1

Néstor Luis Cordero

Concerning a suggested new arrangement of Parmenides' fragments

As we know, an arrangement of recovered quotations of Parmenides was

proposed in 1795 by Georg G. Fülleborn, the first author who devoted a (short) book1
entirely to the thought of the philosopher. Only minimal corrections were made to the
order he proposed2 and for that reason we can understandably speak today of an
"orthodox" or "canonical" version (that which is an exception among the pre-
Socratics, whose texts are readable ad libitum by the researcher).
However, a detailed (or even superficial) reading of Parmenides' quotations
would show that the order proposed by Fülleborn is completely arbitrary, even if it
may be clearly justified by Fülleborn’s own philosophy that adopts the Kantian3
gnoseological separation of the senses and reason. Fülleborn divides the Poem (apart
from a Proemium) in two “parts”: the Truth and the Doxa, taking his cues from
Simplicius’ interpretation. As we know, this organization resulted from Aristotle
erroneously attributing to Parmenides a “physics” that he himself criticizes as the
opinions of “men who know nothing.” This version of the Poem, while coherent if
following the line of Kantian criticism, is anachronistic and inappropriate in regards to
Parmenides himself.
Given the above considerations, any attempt to modify the order of the
“canonical version” is welcome,4 as is the case for Christopher John Kurfess’ book,
Restoring Parmenides' Poem: Essays toward a New Arrangement of the Fragments
Based on a Reassessment of the Original Sources (University of Pittsburg, 2012). The
work is extremely precise and subtle, but as the term "toward" in the title suggests, it
never really arrives at its goal. While Kurfess “restores” the so-called “fragment 1”
thanks to a vigorous (but questionable, as we shall see) defense of Sextus Empiricus'

1
Die Fragmente des Parmenides, Zullichau, 101 pages
2
In 1810, it was necessary to add three new verses, the current fr. 19.
3
We can even trace Fülleborn’s Kantian ties back to a book he wrote on Kant’s philosophy: Immanuel Kant.
Nebst einigen Bemerkungen über die Kantische Philosophie (1880).
4
See N.L.Cordero, "The 'Doxa of Parmenides'Dismantled', Ancient Philosophy, XXX, 2, 2010.
 2

version and offers a complete panorama of Simplicius’ interpretation, he fails to

propose a "new arrangement of Fragments." But we can already assume that the new
arrangement that could arise from the work of Kurfess would not differ significantly
from the "orthodox version" given that he shares its main defect: the introduction of
“parts” into the Poem.5 How can we know that the Poem had “parts” if Parmenides
does not mention them? The problem comes to the fore particularly in the "Doxa" or
"Second Part" section in which he, as did Fülleborn, places nine fragments (fr. 9 to
18),6 six of which have nothing to do with “Doxa.”
In this paper I will focus on only (A) Kurfess’ detailed analysis of Sextus'
version of the so-called "fragment 1", and (B) his theory on "the truth of the Doxa."7

(A) After having announced that "Thus began the Poem of Parmenides" (Adv.
Math. VII, 111), Sextus Empiricus quotes thirty-six authentic verses, thirty of which
are known as Proemium in the version considered today as orthodox, while five are
part of fr. 7, and one verse, somewhat modified, is the first line of fr. 8. As the
ordering of the nineteen quotations recovered from Parmenides (which today
constitute "the Poem") took place only at the end of the 18th century, Sextus obviously
could not take this into account; nevertheless, with respect to the thirty-six verses he
cited, he "provides no indication that the lines quoted are anything other than an
unbroken, continuous passage."8 According to Kurfess, fervent defender of Sextus'
version, this demonstrates "the unity of the quotation."9
It is undeniable that the passage, as quoted by Sextus, is, in itself, very
coherent. If other quotations from the Poem were lost, readers would find in Sextus’
version the central points of Parmenides' philosophy: the necessity, for anyone moved
by their thumós to become an "eidòs phós." In other words, the need to know the heart
5
"The relationship between the two major parts of Parmenides' poem, the Aletheia or 'Way of Truth' and the
'Way of Opinion' or Doxa, is one of the central questions of Parmenidean scholarship" (Kurfess, op.cit., p. 123).
The issue here is not "the relationship" between the two "parts", but its existence.
6
Kurfess criticizes our assertion that, except the fr. 1, it is impossible to known the place of the eighteen
quotations remaining (By Being, It Is: The Thesis of Parmenides, Las Vegas, Parmenides Publishing, 2004,
p.16). Kurfess says: "the sources that quote them give us at least some relatively explicit indication of the place
they occupied for nine of them" (op. cit., p. 4). Is precisely this submission to the interpretation of Simplicius as
a faithful source, the parti pris which invalidates all possible "new Arrangement" of quotations.
7
Title of the second part of the book.
8
Kurfess, op.cit. p. 18.
9
One Section of Kurfess' works is "The Unity of Sextus' Quotation" (pp. 43-50).
 3

