34 THE O RIES AND T H I N G S

analysis of the given form of the theory will

yield a structure in accordance with Principle
P2. These are, however, working theories, and
do possess the suggestiveness that a working
theory must have. It is, then, possible to argue
that theories can still possess all the heuristic
properties we demand of them while at the
same time conforming to the strict criteria of
P2 . I shall be dealing with examples of this
below . I should like to make the general claim
now that a logical analysis of a suggestive
theory that shows the theory to be in conform­
ity with the demands of Principle P2, is mis­
taken. The reason for this is that when the
actual use of the terms, used in the apparent
straight generalizations of observables, is clearly
described, there are terms which turn out to be
metaphors. And , I propose to show below that
when a general statement contains metaphor­
ical terms, then it is for that reason part of a
wider theory whose structure turns out to be in
conformity with Principle P I . One can des­
cribe son:i.ething with or without the use of
metaphors. When a description in non-meta­
phorical terms is given I shall, for the sake of
brevity, call the terms used D-terms. If meta­
phor is used I shall call metaphorical terms
M-terms.
If there are two different kinds of terms
(words or phrases) used in descriptions then I
shall say that this shows that there are at least
two types of empirical concept; provided that
the difference in type of the words has to do
 M O D E L S T O M E C H A N I S MS 35
with their depth of meaning. ( "Depth of mean­
ing'' will be defined below. ) The meaning of a
term can be discussed in two different ways­
by reference to the way it is used, and by refer­
ence to the way it is introduced. By "intro­
duction of a term" I mean the definitions we
use in a formal context, and the explanations of
how a term is to be used, that we use in an
informal context. In the situation we are now
discussing, the hypothesis is that if there are
two kinds of terms both kinds are currently
used in descriptions and hence there will be no
difference in use discernible within the scien­
tific context. Hence we must look to the way
the terms are defined or explained, that is, to
how they are introduced, to establish anything
in the way of significant differences in meaning.
I shall say that a term has been defined with
reference to a paradigm case (p.c.) if it could have
been introduced by ostension, i.e., we could
have indicated what it meant by pointing to
something which it could have been used to
describe. The paradigm case will be that to
which we could have pointed in introducing
the term, and the whole method of introduc­
tion I shall call a paradigm-case procedure (p.c.p.) .
We can use these notions to distinguish D­
terms from M-terms :

D-term. A term is a D-term if it is fully

definable by reference to one paradigm case.
M-term. A term is an M-term if it is
effectively definable by reference to one
36 T H E O R I E S AND T H I N G S
paradigm case but fully definable only by
reference to two or more paradigm cases ;
provided that the occasions of the use of these
paradigm cases are historically distinct. A
term has depth of meaning if two or, more
p.c.p's are required to define it fully.

This needs some explanation. First, the

expressions "effectively definable" and "fully
definable" need to be expounded. If a word or
phrase isfully defined by a certain procedure then
there will be no occasion of its use which cannot
be e:x!plained by reference to that procedure.
A word or phrase is effectively defined by a certain
procedure when, though there is a range of
occasions of its use which are explainable by
reference to that procedure, there is a further
range of occasions of use which are not e:x:plain­
able by reference to that procedure. For
instance, the word "cat" is effectively defined
by pointing out the appropriate specific dijfer­
entia in a particular case, but not fully defined
in this way for this procedure will not explain
the use of the word for whips or gossips. There
is also the condition that the two or more para­
digm cases required for a full definition should .
be historically distinct. This ensures that the
word or phrase which acquires a new primary
or a secondary meaning by the p.c.p, should
retain an accretion of force or meaning derived
from an earlier p.c.p. and not be just ambiguous.
It is the historical distinction of p.c.p.'s that
accounts for depth of meaning.
 M O D EL S T O M E C H A N I S M S 37
This difference, between D-terms and M­
terms, is exemplified throughout the sciences.
For instance, in physics a typical D-term is
"length"; for a complete account of length can
be given with reference to typical procedures of
measurement. As Bridgman has pointed out,
there are several different procedures for meas­
uring length and hence several empirical con­
cepts for which the expression is used. This does
not affect the force of the distinction I am
making here, for each is introduced, and can be
understood, independently of the others. Of
course they form a family of concepts, but the
relations between them are not those between
metaphorical and non-metaphorical terms. For
a typical M-term, consider the word "current"
as it is used in physics. It could be effectively
introduced witli reference to an ammeter and a
simple circuit, but not fully defined, because as
it is used in electro-dynamics it carries with it
an accretion of meaning derived from its use in
hydro-dynamics, where it could be effectively
taught before a flowing or running stream.
Hence the expression "current" is metaphor­
ical, carrying with it into the description
of the phenomena encountered in electrical
circuits some of the force it had in its original
p.c.p.
Why is the language of physics sprinkled with
i e " current " ,
M-terms l'k energy" , iorce" ,
" ""

"repulsion", "field", "conductor", "wave" and

so on? To answer this we need to see what
function M-terms perform. M-terms, in contrast