ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY.
PASCASIO
DOCTRINES
GENERAL
CONSIDERATION:
MALAGA v. PENACHOS
GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY
DEFINED: Instrumentality refers to any
agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions
or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some
if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter.
This term includes regulatory agencies,
chartered institutions, and government-
owned or controlled corporations.
DE LA LLANA v. ALBA
Valid abolition of offices is neither
removal nor separation of the
incumbents. ... And, of course, if the
abolition is void, the incumbent is
deemed never to have ceased to hold
office. The abolition of an office does not
amount to an illegal removal of its
incumbent is the principle that, in order to
be valid, the abolition must be made in
good faith."
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
POWERS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES:
TIO v. VIDEOGRAM
REGULATORY BOARD
"The true distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion
as to what it shall be, and conferring
authority or discretion as to its
execution to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be
done; to the latter, no valid objection can
be made."
U.S. v. ANG TANG HO
THE LAW MUST BE COMPLETE, IN
ALL ITS TERMS AND PROVISIONS,
when it leaves the legislative branch of
the government, and nothing must be left
to the judgement of delegate of the
legislature, so that, in form and
substance, it is a law in all its details in
presenti, but which may be left to take
effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the
ascertainment of any prescribed fact or
event.
YNOT v. IAC
The phrase "may see fit" is an
extremely generous and dangerous
condition, if condition it is. It is laden with
perilous opportunities for partiality and
abuse, and even corruption. One
searches in vain for the usual standard
and the reasonable guidelines, or better
1

still, the limitations that the said officers
must observe when they make their
distribution. There is none.
MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS
It has been advanced that whatever
power inherent in the government that is
neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive.
CARINO v. CHR
FACT FINDING IS NOT
ADJUDICATION, AND CANNOT BE
LIKENED TO THE JUDICIAL
FUNCTION OF A COURT OF JUSTICE,
or even a quasi-judicial agency or
official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the
facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function. To be considered such, the
faculty of receiving evidence and making
factual conclusions in a controversy must
be accompanied by the authority
of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by
law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.
LLDA v. COURT OF APPEALS
ISSUANCE OF CEASE & DESIST
ORDER IS IMPLIED POWER TO THE
POWOER TO REGULTE AND
ADJUDICATE. In the exercise of its
express powers under its charter as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
respect to pollution cases in the Laguna
Lake region, the authority of the LLDA
to issue a "cease and desist order" is,
perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may
well be reduced to a "toothless" paper
agency.
RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE CO.
v. NLRC
It is an elementary rule in administrative
law that administrative regulations and
policies enacted by administrative bodies
to interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce, have the force of
law, and are entitled to great respect.
QUASI- LEGISLATIVE
POWER:
CRUZ v. YOUNGBERG
The true distinction between the
delegation of power to make the law,
which involves a discretion as to what it
shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of law.
First cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made.
ARANETA v. GATMAITAN
Even without the Executive Order, the
restriction and banning of trawl fishing
from all Philippine waters come, under
the law, within the powers of the
Secretary of Agriculture, who in
compliance with his duties may even
cause the criminal prosecution of those
who violate his instructions.
2

PEOPLE v. MACERAN
All that is required is that the regulation
should be germane to the defects and
purposes of the law and that it should
conform to the standards that the law
prescribes. In the instant case the
regulation penalizing electro fishing is not
strictly in accordance with the Fisheries
Law, under which the regulation was
issued.
BAUTISTA v. JUINIO, EDU,
RAMOS
While the imposition of a fine or the
suspension of registration under the
conditions therein set forth is valid under
the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, the impounding of a vehicle finds
no statutory justification. To apply that
portion of Memorandum Circular No. 39
would be ultra vires. It must likewise be
made clear that a penalty even if
warranted can only be imposed in
accordance with the procedure required
by law.
PHIL. CONSUMERS
FOUNDATION v. DECS
If it were a legislative function, the grant
of prior notice and hearing to the
affected parties is not a requirement of
due process. As regards rates prescribed
by an administrative agency in the
exercise of its quasijudicial function,
prior notice and hearing are essential
to the validity of such rates.
CIR v. FORTUNE TOBACCO
CORP
rule-making power must be confined to
details for regulating the mode or
proceedings in order to carry into effect
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
the law as it has been enacted, and it
cannot be extended to amend or expand
the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the
statute. Administrative regulations
must always be in harmony with the
provisions of the law because any
resulting discrepancy between the two
will always be resolved in favor of the
basic law.
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF
METRO MANILA v. BOT
Previous notice and hearing as elements
of due process are constitutionally
required for the protection of life, right, or
property when its limitation of loss takes
place in consequence of a judicial or
quasi- judicial proceeding.
US v. PANLILIO
A violation of the orders of the BOA is not
a violation of the provision of the Act. The
orders of the BOA while they may
possible be said to have the force of law,
are statutes and not penal statutes, and
a violation of such order is not a penal
offense unless the statute itself
somewhere make a violation thereof
unlawful and penalizes it.
HOLY SPIRIT ASSOCIATION v.
DEFENSOR
1. A petition for prohibition is not the
proper remedy to assail an IRR
issued in the exercise of a quasi-
legislative function. Prohibition lies
against judicial or ministerial
functions, but not against legislative
or quasi-legislative functions.
2. Where a rule or regulation has a
provision not expressly stated or
contained in the statute being
3

implemented, that provision does
not necessarily contradict the
statute. In subordinate legislation
all that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; that
the regulation be not in contradiction
to but in conformity with the standards
prescribed by the law.
OPLE v. TORRES
It cannot be simplistically argued that
A.O. No. 308 merely implements the
Administrative Code. Such a System
requires a delicate adjustment of various
contending state policies — the primacy
of national security, the extent of privacy
interest against dossier-gathering by
PSDSA v. DE JESUS
The court reviewed the IRR and found
that Section 4.3 of Rule IV, and Sections
5.1 and 5.2 of Rule V are valid. The
provisions merely reiterate and
implement the related provisions of R.A.
No. 9155. Under the law, a division
superintendent has the authority and
responsibility to hire, place, and evaluate
all division supervisors and district
supervisors as well as all employees in
the division, both teaching and non-
teaching personnel, including school
heads. A school head is a person
responsible for the administrative and
instructional supervision of the schools or
cluster of schools. The division
superintendent, on the other hand,
supervises the operation of all public and
private elementary, secondary, and
integrated schools and learning centers.
CAWAD v. ABAD
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
Publication is not necessary for
interpretative regulations which Indeed,
publication, as a basic postulate of
procedural due process, is required by
law in order for administrative rules and
regulations to be effective.24 There are,
however, several exceptions, one of
which are interpretative regulations
which "need nothing further than their
bare issuance for they give no real
consequence more than what the law
itself has already prescribed."25
EQUI-ASIA PLACEMENT INC. v.
DFA
As for the sufficiency of standard test,
this Court had, in the past, accepted as
sufficient standards the following: "public
interest," "justice and equity," "public
convenience and welfare," and
"simplicity, economy and welfare."
QUASI- JUDICIAL
POWER
SYQUIA v. BOARD OF POWER &
WATER WORKS
Respondents' complaints against being
charged he additional cost of electricity
for common facilities used by the tenants
(in addition to those registered in their
respective apartment meters) give rise to
a question that is purely civil in
character that is to be adjudged under
the applicable provisions of the Civil
Code (not the Public Service Act) and not
by the respondent regulatory board
4

which has no jurisdiction but by the
regular courts.
GLOBE WIRELESS v. PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION
The jurisdiction and powers of
administrative agencies, like respondent
Commission, are limited to those
expressly granted or necessarily implied
from those granted in the legislation
creating such body; and any order
without or beyond such jurisdiction is
void.
PHIL. ASSOC. OF LAWYERS v.
AGRAVA
Members of the Philippine Bar
authorized by this Tribunal to practice
law, and in good standing, may practice
their profession before the Patent Office,
for the reason that much of the business
in said office involves the interpretation
and determination of the scope and
application of the Patent Law and other
laws applicable, as well as the
presentation of evidence to establish
facts involved;
GUEVARRA v. COMELEC
COMELEC, as an incident of its power to
try, hear, and decide any controversy,
may also punish for contempt. However,
to come under this jurisdiction, the
question should be controversial in
nature and must refer to the enforcement
and administration of all laws relative to
the conduct of election
SEC. OF JUSTICE v. LANTION
In a preliminary investigation which is an
administrative investigatory proceeding,
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
guarantees the respondent's basic due
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
process rights, granting him the right to
be furnished a copy of the complaint, the
affidavits, and other supporting
documents, and the right to submit
counter-affidavits and other supporting
documents within ten days from receipt
thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall
have the right to examine all other
evidence submitted by the complainant.
ANG TIBAY v. CIR
(1) The first of these rights is the right to
a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish
the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not
impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support it is a nullity, a
place when directly attached."
(4) Not only must there be some
evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be
"substantial." It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind accept as
adequate to support a conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered on
the evidence presented at the hearing,
or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected.
Only by confining the administrative
tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the
5

parties, can the latter be protected in their
right to know and meet the case against
them. It should not, however, detract
from their duty actively to see that the law
is enforced, and for that purpose, to use
the authorized legal methods of securing
evidence and informing itself of facts
material and relevant to the controversy.
Boards of inquiry may be appointed for
the purpose of investigating and
determining the facts in any given case,
but their report and decision are only
advisory.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or
any of its judges, therefore, must act on
its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision. It may be that the volume of
work is such that it is literally Relations
personally to decide all controversies
coming before them.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations
should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decision rendered.
MAGCAMIT v. INTERNAL
AFFAIRS SERVICE- PDEA
Finally, the last requirement, relating to
the form and substance of the decision of
a quasi-judicial body, further
complements the hearing and decision-
making due process rights and is similar
in substance to the constitutional
requirement that a decision of a court
must state distinctly the facts and the law
upon which it is based.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
Thus, the requirement that "[t]he decision
must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record AND disclosed to
the parties affected," was not complied
with
JUDICIAL REVIEW
ABEJO v. DELA CRUZ
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY
JURISDICTION: The Court held that
under the "sense-making and
expeditious doctrine of primary
jurisdiction ... the courts cannot or will n6t
determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of
an administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience, and
services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters
of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the purposes of
the regulatory statue administered.
BERNARDO v. ABALOS
The petitioners should have exhausted
all the remedies available to them at the
COMELEC level. A motion for
reconsideration gives the COMELEC an
opportunity to correct the error imputed to
it. Rule 65 requires that there must be no
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES v.
CA
However, if the case is such that its
determination requires the expertise,
6

specialized skills and knowledge of the
proper administrative bodies because
technical matters or intricate questions of
facts are involved, then relief must first
be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before a remedy will be
supplied by the courts even though the
matter is within the proper jurisdiction of
a court.
GSIS v. CSC
Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency
of adjudicatory power, or the authority to
hear and adjudge cases, should
normally and logically be deemed to
include the grant of authority to enforce
or execute the judgments it thus
renders.
PAAT v. COURT OF APPEALS
EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXHAUSTION
OF REMEDIES: However, we are not
amiss to reiterate that the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies as
tested by a battery of cases is not an
ironclad rule. It is disregarded:
(1) when there is a violation of due
process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a
legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is
patently illegal amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of
the administrative agency concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department
secretary whose acts as an alter ego of
the President bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
(7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be
unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private
land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
and
(11) urgency of judicial intervention
VALMONTE v. BELMONTE
However, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is subject to
settled exceptions, among which is when
only a question of law is involved.
PROS. TABAO v. JUDGE
LILAGAN
Under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, courts cannot take
cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies of special
competence. Note, too, that the plaintiff
in the replevin suit who seeks to recover
the shipment from the DENR had not
exhausted the administrative remedies.
ARROW TRANSPORTATION v.
BOT
It is essential then both from the
standpoint of the firms engaged as well
as of the riding public to ascertain
whether or not the procedure followed in
this case and very likely in others of a
similar nature satisfies the procedural
due process requirement.
KBMPBM v DOMINGUEZ
7

EXHAUSTION DOES NOT APPLY IN
CASE OF PRESUMED APPROVAL OF
THE PRESIDENT UNDER THE ALTER
EGO DOCTRINE: As to failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, the rule
is well-settled that this requirement does
not apply where the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts, as an
alter ego of the President, bear the
implied approval of the latter, unless
actually disapproved by him.
NATIONAL DEVT CO. v.
HERVILLA
FAILURE TO ASK FOR
RECONSIDEATION OR APPEAL TO
ADMINSITRATIVE SUPERIOR IS
FATAL TO CAUSE OF ACTION.
Records do not show that private
respondent Wilfredo Hervilla ever filed a
motion for reconsideration of the decision
of the Director of Lands issuing free
patent over the lands in dispute in favor
of petitioners' predecessor-in-interest.
Neither did he appeal said decision to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, nor did he appeal to the
office of the President of the Philippines.
In short, Hervilla failed to exhaust
administrative remedies, a flaw which,
to our mind, is fatal to a court review.
ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING
v. FACTORAN
FINDING OF FACT BY
ADMINISTRATIVE BODY SHOULD
NOT BE DISTURBED IF SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. A
question of fact is best left to the
determination of the administrative
bodies charged with the implementation
of the law they are entrusted to enforce.
As uniformly held by the Court, it is
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
sufficient that administrative findings of
fact are supported by evidence.
Substantial evidence is all that is needed
to support an administrative finding of
fact, and substantial evidence is "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."
Finding of fact in administrative decision
should not be disturbed if supported by
substantial evidence, but review is
justified when there has been a denial of
due process, or mistake of law or fraud,
collusion or arbitrary action in the
administrative proceeding, where the
procedure which led to factual findings is
irregular; when palpable errors are
committed; or when a grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, or
capriciousness is manifest.
CARPIO v. EXEC. SECRETARY
NAPOLCOM RETAINS POWER OF
CONTROL DESPITE THE CREATION
OF PLEB. Pursuant to the Act, the
Commission exercises appellate
jurisdiction, thru the regional appellate
boards, over decisions of both the PLEB
and the said mayors. This is so under
Section 20(c). Furthermore, it is the
Commission which shall issue the
implementing guidelines and
procedures to be adopted by the PLEB
for in the conduct of its hearings, and it
may assign NAPOLCOM hearing officers
to act as legal consultants of the PLEBs.
HEIRS OF EUGENIA V. ROXAS
INC v. IAC
EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES NOT
REQUIRED IN CASE OF GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
8
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO

TO LACK OR EXCESS OF In such case, an appeal to the

JURISDICTION. Public respondents
undeniably had knowledge prior to the
issuance of the license to Guillermo
Roxas and/or MJBFS that the subject
restaurant was owned by petitioner and
presently leased to Valley Resort
Corporation, and that Guillermo Roxas
and/or MJBFS' right to possess and
operate the restaurant was the subject of
a pending litigation.
The grant is arbitrary and capricious
exercise of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
INDUSTRIAL POWER SALES v.
SINSUAT
AXIOMS GOVERNING JUDICIAL
REVIEW BY CERTIORARI: first, that
before said actions may be entertained in
the courts of justice, it must be shown
that all the administrative remedies
prescribed by law or ordinance have
been exhausted; and second, that the
administrative decision may properly be
annulled or set aside only upon a clear
showing that the administrative official or
tribunal has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion.
Commissioner of Customs is not in reality
a plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v.
COMELEC
QUESTIONS INVOLVING FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION IS PURELY LEGAL
AND IS OF URGENT CHARACTER,
EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES IS NOT
NECESSARY. The circumstances
emphasized are squarely applicable with
the present case. First, petitioners allege
that the assailed issuances violated their
right to freedom of expression and the
principle of separation of church and
state. This is a purely legal question.
Second, the circumstances of the
present case indicate the urgency of
judicial intervention considering the
issue then on the RH Law as well as the
upcoming election

NATIONAL DEVT CO. v.

COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
WHEN DUE PROCESS IS
DISREGARDED, EXHAUSTION OF
REMEDIES IS NOT REQUIRED. While
as a rule, exhaustion of administrative
remedies must be done before court’s
jurisdiction may be invoked, the same is
not necessary if there is an utter
disregard of the principle of due process.

9

DIGEST
GENERAL
CONSIDERATION:
MALAGA v. PENACHOS
FACTS:
Iloilo State College of Fisheries caused the
publication of an invitation to bid for the
construction of a Micro Lab Bldg. The Notice
announced that the last day of submission of
the prequalification bids was 2 Dec 1988.
Petitioners submitted their pre-qualification
documents. However, they were not allowed
to participate on the ground that they passed
the requirements late (beyond 10am cut off
time).
Petitioners filed a petition seeking a
restraining order against the conduct of the
bidding process. A restraining order was
issued to which defendants filed a motion to
lift on the basis of PD1818.
Respondents contend that PD1818 prohibits
any court to issue any restraining order
against project of the government.
Petitioners contend that PD1818 is not
applicable because ISCOF has its own
charter and is not a part of the national
government.
RTC lifted the order prompting petitioner to
file a petition with the SC.
ISSUE:
Is ISCOF a government instrumentality?
(Yes)
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
Is it protected by the prohibition under PD
1818? (No)
RULING:
ISCOF is a government instrumentality.
However, PD 1818 is not applicable since the
prohibition from issuing restraining orders
contemplates an administrative body’s
exercise of discretion in technical cases only
and does not apply to questions of law.
In this case, what is involved is non-
compliance with procedural rules on bidding
which requires strict observance.
GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY
DEFINED: Instrumentality refers to any
agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction
by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special
funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,
usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions,
and government-owned or controlled
corporations.
DE LA LLANA v. ALBA
VALID ABOLITION OF OFFICE IS
NEITHER REMOVAL NOR SEPARATION
OF INCUMBENTS FROM OFFICE.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a case for declaratory relief
with the SC assailing the constitutionality of
BP 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act.
Petitioner contends that the provisions of BP
129 which abolish some inferior courts
collide with the security of tenure of
incumbent judges and justices.
ISSUE:
Is there removal from office by virtue of a
reorganization law? (No)
10

RULING:
Valid abolition of offices is neither removal
nor separation of the incumbents. ... And, of
course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent
is deemed never to have ceased to hold
office. The abolition of an office does not
amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent
is the principle that, in order to be valid, the
abolition must be made in good faith."
Removal is to be distinguished from
termination by virtue of the abolition of the
office. There can be no tenure to a non-
existent office. After the abolition, there is in
law no occupant. In case of removal, there is
an office with an occupant who would
thereby lose his position. It is in that sense
that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of
tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the
incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the
effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no
distinction exists between removal and the
abolition of the office. Realistically, it is
devoid of significance. He ceases to be a
member of the judiciary.
POWERS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES:
TIO v. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY
BOARD
CONFERMENT OF AUTHORITY TO
ENFORCE LAW IS NOT A DELEGATION
OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
FACTS:
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of PD
1987 creating the Videogram Regulatory
Board was promulgated.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
The assailed law among others empower the
VRB to "solicit the direct assistance of other
agencies and units of the government and
deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the
heads or personnel of such agencies and
units to perform enforcement functions for
the Board.”
Petitioner contends that this power is an
undue delegation of legislative power.
ISSUE:
Is there an undue delegation of legislative
power?
RULING:
It is not a delegation of the power to legislate
but merely a conferment of authority or
discretion as to its execution, enforcement,
and implementation.
"The true distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it
shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter, no
valid objection can be made."
Besides, in the very language of the decree,
the authority of the BOARD to solicit such
assistance is for a "fixed and limited period"
with the deputized agencies concerned
being "subject to the direction and control of
the BOARD." That the grant of such authority
might be the source of graft and corruption
would not stigmatize the DECREE as
unconstitutional. Should the eventuality
occur, the aggrieved parties will not be
without adequate remedy in law.
U.S. v. ANG TANG HO
A LAW WHICH DELEGATES THE POWER
TO FIX PRICE WITHOUT ANY STANDARD
11

IS AN INVALID DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER.
FACTS:
Act No. 2868 was passed which authorized
the Gov-Gen to issue necessary rules to
prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and
speculation in, palay, rice or corn, inter alia.
The law also defines what constitute a
monopoly or hoarding but does not specify
the price or defined any basis for fixing the
price.
Thereafter, the Gov-Gen issue a
proclamation fixing the price for the sale of
rice. The controversy began when a
Petitioner was charged with sale of rice at an
excessive price. He was found guilty by the
lower court prompting petitioner to appeal to
the SC.
ISSUE:
Is there a valid delegation of legislative
power to the Executive? (No)
RULING:
The law must be complete, in all its terms
and provisions, when it leaves the legislative
branch of the government, and nothing must
be left to the judgement of delegate of the
legislature, so that, in form and substance, it
is a law in all its details in presenti, but which
may be left to take effect in futuro, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any
prescribed fact or event.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the
violation of the proclamation of the Governor-
General which constitutes the crime. Without
that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice
at any price.
The Legislature did not specify or define
what was "any cause," or what was "an
extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or
corn," Neither did it specify or define the
conditions upon which the proclamation
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
should be issued. In the absence of the
proclamation no crime was committed.
Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to
authorized the Governor-General in his
discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the
price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in
violation of the price of rice, and to make the
sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a
crime, is unconstitutional and void.
YNOT v. IAC
A ROVING COMMISSION WHICH
GRANTS UNLIMITED DISCRETION IS AN
INVALID DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER
FACTS:
Petitioner transported 6 carabaos in a pum
boat from Masbate to Iloilo. They were
confiscated by the station commander of
Barotac for violation of EO 626-A.
EO 626-A, was issued by Pres. Marcos in the
exercise of his legislative power. In gist, it
amended EO 626 to the effect that it also
prohibited inter-provincial movement of
carabao (not just carabeef). The Order also
provides that the carabao or carabeef
transported in violation of this Executive
Order as amended shall be subject to
confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as
the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the
case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers
through dispersal as the Director of Animal
Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
The RTC sustained the confiscation which
was affirmed the CA prompting petitioner to
appeal to SC.
ISSUE:
12

Is the standard may see fit sufficient to be a
valid delegation of legislative power? (No)
RULING:
No. It is an invalid delegation of legislative
power because they are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of properties
arbitrarily taken.
The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely
generous and dangerous condition, if
condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and
even corruption. One searches in vain for the
usual standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the limitations that
the said officers must observe when they
make their distribution. There is none. Their
options are apparently boundless. Who shall
be the fortunate beneficiaries of their
generosity and by what criteria shall they be
chosen? Only the officers named can supply
the answer, they and they alone may choose
the grantee as they see fit, and in their own
exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here
a "roving commission," a wide and
sweeping authority that is not "canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing," in
short, a clearly profligate and therefore
invalid delegation of legislative powers.
MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS
EXERCISE OF PRESIDENT’S RESIDUAL
POWER IS NOT AN UNDUE DELEGATION
OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
FACTS:
In February 1986, former President
Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the
presidency via the non-violent "people
power" revolution and was forced into exile.
Corazon C. Aquino was then declared
President of the Republic under a
revolutionary government.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
Marcos signified his wish to return to the
Philippines to die. Considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return at a
time when the government was still
threatened and unstable and the economy
was just beginning to rise and move forward,
Aquino decided to bar the return of Marcos
and his family.’
ISSUE:
Is the President empowered to prohibit the
return of Marcos in the country despite the
absence of an express power to do so under
the Constitution? (Yes)
RULING:
It has been advanced that whatever power
inherent in the government that is neither
legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
The power involved is the President's
residual power to protect the general welfare
of the people. It is founded on the duty of the
President, as steward of the people. To
paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not
only the power of the President but also
his duty to do anything not forbidden by
the Constitution or the laws that the
needs of the nation demand.
CARINO v. CHR
CHR IS NOT EMPOWERED TO
ADJUDICATE, IT IS ONLY EMPOWERED
TO INVESTIGATE
FACTS:
Several teachers including private
respondents in this case undertook a mass
concerted actions on a Monday (class day)
as a response to the alleged failure of the
authorities to act upon their grievances.
The private respondents were
administratively charged. This prompted
respondents to file a complaint with the CHR.
Petitioner, Secretary of Education,
intervened and moved that the complaint be
dismissed.
13

Pending determination of motion to dismiss,
Carino promulgated a decision dismissing
Esber from service and suspension for
Babaran, Budoy, and Del Castillo.
CHR denied the motion to dismiss prompting
Carino to file a petition with the SC.
ISSUE:
Is the CHR empowered to adjudicate on
controversies? (No)
RULING:
The most that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative power
is that it may investigate, i.e., receive
evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights.
Fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot
be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or
official. The function of receiving evidence
and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in
a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy
may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject
to such appeals or modes of review as may
be provided by law. This function, to repeat,
the Commission does not have.
"Adjudicate" means: "To settle in the
exercise of judicial authority. To determine
finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its
strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To
pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree,
or to sentence or condemn... implies a
judicial determination of a fact, and the entry
of a judgment."
LLDA v. COURT OF APPEALS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
POWER TO ISSUE CEASE AND DESIST
ORDER BY LLDA IS AN IMPLIED POWER
GRANTED BY ITS CHARTER
FACTS:
Task Force Camarin Dumpsite filed a letter-
complaint with the LLDA seeking to stop the
operation of the open garbage dumpsite due
to its harmful effects. Following an
investigation conducted by LLDA, it issued a
Cease and Desist Order against Caloocan
City to desist from dumping any form of
garbage.
Caloocan filed with the RTC an action for the
declaration of nullity of the C&D Order. RTC
decided in favor of Caloocan City. LLDA then
filed a petition for certiorari with the SC which
remanded the same to CA. CA ruled that
RTC had no jurisdiction to try and hear
LLDA’s C&D Order and that LLDA has no
power to issue a C&D Order.
ISSUE:
Is LLDA authorized to issue a Cease and
Desist Order absent an express provision in
its charter? (Yes)
RULING:
LLDA as a specialized administrative agency
is mandated to pass upon and approve or
disapprove all plans proposed by LGU within
the region etc. It exercises a quasi-judicial
function.
While it is a fundamental rule that an
administrative agency has only such powers
as are expressly granted to it by law, it is
likewise a settled rule that an administrative
agency has also such powers as are
necessarily implied in the exercise of its
express powers.
In the exercise of its express powers under
its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial
body with respect to pollution cases in the
Laguna Lake region, the authority of the
LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order"
is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well
be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
14

RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE CO. v.
NLRC
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES ARE ENTITLED
TO GREAT RESPECT BY COURTS
FACTS:
Private Respondent Coria was initially hired
as a casual employee and eventually
promoted to Inspector of the Fire Division by
Rizal Empire.
Sometime thereafter, he was dismissed from
work on the grounds of tardiness and
unexcused absences. Coria filed a complaint
with the Labor Dept. The Labor Arbiter order
his reinstatement. Petitioner appealed to
NLRC which dismissed the appeal on the
ground that the same had been filed out of
time.
The focal point of the case is the provision
under NLRC Rules which provides that no
motion or request for extension to perfect an
appeal shall be entertained.
ISSUE:
May the court allow the appeal contrary to
the rules promulgated by an administrative
body? (No)
RULING:
It is an elementary rule in administrative law
that administrative regulations and policies
enacted by administrative bodies to interpret
the law which they are entrusted to enforce,
have the force of law, and are entitled to
great respect.
QUASI- LEGISLATIVE
POWER:
CRUZ v. YOUNGBERG
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO
EXECUTE LAW IS VALID, NOT UNDUE
DELEGATION
FACTS:
Petitioner sought that Act No. 3155
prohibiting the importation of cattle from
foreign countries into the Philippines be
declared as unconstitutional.
Among others, it contends that the power
given by Act No 3155 to the Governor-
General to suspend or not, at his discretion,
the prohibition provided in the act constitutes
unlawful delegation of the legislative powers.
ISSUE:
Is the power to suspend the application of the
law at his discretion a valid delegation of
legislative power? (Yes)
RULING:
The delegation is an authority as to the
execution of the law. No objection can be
made.
The true distinction between the delegation
of power to make the law, which involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of law. The first cannot be done;
the latter no valid objection can be made.
ARANETA v. GATMAITAN
A REGULATION IS VALID IF THE LAW IS
COMPLETE. THE FISHERIES LAW IS
COMPLETE SO AS TO EMPOWER THE
SEC TO PROHIBIT TRAWLING.
FACTS:
President issued an EO prohibiting the use
of trawls in San Miguel Bay, CamSur. A
group of Otter Trawl Operators filed a
declaratory relief with the CFI. The CFI
declared the assailed orders as invalid.
It is contended that EO expanded the
Fisheries Law. They contend that trawl
15

fishing is not expressly prohibited by the law,
thus the EO cannot prohibit what the law
does not prohibit.
They also contend that the law unduly
delegated the legislative power.
ISSUE:
Did the EO expand the law where the law
does not expressly prohibit trawling? (No)
Is there a valid delegation of legislative
power? (Yes)
RULING:
Even without the Executive Order, the
restriction and banning of trawl fishing from
all Philippine waters come, under the law,
within the powers of the Secretary of
Agriculture, who in compliance with his
duties may even cause the criminal
prosecution of those who violate his
instructions.
Under the Fisheries Law, the Sec. of
Agriculture is authorized to promulgate rules
restricting the use of any fish net or fishing
device for the protection of fry or fish eggs.
The law likewise authorizes the Secretary to
create refuges and sanctuaries for fishes.
The Legislature cannot delegate legislative
power to enact any law. If the law is a law
unto itself, and it does nothing more than to
authorize the delegate to make rules and
regulations to carry it into effect, then the
Legislature created the law. There is no
delegation of power and it is valid. On the
other hand, if the act within itself does not
define a crime and is not complete, and some
legislative act remains to be done to make it
a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested
in the delegate, the act is delegation of
legislative power, is unconstitutional and
void.
Insofar as the protection of fish fry or fish egg
is concerned the law is complete in itself,
leaving to the Sec. of Agriculture the
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
promulgation of rules and regulations to
carry into effect the legislative intent.
PEOPLE v. MACERAN
THE LAW MUST EXPRESSLY PENALIZE
ELECTROFISHING, OTHERWISE, ANY
REGULATION DOING SO IS INVALID
FACTS:
The respondents were charged with violating
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1
which penalizes electro fishing in fresh water
fisheries.
This was promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries under the old
Fisheries Law and the law creating the
Fisheries Commission.
The municipal court quashed the complaint
and held that the law does not clearly prohibit
electro fishing, hence the executive and
judicial departments cannot consider the
same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the
dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC.
ISSUE:
Did the administrative order expand the
Fisheries Law? (Yes, Note that the fisheries
law was amended, including electrofishing
as a prohibited act)
RULING:
Administrative agents are clothed with rule-
making powers because the lawmaking body
finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to
anticipate and provide for the multifarious
and complex situations that may be
encountered in enforcing the law.
All that is required is that the regulation
should be germane to the defects and
purposes of the law and that it should
conform to the standards that the law
prescribes.
16

