Neypes vs.

Court of Appeals
469 SCRA 633

Facts:

Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of

land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary
injunction before the RTC of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro against the
private respondents.

Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint

on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners
allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3,
1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed
a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court
issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration
which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on
July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the
appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the trial court denied the notice of appeal

and held that it was filed eight days late. This was received by
petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners then filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied in an order dated
September 3, 1998.

Aggrieved, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of

appeal before the CA via a petition for certiorari and mandamus
under Rule 65. Petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed

their notice of appeal and argued that the 15-day reglementary

period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this
was the day they received the final order of the trial court which
denied their motion for reconsideration. Thus, when they filed
their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had
elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for
appeal.

On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition and ruled

that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned
from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12,
1998 order dismissing their complaint. The CA further held that
such order was the “final order” appealable under the Rules.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied by the CA. Hence, this petition for review.

Issues:
1. What should be deemed as the “final order,” receipt of which
triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal:
the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the
July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration?

2. Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time?

Ruling:
1. The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration should be deemed as the “final order.”

The Court held that the right to appeal is neither a natural right
nor a part of due process but rather, a mere statutory privilege
which may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law. Thus, a party who seeks to avail of the
right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules.
Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The
period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP
129, as amended, provides:

Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders,
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all
these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of
the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed
from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period
for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of
judgment appealed from. x x x

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken

within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or
final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record
on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or
final order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for

new trial or reconsideration.

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days

from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from.

A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case,

leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. Its effect
is an adjudication on the merits or it may be an order or judgment
that dismisses an action.

In this case, the order of July 1, 1998 denying petitioners’ motion

for reconsideration should be construed as the “final order” the
receipt of which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary
period.

2. Yes, petitioners filed their notice of appeal on time.

The Supreme Court, having the sole prerogative to amend, repeal

or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive
process, and the speedy disposition of cases, may promulgate
procedural rules in all courts.

With this, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of

15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional
Trial Court, reckoned from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. This is to
standardize the appeal periods in the Rules so as to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases.

Based on the foregoing, the Court held that petitioners filed their
notice of appeal on time and within the fresh period of 15 days,
counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying
their motion for reconsideration).