of the truth but also the unreliable opinions of mortals. The relationship between
versos 1.30 (referring to the opinions) and the verse that Sextus quotes immediately
after (today, 7.2) ("put away your thought from this way of research") clearly shows
that the way to avoid is, precisely, the way of the doxai.
However, apart from the passages of the Poem quoted by Sextus, others were
conserved that allow us to have a very rough idea of the philosophy of Parmenides. If
the passage quoted by Sextus really is “a unit” and not a collage of different texts, at
least two problems arise that invalidate the thesis of the continuity of the quotation: (a)
the location of the other remaining texts of the Poem that have been preserved and,
fundamentally, (b) the inconsistency of the text of Sextus with the Poem as a whole.
Concerning (a), there are two possibilities: (a') In verse 36, if the thumós of
Sextus' version is mistaken and we assume that he wrote mûthos,10 as Simplicius did,
then nothing would have prevented the current fr. 7 (the end of Sextus’ version) to
continue normally with the first verse of fr. 8, followed by the texts known as fr. 9 to
19, as seen in the unanimously accepted orthodox reconstruction of the Poem. But
what to do with fr. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6? Placing them before the text quoted by Sextus
would be impossible, as would after the fr. 8.51 due to the fact that, according to the
canonical reconstruction of the text, "The Doxa" begins in 8.51. Sextus' version of the
Proem places these fragments in no-man's-land.
In case (a"), if Sextus really wrote mûthos and his quotation ends in leípetai,
the question about the location of fragments 2 to 6 extends to fr. 7 and 8.
Nevertheless, case (b) is more serious, because it does not respect the "logic" of
Parmenides, that is, the novelty introduced by him in the field of philosophy, and
permits the suggestion of a certain order in the reading of some quotations (because it
is evident that some texts must necessarily come before or after others). This does not
occur with other pre-Socratics authors. No one can object to Sextus' version of the 1.1-
30 set. But in the next verse, 1.31, Parmenides would say (according to Sextus) that it

10
The difference between moûnos (Simplicius, codd. D, E) and mónos (Sextus), which Kurfess emphasizes, is
not significant, since mónos also appears in the cod. F of Simplicius. Moreover D and E are not, as Kurfess said
"the 'better' manuscripts" (op.cit. p. 27): the 'quality' of D, E and F is the same.
 4

is necessary to distance oneself from this way of inquiry (hodoû dizésios), namely the
opinions. This order would be incomprehensible to a reader of the thirty previous
verses, in which nothing is said of a way of inquiry. Parmenides, with his "logic,"
presents it for the first time in the current fr. 2, apparently using a word11 of his own
invention, derived from the verb dízemai12.
The reader of the Proem also doesn’t know that two possible ways of inquiry
can be taken for thinking13 (eisi noêsai) (ways presented also in the fr. 2); that is why
the nóema must depart from the route in question, as Sextus says in verse 1.32.
Further, according to Sextus’ version, Parmenides urges his disciple not to be
influenced by inveterate habit, nor to use the eyes that do not see and ears that resonate
(line 7.6). But this warning makes no sense without knowledge of the current fr. 6 that
states the customs of men consist in using a nóos that wanders with blind eyes
(tuphloí) and deaf ears (kophoí). Sextus' text, from verse 31 to the end, presents the
conclusion of a process that Parmenides announced in fr. 2 and 6, that must
necessarily precede the last verses of Sextus' quotation. It is probably for this reason
that W. Kranz separated them.
And, finally, in verse 1.34 of Sextus' version (today, 7.5) Parmenides spoke of
an élegkhos "already told,"14 and nothing of the sort is contained in the thirty-three
preceding verses of the Proem.15
Sextus' quotation ends with an autonomous phrase: mónos d'eti thumòs hodoîo
leípetai. In the version of Simplicius (which, according to Kurfess, belongs to another
context), the text is not autonomous. Instead, it alludes to the mûthos remaining:
mónos d'eti mûthos hodoîo leípetai, hos ésti. In Sextus' version, however, a way was
deleted, making the only remaining way the one of thumós. Kurfess opts for the

11
Cf. A.P.D. Mourelatos: "The noun dízesis appears to be Parmenides' own coinage" (The Route of Parmenides,
2nd ed., Parmenides Publishing, 2008, p. 67)
12
R. Bett, translator of Sextus, is of the same opinion: the last verses cited "come from a different point in the
poem (after the two "roads of inquiry" have been introduced and one has been dismissed)", (Sextus Empiricus:
Against the Logicians, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 24, n. 49).
13
The ways are presented "to think" (eisi noêsai, aorist final infinitive). A mistake shared by 99% of the works
devoted to Parmenides interpreted the passage as if the ways were "noetai", "thinkable".
14
According to W.J. Verdenius, Parmenides refers to ' 'the proof which I have uttered' i.e., which I have given
you" (Parmenides, Groningen, 1942, p. 64), and A.P.D. Mourelatos supports this position: "the aorist rhethénta
clearly shows that the élegkhos have already been delivered" (op. cit., p. 91, n. 46).
15
At this point we partake some of the arguments of L. Tarán (Parmenides, Princeton, 1965, pp. 21-2).
 5