The grant of the rule-making power to
administrative agencies is a relaxation of the
principle of separation of powers and is an
exception to the non-delegation of
legislative, powers.
Administrative regulations or "subordinate
legislation calculated to promote the public
interest are necessary because of "the
growing complexity of modem life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of
administering the law."
In case of discrepancy between the basic law
and a rule or regulation issued to implement
said law, the basic law prevails because said
rule or regulation cannot go beyond the
terms and provisions of the basic law.
In the instant case the regulation penalizing
electro fishing is not strictly in accordance
with the Fisheries Law, under which the
regulation was issued, because the law itself
does not expressly punish electro fishing.
BAUTISTA v. JUINIO, EDU, RAMOS
PENALTY IMPOSED IN A REGULATION
MUST BE REFLECTED IN THE LAW
ITSELF.
FACTS:
Letter of Instruction No. 869, issued in
response to the protracted oil crisis, pursuant
thereto, reespondent Juinio issued
Memorandum Circular No. 39, which
imposed penalties of fine, impounding of
vehicle, and cancellation of registration on
owners of the above-specified vehicles such
letter of instruction.
The memorandum is being assailed as
unconstitutional for being violative of the
doctrine of undue delegation of legislative
power. It is to be noted that Memorandum
Circular No. 39 does not impose the penalty
of confiscation but merely that of
impounding, fine, and for the third offense,
that of cancellation of certificate of
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
registration and for the rest of the year or for
ninety days whichever is longer.
ISSUE:
Did the MC unduly expand the law when it
imposed a penalti of impounding?
RULING:
The regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be
in harmony with the provisions of the law,
and for the sole purpose of carrying into
effect its general provisions. By such
regulations, of course, the law itself cannot
be extended. So long, however, as the
regulations relate solely to carrying into
effect the provisions of the law, they are valid
Administrative interpretation of the law is at
best merely advisory, for it is the courts that
finally determine what the law means.' It
cannot be otherwise as the Constitution
limits the authority of the President, in whom
all executive power resides, to take care that
the laws be faithfully executed. No lesser
administrative executive office or agency
then can, contrary to the express language
of the Constitution, assert for itself a more
extensive prerogative."
While the imposition of a fine or the
suspension of registration under the
conditions therein set forth is valid under the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the
impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory
justification. To apply that portion of
Memorandum Circular No. 39 would be ultra
vires. It must likewise be made clear that a
penalty even if warranted can only be
imposed in accordance with the procedure
required by law.
PHIL. CONSUMERS FOUNDATION v.
DECS
17

NOTICE AND HEARING NOT
MANDATORY IN THE EXERCISE OF
QUASI LEGISLATIVE POWER
FACTS:
The Department of Education, Culture, and
Sports issued an order authorizing the 15 to
20% increase in school fees, in light of the
recommendation submitted by the Task
Force on Private Higher Education created
by the DECS. The petitioner sought
reconsideration arguing that the increase is
too high, so the DECS issued DO No. 37
lowering the ceiling of 10 to 15% increase.
Despite the reduction, the petitioner opposed
the increases. Petitioner urged the president
to suspend its implementation but he
obtained no response.
Petitioner filed an instant petition for
prohibition, seeking that judgment be
rendered declaring the questioned
Department Order unconstitutional on the
ground that the Department Order is issued
without legal basis.
ISSUE:
Is there a need for a prior notice and hearing
in the application of new rates for tuition fee
hike for all private schools? (No)
RULING:
QUASI JUDICIAL VS QUASI
LEGISLATIVE, WHEN NOTICE AND
HEARING MANDATORY: The function of
prescribing rates by an administrative
agency may be either a legislative or an
adjudicative function.
If it were a legislative function, the grant of
prior notice and hearing to the affected
parties is not a requirement of due
process. As regards rates prescribed by an
administrative agency in the exercise of its
quasijudicial function, prior notice and
hearing are essential to the validity of
such rates.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
When the rules and/or rates laid down by an
administrative agency are meant to apply to
all enterprises of a given kind throughout the
country, they may partake of a legislative
character.
Where the rules and the rates imposed apply
exclusively to a particular party, based upon
a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-
judicial in character.
CIR v. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP
DISCREPANCY BETWEEN REGULATION
AND LAW WILL RENDER THE FORMER
VOID.
FACTS:
Immediately prior to January 1, 1997, the -
mentioned cigarette brands were subject to
ad valorem tax pursuant to then Section 142
of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended.
However, on January 1, 1997, R.A. No. 8240
took effect whereby a shift from the ad
valorem tax (AVT) system to the specific tax
system was made and subjecting the
aforesaid cigarette brands to specific tax
under [S]ection 142 thereof, now
renumbered as Sec. 145 of the Tax Code of
1997, pertinent provisions of which are
quoted thus:
The rates of excise tax on cigars and
cigarettes under paragraphs (1), (2) (3) and
(4) hereof, shall be increased by twelve
percent (12%) on January 1, 2000.
To implement the provisions for a twelve
percent (12%) increase of excise tax on,
among others, cigars and cigarettes packed
by machines by January 1, 2000, the
Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation
of the respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, issued Revenue Regulations No.
17-99, dated December 16, 1999
18

For the period covering January 1-31, 2000,
petitioner allegedly paid specific taxes on all
brands manufactured and removed in the
total amounts of P585,705,250.00.
On February 7, 2000, Fortune filed with
respondent’s Appellate Division a claim for
refund or tax credit of its purportedly overpaid
excise tax for the month of January 2000 in
the amount of P35,651,410.00, granted and
ordered CIR to refund the same.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The Supreme Court have previously
declared, rule-making power must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceedings in order to carry into effect the
law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be
extended to amend or expand the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not
covered by the statute. Administrative
regulations must always be in harmony
with the provisions of the law because any
resulting discrepancy between the two will
always be resolved in favor of the basic law.
By adding the qualification that the tax due
after the 12% increase becomes effective
shall not be lower than the tax actually paid
prior to 1 January 2000, Revenue Regulation
No. 17-99 effectively imposes a tax which is
the higher amount between the ad valorem
tax being paid at the end of the three (3)-year
transition period and the specific tax under
paragraph C, sub-paragraph (1)-(4), as
increased by 12%—a situation not supported
by the plain wording of Section 145 of the
Tax Code.
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO
MANILA v. BOT
AN ORDER IN THE EXERCISE OF QUASI
LEGISLATIVE POWER NEED NOT
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
COMPLY WITH PRIOR NOTICE AND
HEARING
FACTS:
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro
Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic
corporation composed of taxicab operators,
who are grantees of Certificates of Public
Convenience.
Respondent Board of Transportation (BOT)
issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42
which provides for the phasing out old and
dilapidated taxis.
Pursuant to BOT Memo-Circular No. 77-42,
taxi units with year models over six (6) years
old are now banned from operating as public
utilities in Metro Manila.
Petitioners take the position that fixing the
ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and
oppressive because the roadworthiness of
taxicabs depends upon their kind of
maintenance, they also contend that they
were not given the opportunity to be heard..
ISSUE:
Is there a need for prior notice in the
promulgation of an administrative
regulation? (No)
RULING:
Previous notice and hearing as elements of
due process are constitutionally required for
the protection of life, right, or property when
its limitation of loss takes place in
consequence of a judicial or quasi- judicial
proceeding.
Conversely, since the assailed order was
made pursuant to quasi-legislative powers,
no prior hearing is required.
US v. PANLILIO
THE PENAL LAW MUST EXPRESSLY
STATE THAT VIOLATION OF ORDERS OF
19

DELEGATE WILL ALSO AMOUNT TO A
CRIME
FACTS:
Accused was convicted of violation of Acr
1760 re quarantine of animals suffering
contagious disease. The accused contends
that the facts alleged in the information and
proved on the trial do not constitute a
violation of law.
ISSUE:
Can accused be penalized for the order of
the Bureau of Agriculture? (No)
RULING:
Nowhere in the law is the violation of the
orders of the BOA prohibited or made
unlawful, not is there a penalty for its
violation. The law expressly provides for acts
which shall be prohibited or unlawful, the
case does not fall within any of them.
A violation of the orders of the BOA is not a
violation of the provision of the Act. The
orders of the BOA while they may possible
be said to have the force of law, are statutes
and not penal statutes, and a violation of
such order is not a penal offense unless the
statute itself somewhere make a violation
thereof unlawful and penalizes it.
HOLY SPIRIT ASSOCIATION v.
DEFENSOR
FACTS:
Pursuant to RA 9207 aka National
Government Center Housing and Land
Utilization Act of 2003, the NGC
Administration Committee formulated the
IRR of said law. In assailing the provisions of
the law, petitioners filed a petition for
prohibition with the SC.
1 Implicit in this authority and the statutes objective of urban poor
In Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee is granted the
power to administer, formulate guidelines and policies, and
implement the disposition of the areas covered by the law.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
OSG contends that the petition for prohibition
filed by petitioners is an improper remedy
because a writ of prohibition does not lie
against the exercise of a quasi-legislative
function.
Petitioners contends:
1. That while Sec. 3.2 (a.1) of the IRR fixes
the selling rate of a lot at P700.00 per sq. m.,
R.A. No. 9207 does not provide for the price.
2. That the adoption of the assailed IRR
suffers from a procedural flaw.
ISSUE:
Is prohibition a proper remedy to assail a
body’s exercise of quasi-legislative power?
RULING:
3. A petition for prohibition is not the
proper remedy to assail an IRR issued
in the exercise of a quasi-legislative
function. Prohibition lies against judicial
or ministerial functions, but not against
legislative or quasi-legislative functions.
Where the principal relief sought is to
invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is
an ordinary action for its nullification, an
action which properly falls under the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
4. Where a rule or regulation has a
provision not expressly stated or
contained in the statute being
implemented, that provision does not
necessarily contradict the statute. In
subordinate legislation all that is
required is that the regulation should be
germane to the objects and purposes of
the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction to but in conformity with the
standards prescribed by the law.1
housing is the power of the Committee to formulate the manner
by which the reserved property may be allocated to the
20

