The Past and Present Society

Urban Transport and Popular Violence: The Case of Brazil

Author(s): José Alvaro Moisés and Verena Martinez-Alier
Source: Past & Present, No. 86 (Feb., 1980), pp. 174-192
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present Society
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 URBAN TRANSPORT AND POPULAR
VIOLENCE: THE CASE OF BRAZIL*

I
BEGINNING IN 1974 BRAZIL'S LARGEST INDUSTRIAL CITIES, RIO DE
Janeiroand Sao Paulo, weresweptby a seriesof riotsdirectedat the
suburbanrailways.The riotswerenotonlya signofthegrowingdis-
contentof the urban poor with theirlivingconditions,but also a
consequenceof theirloss sincethemilitarycoup of I964 of any ade-
quate meansof politicalexpression.The purposeof thispaper is to
attemptto tracetheimmediate causesoftheriots,and toindicatetheir
bothforthe government
politicalsignificance in powerand forthe
participantsthemselves.
The firstofthetrainswas seton fireand partiallydestroyed in July
1974. There had been earlieroutbreaksof popularviolenceagainst
publictransport,butthesehad beenlocalizedand quicklysuppressed.
The July1974 riot,however,was notto be simplyone moreisolated
instanceofpopularunrest.It was merelythefirst ofa waveofpopular
protestsagainsttransport conditions in the rapidlyexpandingindus-
trialcentresof Brazil.
The followinganalysisof eventsis based on newspaperreports.'
Both the wealthof information available and the candour of the
are
reporting striking ifone considers Brazil's presentpoliticalsitua-
tion.That such a conservative newspaperas O Estado de Sao Paulo
shouldhaveso widelypublicizedthelamentablestateofpublictrans-
portmust,however,be attributed in parttoitsownrunningcampaign
against the government's interference with the principlesof free
enterprise.The disastrousperformance recordof the state-owned
Federal RailwayCompanyprovidedthenewspaperwitha welcome
pretextto expressits dissatisfactionwiththegovernment's economic
policy.
As the riots recurred,a new termwas coined: quebra-quebra
("break-break").The riotswerenot theresultoffareincreases.The
cause was alwayslinkedto thefrequent delaysofthesuburbantrains,
the incessantbreakdowns,and the occasionalfatal accidentwhich
* An earlierversionofthisarticlewas publishedas JoseAlvaroMoisesand Verena
Martinez-Alier[Stolcke],"A revoltados suburbanosou 'Patrao,o trematrasou' ", in
JoseAlvaroMoisesetal., Contradicoesurbanase movimentos sociais(Rio de Janeiro,
977), PP. 13-63.
1 The threenewspaperson whichthisstudyis basedare O Estado de Sao Paulo, the
Jornalda Tarde (whichbelongsto thesamegroup),and theJornaldo BrasilofRio de
Janeiro.

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 URBAN TRANSPORT AND POPULAR VIOLENCE IN BRAZIL 175
turnedeverytripintoa nightmare. All of theriotsoccurredearlyin
the morning,whenany disruptionto the servicemight,by delaying
arrival at work, threatenthese predominantly working-classpas-
sengerswithlossof job, and thusoflivelihood.2
In someEuropeancountriesactiongroupshave emergedin recent
yearsin responseto thedeterioration in thequalityofurbanlivingor
as a reactiontoincreasesin thecostofbasicservices.Thesenewforms
ofpoliticalparticipation have as a rulebeen,ifnotactuallyfounded,
certainlyquickly taken over and controlledby partiesof the left,
but only veryexceptionally have theyassumeda violentcharacter.
Usuallythoseinvolvedhave been drivento protestby whattheyfelt
was a threatofsomekindor otherto theirwayof life.3
In Brazil the livingconditionsof the suburbanpopulationhave
been consistently poor sincethe beginningsof industrialexpansion.
The geographicalconcentration of productionin a few cities,and
the consequentdevelopmentof sprawlingsuburbsfromthe I930S
onwardsto accommodatetherapidlyexpandinglabourforce,created
a growingneedforpublicservices, butthisneedwas onlypartiallyand
inadequatelymetbythecityauthorities and thegovernment. In 1975
no lessthan80 percentofthehouseson theoutskirts ofSao Paulo still
lackedproperdrainage,and 54 percenthad no reliablewater-supply.
In additionmorethan two-thirds of the streetswere not surfaced;
between70 and 80 percentlackedpubliclighting;and housesbuilton
about fivethousandillegaldevelopments werelocatedon twenty-six
thousand"officially non-existent" streets.4The situationin Rio de
2 The
poor state of suburbantransportin the principalcitiesof Brazil was, of
course,nothingnew.The songhitofthe 1941 carnivalwas abouthardshipsinflicted
on the suburbanpopulationby thisveryproblem:
Patrao,o trematrasou... Boss,thetrainwas late ...
Por issoestouchegandoagora That's whyI am gettingherenow
Trago aqui o memorandoda Central Hereis theCentral'scertificate
O trematrasoumeiahora The trainwas halfan hourlate
O senhorneo temrazao You haveno right
Para memandarembora! To dismissme!
O senhortenhapaciencia You musthavepatience
E precisocompreender You mustunderstand
Semprefuiobediente I've alwaysbeenobedient
Um atrasoe muitojusto One delayis justified
Quando hi explicacao Ifthereis reason
Sou chefede familia I'm thehead ofa family
Precisoo p5o I needthebread
Nao mediga nao. Don't sayno.
The samba was by ArturVilarinho,Estanislau da Silva and Paquito. It was re-
cordedforthe 194I carnivalby RobertoSilva. For further references,see Edigar de
Alencar,O carnavalcarioca atravesda miusica,2nd edn. (Rio de Janeiro,1965).
3 JeannineVerdes-Leroux, "Les conditionsde transport:objet de mobilisation",
Sociologie du travail(July-Sept.1974), pp. 225-46; Eddy Cherkiand MichelWie-
voirka,"Luttessocialesen Italie", Les tempsmodernes(June1975), pp. 1793-183I;
(Nov. 1976), pp. 635-73.
4 L. Kowarick,"A
16gicada desordem",in C. P. F. de Camargo,F. H. Cardoso et
al., Sdo Paulo, 1975: crescimento e pobreza (Sao Paulo, 1976), pp. 33-6.

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I76 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 86

Janeirowas basicallyno different. Rapid urban growthnot only

createdan urgentdemandforsuchbasic servicesas water,drainage,
public and domesticlighting,but in particular,because of the con-
siderabledistancesbetweenhomeand work,fora systemof public
transport thatwas fast,efficient
and reliable.
The totallack of somepublicservicesand the unreliablestateof
othersgoes a longway towardsexplainingthegrowingdiscontent of
thesuburbanpopulation.Buttheseconditions alonedo nottellus why
theprotestseruptedin 1974 ratherthanat any othertime,norwhy
theywerefocusedspecifically on theproblemofpublictransport. Nor
are theyin themselvesanysufficient reasonforthespontaneous,un-
organized,sustainedand violentnatureoftheriots.Therehad, as we
have said,beenearliertransport riots- forinstance,in Sao Paulo in
1947 and in Rio de Janeiro in I959 - but therehad been nothingto
compare with the wave of riots that began in i974.5
It couldbe argued,following theclassicexamplesof"spontaneous
eruptions"of the urban crowd,thattherecomesa pointwhenthe
labouringpoorfeelthattheonlywayto improvetheirlotis bymeans
of open rebellion.In 1974 real wagesin Brazil reachedtheirlowest
pointsince i964.6 The declinein purchasingpowermustcertainly
have contributed to the creationof a favourableclimateforrevolt,
thoughit still does not explain whypublic transportshould have
becomethe specifictargetof the riots.For such an explanationwe

5 In
1947,shortlyaftertheelectionofAdhemarde Barrosas governorofthestate
of Sao Paulo, the cityof Sao Paulo was the sceneof a violentriotdirectedagainst
buses and trams,and caused by a fare increase.It was a timeof intensepopular
unrest,because of a sharpincreasein the cost of livingcoupledwitha toughwage-
restraintpolicy.Yet therewas relativepoliticalfreedom.The objectoftheattackwas
themunicipaladministration, whichwas blamedforthefareincrease.In I959, at a
timeof growingpoliticalactivity,anotherriot occurredin Niteroiin the state of
Guanabara. This timethe targetwas the CompanhiaCantareira,the ownerof the
ferrylinkingNiteroiwithRio de Janeiro,whichwas out ofactionbecauseofa strike
by company employees.A crowd of between thirtyand fortythousand people
destroyedthe ferrystation,the owners'residences,a restaurant,two ferryboats,a
shipyard,a police car, and a jeep. The rioterssided withthe strikers.E. Oliveira
Nunes,Multidao violenta,(I.U.P.E.R.J., Rio de Janeiro,1975), mimeo,p. 8.
6 The
DepartmentoIntersindicalde Estadisticae Estudos Socio-Econ6micosof
Sao Paulo (hereafterD.I.E.E.S.E.) undertookan analysisof thetrendofreal wages
foreighty-one categoriesof wage-earners in thecountryas a whole(of whom,how-
ever,74 per centwerein Sao Paulo), as negotiatedin Julyof each yearthroughthe
officialunions.Figuresobtainedforthemodalreal wagefortheperiod1964-75were
as follows:
1964/5 o00 1970/I 82
1965/6 90 1971/2 80
1966/7 73 1972/3 79
I967/8 74 1973/4 71
1968/9 72 I974/5 73
1969/70 75
D.I.E.E.S.E., Io anos de politicasalarial (Sao Paulo, I975), p. 64.

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 URBAN TRANSPORT AND POPULAR VIOLENCE IN BRAZIL 177

mustlookat theactualconditionsofurbantransport and thewaysin

whichtheseaffected thesuburbanpopulation'slivingconditions.
Expenditureon transport on averagetookup lessthan o percent
of thebudgetof a working-lassfamily,with39 percentbeingspent
on food and 23-5 per cent on housing.7Money was not the main
problem,and theprincipalgrievances werenotassociatedwithfarein-
creases.The centralissuewas thefactthattheincreasingly unreliable
stateofpublictransport threatened theworkingpopulationwithloss
of wages,unemployment, evendeath- thatis, it mightactuallyde-
privethe passengers who dependedupon it (predominantly wage-or
salary-earners)of theverybasis of theirsurvival.8
The suburbanrailwaysofRio de Janeiroand Sao Paulo are owned
bythestateand runbythefederalgovernment, notbyregionalorcity
The FederalRailwayCompany,formerly
authorities. theCentraldo
Brasil,servesoverninetystationsin thesuburbsofRio de Janeiro,and
in 973 carried about 700,000 passengersa day in 7 I 5 trains;9in I975
thesuburbantrainsof Sao Paulo carriedabout900,000 passengersa
day.10
In spiteof theirimportanceto thefunctioning
and development of
thesetwocities,thestateof thesuburbanrailwayshas continuously
deterioratedovertheyears.11Despitea growingdemandfortransport
the totalnumberof trainshas actuallydeclined.And thereare con-
tinual breakdowns. In 1974 there were 1,720 train stoppages on the
Centraldo Brasilbecauseofsomefailureor other,12
and a breakdown
at any point on the line oftenmeant the disruptionof the entire
7 D.I.E.E.S.E., Familia assalariada: padrao e custode vida (Estudos socio-econ6-
micos,ii, Sao Paulo, I974).
8 The employmentpatternof Nova Iguacu in the Baixada Fluminense,Rio de
Janeiro,was broadlyrepresentative of the fourteentownsand thirty-nine villages
thatmade up theprincipallower-classsuburbsof thatcity.The townis twenty-two
milesaway fromthe centreof Rio, and had almosta millioninhabitants,but only
fourteenthousandofthemhad managedto findemployment locally.The majorityof
the residentsworkedin Rio de Janeiro.Accordingto a recentsurvey80 per centof
theseworkerswereemployedeitherin thebuildingsectororin otherindustries in Rio.
Jl. da Tarde, IO July1974.
The statisticsof the Federal Railway Companyindicatethat of the passengers
usingthecentrallineoftheCentraldo Brasil,whichservesthesuburbsofRio, 53 per
centwerelabourers,36 per centshop assistants,7 percentsoldiersor civilservants,
with4 per centin middle-classoccupations.Of thoseusingthe auxiliaryline 42 per
centwerelabourers,38 percentshopassistants,12 percentsoldiersor civilservants,
and 8 per centmembersof themiddleclass.Jl. do Brasil, 27 July1975.
9 Estado de Sdo Paulo, 7 Dec. 1973.
10Kowarick,"A logica da desordem".
11In thewordsofan employeeoftheFederalRailwayCompany,"the trainsare in-
adequate forthenumberofpassengerswho dependupon them.In thepast tenyears
the I6 trains[of the lines servingRio de Janeiro]have been cut to 92, whilethe
numberof passengershas increasedduringthesame periodby 400 per cent.Trains
carrypeoplehangingon to theoutsideand eventravelling on theroofs.Each trainhas
a capacityof I,500 but usuallycarriesaround5,000": Jl. da Tarde, I6 Oct. I974.
12Estado de Sdo Paulo, 23 May I975.

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I78 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 86

network.It is,ofcourse,an oldstory.The suburbanrailwaysofRio de

Janeirowerebuiltin I923; theyhavenotbeenoverhauledsinceI943,
and thenonlypartially.13Everyyearderailments and collisionshave
takentheirtollofdead and injured.Not leastamongthesehavebeen
the frequentaccidentsto the so-calledpingentes,passengerswho,
eitherforlackofmoneyor ofroominsidethecarriages,orboth,travel
on theoutsideof thecoachesin orderto getto workon time.
Whatwerethereasonsforthisdeplorablesituation? As O Estado de
Sdo Paulo statedin June1975 afterone of theriots:"In Brazil the
railways... are the responsibility
of the ministryof transport,and
duringthe last administration 87 per centof the ministry'sbudget
wenton roads,whilerailwayswereforcedto sharewithportauth-
whilepublictrans-
oritiestheremaining13 percent".14Significantly,
portstagnated,thenumberofcarsin Sao Paulo rosefrom120,000in
1960 to almost a million in 1974.
Whatwas theeffecton productionand productivity of theloss of
workinghourscaused by the lamentablestateof public transport?
Generalattrition oftheworkingpopulationwouldonlybe recognized
as a problembymanagement ifthesatisfactoryoperationofindustry
was seento be affected.15 But thenatureofthelabour-market and the
factthatthemajorityof theworkerswereunskilledallowedforeasy
replacement withinthelabourforce.Individualhardshipwas ignored.
The overallsituationthus allowedemployersto remainlargelyin-
sensitiveto the transportproblem.Insteadof exertingpressureon
government to effectan improvement in publictransport,
theysimply
penalized those of their workers who had to dependon therailways,
eitherbydeducting moneyfortimelostorbyoutright dismissal.In the
wordsofone passenger:"whatmakesus wreckthetrainsand stations
are theconstantdelays,becausemostofus knowthatifwe are notat
workon timewe lose our pay fortheday and forSunday".16
Some employers no longeracceptedthe"delaycertificates" issued
by the railwaycompany,whileotherspractiseda policyof selective
employment. As oneemployer warned:"ifthingscontinuein thisway
it will no longerbe possibleto employpeoplefromMaua, Riberao
Piresand theothersuburbswhichrelyon thetrains""7- a somewhat
impracticalattitude,one mightthink,as thebulkof thelabourforce
livedin precisely suburbssuchas these,and as privatetransportbycar
was not at thetimeeconomically viableforthemajorityof Brazilian
urbanworkers.Moreoverstoppageofpay or outrightdismissalwere
yearsold:J7.do
13Jl. da Tarde, I6 Oct. I974. The signallingsystemwas overforty
Brasil, 27 July I975. In I975 the Federal Railway Companyhad a total of 819
carriages,ofwhich408 (or 50 percent)wereunderrepair:Jl. da Tarde, 18 July1975.
14Estado de Sdo Paulo, 26 June1975.
15Kowarick,op. cit.,p. 35.
16Jl.do Brasil, 27 July1975.
17Jl.da Tarde, 27 Jan. I976.

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 URBAN TRANSPORT AND POPULAR VIOLENCE IN BRAZIL 179

sinceitwas in partexactlythissortofreprisal
also counter-productive,
whichfuelledtheangeroftheworkers.As one passengercomplained:
thingsare allowedto go so far,and thenthepeopleexplode.Theygiveventto their
fury.Whenyou getto workin the morningyou have to tellyourboss: "I am late
because thetrainbrokedown". The nextday yougetthereand yousay: "I am late
because thetrainwas delayed".The nextday ... and so on. Do youthinktheboss
willgo on believingyou,or thathe can be botheredwithyourtrain?18
A significantpercentageofthepassengerstravelledas clandestinos,
that is, withoutpayingtheirfares.In 1975 the proportionof clan-
destinoswas estimatedat around27 -5 percent,19and this,ofcourse,
furtheraggravatedthe railwaycompany'sdifficulties in improving
theservice.Also thelow wagesofthevastmajorityof thepassengers
made it practicallyimpossiblefor the companyto set realisticrail
fares.For manyof thepassengerseventhesinglefareof 60 centavos
was toohigh:"Nobodyriskshislifeforfun... ManytimesI haverun
along the trackto reach the platform[bypassingthe ticketbarrier]
because I did not have 60 centavosfor the fare", said one of the
passengerswho invariablytravelledon the outsideof the train.20
Moreover overcrowdingof the platformsduring the rush-hours
encouragedmanypassengersto waitforthetrainoutsidethestation
and theywerethenable to bypasstheticketbarriers.An alternative
meansof transportwas the bus, but it cost 4.70 cruzeirosa day as
comparedto the returnrail fareof I-20 cruzeiros,so it was not a
realisticalternative:"What can we do? This is the60 centavotrain,
the train of the poor".21Any additionalexpense,howeversmall,
wouldhave strainedthefamilybudget.The situationof one particu-
lar worker,reportedin O Estado de Sao Paulo aftertwo riotshad
occurredon thesamedayin July1975,was probablyrepresentative of
a significantnumberof passengers.His incomewas 900 cruzeirosa
month:
each day he leaveshomeat 5.30 a.m., takingthetrainat 6.15 a.m. to be at workby
8.00 a.m. He takes 5-00 cruzeiroswithhim, 1-20 cruzeirosforhis trainfareand
the restforcigarettes.For his main meal of the day he has a handfulof rice and
beans and once a week some meat. In his pockethe carefullykeeps his working
forwithoutit he couldbe pickedup bythepolice.Ifhe wereto takethebus
register,
18Ibid., 22 Jan. 1976.
19J1.do Brasil, 27 July1975.
20Ibid. Passengerswerealso temptedto travelaspingentesbythesmallamountsof
timethattheymightgain upon theirarrival:"The pingenterunsa considerablerisk
buthe has one advantageovertheotherpassengers- gettingoffthetrainand outof
the stationbeforeeverybody else. He thusgainspreciousseconds,whichmaymean
thedifference betweencatchingor missinga bus,keepingorbeingfiredfromhisjob":
Jl. da Tarde, 30 May 1974.Pingenteswereliableto a fineand,iftheycouldnotpayit,
mightbe arrested;in 1973, 1,175pingenteswerearrestedin thisway: ibid.,30 May
1974. In case of accidents,and in orderto avoid havingto pay any indemnities
that
mightotherwisebe due to relatives,thecompanyusuallytriedtoputtheblameon the
passengers:"pingentesare an ill-bredlot; whattheyneed is educating!":Estado de
Sdo Paulo, 31 May 1974.
21J1. da Tarde, II JulyI975.

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 80o PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 86

he wouldhave to pay 4-70 cruzeirosforthereturntrip.Andifhe spentmorethan

5-00 cruzeirosin a day "the childrenwouldn'teat".22
In thecircumstances thedisplayboardat theD. PedroII stationin
Rio de Janeirowhichtoldthepassengers,alreadytiredaftera day's
workanddreadingthereturnjourney,"Go homequietly.The Central
do Brasilwishesyoua goodjourney.Do notriskyourlifetravelling as
a pingente",musthave seemedlike a bad joke. Travellingon these
overcrowded, dilapidatedtrainsmay not only have lost themtheir
jobs; formanyit also involvedriskingtheirlives.In 1973 a pingente
was involvedin an accidenton averageeveryfivedaysor so.23There
was a hightensionelectricitypostnextto the tracksat Engenhode
Dentrostation;afterBrazil firstwon theWorldCup in I958, it was
christened"Bellini" aftertheteam'sgoalkeeper,becauseit so effect-
ivelypreventedthepingentesfromtravellingon the outsideof the
carriages.24
The dangersinvolvedin travellingon thesetrainsdeeplyaffectthe
psychologicaloutlook of thepassengers.As one of themconfessed:
I workall day thinking:"in fourhoursI have to takethetrain... in threehoursI
have to takethetrain... I haveto takethetrain";evenmyfriendsmakefunofme:
"hey,Jonas,thinkingof thetrainagain?". I startleand say, "ah, thetrain",and
decidenotto thinkofit; butI lookat theclock,and itbeginsagain: "in twohoursI
have to take thetrain"; evenwhenI am restingat workI dreamof thetrain.25

In thesixyearsfrom1970to 1976theaverageamountoftimespent
on travelto and fromworkincreasedbyabout30 percent.Passengers
livingon theperiphery of thetownsspentas muchas threeto four
hourseverydaytravelling.26 Moreovera largepartofthelabourforce
attempted to makeup forthedeclinein realwagesbyregularly work-
ingovertime.27 The passengersthatcrammedthestationeverymorn-
ingthusfacedeach newdayexhausted.The struggle fora placeon the
train,and thejourneyitself,oftenstandingthewholeway,onlyserved
to exasperatethemevenfurther.
Anotherreason why popular unrestshould have been directed
specificallyagainsttheirmeansof transport maybe the "collective"
natureof travel.This notonlyoffered favourableconditionsforjoint
actionwithoutthe need forany priororganization,but by contrast
with, for instance,collectiveaction in the factories(which was
banned) the daily crowdingof the stationplatformsand the trains
gave a measureof anonymity a degreeofimpunity.
and therefore

22Estado de Sao Paulo, Io July1975.

