15. Republic vs. Cloribel, 36 SCRA 534, No. L-27905 December 28, 1970.

Facts:
On October 24, 1958, a petition for prohibition and injunction was filed by the Republic of the
Philippines and/or the Central Bank of the Philippines against Pedro Hernaez, as Secretary of Commerce
and Industry, several other government officials, and Bienvenido Y. Aguilar, in Civil Case No. 38224 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, seeking to enjoin the respondents and all persons actively under
their direction from releasing the consumers and producers goods and commodities imported by
respondent Aguilar under a license issued to him by the No-Dollar Import Office of petitioner Central
Bank of the Philippines. Subsequently, however, the petitioners agreed to the release of the goods on the
undertaking of surety bonds in the total amount of P1,351,000.00, the approximate value of the goods so
imported.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 1, 1965 dismissing the petition. Appeal to the
Supreme Court was filed with the lower court by petitioners Republic and Central Bank. Prior, however,
to the transmitted of the record of the case to this Court, the parties arrived at an amicable settlement, and
submitted to the court their Compromise Agreement. On its face, it appears that one of the considerations
for the said Trade Assistance Agreement, as included in the said Compromise Agreement, was the
projected filing of a joint motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 38224 by Aguilar and the Central Bank,
among others. Alleging that the Trade Assistance Agreement was being assailed in certain quarters as
immoral, illegal and ultra vires on the part of the NAMARCO, thereby placing him in a bad light,
Aguilar filed with the court below a petition praying that the December 2, 1966 decision approving the
Compromise Agreement be set aside. The court denied Aguilar's petition. In view of the denial of his
petition, he filed with the lower court a motion for execution praying that court, among others, to
command the petitioners in the case and the NAMARCO to take the necessary steps to comply with the
terms of the Compromise Agreement by implementing the Trade Assistance Agreement.
Respondent Judge issued an order on July 5, 1967, for the issuance of a writ of execution as
prayed for by herein respondent Aguilar, i.e., including the implementation of the Trade Assistance
Agreement.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order of July 5, 1967, for the issuance of a writ of execution insofar
as it concerns the implementation of the NAMARCO-Aguilar Trade Assistance Agreement.

RULING:
After examining carefully the record of the case and weighing the arguments of the parties, we
have come to the conclusion that respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in including the
implementation of the Trade Assistance Agreement among the matters which should be executed.
The Trade Assistance Agreement entered into by and between the NAMARCO and respondent
Bienvenido Y. Aguilar on November 17, 1966, is not a binding and perfected contract. The said
agreement not having been approved by the President, it stands to reason that the same is not a perfected
and operative contract.
 Moreover, the General Manager of the NAMARCO did not have the authority to submit the
NAMARCO to the jurisdiction of the court in Civil Case No. 38224, or to sign the Compromise
Agreement which was later approved by the court in its December 2, 1966 decision. As we have already
stated above, the only authority given by the NAMARCO Board of Directors to the General Manager was
to enter into a trade assistance agreement with Aguilar Enterprises. The General Manager was not
authorized to sign any compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 38224. Although the text of the Trade
Assistance Agreement shows that one of the consideration for its execution was the filing by the Central
Bank and respondent Aguilar of a joint motion to dismiss, the NAMARCO was not in a position to
legally bind the Central Bank, which, in spite of the terms of the Trade Assistance Agreement, was still
free to decide for itself whether or not to enter into an amicable settlement of the case, as well as the
terms of such settlement.
2. Roldan, Jr. vs. Arca, 65 SCRA 336, No. L-25434 July 25, 1975.
FACTS:
On April 3, 1964, respondent company filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a civil case
docketed as No. 56701 against petitioner Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Roldan, Jr., for the recovery
of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI (one of two fishing boats in question) which had been seized and
impounded by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy.
On April 10, 1964, respondent company prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction with
respondent court, but said prayer was, however, denied. On April 28, 1964, the Court of First Instance of
Manila set aside its order of April 10, 1964 and granted respondent company’s motion for reconsideration
praying for preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, respondent company took possession of the vessel
Tony Lex VI from herein petitioners by virtue of the abovesaid writ.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge has acted in grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the
writ?
RULING:
WE rule that the respondent Judge of the Manila Court of First Instance acted without jurisdiction
and with grave abuse of discretion when he issued on October 18, 1965 the order directing the issuance of
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and when he refused to reconsider the same.
When the respondent Judge issued the challenged order on October 18, 1965 and the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction pursuant thereto, the fishing vessels were already under the jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance of Palawan by virtue of its orders of October 2 and 4, 1965, upon motion of
the Provincial Fiscal, directing the Philippine Navy to detain said vessels, which are subject to forfeiture
as instruments of the crime, to be utilized as evidence in Criminal Cases Nos. 3417 for illegal fishing
pending in said court. The said vessels were seized while engaging in prohibited fishing within the
territorial waters of Palawan and hence within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Palawan,
in obedience to the rule that “the place where a criminal offense was committed not only determines the
venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction over the vessels acquired
by the Palawan Court of First Instance cannot be interfered with by another Court of First Instance. Only
the Palawan court can order the release of the two vessels. Not even the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources nor the Fisheries Commissioner can direct that the fishing boats be turned over to
private respondent without risking contempt of court.