PUBCORP: Local Government Structure and Officials effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab
Date
1. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC
FACTS: ​Cardino filed a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted
that Jalosjos made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared
under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor. He Cardino claimed that before Jalosjos filed
his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had been convicted by final judgment for robbery and that he
has not yet served his sentence.
Jalosjos admitted his conviction but stated that he had already been granted probation.
COMELEC: Jalosjos committed material misrepresentation when he declared that he is eligible to
run when in fact he is not by reason of a final judgment in a criminal case, the sentence of which he
has not yet served. The COMELEC First Division found that Jalosjos' certificate of compliance of
probation was fraudulently issued; thus, Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence.
Jalosjos then filed a Manifestation which stated that he has already resigned from his position
rendering the present case moot and academic. However, COMELEC upheld its constitutional duty
to enforce and administer all laws relating to the conduct of elections.
Cardino now challenges the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, which applied the rule on
succession under the Local Government Code in filling the vacancy created by the cancellation of
Jalosjos' certificate of candidacy.
ISSUE: Whether Cardino, the second-placer during the election, is the rightful successor of the
position.. (YES)
RULING: ​The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction
by final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is proper. Jalosjos' certificate of
candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he
filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos
were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos' certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino, as the
only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
A false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run for public office is a
false material representation which is a ground for a petition.
The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos' certificate of candidacy. A void certificate of
candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Jalosjos'
certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible from the start to run for
Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is
immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a valid candidate
from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. Jalosjos' ineligibility
existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy, and the cancellation of his certificate
of candidacy retroacted to the day he filed it. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed. There was only
one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections — Cardino — who received the
highest number of votes.
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the
first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the
certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had
to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took
initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a
candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and
should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections.
If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the
election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a
certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all
votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is
void from the very beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of
the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of
candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for
the same position.
2. ABUNDO v. COMELEC
Relevant Laws:
1987 Constitution, Article X, Section 8 -​The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
LGC, Section 43(b) - ​No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
Petitioner: ​Mayor Abelardo Abundo (“Abundo”)
Respondent: ​COMELEC; Ernesto R. Vega (“Vega;”)
FACTS: In 2001 and 2007, Abundo won the electoral race for municipal mayor in Viga, Catanduanes.
However, in 2004, his opponent Jose Torres (“Torres”) was initially proclaimed the winner. Abundo
protested and was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty contest. Abundo began to
assume office on May 9, 2006 up until June 30, 2007.
In the 2010 elections, Abundo and Torres again faced. Torres moved to disqualify Abundo by filing a
disqualification case before the COMELEC, claiming that Abundo violated the three-term rule as
provided in the Constitution. Upon the conclusion of the 2010 elections, Abundo was declared the
winner. While the COMELEC case is pending, a ​quo warranto​case was then filed by Vega before the
RTC under the same grounds as that of Torres. COMELEC then made its ruling in favor of Abundo.
Meanwhile, in the ​quo warranto ​case, the RTC ruled in favor of Vega; thus unseating Abundo as
mayor. In so ruling, the RTC found to have served for three terms, namely 2001, 2007, as well as
2004 where in the latter year, he has been declared the rightful mayor and actually served as mayor
from May 9, 2006 to June 30, 2007. To the RTC, this constituted full service of Abundo’s second
term.
Appeal was made before the COMELEC’s 2​nd​Division which affirmed the RTC; and in turn, the same
was made before the COMELEC en banc which then affirmed 2​nd​Division’s ruling. Thus this petition
for certiorari before the SC.
Intervening events (SKIP if livestream mode)
1. The COMELEC decision became final and executory, and as such, Vega moved for a
writ of execution which the RTC granted.
2. Sheriff Tador served the writ to Abundo on the same day of the receipt of the writ.
3. The SC issued a TRO to enjoin the enforcement of the writ. This was received by
Vega. However, on the same day, Vice Mayor Tamarin took his oath of office;
4. Abundo moved for an urgent motion for TRO and status quo ante order;
These were the background as to how Abundo was dislodged from office, SC took note of the speed
by which Tamarin was placed into office, having taken his oath during the same day of the TRO.
ISSUE:​ ​W/N Abundo violated the three-term rule? (NO)
RULING​: The Court found that Abundo did not violate the three term rule and thus is entitled to his
seat as mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. The three-term rule is devised to abrogate the monopolization
of political power and to prevent the breeding of proprietary interest in their position.
Based on the Constitution, the LGC, and jurisprudence, the following are the requisites for a
disqualification to run for an elective office based on the three-term rule:
1. That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive term in the same
local government post; and
2. That he has fully served three consecutive terms.
What is prohibited is a consecutive fourth term. There has to be a break or interruption in the
successive terms in order for the official to be allowed to run into office. In addition, based on the
provisions of the Constitution and the LGC, voluntary renunciation shall not be considered an
interruption of the continuity of the service for the full term. “Term” in this sense is defined as a
fixed and and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office.
(IMPORTANT AF)​This brings us to an examination of situations and jurisprudence wherein such
consecutive terms are not considered as voluntary:
Assumption of Office by Operation of Law
1. Borja, Jr. Vs COMELEC
· The assumption of office by operation of law happens when an elective official fills
by succession a higher local government post left vacant due to refusal of assumption,
fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is incapacitated to
discharge functions.
· Here, Capco became mayor by succeeding from the death of the incumbent mayor.
Capco was reelected in 1992 and 1995. When running again for 1998, his candidacy was
challenged.
· Court ruled for Capco, stating that Capco must also have ​been elected​to the same
position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
2. Montebon vs. COMELEC
· Here, Montebon was municipal councilor for the terms 1998, 2001, and 2004.
During his 2001 term, he succeeded and assumed the position of vice-mayor. When
running again as municipal councilor in 2007, his candidacy was challenged.
· The Court ruled that Montebon's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January
2004 was an interruption of his continuity of service as councilor. The Court emphasized
that succession in local government office is by operation of law and as such, it is an
involuntary severance from office.
Recall Election
1. Adormeo v. COMELEC
· Here, Talaga has served as mayor for the terms 1992 and 1995. In 1998, Talaga
lost to Tagarao. However, before Tagarao’s 1998 term expired, a recall election was
conducted in 2000 which Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao. Talaga
then opted to run again as mayor during the 2001 elections, and his candidacy was
challenged.
· The court ruled that the continuity of Talaga's mayorship was ​disrupted by his
defeat​during the 1998 elections. The remainder of Tagarao’s term which he filled and
served after the recall elections should not be considered in applying the three-term rule.
2. Socrates v. COMELEC
· Here, Hagedorn served as mayor for the terms 1992, 1995, and 1998. He did not
run in the 2001 elections, and the latter was won by Socrates. But midway in his 2001
term, Socrates faced a recall election. Hagedorn ran and won said recall election. Socrates
challenged Hagedorn’s qualification.
· The Court ruled that the three-term rule does not apply as Hagedorn became a
private citizen ​until he won the recall election. This period, in which he is a private
citizen, was an interruption to the three-term rule. What is prohibited is the fourth term
resulting from a ​regular election ​and not from a recall election.
Conversion of a Municipality into a City.
1. Latasa v. COMELEC
· Latasa served as mayor of Digos, Davao del Sur during the terms 1992, 1995, and
1998. During the 1998 term, Digos was converted from a municipality to a component
city based on the cityhood laws. He then opted to run in 2001 for mayor of Digos. His
candidacy was challenged.
· The Court ruled that although he relinquished his office involuntarily as municipal
mayor due to its abolishment caused by the conversion, however, the very instant he
vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor. Latasa ​never
ceased from acting as chief executive of the LGU, ​thus violating the three-term rule.
Period of Preventive Suspension
1. Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC (this is the case used as legal basis by RTC and COMELEC in
disqualifying Abundo)
· Here, the Court laid down the doctrine that the period during which a local elected
official is under preventive suspension cannot be considered as an interruption of the
continuity of his service.
· The Court elaborated that the best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity
of service in this case is the ​absence of a permanent replacement​and ​lack of the
authority to appoint one ​since ​no vacancy exist.​(No discussion of the case)
Electoral Protest
1. Lonzanida v. COMELEC
· Here, Lonzanida served for the years 1989, 1992, and 1998. However, the 1995
elections was declared void by the COMELEC due to failure of elections. Thus, Lonzanida
vacated the post, which was about 3 months before the May 1998 election. He then filed
for candidacy during the 1998 elections which was then challenged.
· The Court ruled that the requisites were absent for disqualification on the ground
of the three-term rule. His 1995 assumption ​cannot be considered by virtue of a valid
election ​and that he was ​ordered to vacate his then post, thus amounting to
involuntary relinquishment.