23Jl. do Brasil, 2 JuneI974.
24Estado de Sao Paulo, 2 June1974.
25Jl.da Tarde, II July1975.
26Kowarick,"A 16gicada desordem",p. 33.
27Jl. do Brasil, 27 July1975.

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 URBAN TRANSPORT AND POPULAR VIOLENCE IN BRAZIL I 8
II
The continuouserosionofpurchasingpowerand thesteadydeter-
iorationofpublictransport werereasonenoughin themselves forthe
peopleto riot.Indeedin viewof thegeneralconditionsin whichthey
livedand workedit is perhapssurprising thattheydid notriotmore
often.The systematic natureofpoliticalrepression since1964 and the
powerand ubiquityof thepoliceforces- eventheFederalRailway
Companyhad its own police force- made any sortof organized
movementalmostimpossible.The massivestrikesin Osasco in Sao
Paulo and Contagemin Minas Gerais in 1968 were violentlysup-
pressed,and werefollowedby stateintervention in the unions.The
MovimentoIntersindicalAnti-Arrocho(Anti-Wage-Freeze Move-
ment)thatgot underway duringthe government of Costa e Silva,
thoughneverchallenging establishedlimitsforcollective
theofficially
bargaining, was declared illegalby the federalgovernment.28 While
thepermanent displayand use offorcemayhavedeterred manyfrom
openlymanifesting theirdiscontent,repressionmayitselfhavegener-
ateddirectpopularaction.The riotswerenotsimplya responsetoeco-
nomic hardship.They were also the productof a politicalsystem
whichblockedall legitimate outletsfordissent.
Since I964 the Brazilian workingclass has lacked independent
organizationsforsocialand politicalrepresentation throughwhichit
can expressitsgrievancesin an organizedmanner.The labourunions
are firmly understatecontrol.MoreoverSao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro
and the otherstate capitals have been deprivedof theirpolitical
autonomy,withtheirmayors(and also, morerecently,stategover-
nors)thereafter beingnominatedbythepresident.In 1965 all politi-
cal partieswerebanned,beingreplacedby a two-party system:the
Alianza RenovadoraNacional (A.R.E.N.A.), theofficialgovernment
party,and the MovimentoDemocraticoBrasileiro(M.D.B.), an
officialopposition.Popularparticipation in theelectoralprocesswas
restrictedto theelectionofmunicipalcouncillors and stateand federal
deputiesandsenators, buteventheseelectionswerestrictly controlled.
The federalelectionsofNovember1974 wereprecededbya period
of relativepoliticalfreedom.It can thusbe plausiblyarguedthatthis
providedtheopportunity forsomedegreeofmobilization bythework-
ingclasses,howeverbasic theactualleveloforganization.In thissort
of politicalclimatepeoplemighthave managedto shedsomeof their
fearsand venturedto expresstheirdiscontentopenly.However,the
waveofriotswhichbeganin Sao Paulo in January1974 tookplace at
a timeof renewedrepression, whenseveralfederaldeputieshad been
dismissedfromParliamenton thegroundsofbeingaffiliated toparties
28 For an
analysisof theOsasco and Contagemstrikes,see F. C. Weffort,
Partici-
pacdo e conflitoindustrial:Contageme Osasco, 1968 (CadernosCebrap, no. 5, Sao
Paulo, 1972).

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I 82 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 86

whichhad beenbanned,and eventhepoliticalactivities oftheofficial

oppositionpartywereopenlysuppressed.
In short,while the materialconditionsof wage-earnerssteadily
deteriorated duringtheseyears,periodsofrelativepoliticaltoleration
alternatedwithperiodsof harshrepression. The lackoforganization
and the spontaneousand violentcharacterof thevarioustransport
riotsmustbe viewedwithintheirparticularpoliticalcontexts.How-
ever,thisstilldoes not explainthe actual timingof the riots,which
tookplace in bothpoliticalcontexts.
E. J.Hobsbawmhas suggestedthatin anyindustrialsocietyurban
crowdactivityand movements such as theseriotstendto be super-
sededby themoretypicalmodernlabourmovements, becauseof the
emergence ofan industrialworkingclassand theincreasingly efficient
nature of the apparatusof public order. "Only outside Western
Europecan theordinary citizenoflargetownsstillbe expectedtohave
experienceof the pre-industrial riotand the pre-industrial mob".29
However, though we are concernedhere with a non-European
country,the settingsforthe riotsare, of course,the largestindus-
trialcentresin South America.Moreoverit is well knownthat the
"apparatusofpublicorder"is particularly welldevelopedin Brazil.It
is also clearthata largeproportion ofthoseinvolvedin thetransport
riotsbelongedto theindustrial proletariat.Yet stilltheriotsoccurred.
This hardlybearsoutHobsbawm'spoint.We would,therefore, liketo
put forward the hypothesisthat in those industrialsocietieswhere
autocraticpoliticalregimeshaveassumedpowerand suppresspopular
discontent, spontaneousriotsmaytendto occuronceagain. In a con-
textwherepoliticalrightshave beenreducedto a minimum, riotsare
afterall one ofthefewpossibleformsofpopularpoliticalexpression.
Viewedfromthisperspective theyare notpre-political but eminent-
ly political.Only on the surfacedo the riotsappear "irrational",
"anarchic" thoughinevitablereactionsto hardship.Their sponta-
neityand violenceare theconsequenceof theworkingclass'sformal
exclusionfrompolitics.The peoplereactedin thewaythattheydid,
not out of any historically determinedpoliticalbackwardness,but
because,in the circumstances in whichtheyfoundthemselves, this
was theonlymeansavailableto themto makethemselves heard.After
all, thealmosttotalexclusionofthemassesfromthepoliticalprocessis
preciselytheconsequenceoftheirlatentpoliticalpotential.
Repressionsucceededin temporarily theriots,butit didnot
stifling
put an end to them.It may be that it was preciselythe absenceof
leadersand thelack oforganizationthatmadethesuppression ofthe
riotsso difficult.
The suburbanpopulationsofRio de Janeiroand Sao Paulo couldin
29 E. J. Hobsbawm,PrimitiveRebels (Manchester,1959), p. I Io.

