RAKESH WADHAWAN V.

M/S JAGDAMBA INDUSTRIAL

CORPORATION & ORS.
(RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF LAW OF EVIDENCE)

SUBMITTED TO – Ms. MEETA MOHINI

SUBMITTED BY – MR. VIJAYENDRA

ROLL NO. – 1773

 DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the Project Report titled “Rakesh Wahawan v. M/s Jagdamba Industrial
Corporation”, submitted to Miss Meeta Mohini at Chanakya National Law University, in partial
fulfillment of the course Law of Evidence, is my original work and has not been submitted in any
other journal or essay competition in any meaning or format.

Vijayendra
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .............................................................................................................. 4
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.................................................................................................... 5
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 6
SECTION 17: ADMISSION DEFINED ........................................................................................ 8
SECTION 17: EFECT OF ADMISSION ..................................................................................... 12
VALUE OF ADMISSION ............................................................................................................ 14
FACTS OF THE CASE ................................................................................................................ 16
JUDGEMENT............................................................................................................................... 19
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 25
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... 26
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I take this opportunity to express my profound gratitude and deep regards to my guide and
professor Ms. Meeta Mohini for her exemplary guidance, monitoring and constant
encouragement throughout the course of this work. The blessing, help and guidance given by her
time to time shall carry me a long way in the journey of life on which I am about to embark.

I am obliged to staff members of Chanakya National Law University, for the valuable
information provided by them in their respective fields. I am grateful for their cooperation during
the period of my assignment.

Lastly, I thank Almighty and my parents, brother, sisters and friends for their constant
encouragement without which this assignment would not be possible.

4
 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

• Whether Doctrinal or Non Doctrinal?

This project is doctrinal in nature. The researcher has attempted to understand the topic with
the help of various books and internet resources.

• Whether Primary or Secondary?

The research is based on secondary material in as much as it is based on Text books, articles
and Internet research (secondary source). The primary source relied on is the Constitution of
India, 1950.

• Analytical or Descriptive?

An analytical approach is taken in writing this project.

5
 INTRODUCTION

An admission is defined in s. 17 as a statement (oral or documentary) made by a party or by a

person connected with him in any of the ways described in ss. 18-23 under certain
circumstances, which suggest an inference as to any fact in issue or a relevant fact. Like s. 115
this section refers to matters of fact only. The statement may be either a denial or admission of a
fact and it may be addressed to anyone. Admissions in reference to crimes are generally called
‘Confessions’.

Ss.17-31 deal generally with the subject of admissions and confessions. The rules as to
admissions, statements made by persons who cannot be called as witnesses or account of death,
unavailability &c (s s. 32, 33), and statement made under circumstances which in themselves
afford a guarantee for their truth are an exception to the exclusion of statements as proof of the
matter stated.

The word ‘statement’ in ss. 17-21, 32, 39 and 145 not being defined, its dictionary meaning of
‘something that is stated’ (oral or written) should be given to it and it is not necessary that the
maker of it should communicate it to another person. The value of admission depends upon the
circumstances in which it is made and to whom it is made. This was also upheld in the case of
Rakesh Wadhawan v. J.I. Corpn.1, Admission of a party is the best piece of evidence. Where the
plaintiff sought declaration that she was legally married wife of the deceased, there was clear
admission of the defendant that the plaintiff was the legally wedded of the deceased, the
defendant’s admission was considered and relied upon as substantive piece of evidence,
corroborative of the plaintiff’s case.

It is a question which needs to be considered as to what weight is to be attached to an admission

and for that purpose it is necessary to find out as to whether it is clear, unambiguous and a
relevant piece of evidence, and further it is proved in accordance with the provisions of the
evidence Act. It would be appropriate that an opportunity is given to the person under cross-
examination to tender his explanation and clear the point on the question of admission.

1
AIR 2002 SC 2004(2008) : 2002 AIR SCW 2044 : (2002) 5 SCC 440 : 2002 (2) Cur CC 156.

6
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

• To find the facts, issues and decision of the case.

• To understand the relevance of the case.

HYPOTHESIS

Admission is only a piece of evidence and can be explained; it does not conclusively bind a party

unless it amounts to an estoppel.

SCOPE

The scope of this project is limited due to paucity of time and scarcity of resources.

7
 SECTION 17: ADMISSION DEFINED

This section starts by saying that an admission is a statement, oral or documentary, suggesting an
inference as to any fact in issue or a relevant fact. A statement in relation to a fact or
circumstance which is not in issue or is not a relevant fact, is not an admission. The latter part of
this section says that an admission made by any of the persons and under the circumstances
hereinafter mentioned is relevant. The circumstances are detailed in the succeeding Sections.

Black‘s law dictionary defines as a voluntary acknowledgement made by a party of the existence
of certain facts which are inconsistent with his claim in an action. A statement, if not denied, is
tantamount to a waiver of the necessity of proving the fact which is admitted and, if such
admission is not explained away, it would be tantamount to estoppel.

According to Stephen, An admission is a statement, oral or written, suggesting an inference as to

any fact in issue or relevant or deemed to be relevant to any such fact, made by or on behalf of
any party to any proceeding. An ‘admission’ is a statement of fact which waives or dispenses
with the production of evidence by conceding that the fact asserted by the opponent is true.
Admissions are admitted because the conduct of a party to a proceeding, in respect to the matter
in dispute, whether by acts, speech, or writing, which is clearly inconsistent with the truth of his
contention, is a fact relevant to the issue.

Admission should be clear cut and accurate specific statement of that very person in his own
words. Inference drawn by someone else can not be admission.2Admission should be of a precise
fact and as can pin down a person to the very admission and not one which lead to other
inference or that the statement can lead to characterize that as an admission in respect of a
different fact.3 Admission is confession or voluntary acknowledgement, made by a party or some
one identified with him in legal interest, of the existence of certain facts which are in issue or
relevant to an issue in the case.

2
H.G. Ramchandra Rao v. Srikantha, 1997 Cr LJ 347(Kant)
3
G. Rangaiah v. Govindappa , AIR 2008 Kant 151

8
The predominant characteristic of this type of evidence consists of its binding character.
Admission can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties.4 Admission is a positive act of
acknowledgement or confession. Merely because the allegations have not been denied, it can not
be admitted to be established.5

Admissions must be made on the basis of personal knowledge of the facts stated. 8 An
admission is of evidentiary value only to the extent that its maker has personal knowledge of the
matters it contains.6 Statements made by a person that an article was manufactured in U.S.A.
which was based on markings was held not admissible. If a man admits something of which he
knows nothing, it is of no real evidential value. A party’s statement however of his own age is
admissible although the party cannot be said to have personal knowledge.7

Where the contents of the application of the plaintiff for old age pension were not put to her
when she appeared in her suit, the statement by her in cross-examination that she was getting old
age pension and that her form was filled by the another cannot be treated as admission in respect
of the contents of her application for old age pension.8

Admissions may be oral or may be contained in documents, e.g. , letters, depositions, affidavits,
plaints, written statements, deeds, receipts, horoscopes.9 Under Section 9(1) of the Civil
Evidence Act (England) admission includes any representation of facts made in words or
otherwise. When denial of things said against a person could reasonably be expected his silence
would amount to an admission.10

According to Baron Alderson ‘what a person is over-heard saying to himself would even be
evidence.’11 It is more satisfactory for a body entrusted with functions such as the customs
authority, to take the precaution of getting the admission of the accused in writing, when its

4
Ajodhya Prasad Bhargava v. Bhawani Shankar Bhargava, AIR 1957 All 1
5
Mukesh Kumar .4jmera v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 Raj 250
6
1966 AC 367 at 371
7
R. v. Twiner, (1910) 1 KB 346 at 362.
8
Twarku v. Surti, AIR 1997 HP 76
9
Satish Mohan v. The State, AIR 1986 All 126
10
Bessela v. Stern, (1877) 2 CPD 265
11
R. v. Simmons, (1834) 6 C&P 540.

9
decision mainly depends upon such admission.12 It is immaterial to whom the admission is made.
An admission made to a stranger is relevant.

Statement given by the accused to the doctor examining him as to the cause of injuries sustained
by him, amounts to admission.13 Where a party accepts his statement made in an earlier
proceeding, it amounts to admission.14 Where the accused police official stated that the deceased
party started firing on the police party which necessitated the opening of fire by them and the
first part of his statement was not proved from the evidence on record, the second part of his
statement could be utilised as an admission.15 constitute an admission in law, the statement of the
party should be ex facie unequivocal and categorical. A vague statement cannot be construed as
an admission16

Classification of admissions.— Admissions are broadly of two categories:—

(1) Judicial admissions

(2) Extra-judicial admissions.

Judicial admissions are formal admissions made by a party during the proceedings of a case.
Extrajudicial admissions are informal admissions not appearing on the record of the case.
Judicial admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them. They constitute a waiver of
proof.17 Admission in a pleading in the court is a judicial admission and it can be made the
foundation of the rights of the parties.18

A pleading should not be construed strictly as an admission. 19 An averment in an application for

setting aside an award, regarding the misconduct of the arbitrator by a party would not constitute
‘admission’ under Section 17. An admission by a party in a plaint may be used against him in
another suit.

12
Ambalal v. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 264
13
Ammini v. State of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 260
14
Alpana v. Mohanlal, 1993 Cr LJ 100
15
Brijlala Pd. Sinha v. State of Bihar, AIR 1998 SC 2443
16
Budavant Subraya Palekar v. Babu Vijra Chandravarkar , AIR 2004 Kant 105
17
Section 58.
18
Satish Mohan v. State of U.P., AIR 1986 All 126
19
Bharath Fire and General Insurance v. Parameswari Prasad Guptha, AIR 1968 Del 68

10
Extra-judicial or informal admissions are also binding on the parties against whom they are set-
up. Unlike judicial admissions, however, they are binding only partially, and not fully, except in
cases where they operate as or have the effect of estoppel, in which case again they are fully
binding and may constitute the foundation of the rights of the parties.

11
 SECTION 17: EFECT OF ADMISSION

(1) An admission constitutes a substantive piece of evidence in the case and, for that reason, can
be relied upon for proving the truth of the facts incorporated therein.

(2) An admission has the effect of shifting the onus of proving to the contrary on the party
against whom it is produced, with the result that it casts an imperative duty on such party to
explain it. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, it is presumed to be true.

(3) An admission, in order to be competent and to have the value and effect referred to above,
should be clear, certain and definite, and not ambiguous, vague or confused.20

Admissions as defined in Sections 17 and 20 and fulfilling the requirements of Section 21 are
substantive evidence proprio vigore.21 In Union of India v. Moksh Builders and Financiers
Ltd.,22it was held that an admission by a party is substantive evidence of the fact admitted, and
admissions duly proved are admissible evidence, irrespective of whether the party making them
appeared in the witness box or not, or whether that party, when appearing as witness, was
confronted or not with those statements in case he made a statement contrary to those
admissions. (The court cited a statement from Wigmore on Evidence (Vol. 4, 1048) to the effect
that an admission need not be contrary to the maker’s interest.23

In a previous suit filed by the wife for maintenance, the husband made a statement in his counter
that she was his wife. In a later similar suit, he resiled from that statement. It was held that as the
previous admission was against his own interest, it was relevant and it required no proof.

An admission of a party giving certain land to a particular person on sub-lease is substantive

evidence. As an admission is substantive evidence, there is no need to confront a party to a
proceeding with such statement before acting upon it, as it becomes conclusive unless the
admission is properly explained. Where in a case of specific performance of an agreement to sell,
the defendant did not plead hardship in the written statement, it was held that mere admission by

20
Ajodhya Prasad Bhargava v. Bhawani Prasad Guptha, AIR 1957 All 1
21
Thiru John v. Returning Officer, AIR 1977 SC 1724
22
AIR 1977 SC 409
23
Bharath Singh v. Bhagirathi, (1966) 2 SCJ 53

12
the plaintiff that the defendant would be left with only one bigha of land after the sale, could not
be read as evidence to support the defendant’s case in absence of any pleading to that effect.24

An admission on the part of the defendant in an unregistered rectification endorsement deed

about transfer of possession of land and clerical mistake in registered deed of an agreement to
sell can be read in evidence as it is neither an agreement executed by both the parties nor a sale
deed.25

Where the defendants have made admissions in agreement deed, affidavits, vouchers and general
power of attorney regarding delivery of possession by them to the plaintiff on the date of
execution of the agreement and a huge amount was paid to them by the plaintiff, such admissions
would shift the onus on the maker and heavy burden would lie on the defendants to show that
such admissions were not correct.26

When the petitioners had admitted both by record and by evidence that a whip was issued by
their political party to vote in favour of its official candidate but they voted contrary to whip in
favour of the candidate of other political party, such admissions are admissible in evidence
against the petitioners.27 Admission made in the explanation given in reply to show cause notice
and in the deposition in a dacoity case are relevant and admissible in another case for perjury and
for fabricating false evidence for that dacoity case. Where the witness has admitted having
signed previous statement that is enough to prove that some statement of his was recorded and he
had put his signature thereto. When the witness is contradicted by his previous statement then
that part of statement which has been put to the witness will be considered alongwith the
evidence to assess the worth of the witness in determining his veracity. The whole of such
previous statement cannot be treated as substantive evidence. When the defendant has clearly
admitted in rectification deed regarding transfer of possession of land to the plaintiff, he cannot
retreat from such admission after a long period of eight years.

24
Ram Dhan v. Kalu Ram, 1997 AIHC 1935
25
Desh Raj v. Dharam Veer Singh , 2005 AIHC 4188,
26
Chetak Constructions Ltd., Indore v. Om Prakash , AIR 2003 MP 145
27
Ananda Lakshmi v. Dy. Commr. , Mysore District , 2002 AIHC 4846,

13
 VALUE OF ADMISSION

Admission is only a piece of evidence and can be explained. It does not conclusively bind a party
unless it amounts to an estoppel. The value of an admission has to be determined by keeping in
view the circumstances in which it was made and to whom. A mere failure to object cannot be
placed on a footing higher than admission, rather it is nothing more than admission.28

It is well settled that a party’s admission, as defined in Sections 17 to 20, fulfilling the
requirements of Section 21, Evidence Act, is substantive evidence proprio vigore . An admission,
if clearly and unequivocally made, is the best evidence against the party making it and, though
not conclusive, shifts the onus on to the maker as it must necessarily be presumed to be true and
until the presumption is rebutted the fact admitted must be taken to be established.29Admission is
the best evidence that an opposite party can rely upon.

Though it is not conclusive, it is decisive of the matter unless it is successfully withdrawn or

proved to be erroneous.30 Admission goes a long way to establish the case unless rebutted.
However in Latafat Hussain v. Lala Onkar Mal31 and Raja Partab v. Raja Rajgan,32 it was held
that admissions are a very weak kind of evidence and the court may reject them if it is satisfied
from other circumstances that they are untrue. When there are contradictory admissions made by
each of the parties, the court may accept one admission in preference to the other, but it will not
be possible to consider both the admissions.

In a proceeding under Section 97,Cr.P.C. the wife admitted the factum of marriage between her
and the husband. When a question arose under the Hindu Marriage Act whether there was
solemnization of the marriage according to the Section 7 of the Act, it was held that the
admission by the wife was not sufficient for proving legal and valid marriage and the evidence
regarding the performance of necessary ceremonies should be placed on record.

28
Rakesh Wadhawan v. Jagadamba Industrial Corporation , AIR 2002 SC 2004
29
Thiru John Subrahamanyan v. Returning Officer, Madras AIR 1977 SC 1724
30
Bihar State Board of Religious Trust Patna v. Harkishun Das, AIR 1971 Pat 363
31
(1934) 10 Luck 423 : AIR 1935 Oudh 41.
32
(1936) 12 Luck 371

14
Acknowledgement by a man or a woman to the effect that they have been living as husband and
wife and they have got children, would not be sufficient to determine the question whether there
was a valid marriage.

The other party has to adduce evidence bearing upon the issue of marriage. In any view of the
matter, a declaration as to the status of a petitioner as a wife, being a judicial act, cannot be
founded on admissions but on evidence.

Regarding admission made during the conduct of the suit, the courts are not precluded from
taking into consideration the effect of such admissions. Where a party produces a document
containing admissions made by the opponent, it can be used as evidence without drawing the
attention of the opponent to those admissions in the cross-examination. An admission by a
person in a suit that he was a tenant; can be used in a subsequent suit to show that possession was
permissive. Previous admissions though they are not conclusive, can be admitted without
confronting the party with such admissions when he is in the witness-box.

15
 FACTS OF THE CASE

Late Parmodh Paul, who died during the pendency of the proceedings and whose legal
representatives, the appellants before us, have been brought on record, filed a petition under
Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restrictions Act, 1949 (hereinafter 'the Act', for short),
against the respondent-firm through its two partners on the ground of the tenants having
defaulted in payment of rent, a ground for eviction under Clause (i) of sub-Section (2) of Section
13 of the Act.

According to the averments made in the petition for eviction filed on 17.9.1991, the suit premises
were obtained by the tenants on tenancy from Shri Mani Ram and Smt. Ratan Devi, the then
owners and landlords, under the rent note dated 20-9-1982. The rate of rent agreed upon was
Rs.2000/- per month excluding water and electricity charges. The tenants neither paid nor
tendered the arrears of rent from 1st March, 1985. There was a civil litigation relating to partition
of joint family properties, including the suit premises, between the members of the family
wherein, in terms of an interim order passed by the Civil Court, the tenants had deposited rent at
the rate of Rs.1800/- per month for the period October 1985 to January 1988. In the eviction
petition, the landlord prayed for a direction from the Rent Controller to evict the tenants on the
ground of non-payment of rent.