2. Ong v. Alegre
· Here, Ong served as mayor for the terms 1995, 1998, and 2001. COMELEC
nullified Ong’s election to the post for his 1998 term, but the COMELEC’s decision became
final and executory only on 2001, when Ong had already fully served his 1998-2001 term.
During the 2004 elections, Ong again opted for candidacy which was challenged.
· The Court ruled that the three-term rule applied in this case. This is to be
distinguished from ​Lonzanida ​since Ong’s proclamation was voided only after the expiry
of the term. The facts of ​Lonzanida ​were not on all fours with that of Ong’s.
3. Rivera III v. COMELEC and Dee v. Morales
· Morales was elected as mayor during the terms 1995, 1998, and 2001. Morales
opted to run again in 2004 and emerged as the winner in said elections. A ​quo warranto
case was filed against her. Morales defended that for his 1998 term, although he had fully
 served the same, Dee his electoral rival, was declared by the RTC has the elected mayor.
He argues that he is a mere caretaker of the mayor office at that time.
· The Court ruled that this factual milieu is the same as in ​Ong.
4. Dizon v. COMELEC
· The same Morales above again opted to run in the 2007 elections. His candidacy
was again challenged.
· The Court ruled that the ​Rivera ​ruling is an involuntary interruption with respect
to the 2004 term, even though he ceased from holding office only on May 17, 2007. The
break or interruption ​need not be for a full term or a major part. Any length of time,
provided it is involuntary, is sufficient.
As for the case of Abundo, clearly the RTC and COMELEC erred in holding that the three-year rule
applied. During Abundo’s 2004 term, Abundo assumed position as mayor, but ​only for a period of
one year and one month​(May 9, 2006 to June 30, 2007). The facts clearly point to an interruption
on the 2004 term. From June 30, 2004 to May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot claim that he is holding the
position as a matter of right nor can he discharge the functions of said office because during that
time ​the right to assume such office still belongs to his opponent.
The RTC and the COMELEC erred in its application of ​Aldovino, Jr. ​Again, in that case, a preventive
suspension cannot be considered as an interruption of the term for one under preventive
suspension does not lose title to his office.
3. ALDOVINO v. COMELEC
FACTS: ​Asilo was elected as councilor of Lucena City for 3 consecutive terms 1998-2001,
2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In Sep. 2005, during his 2004-2007 term, the Sandiganbayan
preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation to a criminal case against him. This Court,
however, subsequently lifted the suspension order, hence, he resumed performing the functions of
his office and finished his term.
In the 2007 elections, Asilo filed his CoC for the same position. The petitioners sought to deny due
course to Asilo’s CoC on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms, and his
candidacy for a fourth term would violate the 3-term limit rule under the Constitution
The COMELEC ruled against the petitioners and declared that the 3 term limit DID NOT apply to
Asilo because he was unable to render complete service of his 2004-2007 term due to the
Sandiganbayan’s suspension.
ISSUE: ​1.) Is preventive suspension an interruption of the three-term limit? NO
2.) Is preventive suspension involuntary renunciation as contemplated in RA7160? NO
RULING:
Asilo is disqualified to run for the 2007 elections because his term was not interrupted by the
Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive suspension, as preventive suspension does not interrupt
an elective official’s term.
A term means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an office may hold an
office. Upon expiration of the officer’s term, unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his rights,
duties and authority as a public office must ipso facto cease.
The provision also expresses its intent to prevent any circumvention of the limitation through
voluntary severance of ties with the public office; it expressly states that voluntary renunciation of
office shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
which he was elected. A notable feature of this second branch is that it does not textually state that
voluntary renunciation is the ONLY actual interruption of service that does not affect “continuity of
service for a full term” for purposes of the three term limit rule.
In Lonzanida, the Court presented 2 requisites for the three term limit to apply, namely:
1. That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post
2. That he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Our intended meaning under this ruling is clear: it is severance from office, or to be exact, loss of
title, that renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable.
We conclude that “interruption” of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit is
one that involves NO LESS THAN THE INVOLUNTARY LOSS OF TITLE TO OFFICE. The elective
official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective
interruption to occur. Based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is
an effective interruption of service within a term, as held in Montebon. On the other hand,
temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if
involuntary, should not be considered as an effective interruption of a term because it does not
involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder,
while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason
provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the officer lost the right to hold on to his
office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs during an office
holder’s term when he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his functions for reasons
established by law. Ofcourse, “failure to serve” cannot be used once the right to office is lost; without
the right to hold office or to serve, then no service can be rendered so that none is really lost.
Nature of Preventive Suspension
Preventive suspension is an interim remedial measure to address the situation of an official who
have been charged administratively or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily indicates the
likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled conditions and
gives a premium to the protection of the service rather than to the interests of the individual office
holder. Even then, protection of the service goes only as far as a temporary prohibition on the
exercise of the functions of the official’s office; the official is reinstated to the exercise of his position
as soon as the preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of
power results, no position is vacated when a public official is preventively suspended. This is what
happened to Asilo.
Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an elective official’s
service in office and they do not overlap. As already mentioned above, preventive suspension
involves protection of the service and of the people being served, and prevents the office holder
from temporarily exercising the power of his office. Term limitation, on the other hand, is triggered
after an elective official has served his three terms in office without any break. Its companion
concept, interruption of a term, on the other hand, requires loss of title to office.
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension
should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official's stay in office beyond three
terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official
continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of
the office within the suspension period. ​The best indicator of the suspended official's continuity in
office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no
vacancy exists
Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a voluntary act
on the part of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he may have voluntarily
committed the act that became the basis of the charge against him. From this perspective,
preventive suspension does not have the element of voluntariness that voluntary renunciation
embodies. Neither does it contain the element of renunciation or loss of title to office as it merely
involves the temporary incapacity to perform the service that an elective office demands. Thus
viewed, preventive suspension is — by its very nature — the exact opposite of voluntary
renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and ​involves only the actual delivery of service, not
the title to the office.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render service, is
disallowed by the Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is therefore not allowed as
a mode of circumventing the three-term limit rule.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term and
should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation. It can pose as a threat,
however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective interruption of a term. Let it
be noted that a preventive suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary renunciation, as it
does not require relinquishment or loss of office even for the briefest time. It merely requires an
easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension
has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing preventive suspension as an effective interruption of
a term can serve as a circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the
Constitution expressly disallows as an interruption.
4. SOCRATES v. COMELEC
FACTS: ​This case involves 4 consolidated petitions seeking the reversal of the resolution
stemming from the recall of Victorino Socrates from assuming office as Mayor. A recall
election happened and Hagedorn was elected.
Barangay officials of Puerto Prinsesa convened into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA)
to initiate the recall of Socrates. This was initiated by Hagedorn. The PRA requested the
COMELEC to schedule the recall election for mayor within 30 days from receipt of the
Recall Resolution.
They passed a resolution which declared the loss of confidence in Socrates and called for
his recall.
COMELEC gave due course to the recall and scheduled the recall election. Hagedorn filed
for candidacy, but a certain Adovo and Gilo filed a petition to disqualify him. The
petitions were all anchored on the ground that Hagedorn is disqualified from running for
a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for
three (3) consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the
same post. COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification and declared Hagedorn
qualified to run.
1. Socrates seeks to nullify the resolution of COMELEC which gave due course to
the recall election. Socrates cites the following circumstances as legal
infirmities attending the convening of the PRA and its issuance of the Recall
Resolution: (1) not all members of the PRA were notified of the meeting to
adopt the resolution; (2) the proof of service of notice was palpably and legally
deficient; (3) the members of the PRA were themselves seeking a new electoral
mandate from their respective constituents; (4) the adoption of the resolution
was exercised with grave abuse of authority; and (5) the PRA proceedings were
conducted in a manner that violated his and the publics constitutional right to
information.
2. Sandoval seeks the annulment of the resolution saying that campaign shall be at
least 15 days.
3. Adovo, Gilo and Ollave assail the resolutions of COMELEC declaring Hagedorn
as qualified to run despite statutory prohibitions against a fourth consecutive
term for elective local officials.
ISSUE:
1.WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the Recall
Resolution and scheduling the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa. ​NO
2. WON Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of Puerto Princesa.
YES
RULING:
Constitution:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, ​shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms​. xxx
LGC Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in
the same position.xxx
The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only ​consecutive terms count in determining
the three-term limit rule.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek ​immediate reelection
for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same
office following the end of the third consecutive term. A​ny ​subsequent ​election,​ like a
recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a
subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection
after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not
an immediate reelection after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001.
The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred
to the regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections.
Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections
and served in full his three consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa. Under the
Constitution and the Local Government Code, Hagedorn could no longer run for mayor in
the 2001 elections. The Constitution and the Local Government Code disqualified
Hagedorn, who had reached the maximum three-term limit, from running for a fourth
consecutive term as mayor. Thus, Hagedorn did not run for mayor in the 2001
elections.Socrates ran and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the 2001 elections. After
Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the
recall election of September 24, 2002.
