe from the
1970s and central and eastern Europe from the 1990s. Running separate analysis or introducing interaction terms
identifying these different historical circumstances might alter the results. It can be hypothesized, for example, that
in new democracies, where stakes are higher and where public awareness of democratic rules are lower,
manipulation with the rules of the game in order to enhance one’s own chances are more attractive and easy than in
older democracies.
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