In the written statement dated 8.1.1992 the tenants admitted to have executed the rent note
reciting the rate of rent at Rs.2000/- per month, other than water and electricity charges, but
submitted that the rate of rent so appointed was never intended to be acted upon and the real
monthly rent of the premises was Rs.1800/- only. In the family litigation, to which the tenants
were not a party, in terms of the order passed by the Civil Court, rent at the rate of Rs.1800/- was
deposited for the period October 1985 to January 1988. The rent for the period upto September
1985 was paid to the landlords. Subsequent arrears accumulating, owing to infighting amongst
the legal heirs, for the period 1.2.1988 to September 1991, i.e. for 44 months, amounting to
Rs.79200/- plus interest Rs.8910/- and costs Rs.75/- totalling Rs.88,185/- were tendered before
the Rent Controller on 14.11.1991.

16
The Rent Controller held the rate of rent of the demised premises was Rs.2000/- excluding water
and electricity charges. The amount tendered by the tenants was found to be short and, therefore,
invalid. Consequently, at the end, the tenants were ordered to be evicted from the suit premises.

The tenants preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority
reversed the finding of the Rent Controller and held the rate of rent to be Rs.1800/-, at which rate
the arrears had stood cleared and, therefore, the tenants were not liable to be evicted. Civil
Revision preferred before the High Court by the landlord was dismissed by the High Court
forming an opinion that the finding of fact arrived at by the Appellate Authority was not liable to
be interfered with in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

The Court first examined what is the rate of rent. It is admitted between the parties that the
agreed rate of rent as recited in the deed of lease executed between the parties was Rs.2000/- but
it was the case of the tenants that the rate of rent so appointed was not intended to be acted upon.
No reason has been assigned to show why the parties would have arrived at an agreed rate of rent
of Rs.2000/- per month and yet chosen not to act upon it. The subsequent conduct of the parties
belies the plea taken by the tenants. For several months rent has been paid at the rate of
Rs.2000/- p.m.. The Court referred in particular to the contents of the letter dated 9.8.1985
written by the tenants to Ratan Devi, the then landlord wherein it is stated inter alia "we are
forwarding herewith two cheques of Corporation Bank, cheque No.CA 78/770482 dated
9.8.1985 for Rs.4000/- being the amount of rent for June and July, 1985. Another cheque for
United Commercial Bank, cheque No.256453 dated 9.8.1985 for Rs.2000/-, the rent of August,
1985 receipt of which please be acknowledged."

The contents of this letter are neither disowned nor explained and this letter sinks a death-nail
into the plea of the tenants. Apart from other evidence available on record, these two material
pieces of evidence viz. the deed of lease and tenants' letter abovesaid accompanied by cheques,
are enough to overrule the plea of the tenants and to hold that the rate of rent is Rs.2000/- p.m.
The Appellate Authority, in arriving at a finding to the contrary, was deeply impressed by the
fact that in the family litigation for partition of the property, the plaintiffs therein had alleged rate
of rent of these premises as Rs.1800/- p.m. and this averment was not disputed by the landlord
herein, who was one of the defendants therein. The Appellate Court overlooked some very

17
relevant facts. The plaintiffs in the partition suit were not the landlords realizing the rent; that
was the landlord herein who was realizing the rent from the tenants.

By an interim order the Civil Court had restrained the tenants from making payment of rent to
the litigating parties and had directed the rent to be deposited in the Court so as to be available
for distribution to the party found entitled at the end to release of the rent. The written statement
filed in the civil suit by the landlord-plaintiff herein did not contain any admission as such; there
was a mere failure to object. In that suit, rent payable by the tenants herein was not a subject
matter of controversy; it was a side issue. Admission is only a piece of evidence and can be
explained; it does not conclusively bind a party unless it amounts to an estoppel. Value of
an admission has to be determined by keeping in view the circumstances in which it was
made and to whom. A mere failure to object cannot be placed on a footing higher than an
admission. If the two clear cut admissions made by the tenants, referred to herein above,
were to be weighed against the landlord's mere failure to object about a wrong averment as
to rate of rent in a case where it was not a point in issue, then no inference other than the
one of the rate of rent being Rs.2000/- p.m. could have been drawn. To that extent, the
finding arrived at by the Appellate Authority suffer from perversity and should have been set
aside by the High Court even in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. On the material available on
record, no inference other than the rent of the suit premises being Rs.2000/- p.m., excluding
water and electricity charges, can be drawn. We hold it accordingly.