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 URBAN TRANSPORT AND POPULAR VIOLENCE IN BRAZIL I83

theoryhaveoptedforsomeother,morepeaceful,formofprotest, such
as occurredin Barcelonain 1951 whena massiveboycottoftramswas
stagedin responseto a fareincrease.Tramsweretheprincipalmeans
of public transportin Barcelona at the time.For days on end the
people of Barcelonawalkedto work,untilthe authoritieswithdrew
theincrease.The boycottwas precededbythedistribution ofpamph-
lets,drawnup byuniversity studentsand thencopiedbyhandbythe
generalpublicforfurther circulation.Duringtheboycotthundreds
of tram windowswere broken,thoughno tramcarswere actually
destroyed. Therewas no organization, properlyspeaking.It seemsto
havebeentheculmination ofa longsuppressed in thedim,
frustration,
protractedaftermath of the Spanish Civil War. Resentmentat the
political centralismof Madrid also played a part, inducingeven
middle-class Catalans to join theprotest.Significantly
thesuccessful
boycottwas followedbya one-daygeneralstrike.30
A boycottofthetypecarriedout in Barcelonawas not,however,a
viableoptionforthepeopleofeitherRio de Janeiroor Sao Paulo. In
the firstplace thereare specifictopographicalreasonswhichmake
walkingto workvirtuallyimpossiblein eitherof the lattercities.
Secondly,withdrawalof a fare increaseis a verylimitedand well-
definedobjective.The action requiredof the authoritiesis quite
straightforward; itmerelyrequiresan administrativedecision.Butthe
suburbanpopulationsofSao Paulo and Rio de Janeirowerenotreact-
ing to specificimpositions of thissort.Whenpassengersriotedthey
were ventinglong pent-upfeelingsof frustration and anger at the
generalconditions oftransport,theimprovement ofwhichwas a much
morecomplexand drawn-outmatter.Also,because of the extentof
the railwaynetworksof thesetwo citiesany effective boycottof the
trainswouldhaverequiredconsiderable Yetitshouldbe
organization.
stressedonce again that it was the difficulty
of organizing ratherthan
any basic inabilityto do so which was the reason forthe spontaneous
natureand apparently randomviolenceoftheriots.
Ifwecomparethesetransport riotswiththefoodriotsofeighteenth-
centuryEngland analysedby E. P. Thompson31a furtheraspect
standsout. As one of thepassengerswarnedafterthedevastationof
EngenheiroTrinidadestationin Sao Paulo in 1976: "now everything
is calm.It is inthemornings
thatthisbecomesa madhouse.Tomorrow
thepeoplewilltakethetrainagain andthenwewillseewhether ornot
theynowunderstand whatwe want;iftheydo nottakeanyactionwe

30 The strikewas called to demanda

wage increase.The earliervictoryprobably
encouragedthe workersto take furtheraction, but this time the reactionof the
authoritieswas drasticand decisive.Felix Fanes, La vaga de tramviesdel I95I: una
cronicade Barcelona (Barcelona, I977).
31 E. P.
Thompson,"The Moral EconomyoftheEnglishCrowdin theEighteenth
Century",Past and Present,no. 50 (Feb. 197I), pp. 76-136.

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I84 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 86

willstartanotherfire".32 Whoare they?By contrastwitheighteenth-

centuryfoodriotsthesuburbanpopulationsofRio de Janeiroand Sao
Paulo did notriotin orderto defendtraditional prerogatives - after
all, publictransport had beenin a shockingstatefora verylongtime
- but ratheragainstone of theseveralmanifestations of a growing
exploitation.The suburbanrailwayswere owned and run by the
federalgovernment. The legitimacy ofthepassengers'protests derived
fromthefeelingthatthestateshould,but did not,providethebasic
servicesessentialto theirlivelihood.Theirhostility wasdirectednotat
subordinateor intermediate agencies, but in the finalanalysisat the
stateitself.In so faras theidea of a paternalisticstatelingeredon (a
remnantofthepre-1964populistmasspolitics),suchrecourseto riot-
ing pointedto thecrumbling of thisidea. Beingunderdirectattack,
thestatehad to react.Faithin a paternalistic statewas further eroded
by therepressive actiontakenby thepoliceand militaryto suppress
the riots.The riotsconstituteda "delegitimization" of established
authorityand had distinctpoliticalimplicationsand consequences.
The choice of targetwas not random.The riotswere caused by a
collectivefeelingof distress,the resultof the participants'identical
situationas membersof the labour force,and finallythe people
demandedrecognition oftheirgrievancesbythestate.

III
The mostdifficult problemis to reconstruct thecrowd'sown atti-
tudesand expectations. It is possibleto obtainsomeidea of theseby
analysingtheactualcourseofevents.
In OctoberI974 one of theearly-morning rush-hourtrainsbroke
down and stoppedbetweenthe stationsof AugustoVasconcelosand
Santissimo(in theBaixada Fluminense,Rio de Janeiro).A crowdof
about threethousandpassengers,"exasperatedby the interminable
delays",set threecarriageson fireand stonedanothertwelve.This
was onlythebeginning. Passengerson a secondtrain,"forcedto stop
at a barricadethrownup on anotherlinebythepassengers on thefirst
train" (presumablyto obtainalternativetransport), joinedthe riot.
Armedwith"tuftsof driedgrass,woodenbenchesand somerailway
sleeperstheyjoinedin theburningofthethreecarriages".According
to someoftheonlookersit was like"a realwar". The riotonlyended
afterthe arrivalof a squad of railwaypolice.The driverof thefirst
train was also attacked.33Somethingof the spiritof the crowdis
32
J. da Tarde, 22 Jan. 1976. Our italics.
33
Ibid., I Oct. 1976. On the same day workerslivingin the satellitetownsof
Brasiliapartiallydestroyed fortybuses.The authorities
had attemptedto introducea
three-tierbus systemwithdifferential fares.As a resultthe moreexpensivebuses
passed by emptywhilethe cheaperones were overcrowdedand did not stop. The
Brasilia policeput an end to theriot,buttheauthoritieswereforcedto abandonthe
new system.Ibid., I I Oct. I974.

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 URBAN TRANSPORT AND POPULAR VIOLENCE IN BRAZIL 185

revealedby the solidarityof the passengersof thesecondtrainwith

thoseofthefirst.Althoughtheformer werein effectprevented bythe
latterfromcontinuingtheirjourney,theynevertheless immediately
joinedtheriot.
In thefollowing year,1975,transport riotsbecamebothmorefre-
quentand moreextensive.Aroundthemiddleoftheyear,withinthe
space ofa singlemonth,therewereno fewerthansixquebra-quebras,
fivein Rio de Janeiroand one in Sao Paulo. Allofthemweretriggered
by breakdownsand delaysor werethe directresultof accidents.O
Estado de Sao Paulo reportedthat"the collisionof an overcrowded
passengertrainwithanothertrain,standingin thestationofDeodoro
- on accountof a failureto operatea manual signallinglever-
caused one death,seriouslyinjuredtheengine-driver ... and also in-
juredover200 ofthe1,800passengers".The accidentwas followedby
thetotaldestruction of thestationand also thetraffic-control cabin.
The railmanin chargeand his threeassistantsquicklydisappeared
fromthe scene to escape the popular fury.Armyforcesfromthe
nearbyVila Militartogetherwithmilitarypolice soon made their
appearance"in orderto preventfurther rioting".34The railwaypolice
wereapparently unabletocontrolthesituationaloneand itwas feared
thattheriotmightspread.It was,ofcourse,significant thatpartofthe
attackwas directedat thetraffic-control cabin fromwhichthesignal
leverwas operated.35 Duringthisriotthedestruction was methodical
and to a purpose.Although,accordingto the press,the crowdwas
"panic-stricken" it did notin factsimplydestroyeverything blindly,
but actedas thoughit had a specifictarget.The resourcesofthestate
in theformofitsforcesofrepression, thearmyand themilitary police,
weremobilized.
The choiceof targets,therefore, was not random.Actionwas not
blind.But weretheactionsoftheriotersperhapsin thefinalanalysis
simplyan end in themselves, a kindof ritualof redresslackingany
clear notionof thesocial forcesbehindtheconditionsagainstwhich
theywererebelling?Perhapsthe riotswerebasicallysymbolic,even
thoughtheirconsequencesmightgo muchfurther. Lackingthemeans
and thepowerto reachdirectly thoseultimately responsible forpublic
transport, thestateitself,thecrowdmanifested itsragebydestroying
suchthingsas wereimmediately to hand: thetrainsand thestations.
In one of the riotsin I976 the riotersat the stationof Engenheiro

34Estado de Sao Paulo,

23 May I975.
35 The semi-automatic traffic-control
systemwas one ofthemain reasonsfortrain
breakdownsand accidents.Only in Duque de Caxias and BelfortRoxo in Rio de
Janeiro(the sceneof theriot)and in Mogi das Cruzes in Sao Paulo (afterthederail-
mentof a "studenttrain"in 1972 whichcaused thedeathsof twenty-four students,
most of them fromthe local middleclass) were more reliable electroniccontrol
systemsinstalled.Ibid., 23 May 1975.

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I86 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 86

Trinidade,outragedbythedeathofsomepingentes, notonlysetfireto
thestation,but also toredownthestationclock(whichwas running
six hourslate at the time),stampedon it and brokeit in pieces.36
Similarlya few days later, at Maua stationin Sao Paulo, rioters
damagedthe displayboard thatgave the timesof the trains.37The
employeesof the FederalRailwayCompanyseemedwell aware that
theseactionsweresymbolic.AfterthedevastationofVila Roselista-
tionin Rio de Janeiroone employeereportedthat"he immediately
tookoffhiscompanycap, tieand jacketso thathe wouldnotbe recog-
nizedas an employee oftheCentral.Bydoingso hewas able towitness
everything that went on".38
Over and above such symbolicdestruction the passengersthem-
selvesdefinedthetargetof theiractionquiteexplicitly: "I onlyhope
thatGod willblessthemenofgovernment and enlightenthemso that
theywill understandthe situationof the poor", sigheda woman
passenger,infuriatedby the stateof publictransport.39 In political
circlesit was fullyappreciatedthatthe riotshad an ulteriormotive
and meaning.As a candidateof A.R.E.N.A. forthe municipalelec-
tionsof I976 remarked:"the peoplevotefortheoppositionbecause
theythinkthatthegovernment is to blameforthedelays".40One of
thepassengersrecalledthetimeofGetuilioVargaswhen,he asserted,
thepresident wouldhavedismissedthoseresponsible fortheaccident
withintwenty-four hours.41Even thoughimmediateblamemightlie
withtherailwaycompany,it was thusassumedto be thefunctionof
thestateto ensurethatthecompanysatisfied thepublic'sneeds.This
explainsone aspectoftheriotingthatseemedincomprehensible to the
head of the regionaldepartment of the Federal Railway Company
when he exclaimed:"theydestroytheirown means of transport.I
cannotunderstandit!".42The logicof eventsseemedto be thatonly
suchradicalactionas thedestruction ofpublicproperty as a demons-
trationof thelatentor potentialpowerofthecrowdwouldmovethe
authoritiesto takeanyaction.
How thendid the statereactto theseincidents,eitherindirectly,
throughits intermediate agencies,or directly? The Federal Railway
Companyoftenattempted toexplainawaythevariousaccidentsas the
resultof "possiblehumanerror"and,wheneveranyonewas injured,
as a consequenceof theirresponsible stoningof thetrains.The pin-
gentesweresaid to be typicalof"theyouthoftoday,constantly seek-
ing some formof self-affirmation and obsessedwiththe prospectof
36 Ibid., 22 Jan.
1976.
37 Ibid., 27 Jan. 1976.
38Ibid., 23 July I975.
39J1.do Brasil, 27 July 1975.
40 Estado de Sao Paulo,
27 Jan. I976.
41 Ibid.

42Jl. do Brasil, 25 June I975.

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 URBAN TRANSPORT AND POPULAR VIOLENCE IN BRAZIL 187

excitement and adventure";43 theythushad onlythemselves to blame

if theywerekilled.In thisway the railwaycompanytriedto divert
attentionfromitsownresponsibility forthedelaysand theaccidents.
Besides,by explainingaway the accidentsin the way theydid, the
authoritiescoulddenythattheriotsconstituted anysortoflegitimate
collectiveresponse.
A monthafterthetraincollisionin I975 and thesubsequentriot,
therewas anotherincident,thistimecaused bythedelayofan early-
morningtrain.Olinda stationin Rio de Janeirowas destroyed, the
traffic-controlcabin burneddown and the communications system
damaged. Showingconsiderableforesight, "the passengerscut the
telephonewiresconnecting Olinda withtheD. PedroII station,thus
preventing the railmanfromcallingforhelp". Then they"leftfor
Nilopolis station ... and destroyedeverything there". Passengers
waitingat anotherstationon thelineand equallyaffected
bythedelay
also threatened disruption.
Notwithstandingtheprecautionstakenby
the rioters,militarypolice accompaniedby railwaypolice and the
armyquicklyappearedat Nilopolis,thistimearmedwithmachine-
guns.Twelvepeoplewerearrested,"all ofthemworkers".The news-
papersdid notprintanystatements bythosearrested,butdidpublish
theviewoftheheadoftheregionalsecurity department oftheFederal
RailwayCompanythattheriotwas due tothepresencein thecrowdof
"bad elements ... who incite the generallypeaceful passengers".44
On otheroccasionsitwas so-called"subversiveelements"thatwere
Wereitnotfortheseagitators,
responsible. theauthoritiesargued,the
passengerswould go peacefullyon theirway. It is an old trick.By
denyingtheworkingclass theabilityto perceiveitsownsituationand

43Estado de Sao Paulo, 7 Dec. I973. The railwaycompanyspokesmanwho

expressedthis opinion was probablyreferringto what was popularlycalled the
"roletaferroviaria",a testofcouragedemandedbytheClube dos Pingentes(a kindof
youthorganization)as an initiationrequirement:"Originallythe testwas thatthe
candidateshouldleavethetrainbyone ofthecarriagewindows,climbacrosstheroof,
and re-enterthe carriagethrougha windowon theoppositeside,all whilethetrain
was in motion.Later on [and presumablyas applicationsformembership increased!]
thetestbecamemoreelaborateand moredangerous.The candidatehad to leave the
carriagethroughone ofthewindows,climbacrosstheroof,descendon theotherside,
pass underthetrainand re-enter thecarriagethroughthewindowfromwhichhe had
started,all withthetrainin motion":Estado de Sao Paulo, 2 June1974. That living
conditionsofthesortexperienced bytheurbanpoorshouldgenerateviolencedirected
againstthemselvesas wellas othersis,ofcourse,nothingnew.It is also presentin the
actual riots,thoughcertainlynot theircause. If thetrainswerenotovercrowdedin
the firstplace there would be no pingentes,and thereforeno such tendencyto
violence. There is no comparison,it seems to us, betweenthe behaviourof the
pingentesin Rio de Janeiroand Sao Paulo and thatofthefootballfanswhovandalize
trainsin Britain.In the formercase we are dealingin the main withsobercitizens
goingto workin the veryearlymorningor returninghomeexhaustedaftera hard
day's work.
44Estado de Sao Paulo, 5 JuneI975.

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I88 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 86

to respondcollectively
to it,thepoliticalimplications
oftheriotswere
minimized.As one ofthepassengersputit:
neithercattlenor horsestravelin the sortofconditionsthatwe do ... cows need
space; otherwisetheywouldgoreeach other.As faras I know,350,000 peopleuse
this line. Can it be possiblethat theydeserveno respectat all? I am already
ashamedof gettingto worklate.And thentheysay thatwe are ignorant,thatwe
are savages!45
The allegedpresenceof"subversiveelements"also servedto justify
theintervention of thepoliceand themilitary,
and thearrests.If the
authoritieshad everpubliclyadmittedthe "legitimate"characterof
the riots,then militaryand police intervention would have been
difficult
to justify,and the demand for a more efficienttransport
systemwouldbecomeall themorecompelling. But as longas theriots
could be passed offas the workof "bad elements","savages" and
"subversives",policeand militarycouldalwaysbe usedtore-establish
"order".46
The eventsof I975 reached theirpeak with the simultaneous
destruction of no less than nine of the stationsof the Baixada Flu-
minensein Rio de Janeiro.Once againtheimmediate cause oftheriot
was thetotaldisruption of theSta. Cruz and Japerilinesduringthe
morningrush-hour. The riotsoccurredonlytwenty-four hoursafter
twootherstationsin thesamearea,MorroAgudoand Tomas Coelho,
had beendestroyed forpreciselythesamereason.47
It is the familiarpicture.But a new elementnow appeared.The
crowdbecameincreasingly reckless.The firsttwosquads ofmilitary
policeto make theirappearanceat Tomas Coelho weredrivenback
withstones,and two of the policewereinjured.As a resultsecurity
measureswere intensified: "All stationsin the vicinityof the Vila
Militarwereoccupiedbyparatroopers, and military policeand mem-
bersof the railwaycompany'ssecurityserviceoccupiedall strategic
pointson theSta. Cruz line,controlling accessto thestations".48The
crowdwas dispersedwiththe use of truncheons.The presidentof
the FederalRailwayCompany,GeneralMiltonGonqalves,declared
that"the onlyshort-term measurenow possibleis thestrengthening
of security,since nothingcan be done to improvethe transport
45J1. da Tarde, 22 Jan. 1976.
46 The
secretaryofsecurityforthestateof Sao Paulo maintainedthat"the action
ofthecrowdis likea stampede.The one who actuallystartsthestampedeis oftenfar
removedfromtherestoftheherd.Those responsibleare clearlydisruptive elements;
someofthemmightevenhave subversivetendencies":ibid.,27 Jan. 1976. However,
statements bybothpassengersand policedenythatthisis thecase. One passengersaid
it was thefirsttimethathe had heardtheword"agitator",and asked: "Are agitators
peoplewho simplyprotest,or thosewhofollowthem?":Estado de Sao Paulo, 28 Jan.
1976. Anotherpointedlyremarked:"theytalkofsubversion.Thereis no subversion;
pingentesdo notknowwhatsubversionis; someofthemeventhinkitis somekindof
food": ibid.,4 Feb. 1976.
47Estado de Sao Paulo, IO July1975.
48 Ibid.

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 URBAN TRANSPORT AND POPULAR VIOLENCE IN BRAZIL I89
service".49As we have alreadynoted,however,this escalationof
repressiondid not preventanothernine stationsbeing destroyeda
meretwenty-four hourslater.5°
The climaxwas reachedthefollowing weekwitha derailment near
Magno station,on thesamestretch ofline,leaving14 dead and 370 in-
jured:"thepoliceare out in force,together withrailwayand military
police,and also thefirebrigade,air forceand army.Furtherdevasta-
tion of trainsand stationswas fearedbut could now be prevented
thanksto theextensivesecuritymeasuresnow in operation".51
This timethefederalgovernment itselfwas promptedto act,prob-
ablynotso muchas a resultof thisparticularriotbut becauseofthe
possibilityof furtherincidents,giventhegeneralclimateofviolence.
PresidentGeiselcancelleda tripto Alagoasand rushedinsteadto the
FederalRailwayCompany'sheadquartersin Rio. The ineffectiveness
of thevarioussubordinategovernment agenciesto resolvethetrans-
portproblem and the appearance of the president in person,notonly
to showhisconcernaboutthesituationbut to takeaction,reflect the
degreeofpowercentralization in thecountry. This monopolyofpower
by the executivenaturallyservedto strengthen the tendencyof the
workingclassesto blame the stateforthe conditionof publictrans-
port. Also, by such direct intervention, the federal government
effectivelycountenancedthepoliticalpotentialofsuchmassdemons-
trations.Althoughaccordingto someauthorities theriotsshouldnot
have become"a matterforthe police",52significantly the president
summonednot onlythe ministerof transport,the presidentof the
Federal RailwayCompanyand the governor,but also called in the
minister ofjusticeandthecommanders oftheFirstArmyand theFirst
Naval Districts.53What was involvedwas not merelya straight-
forwardadministrative issue but a serioussecurityproblem.The
"people" had at lastsucceededin makingthemselves heard.President
Geisel declared:"I wantimmediatemeasures.The 'people' wantim-
mediatesolutions".54
The crowdsthusriotedagainsttheconditionsofpublictransport in
thehopeofpersuadingthestateto takethenecessarymeasures.In a
sense,therefore, theiractionswereaimedat reform.But one should
also look at thewaythatactual participation in theriotsmighthave
affectedtheperceptionthatthemasseshad of themselves. Collective
49 Ibid.
50Ibid., I JulyI975. The stationswere Deodoro, Austin,Anchieta,Mesquita,
Olinda, Queimados,Nova Iguacu, Morro Agudo and Nil6polis,some of themthe
scene of earlierriots.The stationswereoccupiedby the army,militarypolice and
securityagentsof the railwaycompanywho, however,werestillunable to prevent
riotsat stationsnextto theVila Militar.
51Jl.da Tarde, 19 July1975.
52Archivesof the weeklyjournalMovimento.The reportwas censored.
53J. da Tarde, 19 July1975.
54Ibid.

