Reporter: JOLINA C.

ROXAS

Magallona vs. Ermita

G.R. No. 187167. August 16, 2011

FACTS:
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 for demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
archipelagic State. This law followed the framing of UNCLOS I in 1958 which codified the sovereign right of States parties
over their “territorial sea,” the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined.

But attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus,
as RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, the Congress passed is the Republic Act No. 5446 in 1986 by
correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was
prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the UNCLOS III which the Philippines ratified on 27
February 1984.

Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the
Philippines7 and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf. Complying opens the
country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine
sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in
violation of relevant constitutional provisions.

In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a
large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. To buttress their argument of territorial
diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included—its failure to reference either the Treaty
of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III’s framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG
and the Scarborough Shoal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 9522 is unconstitutional for allegedly
- reducing Philippine maritime territory and thus violated Article 1 of 1987 Constitution
- opening the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts
- treated the KIG as “regime of islands” loses our sovereignty over those territories

RULING:

RA 9522 did not violated the Article 1 of 1987 constitution and did not reduce its maritime territory because it is merely a
statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and
continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space
and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over
territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous
zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56)
and continental shelf (Article 77.)

Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the rectangular
area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA
9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn
from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the “outermost
islands and drying reefs of the archipelago.

Furthermore, the petitioners argue that RA 9522 under undermines our sovereignty over territorial waters and it gives an
opportunity to any treaty and other statutory provision to claim the territorial waters that were delineated by this statute.
The court ruled that UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of territory. It is a multilateral treaty
regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones. States acquire or lose territory through occupation,
accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.

It did not open our waters to all maritime passages. The petitioners contend that the RA9522 unconstitutionally “converts”
internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage.
The Court ruled that whether referred to as Philippine “internal waters” under Article I of the Constitution or as
“archipelagic waters” under UNCLOS III, the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of
the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirmed by its Article 49.

The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the
territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded,
expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus,
domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional
powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes
passage.

Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress. In the absence of municipal
legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the
territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their exercise. Significantly, the
right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law.
No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance
with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.

The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea
lanes passage45 does not place them in lesser footing vis-à-vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their
territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition
of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in
exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the
coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic
States’ archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their
islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III.

Petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to
measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, “weakens our territorial claim” over that area.
Petitioners add that the KIG’s and Scarborough Shoal’s exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the
loss of “about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters,” prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. A
comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space
encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis-à-vis the
Philippines’ obligations

In fact, the petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522
draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself by the express provision on Section 2 of the law commits to
text the Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal
Reporter: Pat Felipe

OPOSA VS. FACTORAN

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
Ponente: Justice Davide, Jr.

FACTS: Petitioners are minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The minors seek to represent their
generation as well as the generations yet unborn. They pray the cancellation of existing Timber License
Agreements(TLAs) in the country as well as the discontinuation of approving the application for TLAs; in other words, a
total log ban. They alleged that the continued allowance by DENR of commercial logging will cause great damage and
irreparable injury to the plaintiff minors and the succeeding generations. They claimed that the DENR acted in grave
abuse of discretion in granting TLAs to cover more areas than what is available and that their constitutional right to
balanced and healthful ecology under Section 15, Article II of 1987 Constitution has been violated. Also, defendant's act
is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a political question and can be subject to judicial review.
2. Whether or not the minors have locus standi.
3. Whether or not the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is a self-executory provision in the Constitution.
4. Whether or not the petitioners failed to state a cause of action.

HELD:
1. Yes. Judicial power has been broadened by the 1987 Constitution.
Judicial power, pursuant to par.2, Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution, now includes the duty to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.

Political question doctrine is no longer an insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.

2. Yes, based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility.

Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve the nature’s rhythm and harmony for full enjoyment
of a balanced and healthful ecology. The minor petitioners’ assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at
the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

3. Yes, Art. II, Sec 16 of 1987 Constitution is a judicially enforceable right, a self-executory provision.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written
in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in
the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to
come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

4. No, a denial or violation of a right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the
same gives rise to a cause of action.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. It is the DENR’s duty to protect and advance the said right. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the
TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
Therefore, there is a valid cause of action.

IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES

 Intergeneral responsibility - The concept of intergenerational responsibility hinges on the right of the present
generation to sue in its behalf and in behalf of the succeeding generations for the protection of the environment.
 Political question - one the resolution of which has been vested by the Constitution exclusively in either the people, in
the exercise of their sovereign capacity, or in which full discretionary authority has been delegated to a co-equal
branch of the Government.
 Judicial power - the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and
demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.
 Self-executory - A constitutional provision is self-executing when it can be given effect without the aid of legislation,
and there is nothing to indicate that legislation is intended to make it operative. For example, a constitutional provision
that any municipality by vote of four-sevenths of its qualified electors may issue and sell revenue bonds in order to
pay for the cost of purchasing a municipally owned public utility is self-executing and effective without a legislative
enactment.
 Non-self executory - Constitutional provisions are not self-executing if they merely set forth a line of policy or
principles without supplying the means by which they are to be effectuated, or if the language of the constitution is
directed to the legislature. As a result, a constitutional provision that the legislature shall direct by law in what manner
and in what court suits may be brought against the state is not self-executing.
Reporter: Kristine S. Cayetano

EDU vs ERICTA
(GR L-32096 October 24, 1970)

Facts:
Assailed is the validity of the Reflector Law and Administrative Order (AO) No. 2 which implements it. Under the law, a
vehicle has to comply with the requirements of having reflective device prior to being registered at the LTO. 

The respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other motorists, filed a suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction assailing the validity of the challenged Act (Reflector Law) as an invalid exercise of the police power for being
violative of the due process clause. This he followed with a manifestation wherein he sought as an alternative remedy
that, in the event that respondent Judge Ericta would hold said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the
Land Transportation Commissioner, Romeo F. Edu, now petitioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue
exercise of legislative power or violation of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the Reflector Law is constitutional
2. Whether or not AO 2 is valid

Ruling:

1. YES, both the Reflector Law and AO 2 are valid and constitutional.  
Police Power
The Reflector Law reads in full: "(g) Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. — Appropriate parking lights or flares
visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at a corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on
highways or in places that are not well-lighted or is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic. Furthermore,
every motor vehicle shall be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices either pasted,
painted or attached to its front and back which shall likewise be visible at light at least one hundred meters away. No
vehicle not provided with any of the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered."

It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to promote public safety.
The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the
conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good
order, and welfare.

It would be to close one's eyes to the hazards of traffic in the evening to condemn a statute of this character. Such an
attitude betrays lack of concern for public safety. How can it plausibly alleged then that there was no observance of due
process equated as it has always been with that is reasonable? The statute assailed is not infected with arbitrariness. It is
not the product of whim or caprice. It is far from oppressive. It is a legitimate response to a felt public need. It can stand
the test of the most unsympathetic appraisal.

Delegation of Legislative Power

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its
legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over
local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make
laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it
leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the
inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its
functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex
economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully
been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercise under and
in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying
the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of
complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and
regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard
though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered
as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety.