G.R. No.
201011               January 27, 2014 a pending Petition for Certiorari before the CA assailing several of the RTC orders. The
THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO, and GLORIA, all surnamed
DIMAGUILA, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE and SONIA A. MONTEIRO, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
August 15, 2011Decision1 and the March 5, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 92707, which affirmed the August 23, 2007 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Santa Cruz, Laguna (RTC), in Civil Case No. SC-3108.
The Facts
On July 5, 1993, the respondent spouses, Jose and Sonia Monteiro (Spouses Monteiro),
along with Jose, Gerasmo, Elisa, and Clarita Nobleza, filed their Complaint for Partition
and Damages before the RTC, against the pet1t10ners, Theresita, Juan, Asuncion,
Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria Dimaguila (The Dimaguilas), together with Rosalina,
Jonathan, Eve, Sol, Venus, Enrique, Nina, Princess Arieta, and Evangelina Borlaza. The
complaint alleged that all the pmiies were co-owners and prayed for the pmiition of a
residential house and lot located at Gat. Tayaw St., Liliw, Laguna, with an area of 489
square meters, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 1453. Spouses Monteiro anchored
their claim on a deed of sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila
(Pedro).
In their Answer, the Dimaguilas and the other defendants countered that there was no
co-ownership to speak of in the first place. They alleged that the subject property, then
owned by Maria Ignacio Buenaseda, had long been partitioned equally between her two
sons, Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, with its
southern-half portion assigned to Perfecto and the northern-half portion to Vitaliano.
They claimed that they were the heirs of Vitaliano and that Spouses Monteiro had
nothing to do with the property as they were not heirs of either Perfecto or Vitaliano.
During the course of the proceedings, several incidents were initiated, namely: (a)
Motion to Dismiss for lack of legal capacity to sue of Spouses Monteiro and for lack of
cause of action; (b) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of denial thereof, which was
denied; (c) Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents; (d) Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order granting the same, which was denied; (e) Motion to Defer
Pre-trial; (f) Notice of Consignation by the petitioners in the exercise of their alleged
right of redemption of the share being claimed by the Spouses Monteiro in light of the
deed of sale they produced and claimed to have been executed by the heirs of Pedro in
their favor; (g) Motion to Remove Sonia Monteiro (Sonia) as plaintiff, which was denied;
(h) Motion for Reconsideration thereof, which was also denied; (i) Motion for
Clarification and/or Extended Resolution; and (j) Motion to Suspend Proceedings due to
proceedings resumed after the promulgation by the CA of its April 5, 2000 Resolution in
CA-G.R. No. SP 52833, which upheld the assailed RTC orders.
On January 2, 2001, upon resumption of the proceedings, Spouses Monteiro filed their
Motion for Leave to Amend and/or Admit Amended Complaint. 4 The RTC granted their
motion. The amended complaint abandoned the original claim for partition and instead
sought the recovery of possession of a portion of the subject property occupied by the
Dimagui as and other defendants, specifically, the potiion sold to the couple by the heirs
of Pedro. Furthermore, only Spouses Monteiro were retained as plaintiffs and the
Dimaguilas as defendants.
In amending their complaint, Spouses Montiero adopted the Dimaguilas' admission in
their original answer that the subject propetiy had already been partitioned between
Perfecto and Vitaliano, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, dated October 5, 1945,
and that during their lifetime, the brothers agreed that Perfecto would become the
owner of the southern-hal f portion and Vitaliano of the northern-half portion, which
division was observed and respected by them as well as their heirs and successors-in-
interest.
Spouses Monteiro further averred that Perfecto was survived by Esperanza, Leandro and
Pedro, who had divided the southern-half portion equally amongst themselves, with
their respective 1 /3 shares measuring 81.13 square meters each; that Pedro's share
pertains to the 1 /3 of the southern-half immediately adjacent to the northern-half
adjudicated to the
Dimaguilas as heirs of Vitaliano; that on September 29, 1992, Pedro's share was sold by
his heirs to them through a Bilihan ng Lahat Naming Karapatan (Bilihan) with the
acquiescence of the heirs of Esperanza and Leandro appearing in an Affidavit of
Conformity and Waiver; and that when they attempted to take possession of the share of
Pedro, they discovered that the subject portion was being occupied by the Dimaguilas.
In their Answer5 to the amended complaint, the Dimaguilas admitted that the subject
property was inherited by, and divided equally between Perfecto and Vitaliano, but
denied the admission in their original answer that it had been actually divided into
southern and nmihern portions. Instead, they argued that the Extrajudicial Partition
mentioned only the division of the subject property "into two and share and share alike."
In effect, they argued the existence of a co-owenrship, contrary to their original position.
The Dimaguilas further argued that the Bilihan did not specify the metes and bounds of
the property sold, in violation of Article 1458 of the Civil Code. Even assuming that such
had been specified, they averred that the sale of a definite portion of a property owned in
common was void since a co-owner could only sell his undivided share in the property.
During the trial, Spouses Monteiro presented Pedrito Adrieta, brother of Sonia Monteiro
(Sonia), who testified that Perfecto was his grandfather and that at the time of Perfecto's
death, he had two properties, one of which was the subject property in Liliw, Laguna,
which went to his children, Esperanza, Leonardo and Pedro. Pedro was survived by his
children Pedrito, Theresita, Francisco, and Luis, who, in turn, sold their rights over the
subject property to Sonia.
Sonia testified that she was approached by Pedro's son, Francisco, and was asked if she
was interested in purchasing Pedro's 1/3 share of the southern portion of the Bahay na
Sato, and that he showed her a deed of extrajudicial partition executed by and between
Perfecto and Vitaliano, as well as the tax declaration of the property to prove that the
property had already been partitioned between the two brothers.
Engineer Baltazar F. Mesina testified that he was the geodetic engineer hired by Spouses
Monteiro to survey the property in Liliw, and recounted that he checked the boundary of
the subject property, subdivided the lot into two and came up with a survey plan.
Crisostomo Arves, an employee from the Office of the Municipal Assessor, presented a
certified true copy of the cadastral map of Liliw and a list of claimants/owners.
Dominga Tolentino, a record officer of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), testified that as part of her duties, she certifies and safekeeps the
records of surveyed land, including cadastral maps from the region.
One of the Dimaguilas, Asuncion, was the sole witness for the defendants. She testified
that their first counsel made a mistake when he alleged in their original answer that the
property had already been partitioned into n01ihern and southern portions between the
two brothers, as the original answer had been rushed and they were never given a copy
of it. She claimed that the mistake was only pointed out to her by their new counsel after
their former counsel withdrew due to cancer. She further testified that there was no
intention to partition the "bahay na bato" which stood on the subject property, in order
to preserve its historical and sentimental value.
Ruling of the RTC
In its August 23, 2007 Decision, the RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro and ordered
the Dimaguilas to turn over the possession of the subject 1 /3 portion of the southern-
half of the property, to wit:
WHEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants:
a. Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to
peacefully vacate and turn-over possession of 1/ 3 of the southern portion of
the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 1453, specifically described as "A"
of Lot 877 in the sketch plan marked as Exhibit "I", within 60 days from the
finality of this Decision, failing which let a writ of possession issue;
b. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and solidarily, the
amount of ?500 per month in the form of rent for the use of the property from
July 1993 until the property is vacated;
c. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and solidarily, attorney's
fees of ₱30,000 and litigation expense of ₱20,000.
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC found that although the extrajudicial partition merely divided the property into
two share and share alike, evidence aliunde was appreciated to show that there was an
actual division of the property into south and north between Perfecto and Vitaliano, and
that such partition was observed and honored by their heirs. These pieces of evidence
were the cadastral map of Liliw7 and a corresponding list of claimants, which showed
that the subject property had long been registered as Lot 876 (northern-half), claimed by
Buenaventura Dimaguila (Buenaventura), an heir of Vitaliano, and Lot 877 (southern-
half), claimed by Perfecto.
The RTC held that the manner of partition was admitted by the Dimaguilas themselves in
their original answer. It gave no credence to the claim of Asuncion that such admission
was an error of their fonner counsel and that she was unaware of the contents of their
original answer. It noted that the Dimaguilas had strongly maintained their theory of
partition from 1992 when the complaint was first filed, and only changed their defense in
2001 when Spouses Monteiro filed their amended complaint. It keenly observed that it
was precisely their admission which propelled Spouses Monteiro to amend their
complaint from one of partition to recovery of possession. Thus, the RTC concluded that
there was indeed a partition of the subject property into southern-half and northern-half
portions between Perfecto and Vitaliano and that the Dimaguilas were estopped from
denying the same.
As to the authenticity of the Bilihan, where the 1 /3 share of Pedro was sold to Spouses
Monteiro, the RTC found the document to be regular and authentic absent any piece of
evidence to the contrary. It stated that the proper persons to contest the sale were not
the Dimaguilas, who were the heirs of Vitaliano, but the heirs of Perfecto. It noted that
the records showed that the heirs of Esperanza and Leandro (Pedro's siblings), had
signified their conformity to the pa1iition and to the sale of Pedro's 1 /3 portion.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed August 15, 2011 Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
The CA found that Spouses Monteiro had established their case by a preponderance of
evidence thru their presentation of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition,8 the cadastral map
and the municipal assessor's records.9 It noted, more importantly, that the Dimaguilas
themselves corroborated the claim of partition in their original answer. It likewise ruled
that the petitioners were estopped from denying their admission of partition after the
respondent spouses had relied on their judicial admission.
The Dimaguilas also insisted on their argument, which was raised before the RTC, but not
addressed, that the Bilihan should not have been admitted as evidence for lack of a
documentary stamp tax, in accordance with Section 201 of the National Internal Revenue
Code (N!RC). Citing Gabucan v. Manta10 and Del Rosario v. Hamoy,11 the CA, however,
ruled that if a document which did not bear the required documentary stamp was
presented in evidence, the court should require the proponent to affix the requisite
stamp. The CA noted that the RTC had failed to direct Spouses Monteiro to affix the
stamp and merely reminded the presiding judge to be more vigilant on similar situations
in the future. Nonetheless, it held that the petitioners did not possess the necessary
personality to assail the sale between Spouses Monteiro and the heirs of Pedro because it
pe1iained to the southern-half of the property to which they had no claim.
The CA likewise found sufficient basis for the award of rentals as compensatory damages
since Spouses Monteiro were wrongfully deprived of possession of the 1/3 portion of the
southern-half of the subject property. It also upheld the award of attorney's fees and
litigation expenses by the RTC, considering that Spouses Monteiro were compelled to
litigate and incur expenses to protect their rights and interest.
In its assailed March 5, 2012 Resolution, the CA denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I violation of the best evidence rule.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS AN ACTUAL
PARTITION OF THE PROPERTY COVERED BY TAX DECLARATION NO. 1453.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 1/3 PORTION OF
THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE PROPERTY WAS SOLD TO THE RESPONDENTS.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE EXHIBIT C,
THE BIL/HAN NG LAHA T NAMING KARAPATAN.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE
ENTITLED TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE 1/3 PORTION OF THE SOUTHERN HALF
OF THE PROPERTY.
V sold to the respondent spouses.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONERS LIABLE FOR
RENTALS FOR THE USE OF THE PROPERTY FROM JULY 1993 UNTIL VACATED.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THE PETITIONERS LIABLE FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES.
VII
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
PETITIONERS' SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT AND TO GRANT
THE COUNTERCLAIMS INTERPOSED THEREIN.12
The Dimaguilas argue that their original allegation regarding the partition of the subject
property into northern and southern portions was a mistake of their former counsel, and
it was not their intention to partition the property because to do so would damage the
house thereon. Even assuming an admission was made, the petitioners aver that such
was made only by some, but not all, of the co-owners; and that partition can only be
made by all co-owners, and allowing the admission is tantamount to effecting partition
by only some co-owners. Spouses Monteiro themselves, in their original complaint, made
an admission that they were co-owners of the property and asserted that there was no
partition. The evidence aliunde considered by the RTC, consisting of the cadastral map
and the list of claimants, were timely objected to during the trial as hearsay and a
The petitioners reiterate that the Bilihan should not have been admitted into evidence
because it lacked the documentary stamp tax required by Section 201 of the NIRC,
providing that no document shall be admitted in evidence until the requisite stamps have
been affixed thereto. They argue that the ruling of petitioners' lack of personality to
assail the deed of sale is different from the issue of the deed of sale's admissibility as
evidence. They conclude that considering that no documentary stamp was ever affixed
on the deed of sale, such should never have been admitted into evidence and
consequently, should not have been relied upon by the lower courts to prove the sale of
1/3 of the southern portion; and that considering that the Bilihan is inadmissible as
evidence, the respondent spouses have no basis for their claim to the subject 1/3 portion
of the southern-half of the property. Thus, they insist that the lower courts erred in
awarding to Spouses Monteiro the possession of the subject prope1iy, the rentals,
attorney's fees and litigation expenses, and in failing to rule on their counterclaim for
demolition of improvements and payment of damages.
The assignment of errors boils down to two main issues:
I. Whether there was a pa1iition of the subject property; and
2. Whether the 1/3 portion of the southern-half of the subject property was
Ruling of the Court
At the outset, it must be pointed out that the petitioners' assignment of errors calls for
the Court to again evaluate the evidence to determine whether there was a partition of
the property and whether the 1/3 portion of the southern half was sold to the
respondent spouses. These clearly entail questions of fact which are beyond the Court's
ambit of review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, especially considering that the
findings of fact of the RTC were affirmed by the CA.13 On this ground alone, the present
petition must be denied. Nonetheless, the Court shall delve into these factual issues to
finally put this case to rest.
Partition of the Subject Property
Spouses Monteiro, as plaintiffs in the original case, had the burden of proof to establish
their case by a preponderance of evidence, which is the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side, synonymous with the term "greater weight of the
evidence." Preponderance of evidence is evidence which is more convincing to the court
as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.14
To prove their claim of partition, the respondent spouses presented the following: (1)
the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, dated October 5, 1945, executed by and between the
brothers Perfecto and Vitaliano; (2) the cadastral map of Liliw Cadm-484,15 dated August
6, 1976, showing that the subject property had been divided into southern and northern
portions, registered as Lot Nos. 876 and 877; and (3) the Municipal Assessor's
records16 showing that the said lots were respectively claimed by Buenaventura and
Perfecto.
It is undisputed that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition stated that Perfecto and Vitaliano
agreed "to divide between them into two and share and share alike" the subject property,
including the house situated thereon. It appears, however, that the property was actually
partitioned into definite portions, namely, southern and northern halves, as reflected in
the cadastral map of Liliw, which were respectively claimed by an heir of Vitaliano and
Perfecto himself. It, thus, appears that the subject property had already been partitioned
into definite portions more than 20 years prior to the original complaint for partition
filed in 1993, and that such division had been observed by the brothers' heirs. As earlier
pointed out, the petitioners themselves admitted to this very fact in their original
answer, to wit:
(b) On September 5, 1945 the brothers PERFECTO and VITALIANO DIMAGUILA executed
a deed of EXTRA JUDICIAL PARTITION of the aforedescribed property dividing the same
into two (2) equal parts as indicated in the aforesaid deed as follows, to wit:
xxx
(c) As a result of the foregoing partition and as known by all the parties in this case from
the beginning or as soon as they reached the age of discernment PERFECTO DIMAGUILA
became the sole and exclusive owner of the southern half of the aforedescribed property
and VITALIANO DIMAGUILA became the sole owner of the northern half of the same
property; the house that was built thereon and still existing up to this time was likewise
equally divided between the two (2) DIMAGUILA brothers in accordance with the
extrajudicial partition of half equal shares;
xxx
2. In other words, the share of VITALIANO DIMAGUILA in the above described property
has already been long segregated and had passed on to his heirs as is very well known by
all the parties in this case;17
xxx
(Emphases in the Original)
Section 418 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a pa1iy
in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake. The petitioners
argue that such admission was the palpable mistake of their former counsel in his rush to
file the answer, a copy of which was not provided to them. Petitioner Asuncion testified:
Q So, why was that allegations (sic) made in the Answer?
A May be, (sic) in his rush to file the Answer, Atty. Paredes filed the same without giving
us a copy ...19
This contention is unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim unsupported by any iota
of evidence. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof.20 Furthermore, the Court notes that this position was adopted by the petitioners
only almost eight (8) years after their original answer was filed, in response to the
amended complaint of the respondent spouses. In their original answer to the complaint
for partition, their claim that there was already a partition into northern-half and
southern-half portions, was the very essence of their defense. It was precisely this
admission which moved the respondent spouses to amend their complaint. The
petitioners cannot now insist that the very foundation of their original defense was a
palpable mistake.
Article 143121 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the
person relying thereon. The respondent spouses had clearly relied on the petitioners'
admission and so amended their original complaint for partition to one for recovery of
possession of a portion of the subject property. Thus, the petitioners are now estopped
from denying or attempting to prove that there was no partition of the property.
Considering that an admission does not require proof, the admission of the petitioners
would actually be sufficient to prove the partition even without the documents presented
by the respondent spouses. If anything, the additional evidence they presented only
served to corroborate the petitioners' admission.
The petitioners argue that they timely objected to the cadastral map and the list of
claimants presented by the respondent spouses, on the ground that they violated the rule
on hearsay and the best evidence rule.
Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3( d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that
when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except when the original is a public
record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. 22 Section 7 of the
same Rule provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof. 23 Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the
record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody or the record.24
Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants
of the area covered by the map were presented by two public officers. The first was
Crisostomo Arves, Clerk III of the Municipal Assessor's Office, a repository of such
documents. The second was Dominga Tolentino, a DENR employee, who, as a record
officer, certifies and safekeeps records of surveyed land involving cadastral maps. The
cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as ce1iified true copies of original public
records, fall under the exception to the best evidence rule.
As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides
that entries in official records are an exception to the rule. 25 The rule provides that
entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the
inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance as a witness to testify
to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. The document's
trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty.26
Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked
to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys.27 It is, therefore, clear
that the cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in
official records as they were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they
are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are primafacie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Even granting that the petitioners had not admitted the partition, they presented no
evidence to contradict the evidence of the respondent spouses. Thus, even without the
admission of the petitioners, the respondent spouses proved by a preponderance of
evidence that there had indeed been a partition of the subject property.
Sale of 1/3 Portion of the Southern-half
To prove that 1/3 of the southern-half portion of the subject property was sold to them,
Spouses Monteiro presented a deed of sale entitled Bilihan ng Lahat Naming
Karapatan,28 dated September 29, 1992, wherein Pedro's share was sold by his heirs to
them, with the acquiescence of the heirs of Esperanza and Leandro in an Affidavit of
Conformity and Waiver.29 The petitioners argue that the Bilihan should not have been
admitted into evidence because it lacked the documentary stamp tax required by Section
201 of the NIRC.
On August 29, 1994, the petitioners filed a motion for the production and/or inspection
of documents,30 praying that Spouses Monteiro be ordered to produce the deed of sale,
which they cited as the source of their rights as co-owners. On November 20, 1995,
Spouses Monteiro submitted their compliance,31 furnishing the RTC and the petitioners
with a copy32 of the Bilihan. On January 3, 1996, the petitioners filed a notice of
consignation,33 manifesting that they had attempted to exercise their right of redemption
as co-owners of the 1/3 portion of the southern half of the property under Article
162334 of the Civil Code by sending and tendering payment of redemption to Spouses
Monteiro, which was, however, returned.
By filing the notice of consignation and tendering their payment for the redemption of
the 1/3 portion of the southern-half of the property, the petitioners, in effect, admitted
the existence, due execution and validity of the Bilihan. Consequently, they are now
estopped from questioning its admissiblity in evidence for relying on such for their right
of redemption. Additionally, the Court notes that the copy35 of the Bilihan which was
originally submitted by Spouses Monteiro with its compliance filed on November 20,
1995, does in fact bear a documentary stamp tax. It could only mean that the
documentary stamp tax on the sale was properly paid. The Bilihan was, therefore,
properly admitted into evidence and considered by the RTC.
In any case, as correctly held by the lower cou1is, the petitioners, as heirs of Vitaliano,
who inherited the northern-half po1iion of the subject property, do not possess the
necessary personality to assail the sale of the southern-half portion between Spouses
Monteiro and the heirs of Pedro.1âwphi1 They are not real parties-in-interest who stand
to be benefited or injured by the sale of the 1/3 portion of the southern-half over which
they have absolutely no right. As correctly ruled by the courts below, only fellow co-
owners have the personality to assail the sale, namely, the heirs of Pedro's siblings,
Esperanza and Leandro. They have, however, expressly aquiesced to the sale and waived
their right to the property in the affidavit presented by Spouses Monteiro. 36 As such, the
petitioners have no right to their counterclaims of demolition of improvements and
payment of damages.
With Spouses Monteiro having sufficiently proved their claim over the subject I /3
portion of the southern-half of the prope1iy through the Bilihan, the lower courts did not
err in awarding possession, rentals, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses to them.
The Court, however, finds that the award of rentals should be reckoned from January 2,
2001, the date the Spouses Monteiro filed their Amended Complaint seeking recovery of
the subject portion. Interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall also be imposed on the
total amount of rent due from finality of this Decision until fully paid.37
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 15, 2011 Decision and the March 15,
2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G .R. CV No. 92707 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, in that:
a. The award of rent at the rate of ₱500.00 per month shall be reckoned from
January 2, 2001 until the property is vacated; and
 b. Interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on the total amount of
rent due from finality of this Decision until fully paid. On December 15, 2005, Anastacio, Jr. filed a criminal complaint for two counts of
falsification of public documents under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code
SO ORDERED. against the petitioner.[11] However, said criminal charges were eventually dismissed.

On March 2, 2006, the respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra,
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ instituted the action for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No.
221466 with Damages against the petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Makati City. [12]
[ G.R. No. 191936, June 01, 2016 ]
In her  Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,[13] the petitioner averred that the
respondents have no legal capacity to institute said civil action on the ground that they
VIRGINIA D. CALIMAG, PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF SILVESTRA N. MACAPAZ, are illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have no right over Silvestra's
REPRESENTED BY ANASTACIO P. MACAPAZ, JR., RESPONDENTS. estate pursuant to Article 992 of the Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate children from
inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their father and mother.
DECISION
After trial, the RTC found for the respondents and rendered its Decision on September
REYES, J.: 28, 2007.[14] The fallo of the RTC decision reads:

This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of

Appeals (CA) promulgated on October 20, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90907 which affirmed
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
with modification the Decision[3] dated September 28, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 147, in Civil Case No. 06-173, an action for annulment of
deed of sale and cancellation of title with damages. The CA Resolution[4] dated April 5,
2010 denied the motion for reconsideration thereof. 1. Declaring the Deed of Sale purportedly executed by [Silvestra] in favor of [the
petitioner] on January 18, 2005 over a parcel of land covered by TCT No.
183088 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, as Null and Void;
The Facts
2. Ordering the Registrar of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 221466 issued
Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject matter of this case, in the name of [the petitioner], the same having been issued on the basis of a
with Silvestra N. Macapaz (Silvestra). fraudulent/falsified Deed of Sale, and thereafter to reinstate TCT No. 183088
issued in the name of [the petitioner] and [Silvestra] with all the liens and
On the other hand, Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr. (Anastacio, Jr.) and Alicia Macapaz-Ritua encumbrances annotated thereon, including the adverse claim of [Fidela]; [and]
(Alicia) (respondents) are the children of Silvestra's brother, Anastacio Macapaz, Sr.
(Anastacio, Sr.) and Fidela O. Poblete Vda. de Macapaz (Fidela).
3. Ordering [the petitioner] to pay the [respondents] the sum of PI00,000.00 as
moral damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, P50,000.00 as
The subject property, with a total area of 299 square meters, is located at No. 1273 Bo.
and by way of attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.
Visaya Street, Barangay Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City, and was duly registered in the
names of the petitioner (married to Demetrio Calimag) and Silvestra under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 183088.[5] In said certificate of title, appearing as Entry No. [The petitioner's] counter-claim is dismissed for lack of merit.
02671 is an annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights and interests over a
portion of the said property measuring 49.5 sq m.[6] SO ORDERED.[15]

On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died without issue. On July 7, 2005, TCT No. 183088 The RTC found that the Deed of Sale dated January 18, 2005 presented for the
was cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No. 221466,[7] was issued in the name of cancellation of TCT No. 183088 was a forgery considering that Silvestra, who
the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Sale[8] dated January 18, 2005 whereby Silvestra purportedly executed said deed of sale died on November 11, 2002, about three years
allegedly sold her 99-sq-m portion to the petitioner for P300,000.00. Included among the before the execution of the said Deed of Sale.[16] Respecting the respondents' legal
documents submitted for the purpose of cancelling TCT No. 183088 was an capacity to sue, the RTC favorably ruled in this wise:
Affidavit[9] dated July 12, 2005 purportedly executed by both the petitioner and Silvestra.
It was stated therein that the affidavit of adverse claim filed by Fidela was not signed by
the Deputy Register of Deeds of Makati City, making the same legally ineffective. On Demetrio Calimag, Jr. sought, but failed, to impugn the personality of the [respondents]
September 16, 2005, Fidela passed away.[10] to initiate this action as the alleged heirs of [Silvestra]. The marriage between
[Anastacio Sr.J and [FidclaJ is evidenced by the Certificate of (canonical) Marriage
(Exh. "M"). The name 'Fidela Obera Poblete' is indicated in [the respondents']
respective birth certificates as the mother's maiden name but Fidela signed the
same as the informant as "Fidela P. Macapaz". In both birth certificates, "Anastacio
Nator Macapaz" is indicated as the name of the father. [17] (Emphasis ours)
Ruling of the CA
Aggrieved, the petitioner elevated her case to the CA resting on the argument that the
respondents are without legal personality to institute the civil action for cancellation of
deed of sale and title on the basis of their claimed status as legitimate children of
Anastacio, Sr., the brother and sole heir of the deceased, Silvestra.[18]
On October 20, 2009, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTC decision with
modification as to the amount of damages. The fallo of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of
merit. The Decision dated September 28, 2007 of the [RTC] of Makati City, Branch 147 in
Civil Case No. 06-173 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of
moral and exemplary damages is hereby reduced from PI00,000.00 to P50,000.00,
respectively.
With costs against the [petitioner].
SO ORDERED.[19]
The CA sustained the RTC ruling that the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 and the
issuance of TCT No. 221466 in the name of the petitioner were obtained through forgery.
As to the question of whether the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra and thus have
the legal capacity to institute the action, the CA ruled in this wise:
Reviewing the evidence on record, we concur with the trial court in sustaining the
appellees' legitimate filiation to Silvestra's brother [Anastacio, Sr.] The trial court found
unsuccessful the attempt of Atty. Demetrio Calimag, Jr. to assail the validity of marriage
between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] with a certification from the NSO that their office
has no record of the certificate of marriage of [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela], and further
claiming the absence of a marriage license.
The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract. A certificate of
marriage issued by the Most Holy Trinity Parish, Alang[-]alang, Leyte (Exh. "M") as well
as a copy of the marriage contract were duly submitted in evidence by the [respondents].
x x x x
The Marriage Contract (Exh. "U") in this case clearly reflects a marriage license number
and in the absence of a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage
license was issued, the marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] may not be
invalidated on that ground.
x x x.
x x x x
Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. This
jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to
be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
Here, the fact of marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] was established by
competent and substantial proof. [The respondents] who were conceived and born
during the subsistence of said marriage are therefore presumed to be legitimate children
of [Anastacio, Sr.], in the absence of any contradicting evidence.[20] (Citations omitted)
The petitioner sought reconsideration,[21] but her motion was denied in the
Resolution[22] dated April 5, 2010.
Hence, this petition.
Notably, even before the CA, the petitioner never assailed the factual finding that forgery
was indeed committed to effect the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 and the consequent
transfer of title of the property in her name. Verily, in this petition, the petitioner
continues to assail the legal capacity of the respondents to institute the present action.
Invoking the provisions of Article 992 of the Civil Code, [23] the petitioner insists that the
respondents have no legal right over the estate left by Silvestra for being illegitimate
children of Anastacio, Sr.
While the petitioner does not question that Anastacio, Sr. is the legal heir of Silvestra,
she, however, claims that the respondents failed to establish their legitimate filiation to
Anastacio, Sr. considering that the marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was not
sufficiently proven. According to the petitioner, the marriage contract[24] presented by
the respondents is not admissible under the Best Evidence Rule for being a mere fax copy
or photocopy of an alleged marriage contract, and which is not even authenticated by the
concerned Local Civil Registrar. In addition, there is no mark or stamp showing that said
document was ever received by said office. Further, while the respondents also
presented a Certificate of (Canonical) Marriage,[25] the petitioner asserts that the same is
not the marriage license required under Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code; [26] that said
Certificate of (Canonical) Marriage only proves that a marriage ceremony actually
transpired between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela.[27]
Moreover, the petitioner contends that the certificates of live birth of the respondents do
not conclusively prove that they are legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr.
In their Comment,[28] the respondents reiterate the finding and ruling of the CA that the
petitioner's argument has no leg to stand on considering that one's legitimacy can only
be questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by a party who is related to the former
either by consanguinity or affinity. [29]
Notwithstanding, it is well settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of
Thereupon, the resolution of this case rests upon this fundamental issue: whether or not a solemnized marriage.[36] Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven
the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra. by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents.[37]
Ruling of the Court
Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents presented their
The petition is bereft of merit. respective Certificates of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office[38] where
Fidela signed as the Informant in item no. 17 of both documents.
While it is true that a person's legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, as held in Spouses Fidel v. Hon. CA, et al.,[30] this A perusal of said documents shows that the respondents were apparently born to the
Court however deems it necessary to pass upon the respondents' relationship to same parents — their father's name is Anastacio Nator Macapaz, while their mother's
Silvestra so as to determine their legal rights to the subject property. Besides, the maiden name is Fidela Overa Poblete. In item no. 24 thereof where it asks: "24. DATE AND
question of whether the respondents have the legal capacity to sue as alleged heirs of PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARENTS (For legitimate birth)" it was stated therein that
Silvestra was among the issues agreed upon by the parties in the pre-trial. respondents' parents were married on "May 25, 1955 in Alang-alang, Leyte." [39]

At first blush, the documents presented as proof of marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and The petitioner asserts that said documents do not conclusively prove the respondents'
Fidela, viz: (1) fax or photo copy of the marriage contract, and (2) the canonical legitimate filiation, albeit, without offering any evidence to the contrary. The certificates
certificate of marriage, cannot be used as legal basis to establish the fact of marriage of live birth contain no entry stating whether the respondents are of legitimate or
without running afoul with the Rules on Evidence of the Revised Rules of Court. Rule illegitimate filiation, making said documents unreliable and unworthy of weight and
130, Section 3 of the Rules on Evidence provides that: "When the subject of the inquiry is value in the determination of the issue at hand.
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, x x x." Nevertheless, a reproduction of the original document can still be Moreover, the petitioner states that in the respondents' certificates of live birth, only the
admitted as secondary evidence subject to certain requirements specified by law. signature of Fidela appears, and that they were not signed by Anastacio, Sr. She argues
In Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr.,[31] it was held that: that the birth certificate must be signed by the father in order to be competent evidence
to establish filiation, whether legitimate or illegitimate, invoking Roces v. Local Civil
Registrar of Manila[40] where it was held that a birth certificate not signed by the alleged
father is not competent evidence of paternity. [41]
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5,
which states that: when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
The petitioner's contentions are untenable.
court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
"A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding the
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in
facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a duty by a
the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to
public officer (Civil Registrar)."[42] Thus, being public documents, the respondents'
satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution or existence of the
certificates of live birth are presumed valid, and are prima facie evidence of the truth of
original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and
the facts stated in them.[43]
(3) the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss
"Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such
would constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence, x x x.[32] (Citation
evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group
omitted)
or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense and which if not rebutted or
contradicted, will remain sufficient."[44]
On the other hand, a canonical certificate of marriage is not a public document. As early
as in the case of United States v. Evangelista,33 it has been settled that church registries
The petitioner's assertion that the birth certificate must be signed by the father in order
of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders
to be a competent evidence of legitimate filiation does not find support in law and
No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by
jurisprudence. In fact, the petitioner's reliance on Roces[45] is misplaced considering that
duly authorized public officials.[34] They are private writings and their authenticity must
what was sought to be proved is the fact of paternity of an illegitimate child, and not
therefore be proved as are all other private writings in accordance with the rules of
legitimate filiation.
evidence.[35] Accordingly, since there is no showing that the authenticity and due
execution of the canonical certificate of marriage of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was duly
Verily, under Section 5 of Act No. 3753, [46] the declaration of either parent of the new-
proven, it cannot be admitted in evidence.
born legitimate child shall be sufficient for the registration of his birth in the civil
register, and only in the registration of birth of an illegitimate child does the law require baptismal certificate of children born during such union; and d) the mention of such
that the birth certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant, or nuptial in subsequent documents.[48] (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
only by the mother if the father refuses to acknowledge the child. Moreover, in a catena of cases,[49] it has been held that, "[p]ersons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence
The pertinent portion of Section 5 of Act No. 3753 reads: special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they
would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
Sec. 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. - The declaration of the physician or established by our Code of Civil Procedure is 'that a man and a woman deporting
midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of cither themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper
parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage."[50]
civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax and
shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the Furthermore, as the established period of cohabitation of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela
physician, or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newly born transpired way before the effectivity of the Family Code, the strong presumption
child. accorded by then Article 220 of the Civil Code in favor of the validity of marriage cannot
be disregarded. Thus:
In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a)
date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship, and
religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every
of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; if) and such other data as may be intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the
required in the regulations to be issued. marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage,
the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member
x x x x of the family in case of unlawful aggression.

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to
jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father refuses. In the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the October 20, 2009 and Resolution dated April 5, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which CV No. 90907 are AFFIRMED.
such father could be identified, x x x (Emphasis Ours)
SO ORDERED.
Forsooth, the Court finds that the respondents' certificates of live birth were duly
executed consistent with the provision of the law respecting the registration of birth of
legitimate children. The fact that only the signatures of Fidela appear on said documents
is of no moment because Fidela only signed as the declarant  or informant of the ______________________________________________________________________________________________________
respondents' fact of birth as legitimate children.
G.R. No. 200065               September 24, 2014
Nonetheless, the respondents' certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio, Sr.
and Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and wife for a number of years, as a result of
which they had two children—the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than three CAPITAL SHOES FACTORY, LTD., Petitioner,
years after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible proof to establish the vs.
validity of marriage. Court Resolution dated February 13, 2013 in GR. No. 183262 TRAVELER KIDS, INC., Respondent.
entitled Social Security System (SSS) v. Lourdes S. Enobiso [47] had the occasion to state:
DECISION

Sarmiento v. CA is instructive anent the question of what other proofs can be offered to MENDOZA, J.:
establish the fact of a solemnized marriage, viz:
Questioned in this petition is the October 5, 2011 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
In Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that as proof of marriage may and its January 16, 2012 Resolution,2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 120413, which affirmed with
be presented: a) testimony of a witness to the matrimony; b) the couple's public and modification the May 13, 20113 and June 23, 20114 Orders of the Regional Trial Court,
open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock; c) the birth and Branch 170, Malabon City (RTC), regarding the admissibility of duplicate originals as
evidence in an action for sum of money and damages.
The Facts
Sometime in 2000, petitioner Capital Shoes Factory Ltd., (CSFL),a foreign corporation
engaged in the manufacturing and trading of children's shoes and similar products, and
respondent Traveller Kids, Inc. (TKI),a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
manufacturing, importing and distributing shoes, sandals and other footware entered
into an agreement, wherein they agreed that TKI would import the shoes and sandals
made by CSFL from its China factory. After TKI placed numerous purchase orders, CSFL
began manufacturing the goods pursuant to the special designs and specifications of TKI.
CSFL then shipped the goods to TKI. It was their arrangement that TKI would pay thirty
(30%) percent of the purchase price of the goods by way of letters of credit, and the
balance of seventy (70%) percent by way of telegraphic transfer, thirty (30) days from
the date of delivery of the goods.
For the first three years, TKI was able to pay its purchase orders and the shipments made
by CSFL. In 2004, however, TKI started to default in its payments. CSFL granted
numerous concessions and extensions to TKI. Thereafter, TKI was able to make a partial
payment on its unpaid accounts.
As of July 10, 2005, the total unpaid accounts of TKI amounted to U.S. $325,451.39,
exclusive of the interest accruing thereto. In addition, CSFL also manufactured
$92,000.00 worth of children's shoes and sandals pursuant to the design and
specifications of TKI in its purchase orders.
Both verbal and written demand letters were made by CSFL to TKI for the payment of its
unpaid accounts, but to no avail.
To protect its interest, CSFL filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and
damages against TKI beforethe RTC. During the trial, CSFL, through its witness, identified
several sales invoices and order slips it issued as evidence of its transactions withTKI.
The latter objected to the identification pointing out that the documents being presented
were mere photocopies. TKI also objected to the evidence presented by CSFL to prove
the amount of attorney’s fees on the ground that it was not an issue raised during the
pre-trial. The RTC noted the objections.
After the presentation of its last witness, CSFL filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits 5 seeking
the admission of, among others, the sales invoices and order slips earlier objected to by
TKI. The latter objected to the admission of the documents offered, contending
thatseveral of the sales invoices and order slips should not be admitted because they
were merely photocopies. TKI also objected to the admission ofdocuments by which
CSFL sought to prove its claim for attorney’s fees.6
On May 13, 2011, the RTC issued the Order7 admitting all the exhibits offered by CFSL.
The Order reads:
ORDER
Acting on Plaintiff’s Formal Offer of Exhibits as well as Defendant’s
Comment/Opposition on/thereto and finding the said offer to be well-taken
and in order – despite the objections made to the admission of said exhibits by
defendant, Exhibits "A" to ZZZ-1-A," inclusive, are all admittedfor the purposes
for which the same are offered and as part of the testimony of the witness who
testified thereon.
Let the presentation of defendant’s evidence commence on May 25, 2011 at
8:30 o’clock inthe morning, as previously scheduled.
SO ORDERED. [Emphasis supplied]
Not in conformity, TKI filed a motion for reconsideration8 arguing that the exhibits
formally offered by CSFL were inadmissible in evidence for being mere photocopies. TKI
also argued that the evidence relating to the claimed "legal fees" were erroneously
admitted because the matter was not raised as an issue during the pre-trial.
On June 23, 2011, the RTC issued the order 9 denying TKI’s motion for reconsideration,
ruling that the sales invoices and order slips could be admitted because the duplicate
originals of the invoices were already sufficiently established by the testimony of CSFL’s
officer and principal witness, Ms. Susan Chiu (Chiu). Regarding the documents offered by
CSFL to prove its claim for attorney’s fees, the RTC stated that the demand for attorney’s
fees was impliedly included in the issue of whether or not TKI was liable to CSFL for the
entire amount claimed.
Instead of presenting evidence, TKI opted to file a petition for certiorariwith prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the
CAin which it reiterated its argument regarding the inadmissibility of the photocopied
evidence and the erroneous inclusion of those documents proving entitlement to
attorney’s fees which matter was not raised during the pre-trial.
As there was no injunction order issued by the CA, the RTC continued the proceedings
and directed TKI to present evidence. TKI refused, citing the petition for certiorari it filed
with the CA. Because of its refusal, the RTC considered TKI’s right to adduce
countervailing evidence as waived and ordered CSFLto submit its memorandum.10
On October 5, 2011, the CA rendered a decision partially granting TKI’s petition. The
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Accordingly, the assailed Orders dated May 13, 2011 and June23, 2011 of public
respondent judge are hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that Exhibits "D" to "GG-
1" and "HH" to "KK-1" should be denied admission for being merely photocopies. As
such, they are inadmissible for failure of private respondent to prove any of the
exceptions provided under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.11
[Underscoring supplied]
Applying Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,12 the CA explained that while it was
true that the original copies of the sales invoices were the best evidence to prove
TKI’sobligation, CSFL merely presented photocopies of the questioned exhibits. It stated
that Chiu’s testimony merely established the existence or due execution of the original
invoices. CSFL, however, did not present the original invoices, only the photocopies,
contrary to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 13 Nonetheless, the CA agreed with
the RTC’s admission of CSFL’s evidence proving attorney’s fees, quoting verbatim its
logic and reasoning.
CSFL filed a motion for partial reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its
Resolution, dated January 16, 2012.
Hence, this petition.
GROUND
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DELVING INTO THE LOWER COURT’S
EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE AND FACTUAL FINDINGS SINCE IT IS BEYOND THE VERY
LIMITED JURISDICTIONAL PARAMETERS OF A CERTIORARI PROCEEDING, THATIS, THE
CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF JURISDICTION.14
Stripped of non-essentials, the only issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA
correctly modified the RTC order admitting the exhibits offered by CSFL.15
CSFL basically argues that the excluded documents are admissible in evidence because it
was duly established during the trial that the said documents were duplicate originals,
and not mere photocopies, considering that they were prepared at the same time as the
originals.
On the other hand, TKI counters that CSFL’s claim that the photocopied documents were
duplicate originals was just a unilateral and self-serving statement without any
supportive evidence.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court finds merit in the petition.
After a review of the RTC and the CA records, which were ordered elevated, the Court is
ofthe considered view that the CA erred in not admitting the invoices and order slips
denominated as Exhibits "D" to "GG-1" and "HH" to "KK-1," which were duplicate
originals. Section 4(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 4 . Original of document. —
xxxx
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with
identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
xxxx
In Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies v. The Court of Appeals and Associated Bank, 16 it was
stressed that duplicate originals were admissible as evidence. Pertinent portions of the
said decision read:
Respondent court is of the viewthat the above provision must be construed to mean the
original copy of the document evidencing the credit and not its duplicate, thus:
. . . [W]hen the law speaksof the delivery of the private document evidencing a credit, it
must be construed as referring to the original. In this case, appellees (Trans-Pacific)
presented, not the originals but the duplicates of the three promissory notes." (Rollo, p.
42)
The above pronouncement of respondent court is manifestly groundless.It is undisputed
that the documents presented were duplicate originals and are therefore admissible as
evidence. Further, it must be noted that respondent bank itself did not bother to
challenge the authenticity of the duplicate copies submitted by petitioner. In People vs.
Tan, (105 Phil. 1242 [1959]),we said:
When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that
the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be
charged thereby, produces a facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature being
thus reproduced by the same stroke of pen which made the surface or exposed
impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either
of them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the
nonproduction of the others.
[Emphases supplied]
Records reveal that Chiu, CSFL’s principal witness, was able to satisfactorily explain that
Exhibits "D" to "GG-1" and "HH" to "KK-1" were duplicate originals of invoicesand order
slips, and not mere photocopies. She testified as follows:
Atty. Fernandez:
Q The documents that you have brought today, to what records do they belong?
A Those originals are from our company because one copy was sent to the customer and
one we keep in our company, Sir.
Q When you prepare a particular invoice pertaining to a particular transaction Miss
Witness, how many copies do you prepare for that invoice? How many copies of the
invoice will you prepare?
A Two sets of invoice, one to the customer and one for our office sir.
Q And the copies that you brought today, are those the ones that were retained to you
inyour office, the copies you brought to court?
A Yes sir.17
[Emphases supplied]
The transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) clearly show that Chiu convincingly
explained that CSFL usually prepared two (2) copies of invoices for a particular
transaction, giving one copy to a client and retaining the other copy. The Court combed
through her testimony and found nothing that would indicate that the documentsoffered
were mere photocopies. She remained firm and consistent with her statement that the
subject invoices were duplicate originals as they were prepared at the same time. The
Court sees no reason why Section 4(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court should not apply.
At any rate, those exhibits can be admitted as part of the testimony of Chiu.
The Court went over the RTC records and the TSNs and found that, contrary to the
assertion of TKI, the duplicate originals were produced in court and compared with their
photocopies during the hearing before the trial court. The transcripts bare all of these
but were missed by the appellate court, which believed the assertion of TKI that what
were produced in court and offered in evidence were mere photocopies. The TSNs
further reveal that after the comparison, the photocopies were the ones retained in the
records.18
The Court notes that this case involves a foreign entity and has been pending since
October 6, 2005.19 It is about time that this case be decided on the merits. At this
juncture, the Court reminds counsel for TKI of his duty, as an officer of the court, to see to
it that the orderly administration of justice be not unduly impeded.
After the admission of CSFL’s exhibits as evidence, TKI should have let trial proceed in
due course instead of immediately resorting to certiorari, by presenting its own
testimonial and documentary evidence and in case of an unfavorable decision, appeal the
same in accordance with law. After all, the RTC stated that, granting that the questioned
exhibits were not admissible, "there still remained enough evidence to substantiate
plaintiff’s claim on which the Court can validly render judgment upon application of the
pertinent law and/or jurisprudence."20 In the case of Johnson Lee v. People of the
Philippines,21 it was written:
In this case, there is no dispute that the RTC had jurisdiction over the cases filed by the
public respondent against the petitioner for estafa. The Order admitting in evidence the
photocopies of the charge invoices and checks was issued by the RTC in the exercise of
its "jurisdiction. Even if erroneous, the same is a mere error of judgment and not of
jurisdiction. Additionally, the admission of secondary evidence in lieu of the original
copies predicated on proof of the offeror of the conditions sine qua non to the admission
of the said evidence is a factual issue addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court.1âwphi1 Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction is shown to have been committed by the trial court, the resolution of the trial
court admitting secondary evidence must be sustained. The remedy of the petitioner,
after the admission of the photocopies of the charge invoices and the checks, was to
adduce his evidence, and if after trial, he is convicted, to appeal the decision to the
appropriate appellate court. Moreover, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
only questions of law may be properly raised.
[Emphases supplied]
WHERE FORE, the October 5, 2011 Decision and the January 16, 20 i 2 Resoiution of the
Court of Appeais in CA-G.R. SP No. i 204 i 3, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar
as the exclusion of Exhibits ''D" to "GG-1" and "HH'' to "KK-1 '' are concerned. The May
13, 2011 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City, is REINSTATED.
The pertinent records of the case are hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 170, Malabon City, for appropriate proceedings.
The trial court is directed to give priority to this case and act on it with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
G.R. No. 205879               April 23, 2014
SKUNAC CORPORATION and ALFONSO F. ENRIQUEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO S. SYLIANTENG and CAESAR S. SYLIANTENG, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This treats of the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 1 and
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August 10, 2012 and February 18, 2013,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 92022.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case, as narrated by the CA, are as follows:
The civil cases before the [Regional Trial Court of Pasig City) involved two (2) parcels of
land identified as Lot 1, with an area of 1,250 square meters (Civil Case No. 63987) and
Lot 2, with an area of 990 square meters (Civil Case No. 63988), both found in Block 2 of
the Pujalte Subdivision situated along Wilson Street, Greenhills, San Juan City which are
portions of a parcel of land previously registered in the name of Luis A. Pujalte on
October 29, 1945 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. (-78865) (-
2668) -93165 ("Mother Title") of the Register of Deeds for the City of Manila.
Plaintiffs-appellants Roberto S. Sylianteng and Caesar S. Sylianteng ("appellants") base
their claim of ownership over the subject lots a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in their
favor by their mother, Emerenciana Sylianteng ("Emerenciana"), on June 27, 1983.
Appellants further allege that Emerenciana acquired the lots from the late Luis Pujalte
[Luis] through a Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1958 as reflected in Entry No. P.E. 4023,
annotated on the covering TCT, by virtue of which she was issued TCT No. 42369. Then,
when she sold the lots to appellants, TCT No. 39488, covering the same, was issued in
their names.
[Herein petitioners] Skunac Corporation ("Skunac") and Alfonso F. Enriquez
("Enriquez"), on the other hand, claim that a certain Romeo Pujalte who was declared by
the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151 in Special Proceedings No. 3366 as the sole heir of Luis
Pujalte, caused the reconstitution of the Mother Title resulting to its cancellation and the
issuance of TCT No. 5760-R in his favor. Romeo Pujalte then allegedly sold the lots to
Skunac and Enriquez in 1992. Thus, from TCT No. 5760-R, TCT No. 5888-R, for Lot 1 was
issued in the name of Skunac, while TCT No. 5889-R for Lot 2 was issued in the name of
Enriquez.
[Respondents] contend that they have a better right to the lots in question because the
transactions conveying the same to them preceded those claimed by [petitioners] as
source of the latter's titles. [Respondents] further assert that [petitioners] could not be
considered as innocent purchasers in good faith and for value because they had prior
notice of the previous transactions as stated in the memorandum of encumbrances
annotated on the titles covering the subject lots. [Petitioners], for their part, maintain
that [respondents] acquired the lots under questionable circumstances it appearing that
there was no copy of the Deed of Sale, between Emerenciana and Luis Pujalte, on file
with the Office of the Register of Deeds.3
On November 16, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig (RTC) rendered judgment in
favor of herein petitioners. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
defendants and against the plaintiffs:
1. Declaring as null and void TCT No. 42369 in the name of Emerciana (sic)
Sylianteng and TCT No. 39488 in the name of plaintiffs herein and ordering the
cancellation thereof;
2. Declaring the herein defendants as buyers in good faith and for value; and
3. Declaring TCT No. 5888-R in the name of SKUNAC Corporation and TCT No.
5889-R in the name of Alfonso Enriquez as valid.
The complaint-in-intervention is ordered dismissed.
With costs against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.4
Herein respondents then filed an appeal with the CA.
On August 10, 2012, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appeal is GRANTED. The decision dated
November 16, 2007 of Branch 160, Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil Case No.
63987 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs-appellants Roberto S. Sylianteng and
Caesar S. Sylianteng and against defendants-appellees Skunac Corporation and Alfonso F.
Enriquez, and intervenor-appellee Romeo N. Pujalte:
1. Declaring as null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5760-R in the
name of Romeo N. Pujalte, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5888-R in the name
of Skunac Corporation, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5889-R in the name
of Alfonso F. Enriquez;
2. Upholding the validity of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42369 in the name
of Emerenciana Sylianteng, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 39488 in the
names of Roberto S. Sylianteng and Caesar S. Sylianteng; and
3. Ordering defendants-appellees Skunac Corporation and Alfonso F. Enriquez,
and intervenor-appellee Romeo N. Pujalte, jointly and severally, to pay
plaintiffs-appellants Roberto S. Sylianteng and Caesar S. Sylianteng:
a. Moral damages in the amount of ₱500,000.00,
b. Exemplary damages in the amount of ₱500,000.00,
c. Attorney's fees in the amount of ₱250,000.00, and
d. The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution
dated February 18, 2013.
Hence, the instant petition with the following assignment of errors:
 I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING IN THE CASE
THE PROVISION OF THE CIVIL CODE ON DOUBLE SALE OF A REGISTERED
LAND.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF SALE BETWEEN LUIS
PUJALTE AND THEIR PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST, EMERENCIANA
SYLIANTENG.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING NULL
AND VOID TCT NO. 42369 PURPORTED TO HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO
EMERENCIANA SYLIANTENG BY THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
PETITIONERS ARE THE LAWFUL OWNERS OF THE SUBJECT LOTS SINCE THEY
HAVE VALIDLY ACQUIRED THE SAME FROM ROMEO PUJALTE, THE SOLE HEIR
OF LUIS PUJALTE.
V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COST OF SUIT TO
RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONERS WERE NOT IN BAD FAITH
IN PURCHASING THE SUBJECT LOTS.6
The petition lacks merit.
At the outset, the Court observes that the main issues raised in the instant petition are
essentially questions of fact. It is settled that, as a rule, in petitions for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be put in
issue.7 Questions of fact cannot be entertained. There are, however, recognized
exceptions to this rule, to wit:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.8
In the instant case, the findings of the CA and the RTC are conflicting. It, thus, behooves
this Court to entertain the questions of fact raised by petitioners and review the records
of this case to resolve these conflicting findings. Thus, this Court held in the case of
Manongsong v. Estimo9 that:
We review the factual and legal issues of this case in light of the general rules of evidence
and the burden of proof in civil cases, as explained by this Court in Jison v. Court of
Appeals:
x x x Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and
upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course
of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or
the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case,
otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon,
with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the defendant’s. The concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to
evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in
opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.10
Coming to the merits of the case, the abovementioned assignment of errors boils down to
two basic questions: (1) whether or not respondents' predecessor-in-interest,
Emerenciana, validly acquired the subject lots from Luis, and (2) whether or not
respondents, in turn, validly acquired the same lots from Emerenciana.
The Court rules in the affirmative, but takes exception to the CA's and RTC's application
of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
Reliance by the trial and appellate courts on Article 1544 of the Civil Code is misplaced.
The requisites that must concur for Article 1544 to apply are:
(a) The two (or more sales) transactions must constitute valid sales;
(b) The two (or more) sales transactions must pertain to exactly the same
subject matter;
 (c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject
matter must each represent conflicting interests; and
(d) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject
matter must each have bought from the very same seller.11
Obviously, said provision has no application in cases where the sales involved were
initiated not by just one but two vendors. 12 In the present case, the subject lots were sold
to petitioners and respondents by two different vendors – Emerenciana and Romeo
Pujalte (Romeo). Hence, Article 1544 of the Civil Code is not applicable.
Nonetheless, the Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the CA that
Emerenciana's acquisition of the subject lots from Luis and her subsequent sale of the
same to respondents are valid and lawful. Petitioners dispute such finding. To prove
their contention, they assail the authenticity and due execution of the deed of sale
between Luis and Emerenciana.
Petitioners contend that respondents' presentation of the "duplicate/carbon" original of
the Deed of Sale13 dated June 20, 1958 is in violation of the best evidence rule under
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.14 The Court does not agree.
The best evidence rule is inapplicable to the present case. The said rule applies only
when the content of such document is the subject of the inquiry.15 Where the issue is only
as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances
relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible.16 Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise
admissible without need to account for the original.17 In the instant case, what is being
questioned is the authenticity and due execution of the subject deed of sale. There is no
real issue as to its contents.
In any case, going to the matter of authenticity and due execution of the assailed
document, petitioners do not dispute that the copy of the deed of sale that respondents
submitted as part of their evidence is a duplicate of the original deed of sale dated June
20, 1958. It is settled that a signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed at
the same time as the original is known as a duplicate original and maybe introduced in
evidence without accounting for the non-production of the original.18
Moreover, Section 4 (b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "[w]hen a document
is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents, all
such copies are equally regarded as originals."
In addition, evidence of the authenticity and due execution of the subject deed is the fact
that it was notarized. The notarization of a private document converts it into a public
document.19 Moreover, a notarized instrument is admissible in evidence without further
proof of its due execution, is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents, and has in
its favor the presumption of regularity.20 This presumption is affirmed if it is beyond
dispute that the notarization was regular.21 To assail the authenticity and due execution
of a notarized document, the evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant.22
In the present case, petitioners failed to present convincing evidence to prove that the
notarization of the subject deed was irregular as to strip it of its public character. On the
contrary, a certified copy of page 26 of the notarial register of the notary public who
notarized the subject deed of sale, which was issued by the Records Management and
Archives Office of Manila, shows that the sale of the subject lots by Luis to Emerenciana
was indeed regularly notarized.23
Petitioners further argue that the deed of sale between Emerenciana and Luis was not
registered with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. The Court, however, agrees with
the CA that the said deed was, in fact, registered as evidenced by official receipts24 issued
to this effect. Petitioners, again, did not present any evidence to assail the authenticity of
these documents.
Petitioners also question the authenticity of the subject deed of sale (Exhibit "B-1-C") by
arguing that only one copy of such deed was prepared as only one document number
was assigned by the notary to the said deed. Petitioners claim that this is contrary to the
claim of respondents that the said deed of sale was prepared, executed and notarized in
several copies. The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that Section 246, Article V, Title IV, Chapter II of the Revised Administrative
Code provides that "[t]he notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall
also state on the instrument the page or pages of his register on which the same is
recorded." In this regard, the Court agrees with respondents' contention that the
"instrument" being referred to in the abovequoted provision is the deed or contract
which is notarized. It does not pertain to the number of copies of such deed or contract.
Hence, one number is assigned to a deed or contract regardless of the number of copies
prepared and notarized. Each and every copy of such contract is given the same
document number. It is, thus, wrong for petitioners to argue that only one copy of the
June 20, 1958 deed of sale was prepared and notarized, because only one document
number appears on the notarial book of the notary public who notarized the said deed.
On the contrary, evidence shows that at least two copies of the subject deed of sale was
prepared and notarized – one was submitted for registration with the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City and the other was retained by Emerenciana, which is the copy presented
in evidence by respondents.
As to petitioners' contention that the copy of the deed of sale presented by respondents
in evidence is of dubious origin because it does not bear the stamp "RECEIVED" by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, suffice it to state that the Court finds no cogent reason
to disagree with respondents' contention that the duplicate original of the subject deed
of sale which they presented as evidence in court could not have been received by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City because only the original copy, and not the duplicate
original, was submitted to the Register of Deeds for registration.
Petitioners also question the authenticity of and the entries appearing on the copy of the
title covering the subject properties in the name of Luis. However, the Court finds no
cogent reason to doubt the authenticity of the document as well as the entries appearing
therein, considering that the parties (herein petitioners and respondents)
stipulated25 that the machine copy of TCT No. 78865 in the name of Luis, marked as
Exhibit "DDD" for respondents, is a faithful reproduction of the original copy of the said
title, including the memorandum of encumbrances annotated therein. Included in the
memorandum of encumbrances is Entry No. P.E. 4023, which states, thus:
This certificate of title is hereby cancelled (sic) partially with respect to Lots 1 and 2, Blk.
2 by virtue of a Deed of Sale ratified on June 20, 1958 before Armenio P. Engracia of
Notary for the City of Manila and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42369 is issued in the
name of Vendee, Emerenciana A.S. de Sylianteng, filing the aforesaid Deed under T-No.
42369.26
The same entry appears in Exhibit "11" for petitioners.27
P.E. No. 4023 has been entered on TCT No. 78865 by the then Acting Register of Deeds of
San Juan.1âwphi1 Petitioners assail the regularity of such entry. However, one of the
disputable presumptions provided under Section 3 (m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court is
that official duty has been regularly performed. Under the said Rule, this presumption
shall be considered satisfactory unless contradicted and overcome by other evidence. In
the present case, petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to contradict the
presumption of regularity in the performance of the duties of then Acting Register of
Deeds of San Juan.
Petitioners, nonetheless, insist that they have valid title over the subject properties. They
trace their respective titles from that of Romeo. Romeo, in turn, derives his supposed
ownership of and title over the subject lots from his claim that he is the sole heir of the
estate of his alleged predecessor-in-interest, Luis. Evidence, however, shows that Romeo
never became the owner of the subject properties for two reasons.
First, as shown above, the disputed lots were already sold by Luis during his lifetime.
Thus, these parcels of land no longer formed part of his estate when he died. As a
consequence, Romeo's sale of the disputed lots to petitioners was not affirmed by the
estate court, because the subject parcels of land were not among those included in the
said estate at the time that Romeo was appointed as the administrator thereof. As shown
in its October 11, 1993 Order,28 the RTC of Pasig, acting as an estate court, denied
Romeo's motion for approval of the sale of the subject lots, because these properties
were already sold to respondents per report submitted by the Register of Deeds of San
Juan.
In fact, as early as July 14, 1960, prior to Romeo's appointment as administrator of the
estate of Luis, Paz L. Vda. de Pujalte (Paz), the mother of Luis, who was then appointed
administratrix of the estate of the latter, in her Inventory and Appraisal 29 which was
submitted to the estate court, already excluded the subject properties among those
which comprise the estate of Luis. Subsequently, in the Project of Partition 30 of the
residual estate of Luis, dated March 22, 1963, Paz again did not include the disputed lots
as part of such residual estate. Hence, Romeo's sale of the subject lots to petitioners is
invalid as it is settled that any unauthorized disposition of property under
administration is null and void and title does not pass to the purchasers.31
Second, even granting that the subject lots formed part of the estate of Luis, it was
subsequently proven in a separate case that Romeo is not his heir. In a criminal case for
use of falsified documents filed against Romeo, it was proven that his claim of heirship is
spurious. In the said criminal case, his birth certificate and the marriage certificate of his
supposed parents, which he presented before the estate court, to prove his claim that he
is the sole heir of Luis, were found by the criminal court to be falsified.32 In this regard, it
bears to note the disquisition of the CA as to the legitimacy of Romeo's claim, and its
subsequent effect on petitioners' rights to the disputed properties, to wit:
Appellees' [herein petitioners'] predicament is further compounded by Romeo Pujalte's
conviction on November 18, 2005 of the offense of Use of Falsified Documents, for
falsifying the documents that enabled him to deceive the estate court and have himself
named as Luis Pujalte's sole heir. He did not appeal his conviction and, instead, applied
for probation. It goes without saying that the documents purportedly conveying the lots
in question to appellees and which are founded on Romeo Pujalte's alleged rights over
the estate of the late Luis Pujalte do not deserve any consideration at all. x x x33
Indeed, not being an heir of Luis, Romeo never acquired any right whatsoever over the
subject lots, even if he was able to subsequently obtain a title in his name. It is a well-
settled principle that no one can give what one does not have, nemo dat quod non
habet.34 One can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can
acquire no more right than what the seller can transfer legally. 35 Since Romeo has no
right to the subject lots, petitioners, who simply stepped into the shoes of Romeo, in turn,
acquired no rights to the same.
In addition, and as correctly pointed out by the CA, petitioners' position is neither helped
by the fact that, in the present case, Romeo filed a Verified Complaint-in-
Intervention36 with the RTC, denying that he sold the subject lots to petitioners and
claiming that the same properties still form part of the estate of Luis.
Stretching petitioners' contention a bit further, granting that both petitioners and
respondents bought the disputed lots in good faith by simply relying on the certificates of
the sellers, and subsequently, acquiring titles in their own names, respondents' title shall
still prevail. It is a settled rule that when two certificates of title are issued to different
persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail, and,
in case of successive registrations where more than one certificate is issued over the
land, the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who
relies on a subsequent certificate.37 The titles of respondents, having emanated from an
older title, should thus be upheld.
Anent petitioners' bad faith, this Court finds no persuasive reason to depart from the
findings of the CA that petitioners had prior knowledge of the estate proceedings
involving the subject lots and that they have notice of the defect in the title of Romeo.
It is true that a person dealing with registered land need not go beyond the title.
However, it is equally true that such person is charged with notice of the burdens and
claims which are annotated on the title. 38 In the instant case, The Torrens Certificate of
Title (TCT No. 5760-R) in the name of Romeo, which was the title relied upon by
petitioners, also contained Entry No. P.E. 4023, quoted above, which essentially informs
petitioners that the lots which they were about to buy and which they in fact bought,
were already sold to Emerenciana.39 This entry should have alerted petitioners and
should have prodded them to conduct further investigation. Simple prudence would have
impelled them as honest persons to make deeper inquiries to clear the suspiciousness
haunting Romeo's title. On the contrary, rather than taking caution in dealing with
Romeo, petitioners, instead, subsequently executed deeds of sale40 over the same
properties but all of which were, nonetheless, disallowed by the estate court in its
Order41 dated October 11, 1993 on the ground that the said lots were already sold, this
time, by Emerenciana to respondents. In this regard, petitioners acted in bad faith.
Thus, as correctly held by the CA, respondents are entitled to moral damages. Moral
damages are treated as compensation to alleviate physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury resulting from a wrong. 42 In the instant case, respondents
satisfactorily established their claim for moral damages. They endured suffering brought
about by Romeo's bad faith in using falsified documents to enable himself to acquire title
to and sell the subject lots to petitioners to the prejudice of respondents. Respondents
also suffered by reason of petitioners' stubborn insistence in buying the said properties
despite their knowledge of the defect in the title of Romeo.43 Though moral damages are
not capable of pecuniary estimation, the amount should be proportional to and in
approximation of the suffering inflicted.44 Respondents sought the award of
₱1,000,000.00 as moral damages from each of the petitioners, but the Court agrees with
the CA that the total amount of ₱500,000.00 is sufficient for both respondents.
As to exemplary damages, these are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.45 They are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve
as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious
actions.46 While respondents were again seeking the amount of ₱1,000,000.00 as
exemplary damages from each of the petitioners, the CA correctly reduced it to a total of
₱500,000.00.
Respondents are also entitled to attorney's fees, as awarded by the CA, on the strength of
the provisions of Article 2208 of the Civil Code which provides, among others, that such
fees may be recovered when exemplary damages are awarded, when the defendant's act
or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons, or in any other case
where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, dated August 10, 2012 and February 18, 2013, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
92022, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 203302               April 11, 2013
MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HOMER T. SAQUILAVAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Court hereby resolves the Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration tiled by
petitioner Emmanuel L. Maliksi against the Court's decision promulgated on March 12,
2013, dismissing his petition for certiorari assailing the resolution dated September 14,
2012 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Bane that sustained the declaration
of respondent Homer T. Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor of Imus, Cavite.
For clarity, we briefly restate the factual antecedents.
During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan the
winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the
second highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in
209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on
the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus
commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions of said office.
Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi’s
motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor.
In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties,
decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from
the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to
deposit the amount necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of
the ballot images. Later, it issued another order dated April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan to
augment his cash deposit.
On August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a resolution nullifying the RTC’s decision
and declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor.1
Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to
due process because he had not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He argued
that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had
been unwarranted because there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had
not been preserved.
On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny Maliksi’s motion for
reconsideration.2
Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari, reiterating his objections to the
decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images without prior notice to him,
and to the use of the printouts of the ballot images in the recount proceedings conducted
by the First Division.1âwphi1
In the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013, the Court, by a vote of 8-7, dismissed
Maliksi’s petition for certiorari. The Court concluded that Maliksi had not been denied
due process because: (a) he had received notices of the decryption, printing, and
examination of the ballot images by the First Division — referring to the orders of the
First Division directing Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits for the
decryption and printing of the ballot images; and (b) he had been able to raise his
objections to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration. The Court then
pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion in deciding to use the
ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the ballot
images were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the same
evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that
the First Division’s finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered had
been fully established by the large number of cases of double-shading discovered during
the revision.
In his Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, Maliksi raises the following
arguments, to wit:
I.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT EN BANC GRAVELY
ERRED IN DISMISSING THE INSTANT PETITION DESPITE A CLEAR VIOLATION OF
PETITIONER’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW CONSIDERING
THAT DECRYPTION, PRINTING AND EXAMINATION OF THE DIGITAL IMAGES OF THE
BALLOTS, WHICH IS THE BASIS FOR THE ASSAILED 14 SEPTEMBER 2012 RESOLUTION
OF THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT, WHICH IN TURN AFFIRMED THE 15 AUGUST 2012
RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION, WERE DONE INCONSPICUOUSLY
UPON A MOTU PROPRIO DIRECTIVE OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION SANS ANY
NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER, AND FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
II.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT EN BANC GRAVELY
ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION’S RULING TO DISPENSE WITH
THE PHYSICAL BALLOTS AND RESORT TO THEIR DIGITAL IMAGES
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE BALLOTS ARE THE BEST AND MOST
CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF THE VOTERS’ WILL, AND THAT BALLOT IMAGES CAN BE
RESORTED TO ONLY IF THE OFFICIAL BALLOTS ARE LOST OR THEIR INTEGRITY WAS
COMPROMISED AS DETERMINED BY THE RECOUNT/REVISION COMMITTEE,
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE WANTING IN THIS CASE, AND IN FACT THE INTEGRITY
OF THE BALLOT BOXES AND ITS CONTENTS WAS PRESERVED AND THE ISSUE OF
TAMPERING WAS ONLY BELATEDLY RAISED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AFTER
THE REVISION RESULTS SHOWED THAT HE LOST.