translation of R. Bett, the dark and enigmatic phrase "spirit of a road."16 But is it the
road that the traveler took, driven by his thumós, as we read in 1.1? It doesn’t seem so:
this path is actually the goddess' way rather than a "spirit of the road." As it is most
likely that verses 1.28-36 in Sextus’ version reproduce the 1.28-30 verses + current
7.2-6 in that of Simplicius (without 1.31-2 and 7.1), it is plausible that mónos/moûnos
d'eti thumós/mûthos hodoîo leípetai is the same line transmitted in two versions: both
in a version that allows for a consistent read (mûthos) and in a corrupt version
(thumós) that can be attributed to Sextus himself, its source, or later copyists.17 One
final snag: if Sextus’ version, mónos d' éti thumós hodoîo leípetai, was in the original
text, why does Simplicius, who possesses said text,18 never quote it?
In the debate over the relevance or the inconsistency of the thirty-six verses
cited by Sextus, some of the same verses quoted by Simplicius (and, partially, Proclus)
have great importance. According to Kurfess - this is the core of his interpretation -
there are no two (divergent) quotations of the same passage, but two quotations taken
from different passages, which is explained by the Parmenidean trend of “repetitions”:
“Moreover, given Parmenides' manifest repetitiousness, it seems perfectly possible
that the lines found in Simplicius and Proclus that are similar (but not identical) to
verses 28-30 of Sextus' quotation came from elsewhere in the poem" (p. 50). Let's
consider, then, the text (The same? Two different texts?) quoted simultaneously by
Sextus and Simplicius, and the aforementioned "repetitions."
The text common to Sextus and Simplicius begins in 1. 28b and is substantially
identical in both cases until 1.30. Then come the differences. In Sextus' version, 1.31-6
correspond, in the canonical order in use today, to fr. 7.2-7. Simplicius, for his part,
cites two lines after 1.30 (in his version, 1.31-2) that do not appear in Sextus, and he
does not add new verses.19 Verses 1.28-30 were also cited, both totally and partially,
by Diogenes Laertius, Clement, Plutarch and Proclus. To summarize the status

16
R. Bett, loc.cit.
17
"No reasonable doubt is possible that thumós in Sextus' quotation [...] is an error for mûthos and that the lines
are identical with the first words of fr.8 as cited by Simplicius" (A.H. Coxon, The Fragments of Parmenides,
Assen, 1986, p. 193)
18
See later, see note 22.
19
In other passages Simplicius wrote the first two verses of the current fr. 7. Sextus is again the only source of
verses 3 to 7 of fr. 7, in his version, 1.32-6.
 6

quaestionis regarding the Proem, we can say that Sextus is the only source of verses
1.1-28a (and also of the current fr. 7.3-6), and Simplicius of verses 1.31-2 (while 1.
28b-30 were cited by both and, partially, by those authors just mentioned).
A way of trying to justify the unity of Sextus' version (36 verses) relies on
affirming that he and Simplicius cited different passages; that is why the text of the
latter has two verses not quoted by Sextus, and 31.7 (in Sextus' version) and 8.1 (in
Simplicius version, [mónos/moûnos or mûthos/thumós variants]) do not coincide. This
hypothesis, which is based on the Parmenidean custom of repeating certain terms and
sometimes whole expressions,20 is invalid because (a) it would be unimaginable that in
this case Parmenides had repeated three entire (1.28-30) verses taken by Sextus from
another context. This is the hypothesis of Kurfess, and he accuses H. Diels of not
having thought of this possibility: in Diels version is "absent the idea that these lines
might have been repeated within the poem itself" (p. 23). In support of the existence of
two different passages with the same content, Kurfess said that the adjective
eupeithéos, accompanied in Sextus by the word alétheie, is found in other authorities
(e.g., Clement, Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius), and the presence of eupheggéos in
Proclus and eukukléos in Simplicius is explained by their quoting different passages
(ergo, it is a case of "repetition").
This reason is not valid. If every time a passage of the Poem presents two
different sections (even when if it is difficult to explain the origin of the divergence)
we assume that it is a case of "repetition" (i.e. quotations corresponding to different
locations), the Poem would extend to infinity. In the case presented by Kurfess (the
adjectives accompanying alétheie, 1.29), the reason of the difference is simply the
existence of two models, one followed by Sextus, Clement, Diogenes Laertius and
Plutarch (and nothing can confirm that it was a truthful model) and another followed
by Simplicius (since Proclus' reading, which makes no sense, seems due to a quotation
"from memory"21 or an error). Simplicius, who has the text of the Poem,22 surely
knows the current fr. 5 ("It is for me common where I begin, for there I will return

