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“a Pole has captured he natu the ne threat and radu a equiv ead wr tamper’ packs” General Anthony € Zin USMC Ce former CENTCOM commoner =I sa comprehensive ntrpetation of Muslin teem tates tne ad hin” Nath County Time SCD), 20 Nove 2004 Torts ofthe Crocent Moan bps endestand the Ura of ‘roam and what mut dan dee Ms Gen dn mite USBIC Ret) former et Marine Dvision oman Book har 12 copters.. How lame Gvorilas Are Tene ™ Pe Neprt Ns: Dey Pres, 12 Deemer 2004 “ohn Pole wl sid actin of he Crcent Mon flr Sorbing analy sudyof Islamic grea tein” vay Gen Edin Ht Simmons USMC et fet Hes of Hist fe Museums Die, HOME rr insrgeney' mi eve ders. ae rm acd, the Letnoese Steele apd --— trans Revelatimary ow ouae News Serve, Naver 2004 This ak exp Fourth Generation war sexe ame. sd furhette thn anthing cing tof TRADOC or Quantico" Wil ind thor ef Mancuver Warfare Hondbuck “his honkl may apt arm the td of hic wa = provide. ated inten you ean et ay thr sa eetherack Demir 2008 ida Pie asi me run HIF we. aap our {tuning and operons we eam il pera in inl” vCal fers Kane U8 Ary Het) pubes rmeritan, Preside Pose “abo, outs. sayl that tombarding site sost away Sakti ese smbiterd ian pose mar ver fo Masi Monthy Apa 20% TACTICS OF THE Crescent Moon TACTICS OF THE CRESCENT Moon ‘Murrayt Mustim Comnar Mernops Tawsresreo (Omen Pacrics Manu Sten soM Posrentry PRESS! Postenry Press ogriahs ©.20fy Hain Ple able iy Pasteity Pres 20, Box 8, neat ee, NC 28304 Twenties) Protected under the Berne Convention, All ight ose [Nor ths foo may be repreduced or used in any form hy any moans croc or mechanical inclding ‘hetocnpying ot resarding by aay ttormation storage Snireroval sate iho fall permission swell. from the publisher "AI eagles should be nrc Co Posterity Poe, BO, Bot 060, Emerald Ine, NC 28508, Catalin Publication Date Pe, HJ, 18 ‘Toten f the Cracet Moon. Teles tibliraphy and nde, 1 tnfenry dil and tactics 2 Military art and sence 5 Miltary hist. 1 tile TSHNO9698695.2-4 2006 55:42 iar of Congres Contd Naber noses ‘This publication contain epyrghtd materia frm other lures Pormiatan for ex we se Fcurded i the ures tots the back af the bon This material may ote ‘eer repnaducd without ecoaent a earn os Der [Bry fre has eon oud to ros all pyri older Angora nay hae en miss ean ety ems 8 fate the appropiate permission agreements Cove art ©2006 by Michael Leaby ‘Eid by Dr Ary Bath sie Pronfrad by Wiliam B Hars “The prising, Unita States of Amerie, September 2005 {To the 241 US, Marines who died in the Beirut bombing. May their sacrifice for regional peace be finally rewarded, Contents List of Hlusteations: Foreword Preface Acknowledgments Tatroduetion Part One: A Heritage of Unconventional Warfare Chapter 1: Gallipolis Underreported Tactics ‘Chapter 2: Lessons from the Iran-traq War Chapter 3: Tera» Expulsion from Southern Lebanon Part Twat Islamic Guerrilla Tactics Cchopter 4: Palestinian Fighters Chapter 5: Chechen Rebels Chapter 8 Ahan Mujahedeon Chaptor 7: More fecent Afghan Resistance Chapter 8: The Iraqi Opposition Part Three: Bringing Peace tothe Region Chapter 8 How Islamic Guerrillas Are Trained Chapter 10: The Muslim Mildants' Patera Chapter I: The Response Must Be Unconcentinal Chapter 12: The Tactical Part ofthe Bguation Epilogue Notes Glossary Bibliography wil 3 19 20 9 87 ar m7 i a3 188 an a 249 251 303, omens About the Author Name Index 339 Illustrations Figures ‘Chapter 2: Lessons from the Ian-traq War 21: Ayatollah Rubolah Khomeini Chapter 4: Palestinian Fighters 41 Iseseli Corporn, 1967 442: Christian Mibtieman, 1955, 44: Yarser Arafat Chapter 6: Chechen Rebels 5.1: The Chechen Ambush af an Armored Column Chapter 6: Afghan Mujahideen 46.1: Narrow Valleys Make Helicopters Vulnerable 62; U'S."Stinger” Downs Soviet “HIND” Chapter 7: More Recent Afghan Resistance 7: ALQuedas Flatland “Strongpoiat” Defense 112: Bast Asian Stongpeint Pattorn Chapter 8 The agi Opposition 4. Saddam Hussein 152: US. "Stinger" Shoulder-Fired Anti Airraft Missile a wa 1 im 158 agrmanons ‘Chapter Ms The Response Must Bo Unconventionat LL; Its Harder to Avoid Errors with Standoff Weaponry 220 Chapter 12: The Tactical Part ofthe Equation 1241: The US. Has No Truly Light Infantry 122: Frontline Fighters Beat Decide Whats Feasible 125: Gls Are the Worlds Beat at Using Their Gear 1244: Bunkered Occupiers Wil Be Vulnerable 125; Motorized Occupirs Caa Be Baily Targeted Maps Introduction Li: The Ancient Moslom Bmpire Chapter 1: Gallipel’s Underyportd Tactics Li Relio Map of Turkey 12; Site of ll-Pated Suvla Offensive 118: Where the British Bought the Parm Chapter 2: Lessons fron the ran-trag War 2.1: Relief Map ofan ‘Chapter 3: Feral Bxpulsion from Southern Lebanon 81: Rolie Map of Lebanon 82: Areas of Control in 1985 ‘Chapter 4 Palestinian Fighters 4.1: Palestinian-Contralled Areas with 42: The Gata Strip Refageo Compe Israel 29 21 25 238 20 sa a averanoss Chapter 5: Chechen Rebels 5.1 Rolief Map of Chechnya, 6s ‘5: Mountain "Base Areas” ip Georgia end Dagestan 74 Chapter 6: Athan Mujahideen 6.1: Relief Map of Afphaniston 58 6.2: Mujahideen Resupply Routes a Chapter 8: The raqi Opposition 8.1 Relief Map of rag 132 Chapter 9 Hw Islamic Guerilla Ave Trained 9.41: The Beka Valley 116 ‘Chapter 10: The Mustim Militants’ Patera 10.1: AL Quads Pashtun Corridor to Iran 07 Foreword ‘Once again, John Poole proves himselfto be on the leading edge ‘of military writers and researchers with this book, As this book sees to press the Department of Defense i bmning the provers fof seminars and sty groups took at regular Warfare ad ry todetermine how the US. military needs to change ite education nd taining processes ta combat the-Toetin ofthe Crescent Monn ‘This effort underway even as U.S, soldiers and Marines are en ‘zag in deadly confit ith Mostim regulars in both rag and ‘Afghanistan, eceat experience in Ira reinfores the trem thatthe nature of wat is changing. Fanaties and fundamentalists in the Middle Bast, using the flexible training techniques deseribed inthis book, hhave adapted and adopted a method of war that seeks to oll America’s technical superiority with tactics that ose gle, subs terfuge and terrar mixed with patience and a willingness to de ‘This approach allows the weaker to take on the rteonger and as proven effective against Western-style armies Tiseritical that we ecugnize what has heppened in the Middle Basti the last 50 years, Since the Israeli war of independence Islamic armies are 0 and 7 when fighting western style and 5 and 0 for 50-1, ifthe current conflict is included) when fighting uncom ‘entinaly against Une more modern and powerful mtary Frees ‘of lsrac, the Soviet Union, and nov, the United States. The efforts Underway within the Department o Defense are feeusedonthestrs tegie level” ow to better educate and prepare military leaders to {eal wath ereular wartare, how to adap oo intelligence agencies te deal with the low-tech and no-tech human element, ete. They appear tobe loking for some future slutin, perhaps even new etna and tedhnaogy to deal wih tis “ae” threat Poole ble makes the pone that this threats nok mew a all More importants it nreszor methods, tacties and techie 0 deal with these jregulars in afar better way Uaan we have i the Fonewono pastand wedcal with them now, notin some undefined fature‘trans formation ofthe U.S. mitay. He also make the point a point that seems obvious to me, eventhough it doesn’ appear to be obvi fous to our current Defense leadership that those irrgulars are infantry fares and that what we most need to deal with them are highly trained ight-infantey forces of oa oe Asa great admirer of and proponent fr ligh-itontry forces, couldnt agree with him more-we absolutely ned more, and bet ter ight infantay forces inthe U.S establishment. Precision weap tons, even as pretce as they have become, are not precise enough (Often the bursting radius ie greater than the allowable clear area, oven when they hit the exaet target that we want, they still dan lunaccepeable amount of ellateral damage. [fear tht the pres. ‘on strikes that we seein the contested cities of Irag reste ae ‘many terrorists as they kil, Wo need good ight-infantrymen to g0 Into those cites and Il the terrorists without creating new ones wth their ‘lateral damage Much like his previouseflort, there are things in this bok that will make some American warriors mad. dislike the idea of fat tering terrorists hy referring to them ae good light infantrymen, but Poole main point—that theae iregulare have Meeble and sulaptable training techniques and tactical methods-eanmot be ‘denied. This bok should bon the shelf of every infantryman rm Fre 12am leader through division commander. Te would also be @ ‘ood primer for thase in Washington who send those young wa Fors inte the ght. MaxGu, Rav E.Sun USMC (Rar) Preface Again at war in Une Middle Bast are Judeo-Christian and lamie factions More i at stake this tne, The confit could easily spread. Mont dangerous isthe belief that a worldwide cash of eal three is ineitabe- Without extensive travel, ane cold easily come tw that conclusion, Jad isn