III.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, IT IS THE HUMBLE SUBMISSION OF THE PETITIONER-
MOVANT THAT THE 12 MARCH 2013 RESOLUTION ISSUED BY THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT EN BANC IS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND THEREFORE OF NO
FORCE AND EFFECT, FOR HAVING BEEN PROMULGATED DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ AT THE TIME OF THE
DELIBERATION AND VOTING ON THE 12 MARCH 2013 RESOLUTION IN THE INSTANT
CASE.3
Maliksi insists: (a) that he had the right to be notified of every incident of the
proceedings and to be present at every stage thereof; (b) that he was deprived of such
rights when he was not informed of the decryption, printing, and examination of the
ballot images by the First Division; (c) that the March 28, 2012 and April 17, 2012 orders
of the First Division did not sufficiently give him notice inasmuch as the orders did not
state the date, time, and venue of the decryption and printing of the ballot images; and
(d) that he was thus completely deprived of the opportunity to participate in the
decryption proceedings.
Maliksi contends that the First Division’s motu proprio directive for the decryption,
printing, and examination of the ballot images was highly irregular. In this regard, he
asserts: (a) that the decryption, printing, and examination should have taken place
during the revision before the trial court and after the revision committee had
determined that the integrity of the official ballots had not been preserved; (b) that the
trial court did not make such determination; (c) that, in fact, Saquilayan did not allege or
present any proof in the RTC to show that the ballots or the ballot boxes had been
tampered, and had, in fact, actively participated in the revision proceedings; (d) that the
First Division should not have entertained the allegation of ballot tampering belatedly
raised on appeal; (e) that the First Division should have limited itself to reviewing the
evidence on record; and (f) that the First Division did not even explain how it had arrived
at the conclusion that the integrity of the ballots had not been preserved.
Maliksi submits that the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013 is null and void for
having been promulgated despite the absence from the deliberations and lack of
signature of Justice Jose Portugal Perez.
Ruling
The Court grants Maliksi’s Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and reverses
the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013 on the ground that the First Division of the
COMELEC denied to him the right to due process by failing to give due notice on the
decryption and printing of the ballot images. Consequently, the Court annuls the recount
proceedings conducted by the First Division with the use of the printouts of the ballot
images.
It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have conducted the
assailed recount proceedings because it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to
which no existing rule of procedure allowed it to conduct a recount in the first instance.
The recount proceedings authorized under Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8804, as amended, are to be conducted by the COMELEC Divisions only in the
exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction over all election protests involving
elective regional (the autonomous regions), provincial and city officials.4
As we see it, the First Division arbitrarily arrogated unto itself the conduct of the recount
proceedings, contrary to the regular procedure of remanding the protest to the RTC and
directing the reconstitution of the Revision Committee for the decryption and printing of
the picture images and the revision of the ballots on the basis thereof. Quite
unexpectedly, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the First Division’s unwarranted deviation
from the standard procedures by invoking the COMELEC’s power to "take such measures
as the Presiding Commissioner may deem proper," and even citing the Court’s minute
resolution in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) Party-List v. Commission on
Elections5 to the effect that the "COMELEC has the power to adopt procedures that will
ensure the speedy resolution of its cases. The Court will not interfere with its exercise of
this prerogative so long as the parties are amply heard on their opposing claims."
Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) v. Commission on
Elections, the power of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy
resolution of its cases should still be exercised only after giving to all the parties the
opportunity to be heard on their opposing claims. The parties’ right to be heard upon
adversarial issues and matters is never to be waived or sacrificed, or to be treated so
lightly because of the possibility of the substantial prejudice to be thereby caused to the
parties, or to any of them. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc should not have upheld the First
Division’s deviation from the regular procedure in the guise of speedily resolving the
election protest, in view of its failure to provide the parties with notice of its proceedings
and an opportunity to be heard, the most basic requirements of due process.
I.
Due process requirements
The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the
equivalents of the original official ballots themselves.6 In Vinzons-Chato v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal,7 the Court held that "the picture images of the
ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise ‘official ballots’ that faithfully
capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2(3) of R.A.
No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots
filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an
electoral protest."
That the two documents—the official ballot and its picture image—are considered
"original documents" simply means that both of them are given equal probative weight.
In short, when either is presented as evidence, one is not considered as weightier than
the other.
But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the
Electoral Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the
picture images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them without notice to
the parties. Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the official ballots and
the printouts of their picture images, the rules for the revision of ballots adopted
for their respective proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the primary
or best evidence of the voters’ will. In that regard, the picture images of the ballots
are to be used only when it is first shown that the official ballots are lost or their
integrity has been compromised.
For instance, the aforesaid Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 (In Re:
Comelec Rules of Procedure on Disputes In An Automated Election System in Connection
with the May 10, 2010 Elections), as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9164, itself
requires that "the Recount Committee determines that the integrity of the ballots has
been violated or has not been preserved, or are wet and otherwise in such a condition
that (the ballots) cannot be recounted" before the printing of the image of the ballots
should be made, to wit:
xxxx
(g) Only when the Recount Committee, through its chairman, determines that the
integrity of the ballots has been preserved or that no signs of tampering of the ballots are
present, will the recount proceed. In case there are signs that the ballots contained
therein are tampered, compromised, wet or are otherwise in such a condition that it
could not be recounted, the Recount Committee shall follow paragraph (l) of this rule.
xxxx
(l) In the event the Recount Committee determines that the integrity of the ballots has
been violated or has not been preserved, or are wet and otherwise in such a condition
that it cannot be recounted, the Chairman of the Committee shall request from the
Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD), the printing of the image of the
ballots of the subject precinct stored in the CF card used in the May 10, 2010 elections in
the presence of the parties. Printing of the ballot images shall proceed only upon prior
authentication and certification by a duly authorized personnel of the Election Records
and Statistics Department (ERSD) that the data or the images to be printed are genuine
and not substitutes. (Emphases supplied.)
xxxx
Section 6, Rule 10 (Conduct of Revision) of the 2010 Rules of Procedure for Municipal
Election Contests, which governs the proceedings in the Regional Trial Courts exercising
original jurisdiction over election protests, provides:
xxxx
(m) In the event that the revision committee determines that the integrity of the ballots
and the ballot box have not been preserved, as when proof of tampering or substitution
exists, it shall proceed to instruct the printing of the picture image of the ballots stored in
the data storage device for the precinct. The court shall provide a non-partisan technical
person who shall conduct the necessary authentication process to ensure that the data or
image stored is genuine and not a substitute. Only after this determination can the
printed picture image be used for the recount. (Emphases supplied.)
xxxx
A similar procedure is found in the 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, to
wit:
Rule 43. Conduct of the revision. – The revision of votes shall be done through the use of
appropriate PCOS machines or manually and visually, as the Tribunal may determine,
and according to the following procedures:
xxxx
(q) In the event that the RC determines that the integrity of the ballots and the ballot box
was not preserved, as when there is proof of tampering or substitution, it shall proceed
to instruct the printing of the picture image of the ballots of the subject precinct stored in
the data storage device for the same precinct. The Tribunal may avail itself of the
assistance of the COMELEC for the service of a non-partisan technical person who shall
conduct the necessary authentication process to ensure that the data or images stored
are genuine and not merely substitutes. It is only upon such determination that the
printed picture image can be used for the revision of votes. (Emphases supplied.)
xxxx
Also, the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal’s Guidelines on the Revision of
Ballots requires a preliminary hearing to be held for the purpose of determining whether
the integrity of the ballots and ballot boxes used in the May 10, 2010 elections was not
preserved, as when there is proof of tampering or substitutions, to wit:
Section 10. Revision of Ballots
xxxx
(d) When it has been shown, in a preliminary hearing set by the parties or by the
Tribunal, that the integrity of the ballots and ballot boxes used in the May 10, 2010
elections was not preserved, as when there is proof of tampering or substitutions, the
Tribunal shall direct the printing of the picture images of the ballots of the subject
precinct stored in the data storage device for the same precinct. The Tribunal shall
provide a non-partisan technical person who shall conduct the necessary authentication
process to ensure that the data or image stored is genuine and not a substitute. It is only
upon such determination that the printed picture image can be used for the revision. (As
amended per Resolution of February 10, 2011; Emphases supplied.)
xxxx
All the foregoing rules on revision of ballots stipulate that the printing of the picture
images of the ballots may be resorted to only after the proper Revision/Recount
Committee has first determined that the integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes was
not preserved.
The foregoing rules further require that the decryption of the images stored in the CF
cards and the printing of the decrypted images take place during the revision or recount
proceedings. There is a good reason for thus fixing where and by whom the decryption
and the printing should be conducted. It is during the revision or recount conducted by
the Revision/Recount Committee when the parties are allowed to be represented, with
their representatives witnessing the proceedings and timely raising their objections in
the course of the proceedings. Moreover, whenever the Revision/Recount Committee
makes any determination that the ballots have been tampered and have become
unreliable, the parties are immediately made aware of such determination.
When, as in the present case, it was not the Revision/Recount Committee or the RTC
exercising original jurisdiction over the protest that made the finding that the ballots had
been tampered, but the First Division in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the
parties should have been given a formal notice thereof.
Maliksi was not immediately made aware of that crucial finding because the First
Division did not even issue any written resolution stating its reasons for ordering the
printing of the picture images. The parties were formally notified that the First Division
had found that the ballots had been tampered only when they received the resolution of
August 15, 2012, whereby the First Division nullified the decision of the RTC and
declared Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor. Even so, the resolution of the First
Division to that effect was unusually mute about the factual bases for the finding of ballot
box tampering, and did not also particularize how and why the First Division was
concluding that the integrity of the ballots had been compromised. All that the First
Division declared as justification was a simple generalization of the same being apparent
from the allegations of ballot and ballot box tampering and upon inspection of the ballot
boxes, viz:
xxxx
The Commission (First Division) took into consideration the allegations of ballot and
ballot box tampering and upon inspecting the ballot boxes, it is apparent that the
integrity of the ballots had been compromised so, to be able to best determine the true
will of the electorate, we decided to go over the digital image of the appealed
ballots.8 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
It was the COMELEC En Banc’s assailed resolution of September 14, 2012 that later on
provided the explanation to justify the First Division’s resort to the picture images of the
ballots, by observing that the "unprecedented number of double-votes" exclusively
affecting the position of Mayor and the votes for Saquilayan had led to the belief that the
ballots had been tampered. However, that explanation by the COMELEC En Banc did not
cure the First Division’s lapse and did not erase the irregularity that had already
invalidated the First Division’s proceedings.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Antonio T. Carpio advances the view that the
COMELEC’s finding of ballot tampering was a mere surplusage because there was
actually no need for such finding before the ballots’ digital counterparts could be used.
He cites Section 3, Rule 16 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended by Resolution
No. 9164, which states:
Section 3. Printing of Ballot Images. - In case the parties deem it necessary, they may file
a motion to be approved by the Division of the Commission requesting for the printing of
ballot images in addition to those mentioned in the second paragraph of item (e). Parties
concerned shall provide the necessary materials in the printing of images such as but not
limited to copying papers, toners and printers. Parties may also secure, upon prior
approval by the Division of the Commission, a soft copy of the ballot images contained in
a secured/hashed disc on the condition that the ballot images be first printed, at the
expense of the requesting party, and that the printed copies be signed by the parties’
respective revisors or representatives and by an ERSD IT-capable representative and
deposited with the Commission.
The Over-all chairman shall coordinate with the Director IV, Election Records and
Statistics Department (ERSD), for the printing of images. Said director shall in turn
designate a personnel who will be responsible in the printing of ballot images.
Justice Carpio posits that when a party files a motion for the printing of the ballots that
he or she deems necessary, there is actually no need for a finding of tampering of the
ballots or the ballot boxes before the COMELEC Division may grant the motion. He states
that a determination by the parties that the printing is necessary under Section 3 is a
ground separate from Section 6(e), which in turn pertinently states that:
Section 6. Conduct of the Recount –
xxxx
(e) Before the opening of the ballot box, the Recount Committee shall note its condition
as well as that of the locks or locking mechanism and record the condition in the recount
report. From its observation, the Recount Committee must also make a determination as
to whether the integrity of the ballot box has been preserved.
In the event that there are signs of tampering or if the ballot box appears to have been
compromised, the Recount Committee shall still proceed to open the ballot box and make
a physical inventory of the contents thereof. The committee shall, however, record its
general observation of the ballots and other documents found in the ballot box.
The application of Section 3 to this case is inappropriate, considering that the First
Division did not in any way suggest in its decision dated August 15, 2010 that it was
resolving Saquilayan’s motion to print the ballot images. Instead, the First Division made
therein a finding of tampering, thus:
The COMELEC (First Division) took into consideration the allegations of ballot and ballot
box tampering and upon inspecting the ballot boxes, it is apparent that the integrity of
the ballots had been compromised so, to be able to best determine the true will of the
electorate, we decided to go over the digital images of the appealed ballots.
Even the COMELEC En Banc did not indicate in its decision dated September 14, 2012
that the First Division merely resolved Saquilayan’s motion for the printing of the ballot
images; instead, it reinforced the First Division’s finding that there was tampering of the
ballots. The non-mention of Saquilayan’s motion was a clear indication of the COMELEC’s
intention to act motu proprio; and also revealed its interpretation of its very own rules,
that there must be justifiable reason, i.e. tampering, before the ballot images could be
resorted to.
The application of Section 3 would only highlight the First Division’s denial of Maliksi’s
right to due process. For, if the First Division was really only acting on a motion to allow
the printing of the ballot images, there was a greater reason for the First Division to have
given the parties notice of its ruling thereon. But, as herein noted, the First Division did
not issue such ruling.
To interpret Section 3 as granting to any one of the parties the right to move for the
printing of the ballot images should such party deem it necessary, and the COMELEC may
grant such motion, is contrary to its clear wording. Section 3 explicitly states: "in case the
parties deem it necessary, they may file a motion." The provision really envisions a
situation in which both parties have agreed that the ballot images should be printed.
