Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Carpio, Corona and Leonardo-De Castro, JJ., Concur. Administrative Complaint Dismissed

2/19/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 555
Court, Branch 36, Calamba, Laguna for Unbecoming

Conduct and/or Harassment is DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Carpio, Corona and

Leonardo-De Castro, JJ., concur.
Administrative complaint dismissed.
Note.—In administrative proceedings, complainants

have the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
allegations in their complaints—the Court cannot give
credence to charges based on mere suspicion or speculation.
(Verzosa vs. Contreras, 518 SCRA 94 [2007])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 131903. June 26, 2008.*
OSCAR R. BADILLO, GIOVANNI C. ONG, EDGAR A.

RAGASA represented by heirs CYNTHIA G. RAGASA, and
their children JOSEPH, CATHERINE and CHARMAINE
all surnamed RAGASA, ROLANDO SANCADA, and
DIONISIO UMBALIN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY,
GOLDKEY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, JOSEFA
CONEJERO, IGNACIO D. SONORON, PEDRO DEL
ROSARIO, and DOWAL REALTY AND MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM COMPANY, respondents.
Administrative Law; Housing and Land Use Regulatory

Board (HLURB); The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) is
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
436
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001705ddf44b2d3b2f974003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/18
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Badillo vs. Court of Appeals
the sole regulatory body for housing and land development; Courts
will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution
demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion.—The
HLURB is the sole regulatory body for housing and land
development. The extent to which an administrative agency may
exercise its powers depends on the provisions of the statute
creating such agency. Courts will not determine a controversy
where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound
administrative discretion.
Same; Same; Jurisdictions; An action to enforce statutory and
contractual rights against subdivision owners is a specific perfor-
mance case which falls under the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board’s (HLURB’s) exclusive jurisdiction.—The scope
and limitation of the HLURB’s jurisdiction are well-defined. The
HLURB’s jurisdiction to hear and decide cases is determined by
the nature of the cause of action, the subject matter or property
involved, and the parties. In the present case, petitioners are the
registered owners of several lots adjoining a subdivision road lot
connecting their properties to the main road. Petitioners allege
that the subdivision lot owners sold the road lot to a developer
who is now constructing cement fences, thus blocking the
passageway from their lots to the main road. In sum, petitioners
are enforcing their statutory and contractual rights against the
subdivision owners. This is a specific performance case which falls
under the HLURB’s exclusive jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; When an administrative agency is
conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the
subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be
included within its jurisdiction—split jurisdiction is not favored;
The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims
resoluble under the provisions of the Civil Code is out of step with
the fast-changing times.—In Peña v. GSIS, 502 SCRA 383 (2006),
the Court ruled that when an administrative agency is conferred
quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject
matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included
within its jurisdiction. Split jurisdiction is not favored. As
observed in C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada, 191 SCRA
268 (1998): The argument that only courts of justice can
adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the Civil Code
is out of step with the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of
administrative bodies now performing this function
437
VOL. 555, JUNE 26, 2008 437
by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-

judicial function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an
incident of the principal power entrusted to them of regulating
certain activities falling under their particular expertise. In the
Solid Homes case for example the Court affirmed the competence
of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board to award damages
although this is an essentially judicial power exercisable
ordinarily only by the courts of justice. This departure from the
traditional allocation of governmental powers is justified by
expediency, or the need of the government to respond swiftly and
competently to the pressing problems of the modern world.
Appeals; Questions of Law; In all cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction
where the appellant raises only questions of law, the appeal must
be taken to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.—In Sevilleno v. Carilo, 533 SCRA 385 (2007)
citing Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 602 (1998), this Court summarized
the rule on appeals: (1) In all cases decided by the RTC in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, appeal may be made to the
Court of Appeals by mere notice of appeal where the appellant
raises questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law; (2) In
all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction where the appellant raises only questions of
law, the appeal must be taken to the Supreme Court on a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. (3) All
appeals from judgments rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, regardless of whether the appellant raises
questions of fact, questions of law, or mixed questions of fact and
law, shall be brought to the Court of Appeals by filing a petition
for review under Rule 42. (Emphasis supplied) In First Bancorp,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 492 SCRA 221 (2006) this Court also
explained the two modes of appeal from a final order of the trial
court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction: (1) by writ of error
under Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court if questions of
fact or questions of fact and law are raised or involved; or (2)
appeal by certiorari under Section 2(c), Rule 41, in relation
to Rule 45, where only questions of law are raised or
involved. (Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Question on jurisdiction is
undoubtedly one of law; A question of law exists when the doubt or
438
controversy concerns the correct application of law or

jurisprudence to a certain set of facts, or when the issue does not
call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.—In the
present case, petitioners raised only one issue in their Appellants’
Brief—whether “the Honorable Trial Court a quo seriously erred
in holding that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case when in fact it has already acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of the defendants and the subject matter of the case.” The
question on jurisdiction is undoubtedly one of law. We have held
that “a question of law exists when the doubt or controversy
concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a
certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the
truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.” Consequently, it is not
disputed that the issue brought by petitioners to the Court of
Appeals involves solely the trial court’s jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. The appellate court can determine the
issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence.
Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; A petition for certiorari is
not a substitute for a lost appeal, especially if the loss or lapse was
an error in petitioner’s choice of remedy.—Petitioners should have
directly taken their appeal to this Court by filing a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 and not an ordinary appeal
with the Court of Appeals under Rule 41 nor a petition for
certiorari with this Court under Rule 65. As held in Balayan v.
Acorda, 489 SCRA 637 (2006), “the special civil action for
certiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy of last
recourse.” It lies only where there is no appeal or plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the present
case, petitioners chose the wrong mode of appeal. Hence, the
instant petition cannot prevail since a petition for certiorari is not
a substitute for a lost appeal, especially if the loss or lapse was an
error in petitioners’ choice of remedy.
Same; Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; There were
instances when the Court has relaxed the rule on the special civil
action for certiorari as a substitute for failure to file a timely
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 such as where the
application of this rule would result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice.—There were instances when the Court has
relaxed the rule on the special civil action for certiorari as a
substitute for failure to file
439
VOL. 555, JUNE 26, 2008 439
a timely petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 such as

where the application of this rule would result in a manifest
failure or miscarriage of justice. Although the Court has the
discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed
under Rule 45, there is nothing in the present case to warrant a
liberal application of the rules.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Juan Maria Hans F. Durante III for Heirs of Edgar A.
Ragasa.
Mario E. Valderrama for respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for certiorari1 assails the 17 September

1997 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
50035. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal filed by
petitioners Oscar R. Badillo, Giovanni C. Ong, Edgar A.
Ragasa, Rolando Sancada, and Dionisio Umbalin
(petitioners) questioning the 5 June 1995 Order3 of Branch
222 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil
Case No. Q-91-10510 for Annulment of Documents with
Prayer for Issuance of Prohibitory and Mandatory
Injunction and Damages.
The Facts
Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners
of several lots adjoining a road lot known as Lot 369-A-29
or
_______________
1 Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

2 Rollo, pp. 28-44. Penned by Associate Justice Corona Ibay-Somera,
and concurred in by Associate Justices Antonio M. Martinez and Romeo A.
Brawner.
3 Id., at pp. 25-26. Penned by Judge Eudarlio B. Valencia.
440

