Tañada vs.

Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or
cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes
valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to
give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions
and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That
duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public
concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a

requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that
presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and
effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon
their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which
are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other
date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking,
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A
law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect
the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of
the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette,
and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon
to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows
with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

Yaokasin Vs Custum
Facts: The Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 sacks of refined sugar owned by petitioner
Yaokasin, which were then being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the
custody of the Bureau of Customs. On June 7, 1988, the District Collector of Customs ordered
the release of the cargo to the petitioner but this order was subsequently reversed on June 15,
1988. The reversal was by virtue ofCustoms Memorandum Order (CMO) 20-87 in
implementation of the Integrated Reorganization Plan under P.D. 1, which provides that in
protest and seizure cases where the decision is adverse to the government, the Commissioner
of Customs has the power of automatic review.
Petitioner objected to the enforcement of Sec. 12 of the Plan and CMO 20-87 contending that
these were not published in the Official Gazette. The Plan which was part of P.D. 1 was
however published in the Official Gazette.

Issue: W/n circular orders such as CMO 20-87 need to be published in the OG to take
effect

NO.
Article 2 of the Civil Code does not apply to circulars like CMO 20-87 which is an administrative
order of the Commissioner of Customs addressed to his subordinates, the custom collectors.
Said issuance requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of he Plan, is
addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons (the customs collectors), hence no
general applicability. As held in Tanada v. Tuvera, “It need not be published, on the assumption
that it has been circularized to all concerned.”

Moreover, Commonwealth Act. 638 provides an enumeration of what shall be published in the
Official Gazette. It provides that besides legislative acts, resolutions of public nature of
Congress, executive, administrative orders and proclamations shall be published except when
these have no general applicability.

Bagatsing v Ramirez
GR No L-41631, December 17, 1976

FACTS:
In 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 7522, regulating the operation of public
markets and prescribing fees for the rentals of stalls and providing penalties for violation thereof. The
Federation of Manila Market Vendors Inc. assailed the validity of the ordinance, alleging among others
the noncompliance to the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. CFI-
Manila declared the ordinance void. Thus, the present petition.

ISSUE:
1. What law should govern the publication of a tax ordinance, the Revised City Charter, which
requires publication of the
2. ordinance before its enactment and after its approval, or the Local Tax Code, which only demands
publication after
3. approval?
4. Is the ordinance valid?
RULING:
1. The Local Tax Code prevails. There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila whereas the Local Tax Code is a general
law because it applies universally to all local governments. The fact that one is special and the
 other general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception
of the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. However,
the rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general, which
the general statute treats in particular. The Revised Charter of the City prescribes a rule for the
publication of “ordinance” in general, while the Local Tax Code establishes a rule for the
publication of “ordinance levying or imposing taxes fees or other charges” in particular.
5.
6. The ordinance is valid. 

Caltex vs Palomar Case Digest

Caltex v. Palomar
GR L-19650, 29 September 1966 (18 SCRA 247)

Facts:
In 1960, Caltex (Phils) Inc. conceived a promotional scheme “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest”
calculated to drum up patronage for its products, calling for participants therein to estimate the
actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a
specified period. For the privilege to participate, no fee or consideration is required to be paid.
Neither a purchase of Caltex products is required. Entry forms were available upon request at
each Caltex station where a sealed can was provided for the deposit of accomplished entry
stubs. Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails, not only as amongst the mediator publicizing
the contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations
were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for
mailing, in view of sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code. Such
overtures were formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated 31 October 1960, in
which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify
its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law.
Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General Enrico Palomar opined that the scheme falls
within the purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance.

Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing a petition for declaratory relief against the
Postmaster General, praying that judgment be rendered declaring its Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use
of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public. The trial court ruled that the
contest does not violate the Postal Code and that the Postmaster General has no right to bar
the public distribution of the contest rules by the mails. The Postmaster General appealed to the
Supreme Court.

Issues:
*Whether construction should be employed in the case.
* Whether the contest is a lottery or a gift enterprise that violates the provisions of the Postal
Law.

Held:
 Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of
the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is
rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly
provided for in the law. In the present case, the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law
inescapably require an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein. This is as
much a question of construction or interpretation as any other. The Court is tasked to look
beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious
tendencies that the law is seeking to prevent.

“Lottery” extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing,
gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three
essential elements of a lottery are: (1) consideration, (2) prize, and (3) chance. “Gift enterprise,”
on the other hand, is commonly applied to a sporting artifice under which goods are sold for
their market value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize.
Further, consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis, the term
under construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the
nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a
consideration, so also must the term “gift enterprise” be so construed. Significantly, there is not
in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the
“gift enterprise” therein included. Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not
constitute ‘lottery’, if it is not resorted to as a device to evade the law and no consideration is
derived, directly or indirectly, from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being
cultivated or stimulated thereby. Thus, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein
contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration.
In the present case, there is no requirement in the rules that any fee be paid, any merchandise
be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to
participate; for the scheme to be deemed a lottery. Neither is there is a sale of anything to which
the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser for the scheme to be deemed
a gift enterprise. The scheme is merely a gratuitous distribution of property by chance.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment, without costs.

No. Caltex may be granted declaratory relief, even if Enrico Palomar simply applied the clear
provisions of the law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest.  For,
construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of
the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case is not explicitly provided for
in the law.

In this case, the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably required an inquiry into the
intended meaning of the words used therein.  Also, the Court is tasked to look beyond the fair
exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element that the law is seeking to prevent
or prohibit.

People of the Philippines v. Jose Jabinal

G.R.No.L-30061, 27 February 1974,
G.R. No. L-68470, 8 October 1985 

FACTS:
The instant case was an appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas finding
the accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The validity of
the conviction was based upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Court’s ruling in People
v Mapa.
As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on September 5,
1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint was
without the requisite license a permit. He however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT
appointed by the governor, and was likewise subsequently appended as Confidential Agent,
which granted him the authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his official duties as
peace officer. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in People v Macarandang and People v
Lucero, the accused sought for his acquittal.
Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court nonetheless
decided otherwise, citing that People v Macarandang and People v Lucero were reversed and
subsequently abandoned in people v mapa.
ISSUE:
Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and
Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of Macarandang and
Lucero doctrine in Mapa?
RULING:
Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that “Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system … .”
The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim “legis
interpretatio legis vim obtinet” — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent
court has the force of law.
Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that “Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system.
The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a
country to follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That decision
becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The
doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument
Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a
firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero under which
no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a
license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be
punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
The appellant was acquitted.

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner, vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, respondent.

G. R. No. 136921,     April 17, 2001356
FACTS:
The case at bar is a petition for certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot four children. She
contends that respondent surprisingly showed signs of “psychological incapacity” to perform his
marital obligations starting 1988. His “true color” of being an emotionally immature and
irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker,
staying with friends daily from 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o’clock in the morning.
When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and
kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in
the presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence.
Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon
City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, she returned home to give
him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. On the
morning of 22 March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the
presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. He was imprisoned for 11 days for
slight physical injuries.
Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage invoking psychological incapacity. The trial court declared their marriage to be null
and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, which in turn
reversed the decision of the trial court. Thus, the marriage of respondent and petitioner still
subsists.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the appellate court erred in reversing the decision of the trial court.
(2) Whether or not the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina should
be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature.
HELD:
(1) The appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there was absolutely no evidence
showed and proved by petitioner the psychological incapacity on the part of respondent. Article
36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. Psychological incapacity, as laid
down in the case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals and further explained in Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Molina, refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support.
(2) The “doctrine of stare decisis,” ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The rule follows the settled legal maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The
interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that
law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself
later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith
in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.”
Thus the term psychological incapacity, borrowed from the Canon Law, was given legal life by
the Court in the case of Santos; in the case of Molina, additional procedural guidelines to assist
the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological
incapacity was added. Both judicial decisions in Santos and Molina have the force and effect of
law. Thus, the guidelines in the case of Molina are mandatory in nature. The petition was
denied.

AISPORNA V CA (DIGEST)
DECEMBER 10, 2017
 
BY
 
THELOWLYLAWSTUDENT
 
Aisporna v Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines
 
G.R. No. L-39419
12 April 1982
TOPIC: Statutory Construction, Doctrine of Associated Words (Noscitur a Sociis)
FACTS:
 
Petitioner Aisporna was charged for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
Petitioner’s husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna (Rodolfo) was duly licensed by the Insurance
Commission as agent
 to Perla
Compania de Seguros. Thru Rodolfo, a 12- month Personal Accident Policy was issued by
Perla with beneficiary to Ana
M. Isidro for P50,000. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy.
Subsequently, petitioner was charged because the aforementioned policy was issued with her
active participation,
which is not allowed because she did not possess a certificate of authority to act as agent from
the office of the
Insurance Commission.
Petitioner contended that being the wife of Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, and
that the policy was
merely a renewal and was issued because her husband was not around when Isidro called by
telephone. Instead,
appellant left a note on top of her husband’s desk.
 
The trial court found petitioner guil
ty as charged. On appeal, the trial court’s decisions was affirmed by respondent
appellate court, finding petitioner guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of Sec 189 of the
insurance act.
ISSUE:
 
Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section 189
of the Insurance Act
without reference to the second paragraph of the same section.
RULING:
 
The petition is meritorious. Petition appealed from is reversed, and accused is
acquitted
 of the crime charged.
A perusal of the provision in question shows that the first paragraph thereof prohibits a person
from acting as agent,
sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first
procuring a certificate
of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, while its second paragraph defines who
an insurance agent is
within the intent of this section and, finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty to
be imposed for its
violation.
The definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is
intended to define the word
“agent” mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More
significantly, in its second
paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an insurance agent is within the intent of
Section 189.

Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent mentioned in
the first and second
paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189.
Legislative intent must be ascertained
 from a consideration of the statute as a whole.
 The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning
of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole.
 A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give
effect to all its provisions whenever possible.
 More importantly the
doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a
Sociis)
 provides that
where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible
of
various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the
company in which it is found or
with which it is associated.

Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph is also
applicable to the agent
mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive compensation by the agent is an essential element
for a violation of the first
paragraph of the aforesaid section.
In the case at bar, the information does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts
by the accused with
Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been omitted,
a conviction of the
accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction,
every element of the
crime must be alleged and proved.
The accused
did not
 violate Section 189 of the Insurance act

Republic vs. CA, Molina G.R.

No. 108763 February 13,
1997 Psychological
Incapacity
JANUARY 27, 2018

FACTS:
Roridel O. Molina filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Reynaldo Molina. The petition alleged that after a
year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and
irresponsibility” as a husband and a father since he preferred to
spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money and that he depended on his parents for
aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard
to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not “opposing and conflicting personalities” is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
 
RULING:
NO.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals this Court, speaking thru
Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that “psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . .
and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.” Citing Dr. Gerardo
Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug
wrote that “the psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.”
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing
to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to us to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or
“neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere
showing of “irreconciliable differences” and “conflicting
personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she
and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had
been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability.

Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. V. IAC

G.R. No. 74851. December 9, 1999

FACTS:
On September 28, 1984, BF Homes filed a "Petition for
Rehabilitation and for Declaration of Suspension of Payments
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. RCBC, one of the
creditors, requested the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to extra-
judicially foreclose its real estate mortgage on some properties of
BF Homes. A notice of extra-judicial foreclosure sale was issued
by the Sheriff. On motion of BF Homes, the SEC issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining RCBC and the sheriff from
proceeding with the public auction sale. The SEC ordered the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon petitioner's filing
of a bond. However, petitioner did not file a bond until the very
day of the auction sale, so no writ of preliminary injunction was
issued by the SEC. Presumably, unaware of the filing of the bond,
the sheriffs proceeded with the public auction sale in which RCBC
was the highest bidder for the properties auctioned. BF Homes
filed in the SEC a consolidated motion to annul the auction sale
and filed an original complaint praying for the annulment of the
judgment, premised on the fact that even before RCBC asked the
sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose its mortgage on petitioner's
properties, the SEC had already assumed exclusive jurisdiction
over those assets.

ISSUE:
(1)   Whether or not the issue on preferred creditors of distressed
corporations stand on equal footing with all other creditors gains
relevance and materiality only upon the appointment of a
management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board, or body in
accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 902-A.
(2)   Whether or not RCBC has rightfully moved for the
extrajudicial foreclosure of its mortgage pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 902-A.

HELD:
(1)   Yes. The Court held that whenever a distressed corporation
asks the SEC for rehabilitation and suspension of payments,
preferred creditors may no longer assert such preference, but
stand on equal footing with other creditors. Foreclosure shall be
disallowed so as not to prejudice other creditors, or cause
discrimination among them. The holding that suspension of
actions for claims against a corporation under rehabilitation takes
effect as soon as the application or a petition for rehabilitation is
filed with the SEC — may, to some, be more logical and wise but
unfortunately, such is incongruent with the clear language of the
law. To insist on such ruling, no matter how practical and noble,
would be to encroach upon legislative prerogative to define the
wisdom of the law — plainly judicial legislation. In other words,
once a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or
body is appointed pursuant to P.D. 902-A, all actions for claims
against a distressed corporation pending before any court,
tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly.

Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the

court interpret or construe its true intent. Ambiguity is a condition
of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more
than one way, or of referring to two or more things at the same
time. A statute is ambiguous if it is admissible of two or more
possible meanings, in which case, the Court is called upon to
exercise one of its judicial functions, which is to interpret the law
according to its true intent.

(2)   Yes. Insofar as petitioner RCBC is concerned, the provisions

of Presidential Decree No. 902-A are not yet applicable and it
may still be allowed to assert its preferred status because it
foreclosed on the mortgage prior to the appointment of the
management committee. Suspension of claims against a
corporation under rehabilitation is counted or figured up only upon
the appointment of a management committee or a rehabilitation
receiver. As relevantly pointed out, a petition for rehabilitation
does not always result in the appointment of a receiver or the
creation of a management committee. Petitioner RCBC, therefore,
could have rightfully, as it did, moved for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of its mortgage on October 26, 1984 because a
management committee was not appointed by the SEC until
March 18, 1985.