Resource Mobilization and Citizen Protest in Communities around Three Mile Island

Author(s): Edward J. Walsh

Source: Social Problems, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Oct., 1981), pp. 1-21
Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Society for the Study of Social Problems
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 SOCIALPROBLEMS,Vol. 29, No. 1, October1981

MOBILIZATION
RESOURCE ANDCITIZEN IN
PROTEST
AROUND
COMMUNITIES THREE
MILEISLAND*
EDWARDJ. WALSH
The Pennsylvania State University

The rapid growth and development of social movement organizationsaround

Three Mile Islandafter the 1979 nuclear accident providedata for assessing and
refiningtheories on social movements.This paper summarizesan intense firstyear
of grass roots mobilizationand documents the importance of grievances in
precipitatingand sustainingprotest. The resource mobilizationperspective regards
discontent as a constant ratherthan a variable,and ignores cases where suddenly
imposed majorgrievances generate organizedprotest. Grievances, existing struc-
tures and the mobilizationprocess itself should all be treated as variables in the
search for more inclusivetheory,and three hypotheses involvingthese variablesare
includedin the finalsection of the paper.

The rapid growth and development of grass-roots protest organizations in the wake of the
Three Mile Island (TMI) accident in 1979 provide data for assessing and refining social movement
theory. The obvious importance of grievances in the TMI mobilization processes accentuates a
weakness in the "resource mobilization" (RM) perspective, which tends to treat discontent as a
constant rather than a variable in the emergence of social movement organizations (SMOs). Mc-
Carthy and Zald write:
We arewillingto assume. .. thatthereis alwaysenoughdiscontentin any societyto supplythegrass-roots
supportfor a movementif the movementis effectivelyorganizedand has at its disposalthe powerand
resourcesof some establishedgroup(1977:1215).
Other RM theorists, focusing on specific movements involving relatively powerless groups
founded on decades of discontent, document the importance of factors other than grievances for
successful mobilization. RM theorizing has concentrated mainly on national movements (Tilly et
al., 1975)-especially those of the 1960s and early 1970s (McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 1977; Ober-
schall, 1973)- rather than on local mobilization. Yet modern society's discontents are exper-
ienced more frequently by local collectivities not traditionally regarded as deprived (Egginton,
1980; Levine, 1981; Molotch, 1970; Whiteside, 1978); sometimes such grievances precipitate
widespread protest mobilization. Focusing on the emergence of citizen protest organizations in
the TMI area after the accident, this paper suggests that both grievances and the structural situa-
tions of aggrieved groups should be treated as variables in the RM perspective.
The traditional approach to social movements reserves a central place for individual and group
discontent. While theorists in this camp place varying emphasis on concepts such as status incon-
sistency, social isolation, relative deprivation, or rising expectations as causes of dislocating or
frustrating personal experiences, they have in common the assumption that shared grievances and
homogenizing ideologies are important preconditions for the emergence of a social movement
(Gurr, 1970; Smelser, 1963; Turner and Killian, 1972).' Some variants of this traditional ap-
proach, labelled the "breakdown" perspective by Tilly et al. (1975) and the "collective behavior
paradigm" by Gamson (1975), emphasize the fundamentally irrational nature of the ideologies

* Presentedat the annualmeetingof the AmericanSociologicalAssociationin New York,August,1980.The

author thanks activistsJames Hurst, Donald Hossler, and Chris Sayer, and academicsJohn McCarthy,
CharlesPerrow,CharlesTilly, Steve Barkan,Riley Dunlap, Allan Mazur,CraigHumphrey,JamesFen-
drich,and DavidWestbyfor theircomments,andAudreySmithfor typingthe manuscript.Theresearchwas
supportedby grantsfrom the Ford Foundationand the NationalScienceFoundation.
1. Orum(1974)offers a succinctand criticalsummaryof this approach.
2 WALSH
resulting from the discontent and structural strain. Smelser's (1963) six-factor mobilization
scheme is the prototype of this traditional perspective. The cornerstone of Smelser's model is the
"generalized belief," an allegedly naive and inaccurate assessment suggesting unrealistic remedies
for complex problems, which serves as a mobilizing myth distinguishing mass movements from
routine politics.
RM theorists reject what they regard as the traditionalists' excessively psychological perspective
because it distinguishes organized protest groups from mainstream political parties, lobbies, and
interest groups. In their polemic against what has been dubbed the "mentalism"of the traditional
perspective (Tilly, 1980), RM theorists turned their attention to organizational factors and social
infrastructures for explanations of the emergence of protest movements. Theorists working from
this perspective are more interested in SMOs and their interactions than in the "heartsand minds"
of participants (Gamson, 1975; McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 1977; Zald and McCarthy, 1979).
Although they commonly assume that discontent is a fairly permanent feature of the historical
landscape which is unable to explain variation in the eruption of protest, RM theorists differ
among themselves regarding the importance of grievances.2 One author even divides RM
theorists into two camps on the basis of their treatment of discontent. Perrow (1979:200-201)
distinguishes between RM I and RM II, noting that the latter "has little, even at times no,
dependence on grievances ... (which can be manufactured by issue entrepreneurs if they do not
exist and thus are not only secondary but, on occasion, unnecessary)." RM I theorists focus pri-
marily on deprived groups such as farmworkers (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977), women (Freeman,
1979), blacks (Oberschall, 1973) and others with longstanding grievances (Snyder and Tilly, 1972;
Tilly et al., 1975). They acknowledge the place of discontent in making such groups available for
mobilization, but emphasize their political powerlessness which prevents them from responding
to changes for the better or the worse in their situations. Indeed, there is considerable evidence
that large numbers of discontented persons fail to act, that the relationship between levels of
grievances and levels of collective action is weak for national populations (Snyder and Tilly,
1972), and that grievances are selected, transformed and even created by organizational processes
(Tilly, 1980).
Perhaps because working-class communities (or others at higher socio-economic levels) seldom
have collective discontents serious enough to prompt widespread mobilization, such relatively
non-deprived communities attract little attention from social movement theorists. Neither tradi-
tional nor RM perspectives emphasize the variance in mobilization potential among the various
classes or strata of society. Occasionally, however, non-deprived groups do find themselves con-
fronted with a suddenly realized (Love Canal3) or suddenly imposed (court-ordered busing, a ma-
jor oil spill, etc.) grievance. The lacuna in both of the aforementioned RM perspectives, deriving
from neglect of the nature of grievances as well as the structural situation of the aggrieved group,
becomes most apparent when such comparatively resourceful collectivities are considered. Useem
(1980) showed that discontent was an important factor explaining mobilization in the Boston
anti-busing movement, and Molotch (1970) documented the rapid and widespread mobilization
of the well-to-do Santa Barbara community in the wake of a serious oil spill. Levine (1981) has
discussed the impact of the Love Canal disaster on local residents. The evidence is thus ac-
cumulating against the common RM assumptions that grievances can either be ignored or treated
as constants. The TMI nuclear accident confronted a predominantly middle-class cluster of com-
munities with major collective grievances, thereby generating a rapid and complex mobilization

