resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing

a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he intended to commit.
And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little
distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done
or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal
intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a
disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be looked
upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do
harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less in
proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime
follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime