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Torts Cases
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
APPEALS, DR. ELINO G. FORTADES, MARISOL A. FORTADES AND 1. Case Filed – Civil Case for Damages for Breach of Contract of Carriage
FATIMA A. FORTADES. G.R. No. 108897, October 02, 1997 to recover the value of the remaining lost items, as well as moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.
A. PARTIES: 2. RTC – ruled in favour of plaintiffs
1. Plaintiff – Elino, Marisol, Fatima Minerva Fortades (passengers) 3. CA – affirmed the RTC
2. Defendant – Petitioner Sarkies Tours (common carrier) 4. SC– affirmed
Here, the Marine Cargo Adjusters hired by the insurance companies conducted
a survey and found cracks in the bodega of the barge and heavy
concentration of molds on the tarpaulins and wooden boards. They did not
notice any seals in the hatches. The tarpaulins were not brand new as there
were patches on them, contrary to the claim of NFSSI thus making it possible
for water to seep in. They also discovered that the bulkhead of the barge was
rusty.
NFSSI proved that the vessel was inspected prior to actual loading by
representatives of the shipper and was found fit to take a load of corn grains.
They were also issued Permit to Sail by the Coast Guard. The master of the
vessel testified that the corn grains were farm wet when loaded. However, this
testimony was disproved by the clean bill of lading issued by North Front
Shipping Services, Inc., which did not contain a notation that the corn
grains were wet and improperly dried. Having been in the service since
1968, the master of the vessel would have known at the outset that corn
grains that were farm wet and not properly dried would eventually
deteriorate when stored in sealed and hot compartments as in hatches of
a ship. Equipped with this knowledge, the master of the vessel and his
crew should have undertaken precautionary measures to avoid or lessen
the cargo's possible deterioration as they were presumed knowledgeable
about the nature ofsuch cargo. But none of such measures was taken.
In fine, the Court held that the carrier failed to observe the required
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods placed in its care. The
proofs presented by NFSSI were insufficient to rebut the prima facie
presumption of negligence, more so if we consider the evidence adduced by
04. DR. VICTORIA L. BATIQUIN AND ALLAN BATIQUIN, PETITIONERS, Record, an Anaesthesia Record, a Nurse's Record, and a Physician's
VS.COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES QUEDO D. ACOGIDO AND FLOTILDE Discharge Summary.
G. VILLEGAS, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 118231, July 05, 1996
2. Defendant's Defense and/or Counterclaim
A. PARTIES
1. Plaintiff/Complainant with Background/Position Title, Occupation, etc C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mrs.Flotilde Villegas is a married woman who submitted to Dr.Batiquin 1. Case Filed - Damages
for prenatal care
2. RTC Ruling (inc damages awarded, if any)
2. Defendant; same same The trial court, however, regarded these documentary evidence as
Dr. Victoria Batiquin was a Resident Physician at the Negros Oriental mere hearsay, "there being no showing that the person or persons who
Provincial Hospital, Dumaguete City. She was also the Actg. Head of prepared them are deceased or unable to testify on the facts therein
the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the said Hospital
stated. There was also doubts as to the whereabouts of the piece of
3. Others rubber, as 2 versions arose from Dr.Kho’s testimony: (1) that it was sent
Dr. Ma. SaludKho – testimonial witness; a resident physician at the to the Pathologist in Cebu as testified to in Court by Dr.Kho and (2) that
Holy Child's Hospital in Dumaguete City Dr.Kho threw it away as told by her to Defendant. The failure of the
Plaintiffs to reconcile these two different versions served only to
B. ALLEGATIONS weaken their claim against Defendant Batiquin.
1. Plaintiff's Claim - Negligent Act/s of D; Relief/s Prayed for
The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants.
In the morning of September 21, 1988 Dr.Batiquin, along with other
physicians and nurses, performed a caesarean operation on Mrs. 3. CA - The CA reversed the decision.
Villegas and successfully delivered the latter’s baby. After leaving the
hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and complained 4. SC
of being feverish. She also gradually lost her appetite, so she consulted
Dr.Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain ISSUE: Whether or not Dr.Batiquin is liable
medicines. However, the pains still kept recurring. She then consulted
Dr. Ma. SaludKho. After examining her, Dr Kho suggested that Dr.Batiquin is liable
Mrs.Villegas submit to another surgery. When Dr.Kho opened the
abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside, an The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to
ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus, the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may
dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber material on the be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for
right side of the uterus, embedded on the ovarian cyst. The piece of specific proof of negligence. The rule, when applicable to the facts and
rubber appeared to be a part of a rubber glove. This was the cause of circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and does not
all of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the discomfort dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the
suffered by Mrs. Villegas. party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima
facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a
The piece of rubber allegedly found was not presented in court, and breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and
Dr.Kho testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent
examination. Aside from Dr.Kho's testimony, the evidence which and not readily available.
mentioned the piece of rubber are a Medical Certificate, a Progress
In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine
are present.First, the entire proceedings of the cesarean section were
under the exclusive control of Dr.Batiquin. In this light, the private
respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the
exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private respondent
Villegas' body, which, needless to say, does not occur unless through
the intervention of negligence. Second, since aside from the cesarean
section, private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation
which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her
uterus, it stands to reason that such could only have been a by-product
of the cesarean section performed by Dr.Batiquin. The petitioners, in
this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising
from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.Dr.Batiquin is therefore
liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private
respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.
The court reiterates its recognition of the vital role the medical
profession plays in the lives of the people and State's compelling
interest to enact measures to protect the public from "the potentially
deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would
undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. Indeed,
a physician is bound to serve the interest of his patients "with the
greatest of solicitude, giving them always his best talent and skill."
Through her tortious conduct, the petitioner endangered the life of
Flotilde Villegas, in violation of her profession's rigid ethical code and in
contravention of the legal standards set forth for professionals, in the
general and members of the medical profession, in particular.
05. DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND the fresh supply of oxygen as soon as it arrived. But at around 10:00
LYDIA UMALI, RESPONDENTS.[ G.R. No. 122445, November 18, 1997 ] o'clock P.M. she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to
60/50. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San
A. PARTIES Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and
a. Plaintiff/Complainant further examined. Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District
Lydia Umali – patient/deceased Hospital, she was wheeled into the operating room and the petitioner
and Dr.Ercillo re-operated on her because there was blood oozing from
Rowena Umali De Ocampo – daughter of Lydia Umali the abdominal incision. While the petitioner was closing the abdominal
wall, the patient died. Lydia Umali was pronounced dead. Her death
b. Defendant; same same certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of death and
Dr.Ninevetch Cruz – physician at the Perpetual Help Clinic and General "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent
Hospital cause.
Dr.LinaErcillo- attending anaesthesiologist during the operation of the b. Defendant's Defense and/or Counterclaim
deceased
This is a Certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals which Plaintiff, in turn, made several demands, both verbal and written, upon
affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering defendants but to no avail.
petitioner, as third-party defendant, to pay respondent Rita GuecoTapnio, as
third-party plaintiff, the sum of P2,379.71, plus 12% interest per annum from DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENTS (RITA TAPNIO):
September 19, 1957 until the same is fully paid, P200.00 attorney's fees and
costs, the same amounts which Rita GuecoTapnio was ordered to pay the Defendant claimed that when demand was made upon her by plaintiff for
Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc., to be paid directly to the her to pay her debt to the Bank, that she told the Plaintiff that she did not
Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. in full satisfaction of the consider herself to be indebted to the Bank at all because she had an
judgment rendered against Rita GuecoTapnio in favor of the former; plus agreement with one Jacobo-Nazon whereby she had leased to the latter
P500.00 attorney's fees for Rita GuecoTapnio and costs. her unused export sugar quota for the 1956-1957 agricultural year,
consisting of 1,000 piculs at the rate of P2.80 per picul, or for a total of
The basic action is the complaint filed by Philamgen (Philippine American P2,800.00, which was already in excess of her obligation guaranteed by
General Insurance Co., Inc.) as surety against Rita GuecoTapnio and plaintiff's bond.
CecilioGueco, for the recovery of the sum of P2,379.71 paid by Philamgen to This lease agreement, according to her, was with the knowledge of the
the Philippine National Bank on behalf of respondents Tapnio and Gueco, bank. But the Bank has placed obstacles to the consummation of the
pursuant to an indemnity agreement. Petitioner Bank was made third-party lease, and the delay caused by said obstacles forced 'Nazon to rescind the
defendant by Tapnio and Gueco on the theory that their failure to pay the debt lease contract. Thus, Rita GuecoTapnio filed her third-party complaint
was due to the fault or negligence of petitioner. against the Bank to recover from the latter any and all sums of money
which may be adjudged against her and in favor of the plaintiff plus moral
FACTS: damages, attorney's fees and costs.
Plaintiff executed its Bond with defendant Rita GuecoTapnio as principal, in PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS:
favor of the Philippine National Bank Branch at San Fernando, Pampanga, to
guarantee the payment of defendant Rita GuecoTapnio's account with said Petitioner argued that as an assignee of the sugar quota of Tapnio, it has
Bank. the right, both under its own Charter and under the Corporation Law, to
safeguard and protect its rights and interests under the deed of
In turn, to guarantee the payment of whatever amount the bonding company assignment, which include the right to approve or disapprove the said
would pay to the Philippine National Bank, both defendants executed the lease of sugar quota and in the exercise of that authority, its
indemnity agreement. Under the terms and conditions of this indemnity
agreement, whatever amount the plaintiff would pay would earn interest at the Board of Directors necessarily had authority to determine and fix the rental
rate of 12% per annum, plus attorney's fees in the amount of 15 % of the whole price per picul of the sugar quota subject of the lease between private
amount due in case of court litigation. respondents and Jacobo C. Tuazon. It argued further that both under its
Charter and the Corporation Law, petitioner, acting thru its Board of
The original amount of the bond was for P4,000.00; but the amount was later Directors, has the perfect right to adopt a policy with respect to fixing of
reduced to P2,000.00. rental prices of export sugar quota allocations, and in fixing the rentals at
P3.00 per picul, it did not act arbitrarily since the said Board was guided by
statistics of sugar price and prices of sugar quotas prevailing at the time.
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. This petitioner
Finally, petitioner emphasized that under the appealed judgment, it shall failed to do.
suffer a great injustice because as a creditor, it shall be deprived of a just
claim against its debtor (respondent Rita GuecoTapnio) as it would be Certainly, it knew that the agricultural year was about to expire, that by
required to return to respondent Philamgen the sum of P2,379.71, plus its disapproval of the lease private respondents would be unable to
interest, which amount had been previously paid to petitioner by said utilize the sugar quota in question.
insurance company in behalf of the principal debtor, herein respondent Rita
GuecoTapnio, and without recourse against respondent Rita GuecoTapnio. In failing to observe the reasonable degree of care and vigilance which
the surrounding circumstances reasonably impose, petitioner is
ISSUE: consequently liable for the damages caused on private respondents.
a. Whether or not a corporation is liable whenever a tortious act is Under Article 21 of the New Civil Code, "any person who wilfully causes
committed by an officer or agent under express direction or authority loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
from the stockholders or members acting as a body, or, generally, from customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
the directors as the governing body? (YES)
The afore-cited provisions on human relations were intended to expand
b. Whether or not petitioner is consequently liable for the damages caused
the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
on private respondents? (YES)
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.
RULING:
This is an Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City Thus, emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate
dated January 29, 1965 in Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer
upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate
damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or
occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his
and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, father, mother or guardian.
named AgapitoElcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused
was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is
intent to kill, coupled with mistake." demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
FACTS: incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, children who live in their company."
defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case
No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was
living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the
After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to
because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
of the parties has favored the court with a copy of the decision of
acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint
was the basis stated in the court's decision. (so please bear with the and solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is
absence of other pertinent details of the case) that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to
prevent them from causing damage to third persons.
And so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and
his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor
filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to. emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the
assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it
ISSUE: May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code be applied freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial
against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the litigation. And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.
occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistence from his father, was already legally married? Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of
the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable
RULING: for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property
which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent.
Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage
of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as
14. THE MANILA RAILROAD CO. VS LA COMPANIA TRANSATLANTICA Under the contract for transportation from England to Manila, the
AND THE ATLANTIC GULF &PACIFIC CO. Steamship Company is liable to the plaintiff for the injury done to the
boiler while it was being discharged from the ship.The contract to convey
A. PARTIES imports the duty to convey and deliver safely and securely with reference
1. Plaintiff to the degree of care which, under the circumstances, are required by law
THE MANILA RAILROAD CO.- owner of the locomotive boiler, the and custom applicable to the case.
subject of this case
2. Defendants Such being the contract of the Steamship Company, said company is
LA COMPAÑIA TRANSATLANTICA- steamship company who necessarily liable, under articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code, for the
owned the steamship, Alicante, where the locomotive boiler of consequences of the omission of the care necessary to the proper
plaintiff was aboarded performance of its obligation.Nor does the Steamship Company escape
THE ATLANTIC GULF & PACIFIC CO – employed by La liability by reason of the fact that it employed a competent independent
Companiato lift the boilers; it brings its floating crane in charge of contractor to discharge the boilers.
one named Leyden The conclusion must therefore be that if there had been no
contract of any sort between the Atlantic Company and the Steamship
B. ALLEGATIONS Company, an action, could have been maintained by the Railroad
1. Plaintiffs claim Company, as owner, against the Atlantic Company to recover the
The boiler fell when it was lifted from the steamship. The crane was damages sustained by the former
repaired and the boiler discharged, but it was found to be so badly
damaged that it had to be reshipped to England where it was rebuilt, The CompañiaTrasatlantica de Barcelona should be adjudged to
and afterwards was returned to Manila. The Railroad Company's pay to the Manila Railroad Company and when this judgment is satisfied,
damage by reason of the cost of repairs, expenses and loss of the the CompañiaTrasatlantica de Barcelona is declared to be entitled to
use of the boiler proved to be P23,343.29; To recover these recover the same amount from the Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company,
damages the present action was instituted by the Railroad Company against whom... judgment is to this end hereby rendered in favor of the
against the Steamship Company. CompañiaTrasatlantica de Barcelona.
2. Defendant’s claim
LA COMPAÑIA TRANSATLANTICA- It caused the Atlantic Company
to be brought in as a codefendant, and insisted that whatever liability
existed should be fixed upon the Atlantic Company as an
independent contractor who had undertaken to discharge the boilers
and had become responsible for such damage as had been done.
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. Case filed- action for damages
2. RTC Ruling- In favor of the plaintiff against the Atlantic Company, but
the absolved the Steamship Company from the complaint
3. CA – petition directly filed to the SC
4. SC
ISSUE: Can the Atlantic Company be held directly liable to the Railroad
Company?
No contractual relation existed directly between the Railroad Company
and the Atlantic Company.
15. M. H., RAKES vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY 3. CA – petition directly filed to the SC
4. SC
A. PARTIES
1. Plaintiff - M. H., RAKES.- one of a gang of eight Negro laborers in the ISSUE: Is plaintiff negligent to the extent that it contributed to
employment of the defendant the injuries he suffered?
2. Defendant - THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY-
company which employed plaintiff
THE COURT RULED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE.
B. ALLEGATIONS
1. Plaintiffs claim While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not
forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman
They were transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the workmen testify
company's yard near the Malecon in Manila. At a certain spot at or near that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang
the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he
upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this
was afterwards amputated at about the knee. It was proven that no contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the
repair was made to the weakened track after it was injured by a typhoon defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being made known
had any proper system of inspection. to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in
danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not
as its primary cause.
2. Defendant’s claim
However, it was the duty of the defendant to build and to maintain its track in
The defendant contended that remedy for injuries through negligence reasonably sound condition, so as to protect its workingmen from
lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally responsible unnecessary danger. It is plain that in one respect or the other it failed in its
must be made primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily duty, otherwise the accident could not have occurred; consequently the
to him. negligence of the defendant is established.
Another contention of the defense is that the injury resulted to the
plaintiff as a risk incident to his employment and, as such, one As to the first defense of defendant, the Civil Code shows that the civil
assumed by him. liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to be
suspended thereby, except as expressly provided by law. Where an
individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that
Defendant alleged that the negligence of the plaintiff contributed to the
the inured party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose
accident. In two particulars is he charged with carelessness:
prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil
right.
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his
work; and
Second. That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car
instead of along the boards, either before or behind it.
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. Case filed- action for damages
2. RTC Ruling- In favor of the plaintiff; the judgment of the trial court,
fixing the damage incurred by the plaintiff at 5,000 pesos
16. FLORESCA ET. AL. VS. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION 'B' hereof, but also failed completely to provide its men working underground the
necessary security for the protection of their lives notwithstanding the fact that it
G.R. No. L-30642 had vast financial resources, it having made, during the year 1966 alone, a total
operating income of P 38,220,254.00, or net earnings, after taxes of
A) PARTIES: P19,117,394.00, as per its llth Annual Report for the year ended December 31,
1966, and with aggregate assets totalling P 45,794,103.00 as of December 31,
1) Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Co. 1966.
2) Respondents is a corporation engaged in mining operations. C) ISSUE: 1) WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
B) FACTS: 2) whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right
of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker's right
Sometime prior and up to June 28,1967, the defendant PHILEX, with gross and under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the
reckless negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure to take the required Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers
precautions for the due protection of the lives of its men working underground at by virtue of that negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail
the time, and in utter violation of the laws and the rules and regulations duly themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation
promulgated by the Government pursuant thereto, allowed great amount of water under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the
and mud to accumulate in an open pit area at the mine above Block 43-S-1 which regular courts.
seeped through and saturated the 600 ft. column of broken ore and rock below it,
thereby exerting tremendous pressure on the working spaces at its 4300 level, D) PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
with the result that, on the said date, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, with the
collapse of all underground supports due to such enormous pressure, 1) CASE FILED: a case for damages under the civil code against respondent for
approximately 500,000 cubic feet of broken ores rocks, mud and water, his alleged negligent and deliberate failure to take the required precautions for the
accompanied by surface boulders, blasted through the tunnels and flowed out and protection of the lives of its men working underground.
filled in, in a matter of approximately five (5) minutes, the underground workings,
ripped timber supports and carried off materials, machines and equipment which
blocked all avenues of exit, thereby trapping within its tunnels of all its men above 2) RTC:
referred to, including those named in the next preceding paragraph, represented
by the plaintiffs herein; Respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and ruled
that in accordance with the established jurisprudence, the Workmen's
That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant PHILEX's Compensation Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or
mine on the said date, five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying holocaust; compensation claims for work-connected deaths or injuries of workmen or
22 were rescued within the next 7 days; and the rest, 21 in number, including employees, irrespective of whether or not the employer was negligent, adding that
those referred to in paragraph 7 hereinabove, were left mercilessly to their fate, if the employer's negligence results in work-connected deaths or injuries, the
notwithstanding the fact that up to then, a great many of them were still alive, employer shall, pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, pay
entombed in the tunnels of the mine, but were not rescued due to defendant additional compensation equal to 50% of the compensation fixed in the Act.
PHILEX's decision to abandon rescue operations, in utter disregard of its bounden
legal and moral duties in the premises. 3) SC:
That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and the rules and regulations 1) WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case,
duly promulgated by the duly constituted authorities as set out by the Special
Committee above referred to, in their Report of investigation, pages 7-13, Annex
It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate the harshness and
on the Workmen's Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual, insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence, an employer is
exemplary and moral) in the total amount of eight hundred twenty-five thousand liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is created by law. Recovery
(P825,000.00) pesos. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of the Workmen's under the Act is not based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of the
Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder. In fact, no employer (99 C.J.S. 36).
allegation appeared in the complaint that the employees died from accident
arising out of and in the course of their employments. The complaint instead In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay
alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex compensation benefits for loss of income, as long as the death, sickness or injury
to protect the lives of its workers as a consequence of which a cave-in occurred is work-connected or work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due to the
resulting in the death of the employees working underground. Settled is the rule fault of the employer (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other hand,
that in ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the wrongful invasion of his
workmen's compensation claim or a claim for damages pursuant to the provisions rights. It is the indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either
of the Civil Code, the test is the averments or allegations in the complaint. in his person, property or relative rights, through the act or default of another (25
C.J.S. 452).
In the present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a
contractual relationship. The alleged gross and reckless negligence and The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the
deliberate failure that amount to bad faith on the part of Philex, constitute a causal relation between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury as
breach of contract for which it may be held liable for damages. The provisions of well as the damages suffered. While under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
the Civil Code on cases of breach of contract when there is fraud or bad faith, there is a presumption in favor of the deceased or injured employee that the death
read: or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated; and the employer has the burden
to prove otherwise (De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Carino vs. WCC, 93
Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary SCRA 551; Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228).
damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner. The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's
Compensation Commission then, now Employees Compensation Commission, is
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor strengthened by the fact that unlike in the Civil Code, the Workmen's
who acted in good faith is able shall be those that are the natural and probable Compensation Act did not contain any provision for an award of actual, moral and
consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have exemplary damages. What the Act provided was merely the right of the heirs to
foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was claim limited compensation for the death in the amount of six thousand
constituted. (P6,000.00) pesos plus burial expenses of two hundred (P200.00) pesos, and
medical expenses when incurred (Sections 8, 12 and 13, Workmen's
In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be Compensation Act), and an additional compensation of only 50% if the complaint
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non- alleges failure on the part of the employer to "install and maintain safety
performance of the obligation. appliances or to take other precautions for the prevention of accident or
occupational disease" (Section 4-A, Ibid.). In the case at bar, the amount sought
to be recovered is over and above that which was provided under the Workmen's
Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow the payment of all kinds of
Compensation Act and which cannot be granted by the Commission.
damages, as assessed by the court.
Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582),
applies to third-party tortfeasor, said rule should likewise apply to the employer-
tortfeasor.
17. G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910 have in themselves a considerable explosive power. After some discussion as
to the ownership of the caps, and their right to take them, the boys picked up
DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee, all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried
vs. them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie
THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant- Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of the boy
appellant. Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They
trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result.
They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for a
A) PARTIES:
hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one of the caps with a
knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got
1) The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the
street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. Its power contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all
plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of
within the city of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor. The power plant the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in
may be reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge, impassable for the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in
vehicles, at the westerly end of the island. the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his
right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons
2) The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries who were called in to care for his wounds.
complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more
mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to
and training in mechanics. be on the defendant's premises, nor how long they had been there when the
boys found them. It appears, however, that some months before the accident,
B) FACTS: during the construction of the defendant's plant, detonating caps of the same
size and kind as those found by the boys were used in sinking a well at the
On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel power plant near the place where the caps were found; and it also appears
Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del that at or about the time when these caps were found, similarly caps were in
Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the use in the construction of an extension of defendant's street car line to Fort
defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. William McKinley. The caps when found appeared to the boys who picked
Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled them up to have been lying for a considerable time, and from the place where
apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which they were found would seem to have been discarded as detective or
both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about worthless and fit only to be thrown upon the rubbish heap.
the company's premises. The visit was made on a Sunday afternoon, and it
does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to
house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy. prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and walking about its premises
unattended, when they felt disposed so to do. As admitted in defendant
After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the counsel's brief, "it is undoubtedly true that children in their play sometimes
defendant's coal, they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of crossed the foot bridge to the islands;" and, we may add, roamed about at will
the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its on the uninclosed premises of the defendant, in the neighborhood of the place
furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps where the caps were found. There is evidence that any effort ever was made
scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and to forbid these children from visiting the defendant company's premises,
appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin although it must be assumed that the company or its employees were aware
wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. They of the fact that they not infrequently did so.
are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and
Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin way, things tempting to children, the same implication should arise. (Chap. 10, p.
boy on one of the interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father's 303.)
office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. About a
month after his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman The reasoning which led the Supreme Court of the United States to its conclusion
and continued in that employment for six months at a salary of P2.50 a day; in the cases of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra) and Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs.
and it appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and McDonald (supra) is not less cogent and convincing in this jurisdiction than in that
more mature both mentally and physically than most boys of fifteen. wherein those cases originated. Children here are actuated by similar childish
instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity and impelled by the restless spirit of
C) ALLEGATIONS: Plaintiff's allegations that the caps which were found by youth, boys here as well as there will usually be found whenever the public is
plaintiff on defendant company's premises were the property of the defendant, permitted to congregate. The movement of machinery, and indeed anything which
or that they had come from its possession and control, and that the company arouses the attention of the young and inquiring mind, will draw them to the
or some of its employees left them exposed on its premises at the point where neighborhood as inevitably as does the magnet draw the iron which comes within
they were found. the range of its magnetic influence. The owners of premises, therefore, whereon
things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the public are expressly
Counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience, or impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the owner knows or ought to know
his entry upon defendant company's premises, and the intervention of his action children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, " must calculate upon
between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its this, and take precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises
premises and the accident which resulted in his injury should not be held to can not be heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises
have contributed in any wise to the accident, which should be deemed to be the without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no
direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place duty or obligation whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to
where they were found by the plaintiff, and this latter the proximate cause of the prevent the child from entering his premises at a place where he knows or ought
accident which occasioned the injuries sustained by him. to know that children are accustomed to roam about of to which their childish
instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied
license to enter, and where the child does enter under such conditions the
D) ISSUE: is private respondent liable?
owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to guard the child against injury
from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the owner, is
E) HELD: clearly a breach of duty, responsible, if the child is actually injured, without other
fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his
NO. Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike instincts express invitation or permission. To hold otherwise would be expose all the
and impulses; and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim
toward them must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly. If they of the owners or occupants of land upon which they might naturally and
leave exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to reasonably be expected to enter.
them, and which they in their immature judgment might naturally suppose they
were at liberty to handle or play with, they should expect that liberty to be taken. This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessity, and neither is
contention that a man has a right to do what will with his own property or that
And the same eminent jurist in his treatise or torts, alluding to the doctrine of children should be kept under the care of their parents or guardians, so as to
implied invitation to visit the premises of another, says: prevent their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient weight to put in
doubt. In this jurisdiction as well as in the United States all private property is
In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure
license might sometimes arise when it would not on behalf of others. Thus leaving the equal rights and interests of the community (see U. S. vs. Toribio,1 No. 5060,
a tempting thing for children to play with exposed, where they would be likely to decided January 26, 1910), and except as to infants of very tender years it would
gather for that purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of be absurd and unreasonable in a community organized as is that in which we
it; and, perhaps, if one were to throw away upon his premises, near the common lived to hold that parents or guardian are guilty of negligence or imprudence in
every case wherein they permit growing boys and girls to leave the parental roof that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries
unattended, even if in the event of accident to the child the negligence of the incurred by him under such circumstances.
parent could in any event be imputed to the child so as to deprive it a right to
recover in such cases — a point which we neither discuss nor decide. The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary
capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and
defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable
from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of
part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the
opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the character of his own acts and their consequences; and the age at which a minor
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate can be said to have such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and their
cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly consequences; and at the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability
speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety of
hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and acts which may be done by him. But some idea of the presumed capacity of
putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the infants under the laws in force in these Islands may be gathered from an
resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is examination of the varying ages fixed by our laws at which minors are
not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. conclusively presumed to be capable of exercising certain rights and incurring
certain responsibilities, though it can not be said that these provisions of law are
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of of much practical assistance in cases such as that at bar, except so far as they
15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he illustrate the rule that the capacity of a minor to become responsible for his own
had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical acts varies with the varying circumstances of each case. Under the provisions of
draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses the Penal Code a minor over fifteen years of age is presumed to be capable of
throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The committing a crime and is to held criminally responsible therefore, although the
evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the fact that he is less than eighteen years of age will be taken into consideration as
witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was an extenuating circumstance (Penal Code, arts. 8 and 9). At 10 years of age a
amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to child may, under certain circumstances, choose which parent it prefers to live with
produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who was present, admit of no (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 771). At 14 may petition for the appointment of a
other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, guardian (Id., sec. 551), and may consent or refuse to be adopted (Id., sec. 765).
followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final And males of 14 and females of 12 are capable of contracting a legal marriage
success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the (Civil Code, art. 83; G. O., No. 68, sec. 1).
contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there
be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and
be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he
him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his
frightened and ran away. age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity
for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him
explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and
and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been
well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed
act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal
would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.
exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or
19. DIONISIO CARPIO, vs. HON. SERGIO DOROJA, (Presiding Judge, MTC, B. ALLEGATIONS
Branch IV, Zamboanga City) and EDWIN RAMIREZ Y WEE. G.R. No. 84516
December 5, 1989. 1. Claim
Petitioner relies heavily on the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, 87 SCRA 275,
which enunciates that "the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator is
A. PARTIES fixed by the judgment, because if a case were to be filed against said
operator, the court called upon to act thereto has no other function than
1. Plaintiff – DionisioCarpio, pedestrian to render a decision based on the indemnity award in the criminal case
2. Defendant – Eduardo Toribio, owner-operator of the vehicle which figured without power to amend or modify it even if in his opinion an error has
in the accident been committed in the decision." Petitioner maintains that the tenor of the
aforesaid decision implies that the subsidiary liability of the owner-
FACTS: operator may be enforced in the same proceeding and a separate action
is no longer necessary in order to avoid undue delay, notwithstanding the
fact that said employer was not made a party in the criminal action.
Sometime on October 23, 1985, accused-respondent Edwin Ramirez, while
driving a passenger Fuso Jitney owned and operated by Eduardo Toribio,
2. Defense
bumped DionisioCarpio, a pedestrian crossing the street, as a consequence of
which the latter suffered from a fractured left clavicle as reflected in the medico- It is the theory of respondent that the owner-operator cannot be validly
legal certificate and sustained injuries which required medical attention for a held subsidiarily liable for the following reasons, namely: (a) the matter of
period of (3) three months. subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal; (b) contrary to the case of
Pajarito v. Seneris, the injuries sustained by the complainant did not arise
from the so-called "culpa-contractual" but from "culpa-aquiliana"; (c) the
Ramirez was charged with and convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to judgments of appellate courts may not be altered, modified, or changed
Less Serious Physical Injuries, after entering a plea of guilty to a lesser offense. by the court of origin; and (d) said owner was never made a party to the
Thereafter, he applied for probation. criminal proceedings.
At the early stage of the trial, the private prosecutor manifested his desire to
present evidence to establish the civil liability of either the accused driver or the C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
owner-operator of the vehicle. Accused's counsel moved that the court summon
the owner of the vehicle to afford the latter a day in court, on the ground that the 1. Motion Filed (subject of this Petition) – Motion for Subsidiary Writ of
accused is not only indigent but also jobless and thus cannot answer any civil Execution against the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator of the vehicle.
liability that may be imposed upon him by the court. The private prosecutor,
however, did not move for the appearance of Eduardo Toribio. 2. RTC – Denied the motion on two grounds, namely, the decision of the
appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary liability of Eduardo Toribio,
The civil aspect of the judgment was appealed by the private prosecutor to the and the nature of the accident falls under "culpa-aquiliana" and not culpa-
Regional Trial Court Branch XVI, appellant praying for moral damages in the contractual." A motion for reconsideration of the said order was disallowed for
amount of P 10,000.00, compensatory damages at P6,186.40, and attorney's the reason that complainant having failed to raise the matter of subsidiary
fees of P 5,000.00. The appellate court modified the trial court's decision, liability with the appellate court, said court rendered its decision which has
granting the appellant moral damages in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos become final and executory and the trial court has no power to alter or modify
(P 5,000.00), while affirming all other civil liabilities. such decision.
Thereafter, a writ of execution was duly served upon the accused but was, 3. SC (Petition for Certiorari) – RTC order SET ASIDE. The Court a
however, returned unsatisfied due to the insolvency of the accused as shown by quo was directed to hear and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary
the sheriff’s return. liability of the alleged owner-operator of the passenger jeepney.
ISSUE: Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-operator has been
Whether or not the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be deprived of his day in court, because the case before us is not one wherein
enforced in the same criminal proceeding against the driver where the the operator is sued for a primary liability under the Civil Code but one in
award was given which the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his
employee's criminal negligence is sought to be enforced. Considering the
THE COURT RULED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. subsidiary liability imposed upon the employer by law, he is in substance
and in effect a party to the criminal case. Such subsidiary liability is already
The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article 100, implied from the appellate court's decision.
both of the Revised Penal Code, which reads thus:
Finally, the position taken by the respondent appellate court that to
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability grant the motion for subsidiary writ of execution would in effect be to amend
established in the next preceding article shall apply to employers, teachers, its decision which has already become final and executory cannot be
persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies sustained. Compelling the owner-operator to pay on the basis of his
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in subsidiary liability does not constitute an amendment of the judgment
the discharge of their duties. because in an action under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, once all the
requisites as earlier discussed are met, the employer becomes ipso facto
subsidiarily liable, without need of a separate action. Such being the case,
The contention of respondent that the case of Pajarito v.
the subsidiary liability can be enforced in the same case where the award
Seneris cannot be applied to the present case, the former being an action
was given, and this does not constitute an act of amending the decision. It
involving culpa-contractual, while the latter being one of culpa-aquiliana is
becomes incumbent upon the court to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of
erroneous. The subsidiary liability in Art. 103 should be distinguished from
execution (but only after the employer has been heard), upon conviction of
the primary liability of employers, which is quasi-delictual in character as
the employee and after execution is returned unsatisfied due to the
provided in Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code.Under Art. 103, the liability
employee's insolvency.
emanated from a delict. On the other hand, the liability under Art. 2180 is
founded on culpa-aquiliana. The present case is neither an action for culpa-
contractual nor for culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an action to enforce the
civil liability arising from crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In
no case can this be regarded as a civil action for the primary liability of the
employer under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code, i.e., action for culpa-
aquiliana.
The Court finds, therefore, the award of moral damages made by the court a
quo, affirmed by the appellate court, to be inordinate and substantially devoid of
legal basis.
Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that, “any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.”
In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the amount of P1 million,
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and other medical and
related expenses amounting to a total of P180,000.00, including loss of
expected earnings.
24. MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner,
vs.COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was on his way home,
INC., respondents. G.R. No. 115024 February 7, 1996 travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was raining, visibility was affected and
the road was wet. Traffic was light. He testified that he was driving along the
x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the direction of Araneta
Avenue, when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San
Juan, with a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with
RICHARD LI, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES
"full bright lights". Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the right to
VALENZUELA, respondents. G.R. No. 117944 February 7, 1996
avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which he
did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early
A.FACTS warning device, and the area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense that
the left rear portion of plaintiff's car was protruding as it was then "at a standstill
At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes diagonally" on the outer portion of the right lane towards Araneta Avenue (par.
Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU 542 from 18, Answer). He confirmed the testimony of plaintiff's witness that after being
her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved to the right and hit another car parked
Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia on the sidewalk. Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff
Ramon, heading towards the direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake was reckless or negligent, as she was not a licensed driver
Street, she noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted
place where therewere people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit C.PROCEDURAL HISTORY
help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire
was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car's condition, she parked RTC
along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted
from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found
side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the defendant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under
tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise held Alexander
defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly and severally liable for damages
Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the pursuant to Article 2180.
windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the
ground. She was pulled out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was As a result of the trial court's decision, defendants filed an Omnibus Motion for
severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected New Trial and for Reconsideration
to the rest of the body. She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center
The trial court denied the motion. Defendants forthwith filed an appeal with the
where she was found to have a "traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh
respondent Court of Appeals.
(above knee)". She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was
eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for the hospital confinement CA
(P120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg (P27,000.00) were paid by
defendants from the car insurance. In a Decision rendered March 30, 1994, the Court of Appeals found that there
was "ample basis from the evidence of record for the trial court's finding that the
B. ALLEGATIONS plaintiff's car was properly parked at the right, beside the sidewalk when it was
bumped by defendant's car."1 Dismissing the defendants' argument that the
plaintiff's car was improperly parked, almost at the center of the road, the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a "very fast" speed as testified by
respondent court noted that evidence which was supposed to prove that the car Rodriguez; and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol. 12 Either factor
was at or near center of the right lane was never presented during the trial of working independently would have diminished his responsiveness to road
the case conditions, since normally he would have slowed down prior to reaching
Valenzuela's car, rather than be in a situation forcing him to suddenly apply his
theCourt of Appeals, in its decision, however, absolved the Li's employer, brakes
Alexander Commercial, Inc. from any liability towards petitioner Lourdes
Valenzuela and reduced the amount of moral damages to P500,000.00. Finding WHETHER OR NOT VALENZUELA WAS LIKEWISE GUILTY OF
justification for exemplary damages, the respondent court allowed an award of CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN PARKING HER CAR ALONGSIDE
P50,000.00 for the same, in addition to costs, attorney's fees and the other AURORA BOULEVARD, WHICH ENTIRE AREA LI POINTS OUT, IS A NO
damages. The Court of Appeals, likewise, dismissed the defendants' PARKING ZONE
counterclaims.
Valenzuela was not guilty of contributory negligence
Consequently, both parties assail the respondent court's decision by filing two
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing
separate petitions before this Court. Richard Li, in G.R. No. 117944, contends
as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to
that he should not be held liable for damages because the proximate cause of
which he is required to conform for his own protection
the accident was Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela's own negligence. Alternatively, he
argues that in the event that this Court finds him negligent, such negligence Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of
ought to be mitigated by the contributory negligence of Valenzuela. Appeals,16 an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and
is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be
SC adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to
undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better
ISSUE: WON Li was negligent in driving his company-issued Mitsubishi solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence
Lancer
While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought, or
THE COURT RULED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. the opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the
conduct which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not
"Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates
risk of harm to others."23 It is the failure to observe that degree of care, thoroughful care, but by the over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be
other person suffers injury faulted for stopping at a point which is bothconvenient for her to do so and
which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire
One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence to Li's disingenuous
boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where
and patently self-serving asseverations. The average motorist alert to road
she would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to
conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at the
stop and assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora
speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the street, and the
Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a
road conditions on a principal metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard,
threat to her safety and to other motorists. In the instant case, Valenzuela, upon
Li would have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if
reaching that portion of Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake St., noticed that she
he were alert - as every driver should be - to those conditions. Driving exacts a
had a flat tire. To avoid putting herself and other motorists in danger, she did
more than usual toll on the senses. Physiological "fight or flight" 10 mechanisms
what was best under the situation
are at work, provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol,
exhaustion, drowsiness, etc.11 Li's failure to react in a manner which would have Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the standard
avoided the accident could therefore have been only due to either or both of the reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have
contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually
amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue
park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and capably and responsibly.
it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions.
In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc.
THE LIABILITY OF ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC. LI'S EMPLOYER In his testimony before the trial court, he admitted that his functions as Assistant
Manager did not require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he
We are of the opinion that Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly
was required quite often to perform work outside the office, visiting prospective
and solidarily liable for the damage caused by the accident.
buyers and contacting and meeting with company clients. 30 These meetings,
The employer's primary liability under the concept of pater familias embodied by clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours because, as a managerial
Art 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual or tortious employee tasked with the job of representing his company with its clients,
in character. His liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised the diligence meetings with clients were both social as well as work-related functions. The
of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. service car assigned to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled
Once evidence is introduced showing that the employer exercised the required both Li - as well as the corporation - to put up the front of a highly successful
amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the employer's burden is entity, increasing the latter's goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated
overcome. The question of diligent supervision, however, depends on the meeting between Li and its clients by providing the former with a convenient
circumstances of employment. mode of travel
In most cases, providing a company car serves both purposes. Since important
business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of
situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimited use of a
company car therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a
company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who
actually uses the car, the managerial employee or company sales agent. As
such, in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose of
furthering the company's image, a company owes a responsibility to the public
Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to
the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach
directly toward the horse without diminution of speed.
When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse
25. AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant,vs.FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant- getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently
appellee. G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918 to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then
standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the
CASE BACKGROUND: animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its
head toward the railing.
In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the defendant,
Frank Smith, Jr., the sum of P31,000, as damages alleged to have been caused In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car
by an automobile driven by the defendant. From a judgment of the Court of First and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some
Instance of the Province of La Union absolving the defendant from liability the violence. From the evidence adduced in the case we believe that when the
plaintiff has appealed. accident occurred the free space where the pony stood between the automobile
and the railing of the bridge was probably less than one and one half meters. As
FACTS: a result of its injuries the horse died.
The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place on The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and
December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. required medical attention for several days.
It appears that upon the occasion in question the plaintiff was riding on his pony ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant was guilty of negligence such as gives
over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done? (Yes)
approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of
about ten or twelve miles per hour. RULING:
As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case
to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent
the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he
man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. is guilty of negligence.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning The proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case
signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of
of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was
side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. consequences.
The bridge is shown to have a length of about 75 meters and a width of 4.80 Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think
meters. that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of
the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he
As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to
being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. The pony had not as circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the
yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he
was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the
road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in
such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and
directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties
were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded
the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid
the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences,
without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
The decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. should
perhaps be mentioned in this connection. This Court there held that while
contributory negligence on the part of the person injured did not constitute a bar
to recovery, it could be received in evidence to reduce the damages which
would otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other party.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., concurring:
After mature deliberation, I have finally decided to concur with the judgment in
this case. I do so because of my understanding of the "last clear chance" rule of
the law of negligence as particularly applied to automobile accidents. This rule
cannot be invoked where the negligence of the plaintiff is concurrent with that of
the defendant. Again, if a traveler when he reaches the point of collision is in a
situation to extricate himself and avoid injury, his negligence at that point will
prevent a recovery.
But Justice Street finds as a fact that the negligent act of the interval of time,
and that at the moment the plaintiff had no opportunity to avoid the accident.
Consequently, the "last clear chance" rule is applicable. In other words, when a
traveler has reached a point where he cannot extricate himself and vigilance on
his part will not avert the injury, his negligence in reaching that position
becomes the condition and not the proximate cause of the injury and will not
preclude a recovery.
It argues that since the verification machine flashed an information that
the credit card has expired, petitioner could not be expected to honor
the same much less be adjudged negligent for dishonoring it.
26. MANDARIN VILLA, INC., petitioner,
vs.COURT OF APPEALS, and CLODUALDO DE JESUS, respondents. G.R. Further, petitioner asseverates that it only followed the guidelines and
No. 119850 June 20, 1996 instructions issued by BANKARD in dishonoring the aforementioned
credit card.
FACTS:
b. Petitioner also argues that private respondent's own negligence in not
In the evening of October 19, 1989, private respondent, Clodualdo de Jesus, a
bringing with him sufficient cash was the proximate cause of his
practicing lawyer and businessman, hosted a dinner for his friends at the
damage. It likewise sought exculpation by contending that the remark of
petitioner's restaurant, the Mandarin Villa Seafoods Village Greenhills,
Professor Lirag is a supervening event and at the same time the
Mandaluyong City.
proximate cause of private respondent's injury.
After dinner the waiter handed to him the bill in the amount of P2,658.50. ISSUES:
Private respondent offered to pay the bill through his credit card issued by
Philippine Commercial Credit Card Inc. (BANKARD). This card was accepted by A. Whether or not petitioner is negligent under the circumstances
the waiter who immediately proceeded to the restaurant's cashier for card obtaining in this case? (Yes)
verification. B. Whether or not respondent’s own negligence is the proximate cause of
his own damage? (No)
Ten minutes later, however, the waiter returned and audibly informed private
respondent that his credit card had expired.Private respondent remonstrated RULING:
that said credit card had yet to expire on September 1990, as embossed on its
face. The waiter was unmoved, thus, private respondent and two of his guests First Issue
approached the restaurant's cashier who again passed the credit card over the
verification computer. The same information was produced, i.e., CARD The test for determining the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
EXPIRED. stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the
reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have
Private respondent and his guests returned to their table and at this juncture, used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The Point of
Professor Lirag, another guest, uttered the following remarks: "Clody [referring Sale (POS) Guidelines which outlined the steps that petitioner must follow
to Clodualdo de Jesus], may problemaba? Bakakailangangmaghugasna kami under the circumstances provides:
ngpinggan?"
x xx x xx x xx
Thereupon, private respondent left the restaurant and got his BPI Express CARD EXPIRED
Credit Card from his car and offered it to pay their bill. This was accepted and a. Check expiry date on card.
honored by the cashier after verification.Petitioner and his companions left b. If unexpired, refer to CB.
afterwards. The incident triggered the filing of a suit for damages by private b.1. If valid, honor up to maximum of SPL only.
respondent. b.2. If in CB as Lost, do procedures 2a to 2e.,
b.3. If in CB as Suspended/Cancelled, do not honor card.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS: c. If expired, do not honor card.
Second Issue
While it is true that private respondent did not have sufficient cash on hand
when he hosted a dinner at petitioner's restaurant, this fact alone does not
constitute negligence on his part. Neither can it be claimed that the same was
the proximate cause of private respondent's damage.
Neither can we conclude that the remark of Professor Lirag was a supervening
event and the proximate cause of private respondent's injury.
C. Allegations
b) Defendant
1. Plaintiff’s Claim -
Metropolitan Water District- owns and operates three recreational
swimming pools at its Balara filters, Diliman, Quezon City Plaintiffs spouses seek to recover from defendant, a government-owned
corporation, the sum of P50,000 as damages, P5,000 as funeral
expenses, and P11,000 as attorneys' fees, for the death of their son
B. Facts
Dominador Ong in one of the swimming pools operated by defendant.
In the afternoon of July 5, 1952,, Dominador Ong, a 14-year old high school
student and boy scout, and his brothers Ruben and Eusebio, went to
defendant's swimming pools. This was not the first time that the three brothers
2. Defendants defense or counterclaim
had gone to said natatorium for they had already been there four or five times
before. At about 4:35 p.m., Dominador Ong told his brothers that he was going
to the locker room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke. Upon Defendant admits the fact that plaintiffs' son was drowned in one of its
hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador in swimming pools but avers that his death was caused by his own
the small pool and so they did not see the latter when he left the pool. In that negligence or by unavoidable accident. Defendant also avers that it had
afternoon, there were two lifeguards on duty in the pool compound, namely, exercised due diligence in the selection of, and supervision over, its
Manuel Abaño and Mario Villanueva. employees and that it had observed the diligence required by law under
the circumstances.
Between 4:40 to 4:45 p.m., some boys who were in the pool area informed a
bather by the name of Andres Hagad, Jr., that somebody was swimming under
water for quite a long time. Another boy informed lifeguard Manuel Abaño of the
same happening and Abaño immediately jumped into the big swimming pool D. Issue
and retrieved the apparently lifeless body of Dominador Ong from the bottom.
Whether the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the
negligence of defendant and/or its employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to
recover damages.
E. Procedural History
a. RTC Ruling
The lower court found that the action of plaintiffs is untenable and dismissed the
complaint without pronouncement as to costs.
b. CA Ruling
Plaintiffs took the case on appeal directly to this Supreme Court because the
amount involved exceeds the sum of P50,000.
c. SC Ruling
There is sufficient evidence to show that appellee has taken all necessary
precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident which
may cause their death. Thus, it has been shown that the swimming pools of
appellee are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator
and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors
so as to insure clear visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous place within
the area certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools. Appellee
employs six lifeguards who are all trained as they had taken a course for that
purpose and were issued certificates of proficiency. There is a male nurse and a
sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are
security guards who are available always in case of emergency.
The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved from the
bottom of the pool, the employees of appellee did everything possible to bring
him back to life. All of the actions to revive Dominador shows that appellee has
done what is humanly possible under the circumstances to restore life to minor
Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death.
FESC's imputation of PPA's failure to provide a safe and reliable berthing place
is obtuse, not only because it appears to be a mere afterthought, being tardily
raised only in this petition, but also because there is no allegation or evidence
on record about Berth No. 4 being unsafe and unreliable, although perhaps it is
a modest pier by international standards. No error on the part of the Court of
Appeals in dismissing FESC's counterclaim.
This consolidated case treats on whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding
MPA jointly and solidarily liable with its member pilot. Capt. Gavino, in the 30. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. PEDRO RAMIREZ
absence of employer-employee relationship. G.R. No. 24084, 8 November 1925
A. PARTIES
approaching what he thought was a deer, it proved to be his companion
BartolomeQuiaoit – the one who invited the accused, the victim and one VictorianoRanga. He also says that he did not expect to find his
other witness to go for a hunting companions in that spot, for he had warned them not to leave, but they
left, the place.
Pedro Ramirez – defendant
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
VictorianoRanga – victim; the one who died from a gunshot wound 1. Case filed – Homicide
caused by the respondent
2. Ruling of the CFI
Agustin Menor – witness The CFI of Ilocos Norte found the defendant guilty with the
crime of homicide and sentenced him with the penalty of
B. ALLEGATIONS imprisonment of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day and to indemnify the
mother of VictorianoRanga in the sum of P500.00
1. Plaintiff’s Claim
The night being dark like that when the event took place,
admits being the author of the shot which caused the death of
the hunter in the midst of a forest without paths is likely to get
VictorianoRanga; that on that night after getting the first prey, he told
confused as to his relative situation; and after walking around, he
his companions to stay there, watching over the prey, while he was
may think having gone very far, when in fact he has not, from the
going away looking for another; and so he did, because otherwise it
point of departure.
would have been hard for them to find the prey, if no one would have
been left there; that being far away from his companions, he seemed to
Since there existed no motive for resentment on the part of
have seen with his lantern something like the eyes of a deer about fifty
the defendant against the offended party, the Court held that the act
meters from him and then he shot it; but much to his surprise, on
complained of constitutes homicide through reckless
imprudence. The defendant, who was carrying a firearm to hunt at
nighttime with the aid of a lantern, knowing that he had two
companions, should have exercised all the necessary diligence to
avoid every undesirable accident, such as the one that
unfortunately occurred on the person of VictorianoRanga.
While the fact that the defendant, a few days after the
event, has offered to the mother of the deceased a carabao and a
horse by way of indemnity, indicates on the one hand that the
defendant admitted the commission of the crime, on the other it
shows that he performed that act without criminal intent and only
through a real imprudence.
