PUBCORP: LOCAL AUTONOMY
February 10, 2020
1. DISOMANGCOP v. DATUMANONG
FACTS: ​Pursuant to Section 1 and 15 of Article X, which mandates the creation of the autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras, Republic Act No. 6734 (R.A. 6734), entitled “ An
Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao” was enacted and
signed into law on 1 August 1989. The law called for the holding of a plebiscite. In the ensuing
plebiscite held on 19 November 1989, only four (4) provinces voted for the creation of an
autonomous region, namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. These provinces
became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
Nearly nine (9) years later, then DPWH Secretary Gregorio R. Vigilar issued D.O. 119 (Creation of
Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure
projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur.)
Almost two years later, President Estrada approved and signed into law R.A. 8999(establishing
engineering district in lanao del sur).Congress later passed R.A. 9054, entitled “An Act to Strengthen
and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the
Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, as Amended.”
Petitioners addressed a petition to DPWH Secretary Simeon Datumanong, seeking the revocation of
D.O. 119 and the non-implementation of R.A. 8999. No action, however,was taken on the petition.
Petitioners allege that D.O. 119 was issued with grave abuse of discretion and that it violates the
constitutional autonomy of the ARMM. They point out that the challenged Department Order has
tasked the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office with functions that have already been devolved
to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur. Petitioners also contend that R.A.
8999 is a piece of legislation that was not intelligently and thoroughly studied, and that the
explanatory note to House Bill No. 995 (H.B. 995) from which the law originated is questionable.
ISSUE: ​WON respondents should desist from implementing RA 8999 and Department Order 119 for
violating the constitutional autonomy of ARMM. ​(YES)
RULING: ​Regional autonomy refers to the granting of basic internal government powers to the
people of a particular area or region with least control and supervision from the central
government. A necessary prerequisite of autonomy is decentralization. Decentralization is a
decision by the central government authorizing its subordinates, whether geographically or
functionally dened, to exercise authority in certain areas. It involves decision-making by subnational
units. It is typically a delegated power, wherein a larger government chooses to delegate certain
authority to more local governments. Federalism implies some measure of decentralization, but
unitary systems may also decentralize. Decentralization differs intrinsically from federalism in that
the subunits that have been authorized to act (by delegation) do not possess any claim of right
against the central government.
Decentralization comes in two forms — deconcentration and devolution. Deconcentration is
administrative in nature; it involves the transfer of functions or the delegation of authority and
responsibility from the national oce to the regional and local offices. This mode of decentralization is
also referred to as administrative decentralization.
Devolution, on the other hand, connotes political decentralization, or the transfer of powers,
responsibilities, and resources for the performance of certain functions from the central
government to local government units. This is a more liberal form of decentralization since there is
an actual transfer of powers and responsibilities. It aims to grant greater autonomy to local
government units in cognizance of their right to self-government, to make them self-reliant, and to
improve their administrative and technical capabilities.
The aim of the Constitution is to extend to the autonomous peoples, the people of Muslim Mindanao
in this case, the right to self-determination — a right to choose their own path of development; the
right to determine the political, cultural and economic content of their development path within the
framework of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippine Republic. ​With R.A. 8999,
however, this freedom is taken away, and the National Government takes control again. The
hands, once more, of the autonomous peoples are reined in and tied up. The challenged law
creates an office with functions and powers which, by virtue of E.O. 426, have been previously
devolved to the DPWH-ARMM, First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.
D.O. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over
infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of
E.O. 426. The Executive Order was issued pursuant to R.A. 6734 — which initiated the
creation of the constitutionally-mandated autonomous region and which defined the basic
structure of the autonomous government. E.O. 426 sought to implement the transfer of the
control and supervision of the DPWH within the ARMM to the Autonomous Regional
Government. ​In particular, it identified four (4) District Engineering Offices in each of the four (4)
provinces, namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. Accordingly, the First
Engineering District of the DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur has jurisdiction over the public works
within the province.
In conclusion, The repeal of R.A. 8999 and the functus officio state of D.O. 119 provide the necessary
basis for the grant of the writs of certiorari and prohibition sought by the petitioners. However,
there is no similar basis for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent DBM
Secretary to release funds appropriated for public works projects in Marawi City and Lanao del Sur
to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur and to compel respondent DPWH
Secretary to allow the DPWH-ARMM, First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur to implement all
public works projects within its jurisdictional area. Section 20, Article VI of R.A. 9054 clearly
provides that "funds for infrastructure in the autonomous region allocated by the central
government or national government shall only be appropriated through a Regional Assembly Public
Works Act" passed by the Regional Assembly. There is no showing that such Regional Assembly
Public Works Act has been enacted.
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2. VILLAFUERTE v. ROBREDO
FACTS: ​In 1995, COA conducted an audit on the manner LGUs utilised their Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) for the years 1993-94. They found that a substantial portion of the 20%
development fund of some LGUs was not actually used for development projects, but instead was
diverted to expenses properly chargeable against the Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses
(MOOE). This is a violation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code).
The DILG issued a memorandum circular (MC) enumerating policies and guidelines for the
utilization of the development fund, reminding the LGUs that the 20% development fund “shall be
spent judiciously and only for the very purpose(s) for which such funds are intended”. The DILG
further issued three MC’s which are now being assailed.
MC 2010-83 which aimed to promote good governance through enhanced transparency and
accountability of LGUs. It stated that “all Provincial Governors, City Mayors, and Municipal Mayors
are directed to comply with the...laws and existing national policy by posting in conspicuous
places…:
● Annual Budget
● Quarterly Statement of Cash Flows
● Statement of Receipts and Expenditures
● Trust Fund (PDAF) Utilization
● 20% Component of the IRA Utilization
…among others. It also stated that non-compliance will be meted sanctions.
MC 2010-138 ​enumerated expenses for which the fund must ​not​ be utilised. It included:
● Salaries, wages, or overtime pay
● Travelling expenses, domestic or foreign
● Registration or participation fees in training, seminars, conferences or conventions
● Construction, repair or refinishing of administrative offices
…among others.
​MC 2011-08 directed strict adherence to the GAA of 2011 – “that in addition to the publication and
posting requirement…the LGUs shall also post detailed information on the use and disbursement
and status or programs in the LGUs websites. Failure to comply…shall subject the responsible
officials to disciplinary actions…”
Gov. of Camarines Sur (petitioner) sought to nullify the issuances for being unconstitutional.
Petitioner argues that the issuances interfere with the local and fiscal autonomy of LGUs. They
argued that the respondent (DILG Sec. Robredo) cannot substitute his own discretion with that of
the local legislative council in enacting its annual budget and specifying the development projects
that the 20% component of the IRA should fund.
ISSUE: ​W/N the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal autonomy
enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC. ​[NO]
RULING: ​Local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization. Decentralization of administration is when the
government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions to broad the base of
government power. Decentralisation of power is an abdication of political power in favor of local
governments. To safeguard the state policy on autonomy, the Constitution confines the power of the
President over LGUs to mere supervision. The President has no control over their acts in the sense
that he can substitute their judgements with his own. Supervision means the power of a superior
officer to see to it that subordinates perform their functions according to law.
The issuance did not provide for sanctions. It did not establish a new set of acts or omissions which
are deemed violations and provide corresponding penalties therefor. The local autonomy granted to
LGUs does not completely sever them from the national government. Autonomy does not make
them sovereign. They are still under the supervision of the President and may be held accountable
for malfeasance or violation of law.
MC 2010-138 is a mere reiteration of an existing provision in the LGC. It was intended to remind
LGUs to observe the directed stated in Section 287 of the LGC to utilise the 20% portion of the IRA
for development projects. At best it was an advisory. It is erroneous to call them exclusions because
such a term signifies compulsory disallowance. This is not the contemplation of the enumeration.
The items enumerated were those for which the development fund must ​generally not be used. The
items were the expenses which the COA perceived to have been improperly charged against the
development fund based on its audit.
The enumeration was not meant to restrict the discretion of the LGUs. It was meant to enlighten by
citing current practices which seemed incompatible with the purpose of the fund. LGUs remain at
liberty to map out their respective development plans on the basis of their own judgement and
utilise their IRAs accordingly with the only restriction that 20% of the IRA be expended for
development projects.
The two other issuances (MC 2010-83 and MC 2011-08) are but the implementation of the State
policy to make public officials accountable to the people. They are amalgamations of existing laws
designed to give teeth to the constitutional mandate of transparency and accountability. Fiscal
autonomy does not give LGUs with unbridled discretion in the disbursement of public funds. They
remain accountable. It is inconceivable how the publication of budgets could infringe on the local
fiscal autonomy of LGUs.
Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of
supervision.
3. GANZON v. CA
PARTIES:
PT: Mayor of Iloilo City- Rodolfo Ganzon
Member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod- Mary Ann Rivera Artieda [Nothing was said
much about her except that she was in a similarly charged by Respondent Secretary]
RP: Secretary of Department of Local Government- Hon. Luis Santos
Et al
FACTS:
The case of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number,
filed against him by various city officials, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave
misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution,
and arbitrary detention. [E.g. A complaint was filed by a City Health Clerk, charged that due to
political reasons, having supported the rival candidate, Mayor Ganzon, using as an excuse the
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exigency of the service and the interest of the public, pulled her out from rightful office where her
qualification are best suited and assigned her to a work that should be the function of a non-career
service employee. To make matters worse, a utility worker in the office whose duties are alien to the
complainant's duties and functions, has been detailed to take her place. Another, an Assistant City
Health Officer, claims that Mayor Ganzon withheld her salary without cause and that she was the
object of a well-engineered trumped-up charge in an administrative complaint.]
Amidst the two successive suspensions imposed on him, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for
prohibition against the respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Iloilo City
RTC where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently, he instituted, an
action for prohibition, in the respondent Court of Appeals.
Respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another
sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto
Malabor as acting mayor
Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced a petition for prohibition. His primary argument is that the
Secretary of Local Government is devoid of any authority to suspend and remove local officials. He
claims that the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials. The
Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting
the phrase "as may be provided by law," to strip the President of the power of control over local
governments. He claims that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, as their
argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may
provide for it any longer.
1987 Constitution (Sec 4): The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over
local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component
units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
1935 Constitution (Sec 10): The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by
law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
Respondent Secretary, in meting out the suspensions under question, claims to have acted in
consonance with the Local Government Code(Sec 63): Preventive suspension may be imposed by
the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial
governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the
respondent is an elective barangay official.”
ISSUE:
1. Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to
divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and or remove local
officials? [NO, the President retains his power of supervision over them]
2. Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? [NO]
3. Does the Respondent Secretary have the power to suspend Mayor Ganzon [YES, but the
LGC provides a limit of 60 days]
RULING:
Notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the
legislature of its right — or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to
provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as
may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy
from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did
not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over
municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in
the federal governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or Germany). Autonomy, in the
constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the
legislative responsibility under the Constitution — and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest —
is to wean local government units from over dependence on the central government.
"Local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a
local government code.
It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under
the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to
include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that
Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done,
delegate its exercise to the President.
Legally, “supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
This Court had occasion to discuss this scope and extent of the power of supervision by the
President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over
executive officials. It was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different
things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. In administration law supervision
means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power
of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
“Investigating” is not inconsistent with “overseeing”, although it is a lesser power than “altering”.
In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on local officials except
on appeal from the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative Code. Thus, in those case that
this Court denied the President the power (to suspend remove) it was not because we did not think
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that the President can not exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged
the
power elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him the power, the Court found little
difficulty in sustaining him.
The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local
Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible
terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy
under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg.
337 is still in force and effect.
Local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization. The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to
break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put
by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila."
Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between
the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of
federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the
Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely,
albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.
Decentralization means devolution of national administration — but not power — to the local
levels. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power
and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can
substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In
that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous
government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.
The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor RodolfoGanzon is albeit another matter.
What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing
ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in
the event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have
held, is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with
his influence and authority over possible witnesses" or to keep him off "the records and other
evidence." It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an
erring local official.
Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days, which is to say that it need not be
exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it
ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the accused is held
to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the respondent) enjoys a presumption
of innocence unless and until found guilty. Suspension finally is temporary, and as the Local
Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held, a longer
suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.
Imposing 600 days of suspension — which is not a remote possibility — on Mayor Ganzon is to all
intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all
intents and purposes, his suspension permanent. We reiterate that we are not precluding the
President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion
that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave
abuse of discretion.
We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third suspension and
lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued. Insofar as the seven
remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Department of Local Government, upon the
finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to expedite the same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual
remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are
precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints,
notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence.
In resumé, the Court is laying down the following rules:
1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of
administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central
government in the manner the law may provide;
2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;
3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant
but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from
legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of
autonomy;
4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by
law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials;
5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not
signify "control" (which the President does not have);
6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may
no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided:
a. that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect or
request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of
suspension." [Supra, sec. 63(3)]
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 b. that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the
petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper
charges are filed against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous
suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if
warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code.
4. BELGICA v. OCHOA
FACTS:
The Pork Barrel has been allegedly used to defraud the government over the past 10 years by a
syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for ghost
projects. Whistleblowers declared that JLN Corporation swindled billions of pesos from the public
coffers for ghost projects using 20 dummy NGOs. The NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipient
of PDAF, the money was allegedly diverted into Napoles’ private accounts. After its investigation,
criminal complaints were filed (Plunder, Malversation, Direct Bribery, Violation of the RA 3019).
COA showed the results of a three-year audit investigation covering the use of legislators’ PDAF
from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration. It determined the
propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and VILP (Various Infrastructures including Local
Projects) by the DBM.
Some of the highlights are: amounts released for projects identified by a number of legislators
exceeded their respective allocations, amounts were released for projects outside of legislative
districts, selection of NGOs was not compliant with law and regulations.
The local autonomy issue revolved around the Congressional Pork Barrel
The Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund
wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to
effectively control certain aspects of the fund's utilization through various post-enactment measures
and/or practices . In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as
Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual
legislators to wield a collective power.
Congressional Pork Barrel took the form of the following during the past administrations:
Martial Law - Support for Local Development Projects (SLDP)
· Began the practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators
Aquino Admin – Visayas Development Fund, Mindanao Development Fund and Countrywide
Development Funds (CDF)
· Lump-sum amounts were allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President
· Legislators were allowed to identify ​any kind of project​; i.e. hard or infrastructure projects
such as roads, bridges and buildings to soft projects such textbooks, medicines and
scholarships.
Ramos Admin – CDF, Congressional Insertions
· Legislators had the power to direct how, where when these appropriations were to be spent,
shall be made upon prior consultation with legislative district concerned.
Estrada to Arroyo Admin – Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)
· Program menu concept: list of general programs and implementing agencies from which a
particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the identifying authority.
Aquino #2 Admin – PDAF
· The 2013 PDAF Article allowed that the "identification of projects and/or designation of
beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing
agency. However, as practiced, ​it would still be the individual legislator who would choose and
identify the project from the said priority list.
· Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects outside of his legislative district
provided that he secures the written concurrence of the legislator of the intended
outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House.
· Any realignment of PDAF funds, modification and revision of project identification , as well as
requests for release of funds, ​were all required to be favorably endorsed by the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be.
Petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on
local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their
judgments in utilizing public funds for local development.
ISSUE: ​Whether or not the 2013 PDAF is unconstitutional for violating local autonomy – YES, it is
unconstitutional
RULING: The State's policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and
Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, as well as Section 2 of the Local
Government Code enacted pursuant to the Constitution.
Congressional Pork Barrel was an attempt “to make equal the unequal” and was
originally established for a worthy goal, which is to enable the representatives to identify projects
for communities that the LGU concerned cannot afford.
​However now, the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact
of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine
parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into
consideration.
As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same
amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
"underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even
Senators and Party-List Representatives — and in some years, even the Vice- President — who do
not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel too.
The PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the effective control of each
legislator and given unto them on the sole account of their office.
This concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the
functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to
"assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development,
and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction."
Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared
towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden
nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority
except only when acting as a body.
The undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the post-enactment authority
conferred to the latter was succinctly put by petitioners in the following wise:
“With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate
projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven
project identification has not only contributed little to the overall development of the district, but has
even contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the
government."
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 ​Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted him to come to Cotabato City," but that
and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar was "so that their differences could be threshed out and settled." Certainly, that avowed
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional. wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how conciliatory it may be cannot be
a substitute for the notice and hearing contemplated by law. While we have held that due
process, as the term is known in administrative law, does not absolutely require notice
5. LIMBONA v. MANGELIN
and that a party need only be given the opportunity to be heard, it does not appear herein
that the petitioner had, to begin with, been made aware that he had in fact stood charged
FACTS​: This is a petition assailing the acts of Sangguniang Pampook Region XII.
of graft and corruption before his colleagues. It cannot be said therefore that he was
accorded any opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now
Preview: ​Basically yung petitioner inaassail yung pagkatanggal niya as Speaker (i.e. representative)
levelled amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion.
ng Sangguniang Pampook.Nagvote sila nung wala siya. So the Court went on to rule the autonomy of
2. As to the autonomy of the Region, i.e. the extent of powers ​- The autonomous
the Sanggunian if it has decentralization of powers or decentralization of administration, as per the
governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree
Constitution. Now, the Court ruled na may autonomy and has decentralization of powers sila. But
No. 1618 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree established
invalid yung pagkakatanggal because of due process, among others.
"internal autonomy" in the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its
Now into the details:
Constitution," "with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and
Petitioner Sultan Alimbosar Limbona was appointed as member of the Sangguniang Pampook and
responsibilities"' specified therein. It requires the autonomous regional governments to
was later on elected as Speaker of the Regional Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central
"undertake all internal administrative matters for the respective regions," except to "act
Mindanao. Congressman Datu Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs invited Mr.
on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National
Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his capacity as
Government," "which include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) National defense
Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII. The purpose of the invite was to “hopefully chart the
and security; (2) Foreign relations; (3) Foreign trade; (4) Currency, monetary affairs,
autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod the President to
foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and external borrowing, (5) Disposition,
constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the Commission.”
exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural resources; (6) Air and
Pursuant to the said invite, Petitioner Speaker sent a telegram that there will be no session in the
sea transport; (7) Postal matters and telecommunications; (8) Customs and quarantine;
month of November as his presence was asked in the committee hearing.
(9) Immigration and deportation; (10) Citizenship and naturalization; (11) National
economic, social and educational planning; and (12) General auditing." In relation to the
However, the assembly still held a session on November 2 even without the presence of the Speaker.
central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of general
On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the
supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions . . .
affirmative, hence, the chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant. On November 5, the
3. Concept: Decentralization of Powers v Decentralization of Administration -​ Autonomy
assemblymen resumed again with Mangalen as the Presiding Officer.
is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative
Now, the petitioner went to the Supreme Court praying for an injunction and holding the election of
powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in
petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March
the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure
12, 1987 valid and subsisting, and making the injunction permanent.
their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it
ISSUE:
relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to
Whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner is proper - No
concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over
them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no
RULING:
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
1. As to the expulsion ​- We hold that the ​expulsion in question is of no force and effect​. In
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in
the first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation,
the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense, assuming that there was
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
an investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the other hand, what
minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
appears in the records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the respondents) that
decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the
"since November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the
Sangguniang Pampook." To be sure, the private respondents aver that "[t]he
6
 autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.
6. LEAGUE OF PROVINCES v. DENR
FACTS: ​Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation filed with the DENR Mines and Geosciences
Bureau Regional Office III (MGB R-III) and Application for Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA) covering an area of 61, 136 ha situated in Municipalities of San Miguel, San
Ildefonso, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte in Bulacan
MGB R-III DENIED Golden Falcon’s application for failure to secure area clearances from the Forest
Management Sector and Land Management Sector of the DENR Regional Office III
Golden Falcon filed an appeal with the MGB Central Office. While Golden Falcon’s appeal was
pending, Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto Cruz, Gerardo Cruz and Liberato Sembrano filed with the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of Bulacan their respective
Applications for Quarry Permit (AQP) which covered the same area subject of Golden Falcon’s FTAA
Application
Subsequently, MGB Central Office denied Golden Falcon’s Appeal
Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) filed with the PENRO of Bulacan an Application for
Exploration Permit (AEP) covering 5,281 hectares of the area covered by Golden Falcon's
Application for FTAA
[impt in referrence to AMTC’s application validity] DENR MGB Director Ramos, in response to a
query by MGB R-III stated that the MGB- Central Office’s Order became final on ​August 11, 2004​,
fifteen days after Golden Falcon received said Order. AMTC notified the PENRO of Bulacan and the
MGB R-III Director, respectively, that the subject Applications for Quarry Permit fell WITHIN its
(AMTC's) existing valid and prior Application for Exploration Permit, and the former area of Golden
Falcon was open to mining location only on August 11, 2004 per the Memorandum dated October
19, 2004 of the MGB Director, Central Office.
However, the Provincial Legal Office issued a legal opinion stating that the July 16, 2004 order was a
mere reaffirmation hence the order of ​April 29, 1998 should be the recknoning period of the denial
of the application of Golden Falcon
AMTC filed with the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of Bulacan (PMRB) a formal protest against
the aforesaid Applications for Quarry Permit on the ground that the subject area was already
covered by its Application for Exploration Permit.
PENRO of Bulacan issued four memoranda recommending the approval of the Applications of
Small-Scale Mining Permit. Subsequently Governor Dela Cruz issued the corresponding Small-Scale
Mining Permits in favor of Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Lucila S.
Valdez.
[where the conflict arose] AMTC appealed to DENR Secretary the grant of aforesaid Small-Scale
Mining Permits without first resolving its formal request and the areas covered by the Small-Scale
Mining Permits fall within the area covered by AMTC’s valid prior Application for Exploration
Permit. DENR Sec. rendered a decision in favor of AMTC. The DENR Secretary agreed with MGB
Director Horacio C. Ramos that the area was open to mining location only on August 11, 2004,
fifteen (15) days after the receipt by Golden Falcon on July 27, 2004 of a copy of the MGB-Central
Office's Order dated July 16, 2004, which Order denied Golden Falcon's appeal.
Peitioner League of Provinces filed this petition. It stated that this is not an action of one province
alone, but the collective action of all provinces through the League, as a favorable ruling will not
only benefit one province, but all provinces and all local governments. Petitioner admits that
respondent DENR Secretary had the authority to nullify Small-Scal Mining Permits issued by the
Provincial Governor of Bulacan
Control of the DENR over small scale mining provinces is granted by three statutes
● Sec. 17, RA 7160. The Local Government Code
● Sec. 24, RA 7076. People’s Small-Scale Mining Act
● Philippine Mining Act
Allegations of petitioner
● Aforecited laws did not did not explicitly confer upon respondents DENR and the DENR
Secretary the power to reverse, abrogate, nullify, void, or cancel the permits issued by the
Provincial Governor or small-scale mining contracts entered into by the PMRB.
● Petitioner contends that Section 17 (b) (3) (iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and
Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076, which confer upon respondents DENR and the DENR
Secretary the power of control are unconstitutional, as the Constitution states that the
President (and Executive Departments and her alter-egos) has the power of supervision
only, not control, over acts of the local government units, and grants the local government
units autonomy
ISSUES​:
1. W/N the aforementioned provisions are unconstitutional - NO
2. W/N the DENR Secretary has the power to reverse, abrogate, nullify, void, cancel the permits
issued by the Prov. Governor or small-scale mining contracts entered into by the Board – YES
HELD/RATIO:
1. W/N the aforementioned provisions are unconstitutional - NO
● The term "control" has been defined as the power of an officer to alter or modify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his/her duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for the latter, while the term "supervision" is the
power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their function in
accordance with law.
7
 ● It should be pointed out that the Administrative Code of 1987 provides that the DENR is,
subject to law and higher authority, in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate, under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the country's natural resources.
○ Hence, the enforcement of small-scale mining law in the provinces is made
subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR under the Local
Government Code of 1991, while the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991
provides that the People's Small-Scale Mining Program is to be implemented
by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned local government
agencies.
● The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the
Constitution [Art. X, Sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government
units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority. It
does not make local governments sovereign within the State. Administrative autonomy
may involve devolution of powers, but ​subject to limitation​s like following national
policies or standards, and those provided by the Local Government Code, as the
structuring of local governments and the allocation of powers, responsibilities, and
resources among the different local government units and local officials have been placed
by the Constitution in the hands of Congress under Section 3, Article X of the Constitution.
● Clearly, the Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the
small-scale mining law to the provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the
supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and higher
authority, of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization of the country's natural resources.
2. W/N the DENR Secretary has the power to reverse, abrogate, nullify, void, cancel the permits issued
by the Prov. Governor or small-scale mining contracts entered into by the Board – YES
● Hence, the decision of the DENR Secretary, declaring that the Application for Exploration
Permit of AMTC was valid and may be given due course, and canceling the Small-Scale
Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor, emanated from the power of review
granted to the DENR Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.
● The DENR Secretary's power to review and, therefore, decide, in this case, the issue on
the validity of the issuance of the Small- Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor
as recommended by the PMRB, ​is a quasi judicial function​, which involves the
determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are,
with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts
obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights. The DENR Secretary exercises
quasi-judicial function under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims.
This quasi-judicial function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated with
"substitution of judgment" of the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining
Permits nor "control" over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination
of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.
7. DRILON v. LIM
FACTS: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local
Government Code which reads:
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public
Hearings. — The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in
accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the
purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or
legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from
the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from
the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of
suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied
therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the
sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file
appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer,
declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for
non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for
containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.
In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the
Secretary's resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding that the procedural requirements had
been observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as
unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local
governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the
specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of
supervision over local governments. There is a distinction between control and supervision, the
first being "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter,"
while the second is "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their
functions is accordance with law.”
ISSUE: ​Is Section 187 of the LGC unconstitutional insofar as it empowers the Secretary of Justice to
review tax ordinances and annul them? ​[NO, the Secretary of Justice only has the power of
supervision and not of control]
RULING: Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or
legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When
he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did
set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code
should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment.
8
He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All
he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their
functions is accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax
ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. This
is an act not of control but of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his
discretion, order the act undone or redone by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it
himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. ​The supervisor or superintendent merely
sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he
have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the
work done or redone but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his
own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the
rules are followed.
Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act, which
allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the
tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these flaws
would involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or
not the requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would smack of control
rather than mere supervision. That power was never questioned but, at any rate, the Secretary of
Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the
constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is
unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary
Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds: the inclusion therein of certain ultra
vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. In his
resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written notices of public hearings on the
proposed Manila Revenue Code that were sent to interested parties as required by Art. 276(b) of the
Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code nor were copies of the proposed ordinance
published in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Art. 276(a).
No minutes were submitted to show that the obligatory public hearings had been held. Neither were
copies of the measure as approved posted in prominent places in the city in accordance with Sec.
511(a) of the Local Government Code. Finally, the Manila Revenue Code was not translated into
Pilipino or Tagalog and disseminated among the people for their information and guidance,
conformably to Sec. 59(b) of the Code. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or
reasonableness of the tax measure.
8. SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF BATAAN v. GARCIA
FACTS: ​Lots 2193 and 2194 of the Bataan Cadastre were registered in the name of the Province of
Bataan and embraced in OCT N-182. These lots were occupied by Bataan Community Colleges (BCC)
and the Medina Lacson de Leon School of Arts and Trades (MLLSAT), both State-run schools. On 26
February 1998, Congress passed RA 8562 (authored by respondent Cong. Garcia) which converted
the MLLSAT into a polytechnic college, to be known as the Bataan Polytechnic State College (BPSC),
and integrating thereto the BCC. Section 24 of RA 8562 provided “​all parcels of land belonging to the
government occupied by the MLSSAT and BCC are hereby declared property of the BPSC and shall be
titled under that name.” Respondent Cong. Garcia wrote to then Governor of Bataan (Roman) and
petitioner Sangguniang Panlalawigan requesting them to cause transfer of the the title to BPSC. No
transfer was effected. Thus, Cong. Garcia as well as faculty and students of BPSC (collectively,
respondents) filed a Special Civil Action for Mandamus with the RTC against the Governor and the
Sangguian. The RTC granted the writ of mandamus. The CA affirmed the RTC. The CA rejected the
claim that the subject lots were patrimonial properties of the Province of Bataan, declaring that the
petitioner failed to provide proof that they acquired them with its own private or corporate funds
and for this reason the lots ust be presumed to belong to the State. Hence, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Bataan filed his petition for review on certiorari assailing. ​PETITIONER’S
ARGUMENT/S. ​(1) The subject lots are the patrimonial properties of the Province of Bataan; (2)
While in ​Salas, t​ he title of the State over the disputed lot was expressly recognized by the City of
Manila, this is not so in the case at bar; (3) The Province of Bataan used the lots as collateral for its
loan obligations with the LBP; and (4) the BPSC’s Board of Trustees even acknowledged the titles of
the Province of Bataan over the subject properties in their Manifestation and Motion; and in
addition, ​(5) RA 8562 infringes on the State’s underlying policy of autonomy for its territorial and
political subdivisions, found in Article X of the 1987 Constitution and now fleshed out in a landmark
legislation, RA 7160, aka the Local Government Code of 1991, and that thus, for this Court to sustain
its ruling in ​Salas ​would render the State’s policy of local autonomy purely illusory.
ISSUE/S:
1. [RELEVANT ISSUE] Does RA 8562 infringe on the State’s underlying policy of local
autonomy for its territorial and political subdivisions, found in Article X of the 1987
Constitution and now fleshed out in RA 7160 aka the Local Government Code of 1991?
[NO]
2. Are the subject parcels of land patrimonial properties of the Province of Bataan which
cannot be taken without due process of law and without just compensation? ​[NO. They
are the State’s. The Province is merely holding them in trust for the State.]
3. May the court issue a writ of mandamus against the Province of Bataan to compel the
transfer of the of the said properties without due process of law and without just
compensation? ​[YES.]
RULING: NO, RA 8562 DOES NOT INFRINGE ON THE STATE’S UNDERLYING POLICY OF LOCAL
AUTONOMY FOR ITS TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS.
a. The State’s policy to promote local autonomy and to devolve the powers of the National
Government to its political subdivisions ​has for its purpose to improve the quality of
local governance.
● In the instant petition, it is essentially the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's
assertion that the State's policy of local autonomy and decentralization
endows the Province of Bataan with patrimonial rights to use or dispose
of the subject lots according to its own development plans, program
objectives and priorities. ​The Sangguniang Panlalawigan relied upon Secs.
2-3 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Secs. 18 and 22 of the LGC.
9
 ● The Court disagrees. Local autonomy and decentralization of State
powers to the local political subdivisions are the results of putting
restraints upon the exercise by the Presidents of executive powers over
local governments. Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution reads in
part: "The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local governments." ​As with the counterpart provisions of our earlier
Constitutions, the aforesaid provision has been interpreted to exclude the
President's power of control over local governments. 47 The Constitutions of
1935, 1973 and 1987 have uniformly differentiated the President's power of
supervision over local governments and his power of control of the executive
departments, bureaus and offices.
● On the other hand, local autonomy and decentralization of State powers to the
local political subdivisions have for their object to make governance directly
responsive at the local levels by giving them a free hand to chart their own
destiny and shape their future with minimum intervention from central
authorities, thereby rendering them accountable to their local constituencies.
Thus, "[h]and in hand with the constitutional restraint on the President's
power over local governments is the state policy of ensuring local
autonomy."
● It is clear, then, that local autonomy and decentralization do not deal directly
with issues concerning ownership, classification, use or control of properties of
the public domain held by local governments. The State retains power over
property of the public domain, exercised through Congress.
local autonomy under the 1973 Constitution. ​"It is my view that under the
[1973] Constitution, as was the case under the 1935 charter, the holding of a
municipal corporation as a unit of state does not impair the plenary power of
the national government exercising dominical rights to dispose of it in a
manner it sees ft, subject to applicable constitutional limitations as to the
citizenship of the grantee."
CITED PROVISIONS:
​Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among
the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualiAcations, election, appointment
and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local ofAcials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units.
Sec. 18. Power to Generate and Apply Resources. — Local government units shall have the power and authority to establish an
organization that shall be responsible for the efAcient and effective implementation of their development plans, program objectives and
priorities; to create their own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which shall accrue exclusively for their use and
disposition and which shall be retained by them; to have a just share in national taxes which shall be automatically and directly released
to them without need of any further action; to have an equitable share in the proceeds from the utilization and development of the
national wealth and resources within their respective territorial jurisdictions including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of
direct beneAts; to acquire, develop, lease, encumber, alienate, or otherwise dispose of real or personal property held by them in their
proprietary capacity and to apply their resources and assets for productive, developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise or
furtherance of their governmental or proprietary powers and functions and thereby ensure their development into self-reliant
communities and active participants in the attainment of national goals.
Sec. 22. Corporate Powers. — . . . xxx xxx xxx (d) Local government units shall enjoy full autonomy in the exercise of their proprietary
functions and in the management of their economic enterprises, subject to the limitations provided in this Code and other applicable laws.
In the instant petition, it is essentially the petitioner's assertion that the State's policy of local autonomy and decentralization endows the
Province of Bataan with patrimonial rights to use or dispose of the subject lots according to its own development plans, program
objectives and priorities.

b. The grant of autonomy to local governments, although a radical policy change

under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, does not affect the settled rule that they
possess property of the public domain in trust for the State.
● But two considerations kept him reined in, so to speak. One was Justice
Teehankee's "reference to the ratio decidendi of [Salas] as to the trust
character impressed on communal property of a municipal corporation, even if
already titled," "regardless of the source of classification of land in the
possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its
private or corporate capacity." J​ustice Fernando acknowledged that the
local government "holds such [communal property] subject to the
paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it
owes its creation to it as an agent for the performance of a part of its
public work, the municipality being but a subdivision or instrumentality
thereof for purposes of local administration."
● Rabuco stressed that the properties in controversy were not acquired by the
City of Manila with its own private funds. Thus, according to Justice Fernando,
"That [the City of Manila] has in its name a registered title is not questioned,
but this title should be deemed to be held in trust for the State as the land
covered thereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila granted by the
sovereign upon its creation." This doctrine, according to Justice Fernando, has
its basis in the Regalian Doctrine and is unaffected by the grant of extensive

10
PUBCORP: LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
February 11, 2020
1. UMALI v. COMELEC
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
2. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC
FACTS: ​This is an Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration filed by the League of Cities of the
Philippines on the Resolution promulgated by the SC declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws constitutional.
They anchored their contention that SC could no longer modify their decision due to such judgment
having long become final and executory. Specifically, among others, they contended that the
resolution erroneously ruled that the 16 cityhood bills do not violate Article X, Sections 6 and 10 of
the 1987 constitution.
ISSUE: Whether the contended Cityhood Laws are constitutional. (YES)
RULING: ​Firstly, ​the contended Cityhood Laws granted the 16 municipalities with cityhood status
despite the fact that these municipalities failed to meet the 100M annual income exclusive of govt.
appropriation. The income exemption was anchored on House Joint Resolution No 1. Which seeks
to exempt certain municipalities seeking conversion into cities from the requirement that they must
have at least 100M income of locally generated revenue. The League argued that this is
unconstitutional because it runs afoul of the requirements given by RA No. 9009 by virtue of Local
Government Code.
The court however ruled otherwise. ​The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the
exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of
the clear legislative intent to exempt these municipalities, ​without exception,​ from the coverage of
R.A. No. 9009​. Thereby, ​R.A. No. 9009​, and, by necessity, the LGC, were amended, not by repeal but
by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses.​|||
Secondly, the League further contended that the 100M-income requirement was not arbitrary.
However, this court held that the said amount was arbitrary and was passed with no research. ​The
Court takes note of the fact that the municipalities cited by the petitioners as having generated the
threshold income of P100 million from local sources, including those already converted into cities,
are either in Metro Manila or in provinces close to Metro Manila. In comparison, the municipalities
covered by the Cityhood Laws are spread out in the different provinces of the Philippines, including
the Cordillera and Mindanao regions, and are considerably very distant from Metro Manila. This
reality underscores the danger the enactment of ​R.A. No. 9009 sought to prevent, ​i.e.,​ that "the
metropolis-located local governments would have more priority in terms of funding because they
would have more qualifications to become a city compared to the far-flung areas in Mindanao or in
the Cordilleras, or whatever," actually resulting from the abrupt increase in the income
requirement. Verily, this result is antithetical to what the ​Constitution and LGC have nobly
envisioned in favor of countryside development and national growth. Besides, this result should be
arrested early, to avoid the unwanted divisive effect on the entire country due to the local
government units closer to the National Capital Region being afforded easier access to the bigger
share in the national coffers than other local government units.
There should also be no question that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws
belong to a class of their own. They have proven themselves viable and capable to become
component cities of their respective provinces. They are and have been centers of trade and
commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other
natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. Not only are they pacesetters in their respective
provinces, they are also the frontrunners in their regions.
Thirdly, the League argued that the said laws violated their right to a just share in the national
taxes. The court did not accept this contention. The share of LGU is a matter of percentage.
However, we have to note that the allocation by the National Government is not a constant, and can
either increase or decrease. With every newly converted city becoming entitled to share the
allocation for cities, the percentage of internal revenue allotment (IRA) entitlement of each city will
decrease, although the actual amount received may be more than that received in the preceding
year. That is a necessary consequence of Section 285 and Section 286 of the LGC.​|||
The Cityhood Laws were not violative of the ​Constitution and the LGC. The 16 municipalities are
thus also entitled to their just share in the IRA allocation for cities. They have demonstrated their
viability as component cities of their respective provinces and are developing continuously, albeit
slowly, because they had previously to share the IRA with about 1,500 municipalities. With their
conversion into component cities, they will have to share with only around 120 cities.
Local government units do not subsist only on locally generated income, but also depend on the
IRA to support their development. They can spur their own developments and thereby realize
their great potential of encouraging trade and commerce in the far-flung regions of the country.
Yet their potential will effectively be stunted if those already earning more will still receive a
bigger share from the national coffers, and if commercial activity will be more or less
concentrated only in and near Metro Manila.
3. SEMA v. COMELEC
PETITIONER: BAI SEMA
RESPONDENTS: COMELEC and DIDAGEN DILANGALEN
Relevant Provision: Section 10, Article X of the Constitution - ​No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in
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accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution - Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall
provide for legislative powers over: (1) Administrative organization; (2) Creation of sources of
revenues; (3) Ancestral domain and natural resources; (4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development; (6) Economic, social, and tourism
development; (7) Educational policies; (8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage;
and (9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of
the people of the region
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution - The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area
in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution -   ​Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
FACTS: ​Maguindanao is under the ARMM, created under RA 9054 as amended by RA 6734.
Maguindanao has two legislative districts, the first includes Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.
However, subsequently, after a plebiscite was conducted, Cotabato City opted for its exclusion in the
ARMM.
Afterwards, the ARMM Regional Assembly, the legislative body of the ARMM, exercised its power to
create provinces under Section 19 of RA 9054 and created the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
Initially, it has 9 municipalities (including the first 8 municipalities in the first district of Mindanao
mentioned above), but later on, 3 other municipalities out of the 9 were carved out bringing it to a
total of 11 municipalities. Thus, Magindanao was left with only its second legislative district. Note
that Cotabato is not included in the Province of Maguindanao since it belonged to its first district.
The Sanguniang Panglunsod of Cotabato City then passed a resolution requesting the COMELEC to
clarify the status of Cotabato City if it is part of Shariff Kabusnuan in the First Legislative District of
Maguindanao. COMELEC resolved this by ruling to maintain the status quo that Cotabato City as part
of Shariff Kabusnuan pending any enactment of a law. Upon enactment of MMA Act 201, COMELEC
then issued a resolution holding that first legislative district of Maguindanao is composed only of
Cotabato City Another resolution of the COMELEC was passed renaming Cotabato City as "Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.”
Sema, a candidate in the elections for representative of Shariff Kabunsuan, sought to nullify
COMELEC’s resolutions and exclude Cotabato City’s vote for that office. He argued that the Province
of Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress. Respondent Dilangalen replied
that COMELEC resolutions are constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for
Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely renamed
Maguindanao's first legislative district. Respondent Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC
could not reapportion
Maguindanao's first legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole component unit as the power
to reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively with Congress, not to mention that Cotabato City
does not meet the minimum population requirement under
the Constitution for the creation of a legislative district within a city.
Sema then filed a reply contending that as held by jurisprudence, "when a province is created by
statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that
statute — which cannot provide otherwise — nor by apportionment, but by operation of the
Constitution, without a reapportionment; and that ARMM’s power to create provinces is a valid
delegation by Congress to the ARMM under Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to
the autonomous regions, through their organic acts, legislative powers over "other matters as may
be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region"
ISSUE: ​W/N RA 9054, in delegating the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays to the ARMM, is constitutional? (NO)
RULING: RA 9054, insofar as to delegate power to create provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays is unconstitutional. Under Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution, there are three
requisites for the creation of an LGU (i.e., provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays): First, the
creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria xed in the Local Government Code.
Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be
a plebiscite in the political units affected.
Meanwhile under RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation
under its plenary legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one
of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies. But note
that no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies
of the power to create ​municipalities and barangays​, provided Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. In line
with Section 5(3) of Article VI of the Constitution as well as the appended Ordinance to the
Constitution, a province cannot be created without a legislative district. Same goes for a city with a
population of at least 250,000.
Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a
legislative district because once the city's population reaches 250,000, the city automatically
becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or
city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.
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But can Congress delegate the power to create a legislative district? The answer is NO. Section 5(1) RULING:
of Article VI of the Constitution vests the power to the Congress to create legislative districts. This is
exercised through a law created by the Congress itself, NOT through a law enacted by a local or
regional legislative body, such as the ARMM Regional Assembly. Congress is a national legislature 6. NAVARRO v. ERMITA
and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation
of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It FACTS:
would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative
districts for a national legislature like Congress. Further, Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the ISSUE:
Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion
legislative districts for Congress. RULING:

Therefore, since the creation of a province without a legislative district is unconstitutional, the
creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is unconstitutional. Sema 7. THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
argues that jurisprudence (Felwa case) holds that the creation of a province entails the creation of a PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL
legislative district by operation of law. However, Felwa does not apply to the present case because
in Felwa the new provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new FACTS:
province was created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly.
ISSUE:
It thus follows that RA 9054 insofar as it grants the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces and cities is VOID for being contrary to the Constitution. ARMM Regional Assembly cannot RULING:
create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every
province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law
creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because the
legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as
provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the
ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void, and that the
COMELEC resolutions as VALID.

4. ALVAREZ v. GUINGONA

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

5. MIRANDA v. AGUIRRE

FACTS:

ISSUE:

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