20
See especially Kurfess, op.cit., p 23.
21
It is the thesis of A.H. Coxon, op.cit., p. 168.
22
Simplicius is proud to quote a text that he owns and which is already 'rare' (spain) in his time (Phys. 144.28).
Was it a "complete" text? We don’t' know.
 7

again"), which is the expression of a circular process. Nothing would seem more
natural, then, to conserve eukukléos in the model he was copying given its congruity
with aleteheíe in Parmenides. Kurfess argues that those who are in favor of the
Simplicius’ version are forced to "choose between competing adjectives" (p. 26)23 to
qualify alétheia. Exactly the same happens in many passages of the Poem (the most
significant verse in this regard is 8.4), and this does not presuppose reiterations, but
different sources, among which the election takes place. Finally, Kurfess argues that if
Sextus, Proclus and Simplicius had cited the same passage, neither eukukléos
(Simplicius) nor eupheggéos (Proclus) caused the corruption of eupeithéos (Sextus), or
vice versa.24 The argument is invalid because, aside from Sextus, if Simplicius and
Proclus cited the same passage (which, according to Kurfess, is different from the one
quoted by Sextus), this would not explain the corruption of eukukléos in eupheggéos,
or vice versa. The issue here is not corruption, but one of different models of the same
passage.
But, what’s more, (b), the numerous reiterations that are detected in Parmenides
are not literally identical. It is true that 1.1 is repeated almost word for word in 1.25,
but the change in pronoun ("you" instead of "I") is decisive. The same occurs with 6.3
(prótes gár t'aph' hodoû taútes dizésios […]) and 7.2 (têsd' aph' hodoû dizésios eírgo)
whose similarity deceived even H. Diels. He did not see that the taútues of 6.3 alluded
to the way of truth (ésti gàr eînai, medén, d'ouk éstin, 6.1-2) and the têsd' of 7.2
referred to the path of the opinion (eînai mè eónta, 7.1), but posited the same verb
(eírgo) in 7.2 for the lacuna in 6.3. In other words, sometimes repetition hides an
opposition.
As we can see, it is only towards the end of the Proem that the question of
priority between Sextus’ version (36 verses, including 6 of the current fr.7) and that of
Simplicius becomes prevalent. Above we pointed out the inconsistencies arising from
Sextus' version with respect to the entire Poem. This does not occur with Simplicius'
version, which adds two verses (1.31-2), suggesting that Sextus' verses 1.31-6 must

23
Not without some optimism Kurfess adds that "When we cease to regard the verses quoted by Sextus and
Simplicius as quotations from the same portion of the poem, the difficulty of choosing between their respective
readings disappears" (p.26).
24
Kurfess, op. cit., p. 29.
 8

come later. For this reason, we do not hesitate in preferring Simplicius’ version.
According to Kurfess, the two verses added by Simplicius "turned a coherent passage
into an awkward one" (p. 26). It is actually the opposite: the verses "added" by
Simplicius (1.31-2) continue and complete the reasoning interrupted by Sextus in 1.30.
This passage affirmed that opinions must also be learned, even though they are not
reliable, and verse 1.31, added by Simplicius, explains why: "however (all'empes) this
also must be learned: how tà dokoûnta...."25. Without this addition, the reader would
not know why he must learn something that isn't real or convincing.
After presenting what is to be learned by the future philosopher (1.29-30),
Sextus' version, alternatively, quotes a verse (currently, fr. 7.2) which seems to refer to
the previous one (têsd' aph' hodou, quoted in 1.30: the way of the doxaí). However, in
the preceding context (verses 1.1-30), Parmenides had never identified the doxaí with
a hodós. The notion of a way or path, which appears five times in the Proem, never
regarded the "opinions." This detail shows that either Sextus, of his own accord, or his
source, decided to present a summary of the Poem which, as mentioned above, may
respect its general sense, but omits details that would be considered necessary a priori
according to the logic of Parmenides. In short, as stated by L. Tarán, "we possess
enough evidence in the fragments themselves to reject Sextus' arrangement."26
There is one detail that even further weakens Sextus' version. It is hard to
imagine that Sextus did not know the Sophist of Plato, yet on two occasions (237a and
258d) Plato quotes, as does Sextus, the verse têsd' aph' hodoû dizésios eírge nóema
(currently 7.2), preceding it with ou gàr mépote toûto damêi: eînai mè eónta (currently
7.1), which is curiously not included in Sextus' version.27 It seems that in the Poem
both verses go together as a set. Two times Simplicius quotes only the second verse
(7.2) (Phys. 76.8 and 650.13), but in three other places, when discussing the Sophist,
he cites the whole set (7.1-2) (Phys. 135.21, 143.31 and 244.1). It is true that some

25
If they were not related to 1.30, 1.31-2 could be located also after the fr. 6 or at the end of the fr. 8
26
L. Tarán, op.cit, p. 21.
27
Kurfess holds on several occasions (see below) that Sextus uses a Stoic source, but the argument that proposes
to justify the absence of 1.31 is not acceptable: "I think that the omission is indeed remarkable and that the line
was intentionally omitted because it was inconvenient for the Stoic reading of the lines that follow". In this
respect is exactly the opposite: located after 1.29, where opinions are criticized because they do not possess
pístis alethés, 1.30 would show that this occurs because the opinions argue something unsustainable: that mé
eónta, einai.
 9

modern commentators doubted the authenticity of verse 7.1 (as is the case of
Fülleborn, for whom 7.1 is "prosaica non nulla Parmenidis dicta"28), but in ancient
times its authenticity was probably not questioned, since it is cited by Aristotle (Met.
N.2.1089a4) and Pseudo-Alexander (Com. ad.loc, p.805). Of course, it can be argued
that these authors took the verses from Plato, but in any case, we don’t know why
Sextus or his source ignored the current verse 7.1.
If, as we believe, Sextus relies upon (or himself penned) a summary of the
Poem, where the text passed directly from the Proem to the current fr. 7, placing 7.2
immediately after 1.30 respects the coherence of Parmenides' thought since the
rejection of têsd' aph' hodoû dizésios (7.2) refers, in the summary, to the “unreliable”
opinions (1.30), and, in the original (omitted by Sextus), to the negative way which
maintains eînai mè eónta (7.1). But, despite this detail, Sextus' version does not escape
the objections already noted, and we share in this respect the severe opinion of Jaap
Mansfeld: Sextus' version "is in fact a patchwork, combining passages from different
sections of the Poem and omitting crucial lines in the Proem."29
A mystery is waiting to be solved. If we believe, alongside Mansfeld and Tarán,
that Sextus elaborated (or uses) a summary of the Poem, why then, would he add the
verses of fr. 7 that criticize the use of the senses to the end of the Proem (1.30)? We
need not go very far to find the answer. Stoic influence was always detected in the
comments that Sextus uses to complete his extensive quotation. Even Kurfess
mentions, on numerous occasions, "the Stoic source." It is understandable given the
context that a conflict between two criteria of truth, the logos and the senses, was
interpreted in Parmenides. As observed by M.J. Latona,30 this explains why after
mentioning the need to also inform oneself of opinion (1.29), Sextus, or his source,
added a passage with verses taken from elsewhere that describes such opinions as a

28
Fülleborn, op.cit., p. 98. S. Karsten, wrote that 7.1 is a "sententiam Parmenideam Platonis verbis expresam"
(Philosophorum graecorum veterum praesertim qui ante Platone floruerunt operum reliquiae, Vol I, Pars
Altera: Parmenidis, Amsterdam, 1835, p.81) and F.Riaux placed 7.1-2 in the section REMATA PARMENIDE
ANATETHENTA (Essai sur Parmenide d' Élée, Paris, 1840, p. 230).
29
J. Mansfeld, in Long, A. A. The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1999, p. 39.
30
"Sextus appends six additional lines (DK fr. 7.2-6, 8.1-2), which are now generally accepted to have originally
appeared in a different context in the poem, but were moved by Sextus to reinforce his point about sensation and
reason" (M.J. Latona, "Reining in the Passions: The Allegorical Interpretation of Parmenides B Fragment 1",
The American Journal of Philology, 129, 2008, p. 201)
 10

consequence of using the senses as a guide. In this sense, we can underline the
opposition between the impulses álogous (of the soul), represented in Sextus'
commentary by the mares, and the passage in which Parmenides encourages judgment
via logos (7.5).

(B) Nearly half of Kurfess’ work is devoted to the study of the Doxa - which,
since recent years, is the subject à la mode in Parmenidean studies - and his starting
point is a violent but rigorous criticism of the positions put forth in my scholarship in
several works,31 particularly arguments concerning the difference I establish between
the Doxa and a real "Parmenidean physics."32 The controversy is justified, since the
status of the doxaí is a fundamental point for an understanding of the philosophy of
Parmenides.
Kurfess presents his study of the doxai in keeping with the general theme of his
book: an attempt at rearranging the fragments of Parmenides. But already from the
start, his monumental work has a defect: the criteria used in his attempt to reassess the
original sources.
When a researcher is confronted with many recovered quotations of a pre-
Socratic philosopher, before even being able to study them, he must put together this
puzzle in some certain way. As the order of the pieces can’t just be random, there must
be some proposed criterion for any shot at reconstructing the lost work. When this is
possible, the researcher should look for the criteria in the quotations themselves,
which, in some cases, offer certain suggestions.33 But in most cases, the criterion
proposed by ancient commentators is usually adopted given how much more material
they have on these philosophers than we do. The commentators are privileged
especially because they have (almost always) the advantage of possessing the original
texts, although in general they are not contemporaries of the philosophers they discuss,

31
My name is cited 255 times in little more than 73 pages, that is, to an average of almost four times per page
(!).
32
Cf. N.L. Cordero “Parmenidean ‘Physics’ is not part of what Parmenides calls ‘doxa’, in N.L. Cordero (ed.)
Parmenides, Venerable and Awesome (Plato, Theaetetus 183e). Proceedings of the international symposium,
Buenos Aires, October 29-November 2, 2007, Parmenides Publishing, 2011.
33
After many years of titanic work, Seguei Mouraviev proposed a reconstruction of “the book" of Heraclitus.
 11

with even some writing over a Millennium later. Nevertheless, their points of view are
considered virtually as voces deorum.
We do not share this prejudice. The essential difference between an authentic
text, even a brief one, exposing the real thought of the author, and a commentator,
interpreting the text, tends to be devalued by historians. But it is evident that the
enormous prestige of the first commentators (for example, Aristotle) can lead to
subsequent commentators (for example, Simplicius) adopting the point of view of
their teacher with respect to the text of the philosopher. In the case of Parmenides, for
example, in a curious passage from the Commentary on Aristotle’s De Caelo (558.12)
– which we will get to later - Simplicius reproaches the authentic text of Parmenides
(that he just quoted) because it does not correspond with the interpretation of
Aristotle!34
If the purpose of Kurfess is to rearrange Parmenides' fragments, he should have
begun by questioning (and, as a result, abandoning) the criteria used to establish the
canonical version of the Poem. Fülleborn, a subtle and intelligent researcher, found in
Simplicius a presentation of Parmenides which was, according to him, a true precursor
of his own Kantian frameworks. He put the recovered quotations in a certain order
based upon this criterion. There is nothing to reproach in his work. But as long as this
criterion remains unquestioned, any re-arrangement of the fragments will be not only
partial but also practically nonexistent. This is the case of Kurfess’ important work,
which only "re-arranges" fr.1, and advances the current fr. 7 to the place where it had
been placed by Sextus. He himself confesses: "I do not find fault with the placement
of DK 10, 11, or any of the other fragments generally assigned to the Doxa (including
DK 16) […] The totality of the ancient evidence supports the placement of these
fragments in the latter part of the poem" (p. 165). In reality, it is the value of the
"ancient evidence" that should be investigated.
A "reassessment of the original sources," as he proposed, should have begun by
analyzing the origin of Simplicius’ interpretation, which, as far as the doxaí is

34
Mutatis mutandis, the commentary of Simplicius will find an echo in 1611, when the priest Théodore Bussé
respond to the Jesuit and astronomer Christoph Scheiner, who, at the same time as Galileo, discovered the
existence of sunspots, that they are due to an error in his telescope, because Aristotle said never anything like.
 12

concerned, is Aristotle. This way, Kurfess would have seen that Aristotle makes a
large reading error (not one of interpretation), which places Parmenides in a platonic
system (which Plato himself had refused, as we shall see!). From there Simplicius (and
those who, via Theophrastus, also partake in his reading) builds a consistent,
systematic, attractive, yet anachronistic, building that he himself questions in a
moment of lucid reflection. This is the main defect of Kurfess' method since all of the
sources he cites are from Neoplatonic commentators who interpret (and even cite)
Parmenides according to Platonic frameworks or commentators dependent either
directly or indirectly upon Aristotle.
Prioritizing the few passages devoted to Parmenides by Plato in the Sophist
would have been essential given their overall inestimable value already. As would
have noting Aristotle’s notorious inaccuracy, not only because it attributes to
Parmenides precisely what he criticizes, but also because of its reach given its
repetition by the whole philosophical tradition dependent upon Aristotle’s work.
Starting from his oversight of Plato’s testimony, and his almost sacred respect for
Aristotle’s point of view (which is not an interpretation, which would have been
tolerated, but just an error), one can see how a solid and coherent thesis could be
elaborated. But upon questioning such foundations, it falls apart.
Before we discuss the origin of Simplicius-Fülleborn-Kurfess' criterion, we
must ask ourselves: can one find in Parmenides himself a "Parmenidean" criterion
from which to organize the fragments? One can indeed. In the panorama of pre-
Socratic philosophers, Parmenides is an exception, since, from the beginning of his
work (the extensive quotation of Sextus, whether 30 or 36 verses) sets out its "working
plan." Anyone who wants to become an eidòs phós must be informed both of the
nucleus of the truth and of the opinions of mortals. These two ways (hodoí) of looking
at reality, or, if we prefer, at phúsis, at pánta tà ónta, materialize in (a) a persuasive
speech (lógos) accompanying (or which is accompanied by35) truth (2.4) (and,
therefore, reliable, pistón), as well as an ability to think about truth (8.50); and (b) in
the opinions of mortals, in which there is no real certainty (1.30), expressed by a set of
misleading words (8.52). In any case, Parmenides refers to the "object" of the truth

35
In the verse 2.4 usually is followed Bywater's conjecture (teste Diels) aletheíe instead of the original aletheíei.
 13

and of the opinions, because, obviously, it is the same: reality. The distinction is
gnoseological, not ontological.
Given this project, the criterion to order the quotations is as follows: the
passages which contain true, reliable, and persuasive statements must be located
before verse 50 of fr. 8, since the true logos ends at this point, and the texts on
"opinions" should be placed after. But the texts concerning opinions are only the
current fr. 8.51-62, fr. 9, fr.12 and fr. 19, texts in which Parmenides himself speaks of
dóxa and presents a doxical (ergo, deceitful) physics.
The criterion followed by Simplicius-Fülleborn-Kurfess is also found within a
gnoseological point of view, but is based on ontological grounds which do not exist in
Parmenides: being, on the one hand, and appearances (or phenomena), on the other,
ergo, "the" intelligible accessed by intellect, and "the" sensible, by the senses.
Parmenides has nothing to do with this dichotomy. Kurfess' virulent criticism of my
position, which has been developed over the course of several works, results from a
misunderstanding.36 On several occasions I have argued that the difference between
senses and thought, if referring to the way of capturing different degrees of reality,
cannot be found before Sophistry. It is clear that, in order to explain reality, human
beings always use senses and/or thinking (surely there are examples of this already in
Homer). In the field of philosophy, this is clearly seen in Xenophanes (fr. 34) and
Heraclitus (fr. 56, 28a). But this does not mean that there is, on the one hand, a
intelligible "being" only captured by thought, and on the other, appearances, objects of
the senses. To overcome Sophistry, Plato invented this dichotomy; Parmenides
predates him. In Parmenides there is no dichotomy between “being (intelligible)” and
“appearances (sensible).” The reality is only one and to explain it, one must follow a
method. If senses and thought drift about, they fall into a vicious circle.
The dualism noetá-aisthetá that presides and runs through the totality of
Simplician interpretation (and reappears in Fülleborn-Kurfess), does not exist in
Parmenides.37 For him, there are no two levels of existence: reality is, or it is not.

36
See Kurfess, op.cit. p 147 n. 60
37
B.M. Perry says the opposite: "The obvious precursor for the antithesis, at any rate, is Parmenides, who rigidly
distinguishes being from seeming or opinion in his Poem" (Simplicius as a Source for and an Interpreter of
Parmenides, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1983, p. 111)
 14

There are no intermediaries between being and not-being, as erroneously stated by

Kurfess (“Dóxa occupies just such a middle ground. They possess 'seeming being':
they fall short of the fullest reality, but are still something more than utter non-being”,
p. 14338). Kurfess repeats almost word for word the Platonic definition of the doxastón
of the Republic (478d7).
If we said that the analysis of the sources by Kurfess should have begun with
Plato it was because he is not only the first "commentator" of (and also someone that
quotes) Parmenides, but also because he said clearly that his own dichotomy “being
(=Forms)” versus “appearances” does not exist in the Elean. Plato states this so clearly
in the Sophist. If, as it has just been demonstrated (in the previous discussion of the
dialogue) the sophist is a manufacturer of images and appearances, it must then be
shown that, in addition to "being," there are also appearances (tò phaínesthai) and
opinions (tò dokeîn) without being (326e1). But Plato says that Parmenides had not
admitted it, because it would suppose that not-being exists (tò mè òn eînai) (237a3),
which Parmenides denied. For Plato, the most ancient source of Parmenides' thought,
there is no room for appearances in his philosophy. It is curious that Simplicius, who
on several occasions discusses the Sophist (though never this passage) has not seen
this commentary.
As we know, everything changes with Aristotle, who, more papist than the
Pope, applies to Parmenides the khorismós of Plato, a dichotomy which Plato himself
had not found in Parmenides. When Aristotle discusses the Parmenidean "being," he
always considers him as monistic (sometimes accompanied by Melissus). However, he
adds something new in a passage in Metaphysics: "[Parmenides], forced to follow
phenomena, (anagkazómenos d' akoloutheîn toîs phainómenois), and having affirmed
that, according to lógos, [being] is one, while, according to sensations, it is multiple,
supposed two causes and two principles, heat and cold, i.e., fire and earth. He placed
one, heat, as being, and on the other, as not-being" (Met. 986b31). This is the birth of a
dichotomous Parmenides, simultaneous supporter of the intelligible One-being and the

38
"They are 'appearances' [...] (or phainomena in Greek) occupying a spectrum ranging from things that may
appear to be merely of a certain sort (while not really being so) to it is apparent that things are so (i.e., things that
manifestly, obviously, patently, are so) "(op.cit. " (p. 144)
 15

sensible phenomena, author not only of a theory about being but also of a dualistic
explanation of appearances.
Although Aristotle used neither the word "doxa," nor the “mortals” and “men”
formula, it is clear that the quoted passage is a summary of the verses 53 to 59 of the
fr. 8 of Parmenides, and the addition of "being" and "not-being" could be an echo of
fr. 8.40 ("…they are just names... as being and not [to be]")." Why did Aristotle give
credit to Parmenides for a theory that Parmenides himself attributed to "others," a
mass without criteria (ákrita phûla), not only blind and deaf, but also with wandering
thoughts, victim to custom, and, fundamentally, who knows nothing (cf. fr. 6 and 7)?
We will never know.
If, for the moment, we leave aside the problem of copyright of the authors of
the theory, we can perhaps explain the cause of Aristotle’s error. The arkhaí to which
Aristotle refers correspond to tà phainómena, i.e. the sensible multiplicity. Without
falling into philosophy-fiction, we can well suppose that for Aristotle it was clear that
Parmenides the Monist also admitted the existence of multiplicity. Aristotle cites (and
Plato before him) verse 7.1, which will become problematic, as we have seen, for
some modern historians, but was without a doubt regarded as authentic in antiquity.
The verse is clear and distinct: if it is impossible that there are "not-beings" (entities,
plural, mè eînai eónta) it is because there are beings (plural). For Aristotle, as
Parmenides is a monist, supporter of the One-being (notion which, according to
Aristotle, plays the role of an arkhé: cf. Physics I.2.184b17), in order to justify the
existence of multiplicity he was obliged to propose other arkhai. He finds them in the
Poem: heat and cold, treated as being and not-being.
Leaving aside the authors of this hypothesis (in the Poem, "mortal men"), it is
incomprehensible that Aristotle did not know verse 8.55, in which Parmenides says
that those who hold two opposite principles were wrong, and, even worse, that he
could assume cold is assimilated to the not-being, when, for Parmenides, "not-being is
not." Instead of questioning his own interpretation (inherited from Plato) according to
which Parmenides is fundamentally a monist, Aristotle, to justify the existence of
plurality in Parmenides, decided to find in the Poem a position that Parmenides
criticizes. Actually, the justification of plurality was already in Parmenides himself:
 16

"you cannot force what is not to be next to what is, not even if it is completely
dispersed39 according to a certain order, nor even if it is together" (fr. 4.2-4) because
"being 'touches' being" (8.25).
When Simplicius cites the current fr. 19, where the plural reappears ("hoúto toi
katà dóxan éphu táde…"), which is a synonym for multiplicity, he is surprised,
because the quotation is authentic (we must recall that Aristotle had not accompanied
his theory with quotations about the two "principles"). Simplicius notes: "How did
Parmenides suppose (hupelambánein) that there are only sensible things, precisely he,
who had philosophized about that which is intelligible, referred to in [terms] not dealt
with here?" How could he transport (meténegken) the intelligible to the sensible,
[precisely he] who, on the one hand, transmitted separately the union of real being
(ontos) with the intelligible, and, [in turn], separately and clearly, the organization
(diakósmesin) of sensible things, and did not consider it appropriate to attribute to the
sensible the name of 'being'?" (Commentary on De Caelo, 5558.12). Simplicius does
not answer his own questions, which can be summed up in one question: Why did
Parmenides not respect the interpretation of Aristotle that made him a monist, and
decided to become a dualist?
It is strange, in addition, that having just commented on this passage from the
Poem (current fr. 19), Simplicius falls into the contradiction of making Parmenides
one of the dikranoi that he himself criticizes. In other places, he says nothing of the
sort. For example, on page 30 of his Commentary on the Physics, after stating that
towards the end of the current fr. 8, "Parmenides goes from the intelligible to the
sensible, or, as he says, from real being to opinion," Simplicius explains the theory of
the two principles, and, while in the cited text he talks about “them (the mortals),” he
says that "he [= Parmenides] established" these principles. On page 179 Simplicius is
even more explicit: "Even those who say that being is one and quiet, as Parmenides
did, offer two opposite principles for physical things. He does, indeed, in his
[discourse] on opinion, situate heat and cold as principles." Similarly, on page 146 he
says that when "Parmenides deals with perceptions, he establishes other principles, as
Aristotle recalls." And finally, when Simplicius talks about cosmology, he says that

39
If being is "One," it cannot be "dispersed."
 17

"Parmenides clearly (saphos) offered an efficient cause (poietikon), not only for
engendered bodies (en têi genései)40 but also to non corporeal things that complete the
creation" (Phys. 31.10). Is the divergence between what these texts from the
Commentary on the Physics say and the astonishment expressed in the Commentary
on De Caelo due to a change in Simplicius’ perspective on the two?41 The
simpliciologists might have the answer.
While unrecognizable in his recovered quotations, the Parmenides dealing in
being and appearance, dating back to our most ancient sources (Aristotle alongside
Plato) and traced through Fülleborn’s two part arrangement of the fragments as
inspired by Simplicius, sees a revival in Kurfess’ analysis. Some “details” that had
already disoriented Simplicius are weakened or misrepresented in Kurfess'
interpretation. Kurfess even weakens, on a moral level, the opposition between apáte,
the origin of the troublesome "apatelón", and peítho, which is associated with truth42:
"I hope it will not be embarrassing to those who played a role in my moral
development if I admit that persuasion and deception do not seem to me to be an
entirely unnatural pairing" (p. 144). And the same occurs with the notion of the word
"mortals," taken literally by Kurfess, when actually Parmenides used it symbolically,
as a counterpart to his "divine spokes-women.” As Kurfess points out, it is true,
literally, that "the youth, Parmenides, and his audience [are] themselves mortal" (p.
153), but, fortunately, they are not disabled, brainless and stupid, as are the makers of
opinions.
Kurfess’ chapter on the Doxa that has served as the main sticking point for
criticism is entitled "The truth about Parmenides' Doxa." Without detracting from its
abundant merits, we would add “...according to Simplicius” to the title since in reality
Kurfess offers a detailed and thorough analysis of the Parmenides of Simplicius
(completed from time to time with other sources via Theophrastus, ergo, Aristotle).
But, as far as this Parmenides goes, we do not hesitate to partake the judgment of L.

40
Ergo, sensible.
41
According to Ilsetraut Hadot, the Commentary on De Caelo would be prior ("La vie et L'Oeuvre de
Simplicius", Simplicius, sa vie, are oeuvre, sa survie, Berlin-New York, 1987, p. 22).
42
Both terms are together in the philosopher anti-Parmenidean par excellence: Gorgias (ei dè lógos ho peísas kaì
tèn psukhèn apatésas…Fr. 11 § 8). See our paper "The 'Doxa of Parmenides' Dismantled', Ancient Philosophy,
XXX, 2, 2010, p. 225.
 18

Tarán: Simplicius' interpretation "is sufficiently discredited in any case by the very
Parmenidean fragments which he has preserved for us."43

Paris, 2016
nestor.luis.cordero@gmail.com

43
L. Tarán, op.cit., p. 295.