Apollo Street of subdivision plan Psd-37971 (road lot). The

road lot is a short access road which connects petitioners’
properties to the main road known as Road 20. The road lot
is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-
20895 (22682) and registered in the name of respondent
Pedro del Rosario (del Rosario). Annotated at the back of
TCT No. RT-20895 is a court-ordered Entry No. 605/T-
22655 which reads as follows: “It is hereby made of record
that as per order of the Court, the street lot covered by this
title shall not be closed or disposed of by the registered
owner without previous approval of the court.”4
Petitioners alleged that in gross violation of the court
order, del Rosario sold an unsegregated portion of the road
lot to his co-respondents Josefa Conejero (Conejero) and
Ignacio Sonoron (Sonoron) without obtaining prior court
approval. Del Rosario, Conejero, and Sonoron then entered
into a partition agreement to divide the road lot into four
lots which resulted in the partial cancellation of TCT No.
RT-20895 and the subsequent issuance of TCT Nos. 35899
and 35100 in the name of Conejero, TCT No. 35101 in the
name of del Rosario, and TCT No. 35102 in the name of
Sonoron.5
Petitioners stated that del Rosario sold TCT No. 35101
to Goldkey Development Corporation (Goldkey).6
Petitioners alleged that the Register of Deeds violated
the court order when it allowed the registration of the sales
and the subsequent issuance of new titles without first
obtaining judicial approval. Petitioners claimed that
Goldkey had built cement fences on the lot, thus blocking
the ingress and egress of petitioners.7
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 7-8.

5 Id., at pp. 8-9.
6 Id.
7 Id., at p. 9.
441
VOL. 555, JUNE 26, 2008 441

Petitioners prayed that the sales made in favor of

Conejero, Sonoron, and Goldkey and the partition of the
road lot be declared void.8
In its Comment, Goldkey alleged that the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) has exclusive
jurisdiction over the cases mentioned in Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1344.9 Goldkey argued that
the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners’ appeal
because petitioners merely assigned an error involving a
pure question of law. Goldkey added that petitioners are
using the present petition as a substitute for an already
lost appeal since petitioners’ counsel had received the
decision on 17 October 1997 and the present petition was
posted only on 16 December 1997.10
In May 1991, petitioners filed an initial complaint with
the Office of the Building Official (building official) of
Quezon City, docketed as Building Case No. R-10-91-006
entitled Giovanni C. Ong, et al. v. Manuel Chua (building
case).11 Petitioners, who initiated the building case when
Goldkey started putting up fences in some portions of the
property, claimed that the parcel of land was a road lot.12
On 10 September 1991, the HLURB issued a
Development Permit to Goldkey allowing it to develop the
land into residential townhouse units. The permit also
mentioned that the project is classified as “Residential
Townhouse Subdivision” and, as evaluated, the same is “in
accordance with the Zoning Ordinance of Quezon City.”13
_______________
8 Id., at p. 19.
9 Id., at p. 146.
10 Id., at p. 147.
11 Id., at p. 29.
12 Id., at pp. 82 and 336.
13 Id., at pp. 336-337.
442

On 4 November 1991,14 petitioners filed a case for

Annulment of Title and Damages15 with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City.
Subsequently, the building official of Quezon City
resolved the building case against petitioners and this
decision became final and executory.16 The ruling held that

the property is not a road lot but a residential lot.17
On 5 June 1995, Branch 222 of the Regional Trial Court
(trial court) of Quezon City issued an order dismissing the
case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court dismissed petitioners’ case for lack of

jurisdiction over the subject matter. The trial court pointed
out that there was a decision rendered by the building
official of Quezon City declaring the disputed property a
residential lot and not a road lot; hence, the building
official issued a building permit. The HLURB also issued a
permit for the development of the land into a townhouse
project. Petitioners did not appeal both rulings. The trial
court stated that petitioners’ contention that the property
is a road lot had been rendered moot by the finding of the
building official which made the contrary declaration. If
petitioners had any objection to the ruling, they should
have appealed the same to the Secretary of Public Works
and Highways as provided in Section 307 of Executive
Order No. (EO) 1096. The findings of administrative
agencies which have expertise are generally accorded not
only respect but even finality.
The trial court also stated that the property had been
approved by the HLURB for development into a townhouse
project. The subject land was therefore removed from the
_______________
14 Id., at p. 10.
15 Id., at p. 16.
16 Id., at p. 30.
17 Id., at p. 337.
443
VOL. 555, JUNE 26, 2008 443

jurisdiction of the regular courts. The HLURB’s decision

was also not appealed to the Office of the President as
provided in Section 4 of PD 1344 which gave the HLURB
quasi-judicial powers.
The Ruling of the Appellate Court
On 17 September 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed

the appeal on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to
entertain the same. The appellate court stated that the
original and amended complaints filed by petitioners were
both premised on the claim that the subject parcels of land
were subdivision road lots that were illegally converted
into residential lots and thereafter disposed by del Rosario,
the subdivision developer. Therefore, petitioners’
complaints were filed for the purpose of enforcing a
contractual and statutory obligation of del Rosario to
preserve a subdivision road lot for street purposes. As such,
the agency with jurisdiction is the HLURB, pursuant to the
provisions of PD 957, 1216, and 1344, EO 648 dated 7
February 1981 and EO 90 dated 17 December 1986.
Further, the appellate court ruled that the error
assigned by petitioners involves the issue on what law will
apply to determine the jurisdiction of a tribunal over the
subject matter of the complaints. Petitioners’ assigned
error involves a pure question of law; hence, petitioners
appealed to the wrong forum. Petitioners should have
elevated their appeal to the Supreme Court and not to the
Court of Appeals by way of a simple appeal.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners raise three issues in this petition:

1. Whether the appellate court acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion by dismissing petitioners’ appeal on the
ground that juris-
444

diction does not lie with the regular courts but with
the HLURB;
2. Whether the Court of Appeals acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
by dismissing petitioners’ appeal on the ground that
petitioners did not assign any error of fact; and
3. Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the proper
remedy for petitioners.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.

The HLURB is the sole regulatory body for housing and
land development.18 The extent to which an administrative
agency may exercise its powers depends on the provisions
of the statute creating such agency.19 Courts will not
determine a controversy where the issues for resolution
demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion.20
Jurisdiction Lies with the HLURB
PD 957,21 otherwise known as “The Subdivision and

Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree,” granted the
National Housing Authority (NHA) the exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the real estate business. The scope
of the regulatory authority lodged in the NHA is indicated
in the second whereas clause which states:
“WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate

subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have re-
_______________
18 Teotico v. Baer, G.R. No. 147464, 8 June 2006, 490 SCRA 279.
19 Osea v. Ambrosio, G.R. No. 162774, 7 April 2006, 486 SCRA 599.
20 Id.
21 The law became effective on 12 July 1976.
445
VOL. 555, JUNE 26, 2008 445

neged on their representations and obligations to provide

and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage,
sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other similar
basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of
home and lot buyers,” (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 22 of PD 957 provides:
“Sec. 22. Alteration of Plans.—No owner or developer

shall change or alter the roads, open spaces, infrastructures,
facilities for public use and/or other form of subdivision
development as contained in the approved subdivision plan and/or
represented in its advertisements, without the permission of
the Authority and the written conformity or consent of the
duly organized homeowners association, or in the absence of
the latter, by the majority of the lot buyers in the subdivision.”
(Emphasis supplied)
PD 134422 amended PD 957 by empowering the NHA to

issue writs of execution in the enforcement of its decisions.
Section 1 of PD 1344 states:
“Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real

estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided
for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of the following nature:
a. Unsound real estate business practices;
b. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
c. Cases involving specific performance of contractual
and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot
or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman.” (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
22 The law became effective on 2 April 1978.
446

Under EO 648,23 the NHA’s functions were transferred

to the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission. Section
8 of EO 648 provides:
“Section 8. Transfer of Functions.—The regulatory functions

of the National Housing Authority pursuant to Presidential
Decrees No. 957, 1216, 1344 and other related laws are hereby
transferred to the Commission, together with such applicable
personnel, appropriation, records, equipment and property
necessary for the enforcement and implementation of such
functions. Among these regulatory functions are: (1) Regulation of
the real estate trade and business; (2) Registration of subdivision
lots and condominium projects; (3) Issuance of license to sell
subdivision lots and condominium units in the registered units;
(4) Approval of performance bond and the suspension of license to
sell; (5) Registration of dealers, brokers and salesmen engaged in
the business of selling subdivision lots or condominium units; (6)
Revocation of registration of dealers, brokers and salesmen; (7)
Approval or mortgage on any subdivision lot or condominium unit
made by the owner or developer; (8) Granting of permits for the
alteration of plans and the extension of period for completion of
subdivision or condominium projects; (9) Approval of the

conversion to other purposes of roads and open spaces
found within the project which have been donated to the city
or municipality concerned; (10) Regulation of the relationship
between lessors and lessees; and (11) Hear and decide cases on
unsound real estate business practices; claims involving refund
filed against project owners, developers, dealers, brokers or
salesmen and cases of specific performance.” (Emphasis
supplied)
EO 9024 renamed the Human Settlement Regulatory

Commission the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.
The HLURB retained the regulatory and adjudicatory
functions of the NHA.
Clearly, the scope and limitation of the HLURB’s
jurisdiction are well-defined. The HLURB’s jurisdiction to
hear and
_______________
23 It is otherwise known as “Charter of the Human Settlements

Regulatory Commission.” The law became effective on 7 February 1981.
24 The law became effective on 17 December 1986.
447
VOL. 555, JUNE 26, 2008 447

decide cases is determined by the nature of the cause of

action, the subject matter or property involved, and the
parties.25 In the present case, petitioners are the registered
owners of several lots adjoining a subdivision road lot
connecting their properties to the main road. Petitioners
allege that the subdivision lot owners sold the road lot to a
developer who is now constructing cement fences, thus
blocking the passageway from their lots to the main road.
In sum, petitioners are enforcing their statutory and
contractual rights against the subdivision owners. This is a
specific performance case which falls under the HLURB’s
exclusive jurisdiction.
In Osea v. Ambrosio,26 the Court held that the provisions
of PD 957 were intended to encompass all questions
relating to subdivisions. This intention was aimed to
provide for an appropriate government agency, which is the
HLURB, to which all parties aggrieved in the
implementation of provisions and the enforcement of
contractual rights with respect to said category of real

estate may take recourse.
Petitioners claim that respondents violated the
annotation at the back of TCT No. RT-20895 by selling an
unsegregated portion of the lot without obtaining prior
court approval. The date of entry of this annotation is 18
August 1953. When PD 957, PD 1344, and EO 648 were
enacted in 1976, 1978, and 1981, respectively, this
annotation was impliedly modified such that the conversion
of the road lot in the subdivision plan would fall under the
HLURB’s jurisdiction pursuant to these laws.
Petitioners argue that they can file a specific
performance case to compel respondents to comply with
their contractual and statutory obligation to maintain the
road lot. However, petitioners can only be granted complete
relief if the subject sales are declared void and the
subsequent partition is de-
_______________
25 Delos Santos v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 154877, 27 March 2007, 519
SCRA 62, 73.
26 G.R. No. 162774, 7 April 2006, 486 SCRA 599, 607.
448

clared illegal. Petitioners further contend that the HLURB,

having only the jurisdiction to hear and decide specific
performance cases, can only compel petitioners to file a
case for annulment of title and prosecute the action.
Petitioners insist that in the final analysis, a case for
annulment of title would still have to be filed with the
ordinary courts.27
In Peña v. GSIS,28 the Court ruled that when an
administrative agency is conferred quasi-judicial functions,
all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining
to its specialization are deemed to be included within its
jurisdiction. Split jurisdiction is not favored.
As observed in C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. v.
Hibionada:29
“The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims

resoluble under the provisions of the Civil Code is out of step with
the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of administrative
bodies now performing this function by virtue of a valid
authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial function, as

it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the principal
power entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling
under their particular expertise.
In the Solid Homes case for example the Court affirmed the
competence of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board to
award damages although this is an essentially judicial power
exercisable ordinarily only by the courts of justice. This departure
from the traditional allocation of governmental powers is justified
by expediency, or the need of the government to respond swiftly
and competently to the pressing problems of the modern world.”
Finally, in Cristobal v. Court of Appeals,30 we held that

“questions relating to non-compliance with the requisites
for conversion of subdivision lots are properly cognizable by
the
_______________
27 Rollo, pp. 16-17.

28 G.R. No. 159520, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 383, 402.
29 G.R. No. 80916, 9 November 1990, 191 SCRA 268, 272-273.
30 G.R. No. 125339, 22 June 1998, 291 SCRA 122, 132.
449
VOL. 555, JUNE 26, 2008 449

NHA, now the HLURB, pursuant to Section 22 of PD 957

and not by the regular courts.”
Appeal by Certiorari Involving Questions of Law
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 2. Mode of appeal.—

(a) Ordinary Appeal.—The appeal to the Court of Appeals in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal
with the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
No record on appeal shall be required except in special
proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where
the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on
appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition for Review.—The appeal to the Court of Appeals
in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance

with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by certiorari.—In all cases where only
questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be
to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari
in accordance with Rule 45.” (Emphasis supplied)
In Sevilleno v. Carilo,31 citing Macawiwili Gold Mining

and Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court
summarized the rule on appeals:
“(1) In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its

original jurisdiction, appeal may be made to the Court of Appeals
by mere notice of appeal where the appellant raises questions of
fact or mixed questions of fact and law;
(2) In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction where the appellant raises only ques-
_______________
31 G.R. No. 146454, 14 September 2007, 533 SCRA 385, 388.
450

tions of law, the appeal must be taken to the Supreme

Court on a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
(3) All appeals from judgments rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, regardless of whether the
appellant raises questions of fact, questions of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law, shall be brought to the Court of Appeals
by filing a petition for review under Rule 42.” (Emphasis supplied)
In First Bancorp, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,32 this Court

also explained the two modes of appeal from a final order of
the trial court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction:
“(1) by writ of error under Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of

Court if questions of fact or questions of fact and law are raised or
involved; or
(2) appeal by certiorari under Section 2(c), Rule 41, in
relation to Rule 45, where only questions of law are raised
or involved.” (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, petitioners raised only one issue in

their Appellants’ Brief—whether “the Honorable Trial
Court a quo seriously erred in holding that it has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case when in fact
it has already acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the

defendants and the subject matter of the case.”
The question on jurisdiction is undoubtedly one of law.
We have held that “a question of law exists when the doubt
or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue
does not call for an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being
admitted.”33 Consequently, it is not disputed that the issue
brought by petitioners to the Court of Appeals involves
solely the trial court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case. The
_______________
32 G.R. No. 151132, 22 June 2006, 492 SCRA 221, 235.

33 Bukidnon Doctors’ Hospital, Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.,
G.R. No. 161882, 8 July 2005, 463 SCRA 222, 233.
451
VOL. 555, JUNE 26, 2008 451

appellate court can determine the issue raised without

reviewing or evaluating the evidence.
As petitioners’ appeal solely involves a question of law,
the appellate court did not err in dismissing the appeal on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court which provides:
“Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals.

—An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial
Court to the Court of Appeals raising only questions of law
shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable by
said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by
petition for review from the appellate judgment of a Regional
Trial Court shall be dismissed.
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not
be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed
outright.” (Emphasis supplied)
Rule 65 is not a remedy for lost appeal.
Petitioners should have directly taken their appeal to

this Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 and not an ordinary appeal with the Court of
Appeals under Rule 41 nor a petition for certiorari with

this Court under Rule 65.
As held in Balayan v. Acorda,34 “the special civil action
for certiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy of
last recourse.” It lies only where there is no appeal or plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In the present case, petitioners chose the wrong mode of
appeal. Hence, the instant petition cannot prevail since a
petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal,
especially if the loss or lapse was an error in petitioners’
choice of remedy. We have held in David v. Cordova35 that:
_______________
34 G.R. No. 153537, 5 May 2006, 489 SCRA 637, 641.