2. Gamson(1979),himselfa leadingRMtheorist,criticizedhis colleaguesin the RMcampfor theirneglect

of grievances,and Tilly (1978)modifiedhis own model to includea place for discontent.
3. The Love Canalareaof Buffalo, New York,had its problemswith chemicalwastesbroughtto national
attention in August, 1978 (Levine, 1981).
 ThreeMileIsland 3
process.4 In addition to documenting another example of grievances figuring prominently in
SMO emergence and development, this paper focuses on the interaction of discontent and struc-
ture in precipitating and sustaining organized protest.
A corollary of the downgrading of grievances by RM theorists has been the general neglect of
micro-mobilization processes in the emergence of social movement organizations. Gamson (1979)
scored this neglect by fellow RM theorists and called for more attention to the dynamics of SMO
formation. When the research focus shifts to issues involving society's support and constraint of
SMOs, the tendency is to ignore the interactions involved in aggregating resources at the local
level. Some RM theorists have assumed that bloc recruitment- whereby entire blocs of previously
organized persons rather than single individuals are recruited- is essential for rapid mobilization,
but there are only a few empirical studies to support this generalization (Gerlach and Hine, 1970;
Snow, n.d.; Walsh, 1978). The data in the TMI case, however, suggests that, under certain cir-
cumstances, there are alternatives to bloc recruitment for rapid mobilization.
Future historians may decide that the TMI accident caused a critical shift of momentum in this
country against commercial nuclear power. Citizen reaction to the accident is an important story
in itself, apart from its usefulness in the search for broader generalizations (Erikson, 1976).
Citizen opposition to commercial nuclear power will almost certainly constitute a major social
movement of the 1980s, and there is good reason to expect TMI to continue to play a prominent
role in the confrontation between the nuclear industry and its critics. The area within a 25-mile
radius of the Pennsylvania island has become a symbol for the national anti-nuclear movement;
the previously conservative middle-class communities in the vicinity have been transformed into
hotbeds of anti-nuclear activism.
Over 150,000 people within a 15-mile radius of TMI either themselves evacuated or had
another member of their household evacuated during the first few days of the accident.5 As
would be expected, the percentage of evacuees decreased as distance from TMI increased, with
approximately 60 percent of the five-mile area residents and 39 percent of the 15-mile residents
evacuating (Flynn, 1979; Houts et al., 1980). The evacuation cost an estimated $2,500,000 within
the five-mile radius and $18,000,000 within the 15-mile radius (Flynn, 1979).6 Returning to their
homes, evacuees found themselves threatened by a heavily damaged reactor unit (TMI-2) which,
according to some estimates, had come within 45 minutes of a complete meltdown. The same
reactor was also responsible for over one million gallons of radioactive water and more than
50,000 curies of krypton-85 gas which, in conjunction with the damaged reactor core and other
radioactive wastes, presented clean-up problems for which the utility, Metropolitan Edison (Met
Ed), and the nuclear industry were ill prepared. In addition to these Unit 2 problems, residents

4. Althoughthe primaryfocus of protestin this case is TMI, both supportersand adversariesrecognizethe

nationalimplicationsof the issues involved.TMI is commonlyviewedas the linchpinof the commercial
nuclearpowerindustryby areaactivistsas wellas by someof theiroutsidesupporters;thereis a beliefamong
themthat if the anti-nuclearmovementcan'tstop TMIafterthe accident,it can'tstop any nuclearreactorin
the country.Legaldecisionsin this casewill havenationalimplicationsfor the nuclearindustryas wellas for
;ts opponents. The national anti-nuclear movement's mass base is really a loosely-knit cluster of local citizen's
groupsunitedagainsttheirown backyardreactors(Barkan,1979,Mitchell,1978),and Gamson's(1979)em-
processesfor a morefullydevelopedRMperspectivemaybe
phasison the importanceof micro-mobilization
interpreted as a call for more research on such local phenomena. Tilly's (1979) discussion of the issue of what
shouldand shouldnot be considereda socialmovementis also relevantfor the TMIcase. Accordingto Tilly,
the essence of a social movement is a sustained series of interactions between national powerholders (e.g., the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission) and persons claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal
representation (e.g., TMI-area protest groups).
5. Flynn (1979) estimates that 144,000 people evacuated and 18,000 others had at least one household
member evacuated within the 15-mile radius.
6. Flynn's (1979) study was carried out for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the wake of the accident,
but other researchers have suggested that her estimates of evacution costs may be high (Hu and Slaysman,
1981).
4 WALSH
were also confronted with Met Ed's determination to return to service as soon as possible the un-
damaged reactor Unit 1 (TMI-1), which had been shut down for routine refueling at the time of
the accident. Utility spokespersons argued that it was absurd to allow this reactor to remain idle
in the midst of an energy crisis, but activists circulated petitions in surrounding communities
demanding the permanent closure of TMI-1. In addition to the petitions, there were also public
meetings, hearings, and legislative lobbying in the communities, a response pattern strikingly
similar to that following the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill (Molotch, 1970). In both cases, relatively
resourceful populations were confronted with major grievances leading to rapid and widespread
mobilization.
This paper summarizes an intense first year of protest organizing in the TMI area, focusing on
the following theoretical issues: What role did grievances play? How important were structural
factors in the mobilization process? What was the relationship between grievances and struc-
tures? What structural factors promoted conflict and which promoted cooperation among the
numerous groups of discontented and angry citizens spawned by the TMI accident?

DATAAND METHODS
The data were collected over the 18-month period from late fall, 1978, to late spring, 1980; the
bulk were gathered since the March, 1979, accident. The sources include field notes from 18
months of intermittent participant observation, SMO newsletters, taped interviews, notes from
telephone conversations, data from area surveys carried out by other investigators, newspaper ac-
counts, and other published materials.
Prior to the accident, I had attended a few monthly meetings of a loosely-knit, state-wide, anti-
nuclear organization called the Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power (ECNP). With head-
quarters in State College, approximately 95 miles northwest of TMI, ECNP traces its roots back
to the late 1960s when citizen groups successfully prevented the underground detonation of
nuclear bombs intended to create large caverns for the storage of natural gas. The same coalition
also claims partial credit for helping prevent the construction of "energy parks" (multiple nuclear
plants on a single site) in Pennsylvania during the early 1970s. ECNP specializes in legal interven-
tions. Its cadre includes two full-time activists with doctorates (geography and chemistry), a
university-affiliated physics professor, a mathematics graduate student, a Philadelphia
policeman, a housewife, and a number of representatives from various member groups.
After the TMI accident, I attended numerous hearings and meetings in the area, tried to remain
abreast of the mobilization efforts in the various communities, interviewed activists, and kept a
file of TMI-related newspaper stories. Three community leaders in the TMI area read an earlier
version of this paper and offered a number of helpful comments.

THEACCIDENTSETTING
The TMI nuclear generating station is located on a long, narrow island in the Susquehanna
River, approximately 11 miles south of Harrisburg. The area is jurisdictionally complex, with ad-
ministrative responsibilities divided among three different counties and involving numerous
cities, boroughs, and townships. The area's long history of settlement explains the numerous sub-
county areas with interwoven responsibilities. Parts of seven counties lie within 20 miles of the
TMI site, and four cities, each with populations in excess of 25,000 people, lie within a 30-mile
radius of the island. This dispersed settlement pattern helps explain the variety of protest
organizations which emerged in the wake of the accident.
The anti-nuclear movement predated the TMI accident by more than a decade (Gyorgy et al.,
1979; Mitchell, 1979), and there were two anti-nuclear SMOs with members in the TMI area prior
to the accident. Besides ECNP, there was also a Harrisburg-basedgroup calling itself Three Mile
Island Alert (TMIA). Originally formed in 1977 to resist the proposed opening of TMI-2, TMIA
 ThreeMileIsland 5
was "twelve people mailing newsletters to about 200, before the accident," according to one
founder of the group. Both ECNP and TMIA had been meeting regularly and circulating
newsletters before the accident, but neither had much public support. One of TMIA's pre-
accident opposition tactics, for example, had been the release of hundreds of colored balloons
from the island vicinity; notes attached to the balloons told readers they floated from TMI and
warned that air currents carried radioactive gases to the same areas. Most area residents viewed
such tactics as extremist and sensational. One accident-generated activist recalls remarking to his
companions on the day of the balloon release: "Those radicals from Harrisburg have found
another cause for protest - they're disgusting!" The other pre-accident SMO, ECNP, had a legal
case against TMI-2 in process before the accident; they argued that the proximity of TMI to
Harrisburg International Airport constituted a serious accident hazard. The warnings of groups
such as ECNP and TMIA, however, were not taken seriously by the vast majority of area
residents prior to the accident.

EVACUATION AND INITIALMOBILIZATION

The TMI accident began about 4 a.m. Wednesday, March 28, 1979, but by Thursday evening
the majority of area residents were still unaware of the seriousness of events on the island. By Fri-
day, however, a major evacuation was underway. The governor had advised (not ordered) preg-
nant women and those with pre-school children within five miles of TMI to leave the area, but
tens of thousands of others also decided to evacuate. Residents told of their confusion and fear as
policemen went door to door instructing them to remain inside, close all windows, and turn off
air conditioners (Flynn and Chalmers, 1980). Many decided they could trust neither the technical
nor political authorities, and feared the worst. In recounting their experiences, many admitted
thinking they might be leaving their homes for the last time as they drove away on that Friday.
The following experience is typical. The speaker is a high school English teacher and chairman of
the Newberry Township Board of Supervisors, with a home a couple of miles from TMI on the
western bank of the Susquehanna:

One thingyou'vegot to rememberaboutthe 28th is that Met Ed said the problemwasundercontrol. Lt.
GovernorScrantonsaid it was undercontrol.Everybodysaid therewas no problem.I wantedto believe
therewas no problem..... By the 30thit wasa brandnewballgameandsomethingI'llneverforget.In our
school, one of the secretariescameand told me therewas a radiationrelease.I had classat the time...
Parentswerecomingto the schoolto get theirchildren.The PA systemwouldannounce"JohnJones, Bill
Smith,come to the office." After a while, the restof us knewwhatwas going on. All these parentswere
evacuating.Therestof the kidsweresittingthere.It wasa hot dayandthewindowswereclosed[Editor:as
a shieldagainstradiation].Kidsweresaying,"Ifit got throughfour feet of concrete,whatarewe doingsit-
ting heresweating?"The principalgot on the PA systemand said, 'Nobodyis goingto be allowedto leave
the building."... The 15kidswho areleft say, "Noway. We'releavingwhenthe bell ringsat 2:40."I said,
"That'sOK. I'm leavingtoo ... ." (The YorkDispatch,August 15, 1979).
The speaker's wife and daughters evacuated the area, but he decided to remain because of his
official responsibilities.7 After he advocated closing TMI in an interview with a local reporter on
April 1, he was contacted by TMIA activists and asked to speak at an impromtu rally scheduled
for the Capitol steps in Harrisburg the next weekend. Because of his relatively conservative
background and his image of TMIA as a radical organization, he refused. Then he had second
thoughts, as he explained in his speech from the Capitol steps:

7. A numberof peoplereportedunbearabletensionsbetweenthe conflictingresponsibilitiesof theirjob and

those associatedwiththeirfamilies'welfareduringthe evacuationcrisis.Hospitalworkersand thoserespon-
siblefor guidingthe evacuationwereunderparticularstrain,and somedoubtthatanyevacuationplancould
work neara largelypopulatedarea becauseof the split loyaltiesof suchessentialpersonnel.
6 WALSH
I calledhim backwithinten minutesand said, "I haveto do this. I will be your speaker."... ThreeMile
Islandcameinto beingin the heartof centralPennsylvaniabecausethe citizensof the areadid not become
activelyinvolved.. . . We believedthe scientistswho saidthe possibilityof a nuclearaccidentwas remote;
we believedthe bureaucratsof the federalgovernmentwho establishedagenciesto insurethe safetyof
ThreeMileIsland.I no longerbelievetheexperts,scientists,andbureaucrats whoguidedus to the brinkof
disasterat ThreeMile Island(Author'sfield notes).
Approximately 1,000 people attended the April 6th rally at the Capitol, arranged by a few
veteran activists only peripherally associated with TMIA at the time. Various activists from the
civil rights, anti-war, and women's liberation movements attended; organizers were elated at the
turnout, especially because many evacuees had not returnedto the area and would otherwise have
been there. The rally was not only an important early event in the area's widespread protest
mobilization, but also the beginning of a complete restructuring of TMIA itself. Within weeks,
veteran activists from the 1960s had taken over leadership positions in TMIA and transformed
the Harrisburg SMO into a coalition representing local groups from numerous area communities.
The national anti-nuclear rally in Washington, D.C., on May 6, 1979, was another important
event in the mobilization of TMI-area residents. Hastily organized by national anti-nuclear ac-
tivists in the days after the accident, this experience was a heady one for many with no previous
protest involvement. Attendance estimates ranged from 100,000 to 150,000, among whom were
30 busloads of TMI-area residents who were given special places of honor. Most had only
recently returned from a difficult evacuation experience, and there were frequent complaints
about the shallowness and brevity of the national news coverage of what was really a continuing
serious accident (Molotch and Lester, 1975). At this rally, in particular, many TMI area residents
came to understand that they had unwittingly become an important part of the national anti-
nuclear movement. Speaker after speaker emphasized the importance of preventing the restarting
of TMI-1, and area residents came away aware of national support for what they knew would be
a long struggle with the utility and nuclear industries.
Groups of concerned citizens in the surrounding communities began coalescing in the weeks
after the accident. Numerous hearings in these communities by officials at the local, state, and
federal levels provided occasions for individuals to express their fears, anger, and frustration
deriving from the accident and evacuation. The more anger expressed by the speaker, the louder
the empathetic applause. Some talked about health effects such as nausea, diarrhea, and a
mysterious metallic taste in their mouths (all symptoms of radiation sickness), while a few rural
residents told of deformed cat and rabbit litters since the accident. Many wondered aloud
whether they and their loved ones might not already have received lethal doses of radiation which
would only be documented in some future cancer registry. One of the most common explanations
for the accident given by speakers at these public meetings was that the utility had long ignored
the health and safety of surrounding communities in its compulsive pursuit of greater corporate
profits. The number of previously docile citizens determined to have some voice in the decisions
which would have to be made regarding TMI increased rapidly.
Geographical and structural factors, as well as community-specific grievances, interacted in
precipitating organized protest in the TMI area. East- and west-shore communities are separated
by the mile-wide Susquehanna River, with the closest bridges approximately 12 miles north and
18 miles south of the island. New anti-TMI protest organizations emerged in Middletown and
Newberry Township, small communities within a few miles of the reactors on the east and west
shores respectively. As will be discussed at more length below, activists in these "epicenter com-
munities" perceived themselves as running unique risks from TMI decisions.8 Lancaster, second

8. Scientificsurveysof arearesidentsshow oppositionto TMIinverselyrelatedto distancefromthe island.

Sixtypercentof thosewithina five-mileradius-comparedto 40 percentwithina 15-to 25-mileradius-op-
posed the restartof TMI-1(Houts et al., 1980).
 ThreeMileIsland 7
only to Harrisburg in population among area cities, had its drinking water intake only a few miles
downstream from TMI. Concern over the possibility that Met Ed might dump hundreds of
thousands of gallons of highly radioactive water from the damaged TMI-2 was the focal issue for
this more distant SMO. Another protest group developed in York, the third largest city in the
area. Smaller community groups also emerged in other population centers but affiliated with
TMIA, the Harrisburg-based anti-TMI organization which existed before the accident. An early
organization of individuals from both east- and west-shore communities called Central Penn-
sylvanians United met regularly to be trained in non-violent civil disobedience theory and tactics;
it had no single geographical center and has since disbanded, for reasons explained below. ECNP
had its headquarters 95 miles northwest of the island, in State College.

PROFILESOF THE SEVEN KEYPROTESTORGANIZATIONS9

1) The leadership and organizational structure of ECNP remained essentially the same after
the accident as it had been before. While there were a few cadre changes as a result of the acci-
dent, a temporary mushrooming of monthly attendance, and a considerable increase in financial
contributions for the coalition, the pre-accident leader, a woman with a doctorate in geography,
remained firmly in charge. She and another full-time, anti-nuclear activist, a man with a doc-
torate in chemistry who is also self-educated in legal interventions, became overnight celebrities in
the area. Their prophecy had been fulfilled. The regular monthly meetings of the group con-
tinued to run, as usual, from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Saturdays or Sundays in communities
throughout Pennsylvania. ECNP resembled an anti-nuclear "think tank" for activists and others
with serious interests in commercial nuclear power and related issues. The co-director invariably
had her list of topics for discussion but others were encouraged to add to the agenda, which was
outlined on a blackboard or poster at the beginning of each meeting. It was ironic that ECNP's
April, 1979, meeting was scheduled for Harrisburg; but it would probably have been held there
even if originally slated for another city. Attendance at this first, post-accident meeting was more
than four times ECNP's pre-accident average. One member, a Philadelphia policeman,
introduced an innovation into the meeting by taking a carton, dropping in a $100 bill, and exhort-
ing others to contribute whatever they could to help support the coalition's two, full-time ac-
tivists.
2) TMIA, in contrast to ECNP, experienced sweeping leadership and structural changes as a
result of the accident. The organization was transformed from a cluster of intermittent activists
mailing out occasional newsletters to the largest protest organization in the area with a seven-
member steering committee, a 30-member planning council, and 12 community group
affiliates.'0 After bitter infighting in the weeks immediately following the accident, TMIA was
taken over by veteran activists determined to avoid the mistakes of the 1960s when, according to
them, a few spokespersons "represented"a non-mobilized mass. The new TMIA cadre restruc-
tured the organization as a coalition of relatively autonomous, community-based SMOs. These
leaders encouraged people in local communities to organize their own groups which would
affiliate with TMIA and have representatives on its planning council. One of the new cadre
explained, in an interview, that the TMIA central administration tended to be "old lefties from
the 60s without a community base" while the community group leaders were accident-precipitated
local activists. A Methodist minister had been pre-accident leader of TMIA. After the accident, a
former furniture salesperson took over the organization, with a new leadership cadre including an

9. The groups mentioned in this paper include, to the best of my knowledge, all organized anti-TMI activity
in this area.
10. There are TMIA community groups in the following counties, cities, and towns: Adam County, Carlisle,
Hershey, Lebanon, Londonderry, Lower Paxton, Mechanicsburg-Dillsburg, New Cumberland, Perry Coun-
ty, Pine Grove-Tremont, Steelton-Swatara, Susquehanna-Uptown Harrisburg.
8 WALSH
editor from a small newspaper, a staff person for the Fair Housing Council, a librarian/secretary,
a housewife, an activist lawyer, an apprentice plumber, and a postal carrier.
TMIA's intentions were overtly expansionistic. Its leaders wanted to see the restructuredcoali-
tion become the umbrella organization for all area protest groups except ECNP. Conflict with
ECNP was inevitable, although the new TMIA leader thought the goals of the two organizations
were sufficiently distinct to allow each to function independently in the area. He explained, in
one interview, that "ECNP's major focus is on low-level intervention stuff rather than on serious
efforts to organize people, but TMIA's idea is to organize large numbers of people for political
power." In fact, ECNP and TMIA had rather serious disagreements and leadership conflicts,
especially in the first few months after the accident when each coalition was redefining its goals
and strategies to cope with the new situation. Rather than working to the disadvantage of the
overall protest mobilization in the area, however, the tensions and competition between ECNP
and TMIA seemed to add dynamism and strength similar to that provided the International
Typographical Union by its two party system (Lipset et al., 1956). Newly emergent SMOs were
able to use the competitive atmosphere to develop and maintain their own identities rather than
be swallowed up by a single organization dominating the anti-TMI protest field.
3) A short-lived civil disobedience group began meeting the first few months after the accident
and called itself Central Pennsylvanians United. Activists from different communities in the area
discussed non-violent, direct-action tactics they might use to protest if Met Ed tried to restart the
undamaged reactor in the late spring of 1979. The utility was determined to return TMI-1 to full
service. The American Friends Service Committee and the Movement for a New Society, both
from Philadelphia, provided the infrastructure for the protest effort by sending speakers to the
TMI area and leading workshops during the late spring and early summer. Most local par-
ticipants had no previous experience in organized protest, much less civil disobedience. As the
seriousness of what they were planning began to emerge more clearly during the long, living-room
discussions, some members of the group had second thoughts. The Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion (NRC) intervened in mid-summer- primarily as a result of citizen group pressures exerted
via Pennsylvania Governor Thornburgh's office - and ordered special hearings before any TMI-1
restart. This NRC decision was a first victory for area SMOs, and the civil disobedience group
dissolved because its urgency was diminished. Some members of this group have again become
active at this writing (September, 1981) because the restart hearings concluded in July, 1981, and
most expect the NRC to rule in Met Ed's favor by January, 1982.
4) One of the earliest, community-based SMOs to emerge as a direct result of the accident was
the Susquehanna Valley Alliance (SVA) of Lancaster, a city approximately 22 miles east of TMI.
Further removed from the island than the other main protest organizations, concerned Lancaster
residents had their first meeting on March 31 to discuss the hundreds of thousands of gallons of
highly radioactive water accumulating at the accident scene and likely to be dumped into the river
from which their drinking water was drawn. Many residents from communities closer to TMI
were just beginning their evacuations at this time." Religious and academic organizations in
Lancaster provided important resources in launching SVA, including meeting facilities, position
papers calling for citizen involvement in social change, and activist training. Within a month of
the accident, this SMO had elected a five-person leadership committee composed of a housewife,
a college professor, a federal employee, and two college students. Attendance at weekly meetings
during the first few months was regularly in the hundreds. SVA sent representatives to ECNP
meetings, brought ECNP speakers to their meetings, and discussed organizing strategies with
TMIA.

11. An estimated13 percentof Lancasterresidentsevacuatedcomparedto 60 percentin Middletownand

Newberrytown. The estimate for Harrisburg is 36 percent (Flynn, 1979).
 ThreeMileIsland 9
5) Middletown, a small community within a few miles of TMI on the east shore, developed its
own protest organization called People Against Nuclear Energy (PANE).12 The founder of
PANE had weak ties with both TMIA and ECNP before he contacted two individuals whose re-
quest to borough council officials that they take action against Met Ed was covered in the local
paper; together the three started Middletown's own anti-nuclear SMO. The first public meeting
on accident-related issues in Middletown was aided by TMIA cadre, who helped plan it, and
featured an ECNP speaker. PANE recruited Middletown-area residents who had signed petitions
against TMI, spoken out publicly at local hearings by the President's Kemeny Commission and,
later, the borough council, or read about the PANE meetings in the local weekly paper. Although
RM theorists often assume that rapid mobilization depends on the recruitment of groups of
previously organized persons, the members of PANE and other SMOs frequently remark on how
few others in their groups they knew before the accident.13Early differences with the new TMIA
cadre of veteran activists over appropriate protest strategies and tactics for the conservative Mid-
dletown community - as well as the conviction that this community bordering TMI has unique
"backyard problems" which might not be felt as acutely by communities further removed from
the island -prompted PANE leaders to resist affiliation with TMIA. Some PANE cadre per-
ceived TMIA as a radical organization which might alienate many Middletown residents; there
was also a fear that affiliation with a larger umbrella organization like TMIA might dilute the
voices of residents most seriously threatened by TMI.14 PANE lobbied local and state officials to
hold hearings, draft resolutions, and introduce bills against TMI's restarting. Pressures from
PANE and other SMOs on the governor and NRC officials also precipitated the NRC's decision,
in August, 1979, to hold hearings before allowing TMI-1 to restart. PANE's main argument
against the restart of either reactor is that it would cause an intolerable increase of psychological
stress. PANE's founder summarized it thus: "After having experienced the accident and the
evacuation, and now being subjected to five or six years of future uncertainties associated with
the TMI-2 cleanup operations, we've borne our share of the nuclear experiment." Early activists
in PANE included a budget analyst, a psychiatric nurse, a physician, a few retirees, a manage-
ment analyst, a firefighter, a computer programmer, housewives, a school counselor, and a
salesman.
6) The Newberry Township anti-TMI group, on the opposite side of the Susquehanna from
Middletown and also within a few miles of the island, was born with the TMIA call to the chair-
man of the township's board of supervisors. The wife of the chairman subsequently became a key
leader in the area which, like Middletown, has no history of social protest. A mother with
children just entering their teens, this angry, post-accident activist observed in an interview:
"Now I know what some of those people in the 1960's really felt-the government just doesn't
seem to care about anything except corporate profits for businesses. Unfortunately, I didn't
understand what the protesters were saying back then, and I even considered them unpatriotic."
Other members in this SMO included a high-school football coach, a lawyer, a number of
housewives, a truck driver, and a graduate student. Over 60 residents contributed their time and

12. The name was thought up on the phone when an activist had to give a name to the group of citizens want-
ing to use a public facility for a meeting. A number of Middletown activists think their group could be more
aptly named, but have reluctantly gone along with the existing tag.
13. Informal interviews with numerous persons in PANE suggest that a two-stage recruitment process was
typical. Many went with their spouses or alone to a public meeting or hearing, and only later learned of
others in their neighborhood, weight watchers club, sports team, place of employment, church, etc., who had
also gone or become more interested. Their common anti-TMI interests then led to friendships.
14. The PANE charter explicitly excludes civil disobedience as an option for the group. PANE leaders also
discussed among themselves the pros and cons of hiring their own attorneys; their decision to do so derived in
part from their concern over the possibility of out-of-court settlements by other groups' attorneys which
might allow TMI-1 to restart in exchange for promises of greater precautions.
10 WALSH
efforts to conduct a scientific survey of area attitudes and behavior related to the TMI accident,
under the direction of an outside project director. The results of the survey showed area senti-
ment strongly opposed to Met Ed and the restart of TMI-1, and area activists say the process of
conducting the survey established a remarkable degree of solidarity among the new membership.
7) The most imaginatively named area SMO is the group from York, approximately 13 miles
south of TMI. Called ANGRY (Anti-Nuclear Group Representing York), the group is commonly
acknowledged as the most "countercultural"of the area groups. ANGRY has had serious internal
problems deriving, in part, from the individualism of its early activists which have prevented it
from effectively organizing. Its cadre has included "quite a few loners who don't like to work with
committees," in the words of one activist. Backgrounds represented in the ANGRY cadre have in-
cluded the manager of a natural foods restaurant, a plumber specializing in solar homes, a bicycle
repairman, a non-practicing lawyer who runs an alternative community farm, a recent college
graduate, and a former electrician who also runs a farm.
Grievances and structures obviously interacted in this mobilization process. ECNP and TMIA
had not organized successfully until the accident seriously frightened and inconvenienced the
population. If the accident had occurred in the absence of any organized national or local anti-
nuclear groups, it would probably have generated some protest; but without articulate opponents
of nuclear power who could speak the language of the "experts"it would have been difficult to
sustain the anti-TMI momentum. The existing local and national anti-nuclear organizations con-
tributed significantly to the anti-TMI mobilization processes, but not until the surrounding
population had suffered a major grievance. It is instructive, in this regard, to note that
ANGRY - the least effective SMO in the area, even according to its own cadre - also happens to
be the single SMO with neither exceptionally acute community grievances nor a pre-accident
SMO. Middletown and Newberrytown had extraordinarygrievances deriving from their locations
within a few miles of the island, Lancaster had the drinking water problems, and Harrisburg had
a pre-accident SMO.
There is little evidence of group recruitment during the early stages of this particular mobiliza-
tion process. The suddenness and intensity of the accident's impact seem to have substituted for
what is probably the more typical process of rapid mobilization via organizational networks. The
evacuation and subsequent collective fears regarding radioactive gases and water gave former
strangers much in common, while the public hearings enabled them to air their fears and
anger- often to the applause of others - and thus take a public position against the utility and the
restart of TMI-1. Public hearings provided officially sponsored opportunities for SMO recruit-
ment, processes similar to those observed by Gerlach (1979).
The notion of the "generalizedbelief' as a critical factor in the mobilization process receives lit-
tle empirical support; nor does it offer any theoretical leverage for our analysis. Smelser (1963,
1968) and others would consider the accident the "precipitating incident" in this case. The
ideology that the nuclear industry is trying to harness a dangerous technology with too much
probability of catastrophe and too little understanding of how to cope with its routine phases
(disposal of waste, for example) would be labelled the "generalized belief." In the light of actual
events, however, the nuclear and utility industries' assurances that a serious accident was
extremely improbable could be viewed as a more apt example of "magical thinking." In other
words, the "irrational fear of nuclear power" would be viewed by certain traditionalists as a
"generalized belief' before the accident, but industry assurances of nuclear safety could just as
fairly be labelled a "generalized belief' in view of actual events at TMI. Complex issues such as
nuclear power necessitate the assumption of what have been called "trans-scientific" positions
(Weinberg, 1972); the labelling of either side's ideology as "short circuited" is arbitrary (Mazur,
1973).15

15. As John McCarthy has observed in comments on this topic to the author, strong opinions on either side
 ThreeMileIsland 11
STRUCTURAL INTERACTION: SMO CONFLICTAND COOPERATION
Because of the symbiotic nature of the relationship among pre- and post-accident SMOs in the
area, TMIA and/or ECNP not only aided in the mobilization processes of emergent groups in
Middletown, Lancaster, Newberry Township, York, and the numerous other TMIA affiliated
communities, but also flourished themselves in the wake of the accident. The technical expertise
of the ECNP cadre, for example, was especially valuable to the emergent SMOs because it pro-
vided a relatively sophisticated critique of nuclear power. It also netted contributions and new
members for ECNP. Utility and government spokespersons had lost credibility with many people
because of what were viewed as deceitful statements and general incompetence during the critical
early days of the accident. In what is commonly regarded as a conservative area of country, the
accident transformed industry "experts"into "turkeys"'6and anti-nuclear "radicals"into "scien-
tists."
Within six months of the accident, ECNP had expanded its own coalition base to include
PANE, ANGRY, and SVA as member groups. Attendance at the monthly ECNP meetings re-
mained above pre-accident figures until late in 1979, as shown in Figure 1. The sharp increase
after the accident is obvious, and the drop in attendance for the May, 1979, meeting was
primarily due to fears about escaping radiation in the Harrisburg area which many mentioned as
the cause of their absence. The return of ECNP attendance figures to their pre-accident levels by
the end of 1979 was due to a combination of factors. Many activists from the early, post-accident
ECNP meetings were, by the end of the year, deeply involved in their own community's anti-TMI
organizations. The new activists were also educating themselves in nuclear power issues through
reading, and thus less dependent on ECNP cadre members for valuable inside information. The
various "white-hot mobilization processes" (Lofland, 1979) were also taking their toll on discre-
tionary time, especially for the many activists with young families. Another reason for the drop in
attendance at ECNP meetings was the time required for organizing two other coalitions fostered
by outside funders (these will be discussed below). In addition, there was also some "burn out"
among activists, but that does not seem to have been a major factor because the level of intermit-
tent anti-TMI activity in the area did not subside.
Community-specific grievances, personal differences among leaders, and structural constraints
due to geography, SMO legal debts, and other factors contributed to the early, inter-SMO con-
flict. Other structural influences, however, contributed to eventual cooperation among the
groups.
SMO conflict. Although each of the area SMOs had its disagreements with one or more groups
regarding appropriate strategies and tactics, TMIA was the one most frequently at odds with
other groups during the first year of protest mobilization. As noted earlier, TMIA helped both

of an issue as complex as nuclear power could be defined as "short-circuited," depending on how the term is
defined. In the case of the radioactive gases, the TMI area residents' fears over krypton releases would be
regarded as a "generalized belief" by some social scientists because the NRC and other "experts" have
declared the venting safe. Such a judgment, however, is dependent on the NRC's legitimacy as a judge of
nuclear issues. One local activist requested copies of the scientific data upon which the NRC based its convic-
tion that no harm would be done local residents by the venting, but has received no reply. Some residents use
the term "guinea-pigs" to refer to themselves and their exposure to the various radioactive elements from the
clean-up. If abnormally high rates of cancers develop in area residents within a decade or two, should we
then say that those who believed the NRC were naive and victims of a "generalized belief?" This TMI
challenge is only the most recent in a series of cases where Smelser's concept is inadequate (Walsh, 1978:175,
footnote 9).
16. Harry McPherson, Jr., a member of the commission appointed by then-President Jimmy Carter to
investigate the TMI accident (popularly referred to as the Kemeny Commission), and the commission's
counsel, Stanley Goriason, both used this term to refer to Met Ed during a mid-December town meeting in
Middletown. McPherson said: 'I felt Met-Ed were a bunch of turkeys," and Goriason later endorsed this
perspective: 'That's the only way to explain it, they were a bunch of turkeys." (Middletown Press and
Journal, December 19, 1979).
12 WALSH

FIGURE1

Attendance at ECNP Meetings (January, 1979 to May, 1980)

110

100

90
Number
80
of
70
People

Present 60

50

40

30

20

10

Month: Jan Mar Apr May June July Sept Oct Dec Feb Mar Apr May

Location: 1 2 3 3 4 5 1 6 3 2 3 6 1

Code
i. State College 4. Bloomsburg
2. Philadelphia 5. New Cumberland
3. Harrisburg 6. Lancaster

PANE and Newberry Township in the early phases of their mobilization processes, but neither of
these five-mile radius SMOs affiliated with TMIA as a member organization. The reasons in-
volved personality conflicts as well as perceptions of differences regarding key grievances, goals,
and tactics.
The specific disagreement between PANE and TMIA which lead to the former's definitive
separation from the latter involved a falling out over the arrangements for, and distribution of
proceeds after, a Jane Fonda/Tom Hayden anti-TMI benefit. PANE's early leaders also had
some misgivings about TMIA's image as a radical anti-nuclear organization. PANE decided to
consider only legal protest tactics, and to focus exclusively on TMI-related issues. PANE's leaders
were concerned lest Middletown's own particular "backyardproblems" with TMI-1 and TMI-2 be
diluted by focusing on broader issues such as nuclear power in general or nuclear weapons." In
fact, TMIA has only focused on goals specific to the clean-up of TMI-2 and the prevention of
TMI-1's return to service. It is likely, however, that the autonomy of the two SMOs closest to the
island had some influence on the strategies and tactics of the TMIA organization. Both PANE
and Newberry Township cadre members were also hesitant to become involved with TMIA
because they realized that legal proceedings were inevitable; they were wary of out-of-court settle-
ments agreed to by others which might not satisfy themselves (for example, allowing TMI to
restart with stricter safety precautions).

17. There are clear differences in many local residents' attitudes toward commercial nuclear power in general
and TMI in particular. In one survey (Flynn, 1979), for example, 50 percent of the respondents in the five-
mile radius said the disadvantages of TMI outweighed the advantages (while 16 percent said the opposite),
but only 33 percent of the same sample said the disadvantages of nuclear power, in general, outweigh its ad-
vantages (while 33 percent said the opposite).
 ThreeMileIsland 13
The attempt by the SMOs to coordinate their own fund-raising efforts also caused inter-SMO
conflict during the first few months after the accident. Both SVA and TMIA accumulated large
legal debts earlier than the other groups, and they were preparing to launch a national appeal for
funds, via mass mailings, in the summer of 1979. When the other anti-TMI organizations heard
of this plan, they approached SVA cadre members and asked them to delay the appeal until all
area groups could be brought in on it. They feared that the public might be mislead into thinking
that TMIA and SVA were the only legitimate anti-TMI organizations in the area, making it dif-
ficult for the others to get outside support which, they knew, would be essential in their long
struggle against Met Ed and the nuclear industry. When TMIA showed some reluctance to pull
back from the project, further tensions developed and SVA aligned itself with the other area
organizations. Some veteran activists from TMIA felt that other area SMOs were impeding the
mobilization process due to their own inexperience in social movement activities, and this attitude
of superiority did nothing to bridge the gap between TMIA and the rest of the groups. The TMIA
newsletter acknowledged and lamented the problem:
We have chosena routein our interventionon the reopeningof Unit 1 that is verycostly. Muchenergy
mustbe devotedto financiallysupportingthis legalintervention.... Butnot all of ourenergy.... At a re-
cent PlanningCouncilmeetingmy heartstoppedfor a minutewhensomeonesaid,"Thefocusof TMIAin
upcomingmonthswillbe fundraising."I rememberwhenthe focusof TMIAwasshuttingdownTMI....
Overand overagainI haveheardthat TMIA"doesnot havea good reputationnationally,"or thatTMIA
does not work with other local anti-nucleargroups. I hope that the people who say these thingsare in-
correct.The enemyis too largeand powerfuland too anxiousto haveus divided.(TheAlert, December,
1979:7)

ECNP also had its share of difficulties with TMIA, deriving primarily from the fact that these
two were the pre-existent coalitions in the area. However, because it stood alone in its primary
thrust, which is technical expertise and legal involvement, ECNP has had little occasion for
serious conflict with other local SMOs. There have, of course, been disagreements between
ECNP leaders and one or another local leader over legal strategies and tactics (for example, the
SMOs' selection of legal counsel) but these are the exception rather than the rule. Representatives
from PANE, SVA and ANGRY were given positions on ECNP's board of directors in the sum-
mer of 1979, and TMIA leaders have complained that the independent SMOs tend to line up with
the ECNP position whenever the two organizations disagree.
Although personality conflicts between TMIA leaders and those from other area SMOs were
partially responsible for the former organization's difficulties with the remaining groups, Zald
and McCarthy (1980) have suggested a more structural explanation for inter-SMO conflict:
disagreements are more likely to develop among groups in the same social movement pursuing
goals with similar tactical formulas than among those with different, but non-contradictory,
goals. TMIA had what were regarded by some other SMO leaders as expansionistic designs from
the beginning, although TMIA cadre insisted they were only interested in coordinating the protest
effort. There were few real differences between or among TMIA, PANE, SVA, ANGRY, and
Newberry Township in terms of goals - all focused exclusively on a safe cleanup of TMI-2 and
preventing the restart of TMI-1. ECNP, on the other hand, had broader goals involving commer-
cial nuclear power in general as well as nuclear weapons, but its functional specialization in the
technical and legal areas made it easier to achieve domain agreements with the local SMOs than
was the case for TMIA. Because ECNP concerned itself with technical questions and was without
strong links to any constituency, affiliation with that SMO was perceived as being less of a threat
to the autonomy of local groups than affiliation with TMIA might be; by autumn of 1979,
PANE, SVA and ANGRY had become member groups of the ECNP coalition.
Background information on the six groups functioning in the TMI area in December, 1979, is
summarized in Table 1. The anti-TMI effort has evolved significantly since that time, but these
14 WALSH
TABLE1
Characteristics of Various TMISocial-Movement Coalitions
and Organizations, December, 1979
ECNP* TMIA* SVA ANGRY PANE Newberry
1. Host Community State Harrisburg Lancaster York Middletown Newberry
College
2. ApproximateDistance 95 10 20 11 3 2
from TMI(miles)
3. ApproximateTime of 1970 1977 3/79 6/79 4/79 4/79
Origin
4. Frequence of Cadre Thrice Semi- Weekly Semi- Semi- Monthly
Meetings Annually Monthly Monthly Monthly
5. Frequence of Open Semi- Quarterly Monthly Monthly
Meetings Monthly
6. Range of Attendance at 50-500 35-200 50-400 30-300
Open Meetings
7. Newsletters Distributed 650 400 1,100 750 1,700 3,400
(Frequency) Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Quarterly
8. Requested (or#Required) $5# $15# $3 $2 $5 0
Donation for Newsletter
Note:
* ECNPand TMIAare coalitions with memberSMOs in various communities. These coalitions' membergroups
have open meetings at differenttimes with attendance ranges varying;thus these cells are left blankhere. Fig-
ure 2 showed ECNP's open meeting attendance over an 18-monthspan, but did not include attendance at its
various member-SMOs'meetings. TMIAdid not have regularopen meetings in the Harrisburgarea duringthe
time period covered here, but its member SMOs in the communities listed in footnote 10 did.

six groupshave continuedto be the foundationof all subsequentmobilizationprocessesin the

vicinity.
The TMI area has been transformedfrom a relativelyconservativenetworkof small cities,
townsand ruralcommunitiesinto a growinglycohesivehotbedof activism.Whileeach SMOhad
its "regulars"at the open meetingslisted in Table 1, many people came only occasionallybut
countedthemselvessupportersof the anti-TMIeffort. A surveyin late 1979,for example,found
12.9 percentof peoplein the five-mileradius,nine percentin the six- to ten-mileradius,and 4.9
percentin the 11- to 15-mileradiusreportingthemselvesactivelyinvolvedin "attemptingto in-
fluence what happens at TMI" through organizationalaffiliation or attendanceat meetings
(Houtset al., 1980).Whenthesepercentagesaretranslatedinto populationestimatestheysuggest
that over 26,000 people within a 15-mileradiusof the island were actively involvedto some
extent.'8
SMOCooperation.Despitethe inevitableintra-andinter-groupconflictswhicharepartof any
large mobilizationprocess, the six anti-nuclearorganizationswere beginningto make serious
effortsat coordinationby the fall of 1979.Outsidefundingsourceshad expressedinterestin help-
ing the local groups, but insistedon more cooperationamong them. Representativesof the
Washington,D.C.-based Youth Project and the Massachusetts-based LevinsonFoundation,
both sponsorsof environmentalprojects,assuredlocalcadremembersthat financialsupportwas
availableif funderscould be assuredof morecooperationand consolidationamongareaSMOs.
A December,1979,memo from fundingrepresentatives to SMOleadersrequestedthat the dif-
ferentgroupsspecify"areasin whichyourgroupis cooperatingwithothergroups,areasin which
you cancooperatein the future,andthoseareasin whichyou see problemsnow or in the future."
18. In reportingthesepercentagesof TMIareaactivists,Houtset al. (1980:20)note thatonly 5.2 percentof
the respondentsin a 1973NationalOpinionResearchCentersurveyreportedhavingeverbeen involvedin
picketingin the courseof a labordispute.Theseauthorsobservethatthe NORCquestions"referto activities
overan entirelifetime,whereaspoliticalactivityrelatedto the TMIaccidentcouldhaveoccurredonlywithin
a periodof nine months."
 TABLE 2

Summaryof Legal Proceedings by TMIArea Intervenors*

Proceeding Jurisdiction Participants Purpose PrincipalIssues
1. TMI-2Clean-up U.S. MiddleDistrict SVA Preventionof releases Controlof all acc
Courtof Pennsylvania; of radioactivityfromthe contaminatedwa
(1979-?) on appeal in U.S.Third TMIsite throughout preventits releas
CircuitCourtof Appeals clean-up;safe removal Susquehanna Riv
of accident-related Chesapeake Bay
radioactivewastes. containment of k
gas; safe storage
removalof highly
active resins.
2. TMI-2Operating EvidentiaryHearingsre- ECNP Requirecompliance Full accounting o
License opening in Feb., 1980, with NationalEnviron- gas, the largest si
before NRCAppealBoard mental Policy Act to long-termsource
(1974-?) complete EISforTMI-2; activity in the ent
force full risk analysis of clear fuel cycle, w
aircraftcrash. Full costs cost benefit ratio
will be shown to exceed analysis of crash
the benefits; these craft heavierthan
issues providebasis for was designed to w
license revocationfor stand; NCRhas n
TMIand all reactors. amined conseque
health and enviro
3. TMI-1Restart NRCAtomicSafety ANGRY Preventreopeningof Manytechnical sa
and Licensing Board TMIA TMI-1;permanent design and opera
(1979-?) PANE revocationof the defects; psycholo
ECNP license. stress; emergenc
Newberry sponse; evacuatio
Township planning;cumula
radiationdose eff
off-site radiationm
toring;fiscal and
managerialcapab
of licensee, TMI-
up effects; etc.
4. PUCCases PennsylvaniaPublic ANGRY Show incompetence Managementand
UtilityCommission TMIA of MetropolitanEdison financial capabil-
(1979-80) Newberry to operate as a licensed ities of the utility
Township public utility;prevent removalof TMI-1f
rate increase to pay for rate base; rate in-
purchased powerdue to crease attributab
TMI-2.A majorinvest- accident.
ment deterrentto
nuclear power.
Note:
* Adaptedfroma
longer summarypreparedby Dr.Judith Johnsrud,co-directorof ECNP(received in February,1980).
16 WALSH
Meetings with representatives from each group began in early December, 1979, and continued
into the spring of 1980. Disagreements were aired and serious work toward a more coordinated
collective effort was inaugurated. It was to the SMOs' collective advantage to consolidate efforts
in the legal arena where a number of court cases had been filed or were in the process of being
filed. Table 2 summarizes these legal proceedings: the first and third proceedings are of primary
interest to this paper, but the others are also relevant to the total anti-TMI mobilization process.
Activists intend to take the first three proceedings to the U.S. Supreme Court, if necessary.
While these coordinating efforts were taking place, another coalition of area activists began
planning a rally for the first anniversary of the accident. The new group, called the March 28th
Coalition, was a partial reincarnation of the earlier civil disobedience organization, Central
Pennsylvanians United. This group met weekly from December, 1979, to the day of the rally in
1980; it had to decide whether to include in the rally activities and speakers opposed to all com-
mercial nuclear power plants as well as those opposed to nuclear weapons. Convinced that thou-
sands of area residents had not generalized their anti-TMI sentiments to include blanket opposi-
tion to all commercial nuclear power and nuclear weapons, and that those who had not might
become alienated from the anti-TMI movement if forced to embrace all three issues, the or-
ganizers decided to limit the rally's focus to TMI. An estimated 10,000 to 15,000 people attended
on a rainy day. Contributions from participants more than paid expenses, and the March 28th
Coalition cadre decided to continue as an organization specializing in non-violent, direct action.
There were numerous indicators of greater cooperation among area groups during the early
months of 1980 prior to the first anniversary of the accident, but none were more dramatic than
the public meeting at the Liberty Fire House in Middletown on March 19, 1980. NRC personnel
were scheduled to outline the various options available to Met Ed for the venting of the large
volume of radioactive krypton gases trapped inside TMI-2 since the accident. Utility and govern-
ment personnel were used to hostility at public meetings in the TMI area. In August, 1979, for
example, a similar meeting at the Londonderry Township Fire House a few miles away involved
occasional interruptions from angry individuals in the crowd of 200. One woman promised to
hunt down the speaker, a high Met Ed official, and shoot him if anyone in her family contracted
cancer within the next 20 years. But most such comments were saved for the question and answer
period after the presentation-and thus it was at every other public meeting until March 19, 1980.
At the Liberty Fire House Meeting, however, the angry crowd refused to allow the meeting to
go on as scheduled, challenging successfully what has been called "the hegemony of the task
frame" (Fireman et al., 1979). The hall can normally accommodate just over 400 people, but ap-
proximately 600 packed in that night and 250 more were locked out because of fire regulations.
The crowd was overwhelmingly anti-nuclear, and sporadic anti-Met Ed and anti-NRC chants
began even before the meeting started. Placards throughout the hall bore such inscriptions as:
"Krypton-85 Kills," "Rosalyn, Send Amy To Stay With Us During The Venting," and "Are You
As Sure The Krypton Won't Hurt Us As You Were There Couldn't Be An Accident?" Represen-
tatives from communities in the area attended and the national news media were there to record
their performances. When the NRC speakers tried to address the audience they were ridiculed
and shouted down. The prepared slide show was drowned out by challenges to almost every state-
ment and the speakers were visibly shaken by the intensity of the crowd's anger. At one point, a
voice from the crowd mocked one of the NRC spokespersons sitting at the table in front because
his eyes appeared to be closed: "Wake up!" You on the right - listen to us for a change. You and
your friends have been pushing decisions down our throats for too long.. ." Others picked up the
taunt. By this time the crowd had taken over the microphones and demanded that the panel of
NRC experts listen rather than lecture. The meeting continued until midnight, two hours beyond
its scheduled closing time, with speaker after speaker demanding that the krypton be disposed of
in some manner other than venting it into the atmosphere. Delegations from each area SMO were
 ThreeMileIsland 17
at the meeting, and "the Liberty Fire House" has subsequently become a frequently repeated sym-
bol of area group cohesion, concern, and strength among activists. The event itself, however, like
the TMI mobilization process in general, emerged from a combination of grievances and struc-
tures. The various SMOs were important for alerting people in different communities about the
meeting, but few would have taken the trouble to come that night - or shown such emotional
fervor at the meeting - if there had not been an impending venting of radioactive krypton.'9
A week or so later, the day of March 28th rally, the area SMOs issued a joint press release
announcing the establishment of two umbrella coalitions supported by outside funders. The two
new coalitions - called the TMI Public Interest Resource Center and the TMI Legal Fund - also
had representatives from the funding community helping decide on the allocation of resources.
Some activists expressed concern that this new set of area coalitions might lead to the profes-
sionalization of protest efforts at the expense of serious grass roots' involvement, but the
majority were convinced that such outside help was essential and were willing to accept the ob-
vious risks involved.
Zald and McCarthy (1980) have observed that overlapping memberships, SMO board inter-
locks, and coalition grants promote protest group cooperation, and all three processes were
operating in this case. Prodded to increase their cooperation by the funders as well as by the net-
works fostered through board interlocks (ECNP, TMIA, Public Interest Resource Center, TMI
Legal Fund) and joint projects (March 28th Coalition), the various SMOs overcame many of the
factors militating against organizational cooperation because of the intensity of their grievances
and desire to do something about the TMI clean-up and restart issues.

SUMMARYAND CONCLUSION
The multiplicity and diversity of individual and collective grievances associated with the TMI
accident created a large pool of people available for protest mobilization. The existence of two
pre-accident SMOs provided both anti-nuclear experts and a developed protest ideology which
helped channel the discontent. The post-accident influx of resourceful protestors was more than
the two pre-accident SMOs could accommodate and new protest organizations emerged. A
geographically dispersed population and community-specific grievances impeded centralization
of the protest effort during its early, post-accident phases. Official decisions associated with both
the continuing TMI-2 clean-up and the restart of TMI-1 provided a steady source of new
grievances to facilitate the mobilization processes for area SMOs. The multiplicity of groups and
coalitions increased the opportunity for activist training and recruitment, facilitated the
implementation of diverse strategies and tactics, and contributed a vitality to the general protest
effort. However, when the decentralized nature of the protest movement threatened to become a
liability, dissipating legal efforts and discouraging outside financial support, area SMOs were
able to coordinate their activities.20
Grievances were obviously important in the precipitation and development of organized pro-
test in the TMI area. This is another in a growing number of instances where suddenly imposed
major grievances have been important in explaining grass roots mobilization phenomena. Most
RM theorists acknowledge the importance of the perception of grievances by the target
collectivity for the success of any widespread and rapid mobilization process. However, the RM
focus has usually been on SMOs developed through moves of political actors outside the
aggrieved group rather than directly from the impact of the grievances themselves on the group.

19. The NRCgaveMet Ed permissionto ventthe kryptoninto the atmospherein the earlysummerof 1980.
20. Gerlach's (1979) report on the strengths deriving from segmented and poly-centric protest networks con-
tains much of relevance for the TMI area mobilization process, but he does not consider the potential
liabilities of such a structure when outside support is being sought.
18 WALSH
Impressed by the importance of such outside sponsors and political processes in representing
and/or mobilizing collectivities with longstanding grievances, especially during the 1960s and ear-
ly 1970s, RM theorists have tended to treat discontent as a constant rather than a variable. The
sudden perception of major grievances, however, was important in the mobilization of citizen
protests over Love Canal (Levine, 1981), in Sevaso, Italy (Whiteside, 1978), and in Santa Barbara
(Molotch, 1970). The court-ordered busing protests (Useem, 1980) and the anti-Vietnam War
mobilization are other examples of grievances leading directly to protest organizing. The TMI
case, in conjunction with these others, suggests that RM theory should try to specify the condi-
tions under which discontent is likely to be an important variable in protest mobilization. Such
data show that grievances, the structural situation of the aggrieved population, and the mobiliza-
tion process itself should each be considered variables in the search for more comprehensive
social movement theory.
Suddenly imposed major grievances such as chemical spills, court-ordered busing, or a nuclear
accident are more or less likely to spur collectivities to protest mobilization, depending on their
structural situation. Few mainstream communities or collectivities have long-standing major
grievances, and the environmental accident may thus be a rather typical source of serious and
widespread discontent for such populations. Whereas many of the 1960s protest movements in-
volved middle-class constituencies assisting professionally-led efforts on behalf of lower-class
beneficiaries, the major social movements of the 1980s (for example, pro- and anti-abortion,
environmental, anti-nuclear) are predominantly middle-class phenomena. The RM model of
McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977) emphasizes the importance of discretionary resources among the
middle class in accounting for the proliferation of SMOs in the 1960s, but there is nothing in the
logic of their argument to prevent some other precipitant-or set thereof- from figuring more
prominently in the 1980s. An increase in discretionary resources and an increase in grievances
would thus be viewed as functional alternatives. The data from TMI and some of the other
examples cited suggest a general grievance hypothesis: Suddenly imposed (or abruptly realized)
and continuing major grievances, attributable to human decisions or negligence, make sustained
grass-roots protest mobilization more likely when the target collectivity is of working-class or
higher socio-economic status. This hypothesis suggests that the aggrieved collectivity must have
some threshold level of resources able to be activated when perceived grievances increase
dramatically. (I arbitrarily set this threshold at the working-class level, excluding the poor.) This
hypothesis also stipulates that the perceived major grievances are continuing, implying that if the
owners of TMI had closed down their nuclear facilities after the accident, protest mobilization
would not have occurred. The lack of grass-roots protest mobilization at Buffalo Creek (Erikson,
1976), for example, is at least partially explained by the fact that no new dam was proposed.
Finally, the hypothesis only says that sustained grass roots protest mobilization is more
likely-not that it is inevitable.
The national anti-nuclear structures and, especially, the presence of local organizations such as
ECNP and TMIA also contributed to the widespread and rapid protest mobilization in the TMI
area after the accident. While some RM theorists emphasize the importance of organizational
processes in the selection, transformation, or even creation of grievances (Tilly, 1980), the TMI
accident presented a more complex process. The anti-nuclear organizations in the area had little
success in mobilizing the local population against the twin reactors on the island prior to the acci-
dent, but afterwards became instrumental in crystallizing the discontent. If the same accident had
occurred in the absence of any national or regional anti-nuclear structures and protest ideology, it
would have been virtually impossible for area residents to organize themselves as they have done.
The complexity of the technology and extensive links between government and the nuclear in-
dustry would have intimidated even the most aroused citizens' group. For accidents involving
high technology then, these considerations suggest a second hypothesis: Suddenly imposed and
 ThreeMileIsland 19
continuingmajor grievancesattributableto human decisionsor negligenceare more likely to
generatemobilizationwhenan organizedprotest ideologyis alreadyavailable.
Theorists in the RM tradition emphasize the importance of group recruitment for successful
protest mobilization, but none of the TMI-area SMOs enlisted large groups of previously
organized people. Public meetings and official hearings were, however, central in this mobiliza-
tion process. At these public encounters, many individuals voiced their private and collective
grievances, became more politicized, and were recruited to existing or emergent SMOs in the
area. These public meetings and hearings continued to serve as important solidarity-promoting
events and opportunities for further SMO recruitment throughout the first year after the acci-
dent. As opponents became more organized, such officially-sponsored events became occasions
for a show of SMO strength. The Liberty Fire House confrontation was only the most notable
example of this process. Such findings are similar to those reported by Gerlach (1979) and lead to
a third hypothesis for subsequent investigation: Public hearing processes, in the wake of suddenly
imposedand continuingmajorgrievancesattributableto humandecisionsor negligence,may
becomemore an instrumentof protest mobilizationthan of social control, especiallywhenan
organizedprotestideologyis available.
How likely is it that this mobilization effort will be ultimately successful? According to certain
recent insights from the RM literature, the prospects are encouraging. The restriction of focus to
their own "backyard" reactor, rather than attacking commercial nuclear power in general,
excluded the TMI groups from that unpromising category of SMOs opposing major
technological trends (Ash-Garner, 1977). Neither are these anti-TMI organizations attempting to
remove their antagonists, an extremely risky venture for protest groups (Gamson, 1975;
Goldstone, 1980). Rather, they are willing to see Met Ed retain ownership of the TMI facility pro-
vided it is converted to some other source of electric power generation. Area protest groups are
also evolving into more bureaucratized and centralized structures, characteristics Gamson (1975)
found predictive of success. The support of the majority of people living in the vicinity of the
island (Houts et al., 1980), and the outside help from funders as well as the general public also
bode well for area SMOs.
On the other hand, the critical decision on the restart of TMI-1 is acquiring increasing
economic as well as symbolic value for the whole commercial nuclear power industry. It is
unlikely-even in the opinions of area anti-TMI activists-that the NRC will rule against that
restart; a decision is expected by January, 1982. The logic of most of the anti-TMI-1 arguments
apply to all reactors near population centers, and the commercial nuclear power industry has
launched a massive public relations campaign in the TMI area. The special relationship of this in-
dustry to the highest circles of national political power (Gyorgy et al., 1979) makes it a for-
midable foe, and also suggests that RM theory should concern itself more with the locations of
contending groups in the political economy in its efforts to understand the impact of social con-
trol processes on social movements.
The success or failure of the anti-TMI coalitions in blocking the restart of TMI-1, however,
may ultimately depend more on world events than on the organization and tactics of area protest
groups (Goldstone, 1980). Developments in the Middle East may prompt the U.S. government to
order TMI-1's restart, or the shift of U.S. political administrations may further the interests of
the commercial nuclear power industry and help undermine whatever political leverage citizen
protest groups have had. It is also possible that the U.S. courts may decide against the TMI-area
SMOs in their efforts to prevent TMI-1 from restarting. Any further venting of radioactive gases
or, especially, dumping of radioactive water into the Susquehanna will not only precipitate
immediate protest reactions but also further mobilize area residents against the restart of TMI-1.
A restart decision will be strongly opposed by numerous activists, and the questions then will be:
How many others feel the same way? What tactics will they employ? What level of outside sup-
20 WALSH
port will be available? What tactics will authorities use in response? The TMI issue warrants
serious attention by anyone interested in the complexities of protest mobilization within a multi-
faceted modern technological environment.

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