integral par of islam, and America has been tying to ree the world. But tow Muslim, pad has many definitions. Literally. it means “strugole” Teena havea violent oF ronvolent, and external or internal, eonnotation. ‘To many Mus Tints, iad simply means striving to ive a beter lie te aid that when Mohammed returned frm battle he told is followers, "We return fom the lessor jihad tothe sreator jihad” The greater jihad isthe more dificult and ‘ore important struggle against one’s ego, selfishness, roe an evil wean Esposito, well-respected US. Islamic scholar ‘A numberof factors have contributed to this new conflict. To blame any one ofthe core religions i overly simplistic. Whi the ‘Koran does take the most aggressive approach to conversion, its ‘more militaristic passes sre generally considered tobe histor Cally spmbalie. If they were strely followed by all Mustims, the ‘world would have been continually at war ance dhe Crusades. Tn Christianity, those who literally interpret the Old Testament are called “fundamentalists” Largely to blame for th recent turmoil ‘thin Maslin scety are ite radial fundamentalists. While good {rabble rousing, they constitute only tiny fraction ofthe whole, ‘Their viewpoints are not shared by its mainstream moral wthor: Islam provides clear rules and ethical norms that forbid the killin of noncombatents, well as women, children, and Pensce the elderly, and also forbs the pursuit the enemy in de feat, the execution of those who surrender the inition of harm on prisoners of war. and the destruction of property ‘hat snot being used in the HostilitesAL-Hayat, 8 Naver hor 200102 Islamic Research Council, l-Achar Unis ity Christianity, Judaism, and Islam spring from the same Abrahamic oats Al are reject terraism" This sa war in whieh both sides have-~at one tine o ather—violated their own ees, [either side has ao tempered ite a of force a to justify ealing the ther evil. Whether they can reconile wil depend on lus” hard they ty "The United States has its fair share ofehurchgoing ultracon- arvativess well. Some go so far as to openly bonrt abut bung tly antieuitural” They have apparently forgotten that Ameria was founded by foreigners and revitalize by samira: (On 11 September 2001, this country experience evil beyond ima ration. Yet, the Christan American who favors retaliation fas hore isthe Blessed Saviors central precept. Vengeance is mine, will repay, sayeth the Lard New Tidamnent, Romans 12: 18°20 So that U.S. units might accomplish their missions with ess force this book reveals but doesnot condone opposition tates. In attempting to revisit history ebjetvely, the ok may’ sso touch ‘upon a few things that Western Christians might peter to fing, (On the northern plains of srl lies a place called Mogi Uni. pressive by today's military standards ite neientfrtfiations re fain the prophetic ste ofthe final russe between good snd el ‘Tokeep the current colct from spreading to Masiade, Western forces must fully ascertain and then deft the tactics of the ers: dons Poot Acknowledgments ‘This book would aot have been posible without the leaning ‘thos and modiafoodback ofa free socct. To that society and its ‘vine mentor bolongs most ofthe credit. That God sil aves ‘Americe should be abundonty clear to everyone ia the werd. His ‘ontigued protection ofthe United States may have more to do ‘withite varied ethnicity than foreign policy. At great expense and how morel sk), it hae continued to provide refuge to the worlds downtrodden, Te gives them something they ean Gnd at hone — hope “Toll deployed U.S. servie personnel alo guesa vote of thanks ‘They have Worked hard, hovn great courage, and made consider ablesaerifice overseas. Fur several Years, they have had ta endure fan anrealistie operational tempo. Americas success at promot ‘worl pace wil now depend on whether tx technlogy-relian Tanteymen can tactically defeat thele Bastera counterpart, In a ‘world where unconventional warfare has become the state ofthe an, firepower no longer ensures vitor By alienating the lal population, it provides a growing base of support tothe gueril, {erorst, or dth generation” warrior More produetivein madera battles the surprise that ean only be generated through small ‘it manesvor Finals, one must not forget those few individuals who have never topped trying to get the U.S. infantry to improve ts shor range, smallunit technique, Of lat, ther efforts have been par ticularly thankless, To evolve tactically 1917, the German Army cated the specter of eet, The US Amy and Marne Coan have another option. Within their active duty, eserve, and rel fans they hae the widom of every calle Tel adiona, “opdosen” way of training and operating is of Pronch and British ‘origin, With the help ofa few Asian or Gerinan Americans, they ‘ould easily shift over tothe mare productive "ottam-up" approach ‘Then, 118 service personnel could accomplish more with tvs fe Romanos power They might even come taser thet ors a preions in the fe of God In tuee, the world ballon Moslems might start totee America ne thee friend. Violence begets violence. To restore fonder to Teaq and Afghanistan, US. soldiers and Marines mast Drojet leas free, Semper ils. Introduction ‘A Daunting Challenge Several years ago during an evoning stall in the author and hie wife wore startled tn seen bright star noxt to crescent moon. Trouble had been brewing between the Hinds and Duss, and the bliday ecerackers had everyone on edge Just {ollndiat west lesa rion that is among the world’s most volatile snd convulvted, One doesnot solve eny problem there without flly ‘ppreciting its history. that problem happens tobe military, the Solution must necessary inenrporate cultural, religions, and po Teal auanoes Many Moslem nations havea star and erscent an their Ma ‘They also have a growing number of young men who consider ‘their religious duty to expel foreign invaders from any Islamie coun try. While traditionally underestimated by the West, these "haly ‘warriors’ have recently seored major vietares against "high ech” larmies. Thea! Qoela-supported mujahideen drove a well-supported Soviet army ou of Alghanistan in 1988. Hesballa-led Shee and Palestinians freed an end to the Tsrali oreypation of Southern abn in 2000! Now that U.S. frees are facing these same two movements in [Afghanistan and leat time for American commanders to ener {ain some potentially embarrassing questions. How could Muslim guerrillas With hand-held weaponry have defeated Soviet and Ie itregulars with “state-of-the-art” sreraft, aril and tanks? Did those guervlis enjoy a taetienl advantage at short range? I 420, ill American troop fare any beter gst thes in clone te rin? To find out, one must travel bac into history—being careful hot to blame Islam or aay uf mainstream set forthe aeons of ‘few members In every religion, there willbe those who misinter- pect the wil of Go oe Islam's Barliest Days atthe outset ofthe Th Century, Islam was founded. me rots by Mohammed.” “After his death in 22A.D. ies quickly conquered ‘everything. from Spain to the Indus Valley" (See Mop LL.) Abu Bakr vs installed a the Prophet's immediate successor, but Ali Mohammed son-in-law and corasin) thought himell the personal choice imams). alt eventually fecame the fourth caliph uecessorand ws subsequently aeons ‘ated at Kufs, The formal schism between Shite and Suns came tw HasanyAlfe aon and fh eliph—was freed When another of Alis sons (Hasan was killed leading ‘gsinst 4000 at Karbala, the breakstny set gained momentum rom thet point forward, Shites thought that Mohammed had des ignated All, whereas Sunnis believed thatthe Propet had autho ‘Heed the selection of any per By the ime the Mslim empire broke up, it had generated many converts. Tada ther half blion destndent are roughly 9% Sunni tad 10% Shite Sunnis consitate the majority in Terk, Jordan, Studi Arabi, Pakistan, and Afghanistan” Shiites enjoy the nw rmerieal edge in Bahrain, Iran, Iraq and North Yemen, The alsa thve large populations in Pakistan and India.” Most Shite ae amis the state religion of Iran\. Many’of the rst are Temas Deep sith Ismail story les the martyrdom tradition that has soconfounded Western armies, A Flecigling Sect Resorts to.a Strange Method Since the 11th Century, the Isai mvesnent has ad two nin branches: the Mustallans and the Nizar. To challonge the Selivk Turks (who were Senn" Hasan bin Sabbah founded a "Niza sate in Persia around 1090.D. Having jst come fron B Syria, he "managed through eareful theological argame create a powerful sectarian sense of community based on the td. onal secrecy nd conepieatorial (rovolutionary] nature of Ismaism."” Initially, Hasan bin Sabbah was only woried ost ‘An armed unit of the fda [thf warriors. adopted an ‘pheval method of guerilla sel warfare for defensive par termooveron ne, Some scholars regard the Ismail trayyle a sevalt, brut it was positively strogate for survival It was a teh rigue ofthe luted wariost fore the gigantic nnd clos: Sal military machine to urn back by spreading avefel mi Tie in their camps" Tema Heritage Society wobite ‘Then ta consolidate and expand this Nizari stat, Hasan bin Sabbah recorted to more than just spies and missionaries. Later ‘iubed the “Old Man of tae Mountain” by Marco Pol, be subst tuted political assassination for open waare." He erated a school for nesnesins in the Allure mountains just north of Tehran. Tere, na verdant valley below the forres of fis teenage trainces a distorted glimpse of th feneouraged thelr martyrdom." “According to Tightly drugged and Usen carried wo a garden simulating the Korais description of paradise, After experiencing various sensual delights, they were redrugged and removed. When they awoke, they Were {old they had dreamed of heaven and could any go thereby doing the Prophets wil as interpreted by Hasan)” They subsequent lost thete far of death ‘Thechief fHassal thereupon addressing thems “We havo the nsrursnees af oer propel that he who defend his lord shall inherit Paradise. ad if you show yourselves de- voted 0 the obedience of my orders, that happy lot awaits you ‘The consequence of tie ayatem was, that when any ‘ofthe neighboring princes, rather, gave umbrage to this ‘hie they were put to death by thes, his isepined sas fing none of whom fl terror at he rik of losing their lives, whieh they held in ite estimation, provided they ‘ould execute thir master's wil” = Marco Polo esan's graduates called themselves the fidais of “ones ready to saerfen their lives fort enune™” "The term can variously be islated ae "devrted ones" and has eeveral variants feda, eda, a's, fedaie, and fedayeens.” Hasan’ operatives specal- aed in terrorizing lca! populations, bypassing entries, and sas inating opposition leaders" With a dagger as their weapon of hice, they could not have accomplished such fit wit big fully sober. The dae ital") were subjected to an sat nastc discipline. Tac food was plain and their regimen austere Hasan had banished all drinking from the castle Tp beter focus fon the hero-and-no. the fais were systematically trnined toi Dore provonceived notin and societal parameters" Aw such, they ‘behaved quite strangely and son gained the unflattering aékname of lashishine “ones who use hashish". Whale Marco Polos ar fen trip may have been pure fantasy, the lone Hashishin was prob ably under some sort of mind control during hie dangers foray, ‘Tally fear and pai, he may have used sehypnatism--an Bast Asian ninjutsa technique.” (For how ind cuntrol ix achieved Uhrig minpe, se The Tigers Way) Tae fdais also shared the inj’ lve for disse, Hewas highly tained in foreign languages Dele and given along time to stalk his pres.” As such, he prob ably lacked the short-range infiltration sk af nina ‘The Hashishins Expand into the Levant Soon the Nizari Ismaili state—dotted sith mountain for tresses extended fm Eastern Persia ran) inta Western Sia Hasan had spent three years in Syria in 10S1 and had no trovble bringing ol acquaintances into the fald At chs time, the ‘Tre also cont tians launched the Brst Ceasade ta take hack. Upon capturing ‘Jerusalem in 1090, the Crsaders slaughtered everyone inde (0 Include an estimated 40,000 Muslin, hundreds of Jews, and dor tens of Bastern Orthodox Christiane!” When Salsdin recaptured it in 1187, he not only spared its non-Mosiem inkitsnts but alsa forbade the deseeration ofthe Christian hay sites." All he whl, Hasan's Hashishins~who would hire out tthe highest bidder Ina been ighting bt Crusaders and Turks, Fas killed the Cris tian King of Jerusalem around 1150 and made two steempts on Saladin ite Te most eolebrated Hashishin chet in Syxia was Sinan bin Salman bin Mohammad. Hetaok over clifthanging caste at Kat In 1162 and wa ealled the Old Man ofthe Mountain” bythe Cru Saders, Sisan operated almost independent of Alamut.Sostrong tnd celebrated did he become that mapa ofthe Middle East diring the Crusades included a large, roughly tangular area sn the moun: tains behind the Syrian cost marked Country of the Assassins ‘Wiileeubeequent Crusades had limited succes, there were events im China that would greatly effect the eaten part of the Niaart State The Mongol Influence In 1227, Genghis Khan captured Bejing and established what ‘wold some the Yann Dynasty" By the mille of the 13th Cen tory, is Golden Horde had overrun much of the Middle Est For ‘ver 200 year, his Mongol Hmmpire eneamnpasced what would be ome eastera Turkey, northeastern Syria, astern Irag, Tan, AE shaniston, northeastern Pakistan, Kashmir Ladi, and the south fra Soviet Union.” Durig that extended period, the indigenous poop of those regions gota good look atthe Chinese way af war, End thus he teachings of Su Bu