Should only one of the parties move for the printing of the ballot images, it is not Section
3 that applies but Section 6(e), which then requires a finding that the integrity of the
ballots has been compromised.
The disregard of Maliksi’s right to be informed of the decision to print the picture images
of the ballots and to conduct the recount proceedings during the appellate stage cannot
be brushed aside by the invocation of the fact that Maliksi was able to file, after all, a
motion for reconsideration. To be exact, the motion for reconsideration was actually
directed against the entire resolution of the First Division, while Maliksi’s claim of due
process violation is directed only against the First Division’s recount proceedings that
resulted in the prejudicial result rendered against him. Notably, the First Division did not
issue any order directing the recount. Without the written order, Maliksi was deprived of
the chance to seek any reconsideration or even to assail the irregularly-held recount
through a seasonable petition for certiorari in this Court. In that context, he had no real
opportunity to assail the conduct of the recount proceedings.
The service of the First Division orders requiring Saquilayan to post and augment the
cash deposits for the printing of the picture images did not sufficiently give Maliksi notice
of the First Division’s decision to print the picture images. The said orders did not meet
the requirements of due process because they did not specifically inform Maliksi that the
ballots had been found to be tampered. Nor did the orders offer the factual bases for the
finding of tampering. Hence, to leave for Maliksi to surmise on the factual bases for
finding the need to print the picture images still violated the principles of fair play,
because the responsibility and the obligation to lay down the factual bases and to inform
Maliksi as the party to be potentially prejudiced thereby firmly rested on the shoulders
of the First Division.
Moreover, due process of law does not only require notice of the decryption, printing,
and recount proceedings to the parties, but also demands an opportunity to be present at
such proceedings or to be represented therein. Maliksi correctly contends that the orders
of the First Division simply required Saquilayan to post and augment his cash deposit.
The orders did not state the time, date, and venue of the decryption and recount
proceedings. Clearly, the First Division had no intention of giving the parties the
opportunity to witness its proceedings.
Mendoza v. Commission on Elections9 instructs that notice to the parties and their
participation are required during the adversarial aspects of the proceedings. In that case,
after the revision of the ballots and after the election protest case was submitted for
decision, the ballots and ballot boxes were transferred to the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET) in connection with a protest case pending in the SET. Mendoza later learned that
the COMELEC, with the permission of the SET, had meanwhile conducted proceedings
within the SET’s premises. Mendoza then claimed that his right to due process was
violated because he had not been given notice by the COMELEC that it would be
conducting further proceedings within the SET premises. The Court did not sustain his
claim, however, and pointed out:
After consideration of the respondents’ Comments and the petitioner’s petition and
Reply, we hold that the contested proceedings at the SET ("contested proceedings") are
no longer part of the adversarial aspects of the election contest that would require notice
of hearing and the participation of the parties. As the COMELEC stated in its Comment
and without any contrary or disputing claim in the petitioner’s Reply:
"However, contrary to the claim of petitioner, public respondent in the appreciation of
the contested ballots in EPC No. 2007-44 simultaneously with the SET in SET Case No.
001-07 is not conducting "further proceedings" requiring notice to the parties. There is
no revision or correction of the ballots because EPC No. 2007-04 was already submitted
for resolution. Public respondent, in coordinating with the SET, is simply resolving the
submitted protest case before it. The parties necessarily take no part in said deliberation,
which require utmost secrecy. Needless to state, the actual decision-making process is
supposed to be conducted only by the designated members of the Second Division of the
public respondent in strict confidentiality."
In other words, what took place at the SET were the internal deliberations of the
COMELEC, as a quasi-judicial body, in the course of appreciating the evidence presented
and deciding the provincial election contest on the merits. These deliberations are no
different from judicial deliberations which are considered confidential and privileged.
We find it significant that the private respondent’s Comment fully supported the
COMELEC’s position and disavowed any participation in the contested proceeding the
petitioner complained about. The petitioner, on the other hand, has not shown that the
private respondent was ever present in any proceeding at the SET relating to the
provincial election contest.1âwphi1
To conclude, the rights to notice and to be heard are not material considerations in the
COMELEC’s handling of the Bulacan provincial election contest after the transfer of the
ballot boxes to the SET; no proceedings at the instance of one party or of COMELEC has
been conducted at the SET that would require notice and hearing because of the
possibility of prejudice to the other party. The COMELEC is under no legal obligation to
notify either party of the steps it is taking in the course of deliberating on the merits of
the provincial election contest. In the context of our standard of review for the petition,
we see no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
committed by the COMELEC in its deliberation on the Bulacan election contest and the
appreciation of ballots this deliberation entailed.10 (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, the First Division denominated the proceedings it had conducted as an
"appreciation of ballots" like in Mendoza. But unlike in Mendoza, the proceedings
conducted by the First Division were adversarial, in that the proceedings included the
decryption and printing of the picture images of the ballots and the recount of the votes
were to be based on the printouts of the picture images. The First Division did not simply
review the findings of the RTC and the Revision Committee, but actually conducted its
own recount proceedings using the printouts of the picture image of the ballots. As such,
the First Division was bound to notify the parties to enable them to participate in the
proceedings.
Significantly, Section 6(l), Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No, 8804, as amended by
COMELEC Resolution No. 9164, requires the parties’ presence during the printing of the
images of the ballots, thus:
xxxx
(l) In the event the Recount Committee determines that the integrity of the ballots has
been violated or has not been preserved, or are wet and otherwise in such a condition
that it cannot be recounted, the Chairman of the Committee shall request from the
Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD), the printing of the image of the
ballots of the subject precinct stored in the CF card used in the May 10, 2010 elections in
the presence of the parties. Printing of the ballot images shall proceed only upon prior
authentication and certification by a duly authorized personnel of the Election Records
and Statistics Department (ERSD) that the data or the images to be printed are genuine
and not substitutes.
xxxx
We should not ignore that the parties’ participation during the revision and recount
proceedings would not benefit only the parties, but was as vital and significant for the
COMELEC as well, for only by their participation would the COMELEC’s proceedings
attain credibility as to the result. The parties’ presence would have ensured that the
requisite procedures have been followed, including the required authentication and
certification that the images to be printed are genuine. In this regard, the COMELEC was
less than candid, and was even cavalier in its conduct of the decryption and printing of
the picture images of the ballots and the recount proceedings. The COMELEC was merely
content with listing the guidelines that the First Division had followed in the appreciation
of the ballots and the results of the recount. In short, there was vagueness as to what rule
had been followed in the decryption and printing proceeding.
II.
Remand to the COMELEC
We are mindful of the urgent need to speedily resolve the election protest because the
term of the position involved is about to end. Thus, we overlook pro hac vice the lack of
factual basis for the COMELEC’s decision to use the digital images of the ballots and
sustain its decision thereon. Although a remand of the election protest to the RTC would
have been the appropriate procedure, we direct the COMELEC En Banc instead to
conduct the decryption and printing of the digital images of the ballots and to hold
recount proceedings, with due notice to all the parties and opportunity for them to be
present and to participate during such proceedings. Nothing less serves the ideal
objective safeguarded by the Constitution.
In the absence of particular rules to govern its proceedings in accordance with this
disposition, the COMELEC is urged to follow and observe Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8804, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9164.
The Court, by this resolution, does not intend to validate the victory of any of the parties
in the 2010 Elections. That is not the concern of the Court as yet. The Court simply does
not want to countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due process, a cornerstone
of our legal system.11 After all, it is the Court’s primary duty to protect the basic rights of
the people vis-à -vis government actions, thus:
It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions, all
geared towards the betterment of the nation and its people. But then again, it is
important to remember this ethical principle: "The end does not justify the means." No
matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be
employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with constitutional parameters,
then it cannot still be allowed. The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it
pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles.12
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the Extremely Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner Emmanuel Maliksi; REVERSES the Court's decision
promulgated on March 12, 2013; and DIRECTS the Commission on Elections En Bane to
conduct proceedings for the decryption of the picture images of the ballots involved in
the protest after due authentication, and for the recount of ballots by using the printouts
of the ballot images, with notice to and in the presence of the parties or their
representatives in accordance with the procedure laid down by Rule 15 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804, as amended by Resolution No. 9164.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
For the Court's consideration is the Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration filed
by Emmanuel L. Maliksi (Maliksi) assailing this Court's 12 March 2013 Decision which
affirmed the 14 September 2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
En Bane and declared Homer T. Saquilayan (Saquilayan) as the duly-elected Municipal
Mayor of lmus, Cavite.
In his motion for reconsideration, Maliksi cited extensively from the Dissenting
Opinion1 and asserted that he was denied due process when the COMELEC First Division
decrypted, printed, and examined the ballot images without notice to him. Maliksi
further alleged that this Court's 12 March 2013 Decision is null and void for having been
promulgated in the absence of Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez (Justice Perez).
First, I will discuss the issue of the absence of Justice Perez when the Court's 12 March
2013 Decision was promulgated.
Section 4, Rule 12 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allows a member of this
Court to leave his or her vote in writing. The Rule states:
SEC. 4. Leaving a vote. - A Member who goes on leave or is unable to attend the voting on
any decision, resolution, or matter may leave his or her vote in writing, addressed to the
Chief Justice or the Division Chairperson, and the vote shall be counted, provided that he
or she took part in the deliberation.
As such, there was nothing irregular when Justice Perez left his vote in writing with the
Chief Justice because he took part in the previous deliberation of the case.
Maliksi again assails the decryption and printing of the ballot images for the first time on
appeal.
I reiterate that Saquilayan first requested for the printing of the ballot images before the
trial court when he filed a Motion To Print Picture Images Of The Ballot Boxes Stored In
The Memory Cards Of The Clustered Precincts2 dated 21 March 2011. In that Motion,
Saquilayan made the allegation of tampering citing that during the preliminary revision
proceedings, he noticed an unusually large number of double-voted ballots only for the
position of Mayor and that the recorded counts of all the revision committees show
significant discrepancies between the ballot counts and the results reflected in the
election returns.3 It was only on 3 May 2011 that the trial court in an Omnibus Order
granted Saquilayan's motion for the printing of the ballot images in the CF cards. 4 On 16
May 2011, the COMELEC Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) informed
Saquilayan that the CF cards were still in the custody of the trial court. In a Manifestation
and Request5 dated 20 May 2011, Saquilayan asked the trial court to forward the CF
cards of the protested precincts to the ERSD to enable the COMELEC to decrypt and print
the ballot images. The decryption of the ballot images was set on 21 June 2011.
Maliksi then filed a Motion for Honorable Court to Request ERSD to Specify Procedure to
Decrypt Compact Flash (CF) Cards. The trial court, in an Order 6 dated 17 June 2011,
requested the ERSD to specify the procedure that it would undertake during the
proceedings and set the case for conference on 27 June 2011. In a letter7 dated 20 June
2011, Maliksi wrote the ERSD requesting that further proceedings be deferred and held
in abeyance in deference to the 17 June 2011 Order of the trial court. On 27 June 2011,
on the date the case was set for conference, Maliksi filed a Motion to Consider That
Period Has Lapsed to Print Ballot's Picture Images8 on the ground that Saquilayan only
had 30 days from receipt of the Omnibus Order dated 3 May 2011 to accomplish the
printing of the ballot images. Maliksi alleged that the 30-day period started on 10 May
2011 when Saquilayan received the 3 May 2011 Omnibus Order and ended on 22 June
2011. Thus, Saquilayan was already barred from having access to the electronic data in
the COMELEC's back-up server and to print the ballot images in the CF cards. The trial
court granted Maliksi's motion in its Order dated 3 August 2011 9 despite the fact that the
delay in the decryption could not be attributed to Saquilayan's fault alone but also due to
the failure of the trial court to turn over the CF cards to the ERSD and to Maliksi's motion
for the ERSD to specify the procedure in decrypting the CF cards. Clearly, the issue of
tampering, as well as the request for the decryption of the ballot images, was not raised
for the first time on appeal.
Maliksi also echoed the Dissenting Opinion that the printing of the ballot images may
only be resorted to after the proper Revision/Recount Committee had first determined
that the integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes was not preserved. Citing Section 6,
Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, 10 as amended by Resolution No.
9164,11 Maliksi alleged that the decryption of the images stored in the CF cards and the
printing of the decrypted images must take place during the revision or recount
proceedings and that it should be the Revision/Recount Committee that determines
whether the ballots are unreliable.
Section 6, Rule 1 5 should be read together with Rule 16 of Resolution No. 8804, as
amended by Resolution No. 9164, particularly Section 3, which provides:
Section 3. Printing of Ballot Images. - In case the parties deem it necessary, they may file
a motion to be approved by the Division of the Commission requesting for the printing of
ballot images in addition to those mentioned in the second paragraph of item (e). Parties
concerned shall provide the necessary materials in the printing of images such as but not
limited to copying papers, toners and printers. Parties may also secure, upon prior
approval by the Division of the Commission, a soft copy of the ballot images contained in
a secured/hashed disc on the condition that the ballot images be first printed, at the
expense of the requesting party, and that the printed copies be signed by the parties'
respective revisors or representatives and by an ERSD IT-capable representative and
deposited with the Commission.
The Over-all chairman shall coordinate with the Director IV, Election Records and
Statistics Department (ERSD), for the printing of images. Said director shall in turn
designate a personnel who will be responsible in the printing of ballot images. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 3, Rule 16 does not require any allegation of tampering before the printing
of ballot images may be requested by the parties. It does not require prior
determination by the Revision/Recount Committee that the integrity of the ballots
and the ballot boxes was not preserved. Under Section 3, Rule 16, the request may
be made when the parties deem the printing of the ballot images necessary.
