02. SARKIES TOURS PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. HONORABLE COURT OF
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
APPEALS, DR. ELINO G. FORTADES, MARISOL A. FORTADES AND
FATIMA A. FORTADES. G.R. No. 108897, October 02, 1997
A. PARTIES:
1. Plaintiff – Elino, Marisol, Fatima Minerva Fortades (passengers)
2. Defendant – Petitioner Sarkies Tours (common carrier)
B. ALLEGATIONS
1. Claim
 On August 31, 1984, Fatima boarded petitioner’s De Luxe Bus No. 5 in
Manila on her way to Legazpi City. Her brother Raul helped her load
three pieces of luggage containing important documents and personal
belongings. Her belongings were kept in the baggage compartment of
the bus, but during a stopover at Daet, it was discovered that all but
one bag remained in the open compartment. The others, including
Fatima’s things, were missing and could have dropped along the way.
Some of the passengers suggested retracing the route to try to recover
the lost items, but the driver ignored them and proceeded to Legazpi
City.
 Fatima immediately reported the loss to her mother who, in turn, went to
petitioner’s office in Legazpi City and later at its head office in Manila.
The latter, however, merely offered her P1,000.00 for each piece of
luggage lost, which she turned down. After returning to Bicol
disappointed but not defeated, they asked assistance from the radio
stations and even from Philtranco bus drivers who plied the same route
on August 31st. The effort paid off when one of Fatima’s bags was
recovered. Marisol also reported the incident to the National Bureau of
Investigation’s field office in LegazpiCity, and to the local police.
 On September 20, 1984, respondents, through counsel, formally
demanded satisfaction of their complaint from petitioner. In a letter
dated October 1, 1984, the latter apologized for the delay and said that
“(a) team has been sent out to Bicol for the purpose of recovering or at
least getting the full detail” of the incident.
 Plaintiffs claimed that the loss was due to petitioner’s failure to observe
extraordinary diligence in the care of Fatima’s luggage and that
petitioner dealt with them in bad faith from the start.
2. Defense
 Petitioner disowned any liability for the loss on the ground that Fatima
allegedly did not declare any excess baggage upon boarding its bus. It
claimed that Fatima did not bring any piece of luggage with her, and
even if she did, none was declared at the start of the trip.
C.
1. Case Filed – Civil Case for Damages for Breach of Contract of Carriage
to recover the value of the remaining lost items, as well as moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.
2. RTC – ruled in favour of plaintiffs
3. CA – affirmed the RTC
4. SC– affirmed
ISSUE:Whether Petitioner, as a common carrier, is responsible for private
respondents’ loss
THE COURT RULED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE.
 In its letter dated October 1, 1984, petitioner tacitly admitted its liability
by apologizing to respondents and assuring them that efforts were being
made to recover the lost items.
 Under the Civil Code, “(c)ommon carriers, from the nature of their business
and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods x xx transported by them,” and
this liability “lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the
possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the same
are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier for transportation
until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to x xx
the person who has a right to receive them,” unless the loss is due to any
of the excepted causes under Article 1734 thereof.
 The cause of the loss in the case at bar was petitioner’s negligence in
not ensuring that the doors of the baggage compartment of its bus
were securely fastened. As a result of this lack of care, almost all of
the luggage was lost, to the prejudice of the paying passengers.
 Petitioner questions the award of actual damages to respondents. There is
no dispute that of the three pieces of luggage of Fatima, only one was
recovered. The other two contained optometry books, materials,
equipment, as well as vital documents and personal belongings.
Respondents had to shuttle between Bicol and Manila in their efforts to be
compensated for the loss. During the trial, Fatima and Marisol had to travel
from the United States just to be able to testify. Expenses were also
incurred in reconstituting their lost documents. Under these circumstances,
the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals in awarding P30,000.00 for the
lost items and P30,000.00 for the transportation expenses, but disagrees
with the deletion of the award of moral and exemplary damages which, in
view of the foregoing proven facts, with negligence and bad faith on the
fault of petitioner having been duly established, should be granted to
respondents in the amount of P20,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively.
03. TABACALERA INSURANCE CO., PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE &
ASSURANCE, INC., AND NEW ZEALAND INSURANCE CO., LTD., VS.
NORTH FRONT SHIPPING SERVICES, INC., AND COURT OF APPEALS.
G.R. No. 119197, May 16, 1997
A. PARTIES
1. Plaintiff – Tabacalera Insurance, Prudential Guarantee and New Zealand
Insurance Co., insurance companies
2. Defendant – North Front Shipping, common carrier
B. ALLEGATIONS
1. Claim
 On 2 August 1990, 20,234 sacks of corn grains valued at P3,500,640.00
were shipped on board North Front 777, a vessel owned by North Front
Shipping Services, Inc. (NFSSI) The cargo was consigned to Republic
Flour Mills Corporation (RFMC) in Manila and insured with petitioner
insurance companies. The vessel was inspected prior to actual loading
by representatives of the shipper and was found fit to carry the
merchandise. The cargo was covered with tarpaulins and wooden
boards. The hatches were sealed and could only be opened by
representatives of RFMC.
 The vessel left Cagayan de Oro City on 2 August 1990 and arrived
Manila on 16 August 1990. RFMC was advised of its arrival but it did not
immediately commence the unloading operations. There were days
when unloading had to be stopped due to variable weather
conditions and sometimes for no apparent reason at all. When the
cargo was eventually unloaded there was a shortage of 26.333 metric
tons.The remaining merchandise was already moldy, rancid and
deteriorating. The unloading operations were completed twenty (20)
days after the arrival of the barge at the wharf of RFMC in Pasig City.
 Upon examination, it was found that the corn grains had 18.56% moisture
content and the wetting was due to contact with salt water. The mold
growth was only incipient and not sufficient to make the corn grains toxic
and unfit for consumption. In fact the mold growth could still be arrested
by drying.
 RFMC rejected the entire cargo and formally demanded from NFSSI
payment for the damages suffered by it. The demands however were
unheeded. The insurance companies were perforce obliged to pay RFMC
P2,189,433.40.
2. Defense
NFSSI averred in refutation that it could not be made culpable for the
loss and deterioration of the cargo as it was never negligent. Captain
Solomon Villanueva, master of the vessel, reiterated that the barge was
inspected prior to the actual loading and was found adequate and
seaworthy. In addition, they were issued a permit to sail by the Coast
Guard. The tarpaulins were doubled and brand new and the hatches
were properly sealed. They did not encounter big waves hence it was
not possible for water to seep in. He further averred that the corn grains
were farm wet and not properly dried when loaded.
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. Case Filed –By virtue of the payment made by the insurance companies,
they were subrogated to the rights of the consignee RFMC. Thus, they
lodged a complaint for damages against North Front Shipping,
claiming that the loss was exclusively attributable to the fault and
negligence of the carrier.
2. RTC – Dismissed the Complaint, ruling that the contract entered into
between North Front and RFMC was a charter-party agreement. As such,
only ordinary diligence in the care of goods was required of North Front.
The inspection of the barge by the shipper and the representatives of the
shipping company before actual loading, coupled with the Permit to Sail
issued by the Coast Guard, sufficed to meet the degree of diligence
required of the carrier.
3. CA – affirmed the dismissal by the RTC
4. SC – reversed the CA decision; ruled in favour of petitioners
ISSUE:
Whether respondent carrier observed the required extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods placed in its care
THE COURT RULED IN THE NEGATIVE.
FIRST, the charter-party agreement between North Front Shipping and RFMC
did not in any way convert the common carrier into a private carrier. A 'charter-
party' is defined as a contract by which an entire ship, or some principal part
thereof, is let by the owner to another person for a specified time or use. Upon
the other hand, the term 'common or public carrier' is defined in Art. 1732 of the
Civil Code. The definition extends to carriers either by land, air or water which
hold themselves out as ready to engage in carrying goods or transporting
passengers or both for compensation as a public employment and not as a
casual occupation.
 It is therefore imperative that a public carrier shall remain as such,
notwithstanding the charter of the whole or portion of a vessel by one or
more persons, provided the charter is limited to the ship only, as in the case
of a time-charter or voyage-charter. Thus, contrary to the trial court’s
ruling, respondent carrier was obliged to observe extraordinary
diligence as a common carrier, and not merely ordinary diligence.
SECOND, the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered
for shipment requires the common carrier to know and to follow the required
precaution for avoiding damage to, or destruction of the goods entrusted to it for
safe carriage and delivery. It requires common carriers to render service with
the greatest skill and foresight and 'to use all reasonable means to ascertain the
nature and characteristics of goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise due
care in the handling and stowage, including such methods as their nature
requires'.
petitioners.
However, the destruction, loss or deterioration of the cargo cannot be attributed
solely to the carrier. The consignee RFMCis guilty of contributory negligence. It
was seasonably notified of the arrival of the barge but did not immediately
start the unloading operations. No explanation was proffered by the
consignee as to why there was a delay of six (6) days. Had the unloading been
commenced immediately the loss could have been completely avoided or at
least minimized. As testified to by the chemist who analyzed the corn samples,
the mold growth was only at its incipient stage and could still be arrested by
drying. The corn grains were not yet toxic or unfit for consumption. For its
contributory negligence, RFMC should share at least 40% of the loss.

Here, the Marine Cargo Adjusters hired by the insurance companies conducted
a survey and found cracks in the bodega of the barge and heavy
concentration of molds on the tarpaulins and wooden boards. They did not
notice any seals in the hatches. The tarpaulins were not brand new as there
were patches on them, contrary to the claim of NFSSI thus making it possible
for water to seep in. They also discovered that the bulkhead of the barge was
rusty.

NFSSI proved that the vessel was inspected prior to actual loading by
representatives of the shipper and was found fit to take a load of corn grains.
They were also issued Permit to Sail by the Coast Guard. The master of the
vessel testified that the corn grains were farm wet when loaded. However, this
testimony was disproved by the clean bill of lading issued by North Front
Shipping Services, Inc., which did not contain a notation that the corn
grains were wet and improperly dried. Having been in the service since
1968, the master of the vessel would have known at the outset that corn
grains that were farm wet and not properly dried would eventually
deteriorate when stored in sealed and hot compartments as in hatches of
a ship. Equipped with this knowledge, the master of the vessel and his
crew should have undertaken precautionary measures to avoid or lessen
the cargo's possible deterioration as they were presumed knowledgeable
about the nature ofsuch cargo. But none of such measures was taken.

In fine, the Court held that the carrier failed to observe the required
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods placed in its care. The
proofs presented by NFSSI were insufficient to rebut the prima facie
presumption of negligence, more so if we consider the evidence adduced by
04. DR. VICTORIA L. BATIQUIN AND ALLAN BATIQUIN, PETITIONERS,
VS.COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES QUEDO D. ACOGIDO AND FLOTILDE
G. VILLEGAS, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 118231, July 05, 1996
A. PARTIES
1. Plaintiff/Complainant with Background/Position Title, Occupation, etc
Mrs.Flotilde Villegas is a married woman who submitted to Dr.Batiquin
for prenatal care
2. Defendant; same same
Dr. Victoria Batiquin was a Resident Physician at the Negros Oriental
Provincial Hospital, Dumaguete City. She was also the Actg. Head of
the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the said Hospital
3. Others
Dr. Ma. SaludKho – testimonial witness; a resident physician at the
Holy Child's Hospital in Dumaguete City
B. ALLEGATIONS
1. Plaintiff's Claim - Negligent Act/s of D; Relief/s Prayed for
In the morning of September 21, 1988 Dr.Batiquin, along with other
physicians and nurses, performed a caesarean operation on Mrs.
Villegas and successfully delivered the latter’s baby. After leaving the
hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and complained
of being feverish. She also gradually lost her appetite, so she consulted
Dr.Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain
medicines. However, the pains still kept recurring. She then consulted
Dr. Ma. SaludKho. After examining her, Dr Kho suggested that
Mrs.Villegas submit to another surgery. When Dr.Kho opened the
abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside, an
ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus,
dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber material on the
right side of the uterus, embedded on the ovarian cyst. The piece of
rubber appeared to be a part of a rubber glove. This was the cause of
all of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the discomfort
suffered by Mrs. Villegas.
The piece of rubber allegedly found was not presented in court, and
Dr.Kho testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for
examination. Aside from Dr.Kho's testimony, the evidence which
mentioned the piece of rubber are a Medical Certificate, a Progress
Record, an Anaesthesia Record, a Nurse's Record, and a Physician's
Discharge Summary.
2. Defendant's Defense and/or Counterclaim
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. Case Filed - Damages
2. RTC Ruling (inc damages awarded, if any)
The trial court, however, regarded these documentary evidence as
mere hearsay, "there being no showing that the person or persons who
prepared them are deceased or unable to testify on the facts therein
stated. There was also doubts as to the whereabouts of the piece of
rubber, as 2 versions arose from Dr.Kho’s testimony: (1) that it was sent
to the Pathologist in Cebu as testified to in Court by Dr.Kho and (2) that
Dr.Kho threw it away as told by her to Defendant. The failure of the
Plaintiffs to reconcile these two different versions served only to
weaken their claim against Defendant Batiquin.
The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants.
3. CA - The CA reversed the decision.
4. SC
ISSUE: Whether or not Dr.Batiquin is liable
Dr.Batiquin is liable
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to
the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may
be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for
specific proof of negligence. The rule, when applicable to the facts and
circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and does not
dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the
party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima
facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a
breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and
only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent
and not readily available.
In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine
are present.First, the entire proceedings of the cesarean section were
under the exclusive control of Dr.Batiquin. In this light, the private
respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the
exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private respondent
Villegas' body, which, needless to say, does not occur unless through
the intervention of negligence. Second, since aside from the cesarean
section, private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation
which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her
uterus, it stands to reason that such could only have been a by-product
of the cesarean section performed by Dr.Batiquin. The petitioners, in
this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising
from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.Dr.Batiquin is therefore
liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private
respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.

The court reiterates its recognition of the vital role the medical
profession plays in the lives of the people and State's compelling
interest to enact measures to protect the public from "the potentially
deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would
undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma. Indeed,
a physician is bound to serve the interest of his patients "with the
greatest of solicitude, giving them always his best talent and skill."
Through her tortious conduct, the petitioner endangered the life of
Flotilde Villegas, in violation of her profession's rigid ethical code and in
contravention of the legal standards set forth for professionals, in the
general and members of the medical profession, in particular.
05. DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND
LYDIA UMALI, RESPONDENTS.[ G.R. No. 122445, November 18, 1997 ]
A. PARTIES
a. Plaintiff/Complainant
Lydia Umali – patient/deceased
Rowena Umali De Ocampo – daughter of Lydia Umali
b. Defendant; same same
Dr.Ninevetch Cruz – physician at the Perpetual Help Clinic and General
Hospital
Dr.LinaErcillo- attending anaesthesiologist during the operation of the
deceased
B. ALLEGATIONS
a. Plaintiff's Claim
Rowena Umali De Ocampo, accompanied her mother, Lydia, to
the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital. Lydia was examined by
the petitioner who found a "myoma" in her uterus, and scheduled her for
a hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991. Because of the untidy
state of the clinic, Rowena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed
with the operation. The following day, before her mother was wheeled
into the operating room, Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation
could be postponed. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner
told her that she must be operated on as scheduled. Rowena and her
other relatives waited outside the operating room while Lydia underwent
operation. While they were waiting, Dr.Ercillo went out of the operating
room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's
sister immediately bought. About one hour had passed when Dr.Ercillo
came out again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. After the
lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed them that the operation
was finished. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was brought out of the
operating room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the
other relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. Unfortunately, they
were not able to comply with petitioner's order as there was no more
type "A" blood available in the blood bank. Thereafter, a person arrived
to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia.
Rowena then noticed her mother, who was attached to an
oxygen tank, gasping for breath. Apparently the oxygen supply had run
out and Rowena's husband together with the driver of the accused had
to go to the San Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given
the fresh supply of oxygen as soon as it arrived. But at around 10:00
o'clock P.M. she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to
60/50. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San
Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and
further examined. Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District
Hospital, she was wheeled into the operating room and the petitioner
and Dr.Ercillo re-operated on her because there was blood oozing from
the abdominal incision. While the petitioner was closing the abdominal
wall, the patient died. Lydia Umali was pronounced dead. Her death
certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of death and
"Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent
cause.
b. Defendant's Defense and/or Counterclaim
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
a. Case Filed
Dr.Ninevetch Cruz and Dr.LinaErcillo were charged with "reckless
imprudence and negligence resulting to homicide for the untimely death
of said Lydia Umali on the day following her surgical operation.
b. MTCC Ruling
Trial ensued after both the petitioner and Dr.LinaErcillo pleaded not
guilty to the above-mentioned charge. On March 4, 1994, the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of San Pablo City rendered a decision
finding the accused Dra. LinaErcillo not guilty of the offense charged for
insufficiency of evidence while her co-accused Dra. Ninevetch Cruz is
hereby held responsible for the death of Lydia Umali on March 24,
1991, and therefore guilty under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
c. RTC/CA
The RTC and the CA affirmed the MTCC in toto and further directed
petitioner to pay the heirs of Lydia Umali P50,000.00 as indemnity for
her death.
d. SC
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide
Petitioner is NOT guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
 This Court finds the foregoing circumstances insufficient to part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach and
sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime of the resulting death of his patient. It is significant to state at this juncture
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The elements of reckless that the autopsy conducted by Dr.Arizala on the body of Lydia did not
imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that reveal any untied or unsutured cut blood vessel nor was there any
the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without indication that the tie or suture of a cut blood vessel had become loose
malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; thereby causing the hemorrhage. This Court has no recourse but to
and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the rely on the expert testimonies rendered by both prosecution and
offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, defense witnesses that substantiate rather than contradict petitioner's
degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances allegation that the cause of Lydia's death was DIC which, as attested to
regarding persons, time and place. by an expert witness, cannot be attributed to the petitioner's fault or
Even granting arguendo that the inadequacy of the facilities and negligence. The probability that Lydia's death was caused by DIC was
untidiness of the clinic; the lack of provisions; the failure to conduct pre- unrebutted during trial and has engendered in the mind of this Court a
operation tests on the patient; and the subsequent transfer of Lydia to reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. Thus, her acquittal of the
the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation performed on her by the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, but this Court finds
petitioner do indicate, even without expert testimony, that petitioner was the petitioner civilly liable for the death of Lydia Umali, for while a
recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon, no conviction of a crime requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, only a
cogent proof exists that any of these circumstances caused petitioner's preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil liability.
death. Thus, the absence of the fourth element of reckless
imprudence:that the injury to the person or property was a WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. NINEVETCH
consequence of the reckless imprudence. CRUZ is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of reckless imprudence
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack resulting in homicide but is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased
of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined Lydia Umali the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as
according to the standard of care observed by other members of the civil liability, ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as
profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in moral damages, and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as
mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or exemplary damages.
the present state of medical science. The prosecution's expert
witnesses in the persons of Dr.FlorestoArizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador,
Jr. of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) only testified as to the
possible cause of death but did not venture to illuminate the court on
the matter of the standard of care that petitioner should have exercised.
Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that the
circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive of conduct
falling below the standard of care employed by other physicians in good
standing when performing the same operation. It must be remembered
that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the
instant case, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he
takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge
and skill in attending to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently
established. This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is
so sadly lacking in the case at bench.
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the
burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable
conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the
08. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS,
RITA GUECO TAPNIO, CECILIO GUECO and THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., respondents.G.R. No. L-27155
May 18, 1978
CASE BACKGROUND:
This is a Certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering
petitioner, as third-party defendant, to pay respondent Rita GuecoTapnio, as
third-party plaintiff, the sum of P2,379.71, plus 12% interest per annum from
September 19, 1957 until the same is fully paid, P200.00 attorney's fees and
costs, the same amounts which Rita GuecoTapnio was ordered to pay the
Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc., to be paid directly to the
Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. in full satisfaction of the
judgment rendered against Rita GuecoTapnio in favor of the former; plus
P500.00 attorney's fees for Rita GuecoTapnio and costs.
The basic action is the complaint filed by Philamgen (Philippine American
General Insurance Co., Inc.) as surety against Rita GuecoTapnio and
CecilioGueco, for the recovery of the sum of P2,379.71 paid by Philamgen to
the Philippine National Bank on behalf of respondents Tapnio and Gueco,
pursuant to an indemnity agreement. Petitioner Bank was made third-party
defendant by Tapnio and Gueco on the theory that their failure to pay the debt
was due to the fault or negligence of petitioner.
FACTS:
Plaintiff executed its Bond with defendant Rita GuecoTapnio as principal, in
favor of the Philippine National Bank Branch at San Fernando, Pampanga, to
guarantee the payment of defendant Rita GuecoTapnio's account with said
Bank.
In turn, to guarantee the payment of whatever amount the bonding company
would pay to the Philippine National Bank, both defendants executed the
indemnity agreement. Under the terms and conditions of this indemnity
agreement, whatever amount the plaintiff would pay would earn interest at the
rate of 12% per annum, plus attorney's fees in the amount of 15 % of the whole
amount due in case of court litigation.
The original amount of the bond was for P4,000.00; but the amount was later
reduced to P2,000.00.
It is not disputed that defendant Rita GuecoTapnio was indebted to the bank in
the sum of P2,000.00, plus accumulated interests unpaid, which she failed to
pay despite demands. The Bank wrote a letter of demand to plaintiff;
whereupon, plaintiff paid the bank on September 18, 1957, the full amount due
and owing in the sum of P2,379.91, for and on account of defendant Rita
Gueco's obligation.
Plaintiff, in turn, made several demands, both verbal and written, upon
defendants but to no avail.
DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENTS (RITA TAPNIO):
 Defendant claimed that when demand was made upon her by plaintiff for
her to pay her debt to the Bank, that she told the Plaintiff that she did not
consider herself to be indebted to the Bank at all because she had an
agreement with one Jacobo-Nazon whereby she had leased to the latter
her unused export sugar quota for the 1956-1957 agricultural year,
consisting of 1,000 piculs at the rate of P2.80 per picul, or for a total of
P2,800.00, which was already in excess of her obligation guaranteed by
plaintiff's bond.
 This lease agreement, according to her, was with the knowledge of the
bank. But the Bank has placed obstacles to the consummation of the
lease, and the delay caused by said obstacles forced 'Nazon to rescind the
lease contract. Thus, Rita GuecoTapnio filed her third-party complaint
against the Bank to recover from the latter any and all sums of money
which may be adjudged against her and in favor of the plaintiff plus moral
damages, attorney's fees and costs.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS:
 Petitioner argued that as an assignee of the sugar quota of Tapnio, it has
the right, both under its own Charter and under the Corporation Law, to
safeguard and protect its rights and interests under the deed of
assignment, which include the right to approve or disapprove the said
lease of sugar quota and in the exercise of that authority, its
 Board of Directors necessarily had authority to determine and fix the rental
price per picul of the sugar quota subject of the lease between private
respondents and Jacobo C. Tuazon. It argued further that both under its
Charter and the Corporation Law, petitioner, acting thru its Board of
Directors, has the perfect right to adopt a policy with respect to fixing of
rental prices of export sugar quota allocations, and in fixing the rentals at
P3.00 per picul, it did not act arbitrarily since the said Board was guided by
statistics of sugar price and prices of sugar quotas prevailing at the time.