5. MONTEBON v. COMELEC
FACTS: ​Petitioners Montebon and Ondy and respondent Potencioso, Jr. were candidates for
municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu. Monbetebon and Ondy filed a petition for
disqualication against Potencioso with the COMELEC alleging that Potencioso had been elected and
served three consecutive terms as municipal councilor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007.
Thus, he is proscribed from running for the same position in the 2007 elections as it would be his
fourth consecutive term. Potencioso claimed that the service of his second term in 2001-2004 was
interrupted on January 12, 2004 when he succeeded as vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement
of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Montebon and Ondy maintained that respondent's assumption of office as
vice-mayor in January 2004 should not be considered an interruption in the service of his second
term since it was a voluntary renunciation of his office. COMELEC First Division denied the petition.
On appeal, COMELEC en banc upheld the ruling of the first division. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE: ​WON Potencioso is deemed to have fully served his second term despite his assumption of
office as vice-mayor of Tuburan and is therefore barred from running as municipal councillor for
the 4​th​ consecutive time.​ (NO. His second term was interrupted hence he may still run as
municipal councilor for the 4​th​ time )
RULING: ​The Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualication must
concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post; and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the
office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor.
In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor due to the retirement of
Vice Mayor Mendoza. Potencioso, being the highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in
accordance with law. It is clear therefore that his assumption of office as vice-mayor can in no way
be considered a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor.
Thus, Potencioso's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary
severance from his office as municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of his
2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it
was by operation of law.
6. BORJA v. COMELEC
FACTS: ​1988, Capco (Respondent) was elected Vice-Mayor of Pateros.
1989, he became Mayor by operation of law due to Mayor Borja’s death.
1992, Capco was elected Mayor. In 1995, he was re-elected Mayor.
1998, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor. Borja Jr. (Petitioner), also a candidate
contended that Capco had already served 3 terms. COMELEC initially ruled in favor of Borja, but
later reversed. Capco then won the election.
Borja now seeks to set aside the COMELEC’s resolution. Borja contends that Capco’s service as
mayor when he succeeded Mayor Borja should be considered as a full term. Petitioner Borja also
argues that Vice-Mayors should be treated like Vice-Presidents who is considered to have served a
term after succeeding the President.
ISSUE: ​Is a Vice-Mayor, who succeeds a Mayor by operation of law, considered to have served a full
term?​ [NO] ​*note that this involves a ​local​ office*
RULING: ​Art X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that “​the term of office of elective officials...shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption...”. This was
restated in the LGC. Two ideas emerged from the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The
first is the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The
second is the concern that the right of the people to choose be preserved.
Art X., Sec. 8 speaks of the term of office of ​elective local officials and bars such officials from serving
more than 3 consecutive terms. The term served must therefore be one for which the official
concerned was elected. If he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply
continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully
served. To recapitulate, ​it is not enough that an individual has ​served 3 consecutive terms in an
elective local office, he must also have been ​elected t​ o the same position.
2 conditions to apply disqualification:
1. Local official has been elected 3 consecutive times
2. Local official has fully served 3 consecutive terms
DIFF. OF VICE-MAYOR & HOUSE REP. MEMBER. The Vice-Mayor succeeds to the mayorship by
operation of law. The Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. Such Representative serves a term
for which he was elected. His service of the unexpired term is rightly counted as his first term.
DIFF. OF VICE-MAYOR & VICE-PRES. The VP is elected primarily to succeed the President. In
running for VP, he may thus be said to also seek the Presidency. For their part, the electors likewise
choose as VP the candidate who they think can fill the Presidency in the event it becomes vacant.
Hence service in the Presidency by a VP may rightly be considered as a full term.
For a Vice-Mayor, succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy is just one of his distinct powers
and functions. Under the LGC, has distinct powers and functions such as being presiding officer of
the sanggunian and appointing all officials and employees of such local assembly. It cannot be said
that in running for Vice-Mayor, he also sought mayorship. Hence, his service in that office should not
be counted in the application of the term limit.
SCENARIO1. Vice-Mayor X becomes Mayor. 6 months before the election, he resigns and is twice
elected thereafter -- He can run again for mayor in the next election. The rule that voluntary
renunciation is not an interruption only applies ​if the term is one for which he was elected.
SCENARIO 2. During Mayor Y’s first term, he was twice suspended for misconduct for 1 year. He was
then twice elected -- He can run in the next election, because he has successfully served 2 terms
only.
SCENARIO 3. Vice-Mayor Z became Mayor by succession, but was neither elected for mayorship, nor
has he fully served 3 consecutive terms. He was then elected twice -- He may run in the next election
because he was not elected to the office of mayor during his “first term” but was simply thrust into it
by operation of law. He only continued the service.
7. ADORMEO v. COMELEC
FACTS:
May 1992 Elections- Talaga was elected mayor and served his full term
May 1995 Elections- Talaga was re-elected mayor and served his full term
May 1998 Elections- Bernard Tagarao was elected mayor.
May 12, 2000 Recall Elections- Talaga was elected and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until
June 30, 2001.
For the May 2001 Elections, Talaga and Adormeo were the only candidates for mayor of Lucena City.
Adarmeo filed with the Provincial Election Supervisor of Lucena a Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Talaga on the ground that he had been
elected and served as city mayor for 3 consecutive terms in the 1992 Elections, 1995 Elections, and
2000 Recall Elections. Adarmeo cotended that Talaga’s candidacy is a violation of 1987
Constitution(Art X)(Sec8),
“The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected”
and of Local Government Code (Section 43)(b),
“No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.”
Adarmeo adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, “if one is elected representative to serve the
unexpired term of another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the
purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed.”
Talaga argues that he was not elected for 3 consecutive terms but only for 2 consecutive terms,
pointing to his defeat in the 1998 Elections as an interruption, and thus his mayorship was not for 3
consecutive terms of 3 years each; also, that his service from May 12, 2001 until June 30, 2001 for
13 months, 18 days was not a full term.
ISSUE: ​W/N Talaga had already served 3 consecutive terms in office, thus was disqualified to run for
mayor of Lucena City in 2001 [​NO​]
RULING:
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as
the right to serve in the same elective position. It is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position.
Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a
total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next election?
Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively. To consider C as eligible for reelection
would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the people
should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should
be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.
The two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: a) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2)
that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Talaga was not elected for 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2 years he was a private citizen. The
continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.
With regard to Fr. Bernas’ comment, it is only pertinent to members of the House of
Representatives. Unlike local government officials, there is no recall election provided for members
of Congress
Neither can Talaga’s victory in the recall election be deemed a violation of 1987 Constitution(Article
X)(Section 8) as “voluntary renunciation”.
Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent of the framers of
the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation
of office and at the same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected official full service
of a term is evident in this provision.
Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
8. RIVERA III v. COMELEC
Consolidated cases:
1st case: Atty. Riveraa III and Atty. De Guzman (petitioners) vs COMELEC and Marino “Boking”
Morales (respondent)
2nd case: Anthony Dee (petitioner) vs COMELEC and Marino “Boking” Morales (respondent)
FACTS:
1st case: ​Marino “Boking” Morales ran as candidate for mayor of Mabalacat Pampanga for the term
July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. He filed his Certificate of Candidacy on January 5, 2004. Petitioners
filed with COMELEC a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by Morales on the ground
that he was already elected and had served for three previous consecutive terms as mayor of
Mabalacat.
Respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term
commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 (first term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third
term), but he served the second term from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a "caretaker of the
office" or as a "de facto officer" because: 1) He was not validly elected for the second term 1998 to
2001 since his proclamation as mayor was declared void by RTC of Angeles City in an Election
Protest Case. The Decision became final and executory on August 6, 2001 and 2) He was
preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-graft case for six months- an interruption in
the continuity of his service as municipal mayor of Mabalacat.
COMELEC Second Division disqualified Morales however, this was reversed by COMELEC
En Banc. Hence this petition for certiorari.
2nd case​: Morales was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing
July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, petitioner Anthony Dee, also a candidate for mayor, led with the RTC,
Branch 61, Angeles City a petition for quo warranto against the said respondent. Dee alleged that
Morales, having served as mayor for three consecutive terms, is ineligible to run for another term or
fourth term. RTC dismissed petitioner Dee's petition for quo warranto on the ground that
respondent Morales did not serve the three-term limit since he was not the duly elected mayor of
Mabalacat because although he was proclaimed as the elected mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers, had assumed office and discharged the duties of mayor - his close
rival, the herein petitioner, Anthony D. Dee, was declared the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat,
Pampanga by the RTC of Angeles City in an Election Protest Case led by Dee.
RTC dismissed the case and the decision of the RTC was affirmed by COMELEC. Hence this
petition for certiorari.
It is undisputed that respondent Morales was elected to the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the
following consecutive terms:
a) July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998
b) July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001
c) July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004
d) July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007
ISSUE:​ Whether or not Morales’ term, July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 to which he was elected and
which he served, may not be counted since his proclamation was declared void – NO, MORALES is
DISQUALIFIED.
RULING:​ ​Please note that this case was briefly compared to the cases of Borja and Adormeo. Those
cases are also assigned so ‘lam niyo na yon.
The Supreme Court ruled here that Morales has already served the full term of the July 1,
1998 to June 20, 2001. It applied here the case of​ Ong vs. Alegre​ where Francis Ong was elected and
assumed the duties of the mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for three consecutive terms. But
his proclamation as mayor in the May 1998 election was declared void by the RTC of Daet,
Camarines Norte in its Decision dated July 4, 2001. The SC further here there that for the three-term
limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to
wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local
government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms. As ruled by this
Court, his service for the term 1998 to 2001 is for the full term. Francis was never unseated during
the term in question.
In the case of ​Ong,​ it was compared to the case of​ Lonzanida​ where difference are: in
Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty elections was declared a nullity for the stated reason of "
failure of election," and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect
was nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of the mayor. For another, Lonzanida
did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as
a result of legal processes as he was asked to vacate before the expiration of his term - an effective
interruption of the continuity of service.
In this case, respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30,
2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the
entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case led by
petitioner Dee ousting him as mayor. To reiterate, such circumstance does not constitute an
interruption in serving the full term.
Respondent Morales maintains that he served his second term (1998 to 2001) only as a
"caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer." Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated
and its purpose defeated when an official serves in the same position for three consecutive terms.
Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the
prerequisites of the office which enables him "to stay on indefinitely". Respondent Morales
should be promptly ousted from the position of mayor of Mabalacat.
Having found respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated
December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. ​The effect of the cancellation of a Certificate of
Candidacy is that the votes cast for him shall not be counted and that any vote in favor of a person
who has not filed a certificate of candidacy shall be considered as a stray vote.
Respondent Morales cannot be considered a candidate in the May 2004 elections. Not
being a candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray
votes. Since respondent Morales is DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as mayor of Mabalacat,
the instant petition for quo warranto has become moot.
According to jurisprudence, as a consequence of petitioner's ineligibility, a permanent
vacancy in the contested office has occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor in
accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government Code.
9. ALBANIA v. COMELEC
FACTS: ​Respondent Edgardo A. Tallado and Jesus O. Typoco were both candidates for the position
of Governor in Camarines Norte. Typoco was proclaimed as the winner. Tallado questioned
Typoco's proclamation by filing with the COMELEC, a petition for correction of a manifest error. The
Petition was decided in Tallado’s favor on March 5, 2010 and the latter assumed the position of
Governor of Camarines Norte from March 22, 2010 to June 30, 2010, the end of the 2007-2010 term.
Tallado ran again in the 2010 and 2013 National and Local Elections where he won and served as
Governor of Camarines Norte. Tallado filed his CoC for the 2016 elections for governor of Camarines
Norte. Albana, a registered voter of Poblacion, Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte filed the petition for
disqualication of Tallado on the grounds that he allegedly violated the three-term limit rule
provided under the Constitution and the LGC; and that he was suspended from office for 1 year
without pay together with its accessory penalties as a result of an administrative case. Tallado
denied violating the three-term limit rule as he did not fully serve three consecutive terms since he
only served as Governor for the 2007 elections from March 22, 2010 to June 30, 2010. COMELEC
ruled in favor of Tallado. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: ​WON COMELEC acted with GADALEJ in failing to rule that respondent Tallado should be
disqualified from running as Governor.​ (NO. COMELEC is correct. Tallado can run as governor.)
RULING: ​Suspension from office is not a ground for disqualification, Section 40 (b) of LGC clearly
speaks of removal from office as a result of an administrative offense that would disqualify a
candidate from running for any elective local position. In fact, the penalty of suspension cannot be a
bar to the candidacy of the Tallado as long as he meets the qualifications for the office as provided in
Section 66 (b).
The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was to avoid the evil of a single person
accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged
stay in the same office. After being elected and serving for three consecutive terms, an elective local
official cannot seek immediate re-election for the same office in the next regular election because he
is ineligible.
The alleged violation of the three-term limit rule is not a ground for a petition for disqualification,
but a proper ground for a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a CoC. For the latter, the
petition must be filed within 25 days from the time of filing of the COC. In this case, the petition was
filed beyond the reglementary period. (Filing of CoC: Oct. 16, 2015, 25​TH​ day: Nov. 10, Date petition
was filed: Nov. 13)
We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC when it found that the petition to
deny due course to or cancel a COC will not also prosper as there was no violation of the three-term
limit rule. We held that two conditions must concur for the application of the disqualication of a
candidate based on violation of the three-term limit rule, which are: (1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has
fully served three consecutive terms. In this case, while Tallado ran as Governor of Camarines Norte
in the 2007 elections, he did not win as such. It was only after he filed a petition for correction of
manifest error that he was proclaimed as the duly-elected Governor. He assumed the post and
served the unexpired term of his opponent from March 22, 2010 until June 30, 2010. Consequently,
he did not hold the office for the full term of three years to which he was supposedly entitled to.
Thus, such period of time that Tallado served as Governor did not constitute a complete and full
service of his term.
10. LATASA v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Arsenio Latasa was elected mayor of the municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in 1992, 1995, and
1998 elections. During Latasa’s 3rd term, the Municipality of Digos was declared a component city
(City of Digos). A plebiscite was conducted. This event also marked the end of petitioner's tenure as office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even just a short
mayor of the Municipality of Digos. However, under Section 53, Article IX of the Charter, Latasa was period of time, stepped down from office.
mandated to serve in a hold-over capacity as mayor of the new City of Digos. Hence, he took his oath
as the city mayor. Latasa filed his COC for city mayor for May 2001 elections stating he was eligible DIFFERENTIATE WITH CASES ON RECALL ELECTION: In Lonzanida, petitioner therein
and disclosed that he had already served three consecutive terms as mayor of Municipality of Digos was a private citizen a few months before the next mayoral elections. Similarly, in
but now running for the first time for city mayor. Romeo Sunga, rival, filed before COMELEC a Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents therein lived as private citizens for two
Petition to Deny Due Course, Cancel COC and/or For Disqualification against Latasa alleging that he years and fifteen months respectively. Indeed, the law contemplates a rest period during
falsely represented in his COC that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos City since he had already which the local elective o cial steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or
been elected and served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001. Latasa answered authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local
by arguing that he did not make any false representation in his COC since he fully disclosed therein government unit.
that he had served as mayor of the Municipality of Digos for three consecutive terms. However,
Latasa argued that this did not bar him from running for city mayor
WHO SHALL BE MAYOR: the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an ineligible
candidate at a popular election, or that a candidate is later declared to be disqualified to hold office,
ISSUE: ​Whether or not petitioner Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of
does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to be declared
the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of
elected. The same merely results in making the winning candidate's election a nullity. In the present
the Municipality of Digos (NO)
case, moreover, 13,650 votes were cast for private respondent Sunga as against the 25,335 votes
cast for petitioner Latasa. The second placer is obviously not the choice of the people in that
particular election. In any event, a permanent vacancy in the contested office is thereby created
RULING:
which should be filled by succession ​(differentiate with Jaslosjos)
DEMOCRACY; PURPOSE OF THREE-TERM LIMIT: As a rule, in a representative democracy, the
people should be allowed freely to choose those who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the
Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people. An
examination of the historical background of the subject Constitutional provision reveals that the
members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of
choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. The
framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, ​wanted to establish some safeguards
against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms.

DISQUALIFICATION; TWO CONDITIONS: An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from
running again in for same local government post, unless two conditions concur: ​1.) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.)
that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

APPLICATION: Latasa states that a city and a municipality have separate and distinct personalities.
Substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a city. For one, there is a material
change in the political and economic rights of the local government unit when it is converted from a
municipality to a city and undoubtedly, these changes affect the people as well. However, as seen in
Section 2 and 53 of City of Digos’ Charter, the delineation of the metes and bounds of the City of
Digos did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by the Municipality of Digos.
The elective officials of the Municipality of Digos continued to exercise their powers and functions
until elections were held for the new city officials. True, the new city acquired a new corporate
existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for
the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor
would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor.
The inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city.

DIFFERENTIATE WITH CASES ON SUCCESSION BY OPERATION OF LAW: Latasa was,

without a doubt, duly elected as mayor in the May 1998 elections. Can he then be
construed as having involuntarily relinquished his office by reason of the conversion of
Digos from municipality to city? Yes, he did involuntarily relinquish his office as
municipal mayor since the office has been deemed abolished due to the conversion.
However, ​the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed
PUBCORP: Local Government Structure and Officials
Date
1. FLORES v. DRILON
FACTS: ​Petitioners are taxpayers, employees of the US Facility at Subic, and officers and members of
the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in US Facilities in the Philippines. They are assailing the
constitutionality of Section 13 par (d) of RA 7227 or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of
1992 which appointed Mayor Richard Gordon as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority (SMBA) as it contravenes the following:
1. Section 7 (first par), Article IX-B of the Constitution which states no elective official shall
be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position
during his tenure because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the
subject posts are public offices
2. Section 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that the President shall appoint all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint since it was Congress
through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the
subject post
3. Section 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code, which prohibits the appointment of
new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases during
the period of 45 days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election
for the reason that the appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject posts made by
respondent Executive Secretary on 3 April 1992 was within the prohibited 45-day period
prior to the 11 May 1992 Elections.
Relevant Provision:
Section 13, par (d): "(d) Chairman/Administrator — The President shall appoint a professional
manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex officio chairman of the Board
and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the
first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be
appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority."
ISSUE: ​Is the appointment of Mayor Gordon a violation of the constitutional proscription against the
appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts? ​[YES]
RULING: On the violation of Section 7, Article IX-B. ​Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution
expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person, so that a
public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery
of public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. In this case, the subject
proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other
government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is
precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the
imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first part., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution.
The view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-out difference in the wording of the 2 paragraphs of
Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple
offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the
first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against
appointment or designation of an elective official to other government posts, except as are
particularly recognized in the Constitution itself (the President as head of the economic and
planning agency, the Vice-President, who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet, and a member
of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council).
On the encroachment on the appointing authority of the President. ​An "appointment" is the
designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the duties
of some office or trust or the selection or designation of a person, by the person or persons having
authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and discharge the duties of the same. In his
treatise, Philippine Political Law, Senior Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines appointment as
"the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the
functions of a given office." The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment
involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of issuing
appointment papers to the appointee. In other words, the choice of the appointee is a fundamental
component of the appointing power. Hence, when the qualifications prescribed by Congress can
only be met by one individual, such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing
power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. In this case,
Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a presidential appointee for the first year of its
operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority
to only one eligible (the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City). However, the ineligibility of an elective
official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may resign
first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be
considered fit for appointment. As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for
appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA; hence,
his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be
sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not
necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer.
However, all per diems, allowances and other emoluments received by respondent Gordon, if any, as
such Chairman and Chief Executive Officer may be retained by him, and all acts otherwise legitimate
done by him in the exercise of his authority as officer de facto of SBMA are upheld.
2. CATU v. RELLOSA
FACTS: [BASICALLY] Complainant WILFREDO M. CATU filed an administrative complaint against
respondent ATTY. VINCENT RELLOSA for committing an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a
public officer when he stood as counsel for defendants ELIZABETH Diaz-Catu and Antonio PASTOR
in a case for ejection despite having previously handled/presided over their barangay conciliation
proceedings between WILFREDO and the defendants. The ​IBP found sufficient ground to discipline
RELLOSA and suspended him from the practice for 1 month with a stern warning that a similar act
will be dealt with more severely. ​[BACKGROUND] WILFREDO co-owned a lot and the building
thereon located in Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, REGINA and ANTONIO, contested
ELIZABETH and PASTOR’S possession of one of the units therein. A complaint was thus filed before
Barangay 723. Punong barangay ATTY. RELLOSA summoned the parties to conciliation meetings,
but later issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court after amicable
settlement was not reached. Thereafter, WILFREDO formally filed in the MeTC a complaint for
ejection against ELIZABETH and PASTOR. Atty. RELLOSA entered his appearance as counsel for the
defendants in that case. Thus, WILFREDO filed the said administrative complaint. ​[RELLOSA’S
DEFENSE] ​As punong barangay and head of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, he performed his duty of
hearing complaints with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties.
ELIZABEHTH sought his legal assistance and he agreed to handle it for free because she was
financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her.
ISSUE: ​W/N Atty. RELLOSA was committed an act of impropriety when he stood as counsel for
defendants, and thus, administratively liable ​[YES. A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO IS
NOT PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE LAW MUST SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY FROM THE HEAD OF
HIS DEPARTMENT. THIS HE FAILED TO DO. ]
RULING
The SC modified IBP’s findings and imposable penalty:
(1) ATTY. RELLOSA IS NOT COVERED BY RULE 6.03 of the CPR. ​He was the ​incumbent punong
barangay at the time he committed the act. The rule prohibits ​former government lawyers from
accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had
intervened while in said service” (PCGG v. SB).
(2) SEC. 90 of RA 7160 APPLIES [SPECIAL LAW]; NOT SEC. 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 [GENERAL
LAW]. Sec. 90* of the RA 7160 (LGC) is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of
profession by elective local government officials. As a special law with a definite scope, it constitutes
an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713. The latter is the general law which prohibits all public
officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their
profession "unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions."
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the ff:
the governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the
city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the
municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for
municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the
members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays. Of these elective local officials, the governors,
city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in
any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because
they are required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and
attention to the performance of their official duties. On the other hand, members of the sanggunian
(panlalawigan, panlungsod or bayan) may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their professions,
engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, the city
mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod
or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week. Since the law
itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in
schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or
authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes. ​While, as already discussed,
certain local elective officials are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice
their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay
and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Since they are
excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession.
And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang
barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month. Accordingly, as punong barangay,
respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have procured prior
permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service
regulations.
(3) A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO IS NOT PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE LAW MUST
SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY FROM THE HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT. ​A civil service officer or
employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the
government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head
of the department concerned. As punong barangay, ATTY. RELLOSA should have obtained the prior
written permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his
appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.
(4) RELLOSA’s failure to comply with Sec. 12*, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: ​to obey the laws. x In acting as counsel for a party
without first securing the required written permission, he not only engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the CPR and
Canon 7. Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence
in the integrity of the legal profession. X Atty. RELLOSA is SUSPENDED from the practice for 6
months and sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
*FOR REFERENCE:
SEC. 90. PRACTICE OF PROFESSION. — (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief
executives. (b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar ​shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of
which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending
the interest of the Government. XXX
SEC. 12, RULE XVII, REVISED CIVIL SERVICE RULES: ​No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the
case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal
of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time
so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of investments,
made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and
public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management
of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors.
3. VELASCO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: ​Philip Corpus Velasco, then Mayor of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte filed a complaint against his
predecessor and currently provincial board member Pacifico C. Velasco [yes, pareho sila ng apelyido
pero di sinabi sa case ano relationship nila] for violation of the ANTI-GRAFT LAW using public funds
in the amount of P670,000.00 in the purchase of a Road Grader that was subsequently appropriated
by former mayor Pacifico C. Velasco as his personal property.
● Sangguniang Bayan of Bacarra issued a resolution granting Pacifico Velasco authority to
purchase 1 Komatsu road grader. However, in the turnover ceremony to Philip Velasco,
the latter did not find such road grader
Petitioner Pacifico Velasco branded the filing of the Complaint as politically motivated. He admitted
requesting for a cash advance from the municipality for the purpose of acquiring the road grader,
which was subsequently utilized by the municipality to repair and maintain roads. When the
expected funds from the national government were not released, petitioner Velasco was faced with
the problem of liquidating said cash advance. Thus, he was forced to mortgage the road grader just
so he could reimburse the municipality in the sum of P670,000.00.
[impt] Office of Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dismissed the complaint. Then Acting Mayor Dela
Cruz moved for reconsideration. Petitioner filed a motion to strike out MR on the ground that Acting
Mayor Dela Cruz had no legal personality to file the MR. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon denied the MR. [sa ratio to minention sa case pero reason why si Acting Mayor nagfile ng MR
is because on vacation leave si main Mayor haha]
However, upon instructions of the Deputy Ombudsman for Military and Other Law Enforcement
Offices (MOLEO), the Director of the Office of Chief Legal Counsel, after reviewing the case,
recommended the filing of an Information for TECHNICAL MALVERSATION. Petitioner, thus, filed an
Omnibus MR. The Office of the Special Prosecutor denied petitioner's motion and filed the
Information for technical malversation before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner moved for reinvestigation because accdg to him no preliminary investigation was
conducted. SB denied saying that it already filed an earlier MR. Cannot file again.
Petitioner, in the main, assails the denial of his MR.
[also pls note for recit don’t forget] One of the defense of Petitioner was that Acting Mayor Dela Cruz
had NO standing to file the earlier MR
PUBCORP ISSUE: ​W/N Acting Mayor Dela Cruz had standing to file MR? - YES
ISSUE of the case in case Ma’am asks: W/N Sandiganbayan committed GADALEJ for DENYING
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration - NO
RULING:
In an apparent attempt to mislead, petitioner brings up the alleged incapacity of Acting Mayor Dela
Cruz to file a motion for reconsideration pertaining to the earlier Resolution which dismissed the
complaint against him. This argument cannot prosper. The issue has already been resolved. In fact,
the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon dismissed the complaint against petitioner. The purported
legal incapacity of Acting Mayor Dela Cruz, therefore, bears no relevance to the indictment on hand.
At any rate, Acting Mayor Dela Cruz, in fact, did possess the legal capacity to file the motion on
behalf of the local government unit he represented. ​Under Section 46 of the Local Government Code​,
the ​vice-mayor automatically assumes the powers and duties of the mayor in case of the latter's
temporary absence​, thus:
SEC. 46.  Temporary Vacancy in the Office of the Local Chief Executive. — (a) When the governor,
city or municipal Mayor, or punong barangay is temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties for
physical or legal reasons such as, but not limited to, leave of absence, travel abroad, and suspension
from office, the vice-governor, city or municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang
barangay member shall automatically exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of
the local chief executive concerned, except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees
which can only be exercised if the period of temporary incapacity exceeds thirty (30) working days.
In fact, Acting Mayor Dela Cruz explained that at that time he filed the motion, Mayor Philip Velasco
was "on official vacation leave and out of the country."
It is likewise incontrovertible that Mayor Philip Velasco instituted the complaint in his capacity as
then Mayor of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte. Petitioner premises his challenge on legal standing on the mere
failure of the complainant to state in his complaint that he was suing on behalf of the municipality.
His argument is specious. As correctly asserted by Mayor Philip Velasco in his Comment/Opposition
to the Motion to Strike, the property sought to be recovered in the complaint will revert to the
municipality and not to him
[optional reading; rem] ON THE MR ISSUE:
It is incorrect for petitioner to insist that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration
of the Order of the Special Prosecutor. Pursuant to this authority, the Deputy Ombudsman for
MOLEO approved the Memorandum-Resolution indicting petitioner. Thus, this
Memorandum-Resolution proceeds from the authority of the Special Prosecutor and is virtually his
own memorandum. So when petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, he was
effectively appealing a Memorandum issued by the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The filing of
another motion for reconsideration constitutes a prohibited pleading. Under Section 7 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, "Only one motion for reconsideration or
reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution shall be allowed
4. NAZARENO v. CITY OF DUMAGETE
FACTS: ​Then incumbent Mayor Remollo and Perdices were among the candidates for mayor.
Perdices won and was to assume office on June 30, 2001. After the elections but before Perdices'
assumption, Remollo made 15 promotional appointments and 74 original appointments for various
positions in the city government. Said appointments were reflected in the June 2001 Report of
Personnel Actions (ROPA) of the city, that was submitted to the CSC.
Soon after Perdices assumed office, Perdices announced (during flag ceremony) that he was not
honoring or recognizing the appointments made by Remollo. Anxious that their services would be
terminated, Leah Nazareno, et al., as petitioners, filed Mandamus, Injunction and Damages. They
averred that the appointments made by Remollo were valid, as they were issued pursuant to CSC
Accreditation Program., which granted the City of Dumaguete the authority to take final action on its
appointments subject to the terms and conditions enumerated therein. In view of the city
government's act of withholding the salaries and salary differentials of the appointees, as well as
preventing them from reporting for work, the petitioners prayed that an injunctive writ be issued
enjoining the respondents from doing any act or issuing any order, which would result in the actual
or constructive dismissal of the petitioners.
In a letter, Director Abucejo, of the CSC-Field Office (FO), invalidated and revoked the questioned
appointments as they were issued in violation of the guidelines set forth by the CSC.
Later, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city government to refrain from
issuing any order to the petitioners pending the final adjudication of the case. It held that the order
of Director Abucejo was irregular since the said appointments may only be invalidated by the CSC
Regional Office upon the recommendation by the CSCFO. As such, the finding of the latter was not
yet final.
Respondents moved for the dismissal saying that Director Abucejo's ruling already attained finality
when the "appointing authority" failed to move for its reconsideration.
However, it appears that petitioners was able to exercise all their administrative remedies in timely
manner.
RTC: they then ruled for the dismissal saying that Director Abucejo’s ruling already attained finality.
CA: denied the petition and accordingly dismissed the same. The court held that by express
provision of Section 2, Rule VI of the CSC Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel
Actions, it was Mayor Perdices who had the locus standi to elevate the matter to the CSC.
ISSUE: Whether the previous mayor was the proper “appointing authority” who may appeal.
(NO, the proper appointing authority is the incumbent mayor)
RULING: ​sA real party-in-interest is the one who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or
one entitled to the avails of the suit. The question on who the real party-in-interest is to challenge
the invalidation of one's appointment has been settled in the case of Abella, where the Court held
that both the "appointing authority" and the appointee may question the disapproval of an
appointment.
Petitioners in the instant case, would like this Court to settle who the "appointing authority" is — is
it the former mayor, who made the questioned appointments, or the incumbent mayor, who at the
time of the invalidation of the appointment was the one holding the position? The appointing power
of the mayor or the local chief executive is set forth in Republic Act (RA) 7160 or the Local
Government Code. The power to appoint is vested in the office of the chief executive and not in the
person occupying the position. The local chief executive exercises such power in his official capacity.
Applying it in the present case, the appointing authority who had the right to assail the invalidation
of the appointment is the mayor occupying the position at the time of the institution of the appeal
and not the former mayor who made the assailed appointment.
Note: Although the earlier discussion demonstrates that the appointing authority is the real
party-in-interest to institute an appeal or motion to reconsider the invalidation of an appointment,
there is nothing to preclude the appointee from taking the same course of action. Clearly,
petitioners timely appealed the action of Director Abucejo to the CSC Regional Office, to the CSC
Proper and ultimately to the CA. Therefore, at the time of the issuance of the RTC Order dismissing
the petition for injunction, Director Abucejo's action had not yet become final and executory in view
of the timely appeal made by petitioners.
5. FARINAS v. BARBA
Relevant Law: SECTION 45. Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian. —
(a) Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian where automatic successions provided above do not apply shall be
filled by appointment in the following manner:
1. The President, through the Executive Secretary, in the case of the sangguniang panlalawigan and the
sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities;
2. The governor, in the case of the sangguniang panlungsod of component cities and the sangguniang
bayan;
3. The city or municipal mayor, in the case of the sangguniang barangay, upon recommendation of the
sangguniang barangay concerned.
(b) Except for the sangguniang barangay, only the nominee of the political party under which the sanggunian
member concerned had been elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank created the last
vacancy in the sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from
the same political party as that of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy and shall serve the unexpired
term of the vacant office. In the appointment herein mentioned, a nomination and a certificate of membership of
the appointee from the highest official of the political party concerned are conditions sine qua non, and any
appointment without such nomination and certification shall be null and void ab initio and shall be a ground for
administrative action against the official responsible therefor.
(c) In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who does not belong to any political party,
the local chief executive shall, upon recommendation of the sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person to
fill the vacancy.
(d) In case of vacancy in the representation of the youth and the barangay in the sanggunian, said vacancy shall be
filled automatically by the official next in rank of the organization concerned.
Petitioners: ​Governor Rodolfo Fariñas (“Fariñas”); Al Nacino (“Nacino”)
Respondent:Mayor Angelo Barba (“Barba”); Vice Mayor Manuel Hernando (“Hernando”); Edward
Palafox (“Palafox”)
Respondent: ​Mayor Angelo Barba (“Barba”); Vice Mayor Manuel Hernando (“Hernando”); Edward
Palafox (“Palafox”)
FACTS: ​Carilito Domingo (“Domingo”) was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas,
Ilocos. He had no political party when he was elected. He resigned from this position and left for the
US. In filling in Domingo’s vacancy, Mayor Barba recommended to Governor Fariñas the
appointment of Palafox. Palafox was likewise recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan of San
Nicolas by this recommendation was made to Mayor Barba and not to Governor Fariñas.
Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved of such recommendation. It then
recommended to Fariñas the appointment of Al Nacino as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San
Nicolas. On June 8, 1994, Governor Fariñas appointed Nacino and swore him to office.
Meanwhile, Mayor Barba appointed Palafox to the same position on June 8, 1994. The following day,
June 9, 1994, Palafox took his oath as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas.
Petitioners then filed with the RTC a petition for ​quo warranto.​They claimed that under the LGC, it
was the governor who is duly authorized to appoint a member to fill in the vacancy in the
sanggunian bayan.
RTC dismissed the ​quo warranto ​case, holding that the applicable provision is Section 45(c) of the
LGC in cases of appointment of vacancy caused by a non-political party member in the sangguniang
bayan. To the RTC, the local chief executive mentioned therein pertains to no other than the
municipal mayor of the sangguniang bayan where the vacancy was made. This is to be contrasted
from 45(a)(2) where for political party members, it is indeed the governor empowered. But in this
case, this involves a non-political party member who caused the vacancy. The RTC claims that the
provision would not have been made had it been its intention that the governor holds this power to
appoint.
MR was made by petitioners but the same was denied; thus, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: 1. Under Section 45(c) of the LGC, in filling up the vacancy of the sangguniang bayan,
does the term “local chief executive” pertain to the governor or the mayor? (GOVERNOR);
2. Under Section 45(c) of the LGC, which sanggunian is being pertained to from the words
“sanggunian concerned?” (sanggunian concerned = sanggunian which has the vacancy, in this
case, sangguniang bayan)
RULING: 1.​ ​Under Section 45(c) of the LGC, does the term “local chief executive” pertain to the
governor or the mayor?
The Court ruled that it is the Governor that is pertained under the term“local chief executive” under
Section 45(c) of the LGC.
The Court compared Section 45 from the related provision from the previous LGC (Section 50).
From the latter, it reveals the legislative policy to vest in the President, the governor and the mayor
in descending order the exercise of an executive power whether to appoint in order to fill vacancies
in local councils or to suspend local officials. These provisions are in ​pari materia​with Sec. 45.
For obvious reasons, the President cannot be the “local chief executive” contemplated in the
provision. But it is an apparent misnomer and that the choice of this phrase was simply dictated by
the need to avoid, for stylistic reasons, interminably repeating the officials on whom the power to
appoint is conferred. Perhaps "authorities concerned" would have been a more accurate generic
phrase to use.
It is the petitioners’ contention that in line with 45(a), the local chief executive in 45(c) should be
the governor with respect to vacancies in the sangguniang panlungsod of component cities and
sangguniang bayan, or the mayor with respect to vacancies in the sangguniang barangay.
Meanwhile, for the respondents, they claim that it is the governor for sangguniang panglalawigan,
and that for the sangguniang panglungsod, it is the mayor.
We cannot give credence to the respondents’ interpretation for one, the local chief executive of a
barangay is the punong barangay and thus he will be the one making the appointments for the
sangguniang barangay. But this interpretation renders Section 45(a)(3) meaningless because there
would be no occasion that the mayor can appoint a replacement in the sangguniang barangay since
under the barangay system, political parties are not allowed.
Second, why should a vacancy in the sangguniang panlalawigan be filled by a different authority (the
governor, according to this view) simply because the vacancy was created by a member who does
not belong to a political party when, according to Sec. 45(a)(1), a vacancy created by a member who
belongs to a political party must be filled by appointment by the President of the Philippines? This
again would run into a similar if not greater difficulty.
2. Under Section 45(c) of the LGC, which sanggunian is being pertained to from the words
“sanggunian concerned?”
We think that the phrase "sanggunian concerned" in Sec. 45(c) should more properly be understood
as referring to the Sanggunian in which the vacancy is created. This is in keeping with the policy
implicit in Sec. 45(a)(3).
Petitioners claim that based on Section 61 of LGC which vests in the sangguninag panlalawigan the
power to investigate complaints against elective municipal officials; thus, the “sanggunian
concerned” in the said provision pertained to the sangguniang panlalawigan.
This interpretation is inconsistent with the fact that in filling vacancies in the sangguniang barangay
it is the sangguniang barangay which under Sec. 45(a)(3) recommends the appointee, not the
sangguniang panlungsod or the sangguniang bayan, which would be the case if petitioners' view
were to prevail.
In sum, Section 45 must be read as follows:
I. Where the Permanent Vacancy is Caused by a Sanggunian Member
belonging to a Political Party:
A. Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Panlungsod of highly urbanized cities
and independent component cities — The President, through the Executive Secretary,
upon the nomination and certification of the political party to which the member who
caused the vacancy belonged, as provided in Sec. 45(b).
B. Sangguniang Panlungsod of component cities and Sangguniang Bayan — The
Governor upon the nomination and certication of the political party to which the member
who caused the vacancy belonged, as provided in Sec. 45(b).
II. Where the Vacancy is Caused by a Sanggunian Member Not Belonging to a Political Party
A. Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Panlungsod of highly urbanized and
independent component cites — The President, through the Executive Secretary, upon
recommendation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panlungsod as the
case may be.
B. Sangguniang Panlungsod of component cities and Sangguniang Bayan — The
Governor upon recommendation of the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan
as the case may be.
III. Where the Vacancy is Caused by a Member of the Sangguniang Barangay — City or Municipal
Mayor upon recommendation of the Sangguniang Barangay.
In addition, the for a valid appointment to be made, recommendation must first take place as a
condition sine qua non for the validity of the appointment. Thus, the appointing authority does not
wield that large of a discretion that he can disregard the recommendation of the sanggunian
concerned.
In this case, since neither petitioner Al Nacino nor respondent Edward Palafox was appointed in the
manner indicated in the preceding discussion, neither is entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang
Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte which was vacated by member Carlito B. Domingo. For while
petitioner Al Nacino was appointed by the provincial governor, he was not recommended by the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the other hand, respondent Edward Palafox was
recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan but it was the mayor and not the provincial governor who
appointed him. Thus, the ​quo warranto c​ ase must fail.
6. MOTEBON v. COMELEC
FACTS: ​Motebon and Ondy (Petitioners) and Potencioso (Respondent) were candidates for
municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14 ‘07 elections. On Apr. 30 ‘07, petitioners and
other candidates filed a petition for disqualification vs Potencioso with the COMELEC, alleging that
Potencioso had been elected and served three consecutive terms as councilor, 1998-2001,
2001-2004, and 2004-2007. Thus, he is disqualified for running in the same position in the 2007
elections.
Potencioso answered that he indeed had been elected for 3 consecutive terms. However, he claimed
that his service on the 2nd term was interrupted on Jan. 12, 2004 when he became the Vice Mayor of
Tuburan because the former Vice Mayor retired. Consequently, he is not disqualified from running
as councilor.
COMELEC ruled that since his assumption as vice mayor of Tuburan in 2004 was not a voluntary
renunciation, it operated as an effective disruption in the full service of his second term. Hence, in
the May 2007 elections, he is running for his second term, the first term being the 2004-2007 term.
ISSUE: ​Can Potencioso run in the 2007 elections? YES
RULING: ​The 1987 Constitution disqualifies local elective officials from serving more than three
consecutive terms. It also provides that voluntary renunciation of the office for any length shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
In Lonzanida, the Court held that the two conditions for the application must concur
1. That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
position
2. That he has fully served three consecutive terms.
In Borja, the Court emphasized that the term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer to the
right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Thus, for the
disqualification to apply, it is not enough that the official has been elected three consecutive times;
he must also have served three consecutive terms in the same position.
He may be elected for 3 consecutive terms but the issue lies on whether he is deemed to have fully
served his second term in view of his succession as vice mayor. Succession in local government
offices is by operation of law. The LGC provides for such succession. Since the former vice mayor
retired, a vacancy was created. That vacancy was filled in by Potencioso in accordance with law,
being the highest ranking municipal councilor. It is clear that his assumption of office as vice-mayor
can in no way be considered a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor.
In the concept of voluntary renunciation, the Supreme Court stated that voluntary renunciation of a
term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit. Conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Thus, Potencioso’s assumption as vice mayor
was an involuntary severance of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to have been by reason of
voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law.
7. NAVARRO v. CA {VACANCIES AND SUCCESSION}
FACTS: ​ A petition was filed to nullify the appointment of Tamayo as a Member of the Sangguniang
Bayan.
In the local elections, Cesar M. Calimlim - Mayor - Lakas NUCD-KAMPI. was elected to office in the
Municipality of Mapandan, Pangasinan.
Mayor Cesar Calimlim died. A vacancy was thus created in the Office of the Mayor so by operation of
law, Section 44 of the LGC, then Vice-Mayor Baltazar Aquino succeeded him.
The highest ranking member of the Sangguniang Bayan (Danny Tamayo), who garnered the highest
number of votes, was elevated to the position of the Vice-Mayor, pursuant to the same law.
Since a vacancy occurred in the Sangguniang Bayan by the elevation of Tamayo to the office of the
Vice-Mayor, Governor Victor Agbayani of Pangasinan appointed Navarro [REFORMA-LM] as
Member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Navarro belonged to the same political party as that of
petitioner Tamayo.
Respondents argue that it was the former vice-mayor, succeeding to the position of the mayor, who
created the permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian Bayan because under the law he was also a
member of the Sanggunian. Thus, the appointee must come from said former vice-mayor's political
party, in this case, the Lakas-NUCD-Kampi.
Tamayo and Navarro argued that pursuant to Section 45 (b) of the LGC the person to be appointed
to the position vacated by him should come from the same political party affiliation as that of
petitioner Tamayo. Hence, the appointment extended by Governor Agbayani to petitioner Navarro,
who was a member of and recommended by the REFORMA-LM, is valid.
ISSUE: ​From which party must the appointee come from? ​REFORMA-LM ​(Why? Maintenance of
party representation)
Is the appointment of Navarro proper? ​YES
RULING: ​Under Section 44 of the LGC, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective official fills a
higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily
resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
Section 45 (b) is also important. It provides that "xxx only the nominee of the political party under
which the Sanggunian member concerned has been elected and whose elevation to the position next
higher in rank created the last vacancy in the Sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner
hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the political party as that of the Sanggunian
member who caused the vacancy xxx."
The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a permanent
vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by the people in
the election.
With the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who belonged to REFORMA-LM, to the position of
Vice-Mayor, a vacancy occurred in the Sanggunian that should be filled up with someone who
should belong to the political party of petitioner Tamayo. Otherwise, REFORMA-LM's representation
in the Sanggunian would be diminished.
The reason behind par. (b), section 44 of the Local Government Code [(b) If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking sanggunian barangay members or,
in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the
punong barangay.] ​is the maintenance party representation in the Sanggunian in accordance
with the will of the electorate.
The "last vacancy" in the Sanggunian refers to that created by the elevation of the member formerly
occupying the next higher in rank which in turn also had become vacant by any of the causes already
enumerated. The term "last vacancy" is thus used in Sec. 45 (b) [(b)xxx The appointee shall come
from the same political party as that of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy and shall
serve the unexpired term of the vacant office.xxx] to differentiate it from the other vacancy
previously created.
8. GAMBOA v. AGUIRRE
FACTS: ​In the 1995 elections, Rafael Coscolluela, petitioner Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr. and respondents
Marcelo Aguirre, Jr., and Juan Y. Araneta were elected Negros Occidental Governor, Vice-Governor
and Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) members respectively. Sometime in August, 1995, the Governor
of Negros Occidental designated Vice Governor Romeo Gamboa, Jr. as Acting Governor for the
duration of his official trip abroad until his return. Later, when the SP held its regular session,
respondent members thereof questioned the authority of Gamboa to preside therein in view of his
designation as Acting Governor. The court declared Gamboa temporarily legally incapacitated to
preside over the sessions of the SP during the period that he is the Acting Governor. Gamboa filed
this petition for review.
ISSUE: ​WON Acting governor (Vice governor) Gamboa has the authority to preside over the sessions
of the SP.​ (NO. He is not a member of the SP while acting as governor.)
RULING: ​Sections 49(a) and 466(a)(1) of the LGC provide that the Vice-Governor shall be the
presiding officer of the SP . In addition to such function, he becomes the Governor and assumes the
higher office for the unexpired term of his predecessor, in case of "permanent vacancy" therein.
When the vacancy, however, is merely temporary, the Vice Governor "shall automatically exercise
the powers (subject to certain limitations) and perform the duties and functions" of the governor.
SP is consist of the: 1.) Vice Governor, as presiding officer, 2.) regular elective SP members, 3.) three
elective sectoral representatives, and 4.) those ex- officio members, namely: a.) president of the
provincial chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, b.) president of the panlalawigang pederasyon ng
mga sangguniang kabataan, c.) president of the provincial federation of sanggunian members of
municipalities and component cities. The Governor is excluded from the enumeration.
It has been held that if a Mayor who is out of the country is considered "effectively absent", the
Vice-Mayor should discharge the duties of the mayor during the latter's absence. This doctrine
should equally apply to the Vice-Governor since he is similarly situated as the Vice-Mayor. A
Vice-Governor who is concurrently an Acting Governor is actually a quasi Governor. This means
that, for purposes of exercising his legislative prerogatives and powers, he is deemed as a
non-member of the SP for the time being. Under RA 7160, the Governor was deprived of the power
to preside over the SP as he is not a member thereof. Hence, being the Acting Governor, the
Vice-Governor cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office since the
nature and duties of the Provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them. The
creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a corresponding temporary
vacancy in the office of the Vice Governor whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such
temporary vacancy. This event constitutes an inability on the part of the regular presiding officer
(Vice Governor) to preside during the SP sessions, which thus calls for the operation of the remedy
set in Art. 49(b) of the Local Government Code concerning the election of a temporary presiding
officer. The continuity of the Acting Governor's (Vice Governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP
is suspended so long as he is in such capacity. Under Sec. 49(b), in the event of the inability of the
regular presiding officer to preside during the SP session, the members present and constituting a
quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer.
9. MAQUILING v. COMELEC
FACTS: Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. He then became a naturalised citizen of the USA
and lost his FIlipino citizenship. In 2008, he applied for repatriation under RA 9225 in the US and
took the Oath of Alegiance to the Rep. of the Philippines. He was then issued an Order of APproval of
his CItizenship Retention and Re-acquisition. In 2009, he again took his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. *He used his passport
about 4 times* He then filed his CoC for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Balua, another mayoralty candidate contended that Arnado is a foreigner, alleging he used his
passport in entering and departing the Philippines before filing his CoC. Later, Arnado was
proclaimed as the winning candidate. It was only then that Arnado filed his Answer.
Then in a decision, COMELEC agreed that Arnado was not a Filipino citizen reasoning that Arnado’s
continued use of his US passport indicated that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his
citizenship.
Another candidate, Maquiling (Petitioner) filed an MR. Maquiling garnered the second highest
number of votes contended that he (Maquiling) should be proclaimed as the winner because Arnado
was disqualified.
COMELEC ruled in favor of Arnado reasoning that he embraced his Philippine citizenship and that
the use of a US passport does not operate to revert back to his status as a dual citizen. COMELEC
added that Arnado was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport, yet he used it as soon
as he obtained it. Maquiling filed in the SC seeking to reverse this decision.
ISSUE: ​W/N the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s
qualifications to run for office. ​[YES]
W/N the rule on succession in the LGC is applicable. ​[YES]
RULING: ​CITIZENSHIP. ​The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship
is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it
does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for public office - Oath of Allegiance and
renunciation of foreign citizenship. By taking the Oath, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship.
However, at that time. he was still a dual citizen (ineligible). After renouncing his Philippine
citizenship, he became solely and exclusively an Filipino citizen and thus eligible to run for public
office.
However, this does not operate permanently. The legal presumption is open to attack when after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acs showing his continued
possession of a foreign citizenship. Arnado continued to use his US passport before filing his CoC. He
positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, which runs counter to the affidavit of
renunciation.
The renunciation of a foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath. It requires an absolute and perpetual
renunciation, and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country. His
declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. By
doing so, Arnado was reverted back to his dual citizen status and thus ineligible. In effect, he was
solely and exclusively Filipino for 11 days.
This is distinct form those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth who are not required by law to
take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the CoC carries with it an implied renunciation of
foreign citizenship. Dual citizens by naturalisation, on the other hand, are required to take the Oath
and​ renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate.
Arndao’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he renounced
his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his CoC, he used his passport. His subsequent use of his
Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his passport.
POPULAR VOTE DOES NOT CURE THE INELIGIBILITY. An ineligible candidate who receives the
highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. Ineligibility does not only pertain to one’s
qualifications, but it also necessarily affects one’s right to hold public office. The number of ballots in
his favor cannot cure the defect. The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory
requirements for qualifications. To rule otherwise is to trample upon the very law that sets for the
requirements. We might as well write off our election laws.
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by esuring that
its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice to trump constitutional and
statutory provisions would be electoral anarchy.
SECOND-PLACER. A void CoC cannot produce any legal effect. The votes cast in favor of the ineligible
candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election. Even when the votes
for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected. The votes
cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the
sovereign voice. ​When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is
voided and the laurel is awarded next to the next in rank who does not possess any of the
disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as
candidates. ​The second-placer is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.
ON WHY HE WASN’T DISQUALIFIED EARLIER. RA 6646, Sec. 6 provides “Any candidate...declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted…If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he...receives the winning number of votes...the Court shall continue with the trial nd
hearing….and...may during the pendency thereof order the ​suspension of the proclamation ​of such
candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.”
There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended because Arnado failed to file his
Answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. He filed it long after the elections and after he
was already proclaimed as the winner. Anado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification
prior to the elections because he filed is answer when elections were already conducted and he was
already proclaimed winner.
[just in case] ​intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when there has not
yet been any proclamation of the winner.