To repeat, the parties can request for the printing of the ballot images "in case the parties
deem it necessary." This is a ground separate from that in Section 6( e), which refers to a
determination of the integrity of the ballots by the Revision/Recount Committee. Section
3, Rule 16 provides that "in case the parties deem it necessary, they may file a motion to
be approved by the Division of the Commission requesting for the printing of ballot
images in addition to those mentioned in t11e second paragraph of item (e)." The second
paragraph of item (e) speaks of signs of tampering, or if the ballot box appears to have
been compromised, thus:
Section 6. Conduct of the Recount- x x x.
xxxx
(e) Before the opening of the ballot box, the Recount Committee shall note its condition
as well as that of the locks or locking mechanism and record the condition in the recount
report. From its observation, the Recount Committee must also make a determination as
to whether the integrity of the ballot box has been preserved.
In the event that there are signs of tampering or if the ballot box appears to have been
compromised, the Recount Committee shall still proceed to open the ballot box and make
a physical inventory of the contents thereof. The committee shall, however, record its
general observation of the ballots and other documents found in the ballot box.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 3, Rule 16 allows an additional ground for the printing of the ballot images: the
determination by the parties that the printing is necessary. Clearly, even without signs of
tampering or that the integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes had been compromised,
the parties may move for the printing of the ballot images. In this case, the COMELEC En
Bane made it clear in its Comment12 that the COMELEC First Division ordered the
decryption, printing and examination of the digital images because the COMELEC First
Division "discovered upon inspection that the integrity of the ballots themselves was
compromised and that the ballot boxes were tampered." 13 However, applying Section 3
of Rule 16, the finding of tampering was not even necessary for the COMELEC First
Division to allow the printing of the ballot images.
Saquilayan moved for the printing of the ballot images as early as 21 March 2011 before
the trial court. Saquilayan reiterated his motion to have the ballot images printed when
he filed his appeal brief14 before the COMELEC First Division. Saquilayan pointed out that
he filed reiterations of his motion to print with copies furnished to Maliksi until the
COMELEC First Division ordered the printing. 15 There is nothing in the records which
showed that Maliksi opposed Saquilayan's motion.
Section 3, Rule 9 of Resolution No. 8808 provides:
Section 3. No hearings on motions. - Motions shall not be set for hearing unless the
Commission directs otherwise. Oral argument in support thereof shall be allowed only
upon the discretion of the Commission. The adverse party may file opposition five days
from receipt of the motion, upon the expiration of which such motion is deemed
submitted for resolution. The Commission shall resolve the motion within five days.
(Emphasis supplied)
When Maliksi did not oppose Saquilayan's motion for the printing of the ballot images, he
is deemed to have waived his right to oppose the motion. The motion was deemed
submitted for resolution. The COMELEC En Bane categorically stated that Maliksi "never
questioned the Order of decryption of the First Division nor did he raise any objection in
any of the pleadings he filed with this Commission - a fact which already places him
under estoppel."16 Maliksi could not claim that he was denied due process because he
was not aware of the decryption proceedings. The Order 17 dated 28 March 2012 where
the COMELEC First Division directed Saquilayan to deposit the required amount for
expenses for the supplies, honoraria, and fee for the decryption of the CF cards was
personally delivered to Maliksi's counsel. The Order18 dated 17 April 2012 where the
COMELEC First Division required Saquilayan to deposit an additional amount for
expenses for the printing of additional ballot images from four clustered precincts was
again personally delivered to Maliksi's counsel. Maliksi feigned ignorance of the
decryption proceedings until he received the COMELEC First Division's Resolution of 15
August 2012.
As regards Maliksi's claim that he was deprived of his right to be present during the
authentication process and the actual printing of the ballot images, Section 3 of
Resolution No. 8804, as amended by Resolution No. 9164, does not require the parties or
their representatives to be present during the printing of the ballot images. Maliksi
should have moved to be present at, or to observe, the decryption proceedings when he
received the 28 March 2012 Order directing the decryption. Maliksi did not, and thus he
waived whatever right he had to be present at, or to observe, the decryption proceedings.
I emphasize that there is no denial of due process where there is opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings.19 Further, the fact that a party was heard on
his motion for reconsideration negates any violation of the right to due
process.20 Maliksi's motion for reconsideration was directed against the entire resolution
of the First Division, including the recount proceedings which he claimed to have
violated his right to due process.
Maliksi alleged that the COMELEC First Division should have limited itself to reviewing
the evidence on record, meaning the physical ballots, instead of using the decrypted
images. Maliksi thus wanted the COMELEC First Division to ignore its finding of
tampering. On this issue, the COMELEC En Bane stressed:
x x x. Worth noting also is that these 8,387 ballots all came from 53 clustered precincts
specifically pinpointed by Maliksi as his pilot precincts (which is 20% of the total
precincts he protested) - thereby affecting a total of 33.38% or more than one-third
(1/3) of the total ballots cast in those precincts. We find this too massive to have not
been detected on election day, too specific to be random and too precise to be accidental
-which leaves a reasonable mind no other conclusion except that those 8,387 cases of
double-shading were purposely machinated. These dubious and highly suspicious
circumstances left us with no other option but to dispense with the physical ballots and
resort to their digital images. To recount the tampered ballots will only yield us
tampered results defeating the point of this appeal.21
In his Reflections submitted to this Court, Justice Perez stated that the present electoral
contest is all about over-voting. Justice Perez cited Guideline No. 5 used by the COMELEC
which states:
5. On over-voting. It has been the position of the Commission that over-voting in a certain
position will make the vote cast for that position stray but will not invalidate the entire
ballot, so in case of over-voting for the contested position, such vote shall be considered
stray and will not be credited to any of the contending parties.
Justice Perez added that "in case of over-voting which is the case at hand, Guideline No. 5
out rightly provides- the consequence that the vote shall be considered stray and will not
be credited to any of the contending parties." Justice Perez stated that the COMELEC
disobeyed its own rule that over-voting results in a stray vote.
This case is not a case of over-voting under Guideline No. 5. In over-voting under
Guideline No. 5, one person, that is, the voter himself, votes for two or more persons for
one elective position. When the ballot is fed to the PCOS machine, the machine reads that
two or more candidates for the same position had been shaded. The digital image will
record two spaces shaded for one position. On the other hand, in double-shading, the
voter shades the space for one candidate but another person, after the ballot is fed to the
PCOS machine, surreptitiously shades another space for another candidate for the same
position. In double-shading, the digital image shows only one shaded space for a
candidate while the ballot shows two shaded spaces. In the present case, there was
actually a double-shading (although it was inaccurately referred to as over-voting in the
COMELEC First Division's Decision) which was done by person or persons other than the
voter. When the ballot was fed to the PCOS machine, the machine read only one vote for
one candidate for one position. After the double-shading, there were already two votes
for two candidates for the same position, but the digital image still contains only one
shaded space.
Here, the double-shading happened after the ballots were fed to and read by the PCOS
machines because the digital images show only one shaded space while the ballots show
two shaded spaces. Double-shading is a post-election operation. The double-shading
covered 8,387 ballots, "exclusively affecting the position of Mayor and specifically
affecting the ballots of Saquilayan"22 and the 8,387 affected ballots surprisingly all came
from 53 clustered precincts "specifically pinpointed by Maliksi as his pilot precincts."23
The situation here is the one covered by Guideline No. 2 cited by Justice Perez which
states that "the best way to identity if a ballot has been tampered is to go to the digital
image of the ballot as the PCOS was able to capture such when the ballot was fed by the
voter into the machine when he cast his vote." This is what the COMELEC First Division
did and the COMELEC First Division discovered that there was no double-shading in the
digital images of the ballots. Obviously, the double-shading was done by persons other
than the voters.
Again, Saquilayan raised the issue of tampering of the ballots as early as 21 March 2011
before the trial court. The COMELEC First Division took into consideration the allegation
of tampering. Even without the allegation of tampering, Section 3, Rule 16 of Resolution
No. 8804, as amended by Resolution No. 9164, allows the parties to request for the
printing of the ballot images if the parties deem it necessary. It is undisputed that
Saquilayan requested the COMELEC for the printing of the ballot images and Maliksi did
not file any opposition to Saquilayan's motions. Upon inspection of the ballots and ballot
boxes, the COMELEC First Division found that the integrity of the ballots had been
compromised. When the digital images of the ballots were examined, the COMELEC First
Division found that there was no double-shading. As such, the ballots should not be
considered stray under Guideline No. 5.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY with FINALITY the Extremely Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Emmanuel L. Maliksi.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
CONCURRING OPINION
PEREZ, J.:
The issue as basic as due process of law and the opinion of as many as seven of us who
saw that petitioner was deprived of the fundamental right highlights my duty to join the
discussion. With the present motion for reconsideration providing the opportunity to
look into the reasons that divided the Court, I do so.
1. The electoral contest is all about over-voting. Simply, it means that in the contested
ballots both the slots separately for petitioner Maliksi and respondent Saquilayan who
vied for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite, were shaded. The guideline in the
appreciation of ballots with over-voting is embodied in Guideline No. 5 used by the
COMELEC. Thus:
5. On over-voting. It has been the position of the Commission that over-voting in a certain
position will make the vote cast for that position STRAY but will not invalidate the entire
ballot, so IN CASE OF OVER-VOTING FOR THE CONTESTED POSITION, SUCH VOTE
SHALL BE CONSIDERED STRAY AND WILL NOT BE CREDITED TO ANY OF THE
CONTENDING PARTIES. (Emphasis supplied)
There is a correlated guideline, Guideline No. 2, in the sense that both guidelines refer to
instances of shading. However, as regards the covered matter and the consequence, the
two rules are hugely different. Guideline No. 2 is about an entire ballot that is claimed to
have been shaded by two or more persons, and it states:
2. On ballots claimed to have been shaded by two or more persons. -Unlike in manual
elections where it is easy to identify if a ballot has been written by two persons, in case of
an automated election, it would be very hard if not impossible to identify if two persons
shaded a single ballot. The best way to identify if a ballot has been tampered is to go to
the digital image of the ballot as the PCOS machine was able to capture such when the
ballot was Jed by the voter into the machine when he cast his vote. In the absence of any
circumstance showing that the ballot was shaded by persons other than the voter, the
ballots should not be rejected to give effect to the voter's intent.
Clearly, in case of a ballot claimed to have been shaded by two or more persons, there is
an inquiry to determine whether or not the ballot was shaded by person/s, other than
the voter. The Guideline implies a presumption in favor of shading by the voter whose
ballot should be rejected only if there is "any circumstance" showing shading by
somebody else.
On the contrary, in case of over-voting which is the case at hand, Guideline No. 5 out
rightly provides the consequence that the vote shall be considered stray and will not be
credited to any of the contending parties.
The reason behind the significant variance in the consequences of the two kinds of
shading can be debated endlessly. The obviousness of the difference outlined by the
COMELEC, which is the sole judge of an election contest, forecloses such a debate. What
the obviousness brings about, as it is my intention, is the grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the COMELEC.
The COMELEC disobeyed its own rule that over-voting results in a stray vote. Relying on
"allegations of ballot and ballot box tampering," which allegations are without proof from
the proponent, the COMELEC nonetheless favors the allegations through its own
inspection of the ballot boxes to support its conclusion that "it is apparent that the
integrity of the ballots had been compromised." That was done on the first review of the
appealed decision. On second review, the COMELEC resorted to the observation of
"unprecedented number of double-votes" which left it "with no other option but to
dispense with the physical ballots and resort to their digital image."
The grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC is clear from its own words describing
what it did in this case.
It can be implied from its own decision on first review that the COMELEC agrees that
before the physical ballots can be disregarded and the digital image favored, the
tampering of the ballot box must be priorly proven. It had to allude to ballot box
tampering because without the defect, the integrity of the ballots is unassailable. No
proof of tampering came from the contestants in this case. The COMELEC relied on its
observations. And it did not even detail the circumstances of the inspection it made and
the facts that make tampering "apparent."
Indeed, the over-voting itself cannot be the proof of ballot tampering. Even if we go by
the Guideline on the claim of ballot shading by two or more persons, the presumption is
that the ballot was shaded only by the voter, and this presumption prevails absent any
circumstance showing that the ballot was shaded by persons other than the voter.
Plainly, in the instant case, there is no circumstance independent of the fact of shading
that such shading was done by someone other than the voter. Its odd reliance on the
over-voting itself underscores the applicability of the presumption that, in this case, the
voter himself/herself did the shadings.

The fact is that petitioner has in his Election Protest, come forward with an explanation
about over-voting. Thus:

4.A.6. In Official Sample Ballot with Voters Information Sheet (VIS) issued by the
Commission on Elections, the number four candidate for Mayor of lmus, Cavite is
Emmanuel L. Maliksi which appears on the first row, third column in the said COMELEC
official sample ballot, x x x. However, in the Official Ballot, the name of Emmanuel L.
Maliksi appears on the second row, second column as number four candidate and the
name of the fifth candidate Homer T. Saquilayan was moved from the first row fourth
column to first row third column where the name of Emmanuel L. Maliksi was originally
located on the sample ballot, x x x. This evidently resulted in the confusion and mistake
in the shading of the proper space for mayoralty candidate Emmanuel L. Maliksi.

This proposition was evidently found tenable by the trial court which, upon the opening
of the ballot boxes and ballots, applied the guideline that the over-votes are stray votes.
That proposition based on facts reached the COMELEC via appeal. It should have at least
merited a discussion.

2. 1 concur with the ponencia of Justice Bersamin. I discussed the lack of factual and legal
premise for the decryption done by the COMELEC to punctuate its grave abuse of
discretion that even went further and similarly characterized the process of decryption
itself.

I thus join Justice Bersamin in the remand of this case to the COMELEC for immediate
cleansing of the process, which after all, kindred to the purpose of Justice Bersamin, is
the object of my participation in the resolution of this contest, not the pleasure of anyone
of the contestants.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice