Aristotelian Virtue Ethics and Donation for Planting Trees

Nasrin Sultana

[Abstract: Nature plays an instrumental role in our happy or flourishing life as we

depend on nature for our food, clothing, shelter and so on. Moreover, wild animals
are also instrumentally valuable for protecting the ecological balance; and hence
their habitat, nature, should be protected. However, since the industrial revolution,
nature has been profoundly affected by the emission of CO 2 and other greenhouse
gases. In this circumstance, as human beings what character traits should we
dispose to face these challenges? Should we spend our wealth and time for
protecting the nature, which is instrumentally valuable for present and future
generations’ happy life, by donating and campaigning for planting trees? In this
paper, I have tried to answer to these questions from the Aristotelian virtue ethical
point of view. After explaining different aspects of the Aristotelian virtue ethics I
have tried to conclude that in response to the debate of whether one should
contribute to the tree plantation campaign or not, a virtuous person would go with
donation and campaign for planting trees.]

1. Introduction

Human beings are a part of nature. We and other species eat, drink, breathe and live in nature.

So, nature has an instrumental value in human and other species’ lives. However, increasing

deforestation, limitless emission of CO2 and other greenhouse gases do highly contribute to

the climate change. As a result, some non-human species may become extinct and our future

generations are at a risk. So, some philosophers agree that wild-species are necessary for

protecting the ecosystem; and hence, their habitat should be protected. On the other hand,

some philosophers claim that many wild-species do not play any significant instrumental role

in human life, so we should not spend money on protecting their habitat. Now, the question

arises: as human beings what character traits should we possess regarding this situation?

Page 1 of 16
Should we donate and campaign for planting trees to save the nature to ensure a safe earth for

our future generation as well as a safe habitat for non-human species which are valuable for

protecting ecosystem? In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle does not consider environment or

nature instrumentally valuable for human flourishing. However, according to the neo-

Aristotelian virtue ethics, environment and non-human species play an instrumental role in

achieving biological, cultural, ecological and aesthetic goods which are constitutive elements

of a happy life. In this paper, I will, first, explain different aspects of Aristotle’s virtue ethics,

and then, try to conclude that in response to the debate of whether one should contribute to the

tree plantation campaign or not, a virtuous person should go with donation and campaign for

planting trees. For by donating and campaigning for planting trees one can cultivate the

dispositions of courage, generosity, compassion, appreciation, gratitude, humility and so on.

2. Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics

In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle devotes himself into the inquiry of what virtue is. According

to Aristotle, human beings seek happiness or eudaimonia. Everything we do and think is

ultimately for attaining a happy or flourishing life.1 For happiness is the complete good. By

“complete good” he means a thing which is pursued for its own sake. Not all goods are

complete goods. Some goods, “such as wealth, flute, in general, instruments”, are pursued for

the sake of obtaining other goods. Thus, these are instrumental goods. 2 On the other hand,

pleasure, health, friendship, and eudaimonia, a flourishing life are the things that are pursued

for their own sake; and hence, these are complete or final or intrinsic goods. For according to
1
Richard Burnor and Yvonne Raley, Ethical Choices: an Introduction to Moral Philosophy with Cases, Oxford
University Press, New York, 2011, p.221
2
Jennifer Welchman, “Environmental Stewardship, Biodiversity, and Liberal Neutrality” (an unpublished talk on
January 27), Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, p. 4

Page 2 of 16
Aristotle, we would choose each of these even though these had no further results. However,

among these final goods some are pure final or more complete and some are constitutive. 3 The

pure final goods are unconditional because these are pursued solely for their own sake.

Aristotle says,

… an end pursued in its own right is more complete than an end pursued
because of something else, and that an end that is never choiceworthy because
of something else is more complete than ends that are choiceworthy both in
their own right and because of this end. Hence an end that is always
choicworthy in its own right, never because of something else, is complete
without qualification… Now happiness more than anything else seems complete
without qualification. For we always choose it because of itself, never because
of something else.4

Thus, since happiness or eudaimonia is unconditionally good, i.e. it is pursued solely for its

own sake, happiness is the pure final good. On the other hand, health, friendship, etc. are

pursued for their own sake as well as for the sake of happiness. Thus, these are constitutive

goods.5 Now the question is: if constitutive goods, such as health, friendship etc. are pursued

for the sake of happiness, are these goods instrumental for happiness? According to Jennifer

Welchman’s interpretation, constitutive goods are not the means of a happy or flourishing life.

Rather, they are the parts of what is to flourish as a human being. 6 For example, the materials,

such as, gold, bronze or wood, that a sculpture is made of are the constitutive parts of the

3
Ibid, p. 4
4
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in Terence Irwin, Trans., with Introduction, Notes and Glossary (2 nd edition)
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999), reprinted in J. Welchman (ed.), The Practice of Virtue:
Classic and Contemporary Reading in Virtue Ethics, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Cambridge, 2006, p. 10
5
Jennifer Welchman, “Environmental Stewardship, Biodiversity, and Liberal Neutrality” (an unpublished talk on
January 27), Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, 4-5
6
Ibid, p. 5

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sculpture in question, whereas the instruments used in making that sculpture are the external

parts to the sculpture. That is, the instrumental parts are the external—not internal

constituents, of the sculpture, whereas the constitutive parts are the parts of its own. Similarly,

instrumental goods are the external goods, whereas, constitutive goods, e.g. health, friendship,

are the parts of the pure final good, e.g. eudaimonia, flourishing or happiness.

According to Aristotle, happiness is not only complete, but also self-sufficient as

happiness makes life choiceworthy and lacks nothing.7 Thus, the definition of “happiness” or

“flourishing” can be restated as follows:

Happiness or flourishing is a complete and self-sufficient good because it is

choiceworthy solely for its own sake; and hence it is the pure final good.
or
For any x, x is happiness or flourishing iff x is complete and self-sufficient and x
is choiceworthy solely for its own sake; and hence x is the pure final good.

Now the question arises: where does happiness consists in? According to Aristotle, happiness

consists in the proper functioning of human soul. So, to determine the character traits essential

for attaining a flourishing life, we need to analyze human nature—what kind of creatures

human beings are.8 To explain how human soul functions Aristotle makes a hierarchy of all

living beings. According to him, all living beings can grow and reproduce but only animals

and humans are conscious. He adds, a human soul has two faculties: rational and irrational.

Human beings share the irrational faculty with animals and by the rational faculty they are
7
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in Terence Irwin, Trans., with Introduction, Notes and Glossary (2 nd edition)
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999), reprinted in J. Welchman (ed.), The Practice of Virtue:
Classic and Contemporary Reading in Virtue Ethics, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Cambridge, 2006, p. 10
8
Jennifer Welchman, “Aristotle: Introduction” in J. Welchman (ed.), The Practice of Virtue: Classic and
Contemporary Reading in Virtue Ethics, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Cambridge, 2006, pp. 3-4

Page 4 of 16
different from animals. The most primitive element of irrational faculty is the vegetative

element and this is responsible for nutrition and growth. The second tier of the soul is the

appetitive part which is responsible for emotions and desires. This element is both rational

and irrational. It is irrational in the sense that animals have desires and feelings. It is rational

in the sense that although human beings have desires they have the ability to control their

desires with the help of reason. This ability of human beings is called moral virtue. 9 The third

tier of the soul is the calculative part which is purely rational. This element is responsible for

the human ability to contemplate, to reason with deliberation and judgment. This ability to

choose with deliberation and judgment is called intellectual virtue. 10 Thus, because of

rational faculty human beings decide or choose with deliberation and judgment whereas

animals seem to respond directly and instinctively. Since by possessing and exercising virtue

we can attain goods for soul which are constitutive of a happy or flourishing life, virtue is the

constitutive good in our happy or flourishing life.

According to Aristotle, intellectual virtue arises and grows mostly from teaching

whereas moral virtue or virtue of character results from habit and practice. For both kinds of

virtue, there remains only one principle—the principle of mean. Virtue is the intermediate

state between extreme and deficiency which exist at the end of a straight line. 11 And only a

person having practical wisdom can determine the mean of that line.

9
James Fieser, Metaethics, Normative Ethics and Applied Ethics: Historical and Contemporary Readings,
Wadsworth Thomson Learninig, Inc. 2000, p. 140
10
Ibid, pp. 140-141
11
Ibid. p. 141

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 3. Why Should a Virtuous Person Donate for Planting Trees?

In the previous section, we have reflected on the Aristotelian idea that virtue is the activity of

human soul that makes a life happy or flourishing. A flourishing or happy life is complete and

self-sufficient which is choiceworthy solely for its own sake. Virtue is the constitutive good of

a flourishing life. Now a new question comes in: what is the role of nature in our flourishing

life? It seems that according to Aristotle, nature is not a constitutive good in our happy or

flourishing life; nor does it play any significant instrumental role in making our life happy or

flourishing. So, why should we save nature for our future generation which does not have any

instrumental value in our flourishing life? Moreover, some ethicists think that not all wild

animals are instrumentally valuable in our life.12 So, why should we devote our resources to

protect their habitat that might otherwise have been spent on making us happier, e.g. on

watching movies in a cinema hall or buying fashionable attires? To answer to these questions

take a closer look at Aristotle’ theory once again.

We have seen that Aristotle gives a hierarchy of different goods. Now consider

Aristotle’s hierarchy of different goods, i.e. instrumental, constitutive and final goods.

According to Aristotle, health is one of the constitutive goods of flourishing life. In order to

have good health we need fresh air, pure water and food. However, since the industrial

revolution nature has been profoundly affected by the burning of fossil fuels. Due to

deforestation, the reckless emission of CO2 and other green-house gases, environment is

getting polluted which is a hindrance to achieving good health. Thus, pure environment or

nature plays an instrumental role in achieving constitutive goods, namely health. Again, since

12
Jennifer Welchman, “Environmental Stewardship, Biodiversity, and Liberal Neutrality” (an unpublished talk
on January 27), Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, p. 4

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good health is the constitutive good of flourishing life and environment is the instrumental

good of good health, environment, in turn, plays an instrumental role in achieving happiness

which is the pure final good. A similar argument is provided by Professor Jennifer Welchman.

She claims that a “flourishing human life is always partly determined by our species’

biological and psychological make-up. We do not flourish fully if we cannot obtain the

instrumental goods of food and water.”13 Thus, according to Welchman, to obtain the

instrumental goods of food and water is the necessary condition for a fully flourishing life. On

the other hand, watching movies in a theatre hall or wearing fashionable attires are not

necessary for our happy or flourishing life. Nor are these sufficient for our flourishing life.

For without fashionable attires we are quiet able to keep us warm in the winter; without

watching movies in a cinema hall we are quite able to manage other sources of recreations

that may require spending less money. Moreover, wild animals can be an alternative to

watching movies as a source of recreation. However, there is no alternative to pure water and

food. Thus, following Professor Welchman, it is our moral duty to save nature to obtain the

instrumental goods of food, water and air.

In addition to providing material goods, nature and wild animals provide cultural,

recreational and aesthetic resources which are widely acknowledged as constitutive goods for

human flourishing.14 Hence, we should develop our capacities for feeling, choosing and acting

well to protect them. However, a critic may argue that elements of recreation, culture and

aesthetics vary from man to man and generation to generation. So, there is no guarantee that

our future generation will equally like nature and wild animals as we do. 15 However, this

13
Ibid, p.5
14
Ibid, p. 5
15
Ibid. p. 6

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claim may be rejected by the opposite claim that there is no guarantee that our future

generation will not like nature or wild animals. Moreover, it may be the case that our future

generation will like nature and wild animals more than we do. So, we cannot deprive them on

the basis of an assumption that future generation may not find nature and wild animals

culturally, aesthetically and recreationally valuable.

Moreover, trees and animals are the parts of our ecological community and hence they

are valuable for protecting the ecosystem. Paul Taylor claims that any living thing possesses

inherent worth as a member of Earth’s community; and to recognise the living things as

having inherent worth is to show respect for nature. He adds that the good of a non-human

organism consists in the full development of its biological power. 16 Thus, the flourishing of

things in nature is a constituent part of Earth’s community or ecological community. So,

though some wild animals do not play any instrumental role directly in our flourishing life,

they are necessary for protecting the ecological balance. Since we all depend directly or indirectly

on the product of ecosystem; and a good ecosystem can help one to lead a happy or

flourishing life; hence, all wild animals, in turn, are instrumentally valuable for achieving

happiness.

Now the answer to the question why we should spend our money and resources on

protecting animal’s shelter, rather than on watching movies or buying fashionable dresses, is

very simple. By human flourishing Aristotle means “the flourishing of our whole natures—

rational, emotional, social, and purely physical” flourishing. 17A virtuous person is just in her

business transaction, generous in spending her wealth, courageous in saving her homeland. A

16
Paul Taylor, “The Ethics of Respect for Nature”, Environmental Ethics, Vol. 3, Issue 3, Fall 1981, p. 199
17
Jennifer Welchman, “Introduction” in J. Welchman (ed.), The Practice of Virtue: Classic and Contemporary
Reading in Virtue Ethics, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Cambridge, 2006, p. xx

Page 8 of 16
virtuous friend is a person who cares for his friends’ goods. Good parents act for the sake of

their children’s goods.18 So, as social beings it is virtuous to be disposed to conserve wildlife

and world ecosystem. That means, we should care for the goods of other members of the

ecological community, as they are instrumentally valuable in our happy life. Moreover, if we

spend money on making us happier, i.e. if we spend money on watching movies or buying

fashionable cloths, we will only consider our wellbeing and happiness. And we will

eventually ignore the wellbeing of our future generation. For we wear fashionable attire to

make us look good, whereas a safe nature is required not only for us but also for other

members of the earth as well as for our future generation. And a virtuous person cannot act

like a selfish person who only considers her own wellbeing.

Rosalind Hursthouse, a neo-Aristotelian ethicist, claims that virtue involves feelings

and emotions. According to Hursthouse, virtue is a disposition of certain emotional reactions,

finding certain things enjoyable and others painful or distressing. 19 She holds that virtues are

the things that make their possessor a good human being. For, acting virtuously means “acting

in accordance with reason… this will lead to eudaimonia. That means that the virtues benefit

their possessor”.20 It is discussed earlier that environment provides not only material goods,

such as food, air and shelter, but also cultural, recreational and aesthetic resources which are

constitutive elements of our flourishing life. Thomas Hill argues that failing to value the

18
Suanne E. Foster, “Aristotle and Environment”, Environmental Ethics, Vol. 24, Issue 4, Winter 2002, pp. 420-
421
19
Rosalind Hursthouse, “Environmental Virtue Ethics”, in Rebecca L. Walker & P. J. Ivanhoe (ed.)
Environmental Ethics, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 160
20
Nafsika Athanassoulis, “Virtue Ethics”, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, retrieved on February 22, 2016
from http://www.iep.utm.edu/virtue/#H3

Page 9 of 16
environment lies in the defects in character that are harmful for the agent. He claims that an

agent who fails to appreciate the non-sentient nature reflects the character trait of ignorance, a

lack of appreciation of his place in the nature, a lack of self-acceptance or a lack of aesthetic

sensibility.21 Thus, virtues toward environment can allow (benefit) us to enjoy these material,

cultural, aesthetic goods which can lead us have a happy or flourishing life. So, it seems that

though Aristotle’s virtue ethics does not directly discuss the character traits toward nature or

environment, we can identify virtuous choices and actions regarding the environmental issues

by following the neo-Aristotelian virtue theory. A virtuous person should choose to spend

money on protecting the nature rather than on those, e.g. fashionable attire or watching

movies, that are neither necessary nor sufficient for our happy or flourishing life.

Now let me develop a list of virtues regarding the donation in response to tree

plantation campaign. So far we have discussed, it is evident from the neo-Aristotelian virtue

ethics that nature and non-human species play an instrumental role in human flourishing.

Thus, to donate or campaign for tree plantation reflects the character trait of recognition of the

instrumental value of nature in our flourishing life. Moreover, by donating and planting trees

we can cultivate the disposition of generosity, liberality, compassion, courage, and so on in

terms of Aristotle’s virtue ethics, appreciation and gratitude toward nature in terms of the neo-

Aristotelian virtue ethics.

Now consider how we can cultivate these dispositions by donating for planting trees. In

giving and taking money, according to Aristotle, generosity is the mean between wastefulness
21
Thomas E. Hill Jr, “Ideal for Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments” Environmental Ethics,
Vol. 5, Issue 3, Fall 1983, p. 216

Page 10 of 16
and deficiency.22 Liberality is the mean between giving and taking wealth. According to

Aristotle, a liberal man is a man who gives to the right people, the right amount, and at the

right time for the sake of the noble. 23 Thus, an environmentally generous and liberal person,

i.e. virtuous person, knows how much money or wealth she should spend for protecting

nature.

Now let me explain how courage is related to donation for planting trees. In respect of

courage, a person who “is afraid of nothing” and “goes to face everything” is a rash. 24 On the

other hand, a person who “avoids and is afraid of everything” is a coward. 25 However, though

all evils are bad, to fear some evil is not considered as cowardice activity in Aristotle’s

account. For example, if a person fears disobeying his parents or insulting his elders or bad

reputation, he is not a coward at all; and hence, to control such fears is not considered as

courage. Similarly, though death is the most terrible in all evils, a courageous person doesn’t

fear a noble death, e.g. death in a battle. 26 Thus, courage is not concerned with the lack of fear

in all circumstances; nor is it concerned with the lack of confidence in all circumstances.

22
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in Terence Irwin, Trans., with Introduction, Notes and Glossary (2 nd edition)
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999), reprinted in J. Welchman (ed.), The Practice of Virtue:
Classic and Contemporary Reading in Virtue Ethics, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Cambridge, 2006, Book
II, p. 30
23
Aristotle, (Translated by W. D. Ross) Nicomachean Ethics, Batoche Books, Kitchener, 1999, p. 54
24
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in Terence Irwin, Trans., with Introduction, Notes and Glossary (2 nd edition)
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999), reprinted in J. Welchman (ed.), The Practice of Virtue:
Classic and Contemporary Reading in Virtue Ethics, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Cambridge, 2006, Book
II, p. 22
25
Ibid, p. 22
26
Aristotle, (Translated by W. D. Ross) Nicomachean Ethics, Batoche Books, Kitchener, 1999, Book III, pp. 43-
44

Page 11 of 16
Rather, courage is the proper attitude towards the feeling of confidence and feeling of fear. 27

Now come to the next question: what is meant by proper attitude?

Ross, in respect of courage, suggests that Aristotle’s triad should be substituted by two

dyads,28 where rashness is the lack of fear and excessive in confidence; and cowardice is the

lack of confidence and excessive in fear. That means that rashness is “not an opposite extreme

to cowardice.”29 Similarly, cowardliness is not an opposite extreme to rashness either. 30

Rather, rashness and cowardliness are two distinct variables which can vary independent of

each other. So, a person who is confident to a right degree in a required circumstance is called

a bravery or courageous person; and a person who fears something to a right degree is called

cautious:31

Virtue Vice
Caution Rashness (excessive in confidence, lack of fear)
Courage or bravery Cowardice (excessive in fear, lack of confidence)
J. O. Urmson, however, disagrees with Ross and suggests that Aristotle’s triad should be

replaced by two triads instead.32 According to him, since caution and bravery are the virtues,

27
David Ross, Aristotle, Routledge, London and New York, 6th Edition, 1995, p. 214
28
Ibid, p. 215
29
J. O. Urmson, “Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean”, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 10, Number 3, July
1973, p. 229
30
Aristotle says, “In some cases the deficiency, in others the excess, is more opposed to the intermediate
condition. For instance, cowardice, not rashness, the excess, is more opposed to bravery…” (please see Aristotle,
Nicomachean Ethics, in Terence Irwin, Trans., with Introduction, Notes and Glossary (2 nd edition) (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, 1999), reprinted in J. Welchman (ed.), The Practice of Virtue: Classic and
Contemporary Reading in Virtue Ethics, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Cambridge, 2006, Book II, p. 32)
31
J. O. Urmson, “Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean”, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 10, Number 3, July
1973, p. 229
32
J. O. Urmson, “Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean”, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 10, Number 3, July
1973, p. 229

Page 12 of 16
caution is the mean between over caution and rashness. Similarly, bravery is the mean

between cowardice and insensible fearlessness:33

Vice Virtue Vice

Over caution Caution Rashness
Insensible fearlessness Brevity/courage Cowardice
Thus, following Ross and Urmson, it is evident that a cautious person shows fear to

something to a right degree and a bravery person shows sensibleness to something to a right

degree in a given circumstance. For example, if a person doesn’t fear to go out in heavy snow

fall, he is insensible and fearless. On the other hand, a person who doesn’t go out in a cold

weather is over cautious. So, only a cautious and bravery person faces and fears the right

things from the right motive, in the right circumstance. Similarly, an environmentally cautious

and bravery person doesn’t fear spending money and wealth for protecting earth and global

ecosystem, rather fears and shows the sensibleness to the result of environmental degradation

and climate change, and hence acts virtuously as this is the right time to donate and campaign

for planting trees to save the environment and ecosystem for world’s habitants.

In addition to that we can cultivate the disposition of compassion by protecting the

nature for future generation. For since compassion is a disposition of feeling toward others’

sufferings, we should be compassionate toward the sufferings of our future generation

resulted from environmental degradation and ecological imbalance.

Thomas Hill argues that human being should develop the disposition of humility

toward nature. By “humility he means the recognition of the importance of non-sentient

33
Ibid, pp. 229-230

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nature.”34 Hursthouse argues that we can cultivate the disposition of wonder by aesthetic

appreciation and gratitude toward nature for its beauty and abundance. Thus, aesthetic

appreciation and extending gratitude toward nature are environmental virtues in Hill and

Hursthouse’s account. For by recognizing the aesthetic value of nature and animals we can

cultivate the disposition of appreciation. By planting trees to protect the nature we can also

acknowledge the gifts of nature and hence we can cultivate the disposition of gratitude.

4. Conclusion

So far we have discussed that although Aristotle does not consider nature as instrumentally

valuable in our human flourishing, according to the neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, nature and

animals play an instrumental role in human flourishing. Thus, we should act virtuously to

protect the nature for the wellbeing of existing and future generation by donating and

campaigning for tree plantation rather than by spending money on things that are not

necessary and sufficient for our flourishing life. For by donating and campaigning for tree

plantation we can cultivate the disposition of generosity, liberality, compassion, courage,

appreciation and gratitude toward nature. Since this is the right time to take the decision to use

our time, wealth and labor properly to save the nature and make the earth habitable for future

generation, by donating and campaigning for planting trees we can act virtuously and hence

can be complete human beings who consider their own wellbeing as well as the future

generation’s wellbeing.

▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀

34
Thomas E. Hill, “Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments”, Environmental Ethics,
Vol. 5, Issue 3, Fall 1983, P. 220

Page 14 of 16
Bibliography

1. Aristotle, (Translated by W. D. Ross) Nicomachean Ethics, Batoche Books, Kitchener,

1999.

2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in Terence Irwin, Trans., with Introduction, Notes and

Glossary (2nd edition) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999), reprinted in

J. Welchman (ed.), The Practice of Virtue: Classic and Contemporary Reading in

Virtue Ethics, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Cambridge, 2006.

3. David Ross, Aristotle, Routledge, London and New York, 6th Edition, 1995

4. James Fieser, Metaethics, Normative Ethics and Applied Ethics: Historical and

Contemporary Readings, Wadsworth Thomson Learninig, Inc. 2000.

5. Jennifer Welchman, “Environmental Stewardship, Biodiversity, and Liberal

Neutrality” (an unpublished talk on January 27), Department of Philosophy,

University of Alberta.

6. J. O. Urmson, “Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean”, American Philosophical Quarterly,

Vol. 10, Number 3, July 1973

7. Nafsika Athanassoulis, “Virtue Ethics”, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

retrieved on February 22, 2016 from http://www.iep.utm.edu/virtue/#H3.

8. Paul Taylor, “The Ethics of Respect for Nature”, Environmental Ethics, Vol. 3, Issue

3, Fall 1981.

9. Richard Burnor and Yvonne Raley, Ethical Choices: an Introduction to Moral

Philosophy with Cases, Oxford University Press, New York, 2011.

Page 15 of 16
10. Rosalind Hursthouse, “Environmental Virtue Ethics”, in Rebecca L. Walker & P. J.

Ivanhoe (ed.) Environmental Ethics, Oxford University Press, 2007,

11. Suanne E. Foster, “Aristotle and Environment”, Environmental Ethics, Vol. 24, Issue

4, Winter 2002,

12. Thomas E. Hill, “Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments”,

Environmental Ethics, Vol. 5, Issue 3, Fall1983.

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