Yuan 1

Terry Yuan

Mr. Murphy

Philosophy

17 April 2020

Should the Government Provide Welfare?

Who gets what is perhaps the most basic problem that founds the whole discipline of

politics, and it is a question that is the hardest to answer as modern post-industrial societies

become more complex than ever. A key aspect of such problem is welfare, a key channel for the

government to redistribute resources to achieve social justice. This can take form of social

security benefits, healthcare, unemployment insurance, etc. However, many complain that

welfare nurtures a class of idles who are dependent on the state and that the taxpayers had earn

their wealth righteously, so there’s no reason to provide welfare. These complaints have a grain

of truth in them and need to be looked at both normatively and empirically. But as far as political

philosophy in the past and modern political economy development provide, it is still necessary

for the government to provide welfare but only to an extent that it does not impede economic

growth.

The most substantial normative justification for welfare in the realm of political

philosophy is John Rawls’ two principles of justice, which demands that 1) each person has a

claim to “equal basic liberties” (e.g., the right to live, the freedom of speech, the freedom of

association, etc.) and 2) social and economic inequalities are only permissible if they a) ensure

“equality of opportunities” and b) are to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged, also known

as the difference principle (Wenar). Rawls reasons that these principles are what people most

likely would adopt if they were given the opportunity to enact a social contract behind a veil of
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ignorance that conceals their identity since those who end up in the bottom ranks of the society

would want equal opportunity and benefits provided by the rich who do not 100% deserve their

wealth (Wenar). Therefore, a just government needs a way to provide equal basic liberties, equal

opportunities, and benefits to poorest, all of which can fall under the wings of welfare. However,

whenever Rawls is mentioned, his Libertarian critic Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory and

opposition to any form of income redistribution needs to be considered if we are to accept

Rawls’ justification for welfare.

The entitlement theory suggests that one is entitled to a certain property if it is acquired

justly initially or justly transferred by others (Lamont and Favor). If those two principles are not

satisfied, then rectification is required by tracing the historical lineage of that unjust acquisition.

On the face of it, the entitlement theory seems to take out the entire theoretical foundation of

Rawls’ work, but actually on the contrary, his theory leaves room for Rawls’ difference principle

to kick in and justify welfare to an extent (Lamont and Favor). This room for Rawls’

participation occurs when the Nozickian Libertarianism is applied to the modern Western liberal

democracies, most of whom owe their existence to slavery and genocide against the natives in

their colonies. Since the wealth of the entire modern capitalist system is unjust, it is thus

necessary for rectification to happen. However, since the historical lineage of the capitalist

wealth is almost untraceable and most of the least-advantaged people today are probably once a

victim of the capitalist machine, welfare is again put on the table as a form of reparation to

historical damages that are too enormous to calculate. On that note, a guiding principle has to be

applied to maintain the coexistence of inequality and reparation since a complete egalitarian

society would be impossible. That’s when Nozick turns to Rawls’ difference principle and apply
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it as a guideline for his historic rectification – the wealth of the better-off is permissible as long

as it benefits the worst-off.

Nozick’s second most important argument against Rawls’ redistribution would be that

“liberty upsets pattern” (Mark). This argument suggests as long as citizens are granted liberty to

buy and sell in a free market, any type of income redistribution would be futile. To illustrate,

Nozick asks us to imagine a situation in which everyone starts with ten dollars of wealth. Then,

imagine the former NBA star Chamberlain plays a basketball game and charges one dollar for

entrance fee. Many people will pay him that dollar to see him play. As a result, as time moves

on, the initial equal income distribution is completely upset by people’s own choices. Although

Nozick’s argument is very true, it does not take out all Rawls’ principles of justice because two

of them, ensuring basic liberty and equal opportunities, are not contingent on the outcome but the

starting point, which will not be upset by Nozick’s libertarian argument.

A second normative justification for welfare extends Rawls’ principles and pushes the

jurisdiction of welfare a step further. Luck egalitarianism proposed by Ronald Dworkin suggests

that a just society must compensate for “bad luck” (Lamont and Favor). Dworkin distinguishes

between “ambition” and “endowment”, one represents our choices and the results of our choices

(e.g., working hard, getting a job, etc.) and the other represents the things that we have no control

(e.g., inheritance, bad parenting, race, etc.) (Lamont and Favor). Dworkin argues that unequal

endowment requires compensation while ambition does not. Such a view stems from the premise

that in many cases, the social status that we end up with are contingent on the conditions we have

on our birth that we have no control over (Lamont and Favor). As a result, the upper class does

not necessarily deserve their wealth and compensation should be implemented to those who had
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less luck. In such a luck egalitarian society, everyone would start with equal resources, and such

equal resources is achieved through providing welfare.

Once we determined that welfare should be implemented, the next question is how much

welfare should be given out? My stance is that welfare should only be limited to enable people to

maintain basic subsistence and be able to have a second chance to not be depended on welfare

anymore. The other two common forms of welfare that we often hear about, massive income

redistribution through steep progressive taxation and preferential treatment to certain groups, are

not nearly desirable. The problem with the latter two forms of welfare is more empirical than

normative: they hinder economic growth.

For progressive income redistribution, the problem is that the capital flees and that

discourages business activities (Muller, “The Neosocialist Delusion”). Even in the status quo,

without the new wealth tax proposed by America’s neo-socialists like Bernie Sanders, the giant

corporations like Amazon, Google, Apple, etc. all store their assets abroad to avoid U.S.

taxation. This means that they will be less likely to invest in U.S. businesses and promote

economic growth. Moreover, putting onerous tax on these innovative companies means that there

will be less incentive to take risks and produce new product.

For preferential treatment like racial reparation, affirmative action, and subsidies, the

problem is the mismatch effect. The mismatch effect is discovered in a study done by UCLA law

professor Richard Sander investigating the effect of the affirmative action in higher education. It

is discovered that affirmative action promotes minority individuals to academic institutions that

they are over-matched in, and thus they are more likely to fail their tests and drop out (Sander

and Taylor). The same logic applies to any other economic activities. If preferential treatment is

applied, inefficiency is certainly going to be resulted as incompetent individuals would be in

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positions that they do not qualify for. Moreover, preferential treatment is vulnerable to the

Nozickian “liberty upsets patter” logic – over time, these individuals who are given a favor

would again fall into the lower classes under the natural cycles of competition (Muller,

“Capitalism and Inequality”).

Behind both progressive redistribution and preferential treatment there are large popular

support, just as how Rawls predicts that a welfare state would produce a class of “demoralized”

voters who vote to benefit themselves (Hendricks). Nonetheless, developmental convention has

told us that growth should proceed strict equality as strict equality almost always makes

everyone worst-off, just look at communist Russia and China under Mao. Subsequently, the way

out of the present plight that massive income inequality presents us is still more growth and

better policies that can trickle the profit down. For example, there should be better social safety

nets, better unemployment subsidies, and better vocational trainings to help the losers of

globalization and automation. But no matter how, welfare should not give rise to a demoralized

voting class and sap off the vitality of free market.

In this essay I presents both a normative and an empirical evaluation of welfare,

concluding that welfare is necessary but should not hinder economic growth. The normative

justification of welfare includes Rawls’ principles of justice and Dworkin’s luck egalitarianism

while the empirical evaluation of welfare criticizes progressive redistribution and preferential

treatment. The amount of welfare that should be given is always a tricky issue. This essay only

provides a general guideline through a brief overview of contemporary views on the issue of

inequality and welfare. Detailed policy analysis would be beyond the scope of my argument.

Nonetheless, we should always bear in mind that if we were behind Rawls’ veil of ignorance, we

would certainly want to ensure a safety net for ourselves and the unfortunate.
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Works Cited

Hendricks, Scotty. “Beyond the Welfare State: John Rawls and the Property-Owning

Democracy.” Big Think, Big Think, 23 Nov. 2018, bigthink.com/scotty-hendricks/beyond-

the-welfare-state-john-rawls-and-the-property-owning-democracy.

Mack, Eric, "Robert Nozick's Political Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),

plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/nozick-political/.

Muller, Jerry Z. “The Neosocialist Delusion.” Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs Magazine, 16

Dec. 2019, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-12-10/neosocialist-delusion.

Muller, Jerry Z. “Capitalism and Inequality.” Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs Magazine, 15

Sept. 2015, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-02-11/capitalism-and-inequality.

Lamont, Julian and Favor, Christi, "Distributive Justice", The Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),

plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/justice-distributive/.

Sander, Richard and Stuart Taylor Jr. “The Painful Truth About Affirmative Action.” The

Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 7 July 2015,

www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/10/the-painful-truth-about-affirmative-

action/263122/.
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Wenar, Leif, "John Rawls", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition),

Edward N. Zalta (ed.), plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/rawls/.