Though the court held the rate of rent as Rs.2000/-p.m. excluding water and electricity charges
but it cannot be denied that to begin with there was a serious dispute as to the rate of rent as to
whether it was Rs.2000/-, and hence followed the dispute whether the amount tendered by the
tenant in the suit along with interest and cost of application amounted to compliance with
proviso under Section 13 (2)(i), and if so, whether a decree for eviction could at all have been
passed. All such disputes were genuine and not frivolous or just in air without any basis.

In this appeal, the tenant-respondents have, in the affidavit of Ashwini Kumar, supported by
documents, filed with the leave of the Court, set a statement of payments made, which reveals
that the controversy between the parties is very narrow, and even if there is some default in
payment it is marginal and not deliberate.

18
 JUDGEMENT

The landlord-tenant litigation accounts for a major part of litigation pending in courts of law or
before statutory authorities. Also a substantial number of cases consist of those wherein eviction
is prayed for on the ground of non-payment of rent or the tenant being a defaulter. The enactment
of 1949 Act was preceded by the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1941 which was intended to
restrict unreasonable hike in rent because of shortage of accommodation felt on account of
housing properties being requisitioned by the Government to provide accommodation to the
families of civil and army officers engaged in the war effort in some capacity or the other. For
raising additional revenue to compensate the costs of the war, new tax on the immoveable
property was imposed. The 1941 Act was to remain in force only for a period of five years. It
was replaced by 1947 Act enacted by the Governor of Punjab in exercise of his powers under
Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Then the country witnessed partition and large
scale migration of population between the East and West Punjab. In this wake the 1949 Act was
enacted. Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act stated, inter alia, that need was felt to re-
enact as a permanent measure, a legislation for restricting the increase of rents of certain
premises situated within the limits of urban areas and the protection of tenants against malafide
attempts by their landlords to procure their eviction. The State legislation enacted more than 50
years ago as a measure for taking care of the then problem created by the then circumstances has,
nevertheless, continued to remain in operation till this date. The legislation needs a new look and
revamping at the hands of the legislature. There are several lacunae in the provisions of the Act
creating bottlenecks in their smooth functioning highlighted in several judicial pronouncements
and such deficiencies are proving paradise for unscrupulous litigants and also to some extent
frustrating the very purpose sought to be achieved by the legislation. The present Rent Act had
outlived its utility decades ago and has become totally outdated.

The Act which was initially introduced as a temporary short term measure for five years only,
during the Second World War, has become a permanent piece of legislation. One would not
mind its being permanently on the Statute Book but what is really disturbing is that it has
stagnated for the last five decades. No effort whatsoever, worth the name, has been made either

19
by the State Government, or the Central Government to suitably revise the Act from time to time
so as to keep pace with the changing socio-economic pattern of society.

The need of the hour is a law which will regulate, not control, the relations between an owner
and an occupier with the sole object of harmonising relations between the two. Such a statute is
the dire need of the hour which requires that the present Act be consigned to history."

In Nagindas Ramdas Vs. Dalpatram Iccharam Brijram & Ors.33 - this Court summed up the
reasons which persuaded the spurt of rent control legislations in different States of the country in
these words :

"The strain of the last World War, Industrial Revolution, the large scale exodus of the working
people to an urban areas and the social and political changes brought in their wake social
problems of considerable magnitude and complexity and their connected evils. The country was
faced with spiralling inflation, soaring cost of living, increasing urban population any scarcity of
accommodation. Racketing and large scale eviction of tenants under the guise of the ordinary
law, exacerbated those conditions making the economic life of the community unstable and
insecure. To tackle these problems and curb these evils, the Legislatures of the States in India
enacted Rent Control legislations."

Almost similar necessity existed in the State of Punjab for enacting the 1949 Act as pointed out
by this Court in Attar Singh Vs. Inder Kumar34. The Court observed that the Act is a piece of
ameliorative legislation in the interests of tenants of premises in urban areas, so that they may be
protected against large increase in rents and from harassment by eviction.

It is high time when State of Punjab should have a fresh look at Section 13 and other relevant
provisions of the Act learning lessons from the manner in which these provisions have so far
worked and by reviewing how far the object which the legislation sought to achieve has been
achieved or frustrated. Useful assistance can be taken from the Rent Control legislations in other
States to see how pari materia provisions have been drafted therein. The phraseology employed

33
(1974) 1 SCC 242
34
AIR 1967 SC 773
20
in drafting Section 13(2)(i) with its proviso and the manner in which it has been so far
interpreted, are, in our opinion, far from serving the object of enactment, rather defeating it.

The relevant part of Sec.13 reads as under:

"13. Eviction of tenants. (1) A tenant in possession of a building or rented land shall not be
evicted therefrom in execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of this Act
or otherwise and whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance
with the provisions of this Section, [or in pursuance of an order made under Section 13 of the
Punjab Urban Rent Restrict Act, 1947, as subsequently amended].

(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that
behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause
against the applicant, is satisfied

(i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due by him in respect of the building or rented
land within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his
landlord or in the absence of any such agreement, by the last day of the month next following
that for which the rent is payable:

Provided that if the tenant on the first hearing of the application for ejectment after due service
pays or tenders the arrears of rent and interest at six per cent per annum on such arrears together
with the cost of application assessed by the Controller, the tenant shall be deemed to have duly
paid or tendered the rent within the time aforesaid;

There are two means of resolving the riddle : firstly, by placing such meaningful interpretation
on the provision as would enable the legislative intention being effectuated; and secondly, by
devising such procedure without altering the structure as would enable the substantive law being
meaningfully implemented. The Court saw whether the expression 'assessed by the Controller'
qualifies only 'the cost of application' or qualifies the entire preceding expression i.e. 'the arrears
of rent and interest at six per cent per annum on such arrears together with the cost of
application'. As there is ambiguity and the provision is susceptible to two meanings, the Court
should interpret it in the manner which will best serve the object sought to be achieved. In our

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opinion, if there be a dispute raised as to the quantum of arrears of rent, or as to the rate of rent
which would obviously in its turn have an impact on the quantum of arrears, then for the purpose
of payment or tender within the meaning of the proviso, the Controller must make an assessment,
provisional in nature, and appoint the quantum of arrears including the rate of rent (if necessary)
and, calculating the interest and the cost of application. There may be a dispute as to the date on
which the monthly rent becomes due according to the contract of tenancy which will also need to
be resolved without which the period for which interest at six per cent per annum is liable to be
paid would not be capable of being quantified. For two reasons, we consider it necessary to place
such an interpretation or the language of the proviso. Firstly, it is in conformity with the object of
enactment. The legislation was enacted to protect the tenants from the hands of unscrupulous
landlords and any interpretation to the contrary would give an upper hand to the landlords and
provide a tool in their hands to be cracked like a whip on weaker tenants. Secondly, such an
interpretation would bring the provision in conformity with the several other legislations of the
times such as Section 13 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, Section 11 of A.P.
Buildings (Lease and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, Section 11(4) of Bombay Rents, Hotels and
Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, Section 15 of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and so on.
Thirdly, the provision suffers from ambiguity. In the absence of any in-built indication enabling
determination of the quantum of arrears, if disputed, and the period for which interest at six per
cent per annum is to be calculated, the provision would become unworkable and hence liable to
be struck down under Article 14 of the Constitution. An obligation is cast on the Court to
interpret it in such a manner as to make it workable and save it from the vice of being rendered
unconstitutional.

The written statement filed in the civil suit by the landlord-plaintiff herein did not contain any
admission as such; there was a mere failure to object. In that suit, rent payable by the tenants
herein was not a subject matter of controversy; it was a side issue. Admission is only a piece of
evidence and can be explained; it does not conclusively bind a party unless it amounts to an
estoppel. Value of an admission has to be determined by keeping in view the circumstances in
which it was made and to whom. A mere failure to object cannot be placed on a footing higher
than an admission. If the two clear cut admissions made by the tenants, referred to herein above,
were to be weighed against the landlord's mere failure to object about a wrong averment as to

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rate of rent in a case where it was not a point in issue, then no inference other than the one of the
rate of rent being Rs.2000/- p.m. could have been drawn.

To sum up, The Court’s conclusions were:

1. In Section 13(2) (i) proviso, the words 'assessed by the Controller' qualify not merely the
words 'the cost of application' but the entire preceding part of the sentence i.e. 'the arrears of rent
and interest at six per cent per annum on such arrears together with the cost of application'.

2. The proviso to Section 13(2)(i) of East Punjab Urban Restriction Act, 1949 casts an obligation
on the Controller to make an assessment of (i) arrears of rent (ii) the interest on such arrears, and
(iii) the cost of application and then quantify by way of an interim or provisional order the
amount which the tenant must pay or tender on the 'first date of hearing' after the passing of such
order of 'assessment' by the Controller so as to satisfy the requirement of the proviso.

3. Of necessity, 'the date of first hearing of the application' would mean the date falling after the
date of such order by Controller.

4. On the failure of the tenant to comply, nothing remains to be done and an order for eviction
shall follow. If the tenant makes compliance, the inquiry shall continue for finally adjudicating
upon the dispute as to the arrears of rent in the light of the contending pleas raised by the
landlord and the tenant before the Controller.

5. If the final adjudication by the Controller be at variance with his interim or provisional order
passed under the proviso, one of the following two orders may be made depending on the facts
situation of a given case. If the amount deposited by the tenant is found to be in excess, the
Controller may direct a refund. If, on the other hand, the amount deposited by the tenant is found
to be short or deficient, the Controller may pass a conditional order directing tenant to place the
landlord in possession of the premises by giving a reasonable time to the tenant for paying or
tendering the deficit amount, failing which alone he shall be liable to be evicted. Compliance
shall save him from eviction.

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6. While exercising discretion for affording the tenant an opportunity of making good the deficit,
one of the relevant factors to be taken into consideration by the Controller would be, whether the
tenant has paid or tendered with substantial regularity the rent falling due month by month
during the pendency of the proceedings.

The view of the law so taken by us advances the object sought to be achieved by the legislation,
serves best the interests of landlord and tenant both, removes uncertainty in litigation and
obscurity in drafting of the provision and also accords with the principles of justice and equity.
Even if, it is an innovation, it is in the field of procedural law, without affecting the substantive
rights and obligations of the landlord and the tenant and such innovation is permissible on the
basis of authority and supported by principles of justice, good sense and reason. The Court had
not touched the substantive rights of landlord and tenant, and felt satisfied with a do little in the
field of procedure so as to effectuate the purpose of enactment.

The Court did not find that the Controller had, in the present passed any order under Section
13(2)(i) proviso as aforesaid and therefore the order for eviction stands vitiated on the view of
the law which we have taken hereinabove. The appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the
High Court and the orders of the Rent Controller as also of the Appellate Authority are all set
aside. The case is sent back to the Controller. The Controller shall, after affording the parties an
opportunity of hearing, pass a provisional order under the proviso to Section 13(2)(i) and afford
the tenants an opportunity of making payment or tender and then proceed to decide the case
afresh consistently with the law as settled hereby.

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 CONCLUSION

The law by no means regards admission as conclusive proof of the matters admitted. This is
because, to a Court of Law, admissions are but statements which do no more than suggest an
inference as to some fact or facts in issue. An admission is not conclusive proof of the matter
admitted though in certain circumstances it may operate as an estoppel.

Admissions are good pieces of evidence and they can well be used against its maker but they are
not conclusive and unless they constitute an estoppel, the maker is at liberty to prove that they
are mistaken or untrue. An admission must be clear, precise, not vague or ambiguous. If the
admission is capable of two interpretations, an interpretation unfavourable to the person making
it, should not be put on his admission.

The admission must be clear and conclusive in that matter. Before a right of property can be
considered to have been defeated on the basis of an alleged admission by a person, the
implication of the statement made by him must be clear and conclusive; there should not be any
doubt or ambiguity about the alleged admission. For an admission to have the effect of
substantive evidence it must be voluntary. In a case where a candidate was given permission to
appear for Part 2 of the law examination on the basis of an undertaking that if he would not be
able to get requisite permission from his employer to join law classes he would abide by any
order that may be passed by the university, it was held that, as the candidate was anxious to
appear for the examination, the undertaking given was in terrorem and in complete ignorance of
his legal rights. He was, therefore, not bound by the undertaking.

Admission is only a piece of evidence and can be explained; it does not conclusively bind a party
unless it amounts to an estoppel. Value of an admission has to be determined by keeping in view
the circumstances in which it was made and to whom. A mere failure to object cannot be placed
on a footing higher than an admission. If the two clear cut admissions made by the tenants,
referred to herein above, were to be weighed against the landlord's mere failure to object about a
wrong averment as to rate of rent in a case where it was not a point in issue, then no inference
other than the one of the rate of rent being Rs.2000/- p.m. could have been drawn.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

• Aiyer K.J., Law & Practice of Evidence (Allahabad Law Book Company, 1953).
• Batuk Lal Evidence Law.
• Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Law of Evidence, 24th edition, Lexis Nexis Butterworths
Wadhwa, Nagpur (2004).

Websites

• www.manupatrafast.com
• www.scconline.com
• www.legalservice.com
• www.legalcrystal.com

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