A. PARTIES
1. Private Complainant The Court finds that the defense version cannot prevail against the
prosecution version satisfactorily demonstrating that the subject accident
Gregorio Martinez – owner and driver of the Toyota Corona; was occurred because of Xerxes’ reckless imprudence consisting in his paying
then executing a U-turn at the speed of 5 kph at the north-west no heed to the red light and making Galant car proceed at a fast clip as it
portion of Quezon Avenue going to Manila when the accident approached and entered the intersection. Petitioner testified that he was
occurred. driving slowly, about 40 kilometers per hour. This is refuted by the fact that
the colliding vehicles were thrown 20 meters away from the point of impact;
2. Defendant
Xerxes Adzuara- a law student; together with his friends were It bears to stress that the appreciation of petitioner’s post-collision behavior
cruising in a 4-door Colt Galant sedan along the stretch of Quezon serves only as a means to emphasize the finding of negligence which is
Avenue coming from the direction of EDSA towards Delta Circle at readily established by the admission of petitioner and his friend Renato that
approximately 40 kilometers per hours. Upon reaching the they saw the car of Martinez making a U-turn but could not avoid the
intersection of 4th West Street their car collided with a Toyota collision by the mere application of the brakes. Negligence is the want of
Corona sedan owned and driven by Gregorio Martinez. care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an
absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties
B. ALLEGATIONS and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably
1. Defendant and private complainant’s claims require.
Both petitioner and Martinez claimed that their lanes had green What degree of care and vigilance then did the circumstances require? At
traffic lights 3 although the investigating policeman Marcelo Sabido half past 1:00 o’clock in the morning along an almost deserted avenue,
declared that the traffic light was blinking red and orange when he ordinary care and vigilance would suffice. This may consist of keeping a
arrived at the scene of the accident an hour later. watchful eye on the road ahead and observing the traffic rules on speed,
right of way and traffic light. The claim of petitioner that Martinez made a
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY swift U-turn which caused the collision is not credible since a U-turn is done
at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to
1. Case filed- reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with running straight ahead. Nonetheless, no evidence was presented showing
less serious physical injuries under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal skid marks caused by the car driven by Martinez if only to demonstrate that
Code; Private complainant Martinez manifested his intention to he was driving at a fast clip in negotiating the U-turn. On the other hand, the
institute a separate civil action for damages against petitioner speed at which petitioner drove his car appears to be the prime cause for his
2. RTC Ruling- convicted petitioner Xerxes Adzuara after trial and inability to stop his car and avoid the collision. His assertion that he drove at
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of two (2) months and fifteen the speed of 40 kph.is belied by Martinez who testified that when he looked
(15) days of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P50,000.00 at the opposite lane for any oncoming cars, he saw none; then a few
C. CA – petition directly filed to the SC affirmed the decision of the trial seconds later, he was hit by Adzuara’s car. The extent of the damage on the
court but deleted the fine of P50,000.00 car of Martinez and the position of the cars after the impact further confirm
D. SC the finding that petitioner went beyond the speed limit required by law and by
the circumstances.
ISSUE: Is plaintiff guilty of the crime charged?
It is a rule that a motorist crossing a thru-stop street has the right of way over
the one making a U-turn. But if the person making a U-turn has already
negotiated half of the turn and is almost on the other side so that he is
already visible to the person on the thru-street, the latter must give way to
THE COURT RULED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. the former. Petitioner was on the thru-street and had already seen the
Martinez car. 19 He should have stopped to allow Martinez to complete the
U-turn having, as it were, the last clear chance to avoid the accident which
he ignored. In fact, he never stopped. Rather, he claimed that on the
assumption that he was negligent, the other party was also guilty of
contributory negligence since his car had no lights on. 20 The negligence of
Martinez however has not been satisfactorily shown.chanrobles.com : virtual
lawlibrary
Petitioner insists that the traffic light facing him at the intersection was green
which only indicated that he had the right of way. But the findings of the court
a quo on the matter countervail this stance, hence, we see no reason to
disturb them.
32. G.R. No. 68102. July 16, 1992.* 4. Defendant’s claim
Private respondents alleged that Jose Koh was the person at fault
GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE vs. INTERMEDIATE having approached the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang
APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO which was on the right lane going towards Manila and at a
moderate speed observing all traffic rules and regulations
G.R. No. 68103. July 16, 1992.* applicable under the circumstances then prevailing
E. Issue: Whether Jose Koh is negligent when it invaded the lane of the
CARMEN DAYRIT KOH, LETICIA KOH, JULIETA KOH TUQUERO, ARACELI truck and the collision happened in that lane
KOH MCKEE, ANTONIO KOH and ELIZABETH KOH TURLA vs. F. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA 5. Cases filed-
MANALO
a. an Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of
"Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and
3. Plaintiffs Physical Injuries and Damage to Property"
GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE – parents of the b. Civil Case No. 4477 and No. 4478 (consolidated later)
minors George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and the 6. RTC Ruling- RTC rendered a decision against the accused Ruben
deceased Kim Koh McKee; were passengers of the Ford Escort; Galang in the case; the consolidated two civil cases were dismissed
7. CA – affirmed the conviction of Ruben Galang;
were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478
reversed the set aside the dismissal of the consolidated two
CARMEN DAYRIT KOH, LETICIA KOH, JULIETA KOH civil cases; HOWEVER, upon motion of the respondents, the CA
TUQUERO, ARACELI KOH MCKEE, ANTONIO KOH and reconsidered and set aside its earlier decision and affirmed in
ELIZABETH KOH TURLA- are the wife and children, respectively, toto the trial court's judgment
of the late Jose Koh, were passengers of the Ford Escort were the 8. SC
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4477; Jose Koh was the driver of the No, Jose Koh is not negligent.
Ford Escort
The test of negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is
4. Defendant manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any
JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO - are the owners of reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid
the cargo truck which figured in the mishap; a certain Ruben running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where
they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane.
Galang was the driver of the truck at the time of the accident.
Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take
D. ALLEGATIONS particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several
3. Plaintiffs’ claims meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side of
Araceli Koh Mckee testified that when they were approaching the the road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover, under what
bridge, two (2) boys tried to cross the right lane on the right side of is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in
the highway going to San Fernando. Her father, who is the driver of a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider
the car tried to avoid the two (2) boys who were crossing, he blew the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
his horn and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the two (2) boys. danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
They noticed the truck, their father switched on the headlights to
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought
warn the truck driver, to slow down to give them the right of way to about by his own negligence."
come back to their right lane but the trick did not slow down.
Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane of family to prevent the damage. The answers of the private
the car, the Court find that Jose Koh adopted the best means respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose
possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them. this defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.
Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent,
was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the
same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the
occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the
truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of
the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the
collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the
former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into
its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far
right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure
under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full
speed towards the car.
Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear
chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the
law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the
party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that
the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the
injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear
chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible
for the consequences thereof. Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is
not difficult to rule, that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing
to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the
proximate cause of the collision.
As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the
resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows
from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however,
is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible
defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
33. CONSOLACION JUNIO, plaintiff and appellant, vs. THE MANILA of defendant, and that just before the crossing on one side, of the road
RAILROAD COMPANY, defendant and appellee. leading from the town of Calasiao there was a signpost bearing the
notice, "RAILROAD CROSSING", written crosswise.
[No. 37045. March 29, 1933]
The evidence also show that the car driven by the chauffeur, Pedro
Talbo, was an old Ford bearing number plates. PU-3636, which meant
that it was a hired car. The plate, Exhibit 2, was found by the engineer
A) PARTIES:
on the side of the engine upon arrival at Paniqui, the next station, which
1.) Plaintiff a young woman 22 years of age, is the passenger of the
indicates that it was torn from the front of the radiator when the auto
car that collided with the train of the defendant. The victim in the
collided with the right side of the engine of the night express.
present case.
2.) Defendant is the owner of the train that collided with the car where
The appellants were passengers who took the car in Bayambang and
the plaintiff was a passenger.
were bound for Asingan, via Dagupan.
B) FACTS:
C) ALLEGATIONS:
At about 11:40 o'clock on the night of April 13, 1930, the plaintiffs herein
1) The driver of the car alleges that he slowed down from 19 miles an
with some other persons were traveling in a PU-Car on the road
hour, at which rate he was then going, to 16 miles, and that he was
between Calasiao and Santa Barbara. When they arrived at the
on the lookout for any approaching train.
intersection of the road of the defendant's railway, the car tried to cross
2) The engineer, on the other hand, insists that he rang the bell and
the track and collided while the engine of the night express which left
sounded the whistle before reaching the crossing.
Dagupan for Manila at 11 o'clock that same night and which was then
passing over the crossing in question at great speed. As a result of the
3) Both parties claim to be free from guilt, and if the defendant
collision, the car was thrown some distance, plaintiff Junio's right leg
company were completely so, the plaintiffs would have no cause of
was amputated and her right arm fractured, and Soloria received action against it.
various injuries on her head.
D) ISSUE: 1) Who was negligent? The driver of the car or the defendant?
The aforementioned crossing is situated in the town of Calasiao and the 2) WON the negligence of the driver can be imputed to its
same is presumed to be dangerous due to the fact that gates were passengers so as to bar them from the right to recover damages
required at that crossing. (Section 83, Act No. 1459, as amended by Act suffered by them by reason of the accident.
No. 2100.) On the night of the accident, the gates were not lowered and
there was no notice to the effect that they were not operated at night or E) PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
that they were temporarily out of order. However, a notice to the effect
that that was a railroad crossing was there. CASE FILED:
Consolacion Junio, a young woman 22 years of age, and Beatriz
In addition to the facts mentioned above, it has also been proved that Soloria, another young woman of 18 years, represented by her father,
the gate in question was about three hundred (300) meters from the Faustino Soloria, who was appointed her guardian ad litem, brought
railroad station at Calasiao; that on each side of the crossing there was these actions in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to recover
a wooden bar operated only during the daytime by a woman employee from the defendant, Manila Railroad Company, damages suffered by
them in an accident that occurred at the railroad crossing situated at the strictly when, as in the present case, hired cars or those engaged in
outskirts of the town of Calasiao, Pangasinan, when the automobile in the public service, are involved.
which they were passengers collided with a locomotive belonging to the
aforementioned defendant. This is an appeal taken by them from the The doctrine prevails in a few states that the contributory
judgment rendered by the trial court absolving the defendant, without negligence of the driver of a private conveyance is imputable to a
cost. person voluntarily riding with him. But the general rule is that the
negligence of the driver of a vehicle is not to be imputed to an
SC: occupant thereof who is ]injured at a crossing through the combined
negligence of the driver and the railroad company when such
1) Both the driver and defendant were negligent. occupant is without fault and has no control over the driver. And the
law almost universally now recognized is that when one accepts an
From the evidence, it is obvious that the defendant as well as the invitation to ride in the vehicle of another, without any authority or
driver of the car in which the plaintiffs were passengers were purpose to direct or control the driver or the movements of the
negligent, the former because, by installing the gates at the place or team, and without any reason to doubt the competency of the
crossing where the accident occurred, it had voluntarily imposed driver, the contributory negligence of the owner or driver of the
upon itself the obligation to operate them even at night and to close conveyance will not be imputed to the guest or passenger, so as to
them every time a train passed in order to avoid causing injury to bar him of the right to recover damages from a railroad company
the public. It has been said that the gates constitute an invitation to whose negligence occasions injury to him at a crossing while he is
the public to pass without fear of danger, and failure to operate so riding. This rule has been applied in a number of cases involving
them conveniently constitutes negligence on the part of the the corresponding relation between the driver of an automobile and
company. an occupant having no control over him. The rule is not confined to
cases of gratuitous transportation, but has been applied where a
The driver was, likewise, negligent because he did not comply with conveyance is hired, and the passenger exercises no further control
his duty to slacken the speed of the car and to "look and listen" over the driver than to direct him to the place to which he wishes to
before crossing the intersection and above all, because he did not be taken. Nor is any distinction made between private and public
maintain a reasonable speed so as to permit him to stop any vehicles, such as street cars and stages.
moment if it were necessary in order to avoid an accident. If, in the
present case, the car had been running at a reasonable speed,
there is no doubt that he could have stopped it instantly upon Although this question is, perhaps, raised in this jurisdiction for the first time, it
seeing the train from a distance of five meters. is, nevertheless, a well recognized principle of law that the negligence of a
driver, who, in turn, is guilty of contributory negligence, cannot be imputed to a
passenger who has no control over him in the management of the vehicle and
with whom he sustains no relation of master and servant. This rule is applied
2) No. Although this question is, perhaps, raised in this jurisdiction for more strictly when, as in the present case, hired cars or those engaged in the
the first time, it is, nevertheless, a well recognized principle of law public service, are involved.
that the negligence of a driver, who, in turn, is guilty of contributory
negligence, cannot be imputed to a passenger who has no control The doctrine prevails in a few states that the contributory
over him in the management of the vehicle and with whom he
negligence of the driver of a private conveyance is imputable to a
sustains no relation of master and servant. This rule is applied more
person voluntarily riding with him. But the general rule is that the
negligence of the driver of a vehicle is not to be imputed to an
occupant thereof who is ]injured at a crossing through the combined
negligence of the driver and the railroad company when such
occupant is without fault and has no control over the driver. And the
law almost universally now recognized is that when one accepts an
invitation to ride in the vehicle of another, without any authority or
purpose to direct or control the driver or the movements of the
team, and without any reason to doubt the competency of the
driver, the contributory negligence of the owner or driver of the
conveyance will not be imputed to the guest or passenger, so as to
bar him of the right to recover damages from a railroad company
whose negligence occasions injury to him at a crossing while he is
so riding. This rule has been applied in a number of cases involving
the corresponding relation between the driver of an automobile and
an occupant having no control over him. The rule is not confined to
cases of gratuitous transportation, but has been applied where a
conveyance is hired, and the passenger exercises no further control
over the driver than to direct him to the place to which he wishes to
be taken. Nor is any distinction made between private and public
vehicles, such as street cars and stages.
2. COA – denied petitioner’s request. The COA opined that the concrete
A. PARTY/IES vault is more secured for safekeeping purposes compared to the
"unlocked storage cabinet" where the subject payroll money was placed.
Defendant – Hermogina U Bulilan, Cashier of Visaya State College While it is true that the concrete vault could not be seen directly by the
guard on duty at the lobby, the same is true also insofar as the storage
FACTS: cabinet is concerned . . . The contention of Mrs.Bulilan that "the storage
cabinet is strategically placed in an area which can be seen directly by
Petitioner Hermogina U. Bulilan was the Cashier of Visaya State the guard on duty" is misleading.
College of Agriculture (VISCA) whose responsibility, as such Cashier, was to
prepare the payroll of employees of said State College. 3. SC – affirmed COA
As the first quincina of the March payroll was due, petitioner withdrew ISSUE: Whether petitioner should be relieved from accountability for
from the Land Bank Branch in Tacloban City, the needed amount. Since she the loss of government funds which resulted from the robbery
was scheduled to leave for Baguio City on the day the said payroll was to be
released, she and her staff rendered overtime service without pay, to make sure THE COURT RULED IN THE NEGATIVE.
that payment of salaries of the employees would be on time.
The action of respondent Commission on the matter accords with law and the
The methodology adopted by petitioner in preparing the salaries of evidence.
employees was by placing the net pay of every employee in individual pay
envelopes. When the corresponding amounts were put in the pay envelopes, After a careful examination of the records, it can be gleaned therefrom that the
the same became too bulky for the Mosler safe of petitioner to accommodate. findings of fact by the COA are duly supported by substantial evidence.
Confronted with the problem, she placed such pay envelopes in a steel cabinet
without a lock. According to petitioner, when she left her office, she saw to it The Court is of the opinion, that the respondent Commission did not err in
that its main door was double-locked. finding the petitioner guilty of negligence.
On the night of March 11, 1990, a robbery took place at the Cashier's Negligence is defined as "the omission to do something which a
Office of VISCA resulting to the loss of government funds amounting to reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily
P566,468.91. Because of what happened, petitioner cancelled her trip to Baguio regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
City and reported the incident to the authorities concerned. something which a prudent man and reasonable man could not do.
Negligence is want of care required by the circumstances.
B. ALLEGATIONS
Negligence is therefore a relative or comparative concept. Its
Petitioner theorizes that what she did was what any reasonable person application depends upon the situation the parties are in, and the
would have done under the attendant facts and circumstances and therefore, degree of care and vigilance which the prevailing circumstances
she should not be held liable for the effects of what she calls a fortuitous event reasonably require. Conformably, the diligence which the law requires
over which she had no control. an individual to observe and exercise varies according to the nature of
the situation in which happens to be, and the importance of the act
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY which he has to perform.
1. Pleading Filed (with COA) - Request for Relief of Accountability. Applying the above contemplation of negligence to the case at bar, the
Petitioner wrote the Commission on Audit (COA) begging to be petitioner was negligent in the performance of her duties as Cashier. She
relieved of accountability (Request for Relief of Accountability) for the
did not do her best, as dictated by the attendant circumstances, to
safeguard the public funds entrusted to her, as such Cashier.
Upon verification and ocular inspection it was found out that VISCA had a
concrete vault/room with a steel door secured by a big Yale padlock, which was
very much safer than the unlocked storage cabinet in which petitioner placed
the government funds in question. It is irrefutable that a locked vault/room is
safer than an unlocked storage cabinet.
Thus, the Court concluded that the COA correctly denied petitioner's request for
relief from responsibility.
36. TEODORA ASTUDILLO, plaintiff-appellee, duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place
vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant. where persons have a right to be. The poles must be so erected and the wires
G.R. No. L-33380 December 17, 1930 and appliances must be so located the persons rightfully near the place will not
be injured. Particularly must there be proper insulation of the wires and
A. PARTIES appliances in places where there is probable likelihood of human contact
1. Plaintiff –TeodoraAstudillo, mother of the deceased victim therewith.
2. Defendant – Manila Electric Company
We cannot agree with the defense of the Manila Electric Company in the lower
B. ALLEGATIONS court to the effect that the death of Juan Diaz Astudillo was due exclusively to
1. Claim his negligence. He only did the natural thing to be expected of one not familiar
About 6 o'clock in the evening of August 14, 1928, a group of boys or with the danger arising from touching an electric wire, and was wholly
young men (exact age not indicated) came to this public place. Two of unconscious of his peril. Had not the wire caused the death of this young
them named Juan Diaz Astudillo and AlejoPonsoy sauntered over to man, it would undoubtedly have been only a question of time when someone
where an electric post was situated. They were there looking out else, like a playful boy, would have been induced to take hold of the wire, with
towards Intramuros. For exactly what reason, no one will ever know, but fatal results. The cause of the injury was one which could have been foreseen
Juan Diaz Astudillo, placing one foot on a projection, reached out and and guarded against. The negligence came from the act of the Manila
grasped a charged electric wire.The wire was connected with an Electric Company in so placing its pole and wires as to be within
electric light pole situated near Santa Lucia Gate, Intramuros, in the City proximity to a place frequented by many people, with the possibility ever
of Manila. Death resulted almost instantly. present of one of them losing his life by coming in contact with a highly charged
Shortly thereafter, the mother of the deceased instituted an action in the and defectively insulated wire. (NOTE: The electric pole presumably was
Court of First Instance of Manila to secure from the Manila Electric located by the municipal authorities and conforms in height to the requirements
Company damages in the amount of P30,000. of the franchise of the Manila Electric Company. The feeder wires are of the
insulated type, known as triple braid weather proof, required by the franchise.
2. Defense The pole, with its wires, was erected in 1920. It was last inspected by the City
The death of Juan Diaz Astudillo was due solely to his negligence and Electrician in 1923 or 1924. The pole was located close enough to the
lack of care, and that the company had employed the diligence of a public place, so that a person, by reaching his arm out the full length, would be
good father of a family to prevent the injury. able to take hold of one of the wires. It would appear, according to the City
Electrician, that even a wire of the triple braid weather proof type, if touched by
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY a person, would endanger the life of that person by electrocution).
1. Case Filed – Complaint for Damages
2. CFI – ruled in favour of plaintiff; awarded the sum of 15,000,00. The company further defends in this court on the ground that it has not been
3. SC – affirmed with modification; amount of damages reduced proven that the deceased is an acknowledged natural child of the plaintiff
mother. Technically this is correct. (Civil Code, art. 944). At the same time, it
ISSUE: Whether the defendant is liable to plaintiff for damages should first of all be mentioned that, so far as we know, this point was not raised
in the lower court. Further, while the mother may thus be precluded from
THE COURT RULED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. AWARD OF DAMAGES succeeding to the estate of the son, yet we know of no reason why she cannot
REDUCED TO 1,500.00 be permitted to secure damages from the company when the negligence of this
company resulted in the death of her child.
It is well established that the liability of electric light companies for damages for
personal injuries is governed by the rules of negligence. Such companies are, We, therefore, conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to damages. But the
however, not insurers of the safety of the public. But considering that electricity evidence indicative of the true measure of those damages is sadly deficient. All
is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric that we know certainly is that the deceased was less than 20 years of age, a
companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The student, and working in the Ateneo de Manila, but at what wages we are not
told. We are also shown that approximately P200 was needed to defray the
travel and funeral expenses. As would happen in the case of a jury who have
before them one of the parents, her position to life, and the age and sex of the
child, varying opinions, have been disclosed in the court regarding the estimate
of the damages with reference to the next of kin. Various sums have been
suggested, beginning as low as P1,000 and extending as high as P5,000. A
majority of the court finally arrived at the sum of P1,500 as appropriate
damages in this case. The basis of this award would be the P1,000 which have
been allowed in other cases for the death of young children without their having
been tendered any special proof of the amount of damages suffered, in
connection with which should be taken into account the more mature age of the
boy in the case at bar, together with the particular expenses caused by his
death.
Near this place in the street of Intramuros is an electric light pole with the
corresponding wires.
37. NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION AND THE ADMINISTRATOR C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
OF THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, Petitioners, v. THE 1. Case Filed - Complaint for the abatement of nuisance with damages
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ANDRES VENTURA, against petitioners NIA and/or the Administrator of the National
ANTONIO FAJARDO, MARCELO FAJARDO, ALFONSO VENTURA AND Irrigation Administration.
FLORENTINO VENTURA, Respondents. [G.R. No. 73919. September 18, 2. RTC – ruled in favour of complainants. The Court rendered judgement:
1992.] 1) Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P35,000.00
representing damages: 2) Ordering defendant to pay P5,000.00 for
A. PARTIES attorney’s fees and the cost of the suit."
1. Plaintiffs - Andres Ventura, Antonio Fajardo, Marcelo Fajardo, Alfonso Nonetheless, the court reduced the civil liability of the defendant
Ventura and Florentino Ventura, leasehold tenants since there were typhoons and plant pests that reduced the harvests of
2. Defendant - NIA the plaintiffs and that there were benefits that accrued to the plaintiffs by
reason of said irrigation canal.
FACTS:
3. CA – affirmed in toto the RTC.
It appears on record that plaintiffs/private respondents are leasehold tenants of 4. SC – affirmed the CA; Petition denied.
a parcel of land consisting of about five (5) hectares of riceland situated at
SitioDagat-dagatan, Sto. Rosario, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija. ISSUE: Whether petitioner NIA is immune from suit – NO
Whether NIA is liable for damages - YES
Sometime in 1967, petitioner National Irrigation Administration (NIA for brevity)
constructed an irrigation canal on the property of Isabel and Virginia Tecson THE COURT RULED IN THE NEGATIVE.
which passed through the private respondents’ landholdings as said irrigation
canal traverses the Cinco-Cinco Creek which abuts said landholding. The The NIA "is not immune from suit, by virtue of the express provision of P.D. No.
irrigation canal has two (2) outlets which provide private respondents’ 552."
landholdings with water coming from said canal and at the same time serve to
drain the excess water of said landholdings. A reading of Section 2, sub-paragraph (f) of P.D. No. 552, 5 amending Republic
Act No. 3601 shows the granting to NIA the power "to exercise all the powers of
B. ALLEGATIONS a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent
1. Claim with the provisions of this Act." Paragraph 4 of said law also provide that
Complainants alleged that the two (2) outlets constructed on both sides petitioner NIA may sue and be sued in court for all kind of actions, whether
of the irrigation canal were not provided with gates to regulate the flow contractual or quasi-contractual, in the recovery of compensation and damages
of water from the canal to their landholdings which resulted to the as in the instant case considering that private respondents’ action is based on
inundation of said landholdings causing the former to sustain damages damages caused by the negligence of petitioners. This Court had previously
consisting in the destruction of the planted palay crops and also held that "the National Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a
prevented them from planting on their landholdings. juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere
agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary
2. Defense functions" 6 as it has its own assets and liabilities as well as its own corporate
NIA is immune from suit for quasi-delict or tort and assuming NIA could powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors.
be sued, it is not liable for tort since it did not act through a special
agent as required under paragraph 6, Article 2180 of the Civil Code of Paragraph 6, Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states that:
the Philippines.
It also maintained that the cause of inundation of plaintiffs’ landholdings "The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent;
was the check gate of the Cinco-cinco creek known as Tombo check but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task
gate. done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be
applicable." accordance with the evidence and the law. As correctly held by the appellate
court:
Article 2176 of said Code provides that:
"It has been established that the plaintiffs’ landholdings were actually inundated.
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or The testimonies by all the plaintiffs with respect to the amount of the loss they
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if suffered were not impugned by any contradictory evidence of the defendant. To
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a Our mind, these testimonies are sufficient proof to make the grant of damages
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter."cralaw virtua1aw valid and proper. Besides, the amount awarded by the lower court is but just
library and reasonable considering the circumstances of the case."
Thus, petitioners are liable for the damages caused by their negligent act. Said
the trial court:
B. ALLEGATIONS b. RTC
a. Plaintiff's Claim The finding of the court upon the trial is as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of June, 1912, in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said Enrique Clemente, at the time being and "I am unable to conclude from the evidence that the defendant was
acting as motorman of a street car No. 111 upon the line Pasay- recklessly negligent in operating the car, as contemplated by the
Cervantes of the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, a section of the code upon which the complaint is based, but I am
corporation duly organized and doing business in the city of Manila, satisfied that he was careless and negligent in the performance of his
Philippine Islands, and then and there directing and operating said duty and violated the regulations in relation to the running of street cars
street car, as the motorman thereof, upon and along Dakota Street in as laid down by the ordinance of the city, and that homicide resulted
said city, and then and there being under the obligation as such from his carelessness and negligence.
motorman of said street car to conduct and direct the same with due
care and caution, in order to avoid any accident which might occur to * * * * * * *
the vehicles and pedestrians who were passing upon and over said
Dakota Street, said accused at said time and place voluntarily and "I find the defendant, Enrique Clemente, not guilty as charged in the
illegally, with reckless imprudence and with inexcusable negligence and complaint of homicide through reckless negligence or rather through
in violation of the ordinance pertaining to the matter, conducted and fearful negligence, but find him guilty of a violation of the regulations
directed said street car, without paying any attention to the pedestrians through imprudence and negligence, which resulted in the death of the
who were crossing said street from one side to the other, in such a child as alleged in the complaint, and sentence him to five months of
manner that by reason of his lack of care and reckless negligence he arresto mayor, and to pay the costs of the action."
directed and conducted street car No. 111 against and over the body
and head of Juan Garcia, a child 3 years of age, who was then and c. SC
there passing across the said Dakota Street, dragging the body of said The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the accused is hereby
child over said street-car track for a considerable distance, fracturing convicted of the crime of homicide committed through reckless
and destroying its skull and causing instant death. That if said acts thus negligence, and is hereby sentenced to one year and one day of
performed by the accused had been done with malice or intentionally prisioncorreccional with the accessories provided by law, with costs.
he would be guilty of the grave crime of homicide.
It is the duty of any person driving a vehicle in the public thoroughfares
b. Defendant/Appelant'sDefense and/or Counterclaim to reduce the same to control, ready to be stopped at any moment, if he
The appellant in this case makes two contentions: First, that the trial sees a child below the years of understanding in such place that it can,
court had no right to find as a fact that the defendant had violated an by any reasonable chance, place itself in a dangerous position with
respect to the vehicle. In such case the vehicle must be under such illustration: The superintendent of a jail, in a moment of benevolence
control that, if the child, by some sudden or unexpected movement, and by mere tolerance, permits a prisoner to go out of the jail, who,
places itself in the way of the vehicle, it can be stopped in time to avert abusing the confidence and tolerance of the superintendent, escapes.
injury. No one is able to determine what a child of that age will do, and In such case, the superintendent has violated the rules and regulations
it is incumbent upon the driver of a vehicle, on seeing such child in the of jails which prohibit him from permitting a prisoner to leave the jail.
street, to take such care that, no matter what, within reasonable limits, The escape of the prisoner, brought about by the superintendent's
the child may do, it will nevertheless be safe. infraction of the rules, makes him guilty of the crime of infidelity in the
custody of prisoners committed by simple imprudence with infraction of
This defendant, so far as the great preponderance of the evidence is the rules relating to prisons.
concerned, took no adequate precautions to prevent the accident which
occurred. It is undoubted that he saw the child in the street, very Finally, the Code recognizes as the third class that in which the
probably making its way toward the street-car track; yet he continued negligence can neither be called reckless, because it is impossible to
the car at its maximum speed, without regard to what the child might foresee the evil produced, nor negligence with a violation of rules,
do. Such conduct cannot be permitted. Vehicles cannot be driven in because in reality no rules are violated. It is called simple imprudence
the public streets in such a way as to endanger the life of a child below or negligence, and is punished as a misdemeanor in paragraph 3 of
the thinking age who may have strayed upon the streets in search of its article 605 (Spanish) of the Penal Code. An example of this class is
mother, or who may be there.for any other reason. Having no judgment presented in a case where the driver of a cart, passing along the street
of its own, the drivers of vehicles must substitute their judgment for its; at the speed prescribed by the ordinance and leading his team by a
not having the intelligence to direct itself, men who drive cars or strap attached to the bridle or head, in a moment of distraction, on
vehicles must exercise their intelligence. It may be true, as defendant turning a corner, does not see that there is a child asleep in the gutter
claims, that the child by a sudden dart placed itself in front of the car, on the side of the team opposite to him; by reason whereof the child is
but that is no excuse for the defendant. He should have anticipated run over by the cart and killed. The act cannot be denominated purely
that very thing and should have acted accordingly. accidental, because, if he had been paying strict attention to his duty,
he would have seen the child and very likely would have been able to
The Penal Code recognizes and distinguishes three classes of avoid the accident. Nor can it be called reckless negligence, because
negligence in connection with homicide or other crimes: First, reckless he was not able to foresee the extremely unusual occurrence of a child
negligence, which consists in every act of improvidence (lack of being asleep in a gutter. Neither was there a violation of an ordinance,
foresight), thoughtlessness, carelessness, negligence, unskillfulness because he was driving his vehicle entirely in conformity therewith.
and imprudence, executed or done without taking those precautions or Such act is qualified, then, as simple imprudence or negligence,
measures which the most common prudence would require. For punishable as a misdemeanor.
example, discharging a firearm from the window of one's house and
killing a neighbor who just at the moment had leaned over the balcony We are aware that the crime of homicide through an act of simple
in front of the house. Leaving a loaded firearm on a chair or other place negligence which violates an ordinance or regulation is not necessarily
within the reach of small children then in the house—one of whom picks included in the crime of homicide through reckless negligence. The
it up for the purpose of playing with it, and is killed by its discharge. latter crime might possibly be committed without the violation of an
The facts in both of these cases constitute homicide by reckless ordinance or regulation. In that event it would not include the crime of
negligence, because death was produced by failure to exercise the homicide through an act of simple negligence which violates an
most ordinary and common care. ordinance or regulation. The courts have not yet gone so far as to hold
that, where there is an acquittal of the greater crime and a conviction of
The second class is that in which the act is performed with simple a lesser crime not included in the greater and not charged in the
negligence or imprudence,i.e., with negligence less than reckless information, an appeal from a conviction of the lesser crime opens the
negligence, but at the same time in violation of some ordinance or other way to a conviction of the greater crime in the appellate court if the
rule enacted by some competent body for the public good. An evidence is there found sufficient; nor has there been such holding in a
case where two crimes, neither one,included in the other, and from their
nature having no legal relation to each other, were charged in the same
information, and an acquittal was had as to the higher and a conviction
as to the lower.
In the case at bar, however, we have both the higher and the lower
degrees of the same crime charged in the information. We have, also,
a case in which the commission of the homicide was accompanied by a
violation of the ordinance, and in which, therefore, the crime of
homicide through an act of negligence which violates an ordinance was
included in the crime of homicide by an act of reckless negligence. This
is a case where, as a matter of fact, the one was included in the other.
Under the authorities, therefore, an appeal from a conviction of the
lower grade opens the whole case for reconsideration by this court
upon all the evidence, and requires us in the performance of our duty to
pronounce such a judgment in the premises as in conscience we ought.
39. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., INC., PETITIONER, complied with the terms of its contract with PLDT by installing the
VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES ANTONIO ESTEBAN AND necessary and appropriate standard signs in the vicinity of the work
GLORIA ESTEBAN, RESPONDENTS.[ G.R. No. 57079, September 29, 1989 site, with barricades at both ends of the excavation and with red lights
at night along the excavated area to warn the traveling public of the
A. PARTIES presence of excavations.
Plaintiff/Complainant with Background/Position Title, Occupation, etc
Spouses Antonio Esteban And Gloria Esteban C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
b. Case Filed
Defendant; same same action for damages
PLDT
c. RTC Ruling (inc damages awarded, if any)
B. ALLEGATIONS The trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, the
1. Plaintiff's Claim - Negligent Act/s of D; Relief/s Prayed for decretal part of which reads:
This case had its inception in an action for damages instituted in the
former Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental by private "IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING considerations the defendant
respondent spouses against petitioner Philippine Long Distance Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company is hereby ordered (A) to
Telephone Company (PLDT, for brevity) for the injuries they sustained pay the plaintiff Gloria Esteban the sum of P20,000.00 as moral
in the evening of July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of damages and P5,000.00 exemplary damages; to plaintiff Antonio
earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken Esteban the sum of P2,000.00 as moral damages and P500.00 as
by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. The exemplary damages, with legal rate of interest from the date of the filing
complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the of the complaint until fully paid. The defendant is hereby ordered to pay
open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping the plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees. (B) The third-party
darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. As a result of the defendant is hereby ordered to reimburse whatever amount the
accident, respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her defendant-third party plaintiff has paid to the plaintiff. With costs
arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the against the defendant."
respondent husband suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of the
jeep was shattered. From this decision both PLDT and private respondents appealed, the
latter appealing only as to the amount of damages. Third-party
2. Defendant's Defense and/or Counterclaim defendant Barte did not appeal.
PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the injuries
sustained by respondent spouses were the result of their own d. CA
negligence and that the entity which should be held responsible, if at all, The Court of Appeals rendered a decision reversing the decision of the
is L.R. Barte and Company (Barte, for short), an independent contractor lower court and dismissing the complaint of respondent spouses. It
which undertook the construction of the manhole and the conduit held that respondent Esteban spouses were negligent and
system. consequently absolved petitioner PLDT from the claim for damages.
FACTS: A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the
ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and
The defendant is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street railway in falling, the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a
the city of Manila and its suburbs, including the municipality of Caloocan. The wheel, this might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what
plaintiff's residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along which defendant's his condition; and to conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober man
tracks run, so that to enter his premises from the street plaintiff is obliged to would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to draw a conclusion which
cross defendant's tracks. enters the realm of speculation and guesswork.
On the night of August 8, 1909, plaintiff drove home in a calesa and in crossing Mere intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to
the tracks to enter his premises the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. It is the
causing the vehicle with the rails, resulting in a sudden stop, threw plaintiff from general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of
the vehicle and caused the injuries complained of. ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care
is required than by a sober one. If one's conduct is characterized by a proper
It is undisputed that at the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks on the night in degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober.
question not only the rails were above-ground, but that the ties upon which the
rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the ground,
thus making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of
the street.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE:
The trial court held that both parties were negligent, but that the plaintiff's
negligence was not as great as defendant's and under the authority of the case
of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co. apportioned the damages and awarded plaintiff a
judgment of P1,000.
ISSUE:
RULING:
As is clear from reading the opinion, no facts are stated therein which warrant
the conclusion that the plaintiff was negligent. The conclusion that if he had
been sober he would not have been injured is not warranted by the facts as
43. THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BAGGAY, JR., Defendant- because of the violent death of the woman Bil-liingan. This cause was instituted
Appellant.G.R. No. 6659. September 1, 1911 separately from the other, No. 1109, for lesiones.
After trial and proof that the defendant was suffering from mental aberration, the
SYLLABUS judge on April 28 rendered the judgment cited above, whereupon the
defendant’s counsel appealed to this court.
CIVIL LIABILITY IN CRIME; INSANE PERSONS. — Civil liability generally
accompanies criminal liability, because every person liable criminally is also By another writing of June 27, the same counsel asked for immediate
liable for reparation of damage and for indemnification for the harm done; but by suspension of execution of the judgment, because it had been appealed and
express provision of the penal laws there may be civil liability even when the had not become final.
perpetrator is held to be exempt from criminal liability.
He also requested annulment of the sale at public auction of the property
Such is the case of a lunatic or demented person who, in spite of his deranged attached by the sheriff or his deputy under order of the court, for making
mind is still-reasonably and justly liable with his property for the consequences indemnification with the defendant’s property in accordance with said judgment,
of his acts, even though they be performed unwittingly. as the attachment had been executed upon the property of the non-Christian
woman named Dioalan and of other persons and not upon that of the
Law and society are under obligation to protect him, and, when so declared defendant.
liable with his property for reparation and indemnification, he is still entitled to
reservation of what is necessary for his decent maintenance, but this protection ISSUE: The question raised on the appeal filed in this case by counsel for the
does not exclude liability for damages caused to those who may have the insane defendant, Baggay, jr., is solely whether he, notwithstanding that he was
misfortune to suffer the consequences of his acts. held exempt from criminal liability, has nevertheless incurred civil liability, with
obligation to indemnify the heirs of the murdered woman and to pay the costs.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE:
RULING:
This is an appeal by the defendant from the judgment rendered on April 28,
1910, whereby he was declared exempt from criminal liability but was obligated Article 17 of the Penal Code states:
to indemnify the heirs of the murdered woman, Bil-liingan, in the sum of P1,000,
to pay the costs in the case and to be confined in an institution for the insane "Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable."
until further order of the court.