indivetly. To complet th le fon, most oftheir accupiers convert #o Islam and stayed on to iecome part of she indigenous population ‘When the Hashishins lot thelr headquarters at Alagmut to Holaga Mongols around 1265" they sattered, Many moved ¢ the Levant (Palestine, Lebanon, and western Syria) Others went to Afghanistan” They ould do so because the Samanid dynasty Sate had stretched all the way to India until 1005." There had teen sizable Ismaili presence in Sind (Pakistani Punjab) since 958. Sometime during the 1ith Century that presence embracd the Nizar ideology" Its beliefs also tok rot in western India. swith the Khoj. When displaced Haskins joined the Indian hug ‘becgangs, they areal ha nightlighting chile toinclude stealth fad sentry removal [Bin Sabbab’s Method Survives into the 20th Century vestige of Hasan’ state may have survived well ita the 20ch Century. AS late a8 192, the "unetilize” area north of Trip, Lebanon. was reportedly “infested with" Hashishins." “Historian [Abul Fida(d. 722713311A D1) wter that Masa, a town tha rae the headquarters of the Syrian [Nizar] Ismaili, ls situated on @ ‘mountain, called Jabal Asikkin Jabal al Sikkin)" The ancient fortress of Kabf was 30 miles east of Banas and 28 miles west of Hamas" One cua el visit a fort of that name near a town called Masyaf. oth are 30 miles inland from the Mediterranean and 30 tiles north ofthe Lebanese border" ‘flat, warriors ofthe seme nazte and method have been re ported in Tran and "Occupied Palestine” From 1945 to 1955, the “Pidais of Iam," @ politieatel sinus tororist group, eared oats numberof plitial at Sassinationa in Tran... [Then] the trm Utdats or ane af {te varlanal wos revived bythe militant wing ofthe Paler- ‘nian Liberation Organization (PLO). Prom te 19604 on svar designated the tororst activist of that organi Ironooucno In fact, “all modern Islami terrorist groups toce themselves buck to (idontify with this eult of killers" Bur that's where the larity ends. Whereas ouey fidais only assassinated politial leaders, their modern namesakes are not a selective. Early dais wait disap ‘peared from the region Itis an vaholy mutation that hax spawned the “eulide bomber” Another Way of Fighting Since tho Cruades, Westorners have noticed ow diferetly those who live cast of Constantinople fight. Their Eastern adver Saree routinely avid set-piece battles and ean win while appear. Ing to ea" After a large British force had occupied Alghanistan in 1839, only one of te 4.500 members sirvived the retreat That Muslim fighters do well at short range Was once again proven at Galil in 1015. ‘While Western soldiers were evolving technologically, Rastora soldiers may have boen compensating taetealy: Tats ae what Ihappens where opposing infantrymen meet—something that coun- ties with standoff weaponry seldom worry about, Not lost tothe ‘Third World is how the superpowers fared in Korea, ietaam, and Afghanistan “In April 1978, « leRist group of Soviet-trained officers seized control of tse [Agha] government and founded the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, a elon stato ofthe Soviet Union ™” The Marxist reginte soon encountered armed resistance, and the AE ‘han religious leaders anounced a holy war oe jihad against theie theistic oppressors. In December 1979, the Soviet army ivaded [AMghusnistan to bolster the puppet government. Soon thereat, “Alghanistan’s neighbors, Pakistan and Tran. began providing training and material support tothe Mujghideon."" Not wut near the end of the Ruscian ceeupation would al-Qaeda appear on the scene, Ts zole would he to reeritand tain foreign fighters. ‘Then in 1982, Irae invaded Lebanon to corral tho Palestinian jsuerillas who had been expelled from Jordan in 1970." Iran dis: patched «contingent of Revolutionary Guards or Sepa. Founded Dy anti-Shah guerilla,” th Sepal Waa no stranger to counterin wi Irrnonuenon {ellgence and peveholies! warfare. Wt had, infect, sapped the Iranian army’s will 0 fight.” Because it nti job in Iran had ‘pee to eerut nd tain militia or Base) forthe war with fag” tha litle trouble eeraitintrnining Lebanese Shiltes and Pale ‘inians to confront the feral [At the sume time Lebanon received the Irinian contingent, te Hezbollah oF “Party of God” exploded in ize, Tt had both the Hashishin ana Sepa experienes from which to draw tactical is: =piration, Iran his also intervened [iret] in Lebanon. Its pes fence hogan in 1982 when it sent a contingent of Iran Rovolutimary Guards to join the fight during the Teach invasion. The Syrians never allowed the Iranians near the front, so they sited in the Bokaa Valley, where they now las of 1988) train Shite radicals. Further Iranian inter. vention idencod by the extensive support provided In ita effort establish an slams repli in —Worfare in Lebanon, Nat. Delense Unis Researching the Current Military Dilemma US. forces are now experiencing in Teaq what the leralis en: dduredin Lebanon for 18 years. They are alsa meting more opps. tion in Afghanistan. While Hesbllah snd al-Qaeda may be mately responsible, their mutual lack of organiantional structure makes it difclt to pin dows their tactical and traning methods. ‘oarrive at those methods, one must study the battlefield exploits oftheir subsidiary guorrlla movements: the Palestinians, agi, Chechens, and Afghans. Then, any trends in technique would help tw define their infaney maneuvers. ‘Thee maneuvers would al- ‘oat certainly have cllaers| peyhological and media value, They ‘woeldsnfies enough eaualties to erode the fos poplar suppor, hile being safe enough to bolster friendly morale They would Involve thorough planning, a quik strike with limit obicetives, ‘nd a rapid pullback. "To keep fom playing ino the guoreillas hands, the US. will have to carefully measure each military response and then usea nonmilitary means to remove the rot enuses ofthe ds fonten. exit etnooveron "This bok attempts to make some sense ofthe thouaands of ‘ent media glimpses into Musi combat. While the US. govern- ‘ment may have aeees to more intelligence it seldom tries to assess that ineligence from a tactical standpoint. It = generally more interested inthe fees technological profile. Many of ts analysts are not even aware Unt the Bastern thought process differs fom their own. As most Orientals, the people of Asia Minor wil only show a Western opponent what they want im to see. ‘Tha, the ‘ews fom Iraq end Affhanistan must be caeflly analyzed to de termine enemy method—the book’ ultimate gol ‘Ofcourse, this work cannot hope to completely unravel the po- vical complexities ofthe Middle Bast. To gain media attention ad protet eachother, majo terrorit groups may routinely take credit for things they didn't do. Many ofthe zamations of factions. Stil, the ruses and maneuvers of loosely fonfederated factions wil naturally converue upon those that work best. "That those factions are constantly seeking new waysto defeat the Wester Golisth creates thrend of continuity. Tati of the resent Moon coversin eanaiderable deta—how thoxo militias fight. Ie thelr tchaiques are convenging, US. tronpe deserve 20 naw it. For by amply knowing whist to expec, Ameria’ hart could double Uieir chances of earva When you are ignorant ofthe enemy but know yourself, your ‘ances af winning and losing are equ” Son Te Part One AHeritage of Unconventional Warfare Marco Polo warned ofa “daytime darkness" (or dry mist) being. ‘unjured upby the caravan raiding Koreunas of upper Persia Gallipoli’s ___ Underreported Tactics (© ny were the Altes so soundly beaten? © How sophisticated were the Turkish infantry techniques? ‘They Fight Differently Over There ‘As America struggles to bring demoeracy to Iraq and Afghani stan, it must remember that this egion has hosted eultures much ler than its own. From 618 to 906 AD. the Chinese Tang Dy- hasty ruled everything from northern India to Turkestan.” Thus available throughout Asia Minor for over a millennium have been Sun Tau'-like military precepts, Asearly asthe 10th CenturyA.D., its westernmost fighters displayed a decided preference for sma highly mobile bands, ‘hove bands dd not operate like the armies ot Burope Gauuvou's Unsenneronteo acres [Alenract oF Unconvemonat Wanrane ‘The generals ofthe East considered a campaign brought to a succesful sue without a great battle as the cheapest land moct satisfactory consummation in War. They cansid fred it absurd to expend stores, money, and the valuable lives of veteran soldiers in achieving by free an end that ‘ould equally well be obtained by sil... They had a strong predilection for stratagems, ambushes, and simulated re- treats. For the officer who fought without having fst se- curedall the advantages for hiown side, they had the reat- fst contempt (Oman, A History of War inthe Middle Ages, tos. In short, the fighters of this region have long prefered sim EE lated retreats to set pice atten, That way, they could mare ea Map 1.1: Rellt Map of Turkey choose when and where to fight. When their adversary’ formation een land supply lines were sufficiently stretched, they would reappear this eae. Its then that their eal for lose combat wos become ‘apparent. Having initially misjudged the reason for the backward ‘The Turks. iked} ambushes and stratagems of every motion, the Westerner was offen surprised by the tightening nose sort, lin battle they advanced notin one mass, bt in ‘Anyone who fights in this region should be aware ofits unconven ‘mall scattered bands, whieh swept along the enemys front tional military tradition, ‘and around his fans, pouring in lights of arrows, and ex ‘cating partial charges if they saw a good opportunity? [Expanding the Standard Image of Gallipali In tho first Crusade from 1095 to 1099 A.D. the Turks demon- strated that they could withdraw as expertly as their Mongol in ‘When thinking of Gallipoli, one imagines successive waves of laws British, Australian, and New Zealand infantrymen assaulting up- bill agtinst wellentrenched Turkish mechineguns, While mach of ‘Thor tactics skilfully blended surprise, mobility and the batle aid happen this way, there was another part that eae firepower, less wel reported. It occurred in the high brush and deepaitch ‘The Tork was.a master of feigned retreat. On ocasion, ofthe ard flatlands behind Suvla Bay. Iis here that the legendary hh led Frankish horse cavalry on «chase lasting day, on Sandringham company wa at seen assaulting inte acloud the. othe oecasions, he lured them into prepared ambush. When al yellow mist” fitacking marching columns, he concentrated on teparat- strange an account could bo easily discounted itt had not ing the components, usually striking the rear. And, jus. boon the subject of well-researched book and BBC/PES documen- disconcerting if things went wrong for the attackers, they tary. Hoth bore the title “All the Kings Men. Tp discover how ‘id not hesitate in breaking off action and disappearing.” ‘much the WWI Turks knew about what the US. military now re- ferstoas “unconventional” oasymmotie” warfare, tis is thebatle ‘This was nofuke, At the tur ofthe first millennium, oven the to study. That which boggled the Western mind 90 years ago may Bast Roman (Byzantine occupants of Constantinople Istana fl sill doo, lowed a decidedly Asian military philosophy. 4 [AtenAce oF Unconvennonat Waneane Geographic Orientation "The Gallipali Peninsula juts into the Aogean Sea (an extension ofthe Mediterranean) fom the Europeen part of Turkey. (See Map 1.1) du to the eat of the peningula are the Dardanelles, «nat ‘ow body of water that rons northwesterly nts the Sea of Marmara, Istanbul's Bosphorus Strait, andthe Black Sea. ‘Suvla Bay i a third a the way up the western side ofthis pen- insula. A fow mils to its north isthe Kicteh Tepe Ridge, Just to ite east are a north south string of ills that include Kavak Tepe and Tekke Tepe. Within those hills are the villages of Anafarta Sagir and Bivk Anafarta. (See Map 12.) Just inboard of Suvla Bay isn one-milesquare salt Inke, ‘During the dry season, that Jako may contain very litle water. "The Vanishing of the Sandringham Company Unfortunatoly, it was not just British company that vanished at Suvla Boy, Turkey in 1915. Tt was the better part ofan entire ‘attalion—the 1th Norfolk. Tend it sister batalin (14th Nor folk) were part ofthe Sith Division that had been landing at Suvla ay since § August. The USth Norfolkalong withthe USth Suf- {blk and V8lh Hampshire ("th Hants"}constituted the division’ 165rd Infantry Brigade” As the men of the WSth Norfolk came ashore on the afternoon of 10 August, they saw British 14-inch hells [iting the Anafurta villages inthe ow hills four miles inland. They son encountered sone captured Turkish trenches, decomposing ba fet, and unexploded land mines. ‘The weather was hat, and they ‘were short of water. Ae few afcersreconneitered the ares, they tumbled upon a Lancashire company dug into @ streambed. Its leaders warned that though the fring line was a half mile to the taal they had been “snipe tall day fom a valley to thelr ight ‘That valley" mant have been the edge ofthe Salt Lake or mouth of its Azmak Deri tributary (Look again at Map 1.2) Barly on 11 August, the 16rd brigade (with USth Norfolk on the right, U8th Hants inthe center, and 15 Suffolk on the left) ‘moved eestward* Their formation wae lie of platoons ech in double file.” Unfortunately the terrain was a snipe'sdream—full of thick serab and tiny depressions. To mako matters worse, the battalion was subjected to shel fire fom their own ships." Onthe mormingof12 August, the USth Norfolk sent a fours reconnaissance patrol forward to see how far it could move uncon tested. While there was intermittent abel fie throug