Saudi Arabia Lines vs CA
Facts:
Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA) hired Milagros Morada as a
Flight Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
While on a lay-over in Jakarta, Morada went to a disco with
fellow crew members Thamer & Allah, both Saudi nationals.
Because it was almost morning when they returned to their
hotels, they agreed to have breakfast together at the room of
Thamer. In which Allah left on some pretext. Thamer
attempted to rape Morada but she was rescued by hotel
personnel when they heard her cries for help. Indonesian
police came and arrested Thamer and Allah, the latter as an
accomplice.
Morada refused to cooperate when SAUDIA’s Legal Officer
and its base manager tried to negotiate the immediate release
of the detained crew members with Jakarta police.
Through the intercession of Saudi Arabian government,
Thamer and Allah were deported and, eventually, again put in
service by SAUDIA. But Morada was transferred to Manila.
One year and a half year later, Morada was again ordered to
see SAUDIA’s Chief Legal Officer. Instead, she was brought to
a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a blank document,
which turned out to be a notice to her to appear in court.
Monada returned to Manila.
The next time she was escorted by SAUDIA’s legal officer to
court, the judge rendered a decision against her sentencing
her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes.
Apparently, she was tried by the court which found her guilty of
(1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the
music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the
male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.
After denial by SAUDIA, Morada sought help from Philippine
Embassy during the appeal. Prince of Makkah dismissed the
case against her. SAUDIA fired her without notice.
Morada filed a complaint for damages against SAUDIA, with
the RTC of QC. SAUDIA filed Omnibus Motion to Dismiss
which raised the ground that the court has no jurisdiction,
among others which was denied
ISSUE: Whether RTC of QC has jurisdiction to hear and try the
case
HELD: YES. The RTC of QC has jurisdiction and Philippine
law should govern.Its jurisdiction has basis on Sec. 1 of RA
7691 and Rules of Court on venue. Pragmatic considerations,
including the convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in
favor of the RTC QC assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the
private interest of the litigant. Weighing the relative claims of
the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the case in the
Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it
would be forcing Morada to seek remedial action
elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where
she no longer maintains substantial connections. That would
have caused a fundamental unfairness to her.
By filing a complaint, Morada has voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. By filing several motions and praying
for reliefs (such as dismissal), SAUDIA has effectively
submitted to the trial court’s jurisdiction.
Case: Perkins vs Dizon; G.R. No. 46631             November
16, 1939
Facts: Eugene Arthur Perkins instituted in the CFI of Manila
against Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for dividends
worth P71,379.90 on 52,874 shares of stock registered in his
name, payment of which was being withheld by the company.
The company filed its answer stating that withholding of
dividends and the non-recognition of Eugene Perkins’s right to
the disposal and control of the shares were due to certain
demands made with respect to said shares by the Idonah
Slade Perkins and George H. Engelhard. The prayer in the
answer is that the parties be served with notice by publication
and be required to interplead. The CFI then ordered that
Idonah Slade Perkins (petitioner here) and George H.
Engelhard be included in the complaint. The complaint was
amended and the prayer sought was that Idonah Slade
Perkins and George Engelhard be adjudged without interest in
the shares of stock in question and excluded from any claim
they assert thereon. Summons were then served on Idonah
and Engelhard. Idonah objected to the venue but it was
overruled. She then brought this case via petition for certiorari,
praying that the summons by publication issued against her be
declared null and void.
Issue: W/N the CFI has acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the present petitioner as a non-resident defendant, or,
notwithstanding the want of such jurisdiction, whether or not
said court may validly try the case.
Ruling: The proceedings are valid. The action in this case is
an action quasi in rem.
Citing American Jurisprudence, the SC explained that
when the defendant is a non-resident and refuses to appear
voluntarily, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his
person even if the summons be served by publication, for he is
beyond the reach of judicial process. No tribunal established
by one State can extend its process beyond its territory so as
to subject to its decisions either persons or property located in
another State; and the only exception seems to be found in the
case where the non-resident defendant has expressly or
impliedly consented to the mode of service.
The general rule, therefore, is that a suit against a non-
resident cannot be entertained by a Philippine court. Where,
however, the action is in rem or quasi in rem in connection
with property located in the Philippines, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res, and its jurisdiction over the person of
the non-resident is non-essential. In an action in rem or quasi
in rem against a non-resident defendant, jurisdiction over his
person is non-essential, and if the law requires in such case
that the summons upon the defendant be served by
publication, it is merely to satisfy the constitutional requirement
of due process.
