DAMODARAN,

Aswath - Applied Corporate Finance.

Chapter 1 - The Foundations.

The firm’s investments are generically termed assets. Although assets are often categorized in
accounting statements into fixed assets, which are long-lived, and current assets, which are
short-term, we prefer a different categorization. The investments that a firm has already made
are called assets in place, whereas investments that the firm is expected to invest in the future
are called growth assets.

To finance these assets, the firm can obtain its capital from two sources: Debt and Equity

The Investment Principle

Specifies that businesses invest only in projects that yield a return that exceeds the hurdle rate.

Corporate finance attempts to measure the return on a proposed investment decision and
compare it to a minimum acceptable hurdle rate to decide whether the project is acceptable.

A hurdle rate is a minimum acceptable rate of return for investing resources in a new
investment.

The Financing Principle

Suggests that the right financing mix for a firm is one that maximizes the value of the
investments made.

Though we consider the existing mix of debt and equity and its implications for the minimum
acceptable hurdle rate as part of the investment principle, we throw open the question of
whether the existing mix is the right one in the financing principle section.

The Dividend Principle

Requires that cash generated in excess of good project needs be returned to the owners.

Most businesses would undoubtedly like to have unlimited investment opportunities that yield
returns exceeding their hurdle rates, but all businesses grow and mature. As a consequence,
every business that thrives reaches a stage in its life when the cash flows generated by existing
investments is greater than the funds needed to take on good investments.

Thus, analyzing whether and how much cash should be returned to the owners of a firm is the
equivalent of asking (and answering) the question of how much cash accumulated in a firm is
too much cash.

Corporate Financial Decisions, Firm Value, and Equity Value

The link between these decisions and firm value can be made by recognizing that the value of a
firm is the present value of its expected cash flows, discounted back at a rate that reflects both
the riskiness of the projects of the firm and the financing mix used to finance them.

The financing decisions affect the value of a firm through both the discount rate and potentially
through the expected cash flows.

Some Fundamental Propositions about Corporate Finance

1. Corporate finance has an internal consistency: Risk has to be rewarded, cash flows matter
more than accounting income, markets are not easily fooled,

2. Corporate finance must be viewed as an integrated whole, a firm that takes poor investments
may soon find itself with a dividend problem (with insufficient funds to pay dividends) and a
financing problem (because the drop in earnings may make it difficult for them to meet interest
expenses).

3. Corporate finance matters to everybody

4. Corporate finance is fun. :D

5. The best way to learn corporate finance is by applying its models and theories to real- world

Chapter 2: The Objective In Decision Making.

Maximize Stock Prices: Real-World Conflicts of Interest

In classical corporate financial theory, stockholders are assumed to have the power to discipline
and replace managers who do not maximize their wealth. The two mechanisms that exist for
this power to be exercised are the annual meeting, wherein stockholders gather to evaluate
management performance, and the board of directors, whose fiduciary duty it is to ensure that
managers serve stockholders’ interests.

The Annual Meeting: Every publicly traded firm has an annual meeting of its stockholders,

during which stockholders can both voice their views on management and vote on changes to
the corporate charter. For institutional stockholders with significant holdings in a large number
of securities, the easiest option, when dissatisfied with incumbent management, is to “vote with
their feet,” which is to sell their stock and move on.

The Board of Directors: The board of directors is the body that oversees the management of a
publicly traded firm. the directors are obligated to ensure that managers are looking out for
stockholder interests.

The capacity of the board of directors to discipline management and keep them responsive to
stockholders is diluted by a number of factors.

1. Many directors find themselves unable to spend enough time on management


oversight, partly because of other commitments and partly because many of them
serve on the boards of several corporations. 


2. Even those directors who spend time trying to understand the internal workings of a
firm are stymied by their lack of expertise on core business issues, 


3. In some firms, a large number of the directors work for the firm, can be categorized as
insiders and are unlikely to challenge the chief executive office (CEO). 


4. Many directors hold only small or token stakes in the equity of their corporations. 
 The
remuneration they receive as directors vastly exceeds any returns that they make on
their stockholdings .

5. CEO the chairman is an independent board member.

The net effect of these factors is that the board of directors often fails at its assigned role, which
is to protect the interests of stockholders

Ownership Structure

The power that stockholders have to influence management decisions either directly (at the
annual meeting) or indirectly (through the board of directors) can be affected by how voting
rights are apportioned across stockholders and by who owns the shares in the company.


a. Voting rights: in USA is to have a single class of shares, with each share getting a vote.
In Latin America, shares with different voting rights have been more the rule than the
exception, with almost every company having common shares (with voting rights) and
preferred shares (without voting rights).
b. Founder/Owners: 
 the top manager in the firm is also its largest stockholder, but there
is still the danger that what is good for an inside stockholder with all or most of his
wealth invested in the company may not be in the best interests of outside stockholders,
especially if the latter are diversified across multiple investments. 


 c. Passive versus Activist investors: As institutional investors hold larger portions of
outstanding equity, classifying investors into individual and institutional becomes a less
useful exercise at many firms

d. Stockholders with competing interests: Not all stockholders are single minded about
maximizing stockholders wealth.

e. Corporate Cross Holdings: The largest stockholder in a company may be another

company. In some cases, this investment may reflect strategic or operating
considerations. In others, though, these cross holdings are a device used by investors or
managers to wield power, often disproportionate to their ownership stake.

The Consequences of Stockholder Powerlessness:

1. Fighting Hostile Acquisitions:

● Greenmail: Greenmail refers to the purchase of a potential hostile acquirer’ s stake
in a business at a premium over the price paid for that stake by the target company.
usually causes stock prices to drop, but it
does protect the jobs of incumbent manager.
● Another widely used anti-takeover device is a golden parachute, a provision in an
employment contract that allow for the payment
of a lump-sum or cash flows over
a period, if the
manager covered by the contract loses his or her job in a takeover.

● Firms sometimes create poison pills, which are triggered by hostile takeovers. The
objective is to make it difficult and costly to acquire control. In a flip over right,
existing stockholders get the right to buy shares in the firm at a price well above the
current stock price.
2. Antitakeover Amendments
:
They require the assent of stockholders to be instituted. There are several types of
antitakeover amendments, all designed with the objective of reducing the likelihood of
a hostile takeover. Consider, for instance, a super-majority amendment; to take over a
firm that adopts this amendment, an acquirer has to acquire more than the 51 percent
that would normally be required to gain control.
3. Paying too Much on Acquisitions:
The quickest and perhaps
the most decisive way to impoverish stockholders is
to
overpay on a takeover, because the amounts paid on
takeovers tend to dwarf those
involved in the other decisions. Of course, the managers of the firms doing the acquiring
will argue that they never overpay on takeovers, 8 and that the high premiums paid in
acquisitions can be justified using any number of reasons— there is synergy, there are
strategic considerations, the target firm is undervalued and badly managed, and so on .

Stockholders and Bondholders

there is a risk that bondholders who do not protect themselves may be taken advantage of in a
variety of ways—by stockholders borrowing more money, paying more dividends, or

undercutting the security of the assets on which the loans were based.

The Source of the Conflict

Lies in the
differences in the nature of the cash flow claims of
the two groups. Bondholders
generally have first
claim on cash flows but receive fixed interest
payments, assuming that the
firm makes enough
income to meet its debt obligations. 


Bondholders do not get to participate on the upside if the projects succeed but bear a significant
portion of the cost if they fail. As a consequence, bondholders tend to view decisions that
increase risk much more negatively than stockholders, who are more inclined to factor in the
upside.

Examples:

1. Risky investments
2. Additional Debt: Existing lenders to a firm would optimally like to constrain the firm from
borrowing more money in the future, since the additional debt increases the likelihood
that the company will be unable to make debt payments.
3. Additional Dividends/Buybacks: The effect of higher dividends on stock prices can be
debated in theory, with differences of opinion on whether it should increase or decrease
prices, but the empirical evidence is clear.

The Consequences of Stockholder–Bondholder Conflicts

Focusing on maximizing stockholder wealth may result in stockholders taking perverse actions
that harm the overall firm but increase their wealth at the expense of bondholders.

It is possible that we are making too much of the “bondholders as victims” possibility, for a
couple of reasons. Bondholders are aware of the potential of stockholders to take actions that
are inimical to their interests and generally protect themselves, either by writing in covenants
or restrictions on what stockholders can do, or by taking an equity interest in the firm.

The Firm and Financial Markets

To the extent that financial markets are efficient and use the information that is available to
make measured and unbiased estimates of future cash flows and risk, market prices will reflect
true value. In such markets, both the measurers and the measured will accept the market price
as the appropriate mechanism for judging success and failure.

To the extent that financial markets are efficient and use the information that is available to
make measured and unbiased estimates of future cash flows and risk, market prices will reflect
true value. In such markets, both the measurers and the measured will accept the market price
as the appropriate mechanism for judging success and failure.

The trouble with market prices is that the investors who assess them can make serious mistakes,
for two reasons. The first is that information is the lubricant that enables markets to be efficient.

The second problem is that there are is some evidence that investors, even when information is
freely available, do not process that information rationally.

In both cases, decisions that maximize stock prices may not be consistent with long-term value
maximization.

The Information Problem

Market prices are based on information,
both public (from the company) and private
(from
analysts and investors following the company). In
the world of classical theory,
information about
companies is revealed promptly and truthfully to
financial markets.


There are a
few impediments to this process. The first is that
information is sometimes
suppressed or delayed by firms, especially when it contains bad news. Although there is
significant anecdotal evidence of this occurrence, the most direct evidence that firms do this
comes from studies of earnings and dividend announcements.

The second problem is in their zeal to raise market prices, some firms release intentionally
misleading information, to financial markets, about their current conditions and future
prospects. These misrepresentations can cause stock prices to deviate significantly from value
and when the truth comes out, as it inevitably will at some point in time, the price will tumble.

The Market Problem

a. Financial markets do not always reasonably and rationally assess the effects of new

information on prices: Critics using this argument note that markets can be volatile,
reacting to no news at all in some cases; in any case, the volatility in market prices is
usually much greater than the volatility in any of the underlying fundamentals 


b. Financial markets sometimes over react to information. : Analysts with this point of view
point to firms that reports earnings that are much higher or much lower than expected
and argue that stock prices jump too much on good news and drop too much on bad
news. 


c. There are cases where insiders move markets to their benefit and often at the expense of
outside investors.

The Firm and Society

Most management decisions have social consequences, and the question of how best to deal
with these consequences is not easily answered. An objective of maximizing firm or stockholder
wealth implicitly assumes that the social side costs are either trivial enough that they can be
ignored or that they can be priced and charged to the firm.

The conflicts between the interests of the firm and the interests of society are not restricted to
the objective of maximizing stockholder wealth. They may be endemic to a system of private
enterprise, and there will never be a solution to satisfy the purists who would like to see a

complete congruence between the social and firm interests.

The Real World: A Pictorial Representation

Alternatives to Stock Price Maximization

There are obvious problems associated with each of the linkages underlying wealth
maximization. Stockholders often have little power over managers, and managers consequently
put their interests above those of stockholders. Lenders who do not protect their interests often
end up paying a price when decisions made by firms transfer wealth to stockholders.
Information delivered to financial markets is often erroneous.

A Different System for Disciplining Management (Corporate Governance)

Corporate governance systems be measured on three dimensions—the capacity to restrict

management’s ability to obtain private benefits from control, easy access to financial markets
for firms that want capital, and the ease with which inefficient management is replaced. It can
be argued that a market-based corporate governance system does a better job than alternative
systems on all three counts.

Choosing an Alternative Objective

I. Maximize Market Share: Underlying the market share maximization objective is the belief
(often unstated) that higher market share will mean more pricing power and higher profits in
the long run. If this is in fact true, maximizing market share is entirely consistent with the
objective of maximizing firm value. However, if higher market share does not yield higher pricing
power, and the increase in market share is accompanied by lower or even negative earnings,
firms that concentrate on increasing market share can be worse off as a consequence.

2. Profit Maximization Objectives: The rationale for them is that profits can be measured more
easily than value, and that higher profits translate into higher value in the long run. There are at
least two problems with these objectives. First, the emphasis on current profitability may result
in short-term decisions that maximize profits now at the expense of long-term profits and value.
Second, the notion that profits can be measured more precisely than value may be
incorrect.

3. Size/Revenue Objectives: there have been cases where corporations have made decisions
that increase their size and perceived power at the expense of stockholder wealth and
profitability.

Maximize Stock Prices: Salvaging a Flawed Objective

We consider ways we can reduce the conflicts of interest between stockholders, bondholders,
and managers and the potential for market failures.

Conflict Resolution: Reducing Agency Problems

Stockholders and Managers

Making Managers Think More Like Stockholders: One way to reduce this conflict is to provide
managers with equity stakes in the firms they manage, either by providing them with stock or
warrants/options on the stock. If this is done, the benefits that accrue to management from
higher stock prices may provide an inducement to maximize stock prices.

More Effective Boards of Directors: Directors are increasingly compensated with equity in the
Company. More firms restrict the number of outside directorships held by their directors.

Foundations of Economic Value Added – James Grant

Chapter 1: The EVA Revolution

The analytical tool called EVA, for Economic Value Added. This financial metric has an innovative
way of looking at the firm’s real profitability. Unlike traditional measures of profit such as EBIT,
EBITDA.

EVA looks at the firm’s “residual profitability,” net of both the direct cost of debt capital and the
indirect cost of equity capital. In this way, EVA is closely aligned with the shareholder wealth-
maximization requirement.

Large firms used EVA as a guide to creating economic value for their shareholders. Positive
payments accrue to managers having divisional operating profits that on balance exceed the
relevant “cost of capital,” while negative incentive payments may occur if the longer-term
divisional profits fall short of the overall capital costs.

EVA gives managers the incentive to act like shareholders when making corporate investment
decisions.

Evolution of EVA:

Irving Fisher established a fundamental link between a company’s net present value (NPV) and
its discounted stream of expected cash flows. In turn, Modigliani and Miller showed that
corporate investment decisions as manifest in positive NPV decisions are the primary driver of
a firm’s enterprise value and stock price as opposed to the firm’s capital structure mix of debt
and equity securities.


Operational Definitions of EVA:


There are two ways of defining EVA, an “accounting” way and a “finance” way. From an
accounting perspective, EVA is defined as the difference between the firm’s net operating
profit after tax (NOPAT) and its weighted-average dollar cost of capital. As a result, EVA differs
from traditional accounting measures of corporate profit including, EBIT, EBITDA, net income,
and even NOPAT because it fully accounts for the firm’s overall capital costs.

𝐸𝑉𝐴 = 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑇 − $𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇 𝑂𝐹 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿

In this expression, the firm’s dollar cost of capital is calculated by multiplying the percentage
cost of capital by the amount of invested capital according to:

% 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
$𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 = ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
100

In turn, the percentage cost of capital is obtained by taking a “weighted average” of the firm’s
after-tax cost of debt and equity capital as shown by:

% 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
= 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 ∗ % 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡
∗ % 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦

EVA: The Finance Interpretation:

MVA (or NPV) is equal to the present value of the firm’s expected future EVA. MVA is equal to
the market value of the firm less the “book capital” employed in the business, it can easily be
shown that EVA is related to the intrinsic value of the firm and its outstanding debt and equity
securities.

𝑀𝑉𝐴 = 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑉𝐴 = 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙

𝑀𝑉𝐴 = 𝑃𝑉 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐸𝑉𝐴

Companies having positive EVA momentum should on balance see their stock or bond prices go
up over time as the increasing profits net of the overall capital costs leads to a rise in the firm’s
“market value added.” In contrast, firms with returns on invested capital that fall short of the
weighted-average cost of capital should see share price declines as the adverse EVA outlook
lowers the intrinsic (present) value of the firm.

MVA and EVA: Growth Considerations:

The basic EVA and MVA, one can use a “constant growth” EVA model to show the pricing
importance of both the firm’s near-term EVA outlook and its long-term EVA growth rate in
determining overall corporate (or enterprise) valuation. In this “Gordon-like” model, the
relationship between the firm’s MVA and its EVA outlook for the future is expressed as:


𝐸𝑉𝐴 (1)
𝑀𝑉𝐴 =
𝐶𝑂𝐶 − 𝑔PQR

In this expression, EVA(1) is the firm’s current EVA outlook (one-year ahead forecast), gEVA is
the firm’s assessed long-term EVA growth rate, and COC is the familiar weighted-average cost
of debt and equity capital.

The constant-growth EVA model shows that the firm’s market value added (MVA) is positively
related to its near-term EVA outlook, as measured by EVA(1), as well as the firm’s assessed long-
term EVA growth rate, gEVA. As shown, the firm’s MVA is also negatively related to any
unanticipated changes in the weighted-average cost of (debt and equity) capital, COC.

Behavioral Finance. Psychology, Decision Making, and Markets – Lucy Ackert

Chapter 1: Foundations of Finance l – Expected Utility Theory

1.2 Neoclassical Economics

Neoclassical economics makes some fundamental assumptions about people:
1. People have rational preferences across possible outcomes or states of nature.
2. People maximize utility and firms maximize profits.
3. People make independent decisions based on all relevant information.

An important assumption is that people’s preferences are complete. This means that a person
can compare all possible choices and assess preference or indifference. A second assumption,
transitivity, does not seem to be too strong an assumption for most people. If transitivity does
not hold, we cannot determine an optimal or best choice. So, rational choices are transitive.

Utility theory is used to describe preferences. With a utility function, denoted as u(•), we assign
numbers to possible outcomes so that preferred choices receive higher numbers. We can think
of utility as the satisfaction received from a particular outcome. Normally an outcome is
characterized by a “bundle” of goods.

Neoclassical economics assumes that people maximize their utility using full information of the
choice set.

1.3 Expected Utility Theory

This theory contends that individuals should act in a particular way when confronted with
decision-making under uncertainty. Expected utility theory is really set up to deal with risk, not
uncertainty. A risky situation is one in which you know what the outcomes could be and can
assign a probability to each outcome. Formally, a prospect is a series of wealth outcomes, each
of which is associated with a probability.

1.4 Risk Attitude

There is abundant evidence that most people avoid risk in most circumstances. People are,
however, willing to assume risk if they are compensated for it.

For such an individual, the utility of the expected value of a prospect is less than the expected
utility of the prospect. This person would rather gamble on the uncertain outcome than take
the expected value of the prospect with certainty. For a risk seeker, the certainty equivalent
level of wealth is greater than the expected value.

1.5 Allais Paradox

Alternative approaches to decision-making under uncertainty have been developed because
researchers have detected this and other departures from expected utility theory.

The Allais paradox is not the only documented violation of expected utility theory. Sometimes
researchers demonstrate that people do not make choices in accordance with certain axioms on
which expected utility theory rests. For example, failures in the ability to order outcomes on a
consistent basis and lack of transitivity have been reported.

1.6 Framing

A decision frame is defined to be a decision-maker’s view of the problem and possible outcomes.
A frame is affected by the presentation mode and the individual’s perception of the question,
as well as personal characteristics. Sometimes frames are opaque, which means that they are
trickier to see through.

Psychologists and economists have documented that the frame has significant effects on the
decisions people make, including decisions of a financial nature. Framing has been shown to
have important implications in many areas of behavioral finance.



Chapter 16: Behavioral Corporate Finance and Managerial Decision – Making

16.2 Capital Budgeting: Ease of Processing, Loss Aversion and Affect

Payback and ease of processing is a Conventional finance theory demonstrates that, when
properly applied, net present value (NPV) is the optimal decision rule for capital budgeting
purposes. Yet a number of surveys show that managers often utilize less-than-ideal techniques,
such as the internal rate of return (IRR) and, even worse, payback.

Allowing Sunk Costs to Influence the Abandonment Decision: Mental accounting suggests that
if an account can be kept open in the hope of eventually turning things around, this will often
be done. The problem with abandonment, however, is that it forces recognition of an ex post
mistake. But because of loss aversion, it may happen that managers foolishly hang on, throwing
good money after bad.

The market seems to sense the problem. One study indicates that announcements of project
terminations are usually well received. High personal responsibility in the original investment
decision increases the resistance to project abandonment. This seems to be due to the greater
regret that would be induced by “admitting defeat,” as compared to the feeling of cutting losses
and getting back on track that a new manager without the same level of emotional commitment
to the project would feel.


16.3 Managerial Overconfidence


Managers tended to predict stronger performance for their operations than actually occurred.
Excessive optimism in project cost forecasts is endemic.

There are two forces here. First, generous executive compensation (often only weakly related
to firm performance) signals success. Greater overconfidence can result because of associated
self-attribution bias. Second, the tendency for boards to be overly deferential and for investors
to employ the “Wall Street rule” (sell if unhappy with management) also plays to managerial
overconfidence.

16.4 Investment and Overconfidence

Overinvestment: The advantage of this survey is that it elicited two separate overconfidence
metrics: one based on miscalibration (which they call overconfidence) and the other based on
excessive optimism. It was possible to conclude that overconfident managers invest more.

Investment Sensitivity to Cash Flows: there is a positive relationship between corporate
investment and cash flow. Under perfect markets and market efficiency, this should not be
observed. If a positive-NPV project is identified, investment should proceed whether or not
internal funds are available.

It has been suggested that the potential misalignment of managerial and shareholder interests
induces overinvestment when free cash is available, as managers are keen to empire build and
provide themselves perks. Second, an asymmetric information view purports that the firm’s
managers, acting in the best interests of shareholders and noticing that the company’s shares
are undervalued, will not issue new shares to undertake investment projects. In both cases,
investment and cash flows will be positively correlated.

Mergers and Acquisitions: Survey evidence documents that overconfident managers appear to
be more active on the M&A front.

First, most obviously, managers embodying this tendency will overestimate synergies and their
ability to stickhandle problems. This encourages merger attempts. Second, discouraging
mergers, because overconfident managers see their firms as undervalued, they are less likely to
engage in such activity if transactions must be externally financed. It is not clear on balance
which force predominates.

Starts – Ups: Excessive optimism may mistakenly lead people to think that the market is crying
out for their goods and services, and a better-than-average effect may lead entrepreneurs to
think that, even if industry-wide opportunities are limited, they will still beat the odds.

16.5 Can Managerial Overconfidence Have a Positive Side?

Overconfidence may have a positive aspect. A moderate level of overconfidence could have a
salutary side, if it leads to elevated, concentrated effort. In the context of principal-agent theory,
this can alleviate the moral hazard problem due to the non-observability of the agent’s effort.

Finally, it has even been suggested that overconfidence among entrepreneurs, even if personally
deleterious, might be socially beneficial, because entrepreneurial activity can provide valuable
information to society (unlike herders, who provide no information). In this sense, it serves a
valuable evolutionary purpose.

 Foundations of Economic Value Added – James Grant

Chapter 2: EVA in the Theory of Finance l: Investment Decisions

Two - Period NPV model

The gross present value, GPV, of the firm’s investment decision is simply the present value of
the expected future cash flow:

COC: Cost of Capital
NOPAT: Refers to a firm’s net operating profit after tax

In turn, the net present value, NPV (or MVA in financial jargon), of the firm’s investment
decision is given by:

C: Capital investment

The corporate or “enterprise” value of the firm is therefore:

Assume that the firm’s ability to transform current resources into future resources can be
represented by a Production Possibilities Curve (PPC).

WEALTH CREATION WITH POSITIVE EVA

EVA is the difference between the unlevered net operating profit after tax, NOPAT, and a
dollar charge for capital employed in the business measured by the amount of capital times
the weighted average cost of capital, C × COC.

With positive EVA, the firm’s cash operating profit after tax, NOPAT, is more than sufficient to
cover the anticipated expenses including a “rental charge” and the return of borrowed
principal on the capital employed in the business.




The EVA spread

With the two-period NPV model to explain the residual return on capital (RROC), or the “EVA
spread.” Refers to the difference between the return on invested capital, ROC, and the cost of
capital, COC. To show this, we’ll begin by unfolding NOPAT (again, in terms of a two-period
model) into the firm’s initial capital and the rate of return on that capital according to:


The firm’s NPV derives its sign from the difference between the operating cash flow return on
investment, ROC, and the weighted average cost of capital, COC.

EVA spread or residual return of capital or surplus return of capital or the excess operating
return on capital.

The firm’s NPV is positive because its discounted economic profit, EVA/(1 + COC), is also
positive.

Wealth destruction with negative EVA

The two-period wealth model can also be used to gain some insight on the financial
characteristics of wealth destroyers.

If a company is a wealth destroyer in the future (due to the negative anticipated EVA), then it
must also be a wealth waster in the present.

As a wealth destroyer, it should be apparent that the firm’s NPV is negative because the after-
tax return on invested capital, ROC, falls short of the cost of capital.

The net present value can also be obtained by multiplying the firm’s residual return on capital,
by the initial capital

The company’s negative NPV is due to the poor EVA outlook. The adverse EVA outlook is in
turn caused by the negative residual return on capital (ROC – COC). In a well-functioning
capital market, the firm’s managers would not be able to attract the necessary debt or equity
capital to fund the proposed investment
Wealth neutrality with zero EVA

Use the two-period wealth model to examine the financial consequences of zero-expected
EVA.

Note that if a company has zero-expected EVA in the future—therefore, zero-expected NPV in
the present—then its enterprise value must be the same as the initial capital.

If a company has unused capital resources, then the current shareholders would be just as well
off if managers were to pay out the unused funds as a dividend payment on the firm’s stock.

Moreover, managers should take corporate actions that result in wealth-neutrality seriously
when they do not have discounted positive EVA opportunities for the future. Although stock
repurchase programs do not create any new wealth for the shareholders, they do not destroy
it either. In contrast, managerial actions (or inactions) that result in wealth losses to the
shareholders.

Real meaning of the value/capital ratio

We can show this NPV and EVA connection by simply dividing the firm’s enterprise value, V, by
invested capital, C, according to:

A firm’s enterprise value-to-capital ratio, V/C, exceeds one if and only if in a well functioning
capital market the firm has positive net present value. In contrast, the V/C ratio falls below
unity when the firm invests in wealth destroying or negative NPV projects—such that the NPV-
to-Capital ratio turns negative.

Wealth-creating firms have an enterprise value-to-capital ratio that exceeds unity because
they have positive net present value.

The source of the positive NPV is due to the positive discounted economic profit. In turn, EVA
is positive because the firm’s after tax cash return on investment, ROC, exceeds the weighted
average cost of capital, COC. These relationships point to the central role of EVA and related
economic profit metrics in the theory of finance.

Relatedness of economic profit metrics

CFROI, for cash flow return on investment, is another prominent economic profit measure that
is consistent with the principles of wealth maximization.

CFROI is the after-tax rate of return (IRR) on a company’s existing assets. In principle, CFROI is
that rate that sets the present value of the after-tax operating cash flows equal to their
investment cost. Like any IRR, CFROI is that rate which sets a company’s net present value
equal to zero. Consequently, the firm’s NPV is positive if CFROI exceeds the “hurdle rate” or
cost of capital, while the firm’s net present value is negative when the anticipated cash flow
return on investment falls short of the required return on invested capital.

Wealth equivalency of EVA and CFROI

On the EVA side of the wealth creator ledger, the firm’s NPV can always be viewed as the
present value of the anticipated economic profit. In this context, EVA is the yearly (or periodic)
equivalent of the firm’s net present value.

On the CFROI side of the wealth creator ledger, the firm’s NPV is positive when CFROI on the
average exceeds the corporate-wide hurdle rate.

But EVA, and therefore NPV, is positive if and only if the firm’s residual return on capital (IRR
minus COC) is greater than zero. We’ll now see that cash flow return on investment (CFROI) is
the same internal rate of return that drives the sign of economic profit when measured
relative
to the cost of invested capital.

In the two-period illustration, the firm’s CFROI is that rate which sets the discounted value of
the expected cash operating profit less the investment cost, C, equal to zero:

The formal relationship between the firm’s net present value and its cash flow return on
investment (CFROI) according to:

As expected, the firm’s net present value is positive if and only if CFROI (or the expected IRR) is
greater than the cost of capital, COC.

Chapter 3: EVA in the theory of finance ll: financing decisions
Capital structure theory: a closer look
Wealth is created in the MM world by investing in positive NPV equivalently, discounted
positive economic profit opportunities. As a practical consequence, the substitution of debt for
equity shares or the substitution of equity shares for debt by managers is a dubious way to
create economic profit and shareholder value.

Pivotal role of the cost of equity

MM Proposition II states that the expected return on a “levered” firm’s—typically viewed as a
company with long-term debt outstanding stock is a linear function of the debt-to-equity ratio,
D/E. Required return relationship as:

In this expression, re is the required return on the levered firm’s stock, COCu is the expected
return or cost of capital for an equivalent business risk “unlevered” firm, rd is the cost of debt
capital, and D/E is the ratio of debt to equity.

The cost of capital for the levered firm is a weighted average cost of debt and levered equity.

The cost of capital for the levered firm, COCi, is equal to the cost of invested capital for the
equivalent business risk unlevered firm namely, COCu.

Invariance of financing decision on wealth creation

EVA is the firm’s estimated economic profit and in the second expression NOPAT is the
unlevered net operating profit after taxes. In turn, ROC is the after-tax return on invested
capital and COC is the weighted average cost of debt and equity capital. The letter C in the
two-period model denotes the firm’s initial capital investment.

However, for Modigliani-Miller reasons that were explained before, the firm’s cost of capital is
independent of changes in the mix of debt and equity shares on the balance sheet.
Consequently, we now see why COCi = COCu = COC in the two-period NPV model.

Toward a set of EVA propositions

The MM capital structure foundation to enumerate a set of EVA-based propositions:

EVA Proposition I: Given the investment decision, the firm’s economic profit is invariant to the
capital structure decision. This occurs because (1) ROC is the aftertax return on an unlevered
company, and (2) in a perfect capital market, COC is independent of the financing decision.

EVA Proposition II: The net present value of a company is independent of the corporate
financing decision. This is the present value equivalent of EVA Proposition I since EVA is the
annualized (or annuity) equivalent of a firm’s NPV.

EVA Proposition III: In a perfect capital market, the firm’s enterprise value is independent of
the capital structure decision. This follows from EVA Propositions I and II and because the
value of the firm can always be expressed as invested capital plus the NPV addition to invested
capital.

Traditional view of capital structure

The traditional approach can be examined in a world with no taxes and a world with taxes and
deductibility of debt interest expense at the corporate level. The traditional capital structure
discussion in a no tax world—or better yet, a world with taxes, but no deductibility of debt
interest expense.

Inefficient risks pricing in the traditional view

The incomplete response by shareholders to changing debt levels means that the required
return on levered stock is (for a time) less than the perfect market response as reflected in
MM Proposition II. We can capture this risk pricing inequality for the levered firm’s stock in
terms of:

re,T is the expected return on the levered firm’s stock in the traditional view, while re,MM is
the Modigliani-Miller required return on levered stock that we looked at before.

The cost of capital implication of this risk pricing inequality is transparent. That is, if the
required return on levered stock is not fully responsive to changes in the debt-to-equity ratio
then corporate managers can utilize debt financing to lower COC.

Unlike MM, this means that investment and financing decisions are no longer separable.

If the traditional view is applicable in real world capital markets, then economic profit and
shareholder value may rise in a doubly beneficial way to the announcement of investment
opportunities that are financed with a sizable amount of debt.

Leverage effects on ROE

From the traditional perspective, we could just as easily show that a larger proportion of debt
in the firm’s capital structure leads to higher accounting profitability ratios such as earning per
share and return on equity.

Dupont formula to show the impact of leverage on the accounting return on equity.

ROA is the accounting rate of return on assets
D/A is the debt-to-asset measure of corporate leverage.

When the debt-to-asset ratio rises relative to ROA, a smaller amount of equity capital is
generating the same amount of accounting profit—hence the shareholder return on equity
rises. On the other hand, a decline in ROE happens when a larger equity base is being used to
earn the same amount of after-tax accounting profit.

ROE volatility

The traditional Dupont formula is that it can be used to illustrate the underlying volatility in the
accounting return on equity at varying debt levels.

According to MM Proposition II, the leverage-induced volatility in the accounting return on

equity, ROE, should already be reflected in the required return on levered stock.

Clearly, what is key here from the Modigliani-Miller perspective is not the debt per se, but
rather the business-risk changes that impact the expected return on unlevered stock in other
words, COCu, the cost of capital for the unlevered firm.

Along this line, managers and investors must be particularly cognizant of business-risk changes
that result in heightened volatility in invested capital returns (ROC) and sudden changes in the
(unlevered) cost of capital.

A graphical look at MM and traditional views


Exhibit 3.5 shows that in the traditional view the cost of capital falls as the firm adds debt to its
capital structure. This happens because investors do not see the rising level of debt relative to
capital and therefore do not require a higher level of expected return to compensate for the
added financial risk.

shows how corporate debt policy impacts the levered firm’s cost of capital in MM and
traditional viewpoints.

Shows the resulting impact of competing capital structure positions on enterprise value and
shareholder value.

Vu represents the enterprise value of the unlevered firm a firm having no long-term debt
outstanding while Vi denotes the levered firm’s enterprise value. In the traditional view, we
see that when the debt-to-capital ratio rises from 0% to the target level of, say, 40%, the
enterprise value of the firm and its stock price go up.

Taxes with deductibility of debt interest

This tax imperfection can impact economic profit because a company receives a yearly debt
tax subsidy that shows up in the cost of capital. Specifically, it can be shown that in a world
with taxes and deductibility of debt interest expense, the firm’s weighted average cost of
capital boils down to:

In this expression Te is the firm’s “effective” debt tax subsidy expressed as a rate, and D/C is
the “target” debt-to-capital ratio. As before, COCi is the cost of capital for a levered company,
while COCu denotes the cost of invested capital for an equivalent business risk unlevered firm.

If a company’s debt tax subsidy rate is positive as emphasized in the traditional view of capital
structure then the levered firm’s cost of capital is lower than the cost of capital for the
unlevered firm. In this case, the anticipated economic profit and the currently measured NPV
of the levered firm would be higher than that available to unlevered shareholders. If a
company’s debt tax subsidy rate were zero as argued in the original MM paper then the
levered firm’s cost of capital would equal the cost of capital for the unlevered firm. When this
happens, a company’s economic profit, NPV, and enterprise value are invariant to the
packaging of debt and equity securities on the balance sheet.

How to choose between growth and ROIC - Koller

Companies enjoying strong ROIC can afford to let it decline over the short term to pursue
growth and that companies with low returns are better off improving ROIC than emphasizing
growth.

Invested capital (ROIC) can be an equally or still more important indicator of value creation.

For companies that already have high ROIC, raising revenues faster than the market generates
higher total returns to shareholders (TRS) than further improvements to ROIC do.

Companies that fall in the middle of the ROIC scale have no latitude to let their performance
on either measure decline. For these companies, improving ROIC without maintaining growth
at the pace of market or generating growth at the cost of lower ROIC usually results in a below
- market TRS.

¿Quién necesita presupuestos? - Jeremy Hope y Robin Fraser

Varias empresas han reconocido el verdadero alcance del daño que causa el proceso
presupuestario. Se han negado a depender de información obsoleta y no quieren participar
de la larga y mezquina disputa por lo que esta información dice acerca del futuro. También
rechazan las conclusiones predeterminadas que vienen incrustadas en los presupuestos
tradicionales, conclusiones que le quitan sentido al flujo e interpretación de la nueva
información de mercado de las acciones transadas de la empresa en red basada en el
conocimiento.

En las empresas que usan estos estándares de desempeño, las unidades de negocios se
vuelven más pequeñas, más numerosas y más emprendedoras. Al tener muchos equipos
pequeños aprovechando las oportunidades locales se consigue, como resultado final, una
organización mucho más adaptable.


Abandonar las metas presupuestarias libera a la empresa para dar el reconocimiento que
corresponde a un amplio rango de información emergente. Y compartir esa información puede
constituir la base de un nuevo tipo de relación con los mercados de capitales.

Liberarse del presupuesto

En lugar de adoptar metas anuales fijas, las unidades de negocios establecen objetivos de
más largo plazo, basándose en referentes tales como el retorno sobre capital. Los elementos o
factores que se miden son los indicadores de desempeño clave o KPI (siglas en inglés por key
performance indicators: utilidades, flujos de caja, tasas de costos, satisfacción del cliente y
calidad). Los criterios de medición son el desempeño de los grupos internos o externos y los
resultados de los períodos anteriores. Los KPI, que tienden a ser financieros en el tope de la
organización y más operacionales en las unidades más cercanas a la primera línea, cumplen las
funciones autorreguladoras de los presupuestos. Sin embargo, los KPI no necesitan ser tan
precisos.


Nuevo contrato de desempeño:

Como creció el problema del presupuesto

A pesar de la capacidad de las grandes computadoras para manejar cifras, el presupuesto
sigue siendo un proceso costoso y largo, que absorbe hasta un 30% del tiempo de la
gerencia.

Un informe señala que nueve de cada 10 de ellos creen que es aparatoso y poco confiable. Entre
las quejas se incluye que quita tiempo a actividades que aportan un valor mucho mayor, como
dar información a los gerentes para que puedan tomar decisiones.

Los presupuestos, usados de manera responsable, sirven de base para un buen
entendimiento entre los niveles de la organización y pueden ayudar a la alta gerencia a
mantener el control sobre múltiples divisiones y unidades de negocio.


Partidarios del nuevo enfoque de presupuesto:

● Svenska Handelsbanken: Banco sueco que tiene mejor desempeño que las demás en
prácticamente todos los parámetros, incluyendo retorno sobre patrimonio, retorno
total del accionista, utilidades por acción, relación costo-utilidad (o costo-facturación en
la terminología de otros sectores) y satisfacción del cliente:

a. Organización: Prescinde de una función central de marketing y de metas de ventas.
las sucursales individuales tienen la responsabilidad de reducir los costos, satisfacer
las necesidades del cliente y mejorar las utilidades.
b. Desempeño: Fijan sus propias metas basándose en las mejoras que quieren lograr.
Las sucursales compiten unas con otras en la relación costo-utilidad, así como
también en las utilidades por empleado y utilidades totales. Los resultados se
ponen de forma destacada en lo que la empresa llama la tabla de posiciones.
c. Recursos: Las sucursales poseen la autoridad para decidir si el ingreso generado por,
digamos, la apertura de muchas cuentas nuevas vale la pena frente a los mayores
costos que esas nuevas cuentas implicarán.
d. Información: Rápido y eficiente para detectar cualquier cambio de tendencia, y
con capacidad para supervisar online la rentabilidad por región y por sucursal.

● Ahlsell: La empresa se dio cuenta de que podía lograr ahorros sustanciales y mejoras
operativas si centralizaba el almacenaje, las tareas administrativas y el apoyo logístico,
a la vez que entregaba la responsabilidad a un mayor número de centros de utilidades.

En la época en que Ahlsell usaba presupuestos, no supervisaba cuán rentables eran las
cuentas de clientes individuales o lo que costaba reemplazarlas con nuevos clientes. Las
ventas se trataban como un fin en sí mismas y la empresa simplemente pagaba a sus
vendedores para que vendieran productos. Desde la abolición de los presupuestos, el
sistema de contabilidad ha estado produciendo información sobre la rentabilidad de
los clientes


Pronósticos móviles: No prevén una “meta final” fija al terminar el año fiscal, fecha en que los
ingresos, costos y otros elementos se miden frente a los objetivos a esas alturas desfasados del
presupuesto. Incluyen sólo unas pocas variables clave, como órdenes, ventas, costos y gastos de
capital, lo que significa que se pueden recopilar de manera relativamente fácil y rápida, a veces
por una sola persona en un solo día. Los pronósticos móviles son más precisos por dos motivos:

● Se actualizan constantemente según las últimas estimaciones de las tendencias
económicas.
● Nadie tiene motivos para manipular o modificar las cifras, porque no hay metas fijas de
utilidades ni castigos por no cumplirlas.

Los pronósticos móviles siempre miran hacia el futuro y apuntan a la misma distancia, lo que
permite a la compañía ver si el desempeño va en camino de cumplir las metas que están a un
año o más de distancia. Permiten a los responsables de finanzas recolectar y administrar el
efectivo necesario para los pagos de impuestos y gastos de capital, y ayudan a los gerentes de
operaciones a estimar la capacidad, lo cual les permite planificar ante expansiones o
contracciones de la demanda.

 Applied corporate finance - Damodaran

Chapter 3: The Basics of Risk

Risk has to be measured from the perspective of not just any investor in the stock, but of the
marginal investor, defined to be the investor most likely to be trading on the stock at any given
point in time.

The risk in a company can be viewed very differently by investors in its stock (equity investors)
and by lenders to the firm (bondholders and bankers). Equity investors who benefit from upside
as well as downside tend to take a much more sanguine view of risk than lenders who have
limited upside but potentially high downside.

The characteristics of a good risk and return model:

1. It should come up with a measure of risk that applies to all assets and not be asset-
specific.
2. It should clearly delineate what types of risk are rewarded and what are not, and
provide a rationale for the delineation.
3. It should come up with standardized risk measures, an investor presented with a risk measure
for an individual asset should be able to draw conclusions about whether the asset is above-
average or below-average risk.
4. It should translate the measure of risk into a rate of return that the investor should
demand as compensation for bearing the risk.
5. It should work well not only at explaining past returns, but also in predicting future
expected returns.

Equity Risk and Expected Returns

1. Measuring Risk

Investors who buy an asset expect to make a return over the time horizon that they will hold the
asset. The actual return that they make over this holding period may by very different from the
expected return, and this is where the risk comes in.

Variance in Returns: This is a measure of the squared difference between the actual returns and
the expected returns on an investment.

In the special case of the normal distribution, returns are symmetric and investors do not have
to worry about skewness and kurtosis, since there is no skewness and a normal distribution is
defined to have a kurtosis of zero. Investments can be measured on only two dimensions

 a. The 'expected return' on the investment comprises the reward,
b. The variance in anticipated returns comprises the risk on the investment.

In this scenario, an investor faced with a choice between two investments with the same
expected return but different standard deviations, will always pick the one with the lower
standard deviation.

The return moments that we run into in practice are almost always estimated using past returns
rather than future returns. The assumption we are making when we use historical variances is
that past return distributions are good indicators of future return distributions. When this
assumption is violated, as is the case when the asset’s characteristics have changed significantly
over time, the historical estimates may not be good measures of risk.

2. Rewarded and Unrewarded Risk

The components of Risk:

a. Project – specific risk: This is risk that affects only the project under consideration,
and may arise from factors specific to the project or estimation error.

b. Competitive risk: This is the unanticipated effect on the cashflows in a project of
competitor actions - these effects can be positive or negative.

c. Industry – specific risk: These are unanticipated effects on project cashflows of
industry-wide shifts in technology, changes in laws or in the price of a commodity.

d. International risk: This is the additional uncertainty created in cashflows of projects
by unanticipated changes in exchange rates and by political risk in foreign markets.

e. Market risk: Refers to the unanticipated changes in project cashflows created by
changes in interest rates, inflation rates and the economy that affect all firms,
though to differing degrees.

Why diversification reduces or eliminates firm - specific risk

Diversification: This is the process of holding many investments in a portfolio, either across the
same asset class (eg. stocks) or across asset classes (real estate, bonds etc.

Risk that affect one of a few firms can be reduced or even eliminated by investors as they hold
more diverse portfolios due to two reasons.

1. Each investment in a diversified portfolio is a much smaller percentage of that
portfolio. The impact on the overall portfolio will be small.
2. The effects of firm-specific actions on the prices of individual assets in a portfolio
can be either positive or negative for each asset for any period

The expected returns and variance of a two-asset portfolio can be written as a function of these
inputs and the proportion of the portfolio going to each asset.

The savings that accrue from diversification are a function of the correlation coefficient. Other
things remaining equal, the higher the correlation in returns between the two assets, the smaller
are the potential benefits from diversification.

Identifying the marginal inverstor

The marginal investor in a firm is the investor who is most likely to be trading on its stock at the
margin and therefore has the most influence on the pricing of its equity. In some cases, this may
be a large institutional investor, but institutional investors themselves can differ in several ways.

· If the firm has relatively small institutional holdings but substantial holdings by wealthy
individual investors, the marginal investor is an individual investor with a significant
equity holding in the firm.
· If the firm has small institutional holdings and small insider holdings, its stock is held by
large numbers of individual investors with small equity holdings.

· If the firm has significant institutional holdings and small insider holdings, the marginal
investor is almost always a diversified, institutional investor.

· If the firm has significant institutional holdings and large insider holdings, the choice for
marginal investor becomes a little more complicated.

If the marginal investors are diversified institution and the only risk that they see in a company
is the risk that they cannot diversify away, managers at the firm should be considering only that
risk, when making investments. If the marginal investors are undiversified individuals, they will
care about all risk in a company and the firm should therefore consider all risk, when making
investments.

Why is the marginal investor assumed to be diversified?

The risk in an investment will always be perceived to be higher for an undiversified investor than
to a diversified one, since the latter does not consider any firm-specific risk while the former
does. If both investors have the same perceptions about future earnings and cashflows on an
asset, the diversified investor will be willing to pay a higher price for that asset because of his or
her risk perceptions.

3. Measuring Market Risk

a. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM):

Assumes that there are no transactions costs, all assets are traded and that investments are
infinitely divisible. It also assumes that there is no private information and that investors

therefore cannot find under or over valued assets in the market place. By making these
assumptions, it eliminates the factors that cause investors to stop diversifying.

In CAPM, investors adjust for their risk preferences in their allocation decisions, where they
decide how much to invest in an asset with guaranteed returns – a riskless asset - and how much
in risky assets (market portfolio).

Riskless Asset: A riskless asset is one, where the actual return is always equal to the expected return

These results are predicated on two additional assumptions.

1. There exists a riskless asset.

2. Investors can lend and borrow at this riskless rate to arrive at their optimal allocations.

The risk of an individual asset to an investor will be the risk that this asset adds on to the market
portfolio.

Beta: The beta of any investment in the CAPM is a standardized measure of the risk that it adds to the
market portfolio.

The expected return on an asset can be written as a function of the risk-free rate and the beta
of that asset:

To use CAPM it needs 3 inputs:

1. The riskless asset is defined to be an asset where the investor knows the expected return
with certainty for the time horizon of the analysis.
2. The risk premium is the premium demanded by investors for investing in the market
portfolio, which includes all risky assets in the market, instead of investing in a riskless
asset.
3. The beta, which we defined to be the covariance of the asset divided by the market
portfolio, is the only firm-specific input in this equation.

b. The Arbitrage Pricing Model (APM)

APM begins by breaking risk down into two components. The first is firm specific and covers
information that affects primarily the firm. The second is the market risk that affects all
investment; this would include unanticipated changes in a number of economic variables,
including gross national product, inflation, and interest rates.

APM allows for multiple sources of market-wide risk, and measures the sensitivity of
investments to each source with what a factor betas.

The return on a portfolio will not have a firm-specific component of unanticipated returns. The
return on a portfolio can then be written as the sum of two weighted averages -that of the
anticipated returns in the portfolio and that of the factor betas:

The fact that the beta of a portfolio is the weighted average of the betas of the assets in the
portfolio, in conjunction with the absence of arbitrage, leads to the conclusion that expected
returns should be linearly related to betas.

It provides 2 inputs:

1. It specifies the number of common factors that affected the historical data that it worked on.
2. It measures the beta of each investment relative to each of the common factors.

c. The multi factor model

Multi-factor models generally are not based on extensive economic rationale but are
determined by the data. Once the number of factors has been identified in the arbitrage pricing
model, the behavior of the factors over time can be extracted from the data.

E(R) = Rf + βGNP (E(RGNP)-Rf) + βi (E(Ri)-Rf) ...+ βδ (E(Rδ)-Rf)

βGNP = Beta relative to changes in industrial production

E(RGNP) = Expected return on a portfolio with a beta of one on the industrial production
factor, and zero on all other factors

βi = Beta relative to changes in inflation

E(Ri) = Expected return on a portfolio with a beta of one on the inflation factor, and zero
on all other factors

d. Proxy Models

Start with how investments are priced by markets and relate returns earned to observable
variables. In a pure proxy model, you could plug the market capitalization and book to market
ratio for any company into this regression to get expected monthly returns.

a. Earnings Momentum: Equity research analysts will find vindication in research that seems to
indicate that companies that have reported stronger than expected earnings growth in the past
earn higher returns than the rest of the market.
b. Price Momentum: Chartists will smile when they read this, but researchers have concluded
that price momentum carries over into future periods.
c. Liquidity: In a nod to real world costs, there seems to be clear evidence that stocks that are
less liquid (lower trading volume, higher bid-ask spreads) earn higher returns than more liquid
stocks.

3 dangers:

a. Data mining: As the amount of data that we have on companies increases and becomes more
accessible, it is inevitable that we will find more variables that are related to returns.

b. Standard error: Since proxy models come from looking at historical data, they carry all of the
burden of the noise in the data.

c. Pricing error or Risk proxy: For decades, value investors have argued that you should invest in
stocks with low PE ratios that trade at low multiples of book value and have high dividend yields,
pointing to the fact that you will earn higher returns by doing so. Using the circular logic of these
models, markets are always efficient because any inefficiency that exists is just another risk
proxy that needs to get built into the model.

e. Alternatives to stock price based Models
Accounting Risk Measures: firms that have low debt ratios, high dividends, stable and growing
accounting earnings and large cash holdings should be less risky to equity investors than firms
without these characteristics.

1. Pick one accounting ratio and create scaled risk measures around that ratio.
2. Compute an accounting beta: Rather than estimate a beta from market prices, an
accounting beta is estimated from accounting numbers.

Cost of debt-based measures: The cost of debt is explicit at least at the time of borrowing and
takes the form of an interest rate. While it is true that this stated interest rate may not be a good
measure of cost of debt later in the loan life, the cost of debt for firms with publicly traded bonds
outstanding can be computed as the yield to maturity (an observable and updated number) on
those bonds.

Cost of equity = Cost of debt (Standard deviation of equity/ Standard deviation of bond)

The Risk in Borrowing: Default Risk and the Cost of Debt

The Determinants of Default Risk

• Firms that generate high cashflows relative to their financial obligations have
lower default risk than do firms that generate low cashflows relative to obligations.
• The more stable the cashflows, the lower is the default risk in the firm.
• The more liquid a firm’s assets, for any given level of operating cashflows and financial
obligations, the less default risk in the firm.

Default Risk and Interest rates

The Ratings Process
The process of rating a bond starts when a company requests a rating from the ratings agency.
This request is usually precipitated by a desire on the part of the company to issue bonds.

Determinants of Bond Ratings
The bond ratings assigned by ratings agencies are primarily based upon publicly available
information, though private information conveyed by the firm to the rating agency does play a
role.

Risk, as we define it in finance, is measured based upon deviations of actual returns on an
investment from its' expected returns. There are two types of risk. The first, which we call equity
risk, arises in investments where there are no promised cash flows, but there are expected cash
flows. The second,, default risk, arises on investments with promised cash flows.
On investments with equity risk, the risk is best measured by looking at the variance of actual
returns around the expected returns, with greater variance indicating greater risk.

CHAPTER 4: RISK MEASUREMENT AND HURDLE RATES IN PRACTICE

Cost of Equity

Is the rate of return that investors require to invest in the equity of a firm.

1. Risk - Free Rate:

Requirements for an Asset to be Risk-Free

We defined a risk-free asset as one for which the investor knows the expected returns with
certainty.

• There has to be no default risk, which generally implies that the security has to be
issued by a government.

• There can be no uncertainty about reinvestment rates, which implies that there are no
intermediate cash flows.

Estimating Risk Free Rates

Risk free rates: Default Free Governments
the simplest measure of a risk free rate is the interest rate on a market-traded long-term
government bond.

Risk free rate: Governments have Default risk

Governments in these markets are perceived as capable of defaulting even on local borrowing.
When this is coupled with the fact that many governments do not borrow long-term in the local
currency, there are scenarios in which obtaining a risk-free rate in that currency, especially for
the long term, becomes difficult.

2. Risk Premiun

What Is the Risk Premium Supposed to Measure?

The risk premium in the CAPM measures the extra return that would be demanded by investors
for shifting their money from a riskless investment to the market portfolio or risky investments,
on average. It should be a function of two variables:

1. Risk Aversion of Investors: As investors become more risk-averse, they should
demand a larger premium for shifting from the riskless asset.
2. Riskiness of the Average Risk Investment: As the riskiness of the average risk investment
increases, so should the premium.

Estimating Risk Premiums

a. Survey Premiuns

· There are no constraints on reasonability; individual money managers could provide expected
returns that are lower than the risk-free rate, for instance.
· Survey premiums are extremely volatile; the survey premiums can change dramatically, largely
as a function of recent market movements.

· Survey premiums tend to be short-term; even the longest surveys do not go beyond one year.

b. Historical Premiuns

The most common approach to estimating the risk premium(s) used in financial asset pricing
models is to base it on historical data.

1. The risk aversion of investors has not changed in a systematic way across time.

2. The average riskiness of the “risky” portfolio (stock index) has not changed in a
systematic way across time.

Estimation Issues

· Choice of Risk-Free Security
· Arithmetic and Geometric Averages
· Time Period Used

A Modified Historical Risk Premium

1. Country Bond Default Spreads: We used the sovereign default spreads for
countries, estimated either from the sovereign ratings or the CDS market to
adjust government bond rates to arrive at risk free rates.

2. Relative Standard Deviation: There are some analysts who believe that the
equity risk premiums of markets should reflect the differences in equity risk, as
measured by the volatilities of these markets.

3. Default Spreads + Relative Standard Deviations: The country default spreads
that come with country ratings provide an important first step, but still only
measure the premium for default risk.


Choosing an Equity Risk Premium

1. When stock prices enter an extended phase of upward (downward) movement, the historical
risk premium will climb (drop) to reflect past returns.
2. Survey premiums reflect historical data more than expectations. When stocks are going up,
investors tend to become more optimistic about future returns and survey premiums reflect this
optimism.
3. When the fundamentals of a market change, either because the economy becomes more
volatile or investors get more risk averse, historical risk premiums will not change but implied
premiums will.

Factors
a. Predictive Power
b. Beliefs about market
c. Purpose of the analysis

3. Risk Parameters

 a. Historical Market Beats:

To estimate returns that an investor would have made investing in its equity in intervals
(such as a week or a month) over that period.

(Rj –Rf)=α+βj (Rm-Rf)

Jensen’ s Alpha: This is the difference between the actual return on an asset and the return you
would have expected it to make during a past period, given what the market did, and the asset’s
beta.

b. Fundamental Betas

Determinants of Betas

1. The type of business

2. The degree of operating leverage in the firm
3. The firm´s financial leverage

Bottom - up Betas

1. Identify the business that make up the firm whose beta we are trying to estimate.
2. Estimate the average unlevered betas of other publicly traded firms that are primarily
or only in each of these businesses:
● Comparable firms
● Beta estimation: Use betas estimated against different indices
● Unlever First or Last: Use an unlevered beta or an average beta.
● Averaging Approach: Can be either a simple average or a weighted average
● Adjustment for cash : Unlevered beta may be affected by the cash holdings of the firms.

3. Take a weighted average of the unlevered betas, using the proportion of firm value
derived from each business as the weights.
4. Calculate the current debt to equity ratio for the firm, using market values if available.
5. Estimate the levered beta for the equity in the firm (and each of its businesses) using
the unlevered beta from Step 3 and the debt to equity ratio from Step 4.

3 advanges:

We can estimate betas for firms that have no price history because all we need is an
identification of the business or businesses they operate in.

Because the beta for the business is obtained by averaging across a large number of regression
betas, it will be more precise than any individual firm’s regression beta estimate.

The bottom-up beta can reflect recent and even forthcoming changes to a firm´s business mix
and financial leverage, because we can change the mix of businesses and the weight on each
business in making the beta estimate.

c. Accounting Betas

Estimate the beta of a firm or its equity from accounting earnings rather than from traded
prices.

4. Estimating the Cost of Equity

Can be estimated using risk and return models—the CAPM, where risk is measured relative to a
single market factor; the APM, where the cost of equity is determined by the sensitivity to
multiple unspecified economic factors; or a multifactor model, where sensitivity to
macroeconomic variables is used to measure risk.

• In both these models, the key inputs are the risk-free rate, the risk premiums, and the beta (in
the CAPM) or betas (in the APM). The last of these inputs is usually estimated using historical
data on prices.

• Although the betas are estimated using historical data, they are determined by the
fundamental decisions that a firm makes on its business mix, operating, and financial leverage.
Consequently, we can get much better estimates of betas by looking at sector averages and
correcting for differences across firms.

From Cost of Equity to Cost of Capital

The cost of capital is the weighted average of the costs of the different components of
financing—including debt, equity, and hybrid securities—used by a firm to fund its financial
requirements.

The Costs of Non-equity Financing

The Cost of Debt: measures the current cost to the firm of borrowing funds to finance projects.

1. The current level of interest rates

2. The default risk of the company

3. The tax advantage associated with debt

Short- term and Long-term Debt

short-term debt is cheaper than long-term debt and that secured debt is cheaper than
unsecured debt.

Operating Leases and Other Fixed Commitments

The debt in a firm should include all interest-bearing liabilities, short term as well as long term,
and lease commitments, no matter how they are categorized by accountants. Non-interest
bearing liabilities such as accounts payable and supplier credit should not be treated as debt for
computing cost of capital, unless we are willing to identify and measure the imputed interest
expenses (lost discounts and higher costs) from using this financing.

Book and Market Interest Rates

A company that has debt that it took on when interest rates were low cannot contend that it
has a low cost of debt.

Assessing the Tax Advantage of Debt

• Interest expenses offset the marginal dollar of income and the tax advantage has to be
therefore calculated using the marginal tax rate.

After-Tax Cost of Debt = Pretax Cost of Debt (1 – Marginal Tax Rate)

• To obtain the tax advantages of borrowing, firms have to be profitable. In other words, there
is no tax advantage from interest expenses to a firm that has operating losses.

Calculating the Cost of Other Hybrid Securities

· An option-pricing model can be used to value the conversion option, and the
remaining value of the bond can be attributed to debt.
· The convertible bond can be valued as if it were a straight bond, using the rate at
which the firm can borrow in the market, given its default risk (pretax cost of debt)
as the interest rate on the bond.

Calculating the Weights of Debt and Equity Components

Choices for Weighting

• Book value is more reliable than market value because it is not as volatile: Although it is true
that book value does not change as much as market value, this is more a reflection of
weakness than strength, because the true value of the firm changes over time as new
information comes out about the firm and the overall economy.

• Using book value rather than market value is a more conservative approach to estimating
debt ratios.

• Because accounting returns are computed based on book value, consistency requires the use
of book value in computing cost of capital: Although it may seem consistent to use book values
for both accounting return and cost of capital calculations, it does not make economic sense.

Estimating Market Values


The Market Value of Equity

The market value of equity is generally the number of shares outstanding times the current
stock price.
• Multiple Classes of Shares: If there is more than one class of shares outstanding, the market
values of all of these securities should be aggregated and treated as equity.

• Equity Options: If there other equity claims in the firm—warrants and conversion options in
other securities—these should also be valued and added on to the value of the equity in the
firm.

The Market Value of Debt

The market value of debt is usually more difficult to obtain directly because very few firms
have all of their debt in the form of bonds outstanding trading in the market. Many firms have

nontraded debt, such as bank debt, which is specified in book value terms but not market
value terms.

Estimating and Using the Cost of Capital

The cost of capital is the minimum acceptable hurdle rate that will be used to determine
whether to invest in a project.

the cost of equity vs the cost of capital :

• If we want to adopt the perspective of just the equity investors in a business or a project and
measure the returns earned just by these investors on their investment, the cost of equity is
the correct hurdle rate to use. In measuring the returns to equity investors then, we have to
consider only the income or cash flows left over after all other claimholders needs (interest
payments on debt and preferred dividends, for instance) have been met.

• If the returns that we are measuring are composite returns to all claimholders, based on
earnings before payments to debt and preferred stockholders, the comparison should be to
the cost of capital.