The Committees authority to fix the
selling price of the lots may be likened to
the rate-fixing power of administrative
agencies. In case of a delegation of rate-
fixing power, the only standard which the
legislature is required to prescribe for the
guidance of the administrative authority
is that the rate be reasonable and just.
OPLE v. TORRES
PRESIDENT MAY NOT ENACT A LAW
THROUGH AN ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
OTHERWISE HE WILL ENCROACH UPON
CONGRESS’ LEGISLATIVE POWER
FACTS:
Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" on
important constitutional grounds, among
others, viz: it is a usurpation of the power of
Congress to legislate.
Petitioner claims that AO 308 is not a mere
administrative order but a law and hence
beyond the power of the President to issue.
ISSUE:
Did AO308 encroached upon the legislative
power of Congress? (Yes)
RULING:
An administrative order is an ordinance
issued by the President which relates to
specific aspects in the administrative
operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the
sole purpose of implementing the law and
carrying out the legislative policy.
beneficiaries. Under this broad power, the Committee is
mandated to fill in the details such as the qualifications of
beneficiaries, the selling price of the lots, the terms and
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O.
No. 308 merely implements the
Administrative Code. Such a System
requires a delicate adjustment of various
contending state policies — the primacy of
national security, the extent of privacy
interest against dossier-gathering by
government, the choice of policies, etc.
PSDSA v. DE JESUS
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as
the “Governance of Basic Education Act
2001,” became a law on August 11, 2001, in
accordance with Section 27(1), Article VI of
the Constitution. Under Section 14 of the law,
the DepEd Secretary is mandated to
“promulgate the implementing rules and
regulations within ninety (90) days after the
approval of the Act, provided that the
principle of shared governance shall be fully
implemented within two (2) years” after such
approval.
On March 13, 2003, the PSDSA, the national
organization of about 1,800 public school
district supervisors of the DepEd, in behalf of
its officers and members, filed the instant
petition for prohibition and mandamus,
alleging that the implementing regulation is
inconsistent with the intent and letter of the
law.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The court reviewed the IRR and found that
Section 4.3 of Rule IV, and Sections 5.1 and
5.2 of Rule V are valid. The provisions merely
reiterate and implement the related
provisions of R.A. No. 9155. Under the law,
a division superintendent has the authority
and responsibility to hire, place, and evaluate
all division supervisors and district
supervisors as well as all employees in the
conditions governing the sale and other key particulars
necessary to implement the objective of the law.
21

division, both teaching and non-teaching
personnel, including school heads. A school
head is a person responsible for the
administrative and instructional supervision
of the schools or cluster of schools. The
division superintendent, on the other hand,
supervises the operation of all public and
private elementary, secondary, and
integrated schools and learning centers.
CAWAD v. ABAD
PUBLICATION NOT NECESSARY FOR
INTERPRETATIVE REGULATIONS
WHERE NOTHING IS NO CHANGE IN THE
LAW
FACTS:
RA 7305 aka Magna Carta of Public Health
Workers was signed into law. Subsequently,
Congress issued Joint Resolution No. 4
authorizing the President of the Philippines
to Modify the Compensation and Position
Classification System of Civilian Personnel
and the Base Pay Schedule of Military and
Uniformed Personnel in the Government,
and for other Purposes,
Thereafter, respondents DBM and CSC
issued one of the two assailed issuances,
DBM-CSC Joint Circular No. 1, Series of
20122. Shortly thereafter respondents DBM
and DOH then circulated the other assailed
issuance, DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1,
Series of 2012.
In a letter9 addressed to respondents
Secretary of Budget and Management and
Secretary of Health, petitioners expressed
2 basis of PHW's status in the plantilla of regular positions were already
to prescribe the rules on the grant of Step Increments due to
meritorious performance and Step Increment due to length of service,
it provided that "an official or employee authorized to be granted
Longevity Pay under an existing law is not eligible for the grant of Step
Increment due to length of service."
3 immaterial to its validity because in view of the pronouncements above,
In this case, the DBM-DOH Joint Circular in question gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself had already prescribed. As
previously discussed, the qualification of actual exposure to danger for
the PHW's entitlement to hazard pay, the rates of P50 and P25
subsistence allowance, and the entitlement to longevity pay on the
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
their opposition to the Joint Circular cited
above on the ground that the same
diminishes the benefits granted by the
Magna Carta to PHWs.
Petitioners contend that the DBM-DOH Joint
Circular is null and void for its failure to
comply with Section 3523 of RA No. 7305
providing that its implementing rules
shall take effect thirty (30) days after
publication in a newspaper of general
circulation, as well as its failure to file a copy
of the same with the University of the
Philippines Law Center-Office of the National
Administrative Register (UP Law Center-
ONAR), jurisprudence as well as the
circumstances of this case dictate otherwise.
ISSUE:
Is publication necessary for interpretative
regulation? (No)
RULING:
Publication is not necessary for interpretative
regulations which Indeed, publication, as a
basic postulate of procedural due process, is
required by law in order for administrative
rules and regulations to be effective.24 There
are, however, several exceptions, one of
which are interpretative regulations which
"need nothing further than their bare
issuance for they give no real consequence
more than what the law itself has already
prescribed."25 These regulations need not be
published for they add nothing to the law and
do not affect substantial rights of any
person.3
prescribed and authorized by pre-existing law. There is really no new
obligation or duty imposed by the subject circular for it merely
reiterated those embodied in RA No. 7305 and its Revised IRR. The
Joint Circular did not modify, amend nor supplant the Revised IRR, the
validity of which is undisputed. Consequently, whether it was duly
published and filed with the UP Law Center - ONAR is necessarily
interpretative regulations, such as the DBM-DOH circular herein, need
not be published nor filed with the UP Law Center - ONAR in order to
be effective. Neither is prior hearing or consultation mandatory.
22

EQUI-ASIA PLACEMENT INC. v. DFA
A REGULATION IS VALID AS LONG AS
THE LAW PROVIDED SUFFICIENT
STANDARD.
FACTS:
Petitioner Equi-Asia recruited and deployed
Manny Razon and was sent to South Korea.
Thereafter, while in South Korea, Razon died
of acute cardiac arrest while asleep at the
dormitory of Samsung Textile. Pertinent
communications were made with the
appropriate government agencies. POEA
sent a telegram-directive to Equi-Asia,
ordering petitioner to provide Prepaid Ticket
Advice (PTA) for the repatriation of the
remains and belongings of deceased Razon.
Petitioner declined to follow the directive on
the ground that the deceased violated his
employment contract when he unlawfully
escaped from the company assigned to him.
Another letter-directive was sent to
petitioner. The letter cited Secs. 52 to 55 of
the IRR of RA 8042 aka Migrant Workers
Act of 1995.
CA dismissed the petition. petitioner is
impugning the subject provisions of the
Omnibus Rules for allegedly expanding the
scope of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042
by: first, imposing upon it the primary
obligation to repatriate the remains of the
deceased Razon including the duty to
advance the cost of the plane fare for the
transport of Razon's remains; and second,
by ordering it to do so without prior
determination of the existence of employer-
employee relationship between itself and
Razon.
4 employment was because of the OFW's own undoing, it is only fair that
Nor do we see any reason to stamp Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules
as invalid for allegedly contravening Section 15 of the law which states
that a placement agency shall not be responsible for a worker's
repatriation should the termination of the employer-employee
relationship be due to the fault of the OFW. To our mind, the statute
merely states the general principle that in case the severance of the
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
OSG contends that Sec. 15 of RA 8042
leaves no doubt that a recruitment agency
shall bear the primary responsibility and that
the requirement of prior notice and hearing
are not essential.
ISSUE:
Is there an unlawful expansion of the law?
(No)
RULING:
While Republic Act No. 8042 does not
expressly state that petitioner shall be
primarily obligated to transport back here to
the Philippines the remains of the deceased
Razon, nevertheless, such duty is imposed
upon him as the statute clearly dictates that
"the repatriation of remains and transport of
the personal belongings of a deceased
worker and all costs attendant
thereto shall be borne by the
principal and/or the local agency." That the
concerned government agencies opted to
demand the performance of said
responsibility solely upon petitioner does not
make said directives invalid as the law plainly
obliges a local placement agency such as
herein petitioner to bear the burden of
repatriating the remains of a deceased OFW
with or without recourse to the principal
abroad. In this regard, we see no reason to
invalidate Section 52 of the omnibus rules as
Republic Act No. 8042 itself permits the
situation wherein a local recruitment agency
can be held exclusively responsible for the
repatriation of a deceased OFW.
As for the sufficiency of standard test, this
Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient
standards the following: "public interest,"
"justice and equity," "public convenience and
welfare," and "simplicity, economy and
welfare."4
he or she should shoulder the costs of his or her homecoming. Section
15 of Republic Act No. 8042, however, certainly does not preclude a
placement agency from establishing the circumstances surrounding an
OFW's dismissal from service in an appropriate proceeding. As such
determination would most likely take some time, it is only proper that
an OFW be brought back here in our country at the soonest
23
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO

provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public

Service Act) and not by the respondent
regulatory board which has no jurisdiction
QUASI- JUDICIAL POWER but by the regular courts of general
jurisdiction.

SYQUIA v. BOARD OF POWER &

WATER WORKS GLOBE WIRELESS v. PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION
BOARD OF POWER HAS NO
JURISDICTION TO DECIDE ON MATTER QUASI JUDICIAL BODY TASKED WITH
PURELY CIVIL IN CHARACTER POWER TO ADJUDICATE RATES DOES
NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO RULE ON
FACTS: NEGLIGENCE
Private respondents (tenants) filed a FACTS:
complaint with respondent charging
petitioner (administrator of apartment) with Private respondent Arnaiz filed a complaint
the offense of selling electricity without with PSA against petitioner following an
permit. Respondents contend that petitioner incident wherein the message supposed to
billed them for the electricity consumption on be transmitted to Madrid Spain did not reach
the common areas of the apartment the addressee.
administered by petitioner. Petitioner question PSC’s jurisdiction. PSC
Petitioner moved for dismissal on the ground ordered petitioner to pay a fine and refund
that the Board has no jurisdiction. the sum for the undelivered message. This
Respondent, however, denied the motion. prompted petitioner to file an appeal to the
SC.
ISSUE:
The jurisdiction of the respondent is provided
Does the Board have jurisdiction to rule on in Sec. 5: The Public Service Commission is
the conditions of lease between the landlord hereby given jurisdiction over the
and the tenant? (No) grantee only with respect to the rates which
RULING: the grantee may charge the public subject to
international commitments made or adhered
to by the Republic of the Philippines.
Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction
over petitioner's contractual relations with ISSUE:
respondents-complainants as her tenants,
since petitioner is not engaged in a public Does the Commission have the power to
service nor in the sale of electricity without decide on the imputed negligence of
permit or franchise. petitioner? (No)
RULING:
Respondents' complaints against being
charged he additional cost of electricity for The alleged negligence of Globe is not within
common facilities used by the tenants (in the ambit of PCA’s jurisdiction which is
addition to those registered in their limited to the RATES WHICH THE
respective apartment meters) give rise to a GRANTEE MAY CHARGE.
question that is purely civil in character that
is to be adjudged under the applicable

possible time lest he remains stranded in a foreign land during

the whole time that recruitment agency contests its liability for
repatriation.

24

The jurisdiction and powers of administrative
agencies, like respondent Commission, are
limited to those expressly granted or
necessarily implied from those granted in the
legislation creating such body; and any order
without or beyond such jurisdiction is void
and ineffective.
PHIL. ASSOC. OF LAWYERS v.
AGRAVA
A LAWYER NEED NOT PASS ANOTHER
EXAMINATION TO PRACTICE BEFORE
QUASI-JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS
FACTS:
Agrava is the Director of the Patents Office.
He issued a circular scheduling an
examination for the purpose of determining
who are qualified to practice as patent
attorney before the Patent Office.
Petitioner filed this petition contending that
those who passed the bar examinations etc.
is already qualified to practice before the
Patents Office.
ISSUE:
Is a lawyer required to undergo another
examination to practice before quasi-judicial
bodies? (No)
RULING:
Members of the Philippine Bar authorized by
this Tribunal to practice law, and in good
standing, may practice their profession
before the Patent Office, for the reason that
much of the business in said office involves
the interpretation and determination of the
scope and application of the Patent Law and
other laws applicable, as well as the
presentation of evidence to establish facts
involved; that part of the functions of the
Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial,
so much so that appeals from his orders and
decisions are, under the law, taken to the
Supreme Court.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
GUEVARRA v. COMELEC
QUASI JUDICIAL BODIES MAY NOT
PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT IN THE
EXERCISE OF ITS MINISTERIAL DUTIES
FACTS:
COMELEC initially awarded the
manufacturing of ballot boxes to ACME,
NASSCO and ASIATIC. However,
COMELEC withdrew the award to ACME for
failure to sign the contract and awarded its
portion to the two others. Following
COMELEC’s denial of ACME’s 3rd Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner published in the
Sunday Times an article entitled “Ballot
Boxes Contract Hit.”
This impelled COMELEC to summon
petitioner to show cause why he should not
be cited in contempt for influencing the
COMELEC in the adjudication of the
controversy.
Petitioner argues that COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to punish as contempt said
publication.
ISSUE:
May COMELEC issue contempt order in the
exercise of its ministerial duties? (No)
RULING:
COMELEC, as an incident of its power to try,
hear, and decide any controversy, may also
punish for contempt.
However, to come under this jurisdiction, the
question should be controversial in nature
and must refer to the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of election.
The requisitioning and preparation of the
necessary ballot boxes to be used in the
elections is an imperative ministerial duty.
Such is the incident which gave rise to the
contempt case before us
25

In this case, it only discharged a ministerial
duty; it did not exercise any judicial function.
Such being the case, it could not exercise the
power to punish for contempt as postulated
in the law, for such power is inherently
judicial in nature.
SEC. OF JUSTICE v. LANTION
EVALUATION STAGE OF EXTRADITION
PROCEEDING IS AN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDING. DUE PROCESS IS
OBSERVED.
FACTS:
DOJ received from the DFA a US Note
Varbale requesting for the extradition of
private respondent Mark Jimenez to the US.
Pending evaluation of the extradition
documents by DOJ, private respondent
requested copies of the official extradition
request.
Petitioner denied the request on the ground
that it was premature and that it is only when
the petition is filed in court will the copies of
the petition be furnished by the court.
Jimenez filed with the RTC a petition for
mandamus to compel petitioner to furnish the
extradition documents and a prohibition to
enjoin the SOJ from filing the extradition
petition in court.
RTC ruled in favor of Jimenez and ordered
that the status quo be maintained. SOJ filed
the instant petition to the SC.
ISSUE:
May a possible extradite request for paper
and hearing during the evaluation stage of an
extradition proceeding with the DOJ? (Yes)
RULING:
The Evaluation Stage sets in motion the
extradition proceeding and is akin to an
investigation proceeding. The notice and
hearing requirements of administrative due
process cannot be dispensed with.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial
proceeding involves: (a) taking and
evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts
based upon the evidence presented; and (c)
rendering an order or decision supported by
the facts proved. Inquisitorial power, which is
also known as examining or investigatory
power, is one or the determinative powers of
an administrative body which better enables
it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority
The power of investigation consists in
gathering, organizing, and analyzing
evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an
administrative agency's performance of its
rule-making or quasi-judicial functions.
Notably, investigation is indispensable to
prosecution.
The Court laid down the test of determining
whether an administrative body is exercising
judicial functions or merely investigatory
functions: Adjudication signifies the
exercise of power and authority to adjudicate
upon the rights and obligations of the parties
before it. Hence, if the only purpose for
investigation is to evaluate evidence
submitted before it based on the facts and
circumstances presented to it, and if the
agency is not authorized to make a final
pronouncement affecting the parties, then
there is an absence of judicial discretion and
judgment.
In a preliminary investigation which is an
administrative investigatory proceeding,
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
guarantees the respondent's basic due
process rights, granting him the right to be
furnished a copy of the complaint, the
affidavits, and other supporting documents,
and the right to submit counter-affidavits and
other supporting documents within ten days
from receipt thereof. Moreover, the
respondent shall have the right to examine
all other evidence submitted by the
complainant.
ANG TIBAY v. CIR
26

A QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY MUST
SUPPORT ITS DECISION WITH FACTUAL
BASIS UPON WHICH TO PREDICATE A
CONCLUSION OF LAW
FACTS:
A complaint was filed against Toribio
Teodoro and ANG TIBAY by National Labor
Union for unfair labor practice with the Court
of Industrial Relations. CIR ruled in favor of
ANG TIBAY.
NLU prays for the vacation of the first
judgment of the SC and prays for a new trial.
ISSUE:
Is there a need for a new trial? (Yes)
RULING:
A new trial is necessary. The proceedings in
the CIR did not comply with the Cardinal
Principles of Due Process in Administrative
Proceedings. The record is barren and does
not satisfy the need for a factual basis upon
which to predicate a conclusion of law.
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a
hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the
rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented.
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not
impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support it is a nullity, a place
when directly attached."
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion, but the
evidence must be "substantial." It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
(5) The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected.
Only by confining the administrative tribunal
to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can
the latter be protected in their right to know
and meet the case against them. It should
not, however, detract from their duty actively
to see that the law is enforced, and for that
purpose, to use the authorized legal methods
of securing evidence and informing itself of
facts material and relevant to the
controversy. Boards of inquiry may be
appointed for the purpose of investigating
and determining the facts in any given case,
but their report and decision are only
advisory.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of
its judges, therefore, must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving
at a decision. It may be that the volume of
work is such that it is literally Relations
personally to decide all controversies coming
before them.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should,
in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the
decision rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
MAGCAMIT v. INTERNAL AFFAIRS
SERVICE- PDEA
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE TO THE PARTIES
EVIDENCE USED AS BASIS VIOLATES
THE DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT IN
ADMINSITRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
FACTS:
27

An anonymous complaint was filed against
petitioner et. al. They were charged with
Grave Misconduct for alleged extortion done
to the mother of the anonymous
complainant.
Special Investigator Enriquez recommended
their dismissal. Accordingly, they were
dismissed. Petitioner filed a MR with the IAS-
PDEA where he raised the fact that his name
never came up in the sworn statements
submitted to the hearing officer.
The same was denied, prompting him to
appeal to CSC which also denied his appeal.
The CA likewise denied his appeal and
affirmed the dismissal from service.
ISSUE:
Did the proceedings in the IAS-PDEA comply
with the cardinal principles of due process?
RULING:
Citing Ang Tibay v CIR: The first of the
enumerated rights pertains to the
substantive rights of a party at the hearing
stage of the proceedings.10
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth
aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are
reinforcements of the right to a hearing and
are the inviolable rights applicable at
the deliberative stage, as the decision maker
decides on the evidence presented during
the hearing.11 These standards set forth the
guiding considerations in deliberating on the
case and are the material and substantial
components of decision making.12
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the
form and substance of the decision of a
quasi-judicial body, further complements the
hearing and decision-making due process
rights and is similar in substance to the
constitutional requirement that a decision of
a court must state distinctly the facts and the
law upon which it is based.
Thus, the requirement that "[t]he decision
must be rendered on the evidence presented
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record AND disclosed to the parties
affected," was not complied with. Magcamit
was not properly apprised of the evidence
presented against him, which evidence were
eventually made the bases of the decision
finding him guilty of grave misconduct and
recommending his dismissal.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
ABEJO v. DELA CRUZ
DISPUTES BETWEEN STOCKHOLDERS
IS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE AND
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF SEC
FACTS:
This stemmed from a dispute between
principal stock holders of Pocket Bell Ph.
Abejos sold its minority shares to Telectronic
Systems including some shares registered in
the name of Bragas (majority stockholders)
which results in Telectronic becoming the
majority stockholder at 56%.
Asserting that the Bragas claim a preemptive
right over the 133,000 shares of Abejo, the
corporate secretary refused to register the
aforesaid transfer of shares. This trigerred
several actions.
Abejos contend that the SEC has jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, Bragas contends that it is the
civil court that has jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Which tribunal has jurisdiction over dispute
between stockholders? (SEC)
RULING:
The law provides that SEC shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases involving controversies arising out of
intracorporate or partnership relations,
28

between and among stockholders,
members, or associates inter alia.
The complaint of Bargas for annulment of
sales and transfer questions the validity of
transfer claiming alleged pre-emptive rights.
Such dispute clearly involves disputes
between and among stockholders.
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION:
The Court held that under the "sense-making
and expeditious doctrine of primary
jurisdiction ... the courts cannot or will n6t
determine a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience, and services
of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact, and a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with
the purposes of the regulatory statute
administered "
BERNARDO v. ABALOS
PETITIONERS MUST EXHAUST ALL
REMEDIES IN QUASI-JUDICIAL
TRIBUNALS
FACTS:
A complaint was filed against respondents
with COMELEC for vote buying. COMELEC
conducted an investigation. The COMELEC
En Banck dismissed the complaint for lack of
evidence. Petitioner immediately filed a
petition for certiorari with the SC on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion.
The COMELEC Rules provide that as a
general rule Motion for Reconsideration is a
prohibited pleading except in cases of
election offense cases.
ISSUE:
Is the petition valid?
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
RULING:
The petitioners should have exhausted all
the remedies available to them at the
COMELEC level.
A motion for reconsideration gives the
COMELEC an opportunity to correct the
error imputed to it. Rule 65 requires that
there must be no plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy.
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES v. CA
BED HAS EXCLUSIVE AND ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION IN CONTROVERSIES
INVOLVING ENERGY
FACTS:
Petitioner was granted a coal operating
contract by Bureau of Energy Development.
Thereafter, it executed a MOA with MMIC
whereby it assigned to MMIC all its rights and
interest. The controversy began when
petitioner filed an action for rescission of the
MOA before the RTC.
RTC ordered the rescission of the MOA. CA
reversed the RTC decision and held that
RTC had no jurisdiction over the action since
BED has the power to decide on the issue.
This prompted petitioner to appeal to SC.
ISSUE:
Which tribunal has jurisdiction over cases
involving energy resources?
RULING:
The Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance
of a particular case, which means that the
matter involved is also judicial in character.
However, if the case is such that its
determination requires the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the
29

proper administrative bodies because
technical matters or intricate questions of
facts are involved, then relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding
before a remedy will be supplied by the
courts even though the matter is within the
proper jurisdiction of a court.
This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
It applies "where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts, and comes into play
whenever enforcement of the claim requires
the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within
the special competence of an administrative
body, in such case the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues to
the administrative body for its view"
The question of what coal areas should be
exploited and developed and which entity
should be granted coal operating contracts
over said areas involves a technical
determination by the BED as the
administrative agency in possession of the
specialized expertise to act on the matter.
GSIS v. CSC
POWER TO EXECUTE IS INCLUDED IN
THE GRANT F ADJUDICATORY POWER
FACTS:
GSIS dismissed 6 employees for being
notoriously undesirable. 5 of them appealed
to the Merits System Board which found the
dismissal to be illegal due to lack of formal
charges and opportunity to answer. CSC
also denied the appeal. In the SC, the appeal
was also dismissed but it modified the CSC
resolution ordering that the payment of back
salaries to the employees be eliminated
pending the outcome of the proceedings in
the GSIS.
2 of the concerned employees passed away.
When the decision of the SC became final,
the heirs of the employees filed a motion for
execution. The ME with respect to back
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
wages was granted by CSC despite the
opposition of GSIS.
GSIS appealed to the SC contending the
CSC has no power to execute its judgment
and final orders aside from the allegation that
the execution of CSC is contrary to the
resolution of the court.
ISSUE:
May the CSC execute its judgment and
resolutions? (Yes)
RULING:
CSC is a constitutional commission. It also
exercises quasi-judicial powers, as such it
has the authority to hear and decide
administrative disciplinary cases originally
instituted or on appeal. Corollary to such
power is the authority to promulgate rules
concerning practice before it.
The CSC rules provide that decision in
administrative disciplinary cases shall be
immediately executory UNLESS a motion for
reconsideration is seasonably filed.
Tthe authority to decide cases is inutile
unless accompanied by the authority to see
that what has been decided is carried out.
Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of
adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear
and adjudge cases, should normally and
logically be deemed to include the grant of
authority to enforce or execute the
judgments it thus renders, unless the law
otherwise provides.
PAAT v. COURT OF APPEALS
A REPLEVIN PENDING AN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
VIOLATES THE EXHAUSTION OF
REMEDIES
FACTS:
30

Private respondent’s truck was seized by
DENR personnel due because of the
unexplained forest products concealed in the
truck. An order of confiscation was issued by
the CENRO officer. The order was appealed
to the Regional Director which affirmed the
confiscation. Pending appeal to the Sec. of
DENR, private respondents instituted a civil
action for replevin with the RTC.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of violation of the principle of
exhaustion of remedies. RTC, however,
denied the motion. The same was appealed
to the CA which also dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE:
May a court entertain a civil action for
replevin pending an administrative
proceeding concerning the same property?
(No)
RULING:
The invocation of court’s jurisdiction without
exhausting all administrative remedies
renders the action premature. The
exceptions to the principle of exhaustion
does not come into play. There is no violation
of due process because respondents were
given opportunity to be heard. There is
neither lack of authority to seize, the laws
expressly and broadly give DENR officers
the power to seize and confiscate.
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF
REMEDIES: Before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-
condition that he should have availed of all
the means of administrative processes
afforded him.
Hence, if a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be resorted to by giving
the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his jurisdiction then such remedy
should be exhausted first before court's
judicial power can be sought,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
RATIONALE BEHIND EXHAUSTION: This
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not without its practical and
legal reasons, for one thing, availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser
expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. It is no less true
to state that the courts of justice for reasons
of comity and convenience will shy away
from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed
and complied with so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and to dispose
of the case.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXHAUSTION OF
REMEDIES: However, we are not amiss to
reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as tested by a
battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. It is
disregarded:
(1) when there is a violation of due
process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question,
(3) when the administrative action is
patently illegal amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department
secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be
unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nullification
of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land
in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, and
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 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO

(11) when there are circumstances indicating exceptions, among which is when only a
the urgency of judicial intervention. question of law is involved.

The issue raised by petitioners, which

VALMONTE v. BELMONTE requires the interpretation of the scope of the
constitutional right to information, is one
A QUESTION INVOLVING THE RIGHT TO which can be passed upon by the regular
INFORMATION IS PURELY LEGAL AND courts more competently than the GSIS or its
NEED NO EXHAUST ALL Board of Trustees.
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
FACTS:
MANGUBAT v. OSMENA
Valmonet wrote to GSIS Gen. Manager
Belmonte requesting for the list of names of FACTS:
opposition members who were able to
secure a clean loan of 2M on guaranty of
Mrs. Marcos. PROS. TABAO v. JUDGE LILAGAN
The counsel of GSIS denied the request on AN ACTION FOR REPLEVIN MUST BE
the ground that the list is confidential. This DISMISSED PENDING AN
prompted petitioner to file a petition with the ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION
SC. CONCERNING THE PROPERTY
Petitioner invokes the Right to Information FACTS:
under the Constitution. Respondent opposes
on the ground that petitioner failed to exhaust M/L Hadija docked at Tacloban where it
the remedies when it did not seek a review intended to unload 100 tons of tanbark. NBI
from the Board of the GSIS, hence no cause agents found the documents irregular thus
of action. the cargo, the boat and the cargo trucks were
seized and impounded.
ISSUE:
An criminal complaint was also filed against
Is exhaustion of remedies necessary in the appropriate parties. Thereafter,
cases of purely legal question? (No) complainant also directed the seizure of the
RULING: aforementioned properties pending
preliminary investigation (an administrative
Before a party can be allowed to resort to the proceeding).
courts, he is expected to have exhausted all
means of administrative redress available The consignee filed with RTC a case for
under the law. The courts for reasons of law, replevin. Respondent judge issued a writ of
comity and convenience will not entertain a replevin.
case unless the available administrative
remedies have been resorted to and the ISSUE:
appropriate authorities have been given
May a judge issue a writ of replevin pending
opportunity to act and correct the errors
a preliminary investigation? (No)
committed in the administrative forum.
RULING:
However, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is subject to settled The complaint for replevin itself states that
the shipment of tanbark as well as the vessel

32

on which it was loaded were seized by the
NBI for verification of supporting
documents. This, inter alia, allegations would
have been sufficient to alert respondent
judge that the DENR has custody of the
seized items and that administrative
proceedings may have already been
commenced concerning the shipment.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
courts cannot take cognizance of cases
pending before administrative agencies of
special competence. Note, too, that the
plaintiff in the replevin suit who seeks to
recover the shipment from the DENR had not
exhausted the administrative remedies
available to him.
ARROW TRANSPORTATION v. BOT
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES NEED NOT
BE EXHAUSTED IF THERE IS AN
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS
FACTS:
Petitioner is a holder of a certificate of public
convenience for a line from Cebu City to
Mactan International Airport. Private
respondent Sultan Rent-a-Car applied for the
same certificate. Without the required
publication, the public respondent (BOT)
issued a provisional permit to operate such
service.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
Without waiting for its final resolution,
petitioner filed an action with the SC on the
ground that only a legal question was
involved.
ISSUE:
Is the petition ripe for judicial determination
absent a resolution on the MR?
RULING:
Ordinarily, an MR’s resolution should be
awaited. Prior thereto, an objection grounded
on prematurity can be raised.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
This Court was impelled to go into the merits
of the controversy at this stage, not only
because of the importance of the issue
raised but also because of the strong public
interest in having the matter settled.
It is essential then both from the standpoint
of the firms engaged as well as of the riding
public to ascertain whether or not the
procedure followed in this case and very
likely in others of a similar nature satisfies the
procedural due process requirement. Thus
its ripeness for adjudication becomes
apparent.
KBMPBM v DOMINGUEZ
THERE IS NO NEED TO APPEAL TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR DECISIONS MADE BY A
QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENT SUCH AS
THE SECRETARY
FACTS:
Petitioner and Muntinlupa entered into a
contract granting the former the
management and operation of the New
Muntinlupa public market. When a new
mayor assumed office, he declared that the
Municipality was taking over the
management and operation of the market.
The controversy began when an order was
served upon petitioners. The order was
made by the respondent Secretary of
Agriculture. This prompted the petitioner to
file a petition with the SC alleging that the
respondent acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction. Bunye claims that petitioner
failed to exhaust the administrative
remedies.
ISSUE:
Is there a need for petitioner to appeal to the
President before invoking court’s
jurisdiction?
RULING:
33

As to failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, the rule is well-settled that this
requirement does not apply where the
respondent is a department secretary whose
acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear
the implied approval of the latter, unless
actually disapproved by him.
This doctrine of qualified political agency
ensures speedy access to the courts when
most needed. There was no need then to
appeal the decision to the office of the
President; recourse to the courts could be
had immediately.
Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies also yields to other
exceptions, such as when the question
involved is purely legal, as in the instant
case, or where the questioned act is
patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive.
NATIONAL DEVT CO. v. HERVILLA
COURT MAY NOT NULLIFY A TITLE
GRANTED BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE
BODY PENDING PROCEEDINGS IN
COURT
FACTS:
Hervillla filed an action for recovery of
possession against Dole Philippines
involving several parcels of land in
possession of Dole Philippines as
administrator of the petitioner, NDC. The
RTC ruled in favor of NDC. CA reversed the
decision. Pending CA proceedings, however,
Bureau of Lands issued free patents in favor
of NDC’s predecessor-in-interest.
On appeal to the SC, petitioner contends that
the finding of the BOL must bind the court
and the court cannot declare the title issued
as null and void.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
ISSUE:
May the court nullify a title issued by an
administrative body pending proceeding in
said court? (No)
May court interfere with the decision of the
Director of Land? (No.)
RULING:
The action of respondent became moot and
academic when the BOL issued title to
petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest.
Records do not show that private respondent
Wilfredo Hervilla ever filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the
Director of Lands issuing free patent over the
lands in dispute in favor of petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest. Neither did he
appeal said decision to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, nor did
he appeal to the office of the President of the
Philippines. In short, Hervilla failed to
exhaust administrative remedies, a flaw
which, to our mind, is fatal to a court review.
The decision of the Director of Lands has
now become final. The Courts may no longer
interfere with such decision.
ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING v.
FACTORAN
FINDING OF FACTS BY ADMNISTRATIVE
BODIES SHOULD NOT BE DISTRUBED IF
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE
FACTS:
A dispute began between Atlas Consolidated
and Private respondent Buqueron regarding
the registration of mining claims.
A petition for an adverse claim was filed by
petitioner against private respondent due to
overlapping mining claims. The Director of
Mines ruled in favor of private respondent.
34

The Minister of Natural Resources reversed
the decision and ruled in favor of Atlas. On
further appeal to the Office of the President,
the Deputy Executive Secretary reversed the
decision and reinstated the decision of the
Mines and Geo Science.
ISSUE:
Is the decision of the Director of Mines
supported by substantial evidence? (Yes)
RULING:
A question of fact is best left to the
determination of the administrative bodies
charged with the implementation of the law
they are entrusted to enforce. As uniformly
held by the Court, it is sufficient that
administrative findings of fact are supported
by evidence. Substantial evidence is all that
is needed to support an administrative
finding of fact, and substantial evidence is
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."
Finding of fact in administrative decision
should not be disturbed if supported by
substantial evidence, but review is justified
when there has been a denial of due
process, or mistake of law or fraud, collusion
or arbitrary action in the administrative
proceeding, where the procedure which led
to factual findings is irregular; when palpable
errors are committed; or when a grave abuse
of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness
is manifest.
In reviewing administrative decisions, the
reviewing Court cannot re-examine the
sufficiency of the evidence as if originally
instituted therein, and receive additional
evidence, that was not submitted to the
administrative agency concerned, the
findings of fact in this case must be
respected.
CARPIO v. EXEC. SECRETARY
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
THE NAPOLCOM RETAINS CONTROL
OVER THE PNP MEMBERS DESPITE THE
CREATION OF PLEB
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition assailing the
constitutionality of RA 6975 which
established the PNP under the DILG.
Among others, petitioner contends that the
grant of disciplinary powers over PNP
members to the People’s Law Enforcement
Boards (PLEB) and city and municipal
mayors derogates the NAPOLCOM’s power
of control over the PNP.
ISSUE:
Is the law unconstitutional?
RULING:
Pursuant to the Act, the Commission
exercises appellate jurisdiction, thru the
regional appellate boards, over decisions of
both the PLEB and the said mayors. This is
so under Section 20(c). Furthermore, it is
the Commission which shall issue the
implementing guidelines and procedures
to be adopted by the PLEB for in the conduct
of its hearings, and it may assign
NAPOLCOM hearing officers to act as legal
consultants of the PLEBs.
As a disciplinary board primarily created to
hear and decide citizen's complaints against
erring officers and members of the PNP, the
establishment of PLEBs in every city, and
municipality would all the more help
professionalize the police force.
HEIRS OF EUGENIA V. ROXAS INC v.
IAC
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES NEED NOT
BE EXHAUSTED IN CASE TRIBUNAL
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
35

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
FACTS:
A protracted litigation ensued between
petitioner corporation and Guillermo Luis
Roxas over the ownership of Hidden Valley
Springs Resort. During the pendency of the
proceeding, Guillermo Roxas doing business
under the name MJB Food and Services
obtained a license from the DOT to operate
the restaurant at the Hidden Valley Springs
Resort.
This prompted petitioner to file a petition for
certiorari with the SC. Petitioner contends
that the public respondents acted with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the license
contrary to the rules and regulations
concerning the operations of resorts in the
country. Respondent contends that was not
required to submit a contract of lease.
ISSUE:
Can an administrative body issue license,
pending litigation concerning the ownership
of the subject of the license? (No.)
RULING:
It is a recognized principle that courts of
justice will generally not interfere in executive
and administrative matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies, such as, the grant of
licenses, permits, leases, or the approval,
rejection or revocation of applications
therefor.
Public respondents undeniably had
knowledge prior to the issuance of the
license to Guillermo Roxas and/or MJBFS
that the subject restaurant was owned by
petitioner and presently leased to Valley
Resort Corporation, and that Guillermo
Roxas and/or MJBFS' right to possess and
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
operate the restaurant was the subject of a
pending litigation.
The grant is arbitrary and capricious exercise
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
INDUSTRIAL POWER SALES v.
SINSUAT
ADMINISTRATIVES REMEDIES NEED NO
BE EXHAUSTED IF THE BODY WAS IN
EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION
FACTS:
Bureau of Supply advertised Invitations to
Bid calling for 8 trucks which are factory-built.
The invitation was subsequently amended,
this time including local manufactured trucks.
Petitioner and another bidder DELTA
participated in the process. It was awarded
to IPSI. DELTA protested the award on the
ground that they were not factory built. The
dispute reached the Sec. of General
Services which ruled in favor of DELTA.
Petitioner appealed to the Office of the
President. Pending appeal, petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari with the CFI.
Respondent contends that petitioner failed to
exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
Did the Secretary acted in excess of
jurisdiction thereby excluding the case from
the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies?
RULING:
There is no need to exhaust administrative
remedies when the office from which appeal
is taken acted in excess of jurisdiction. In this
case, respondent Secretary totally
disregarded that fact the DELTA was in
estoppel when it participated in the bidding
36

despite knowledge of the alleged fault in
petitioner’s bid. It also disregarded the law
conferring preferential status to locally
manufactured supplies.
AXIOMS GOVERNING JUDICIAL REVIEW
BY CERTIORARI: first, that before said
actions may be entertained in the courts of
justice, it must be shown that all the
administrative remedies prescribed by law or
ordinance have been exhausted;
and second, that the administrative decision
may properly be annulled or set aside only
upon a clear showing that the administrative
official or tribunal has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion.
There are however exceptions to the
principle known as exhaustion of
administrative remedies, these being: (1)
where the issue is purely a legal one, (2)
where the controverted act is patently illegal
or was done without jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction; (3) where the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an alter
ego of the President bear the latter's implied
or assumed approval, unless actually
disapproved; or (4) where there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention.
NATIONAL DEVT CO. v. COLLECTOR
OF CUSTOMS
THERE IS NO NEED TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN CASE
OF VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS
FACTS:
National Devt Co. is the owner of a
steamship which was apprehended by the
Collector of Customs due to the alleged
violation of customs law. A correspondence
ensued between plaintiff and defendant. The
controversy began when the Collector of
Customs imposed a fine of PHP 5,000 on the
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO
vessel and ordered its payment otherwise
the vessel will be detained.
This prompted plaintiff to file a petition for
certiorari with the CFI on the ground that
there was neither an investigation nor
hearing conducted by the defendant.
Defendant argued that plaintiff failed to
exhaust all remedies (appeal to the
Commissioner of Customs).
CFI ruled in favor of NDC.
ISSUE:
Is there a need to exhaust administrative
remedies when no investigation or hearing
was conducted by the administrative body
prior an imposition of fine? (No)
RULING:
Even in administrative proceeding due
process should be observed. By imposing a
fine without exercising due process
(investigation and hearing), respondent
acted improvidently.
While as a rule, exhaustion of administrative
remedies must be done before court’s
jurisdiction may be invoked, the same is not
necessary if there is an utter disregard of the
principle of due process.
In such case, an appeal to the Commissioner
of Customs is not in reality a plain, speedy,
or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.
DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC
CASE INVOLVING FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION IS A PURELY LEGAL
QUESTION, THERE IS NO NEED TO
EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
FACTS:
Pursuant to a COMELEC resolution limiting
the size of election posters, Election Officer
37
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | ATTY. PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO

wrote to the Diocese of Bacolod concerning

their Team Patay/ Buhay poster allegedly in
excess of the limit imposed by the resolution.
COMELELC Law Dept. issued a letter
ordering its immediate removal otherwise an
election protest will be filed.
Concerned about the imminent threat of
prosecution, petitioners initiated a petition for
certiorari with the SC.
Respondents contend that petitioner failed to
exhaust administrative remedies in
accordance with the COMELEC Rules.
ISSUE:
Is there a need to exhaust remedies in case
of alleged violation of a constitutional right?
(No)
RULING:

The principle of exhaustion of remedies

yields in order to protect the fundamental
right of free speech. Moreover, it is a settled
rule that exhaustion is not necessary when
what is involved is purely legal question or
there is an urgency of judicial intervention.

The circumstances emphasized are squarely

applicable with the present case. First,
petitioners allege that the assailed issuances
violated their right to freedom of expression
and the principle of separation of church and
state. This is a purely legal question.
Second, the circumstances of the present
case indicate the urgency of judicial
intervention considering the issue then on
the RH Law as well as the upcoming
elections. Thus, to require the exhaustion of
administrative remedies in this case would
be unreasonable.

38