The reason for the rule that Philippine courts cannot
acquire jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident is that
"no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over
persons or property without its territory. It is an elementary
principle that an elementary principle, that the laws of one
State have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as
is allowed by comity. When, however, the action relates to
property located in the Philippines, the Philippine courts may
validly try the case, upon the principle that a "State, through its
tribunals, may subject property situated within its limits owned
by non-residents to the payment of the demand of its own
citizens against them. If the non-resident has no property in
the State, there is nothing upon which the tribunals can
adjudicate."
 In this case, Idonah Slade Perkins seeks to exclude her
from any interest in a property located in the Philippines. The
situs of the shares is in the jurisdiction where the corporation is
created. Thus, the action is quasi in rem. The action being in
quasi in rem, The Court of First Instance of Manila has
jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident. In order to
satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process,
summons has been served upon her by publication.
Take note though, that had not the complaint been
amended, the proceeding would have been void since an
interpleader is a personal action.
Petition is denied.
US vs Fowler
Facts: In August 12, 1901, the defendants were accused of the
theft of 16 champagne bottles worth 20 dollars while on board
the vessel, “Lawton”. The counsel for defendants alleged to
the Court of First Instance of Manila that they were without
jurisdiction over the crime charged. Since it happened in the
high seas and not in the city of Manila or in the territory in
which the jurisdiction of the court extends, they asked that the
case be dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has
jurisdiction over the criminal case theft committed on board
while navigating on high seas on a vessel not registered in the
Philippines.
Held: No. The Philippine court has jurisdiction over the crime
of theft committed on high seas on board a vessel not
registered or licensed in the Philippines. The English Rule
states that such crimes are triable in our country when crimes
are committed on board a foreign vessel sailing from a foreign
port and which enters the Philippine waters. In the case at bar,
the vessel Lawton was navigating the high seas at the
commission of the crime. Given the location of the vessel at
the time, such act is not triable within our jurisdiction.
People vs Wong Cheng
Facts: The appellant, in representation of the Attorney
General, filed an appeal that urges the revocation of a
demurrer sustained by the Court of First Instance of Manila
presented by the defendant. The defendant, accused of having
illegally smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel Changsa
of English nationality while the said vessel was anchored in
Manila Bay, two and a half miles from the shores of the city. In
the said demurrer, the defendant contended the lack of
jurisdiction of the lower court of the said crime, which resulted
to the dismissal of the case.
Issue: Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction
over the crime committed aboard merchant vessels anchored
in our jurisdictional waters.
Held: Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed in our
internal waters thus the Philippine courts have a right of
jurisdiction over the said offense. The Court said that having
the opium smoked within our territorial waters even though
aboard a foreign merchant ship is a breach of the public order
because it causes such drugs to produce pernicious effects
within our territory. Therefore, the demurrer is revoked and the
Court ordered further proceedings.
LLUH ASAALI, HATIB ABDURASID, INGKOH BANTALA,
BASOK INGKIN, and MOHAMMAD BANTALA, petitioners,
 v. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondent.
No. L-24170,        December 16, 1968
Facts:
At noontime of September 10, 1950, five sailing vessels, from
Borneo toward the ports of Tawi-tawi and Sulu, were spotted
and intercepted in high seas by the Custom Patrol Team. The
said patrol team aboard Boat ST-23 found out that the five
vessels contained 181 cases of “Herald” cigarettes, 9 cases of
“Camel” cigarettes, and some rattan chairs. The sailing
vessels were all Philippine registered, owned and manned by
Filipino residents from Sulu. Petitioners, however, possessed
no permit from the Commissioner of Customs so that they can
engage in the importation of the goods they carry (as required
by Section 1363 [a] of the Revised Administrative Code). Also,
the goods the petitioners carry were not covered by RA 426 or
the Import Control Law. The Custom Patrol Team then seized
the goods even if they were in the high seas. Petitioners claim
that the interception and seizure of the items were illegal
because they were intercepted outside the territory of the
Philippines. Also, the petitioners contend that they could not
have been engaged to the importation of the above-mentioned
items to incur the forfeiture under Section 1363 of the Revised
Administrative Code. The Court of Tax Appeals held that
Section 1363 should be applied because all the vessels were
all headed to Tawi-tawi. No import license and permit were
carried violating RA 426. Their course, that is—they are about
to enter the Philippine territory, announced loudly that they
were about to import these items in the Philippines.
Issues:
Whether or not the interception and seizure by customs
officials of the vessels valid in the contention that importation
had not yet begun and that the seizure was effected outside
our territorial waters.
Whether or not the Import Control Law was violated since it
had expired when the offense was committed.
Ruling:
The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
stating that “it is quite irrational for Filipino sailors …to sneak
out of the Philippines…and come a long way back laden with
highly taxable goods only to turn about upon reaching
the brink of our territorial waters and head for another country”.
Further, the Court said that the contention, regarding the
apprehension and seizure of the items, of the petitioner-
appellant is without merit. The vessels are all
Philippine registered and are therefore under the jurisdiction of
the Philippines as expressed in the Revised Penal Code. The
petitioners also violated Section 1363(a). Therefore, the action
taken then by the Commissioner of Customs was in
accordance to the law.
The Court also ruled that “The expiration of the Import Control
Law ‘did not produce the effect the declaring legal the
importation of goods which were illegally imported and the
seizure and forefeiture thereof as ordered by the Collector of
Customs illegal or null and void’.” The expiration of the law
does not mean that the law had been abrogated, meaning
even if the law had already expired, the Philippines should still
have jurisdiction over this kinds of cases until their
final determination.
Reyes JBL, J. | CP | Torts and Crimes
P: Time Inc
R: Judge Andres Reyes, Antonio Villegas, JPE S: Antonio J.
Villegas and Juan Ponce Enrile seek to recover from Time Inc
damages upon an alleged libel arising from a publication of
Time (Asia Edition) magazine.
D: [Caveat: The only tort doctrine in the case was mentioned
in passing and was not relevant to the disposition of the case
but the case is placed under the heading torts and crimes so
the author of the digest will put the doctrine pertinent to the
topic aforementioned.] The common law rule/multiple
publication rule as to causes of action for tort arising out of a
single publication was to the effect that each communication of
written or printed matter was a distinct and separate
publication of a libel contained therein, giving rise to a
separate cause of action. This rule ('multiple publication' rule)
is still followed in several American jurisdictions, and seems to
be favored by the American Law Institute. Other jurisdictions
have adopted the 'single publication' rule which originated in
New York, under which any single integrated publication, such
as one edition of a newspaper, book, or magazine, or one
broadcast, is treated as a unit, giving rise to only one cause of
action, regardless of the number of times it is exposed to
different people.
Facts: 1. In Time’s Asian Edition Magazine, Manila Mayor
Antonio Villegas was accused of having coffers containing “far
more pesos than seemed reasonable in the light of his
income.” Juan Ponce Enrile was dragged onto the article
because he allegedly lent Villegas 30,000 pesos as he was his
compadre and at that time, Enrile was the Secretary of
Finance.
2. Villegas and Enrile sought to recver damages from Time
Magazine, an American Corporation, so they filed a complaint
in the CFI of Rizal.
3. Petitioner received the summons and a copy of the
complaint at its offices in New York on 13 December 1967
and, on 27 December 1967, it filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue, relying
upon the provisions of Republic Act 4363.
4. The judge deferred the proceedings for the reason that "the
rule laid down under Republic Act. No. 4363, amending Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code, is not applicable to actions
against non-resident defendants, and because questions
involving harassment and inconvenience, as well as disruption
of public service do not appear indubitable.
Issue/s 1. WON under the provisions of Republic Act No.
4363 the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the civil suit for damages
arising from an allegedly libelous publication, considering that
the action was instituted by public officers whose offices were
in the City of Manila at the time of the publication; if it has no
jurisdiction, whether or not its erroneous assumption of
jurisdiction may be challenged by a foreign corporation by writ
of certiorari or prohibition. – NO and YES 2. WON epublic Act
4363 is applicable to action against a foreign corporation or
non-resident defendant – NO
Ruling: GRANTED. Ratio: 1. Art 360, RA 4363 reads in part:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of
the province or city where the libelous article is printed and
first published or where any of the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense; Provided,
however, That where one of the offended parties is a public
officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court
of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province
where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in
case such public officer does not hold office in the City of
Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of
the province or city where he held office at the time of the
commission of the offense or where the libelous article is
printed and first published and in case one of the offended
parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where
the libelous matter is printed and first published;
Provided,further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same
court where the criminal action is filed and vice versa;
Provided, furthermore, That the court where the criminal action
or civil action for damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction
to the exclusion of other courts; And provided finally, That this
amendment shall not apply to cases of written defamations,
the civil and/or criminal actions which have been filed in court
at the time of the effectivity of the law… 2. The complaint
lodged in the court of Rizal by respondents does not allege
that the libelous article was printed and first published in the
province of Rizal and, since the respondents-plaintiffs are
public officers with offices in Manila at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense, it is clear that the only
place left for them wherein to file their action, is the Court of
First Instance of Manila. 3. The intent, of the law is clear: a
libeled public official might sue in the court of the locality
where he holds office, in order that the prosecution of the
action should interfere as little as possible with the discharge
of his official duties and labors. The only alternative allowed
him by law is to prosecute those responsible for the libel in the
place where the offending article was printed and first
published. Here, the law tolerates the interference with the
libeled officer's duties only for the sake of avoiding
unnecessary harassment of the accused. Since the offending
publication was not printed in the Philippines, the alternative
venue was not open to respondent Mayor Villegas of Manila
and Undersecretary of Finance Enrile, who were the offended
parties. 4. That respondents-plaintiffs could not file a criminal
case for libel against a non-resident defendant does not make
Republic Act No. 4363 incongruous of absurd, for such
inability to file a criminal case against a non-resident natural
person equally exists in crimes other than libel. It is a
fundamental rule of international jurisdiction that no state can
by its laws, and no court which is only a creature of the state,
can by its judgments or decrees, directly bind or affect
property or persons beyond the limits of the state. Not only
this, but if the accused is a corporation, no criminal action can
lie against it, whether such corporation or resident or non-
resident. At any rate, the case filed by respondents-plaintiffs is
case for damages. 5. 50 Am. Jur. 2d 659 differentiates the
"multiple publication" and "single publication" rules (invoked by
private respondents) to be as follows: The common law rule as
to causes of action for tort arising out of a single publication
was to the effect that each communication of written or printed
matter was a distinct and separate publication of a libel
contained therein, giving rise to a separate cause of action.
This rule ('multiple publication' rule) is still followed in several
American jurisdictions, and seems to be favored by the
American Law Institute. Other jurisdictions have adopted the
'single publication' rule which originated in New York, under
which any single integrated publication, such as one edition of
a newspaper, book, or magazine, or one broadcast, is treated
as a unit, giving rise to only one cause of action, regardless of
the number of times it is exposed to different people. 6. These
rules are not pertinent in the present scheme because the
number of causes of action that may be available to the
respondents-plaintiffs is not here in issue. The court is
confronted by a specific venue statute, conferring jurisdiction
in cases of libel against Public officials to specified courts, and
no other. The rule is that where a statute creates a right and
provides a remedy for its enforcement, the remedy is
exclusive; and where it confers jurisdiction upon a particular
court, that jurisdiction is likewise exclusive, unless otherwise
provided. Hence, the venue provisions of Republic Act No.
4363 should be deemed mandatory for the party bringing the
action, unless the question of venue should be waived by the
defendant, which was not the case here. Only thus can the
policy of the Act be upheld and maintained. Nor is there any
reason why the inapplicability of one alternative venue should
result in rendering the other alternative, also inapplicable. 7.
Petitioner's failure to aver its legal capacity to institute the
present petition is not fatal, for A foreign corporation may, by
writ of prohibition, seek relief against the wrongful assumption
of jurisdiction. And a foreign corporation seeking a writ of
prohibition against further maintenance of a suit, on the ground
of want of jurisdiction in which jurisdiction is not bound by the
ruling of the court in which the suit was brought, on a motion to
quash service of summons, that it has jurisdiction. 8. It is also
advanced that the present petition is premature, since
respondent court has not definitely ruled on the motion to
dismiss, nor held that it has jurisdiction, but only argument is
untenable. The motion to dismiss was predicated on the
respondent court's lack of jurisdiction to entertain the action;
and the rulings of this Court are that writs of certiorari or
prohibition, or both, may issue in case of a denial or deferment
of action on such a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.