About the 4th of October, 1909, several persons were assembled in the
defendant’s house in the township of Peñarrubia, Abra, Province of Ilocos Sur, "The exemption from criminal liability declared in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, and 10 of
for the purpose of holding a song service called "buni" according to the Tinguian article 8 does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced,
custom, when he, the non-Christian Baggay, without provocation suddenly subject to the:
attacked the woman Bil-liingan with a bolo, inflicting a serious wound on her
head from which she expired immediately; and with the same bolo he likewise "(1) In cases 1, 2, and 3, the persons who are civilly liable for acts committed by
inflicted various wounds on the women named Calbayan, Agueng, Quisamay, a lunatic or imbecile, or a person under 9 years of age, or over this age and
Calapini, and on his own mother, named Dioalan. under 15, who has not acted with the exercise of judgment, are those who have
them under their authority, legal guardianship or power, unless they prove that
For this reason the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the court of Ilocos Sur, there was no blame or negligence on their part.
dated February 15, charging the non-Christian Baggay, jr., with murder,
"Should there be no person having them under his authority, legal guardianship,
or power, or if such person be insolvent, the said lunatics, imbeciles, or minors
shall answer with their own property, excepting that part which is exempted for
their support in accordance with the civil law."
Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person who, in spite of his irresponsibility
on account of the deplorable condition of his deranged mind, is still reasonably
and justly liable with his property for the consequences of his acts, even though
they be performed unwittingly, for the reason that his fellows ought not to suffer
from the disastrous results of his harmful acts more than is necessary, in spite
of his unfortunate condition.
Law and society are under obligation to protect him during his illness and so
when he is declared to be liable with his property for reparation and
indemnification, he is still entitled to the benefit of what is necessary for his
decent maintenance, but this protection does not exclude liability for damage
caused to those who may have the misfortune to suffer the consequences of his
acts.
According to the law, the persons in the first place liable are those who have the
insane party under their care or guardianship, unless they prove that there was
no blame or negligence on their part; but if the demented person or imbecile
lack a guardian or some person charged with his care, or if the latter be
insolvent, then his own property must meet the civil liability of indemnifying or
repairing the damage done, and for this reason judges and courts in rendering
judgment in a criminal cause prosecuted against an insane or demented
person, even when they hold the accused exempt from criminal liability, must fix
the civil liability of the persons charged with watching over and caring for him or
the liability of the demented person himself with his property for reparation of
the damage and indemnification for the harm done, unless the offended party or
the heirs of the person murdered expressly renounce such reparation or
indemnification.
45. ELIAS S. CIPRIANO and/or E.S. CIPRIANO ENTERPRISES, vs. On May 8, 1991, private respondent sent a letter to petitioner, demanding
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MACLIN ELECTRONICS, INC., reimbursement for the value of the Kia Pride. In reply, petitioner denied liability
on the ground that the fire was a fortuitous event. This prompted private
respondent to bring this suit for the value of its vehicle and for damages against
G.R. No. 107968 October 30, 1996
petitioner.
A. Parties
C. Allegations
a) Plaintiff/Complainant with Background, position title, occupation
1. Plaintiff’s Claim -
e. CA Ruling
f. SC Ruling
The contention of the petitioner is without merit. The SC hold that both
questions must be answered in the affirmative.
Thus, P.D. No. 1572, §1 requires service and repair enterprises for motor
vehicles, like that petitioner's, to register with Department of Trade and Industry.
As condition for such registration or accreditation, Ministry Order No. 32
requires covered enterprises to secure insurance coverage. Rule III of this
Order provides in pertinent parts: 12
The insurance policy of the following risks like theft, pilferage, fire, flood and
loss should cover exclusively the machines, motor vehicles, heavy equipment,
engines, electronics, electrical airconditioners, refrigerators, office machines
and data processing equipment, medical and dental equipment, other
consumer mechanical and industrial equipment stored for repair and/or service
in the premises of the applicant.
There is thus a statutory duty imposed on petitioner and it is for his failure to
comply with this duty that he was guilty or negligence rendering him liable for
damages to private respondent. While the fire in this case may be considered a
fortuitous event, 13 this circumstance cannot exempt petitioner from liability for
loss.
We think, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the award of
attorney's fees by the lower court. The reason for this is that it is not sound
policy to penalize the right to litigate. It can not simply be inserted as an item of
46. HONORIA DELGADO VDA. DE GREGORIO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, 1. Plaintiff's Claim - Negligent Act/s of D; Relief/s Prayed for
vs.GO CHONG BING, defendant-appellee. G.R. No. 7763 December 2,
1957 To sustain the theory that defendant's cargador Francisco Romera was
negligent, plaintiffs introduced one Javier A. Dayo as a witness. According to
A. PARTIES this witness the truck was speeding at the rate of 20 miles an hour. According to
1. Defendant was the owner of a truck. He had a driver and a cargador him also, while the truck was about pass by the house of one Lucio, running at
or driver's helper by the name of Francisco Romera. a speed per hour, he heard Romera shouting "hand brake! hand brake!"; that
2. The plaintiffs appellants' in this action are Gregorio's widow and his both Orfanel and Romera tried to turn the driver's wheel to the left and direct the
children. truck towards also the left to avoid the collision. According to his witness also,
Romera gave the wheel to Orfanel voluntarily upon the request of the latter.
B. ALLEGATIONS
2. Defendant's Defense and/or Counterclaim
Defendant was the owner of a truck. He had a driver and a cargador or
driver's helper by the name of Francisco Romera. Defendant ordered Defendant testified that he gave positive instructions to Romera not to allow
Romera to drive his truck, with instructions to follow another track driven by anybody to drive the truck, and Romera himself testified that he had warned
his driver and help the latter in crossing Sumlog river which was then Orfanel that his master prohibited him from allowing anybody to drive the truck,
flooded, should it be unable to cross the river because of the flood. Romera but that as Orfanel was a uniformed policeman and insisted that he drive the
at that time was not a licensed driver. He only had a student's permit. The truck, and that as he believed that the policeman knew how to drive, he let him
truck started from the town of Lupon at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, drive the truck.
driven by Romera. Some persons boarded the truck and among them was
one policeman by the name of VenancioOrfanel. While the truck was on the C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
way, it made a stop and then Orfanel took the wheel from Romera, while the
latter stayed on the driver's left, reclined on a spare tire inside of the truck. RTC Ruling
The court a quo dismissed the action on the ground that as the death or
While the truck was being driven by Orfanel, with another truck ahead of it accident was caused by an act or omission of a person who is not in any
driven by defendant's driver it so happened that they came to a truck that way related to the defendant, and as such act or omission was punishable
was trying to park on the left side of the road. Romera suggested to Orfanel by law, and as a matter of fact he had already been punished therefor, no
that he shift to low gear and Orfanel did so. But as they approached the civil liability should be imposed upon the Ornafel.
parking truck, and in order to avoid colliding with it, Orfanel swerved the
truck towards the right. It so happened that at that time two pedestrians were CA:
on the right side of the road, As the truck had swerved to the right and was Against this decision the plaintiffs have appealed contending that when
proceeding to hit the said pedestrians, Romera told Orfanel to apply the defendant permitted his cargador, who was not provided with a driver's
brake, but Orfanel instead of doing so put his foot on the gasoline and the license, to drive the truck, he thereby violated the provisions of the Revised
truck did not stop but went on and hit and run over one of the pedestrians, by Motor Vehicle Law and that this constitutes negligence per se.
the name of Quirico Gregorio. The plaintiffs appellants' in this action are
Gregorio's widow and his children. Orfanel was prosecuted for homicide with
reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced SC:
accordingly. We are of the belief that defendant's claim that Romera gave the wheel to
the policeman for fear of, or out of respect for, the latter, and because he
believed that the latter had both the ability and the authority to drive the
truck, especially as he himself had only a student's permit and not a driver's
license.
It is evident that the proximate, immediate and direct cause of the death
of the plaintiffs' intestate was the negligence of Orfanel, a uniformed
policeman, who took the wheel of the truck from defendant's cargador, in
spite of the protest of the latter. The reason for absolving the defendant
therefor is not because the one responsible for the accident had already
received indemnification for the accident, but because there is no direct
and proximate causal connection between the negligence or violation of
the law by the defendant to the death of the plaintiff's intestate.
But admitting for the sake of argument that the defendant had so violated
the law, or may be deemed negligent in entrusting the truck to one who is
not provided with a driver's license, it is clear that he may not be declared
liable for the accident because his negligence was not the direct and
proximate cause thereof. In order that a person may be held guilty for
damage through negligence, it is necessary that there be an act or
omission on the part of the person who is to be charged with the liability
and that damage is produced by the said act or omission.
47. MERCEDES M. TEAGUE vs. ELENA FERNANDEZ, et.al. Plaintiff’s Claim
G.R. No. L-29745, 4 June 1973 - That Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila
refers to public buildings and hence did not apply to the Gil-Armi
A. PARTIES building which was of private ownership.
Mercedes Teague – operator of Realistic Institute, a vocational school - that the obligation to comply with the ordinance devolved upon the
owners of the building and therefore it is they and not the petitioner
for hair and beauty culture
herein, who is a mere lessee, who should be liable for the violation
Elena Fernandez and other respondents (Not named in the caption of - According to the her "the events of fire, panic and stampede were
the case) – siblings of Lourdes Fernandez, the deceased independent causes with no causal connection at all with the
violation of the ordinance."
B. ALLEGATIONS
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
FACTS STATED BY THE CA 1. Case filed – Action for damages
At about four o'clock in the afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire 2. Ruling of the CFI – ruled in favor of Teague and dismissed the case
broke out in a store for surplus materials located about ten meters away (the reason for the dismissal was not stated)
from Realistic Institute. Soler Street lay between that store and the
institute. Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in the Realistic 3. CA – reversed the judgment and sentenced Teague to pay damages
Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter, a panic ensued. in the sum of P11,000.00 with interest.
Four instructresses and six assistant instructress of the Institute Teague was negligent and such negligence was the proximate cause
were present and they, together with the registrar, tried to calm down of the death of Lourdes.
the students, who numbered about 180 at the time, telling them not to
be afraid because the Gil-Armi Building would not get burned as it is
made of concrete, and that the fire was anyway, across the street.
Basis: Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila.
Said provision reads as follows:
They told the students not to rushout but just to go down the
stairway two by two, or to use the fire-escapes. The panic, however,
Sec. 491.Firepro of partitions, exits and stairways. - ... All buildings
could not be subdued and the students, with the exception of the few
and separate sections of buildings or buildings otherwise known as
who made use of fire-escapes kept on rushing and pushing their way
accessorias having less than three stories, having one or more
through the stairs, thereby causing stampede therein.
persons domiciled therein either temporarily or permanently, and all
As a result, Lourdes sustained injuries to wit: lacerations in both
public or quasi-public buildings having less than three stories, such as
eyes and on the upper lip, contused abrasions in different parts of the hospitals, sanitarium, schools, reformatories, places of human
body, internal hemorrhage and fractures in the second and third right detention, assembly halls, clubs, restaurants or panciterias, and the
ribs. The cause of death, according to the autopsy report, was "Shock like, shall be provided with at least two unobstructed stairways of not
due to traumatic fractures of the ribs with perinephric hematoma and less than one meter and twenty centimeters in width and an inclination
lacerations of the conjunctiva of both eyes." of not less than forty degrees from the perpendicular, in case of large
buildings more than two stairways shall likewise be provided when
required by the chief of the fire department, said stairways shall be to evacuate the building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen, was
placed as far apart as possible. bound to happen under emergency conditions if there was only one
The alleged violation of the ordinance above-quoted consisted stairway available. It is true that in this particular case there would have
in the fact that the second storey of the Gil-Armi building had only one been no overcrowding in the single stairway if there had not been a fire
stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2 meters each, in the neighborhood which caused the students to panic and rush
although at the time of the fire the owner of the building had a second headlong for the stairs in order to go down. But it was precisely such
stairway under construction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles contingencies or event that the authors of the ordinance had in mind,
virtual l for under normal conditions one stairway would be adequate for the
4. SC – occupants of the building.
ISSUE: Whether or not P should be held negligent for the death of
Lourdes. – YES
h. CA Ruling
i. SC Ruling
The contention of the petitioner is without merit. The SC hold that both
questions must be answered in the affirmative.
Thus, P.D. No. 1572, §1 requires service and repair enterprises for motor
vehicles, like that petitioner's, to register with Department of Trade and Industry.
As condition for such registration or accreditation, Ministry Order No. 32
requires covered enterprises to secure insurance coverage. Rule III of this
Order provides in pertinent parts: 12
The insurance policy of the following risks like theft, pilferage, fire, flood and
loss should cover exclusively the machines, motor vehicles, heavy equipment,
engines, electronics, electrical airconditioners, refrigerators, office machines
and data processing equipment, medical and dental equipment, other
consumer mechanical and industrial equipment stored for repair and/or service
in the premises of the applicant.
There is thus a statutory duty imposed on petitioner and it is for his failure to
comply with this duty that he was guilty or negligence rendering him liable for
damages to private respondent. While the fire in this case may be considered a
fortuitous event, 13 this circumstance cannot exempt petitioner from liability for
loss.
We think, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the award of
attorney's fees by the lower court. The reason for this is that it is not sound
policy to penalize the right to litigate. It can not simply be inserted as an item of