Music as Heard
(A STUDY IN APPLIED PHENOMENOLOGY
Thomas Clifton
‘YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS
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Contents
Preface
Introduction
2 The Nature of Phenomena and Phenomenological Description
: Essential Backgrounds of Experience
:: Time in Motion
5: Space in Motion
‘The Play Element
7: The Stratum of Feeling
Notes
Bibliography
Index
19
50
a
7
205
22
200)
305
310 Preface
[Aste title indicates, this book isa study of musical experience from the
phenomenological point of view. One is tempted to pose the thetorical
question, What is phenomenology? But chis question was asked by
MerleaucPonty in 1945 in the preface o his Phenomenolngy of Perception,
‘when Husserlian phenomenology was already about forty years old, Ifit
thas not yet been answered by either Huser! himeelf or subsequent
phenomenclogists, then I myself respectfully decline to answer it, at
least in formal terms, To be sure, some idea of what phenomenology is
will be revealed by the way it is used, but the main emphasis here is on
hhow one thinks phenomenologically. andon the sortof phenomenclog-
ical hough that can be communicated, The same option was taken by
Virgil Aldrich in his Philosophy of Art
So it is possible to think and write phenomenclogically without
geting bogged down in questions of method. In view ofthe audience to
‘hich this book is primarily directed, itis evident thac the better partof
‘wisdom lies precisely in communicating a phenomenological atitude.
Ie is difficult enough for musicians to sequire a musical vocabulary
‘without asking that they acquire a phenomenological one as well. And
the vocabulary of phenomenology formidable indeed. leis partly due
tothis vocabulary shat phenomenology has heen so misunderstood and,
for that reason, criticized, Phenomenology attaches special meanings to
such terms as absolute, a priori, evidence, imuition, subjectivity, and én
dividual, which, if misunderstood, can easly distort the purposes of
phenomenology into something quite hopelessly quixotic and regret=
tably old-fashioned. Furthermore, stranger terms exist such as intention
ality, moesissncema, eidetic reduction, presentifcaton, etc., which would
require extensive description, even though the concepts to which these
terms refer can be used without telling anyone, s0 to speak. Even 10, it
has not been possible to keep the language of the book uncluttered by
professional words. Phenomenon, for example, could not be omitted. In
addition, Thave used transcendental to reer to a significance independent
of causation and mode of empirical actualization, and constitution ‘0
«describe 2 process by which the person orients himself toward a par
ticular object which assumes significance for himina certain way. Thus,
its posible to constitute a sounding object asa pices of music, where vii PREFACE
before, its significance was simply a « perhaps bothessome acoustical
event. Terms such as retention, proton, and constiuion were fet co be
indispensable to 2 phenomenological account of time experiences. 1
have alka ese sentalizaion in places where phemmenological reduction
would otherwise apply. While this makes or swifter comprehension for
‘musicians, [hasten goad cha ic might be eoublesome co phenomenol-
‘ists, whose pairing of these evo terms is less deliberate. Other than
these | heliowe dot alo
Tic wll withus the sonia of traditional nie theory
bat perhaps Loan answer another question: Why phenomenology?
It tie already burned with enough ~ns andl -ologis? Joseph
Kerian righily sans us that “methodologies resemble ideoleges in
their tensdency ts lead charied lives oftheir own absondly abstracted
from the real world." But the method of phenomenology consists
precisely in refraining as much as possible from constructing a pre-
fabncated method to impose on the composition, nd phenomenclogy
ise i different in kind from other methods and points of view
(ex. behaviorism, nominaliem, and phenomenslism) in that it ie 3
“fis philosophy. Ie studies how itis posible co hive a behavioristicor
nominalstie atitude, and such a study necessarily invelves both the
acting subject and the qualtes of an event or object. In a ere
phenomenology i dmply a more consciously pursied and thorough
exploration of the notion, held by all we seientiss, that “objectivity”
hnas subjective (person-oriented) foundation. Thus Michael Polanyi:
+ technical words used here are those which
il eritisian
If we decided to examine the universe objectively in the sense of,
paying equal attention to portions of equal mass this would result
in a lifelong preoccupation with interstellar dust, relieved only at
Drief intervals by a survey of incandescent masses of hydrogen—
‘not in a thousand million lifetimes would the turn come 10 give
rman even a seconds notice. It goes without syying that no one—
scientists incladed-—looks at the universe this way, whazever lip-
service is given vo ‘objectivity’. Nor should this surprise us. For, as
hhuman beings, we must inevitably sce the universe from a centre
lying within ourielves and speak about it in terms of a human
Ianguage shaped by the exigencies of human intercourse. Any
attempt rigorously to eliminate our human perspective from our
picture of the world must lead to absurdity.
The phenomenological attitude was chosen, then, 2s way of uttering
Icaningful statements which are objective in thesense that they attempt
|
|
TRFACE x
ro describe th
they issue from a subject to whom an object has some meaning. But
subjective in this sense does not necessarily mean mere opinion: it means
reciprocity Its reciprocity which is to0 often forgotten or suppressed
by music research, Toapproach music—which is privileged in ts ability
to represent nothing and expres. everything—the way a scientist ap~
proaches an experimentis toengage in an inauthentic sort of objectivity.
But Richard Palmer, discussing the procedures of literary criticism,
suggests thac
musical object adequately, and subjective inthe sense that
a work does nut speak by being cut to pieces in order for the
analytical reader to sce how and why its made as it is; one must
cnablea work to speak by knowing how to listen... To put the
mutter in the familiar terminology of Martin Buber’s Ethou =
lationship, i€ i helpful to se the work not as an ie that is at my.
disposal but 2s 1 thou who addresses me, and 10 remember that,
meaning is not an objective, ternal idea but something tht arises,
in elaionship 3
However, the most telling contribution of phenomenological ati~
tude is the means it offers for uncovering and describing phenomena
which are immanent in the composition and preseated by it. This is
different from the more traditional purpose of analysis, which describes
how certain events or compositional procedures are constitative of the
composition. In other words, after we follow the usual analytic route
and ask, How does “overlap,” “prolongation,” or “intersection” con-
tribute to the composition’s intelligibility? We can then focus on the
question, How does thie piece present “overlap,” “prolongation,” ete.,
How are these phenomena experienced? In a perfect
world, these two emphases would comprise two sides of the same coin,
This redirection of the analytic searchlight implies two things: phe
nomenological deseription i not a substitute fr technical analysis, but
we should resist making technical analysis is own purpose. Thus, while
phenomenology may not be the bes way to improve one’s practical
musicianship (performing. composing. et) tisable, because ofthis, 0
transcend analytic methods derived from specific compositional gram-
sats, such those Found in conal and serial mesic, Ths gives phenome
nology a wide ringe of appicatility
The compositions exemplified inthis book are among those which I
have already analysed in some prephenomenological manner, and with
hie have some famiisrty. They were als selected on the assump tion shat most other musicians would be familiar with them. In several
cass, it was not always possible to reproduce excerpts from the com=
position being discussed. For example, reproduction of fourteen pages:
of te fullscore to the Riteof Spring prevents physical, financial, and legal
problems. These problems became particularly acute for contemporary
music, where again, reproduction of fall cores was impossible (consider
Ligcti’s Atmospheres), and reduction was impractical. This is doubly
unfortunate, because a phenomenological attitude can describe the
newer music more Faithfully than methods which rely on the existence
nal notation and which, for that reason,
ign more than the music winch is
jemporiry exmpoeses vrte “phenon=
nological” cfions to present musical essences—
movement, shape, duration, succession, color, play, and feeling—
without cluttering, their picces with such Literary imports as plot
(heme), character development (thematic manipulation), and struct
(beginning, middle, and cn). Contsmporsry compose also realize
thar the old idealsof unity, organization, and cohesiveness, to the extent
that they arestill ideal, are as much a product of subjective constitution
2 compositional givenness. "The world is not a booming, buzzing
confusion, and itis difficult not to synthesize some organization into
isparate experiences, In this respect, both phenomenology and con
temporary music teach us that rigorous analysis requires only one thing:
to listen carefully to whats given, making sure that what is given isthe
music itelf
‘At the risk of exasperating the purists, I do not find it possible to
adhere to thethought of ny single phenomenologist but willresort toa
certain necessary eclecticism 10 strengthen my own ideas. Nevertheless,
Iwill not extend the use ofthe term pheonenolagy further into history
‘han Edmund Husser] (1859-1038). More than anyone else, Huser!'s
work forms the basis. even today, of all serious phenomenological
studies. His ideas had a profound effect on what is popularly known as
‘existentialism (somewhat misnamed). Another major figure whose
presence can be felt throughout this book is Maurice Merleau-Ponty
(1908-61). He examined the nature of art more thoroughly than did
Hussed), but even more importantly, his phenomenology of the lived
body permeates my own interpreration of music as a bodily experience,
not just an aural o intellectual experience.
“Those who already know something of phenomenology also know
that its program is neither completely specified nor entirely fice of
problems (eg.. there is rarely agreement about what is essential or self
evident) In any case, these studies will no doube be subjected toa eerain.
amount of criticism, So much the bester. Concerning the imponaut
{questions of musical experience, there are more than enough problems
to go around. 1: Introduction
‘THE POINT OF DEPARTURE
‘The words encountered here comprise adescription ofthe phenomenon
of music. In the interests of accuracy and completeness, the descriptions
obliged to discuss two separate but related aspects of music: its objects
and the human experience of its object
‘Already, three fundamental assumptions have been made: (2) that
‘words ean describe musical objects and their experience, atleast to the
extent that itis possible to ind inthe sense ofthe words something quite
close to the sense of che music; (2) that there is no music without the
presence of a human being assuming whatever stance of receptivity is
needed to make sounds musical for him: (3) that words like music and
inusical objet refer to specific and recognizable aspects of the human
‘world, But this doesn't mean that such words are easy to define, All the
‘more reason, then, to spend afew moments here in providing at least an
‘operational definition of what the word music in this book, refers to
“Music i an ordered arrangement of sounds and silences whose mean~
ing is presentative rather than denowtive. This sounds innocuous
‘enough. Pethaps the plot will begin to thicken if I suggest that this
definition distinguishes music, as an end in itself, from compositional
technique, and from sounds as purely physical objects. Furthermore, the
definition implies nothing about the intentions of che composer, or
indeed, about whether there is a composer (although it tarns out that
thereusnally isone). Ieszys nothing about the status ofthe score orabont
‘the nature ofthe instruments. Both the score and the instruments are a8
dispensable a the composer. To be more precise then, [should say that
music is the actualization of the posbility of any sound whatever 10
present to some human being, meaning which he experiences with his
bbody—thatisto say, with his mind, his feelings, his senses, his will, and
his metabolism,
‘This raises the obvious question, What sorts of sounds are not music?
‘This cannot be answered by a consideration of the sounds alone, since
the sume sound, under different circumstances, cant be interpreted as
cither music or nonmusie. For example, Alan Merriam writes that
different reactions are shown to what may be physically the same
sound according to where and how itis used... In Akan society,if
_
SSS 2 INFROPLCHON
somone seraped mud offa botels with the lid of a cigarette tin, he
‘would produce noise as a by-product. If he performed this act of
scraping in the performance of ahyewa music, the sound, though
similar, would have 2 different meaning. It would be purposeful in
a mosical sense.”
‘The sugycstion here is thatthe difference between music and nonmusic
lies inthe use thar the experiencing person makesof the sounds, In other
words, the difference lies in the different forms of human behavior.
Accordingly, the shove question becomes transformed into What is
‘meant by musical behavior? A more complete answer to this question is
presented in chapter 7. For now, | will only say that a musically
Ibehaving person is one whose very being is absorbed in the significance
of the sounds being experienced. This significance is not associative,
denocative, or otherwise symbolic, but is presented in and by the sounds
themselves, [tis notaltogether accurate to say that this persons listening
‘m the sounds. First, the person is doing more than listening: he is
.ereciving, interproting, judging, and feeling. Second, the preposition
0" puts too much stress on the sounds as such. Thus, dhe musically
bbchaving person experiences musical significance by means of, of
through, the sounds. But itis not the sounds themselves to which he is
listoning. The experience of piano music is not one which demands chat
wwe listen to pianos. Taken precisely as pianos, these instruments are
capable of producing some curious sounds. But the music which it is
possible to experience when someone uses the piano a¢ a musical instru
‘ment is something else. Paul Klee wrote something similar in 1907:
Lamond, a warm penon, nota pianist like Reiwenauer: he just plays
the piano; the human quality comes out of the total performance;
the individual sounds come from the piano, When Reisenauer
played, it wasn't a piano, it was magic?
Inother words, the sound source—in this case, a piano—must be there
i weare t experience musicat all. Buti is precisely the knowledge that,
such and such an instrument is indeed the sound source which is not
necessarily included in the expericnce itself. Te could be that this is one
reason why humans invented musical instruments in the frst place Ieis
easier to use a musical instrument to make music than to we pots and
pans although we ean guarantee neither that we will always perceive
music emanating fiom 4 musical insteument, nor that potsand pats ate
incrnsically incapable of providing the medium for musical experience.
INTROPUCHON =
So far, [have talked about two things which separate music fom
nonmusic. The first is that musical meaning is presentative. While it
cannot categorically bestated that the sounds made by pots and pans, ot
1 roomful of cocktail sippers, can never be musical, nevertheless, along,
a8 [cannot transcend the condition thac, in fact, Lam hearing pots and
pans or people gostiping over cocktails, then Ido not confuse this sonic
experience with a musical experience. 1am constantly making an asso-
ciation between these sounds and the objects which produce them. They
are signs of something occurring in the factual world, and music,
whatever else it is, is not factually in the world the way trees and
‘mountains are. Musical experience does not necesarily include 2ware-
‘nos of sounds as representing or symbolizing some experience. Musical
‘meanings refer 10 nothing but themseives, though this is a good deal
‘more complicated than Eduard Hanslick ever thought.
The second requirement for distinguishing music from nonmusic is
to be found in the idea of personal involvement. Ie will not do just to
tencounter sounds in che factual world and regard them with feelings of
cither neutrality orirritation, These, t00, are" meanings.” but Idiscount
them from the idea of musical meaning since the persom incerprets the
sounds as simply “things” which either go unnoticed, or which iritate
‘him against his will. Actually, this is 2 complicated situation, because of
the variety of ways in which nonmesie may be experienced, as well as,
the varieties of nonmunic which may be experienced. Thus, an inhabi-
tant of the Bomco highlands might not ever experience Dyoidk’s
Symphony in E Minor as music. Similarly, a Caucasian child of seven,
raised in North America, also might not experience this symphony as
music, Yet the chances are that, for the child, the symphony is still
“something like music,” since the music we presume the child has heard
is something morelike che music of Dvotik’s symphony than the music
of Bomeo. Consider, finally, 2 perion educated within the musical
traditions of Western Europe and North America: when excerpts from
that symphony ate performed during a half-time show at 2 football
‘game, this person is very likely to feel either irvitated or neutral. But his
fesling this way is different from cither the irritation or newtrality fele by
the Bornean or the Caucasian child, because he knows that, under
certain conditions, Dvoiak’s Symphony ia E Minor can sound like
‘music, but for him, 2 football half-time show is not one of those
conditions. The purpose to which this symphony is put is no longer a
primarily musical purpose, and at chat moment, the symphony (or the
torso thereof) is not music to our hypothetical educated person either. ‘There is no snobbery intended here, People can use musical com=
positions for any parpese they please. All Tam suggesting is that there
are many purposes to which musical compositions are put which sic
‘eed in completely or partially burying the music in che composition
Rather than blaming che contentof football half-time shows on cultural
atrophy, it should be recognized that people of widely varying cultures
tend to treat their sacesd objects in some auch similar mance. Basil
Davidson provides this example:
‘The Zande cult of ancestors in centred round shrines erected in the
side of their courtyards, and offerings are placed in these shrines
‘on ceremonial, and sometimes other, oceasions; but when not in
ritual use, s0 0 peak, Azonde ase them as convenient props to ret
thie speats against, and pay no attention to them whatsoever. The
casual construction and everyéay insignificance of Aftican shrines
make repeatedly the same poin. What is important is not the
contingent objec: butthe immancnt power which will be vested in
the object on ritual occasions.”
‘The nonmusical experience of that part of Dvotik’s symphony which
‘was played during half-time is due, then, to its becoming a contingent
object on which weare pleased to “rest our spears” when the symphony.
is transplanted out of its own ritual setting (which is not necessarily 9
concert hal, either).
The above reference to the will is imporcant, because it is entirely
posible that, as part of the musical experience, one can feel ieriated,
slepressed, and the like: there is ncthing particularly joyfal aboue Berg's
Wezzeck, for example. But it snould be clear that these are experiences
which one voluntarily agrees to undergo. Ifthe feeling of oppression—
word used by Beethoven in op. 130—is not experienced 3s ultimately
pleasurable and one which we desire to prolong, dien we will never
‘understand the difference between an experience whose object is fright-
fal as a matter of fict, and one which is frightful because it gives us
pleasure to feel that way.
It is the notion of personal involvement which lends significance to
the word ordered in this definition of music. This word is used 28 a
description of an experience which may be independent of, and other
than, the kinds of orderings injected into the work by the composct.
Once again, then, the experience of order says nothing about whether
order is there in fact. Order is constituted by the experiencing person,
who isjustaslikely to experience it in acolleetion of natural sounds, asin,
-ovised music or afinely wrought Fugue by J.S. Bach. Order ia this
mvrnepucrion 5
‘sense refers to the musical experience which is identical with itself while
unfolding in time. It is ordet which permits us to inclide only certain
sounds within the sphere of musical experience. The sounds of the
andicnee coughing and scraping its fer are not part of the order of
‘musical experience, alshough once again, this doesn’t mean that there
are no circumstances in which audience noises can constitute a musical
experience.
Finally, this definition of musiesays nothing about aesthetic standards
which the object of the musical experience is supposed to meet. This
doesn't deny the existence of standards of eomposttional technique, but
there is a difference berwoen saying thst » work is well or poorly made,
‘which it is perhaps part of the business of aesthetics to say, and saying
that a work of artis definable in terms of the goodness or badness ofits
technique. Much less can we think of standards of experience. What
right have I to demand that a person expericnvea piece of musicexactly
the way I do? Itis possible fora person to grow into an understanding of
piece of music, but this is not to say that the understanding itself is 2
standard, The experience of ehe musical objec: never exhausts the object
ccompleéely, so that what T understand oF piece by Webem now may
‘well be different from what | understand of this piece some time from
now. Of course there are aspects of the object which encourage me to
understand it this way rather than that, and itis these aspects which ean
bbe brought vo the tention ofodher people for whom the understanding
(of the musical object is admitted to be incomplete. In this sort of
intersubjective reltionship, the understanding of an authority isetill nat
swhat amounts tothe criteria for standards, This 20 because the musical
experience is not a purely formal one, and its truths are not purely
formal truths In short, while the phrase “a bad composition” may make
some sense, the expression “bad music” sa contradiction, while "good
music” in edunslant. The former is a contradiction because the behavior
evoked by this situation is ifferent from the behavior evoked by music;
the latter is redundant because the experience of music includes only the
‘experience of music. That is, if can cruthfully say that T have ex
petienced this sound event as music, why should T argue that che
experience or its object is good, since [already know?
So far, have outlined the definition of music ] will ue, and havetsied
to show chat music is not a factor a thing in the world, but a mesning
consticuted by human beings. Itremains for me to explain in what sense
the experience of musical meanings can be described, and why they
should be.
‘To alk about such experience in x meaningful way dem
nds several 6 IvTROBUCTION
things. Fist, we have to be willing to lt the composition speak tous, t0
lect reveal is own orccr and significance. An imposed order, remain
ing on a purely abstract level and represented by some sort of symbolic
scheme, is ukimately unsatisfactory. Second, we have to be willing to
question ourassumptions about the nature nd role of musical material
For cxample, in our culture, a great deal of importance is given tthe
role of pitch and interval. These are considered almost primary sensory
dualiie, while toeuse, timbre, gesture, dynamics, and duration are
foquenily thoughe of assecondary, something thatthe pitches or inter-
vals fave. Bue 8 music really divided into the eo ral
and attbute? Do we relly hear (ol fgno as something simply attached
to the primary substance of pitch? Ifa French horn prolongs an open E,
and then quickly matecit, sit thecame F? Logically, yes but in terms of
sical bchavior, chink not. These are notidle ornive questions, since
they are motivated by reflection upon current trends in music theory,
fiom the content of fundamentals courses to more advanced applications
‘of st cheory to pitch collections. Last, and perhaps mest important, we
Inave to be ready to adunie that describing a meaningful experience is
itself meaningful. Why, indeed, should description be meaningful? n't
the musical experience both complete and untranslatable? Why should
ry experiences bea cancer of other persons. oF why shoud thers be a
conccin of mine? How can one person posibly experience, in the same
‘way, whatanother person isexperiencing? Andisn'cit rue that the very
act of experiencing the object changes the object itself? Even if these
(uetions led to wmatisicrory answers, would this mean ehat we are
‘now jasfed in assuming a aiilisic or sceptical stance?
Let me briefly sugges: some reasons why description is useful, even
necessry. For one thing, in describing, Iengige in an act of communi
cation with mysslf This ac helps to transform Intent knowledge into
the kind of explicit knowledge which is wsefil in lesning about che
gestures and textures of the world, Indeed, this forms a second reason
why description of the musical experience is meaningful. Insofar as
smsicis ofthe world, i teacher me ahou the world. The experience of a
‘munial pattern may contribute to the understanding oF natural paterns
given by the world: “nature imitates art.” Third, the uncovering, of
Intent knowledge contributes to the growth of one’s sensitivity to
‘misc, Mosic is nomnatural in chat our bodies do not naturally know
‘what to do with itin thesame sense that ur stomachs know what wo de
ih food. IFwe aretolearn from music, and tolearn music itsel, it will
nnotde justto have musical experiences. We mus be willing to reflecton
ns of substance
all the possible ramifications of theve experiences. Finally, description is,
meaningful becauce it involves one in a dialogue with other peopk.
‘With such dialogue, the description can be sevised, supplemented, and
refined, thus enlarging the domain of any single experience. This is
possible because, while each pesson’s experience 1s invisble to other
people, they can communicate their experience through behavior:
through facial or bodily expressions, language, or by paraphrasing the
exp ably even in a different
medium. The possibility of a shared! experience is always theve, and this
possibility has been actualized throughout history by the evidence of
{group snging, playing, dancing. orsimply listening, We learn then, not
nce in another artistic creation, con
only about the self and the world, but about other peopl, without
‘whose presence in the world the self would not bea el worth knowing,
The task before us, then, is the description of musical experience, and
of the objects of sich experience. Its not my intention here to deal with
facts of music history asendsin themselves, with explanations or proofs
of wiy such-and-such an experience is the case, with uninterpreted
quanta of sense impressions, or finally, with the application of numer
ical, linguistic, or otherwise symbolic systems to the musical com=
position, Thee systems seem adept at legislating the validity of such
‘experienoe words as ionality, continuity, or unity by assigning them toa
purely formal universe. This seems to diverta great deal of effort away.
from the msin problem: that of providing evidence for the validity of
descriptive conclusions from the way onc experiences a composition asa
material entity.
‘A DEFINITION OF EXPERIENCE
{take the word experience to mean what the German language refers to
28 Erlebus. As the root implies, Erebus refers to an individ living
through of some event. The other German word for experience is
Byfahnang, which means experience-in-general. Erebus is 2. “first”
‘experience, by which meana first-order, and not firsthand, expetience
‘This distinction enables us to say that the Erlebnic of a twelventone
composition is different from the Lifairany of deducing its:
‘example of an Erlebnisisexpresied in this well-known line: “Thate to see
that evening san go down.” Now the person singing this line is ap~
parently expressing the ansct of focings of sadness, of being downcast
and blue, over an event that suietly never happens hat i, the “going
own” ofthe sun. But for him orher,thsisalived experience, and only
Another 8 IVRODUCTON
4 callous cosmologist would suggest 20 this person that the sun really
oes trise or et and hac the night sky really isn’t moody. The point is
that what | know abouta piece of musicas fact may play aninsignsficant
role, ornoneat all, in che way Texperience that piece. For this reason, the
Erleniskindofexpericnceis elected here as an approach toan elemental
(chough not elementary) realm of experience. Perceptual expetience is
jnreplnccable a an opening to this realm, but it enjoys this satus only
because the objects of percepeval experience are not purely private
objects. To speak more correctly, Ishould peshups say thatno judgment
is made atal about whether these objects are private or public, since to
take sch a judgment is already to presuppose 2 dichotomy between
object and subject which philoropherslong ago succeeded in disolving
‘An example will city this stance
‘Apperson heatsa certain musical eventas “ascending,” This willbe the
case whether he perceive the ascending event ina teal performance, ot
‘whether he imagines a musical event as ascending. Or he may have
remembered that the concert he attended yesterday included an.event of
an accending nature. Whte shall we localize this ascending event:
inside, or outside ws? sche abject of my perception outside me? [Fit
‘why am 130 deeply touched by hy isi thae other people
can experience the same thing? Do I experience the ascending event as
“out there,” anda feling which is “in here"? Isn't it rather the case that
the aseending event and the feng conspire to constitute a single
meaning, and that the self and the event merge in the formation of a
single locas? When 1 imagine, remember, or even dream of ascending
evens, do Ifinid within myself anything which is not already in and of
the world? RL. D. Laing suggests that there i, therefore, ro senee in
maintaining the distinction becween inner expetience and outward
behavior. Perceiving, imagining, remembering, and dreaming are, in
stend, “modalities of experience,” none of which is any more “in” or
“out” than any ther Tee, hear, and touch objects because Lam inthe
world, and have eyes, ears, and 2 body. But then these objects become
object-for-me. The subject without an object to experience, and an
‘object without a subject for whom it has s meaning, are both anthink-
able sicuaions
Wits
THE OBJECT OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION
By this time, one might have dhe impression that I am attempting 10
sanctify an extreme relativism. Indeed, itis precisely the “subjective”
INTRODUCTION °
spect of experience which lured many writers earlier in this century
down the path of sheer opinion-mongering, Later on this trend was
reversed by a renewed interest in “objective,” scientific, or otherwise
nonintrospective musical analysis. But we have good reason to believe
that a musical experience is not 2 purely private thing, like seeing pink
clephants, and that reporting about such an eaperience need not be
subjective in the sense of it being 2 mete matter of opinion. Similarly,
swe have good reawn to believe that while both art and science con-
tribute to knowledge about ourselves and the world, it will not do to
pursue the objects of the one with the methous of the other, or to talk
about the one with the other's vocabulary. So weshall have to locate the
‘musical object somewhere between che opinion and the fact, and be=
rrem, Weeeall both che musical object,and
* and the activity of describing phenomena
itsexperience,
‘s called * phenomenology.”
Bue not just any description i+ phenomenological description. A.
phenomenclogical description concentrates not on facts, but upon
tssences, and attempts to uncover what there is about an object and
its experience which is estential (or necessary} if the object or the
experience is to be recognized at all, And since #he appearance or non
appearance of music is not dependent upon a set of factual ciream=
stances, it scems clear that musical essences lie within the realm of value
and meaning.
‘Thus, one of the most imporsant distinctions between ordinary
description and phenomenological description isthat the lauer describes
those aspects af experience which are given in the experience, but which.
are not reducible to any single experience. It would be strange indeed to
think of a piece of music coming into being the moment | become
sensually aware of it, only to pass into nonbeing when T turn away.
‘Whatever meaning is attached to a Mozart sonata, for example, tran=
scends any particular appearance of that sonata, since its meaning as a
sonata by Mozart i independent of is appearances. IF his were nox the
case, it would be impossible to say that any particular performance was
too clumsy, tan slow, too flishy, etc. In order for anyone to say this, be
‘mast haye an idea about what she sonata mieans, whatever the conditions
of an actual performance might be. These conditions can cover up the
sonata’s essence. either by bad performances or inappropriate settings
(for example, using it as background “music” ina sipermarker). Under
these circumstances, itis indeed (rue that what we are hearing is not
Mozart, Orother circumstances can bring outthe sonata‘sessence: those 10 INTRODUCTION
involving the submission ofthe performer to the music, he recognition
of its essences, and his ability 6 bring them out. In bod: eases, chese
esences were neither destroyed nor created by the various circum=
stances just described. The sonata which was mutilated last week by
some inept performer is the same one that provided 2 totally musical
experience yesterday, The problem for phenomenological description is
to clacidate those essnnces which make the musical experience possible,
vad whieh disinyash J musica! experience fron.a nonmesical one. But
alee wes, then
thew essences may oF may Ht be iv
they themselves are not contingent on these circumstances. Indeed,
phenomenology argues that esiences are not contingent, but simul-
taneously necesary and available for questioning,
T now take up a few simple examples dosigned to illustrate how a)
phenomenologist might interpret the world (including the world of
imuisic), Where relevant, | will compare this interpretation to the way
lnther modes of thought approach the same subject. The intention hereis
‘nwofold: to introduce the manner of behavior permeating this book.
and to suggest how his behavior differs from other modes of choughe,
while not neeesianly being totally untimiliar. The basic question is,
What is there about phenomenology that should interest a musician?
What's init far him?
‘Two examples have already been given. Music has been defined as a
certain reciprocal relation established between a person, his behavior,
and 2 sounding object. Generalizing on this statement brings us to the
reslization that an mterpretation ofthe world is inadequate ifitdoes not
consider the role of the interpreter. Even in the natural sciences, che
notion of objectivity has been revised to include this reciprocity
between observer and observed. (ts for this reason, too, that suggested
the impracticality of adhering to objective criteria of aesthetic value
‘These criteria spring fiom a personal judgment, which itself prewp-
poses an attitude toward what is judged, For the moment, then, we can
translate the reciprocity of observer and observed to mean that certain,
observable features of the musical object are valuable because they are
Usted by the observer. This is quite differenc from the pedantic and
patronizing attitude which suggests that because certain works of art are
valued along established lines af “objective” eriteria, we should desire
them, But et us deyclop the implications of this reciprocity abit Further,
with the following examples.
According to basic rules of plane geometry; the figure below can be
proven to be an equilateral triangle:
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