35 G.R. No. 152992, 28 July 2005, 464 SCRA 384, 394-395.
452

“A petition for certiorari cannot be a substitute for an appeal

from a lower court decision. Where appeal is available to the
aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained.
The remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and
certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternate or successive.
Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an
appeal, especially if one’s own negligence or error in one’s
choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the
requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available,
certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefore is grave
abuse of discretion.” (Emphasis supplied)
There were instances when the Court has relaxed the

rule on the special civil action for certiorari as a substitute
for failure to file a timely petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 such as where the application of this rule
would result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of
justice.36 Although the Court has the discretion to treat a
petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45,
there is nothing in the present case to warrant a liberal
application of the rules.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM
the 17 September 1997 Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Corona, Azcuna and

Leonardo-De Castro, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed, judgment affirmed.
Notes.—The HLURB is a quasi-judicial agency, co-equal

with the Regional Trial Court. (Coronado vs. Rojas, 526
SCRA 280 [2007])
_______________
36 VMC Rural Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 153144, 16 October 2006, 504 SCRA 336, 353.
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Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Carpio, Corona and Leonardo-De Castro, JJ., Concur. Administrative Complaint Dismissed

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2/19/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 555

Court, Branch 36, Calamba, Laguna for Unbecoming

Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Carpio, Corona and

Administrative complaint dismissed.

Note.—In administrative proceedings, complainants

G.R. No. 131903. June 26, 2008.*

OSCAR R. BADILLO, GIOVANNI C. ONG, EDGAR A.

Administrative Law; Housing and Land Use Regulatory

436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Badillo vs. Court of Appeals

VOL. 555, JUNE 26, 2008 437

Badillo vs. Court of Appeals

by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-

438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Badillo vs. Court of Appeals

controversy concerns the correct application of law or

VOL. 555, JUNE 26, 2008 439

Badillo vs. Court of Appeals

a timely petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 such as

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

This petition for certiorari1 assails the 17 September

1 Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Badillo vs. Court of Appeals

Apollo Street of subdivision plan Psd-37971 (road lot). The

4 Id., at pp. 7-8.

VOL. 555, JUNE 26, 2008 441

Petitioners prayed that the sales made in favor of

442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On 4 November 1991,14 petitioners filed a case for

decision became final and executory.16 The ruling held that

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court dismissed petitioners’ case for lack of

VOL. 555, JUNE 26, 2008 443

jurisdiction of the regular courts. The HLURB’s decision

The Ruling of the Appellate Court

On 17 September 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed

Petitioners raise three issues in this petition:

444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.

Jurisdiction Lies with the HLURB

PD 957,21 otherwise known as “The Subdivision and

“WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate

VOL. 555, JUNE 26, 2008 445

neged on their representations and obligations to provide

Thus, Section 22 of PD 957 provides:

“Sec. 22. Alteration of Plans.—No owner or developer

PD 134422 amended PD 957 by empowering the NHA to

“Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real

22 The law became effective on 2 April 1978.

446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Under EO 648,23 the NHA’s functions were transferred

“Section 8. Transfer of Functions.—The regulatory functions

subdivision or condominium projects; (9) Approval of the

EO 9024 renamed the Human Settlement Regulatory

23 It is otherwise known as “Charter of the Human Settlements

VOL. 555, JUNE 26, 2008 447

decide cases is determined by the nature of the cause of

contractual rights with respect to said category of real

448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

clared illegal. Petitioners further contend that the HLURB,

“The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims