Professional Documents
Culture Documents
48. Enriquez Vda. de Santiago vs. Vilar 857 SCRA 451 , March 06, 2018
By definition, an indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination
can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. It is a party whose
interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation. In the Matter of the Heirship (Intestate
Estates) of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez, et al. v. Robles, 638 SCRA 712 (2010), the Court held that:
The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to
vest the court with jurisdiction, which is the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in
a case. Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court
cannot attain real finality
Verily, Rosario is an indispensable party in the petition before the CA as she is the widow of the
original party-plaintiff Eduardo. The determination of the propriety of the action of the trial court in
merely noting and not granting his motion would necessarily affect her interest in the subject matter of
litigation as the party-plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court differs with the CA in ruling that the petition for
certiorari filed before it merely delves into the issue of grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower
court. Guilty of repetition, the final determination of the case would pry into the right of Rosario as
party-plaintiff before the lower court who is entitled to the proceeds of the judgment award. As it is, the
CA did not actually rule on the issue of grave abuse of discretion alone as its corollary ruling inquired
into the right of Rosario. In ruling for Vilar’s substitution, the right of Rosario as to the proceeds of the
judgment award was thwarted as the CA effectively ordered that the proceeds pertaining to Rosario be
awarded instead to Vilar. Likewise, the Court finds merit in Rosario’s contention that her failure to
participate in the proceedings before the CA constitutes a denial of her constitutional right to due
process. Hence, failure to implead Rosario as an indispensable party rendered all the proceedings before
the CA null and void for want of authority to act. Moreover, even the basis for the substitution of Vilar as
pronounced by the CA was unfounded. In ruling so, the CA merely relied on the purported Deeds of
Assignment of Rights executed between Eduardo and Vilar in considering that the latter is a transferee
pendente lite, who can rightfully and legally substitute Rosario as party-plaintiff in the implementation
of a writ of execution. Yet, it is significant to note that the Court already brushed aside said Deeds of
Assignment for being belatedly filed in its Decision dated October 21, 2015 in G.R. Nos. 194814 and
194825. The Court did not discuss any further the validity and due execution of said Deeds as the same
were brought to the attention of the trial court more than 20 years after the same were allegedly
executed.
The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as held by this Court in the vintage case of Philippine
Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, 230 SCRA 413 (1994), is that while they are considered valid and
enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in
Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words. They should be
considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there
must be accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and design that
actions between them be litigated only at the place named by them.
50.
51. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Spouses Yujuico 763 SCRA 486
Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to recover the deficiency after
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect title
to or possession of real property, or any interest therein. Accordingly, the proper venue in this case is in
Makati RTC because Makati was the place where the main office of BPI was located.
MTC ruled in favor of Emma Mondejar. Petitioner now then filed before the RTC a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the remedy of
appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its
execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings
where appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner is correct when it filed the said petition before the proper forum (i.e., the RTC). To be sure,
the Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari. Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not give a party unbridled freedom to
choose the venue of his action lest he ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Instead, a
becoming regard for judicial hierarchy dictates that petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari
against first level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with
the Court of Appeals, before resort may be had before the Court. This procedure is also in consonance
with Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its
dispositions should be filed before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied
with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has
jurisdiction over the same.
“Since respondents' counterclaim is compulsory, it must be set up in the same action; otherwise, it
would be barred forever. If it is filed concurrently with the main action but in a different proceeding, it
would be abated on the ground of litis pendentia; if filed subsequently, it would meet the same fate on
the ground of res judicata. There is, therefore, no need for respondents to pay docket fees and to file a
certification against forum shopping for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the said counterclaim.
56. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. CPR promotions and Marketing Inc. (760 SCRA 59, June
22, 2015)
It is elementary that a defending party’s compulsory counterclaim should be interposed at the time he
files his Answer, and that failure to do so shall effectively bar such claim.
57.
61. MEDADO vs. HEIRS OF THE LATE ANTONIO CONSING (665 SCRA 534)
The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a
case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed that the
rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice
and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents
of the certification. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding
the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the
certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. Thus,
under justifiable circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such
certification considering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.
The petitioner in this case is the Commission on Appointments, a government entity created by the
Constitution, and headed by its Chairman. There was no need for the Chairman himself to sign the
verification. Its representative, lawyer or any person who personally knew the truth of the facts alleged
in the petition could sign the verification. With regard, however, to the certification of non-forum
shopping, the established rule is that it must be executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties
and not by counsel. In this case, Atty. Tiu failed to show that he was specifically authorized by the
Chairman to sign the certification of non-forum shopping, much less file the petition in his behalf. There
is nothing on record to prove such authority. Atty. Tiu did not even bother to controvert Paler’s
allegation of his lack of authority. This renders the petition dismissible.
A certification against forum shopping is a peculiar and personal responsibility of the party, an assurance
given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the same
parties, issues and causes of action. It must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If,
however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
Here, the original complaint contained a proper verification and certification against forum shopping
duly signed by Naval-Sai as plaintiff. The verification and certification in the amended complaint, on the
other hand, was only signed by her counsel, Atty. Norberta L. Ela. Atty. Ela was not authorized to sign on
behalf of Naval-Sai, as in fact, she assigned one Rodolfo Florentino as agent. The Court of Appeals
pointed out that in the certification in the amended complaint, Atty. Ela specified that it should be taken
and read together with the original complaint. The Court of Appeals took this as a cautionary move on
the part of Naval-Sai, justifying the relaxation of the rules on the ground of substantial compliance. We
find, however, that this cautionary move is ineffectual because under the Rules of Civil Procedure, an
amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. For all intents and purposes, therefore, the
original complaint and its verification and certification ceased to exist. This, notwithstanding, we find
there was still substantial compliance with the Rules.
In the case of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, while we said that, strictly, a
certification against forum shopping by counsel is a defective ce1iification, the verification, signed by
petitioner's counsel in said case, is substantial compliance because it served the purpose of the Rules of
informing the Court of the pendency of another action or proceeding involving the same issues. We then
explained that procedural rules are instruments in the speedy and efficient administration of justice
which should be used to achieve such end and not to derail it.
We also find that the prima facie merits of the case serve as a special circumstance or a compelling
reason to relax the rules on certification against forum shopping.
In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals, we recognized the flaw in the certification against forum shopping which
was signed only by the counsel, and not by the party. In LDP Marketing, Inc. v. Monter, there was initially
no proof that the one who signed the certification was authorized to do so in behalf of the corporation.
In these two cases, we nonetheless chose to overlook the procedural lapses in the interest of substantial
justice and the existence of prima facie merit in the petitions.
We have ruled that the general rule is that non-compliance or a defect in the certification is not curable
by its subsequent submission or correction. However, there are cases where we exercised leniency and
relaxed the rules on the ground of substantial compliance, the presence of special circumstances or
compelling reasons. The rules on forum-shopping are designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and "should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subve1i its
own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure which is to achieve
substantial justice as expeditiously as possible."
An information is, for all intents and purposes, considered an initiatory pleading because it is a written
statement that contains the cause of action of a party, which in criminal cases is the State as
represented by the prosecutor, against the accused. Like a pleading, the Information is also filed in court
for appropriate judgment. Undoubtedly then, an Information must contain the number and date of issue
of the prosecutor’s MCLE Certificate of Compliance.
66. Powerhouse Staffbuilders International, Inc. vs. Rey 807 SCRA 8, November 07, 2016
Rule 7 Parts and Contents of a Pleading
a. In previous cases, we held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the
verification and certification against Forum Shopping without need of a board resolution: (1) the
Chairperson of the Board of Directors; (2) the President of a corporation; (3) the General
Manager or Acting General Manager; (4) Personnel Officer; and (5) an Employment Specialist in
a labor case. The rationale applied in these cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers
or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum
shopping, being “in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the
petition.”
67. Heirs of Josefina Gabriel vs. Segundina Cebrero, November 12, 2018
Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his
counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must
execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification against forum shopping must be
executed by the plaintiff or principal party. The reason for this is that the plaintiff or the principal knows
better than anyone, whether a petition has previously been filed involving the same case or substantially
the same issues. If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his
behalf must have been duly authorized.
68. FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES INC. vs. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY (781 SCRA 508, January 20,
2016)
Rule 8: Manner of Making Allegations in Pleadings
The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings upon motion of the claiming party when the
defending party's answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the
adverse party's pleading. For that purpose, only the pleadings of the parties in the action are considered.
It is error for the trial court to deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings because the defending
party's pleading in another case supposedly tendered an issue of fact.
Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court recognizes only three modes by which the denial in the answer
raises an issue of fact. The first is by the defending party specifying each material allegation of fact the
truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters
upon which he relies to support his denial. The second applies to the defending party who desires to
deny only a part of an averment, and the denial is done by the defending party specifying so much of the
material allegation of ultimate facts as is true and material and denying only the remainder. The third is
done by the defending party who is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of a material averment made in the complaint by stating so in the answer. Any material
averment in the complaint not so specifically denied are deemed admitted except an averment of the
amount of unliquidated damages.
69. Go Tong Electrical Supply vs. BPI Family Savings Bank (G.R. No. 187487. June 29, 2015 )
The mere statement in paragraph 4 of their Answer, i.e., that they “specifically deny” the pertinent
allegations of the Complaint “for being self-serving and pure conclusions intended to suit plaintiff’s
purposes,” does not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated by law. Verily, a denial is not
specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. Stated otherwise, a general denial does not
become specific by the use of the word “specifically.” Neither does it become so by the simple expedient
of coupling the same with a broad conclusion of law that the allegations contested are “self-serving” or
are intended “to suit plaintiff’s purposes.