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I90 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 86

actionofthistypeclearlygoesa longwaytowardsshapingthemasses'
awarenessoftheirpotentialstrength. The numbersinvolvedin eachof
the incidentsrangedfrombetweenthreeand fivethousand.Only a
smallfractionof theseactuallytookpartin theworkofdestruction,
butthesefewweresupported bythewiderconsensusofthecrowdas to
the legitimacyof theiractions.Moreover therewas a clear "demons-
trationeffect"at work.As one passengerin Sao Paulo put it: "The
rulenowis to setfireto things,becausethepresentsituationis simply
unbearable".55 He was referringtotheeventsin Rio thepreviousyear.
Unable to offerany quick and effectivesolutionto the transport
problem,the onlyalternativeleftto the authoritieswas repression.
The passengerjustquotedwas arrestedshortlyafterwards withseven
ofhis"comrades"because,as a stationemployeelaterexplained,"the
situationwas becomingmoreand moretenseand a riotliableto start
fromone hourtothenext,justas ithad in all theotherplaces".56Each
newincidentreinforced thefuturepotentialforrevolt.The actionsof
a singlepassenger,perhapsonewhohappenedtobe moredaringorex-
asperatedthantherest,mightbe enoughto sparkofftheriot.As one
participantin theMaua riotexplainedafterhis arrest:"I got to the
stationwhenthe riotwas alreadywell underway. Sympatheticto
what was goingon I joinedthe crowd,shoutingquebra-quebra...
peopleoutsidethestationalso joinedin".7 Another,arrestedunder
similarcircumstances,describedhisown experienceas follows:
At 5.00 a.m. I wentto thestationtocatchthetrainto PiritubawhereI worked...
whilewaitingforthetrainI wentto thebar fora drink... whenI came back the
riotwas alreadyunderway ... I saw a mulattoof mediumheighttearingdowna
telephoneand kickingit, and decidedto imitatehim . . . thenI was arrested.58
Thereseemedtobe no prearranged plan,butsimilarity
oflivingand
workingconditionsgenerateda commonpurpose:"let us see whether
or not theyhave understoodwhat we want".59Despite the daily
strugglefora placeon thetrains,"whenitactuallycomestogetting on
the train ... the passengershelp each other.They all know one
another,at least by sight",declaredanotherpassenger,"we at least
knowwho belongsto us".60
In I976 Sao Paulo became the principalscene of the riots.The
varioussecuritymeasuresimplemented in Rio de Janeiro,together
withgovernment promisesto improvethesuburbantransport system,
appearto havediscouragedpassengersfromtakinganyfurther action
But in thefirstsix monthsof 1976 Sao Paulo was thesetting
there.61
55Estado de Sao Paulo, 28 Jan. 1976.
56 Ibid.
57Jl. da Tarde,
27 Jan. 1976.
58 Archivesof the
weeklyjournalMovimento.Our italics. This reportwas also
censored.
59J1.da Tarde, 22 Jan. 1976. Our italics.
60 Ibid.
61 Estado de Sao Paulo, I Aug. I975.

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 URBAN TRANSPORT AND POPULAR VIOLENCE IN BRAZIL 191

forno fewerthantenriots.The firstoftheseoccurredat Engenheiro

Trinidade:
thetrainwas overcrowded. As it nearedthestationthepingentesholdingon to the
carriagedoorsbeganto be knockedoff.It was justafter6.oo a.m.... There were
about two thousandpassengerson the platformand theseimmediately began to
riot;theythrewthe railmenout of the station,brokeup the benchesand station
and set fireto theticket-office.
fittings, Whenit was all overthenumberofinjured
was thirty-four.62
The trainhad beenroutedintothestationon an auxiliarytrackand as
a resulttherewas onlya narrowgap betweenthetraincarriagesand a
stationbuildingnextto thetrack.The pingenteshad beenunawareof
this.Accordingto one railwayemployee:"therewerenopingentes left
at thedoorsofthecarriageswhenthetrainstoppedin thestation;first
I heard screams:'look,our comradesare dead, and you do nothing
aboutit' .. .".63A womanexplainedlater:"thepingentesfelloffthe
train on to the track; otherpassengersreactedwith a mixtureof
sorrowand rage; then theydestroyedand set fireto everything".
Beforeactuallystarting theriot,however,thecrowdneverthelessstill
tookthetimetocarrytheinjuredto a safeplace.Onlyaftertwosquads
of thefirebrigadeand tensquads of policehad arrivedwas "order"
finallyre-established.Even thenationalflagflyingabove thestation
had beentorndown.64It was an explosivedemonstration ofpassenger
solidarity.
Five daysaftertheincidentat EngenheiroTrinidade,passengersat
Maua stationalso rioted.Againthepoliceappeared.Two rioterswere
arrested,thistimebeingtakento the D.O.P.S., theheadquartersof
thepoliticalpolice.It was allegedthatmoneyhadbeenstolenfromthe
ticket-officein thecourseoftheriot.The secretary
ofsecurityforSao
Paulo appearedon televisionthatsameeveningwiththewarning:
it shouldbe made clear thatin timeof social disturbancelootingmaybe punished
by execution... so farwe have takenmeasureswhichare essentiallyonlypreven-
tivein nature.We have occupiedsomeof the stations,and we have tried,and are
stilltrying,to discoverthe people responsible,communistsympathizers, who go
aroundtryingtotakeadvantageofthesuffering masses.You haveno reasonto fear
US .. .65

The newpresident oftheFederalRailwayCompany,ColonelStanley

FortesBatista,perhapsmorerealistically,madepublican emergency
planfortheimprovement ofSao Paulo's suburbantransport
system.66
Universidadede Sao Paulo JoseAlvaroMoises
UniversidadeEstadual de Campinas VerenaStolcke

62J1. da Tarde, 22 Jan. I976.

63 Estado de Sao Paulo, 22
Jan. 1976.
64J1. da Tarde, 22 Jan. I976.
65
Speech on the T.V. programme"Gazeta" in Sao Paulo, publishedin Movi-
mento, 2 Feb. I976.
66
J. da Tarde, 27 Jan. I976.

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192 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 86

POSTSCRIPT
The firstdraftofthisarticlewascompleted inJune1976.Sincethat
timethestateof suburbantransport in Rio de Janeiroand Sao Paulo
has changedverylittle.67 Delays,breakdowns and accidentscontinue
as before.The elaboratemeasuresforensuringpublicorderhavenot
succeededin preventing renewedoutbreaksofviolence,and transport
riotshavebecomepractically endemicin thetwocitiessinceI974. For
thisreasontheanalysispresentedin thispaperhas to be open-ended.
Riots are an importantaspect of the growingpoliticaltensionsin
Brazil. Anyeffectiveimprovement notonlyin publictransport butto
publicservicesgenerallywould requirenothingless than the refor-
mulationof thegovernment's economicpriorities and thisseemsun-
likelyforthe timebeing.Some modification of the presentpolitical
systemto allow greaterpopular participationin the processesof
government, whichwouldcontribute to theeasingof thesetensions,
seemsequally unlikely,thoughpoliticalreformalong theselinesis
being urgedwithgrowinginsistenceby different sectorsof society.
It is doubtfulwhetherpoliticalliberalismon its own, withoutany
corresponding improvement in livingstandards,would have the de-
siredeffectof neutralizingpopulardiscontent. As regardsthetrans-
the
portproblem, onlypossible solutionsfor thetimebeingappearto
be stopgapmeasuresand thetightening of "security".The following
statementis perhapsrevealing.O Estado de Sdo Paulo reportedin
June I977 that the designof a new subwayline to servethe low-
incomesuburbsofSao Paulo "has beenespeciallyadaptedto meetthe
particular characteristicsof the passengers who will use it ... The
carriageshave been reinforced
againsttheinevitablevandalismthat
willoccur,sincethesepassengershave a lowerstandardoflivingand
less educationthanthosewho travelon theotherlines".68

67 The emergencymeasuresimplemented by the Federal Railway Company in

1976 succeededin reducing"the averagedelays[in the Baixada Fluminense]from
thirtyminutesto tenminutes;70 percentof thetotalof6 I 2 trainsare nowin opera-
tion,comparedwithonly52 percentlastyear". However,overthissameperiod"the
average numberof passengersper monthhas increasedfrom8-5 millionto I2 mil-
lion". Estado de Sdo Paulo, 15 JuneI976.
68Ibid., 7 JuneI977.

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