 Finally, petitioner emphasized that under the appealed judgment, it shall
suffer a great injustice because as a creditor, it shall be deprived of a just
claim against its debtor (respondent Rita GuecoTapnio) as it would be
required to return to respondent Philamgen the sum of P2,379.71, plus
interest, which amount had been previously paid to petitioner by said
insurance company in behalf of the principal debtor, herein respondent Rita
GuecoTapnio, and without recourse against respondent Rita GuecoTapnio.
ISSUE:
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. This petitioner
failed to do.
Certainly, it knew that the agricultural year was about to expire, that by
its disapproval of the lease private respondents would be unable to
utilize the sugar quota in question.
In failing to observe the reasonable degree of care and vigilance which
the surrounding circumstances reasonably impose, petitioner is
consequently liable for the damages caused on private respondents.

a. Whether or not a corporation is liable whenever a tortious act is
committed by an officer or agent under express direction or authority
from the stockholders or members acting as a body, or, generally, from
the directors as the governing body? (YES)
b. Whether or not petitioner is consequently liable for the damages caused
on private respondents? (YES)
RULING:
Under Article 21 of the New Civil Code, "any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The afore-cited provisions on human relations were intended to expand
the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.

a. A corporation is civilly liable in the same manner as natural persons for

torts, because "generally speaking, the rules governing the liability of a
principal or master for a tort committed by an agent or servant are the
same whether the principal or master be a natural person or a
corporation, and whether the servant or agent be a natural or artificial
person.
All of the authorities agree that a principal or master is liable for every
tort which he expressly directs or authorizes, and this is just as true of a
corporation as of a natural person. A corporation is liable, therefore,
whenever a tortious act is committed by an officer or agent under
express direction or authority from the stockholders or members acting
as a body, or, generally, from the directors as the governing body."

b. While petitioner had the ultimate authority of approving or disapproving

the proposed lease since the quota was mortgaged to the Bank, the
latter certainly cannot escape its responsibility of observing, for the
protection of the interest of private respondents, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand in
approving or disapproving the lease of said sugar quota.
The law makes it imperative that every person "must in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
09. PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as
Ascendants of AgapitoElcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural
Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
CASE BACKGROUND:
This is an Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
dated January 29, 1965 in Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing,
upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of
damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the
occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living
and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs,
named AgapitoElcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused
was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of
intent to kill, coupled with mistake."  demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
FACTS:
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants,
defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case
No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City.
After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal
because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none
of the parties has favored the court with a copy of the decision of
acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed
was the basis stated in the court's decision. (so please bear with the
absence of other pertinent details of the case)
And so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and
his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees
filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
ISSUE: May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code be applied
against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the
occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistence from his father, was already legally married?
RULING:
Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage
of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as
a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that
of his son.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the
child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place
"by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to
Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute.
Thus, emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate
parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer
his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate
or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or
guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his
father, mother or guardian.
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is
persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company."
In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was
living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to
and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint
and solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is
that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to
prevent them from causing damage to third persons.
On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor
emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the
assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it
freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial
litigation. And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.
Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of
the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable
for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property
which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent. 
14. THE MANILA RAILROAD CO. VS LA COMPANIA TRANSATLANTICA
AND THE ATLANTIC GULF &PACIFIC CO.
A. PARTIES
1. Plaintiff
THE MANILA RAILROAD CO.- owner of the locomotive boiler, the
subject of this case
2. Defendants
 LA COMPAÑIA TRANSATLANTICA- steamship company who
owned the steamship, Alicante, where the locomotive boiler of
plaintiff was aboarded
 THE ATLANTIC GULF & PACIFIC CO – employed by La
Companiato lift the boilers; it brings its floating crane in charge of
one named Leyden
B. ALLEGATIONS
1. Plaintiffs claim
 The boiler fell when it was lifted from the steamship. The crane was
repaired and the boiler discharged, but it was found to be so badly
damaged that it had to be reshipped to England where it was rebuilt,
and afterwards was returned to Manila. The Railroad Company's
damage by reason of the cost of repairs, expenses and loss of the
use of the boiler proved to be P23,343.29; To recover these
damages the present action was instituted by the Railroad Company
against the Steamship Company.
2. Defendant’s claim
 LA COMPAÑIA TRANSATLANTICA- It caused the Atlantic Company
to be brought in as a codefendant, and insisted that whatever liability
existed should be fixed upon the Atlantic Company as an
independent contractor who had undertaken to discharge the boilers
and had become responsible for such damage as had been done.
Under the contract for transportation from England to Manila, the
Steamship Company is liable to the plaintiff for the injury done to the
boiler while it was being discharged from the ship.The contract to convey
imports the duty to convey and deliver safely and securely with reference
to the degree of care which, under the circumstances, are required by law
and custom applicable to the case.
Such being the contract of the Steamship Company, said company is
necessarily liable, under articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code, for the
consequences of the omission of the care necessary to the proper
performance of its obligation.Nor does the Steamship Company escape
liability by reason of the fact that it employed a competent independent
contractor to discharge the boilers.
The conclusion must therefore be that if there had been no
contract of any sort between the Atlantic Company and the Steamship
Company, an action, could have been maintained by the Railroad
Company, as owner, against the Atlantic Company to recover the
damages sustained by the former
The CompañiaTrasatlantica de Barcelona should be adjudged to
pay to the Manila Railroad Company and when this judgment is satisfied,
the CompañiaTrasatlantica de Barcelona is declared to be entitled to
recover the same amount from the Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company,
against whom... judgment is to this end hereby rendered in favor of the
CompañiaTrasatlantica de Barcelona.

C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. Case filed- action for damages
2. RTC Ruling- In favor of the plaintiff against the Atlantic Company, but
the absolved the Steamship Company from the complaint
3. CA – petition directly filed to the SC
4. SC
ISSUE: Can the Atlantic Company be held directly liable to the Railroad
Company?
No contractual relation existed directly between the Railroad Company
and the Atlantic Company.
15. M. H., RAKES vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY
A. PARTIES
1. Plaintiff - M. H., RAKES.- one of a gang of eight Negro laborers in the
employment of the defendant
2. Defendant - THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY-
company which employed plaintiff
B. ALLEGATIONS
1. Plaintiffs claim
They were transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the
company's yard near the Malecon in Manila. At a certain spot at or near
the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or
upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which
was afterwards amputated at about the knee. It was proven that no
repair was made to the weakened track after it was injured by a typhoon
had any proper system of inspection.
2. Defendant’s claim
The defendant contended that remedy for injuries through negligence
lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally responsible
must be made primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily
to him.
Another contention of the defense is that the injury resulted to the
plaintiff as a risk incident to his employment and, as such, one
assumed by him.
Defendant alleged that the negligence of the plaintiff contributed to the
accident. In two particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his
work; and
Second. That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car
instead of along the boards, either before or behind it.
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. Case filed- action for damages
2. RTC Ruling- In favor of the plaintiff; the judgment of the trial court,
fixing the damage incurred by the plaintiff at 5,000 pesos
3. CA – petition directly filed to the SC
4. SC
ISSUE: Is plaintiff negligent to the extent that it contributed to
the injuries he suffered?
THE COURT RULED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE.
While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not
forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman
to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the workmen testify
that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang
against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he
repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this
contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the
defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being made known
to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in
danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not
as its primary cause.
However, it was the duty of the defendant to build and to maintain its track in
reasonably sound condition, so as to protect its workingmen from
unnecessary danger. It is plain that in one respect or the other it failed in its
duty, otherwise the accident could not have occurred; consequently the
negligence of the defendant is established.
As to the first defense of defendant, the Civil Code shows that the civil
liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to be
suspended thereby, except as expressly provided by law. Where an
individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that
the inured party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose
prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil
right.
 16. FLORESCA ET. AL. VS. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION
G.R. No. L-30642
A) PARTIES:
1) Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Co.
2) Respondents is a corporation engaged in mining operations.
B) FACTS:
Sometime prior and up to June 28,1967, the defendant PHILEX, with gross and
reckless negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure to take the required
precautions for the due protection of the lives of its men working underground at
the time, and in utter violation of the laws and the rules and regulations duly
promulgated by the Government pursuant thereto, allowed great amount of water
and mud to accumulate in an open pit area at the mine above Block 43-S-1 which
seeped through and saturated the 600 ft. column of broken ore and rock below it,
thereby exerting tremendous pressure on the working spaces at its 4300 level,
with the result that, on the said date, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, with the
collapse of all underground supports due to such enormous pressure,
approximately 500,000 cubic feet of broken ores rocks, mud and water,
accompanied by surface boulders, blasted through the tunnels and flowed out and
filled in, in a matter of approximately five (5) minutes, the underground workings,
ripped timber supports and carried off materials, machines and equipment which
blocked all avenues of exit, thereby trapping within its tunnels of all its men above
referred to, including those named in the next preceding paragraph, represented
by the plaintiffs herein;
That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant PHILEX's
mine on the said date, five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying holocaust;
22 were rescued within the next 7 days; and the rest, 21 in number, including
those referred to in paragraph 7 hereinabove, were left mercilessly to their fate,
notwithstanding the fact that up to then, a great many of them were still alive,
entombed in the tunnels of the mine, but were not rescued due to defendant
PHILEX's decision to abandon rescue operations, in utter disregard of its bounden
legal and moral duties in the premises.
That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and the rules and regulations
duly promulgated by the duly constituted authorities as set out by the Special
Committee above referred to, in their Report of investigation, pages 7-13, Annex
'B' hereof, but also failed completely to provide its men working underground the
necessary security for the protection of their lives notwithstanding the fact that it
had vast financial resources, it having made, during the year 1966 alone, a total
operating income of P 38,220,254.00, or net earnings, after taxes of
P19,117,394.00, as per its llth Annual Report for the year ended December 31,
1966, and with aggregate assets totalling P 45,794,103.00 as of December 31,
1966.
C) ISSUE: 1) WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
2) whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right
of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker's right
under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the
Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers
by virtue of that negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail
themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation
under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the
regular courts.
D) PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
1) CASE FILED: a case for damages under the civil code against respondent for
his alleged negligent and deliberate failure to take the required precautions for the
protection of the lives of its men working underground.
2) RTC:
Respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and ruled
that in accordance with the established jurisprudence, the Workmen's
Compensation Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or
compensation claims for work-connected deaths or injuries of workmen or
employees, irrespective of whether or not the employer was negligent, adding that
if the employer's negligence results in work-connected deaths or injuries, the
employer shall, pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, pay
additional compensation equal to 50% of the compensation fixed in the Act.
3) SC:
1) WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case,
It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based
on the Workmen's Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual,
exemplary and moral) in the total amount of eight hundred twenty-five thousand
(P825,000.00) pesos. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder. In fact, no
allegation appeared in the complaint that the employees died from accident
arising out of and in the course of their employments. The complaint instead
alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex
to protect the lives of its workers as a consequence of which a cave-in occurred
resulting in the death of the employees working underground. Settled is the rule
that in ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of
workmen's compensation claim or a claim for damages pursuant to the provisions
of the Civil Code, the test is the averments or allegations in the complaint.
In the present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a
contractual relationship. The alleged gross and reckless negligence and
deliberate failure that amount to bad faith on the part of Philex, constitute a
breach of contract for which it may be held liable for damages. The provisions of
the Civil Code on cases of breach of contract when there is fraud or bad faith,
read:
Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary
damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner.
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor
who acted in good faith is able shall be those that are the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have
foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was
constituted.
In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-
performance of the obligation.
Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow the payment of all kinds of
damages, as assessed by the court.
damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate the harshness and
insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence, an employer is
liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is created by law. Recovery
under the Act is not based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of the
employer (99 C.J.S. 36).
In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay
compensation benefits for loss of income, as long as the death, sickness or injury
is work-connected or work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due to the
fault of the employer (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other hand,
damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the wrongful invasion of his
rights. It is the indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either
in his person, property or relative rights, through the act or default of another (25
C.J.S. 452).
The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the
causal relation between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury as
well as the damages suffered. While under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
there is a presumption in favor of the deceased or injured employee that the death
or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated; and the employer has the burden
to prove otherwise (De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Carino vs. WCC, 93
SCRA 551; Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228).
The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's
Compensation Commission then, now Employees Compensation Commission, is
strengthened by the fact that unlike in the Civil Code, the Workmen's
Compensation Act did not contain any provision for an award of actual, moral and
exemplary damages. What the Act provided was merely the right of the heirs to
claim limited compensation for the death in the amount of six thousand
(P6,000.00) pesos plus burial expenses of two hundred (P200.00) pesos, and
medical expenses when incurred (Sections 8, 12 and 13, Workmen's
Compensation Act), and an additional compensation of only 50% if the complaint
alleges failure on the part of the employer to "install and maintain safety
appliances or to take other precautions for the prevention of accident or
occupational disease" (Section 4-A, Ibid.). In the case at bar, the amount sought
to be recovered is over and above that which was provided under the Workmen's
Compensation Act and which cannot be granted by the Commission.

Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation benefits

The rationale in awarding compensation under the
differs from that in giving damages under the Civil
are based on a theory of compensation distinct
damages, payments under the acts being made
Workmen's Compensation Act
should be paid to an employee who suffered an accident not due to the facilities
Code. The compensation acts
or lack of facilities in the industry of his employer but caused by factors outside
from the existing theories of
the industrial plant of his employer. Under the Civil Code, the liability of the
as compensation and not as
employer, depends on breach of contract or tort. The Workmen's Compensation
Act was specifically enacted to afford protection to the employees or workmen. It
is a social legislation designed to give relief to the workman who has been the
victim of an accident causing his death or ailment or injury in the pursuit of his
employment (Abong vs. WCC, 54 SCRA 379).
2) In Pacaña WE said:
In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma, involving the application of
Section 6 of the Workmen's Compensation Act on the injured workers' right to sue
third- party tortfeasors in the regular courts, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, again
speaking for the Court, pointed out that the injured worker has the choice of
remedies but cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and thus
balanced the relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen's Compensation
Act as against an ordinary action.
As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra cannot maintain his action for
damages against the respondents (defendants below), because he has elected to
seek compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law, and his claim (case
No. 44549 of the Compensation Commission) was being processed at the time he
filed this action in the Court of First Instance. It is argued for petitioner that as the
damages recoverable under the Civil Code are much more extensive than the
amounts that may be awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act, they
should not be deemed incompatible. As already indicated, the injured laborer was
initially free to choose either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set
by the Compensation Law or else, to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the
tortfeasor for higher damages. While perhaps not as profitable, the smaller
indemnity obtainable by the first course is balanced by the claimant's being
relieved of the burden of proving the causal connection between the defendant's
negligence and the resulting injury, and of having to establish the extent of the
damage suffered; issues that are apt to be troublesome to establish satisfactorily.
Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, petitioner is precluded from
pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is rejected by the
Compensation Commission. Anyway, under the proviso of Section 6 aforequoted,
if the employer Franklin Baker Company recovers, by derivative action against the
alleged tortfeasors, a sum greater than the compensation he may have paid the
herein petitioner, the excess accrues to the latter.
Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582),
applies to third-party tortfeasor, said rule should likewise apply to the employer-
tortfeasor.
Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned, as already stated, the
petition has been dismissed in the resolution of September 7, 1978 in view of the
amicable settlement reached by Philex and the said heirs.
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to
dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased
employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla
and Saturnino Martinez submitted notices and claims for compensation to the
Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them have been
paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided
that they be paid in installments (pp. 106-107, rec.). Such allegation was admitted
by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated May 27,
1968 (pp. 121-122, rec.) in the lower court, but they set up the defense that the
claims were filed under the Workmen's Compensation Act before they learned of
the official report of the committee created to investigate the accident which
established the criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which
report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to the then Executive Secretary
Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only (p. 76, rec.).
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an
action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that
Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners
only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of
said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its
negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen's
Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation.
The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which
nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore
be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the
petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made
under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages
that may be decreed in their favor.
17. G.R. No. L-4977             March 22, 1910
DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-
appellant.
A) PARTIES:
1) The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a
street railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. Its power
plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River
within the city of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor. The power plant
may be reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge, impassable for
vehicles, at the westerly end of the island.
2) The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries
complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more
mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude
and training in mechanics.
B) FACTS:
On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel
Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del
Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the
defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine.
Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled
apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which
both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about
the company's premises. The visit was made on a Sunday afternoon, and it
does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power
house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy.
After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the
defendant's coal, they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of
the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its
furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps
scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and
appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin
wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. They
are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and
have in themselves a considerable explosive power. After some discussion as
to the ownership of the caps, and their right to take them, the boys picked up
all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried
them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie
Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of the boy
Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They
trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result.
They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for a
hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one of the caps with a
knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got
matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the
contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all
three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of
the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in
the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in
the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his
right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons
who were called in to care for his wounds.
The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to
be on the defendant's premises, nor how long they had been there when the
boys found them. It appears, however, that some months before the accident,
during the construction of the defendant's plant, detonating caps of the same
size and kind as those found by the boys were used in sinking a well at the
power plant near the place where the caps were found; and it also appears
that at or about the time when these caps were found, similarly caps were in
use in the construction of an extension of defendant's street car line to Fort
William McKinley. The caps when found appeared to the boys who picked
them up to have been lying for a considerable time, and from the place where
they were found would seem to have been discarded as detective or
worthless and fit only to be thrown upon the rubbish heap.
No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to
prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and walking about its premises
unattended, when they felt disposed so to do. As admitted in defendant
counsel's brief, "it is undoubtedly true that children in their play sometimes
crossed the foot bridge to the islands;" and, we may add, roamed about at will
on the uninclosed premises of the defendant, in the neighborhood of the place
where the caps were found. There is evidence that any effort ever was made
to forbid these children from visiting the defendant company's premises,
although it must be assumed that the company or its employees were aware
of the fact that they not infrequently did so.
 Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin
boy on one of the interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father's
office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. About a
month after his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman
and continued in that employment for six months at a salary of P2.50 a day;
and it appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and
more mature both mentally and physically than most boys of fifteen.
C) ALLEGATIONS: Plaintiff's allegations that the caps which were found by
plaintiff on defendant company's premises were the property of the defendant,
or that they had come from its possession and control, and that the company
or some of its employees left them exposed on its premises at the point where
they were found.
Counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience,
his entry upon defendant company's premises, and the intervention of his action
between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises and the accident which resulted in his injury should not be held to
have contributed in any wise to the accident, which should be deemed to be the
direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place
where they were found by the plaintiff, and this latter the proximate cause of the
accident which occasioned the injuries sustained by him.
D) ISSUE: is private respondent liable?
E) HELD:
NO. Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike instincts
and impulses; and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution
toward them must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly. If they
leave exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to
them, and which they in their immature judgment might naturally suppose they
were at liberty to handle or play with, they should expect that liberty to be taken.
And the same eminent jurist in his treatise or torts, alluding to the doctrine of
implied invitation to visit the premises of another, says:
In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied
license might sometimes arise when it would not on behalf of others. Thus leaving
a tempting thing for children to play with exposed, where they would be likely to
gather for that purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of
it; and, perhaps, if one were to throw away upon his premises, near the common
way, things tempting to children, the same implication should arise. (Chap. 10, p.
303.)
The reasoning which led the Supreme Court of the United States to its conclusion
in the cases of Railroad Co. vs. Stout  (supra) and Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs.
McDonald  (supra) is not less cogent and convincing in this jurisdiction than in that
wherein those cases originated. Children here are actuated by similar childish
instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity and impelled by the restless spirit of
youth, boys here as well as there will usually be found whenever the public is
permitted to congregate. The movement of machinery, and indeed anything which
arouses the attention of the young and inquiring mind, will draw them to the
neighborhood as inevitably as does the magnet draw the iron which comes within
the range of its magnetic influence. The owners of premises, therefore, whereon
things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the public are expressly
or impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the owner knows or ought to know
children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, " must calculate upon
this, and take precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises
can not be heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises
without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no
duty or obligation whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to
prevent the child from entering his premises at a place where he knows or ought
to know that children are accustomed to roam about of to which their childish
instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied
license to enter, and where the child does enter under such conditions the
owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to guard the child against injury
from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the owner, is
clearly a breach of duty, responsible, if the child is actually injured, without other
fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his
express invitation or permission. To hold otherwise would be expose all the
children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim
of the owners or occupants of land upon which they might naturally and
reasonably be expected to enter.
This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessity, and neither is
contention that a man has a right to do what will with his own property or that
children should be kept under the care of their parents or guardians, so as to
prevent their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient weight to put in
doubt. In this jurisdiction as well as in the United States all private property is
acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure
the equal rights and interests of the community (see U. S. vs. Toribio,1 No. 5060,
decided January 26, 1910), and except as to infants of very tender years it would
be absurd and unreasonable in a community organized as is that in which we
lived to hold that parents or guardian are guilty of negligence or imprudence in
every case wherein they permit growing boys and girls to leave the parental roof
unattended, even if in the event of accident to the child the negligence of the
parent could in any event be imputed to the child so as to deprive it a right to
recover in such cases — a point which we neither discuss nor decide.
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without
defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant
from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his
part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of
opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate
cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly
speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other
hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and
putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the
resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is
not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of
15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he
had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical
draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses
throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The
evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the
witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was
amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to
produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who was present, admit of no
other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity,
followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final
success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the
contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there
be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might
be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within
him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became
frightened and ran away.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the
explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap,
and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he
well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his
act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It
would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he
exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or
that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries
incurred by him under such circumstances.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary
capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own
acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and
precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable
and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of
negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the
character of his own acts and their consequences; and the age at which a minor
can be said to have such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and their
consequences; and at the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability
will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety of
acts which may be done by him. But some idea of the presumed capacity of
infants under the laws in force in these Islands may be gathered from an
examination of the varying ages fixed by our laws at which minors are
conclusively presumed to be capable of exercising certain rights and incurring
certain responsibilities, though it can not be said that these provisions of law are
of much practical assistance in cases such as that at bar, except so far as they
illustrate the rule that the capacity of a minor to become responsible for his own
acts varies with the varying circumstances of each case. Under the provisions of
the Penal Code a minor over fifteen years of age is presumed to be capable of
committing a crime and is to held criminally responsible therefore, although the
fact that he is less than eighteen years of age will be taken into consideration as
an extenuating circumstance (Penal Code, arts. 8 and 9). At 10 years of age a
child may, under certain circumstances, choose which parent it prefers to live with
(Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 771). At 14 may petition for the appointment of a
guardian (Id., sec. 551), and may consent or refuse to be adopted (Id., sec. 765).
And males of 14 and females of 12 are capable of contracting a legal marriage
(Civil Code, art. 83; G. O., No. 68, sec. 1).
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and
understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he
put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his
age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity
for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury
which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him
must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and
reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been
incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed
on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal
cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.
19. DIONISIO CARPIO, vs. HON. SERGIO DOROJA, (Presiding Judge, MTC,
Branch IV, Zamboanga City) and EDWIN RAMIREZ Y WEE. G.R. No. 84516
December 5, 1989.
A. PARTIES
1. Plaintiff – DionisioCarpio, pedestrian
2. Defendant – Eduardo Toribio, owner-operator of the vehicle which figured
in the accident
FACTS:
Sometime on October 23, 1985, accused-respondent Edwin Ramirez, while
driving a passenger Fuso Jitney owned and operated by Eduardo Toribio,
bumped DionisioCarpio, a pedestrian crossing the street, as a consequence of
which the latter suffered from a fractured left clavicle as reflected in the medico-
legal certificate and sustained injuries which required medical attention for a
period of (3) three months.
Ramirez was charged with and convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Less Serious Physical Injuries, after entering a plea of guilty to a lesser offense.
Thereafter, he applied for probation.
At the early stage of the trial, the private prosecutor manifested his desire to
present evidence to establish the civil liability of either the accused driver or the
owner-operator of the vehicle. Accused's counsel moved that the court summon
the owner of the vehicle to afford the latter a day in court, on the ground that the
accused is not only indigent but also jobless and thus cannot answer any civil
liability that may be imposed upon him by the court. The private prosecutor,
however, did not move for the appearance of Eduardo Toribio.
The civil aspect of the judgment was appealed by the private prosecutor to the
Regional Trial Court Branch XVI, appellant praying for moral damages in the
amount of P 10,000.00, compensatory damages at P6,186.40, and attorney's
fees of P 5,000.00. The appellate court modified the trial court's decision,
granting the appellant moral damages in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(P 5,000.00), while affirming all other civil liabilities.
Thereafter, a writ of execution was duly served upon the accused but was,
however, returned unsatisfied due to the insolvency of the accused as shown by
the sheriff’s return.
B. ALLEGATIONS
1. Claim
 Petitioner relies heavily on the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, 87 SCRA 275,
which enunciates that "the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator is
fixed by the judgment, because if a case were to be filed against said
operator, the court called upon to act thereto has no other function than
to render a decision based on the indemnity award in the criminal case
without power to amend or modify it even if in his opinion an error has
been committed in the decision." Petitioner maintains that the tenor of the
aforesaid decision implies that the subsidiary liability of the owner-
operator may be enforced in the same proceeding and a separate action
is no longer necessary in order to avoid undue delay, notwithstanding the
fact that said employer was not made a party in the criminal action.
2. Defense
 It is the theory of respondent that the owner-operator cannot be validly
held subsidiarily liable for the following reasons, namely: (a) the matter of
subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal; (b) contrary to the case of
Pajarito v. Seneris, the injuries sustained by the complainant did not arise
from the so-called "culpa-contractual" but from "culpa-aquiliana"; (c) the
judgments of appellate courts may not be altered, modified, or changed
by the court of origin; and (d) said owner was never made a party to the
criminal proceedings.
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. Motion Filed (subject of this Petition) – Motion for Subsidiary Writ of
Execution against the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator of the vehicle.
2. RTC – Denied the motion on two grounds, namely, the decision of the
appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary liability of Eduardo Toribio,
and the nature of the accident falls under "culpa-aquiliana" and not culpa-
contractual." A motion for reconsideration of the said order was disallowed for
the reason that complainant having failed to raise the matter of subsidiary
liability with the appellate court, said court rendered its decision which has
become final and executory and the trial court has no power to alter or modify
such decision.
3. SC (Petition for Certiorari) – RTC order SET ASIDE. The Court a
quo was directed to hear and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary
liability of the alleged owner-operator of the passenger jeepney.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be
enforced in the same criminal proceeding against the driver where the
award was given
THE COURT RULED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE.
The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article 100,
both of the Revised Penal Code, which reads thus:
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall apply to employers, teachers,
persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in
the discharge of their duties.
The contention of respondent that the case of Pajarito v.
Seneris cannot be applied to the present case, the former being an action
involving culpa-contractual, while the latter being one of culpa-aquiliana is
erroneous. The subsidiary liability in Art. 103 should be distinguished from
the primary liability of employers, which is quasi-delictual in character as
provided in Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code.Under Art. 103, the liability
emanated from a delict. On the other hand, the liability under Art. 2180 is
founded on culpa-aquiliana. The present case is neither an action for culpa-
contractual nor for culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an action to enforce the
civil liability arising from crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In
no case can this be regarded as a civil action for the primary liability of the
employer under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code, i.e., action for culpa-
aquiliana.
Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-operator has been
deprived of his day in court, because the case before us is not one wherein
the operator is sued for a primary liability under the Civil Code but one in
which the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his
employee's criminal negligence is sought to be enforced. Considering the
subsidiary liability imposed upon the employer by law, he is in substance
and in effect a party to the criminal case. Such subsidiary liability is already
implied from the appellate court's decision.
Finally, the position taken by the respondent appellate court that to
grant the motion for subsidiary writ of execution would in effect be to amend
its decision which has already become final and executory cannot be
sustained. Compelling the owner-operator to pay on the basis of his
subsidiary liability does not constitute an amendment of the judgment
because in an action under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, once all the
requisites as earlier discussed are met, the employer becomes ipso facto
subsidiarily liable, without need of a separate action. Such being the case,
the subsidiary liability can be enforced in the same case where the award
was given, and this does not constitute an act of amending the decision. It
becomes incumbent upon the court to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of
execution (but only after the employer has been heard), upon conviction of
the employee and after execution is returned unsatisfied due to the
employee's insolvency.

In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the

employee's civil liability in the criminal action, it should be shown (1) that the
employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry, (2) that the employee
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) that he is
insolvent (Basa Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary
liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction of the
employee in the criminal action. When all these requisites are present, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee's
conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency. The case at bar
satisfies all these requirements.
 ordered to pay Luis A. Luna an amount of P5,000.00by way of nominal
damages.
20. FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
LUISA LUNA AND CLARITA LUNA.G.R. NO. 108164. FEBRUARY 23, 1995 ISSUE: Whether private respondents are entitled to the damages
prayed for
A. PARTIES
THE COURT MODIFIED THE AWARD OF DAMAGES.
1. Plaintiffs – Luis and Clarita Luna, credit card holders
2. Defendant – FEBTC
In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is
shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract.
FACTS:
Luis Luna applied for a far east card issued by far east bank at its Pasig
The Civil Code provides:
branch. Upon his request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to Clarita
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding
Luna. Then Clarita lost her credit card and submitted an affidavit of loss. In
moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such
cases of this nature, the bank's internal security procedures and policy would
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where
appear to be to meanwhile so record the lost card, along with the principal
the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
card, as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file.Private
respondents were not informed of this security policy.
Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence.
Later Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend, a Filipino-
Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case
American, and another guest at the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel
of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed) of the
Intercontinental Manila. To pay for the lunch, Luis presented his
common carrier.
FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter who promptly had it verified through a
telephone call to the bank's Credit Card Department. Since the card was not
In this case, concededly, the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to
honored, Luis was forced to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588.13.
personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation. Nothing in the findings
Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by this incident.
of the trial court and the appellate court, however, can sufficiently indicate
Luis thru a counsel then demanded from far east to pay damages for
any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private
the humiliation he felt. The vice-president of the bank expressed, thru letter, the
respondents. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal
bank's apologies to Luis, explaining that the incident was a consequence of the
notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith.
bank’s security policy, particularly for the purpose of averting a lost card’s
unauthorized use (by tagging the card as hotlisted).
Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private respondents filed a complaint We are not unaware of the previous rulings of this Court, such as in American
for damages with the RTC of Pasig against FEBTC. Express International, Inc., vs. Intermediate Appellate Court  (167 SCRA 209)
and Bank of Philippine Islands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (206 SCRA
408), sanctioning the application of Article 21, in relation to Article 2217 and
B. ALLEGATIONS– No arguments presented/discussed in the case
Article 2219 of the Civil Code to a contractual breach similar to the case at
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY bench. Article 21 states:
1. Case Filed – Complaint for Damages
2. RTC – ruled in favour of plaintiff; ordered FEBTC to pay private Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees. compensate the latter for the damage.
3. CA - affirmed the RTC decision
4. SC – modified the decision appealed from by deleting the award of moral Article 21 of the Code, it should be observed, contemplates a conscious act to
and exemplary damages to private respondents; in its stead, FEBTC was cause harm. Thus, even if we are to assume that the provision could properly
relate to a breach of contract, its application can be warranted only when the
defendant's disregard of his contractual obligation is so deliberate as to
approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad
faith. Most importantly, Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in
human relations that clearly must, in any case, give way to the specific provision
of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the grant of moral damages
in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or bad faith.
The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can
be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application
of applicable principles on tort even where there is a pre-existing contract
between the plaintiff and the defendant (Phil. Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 106
SCRA 143; Singson vs. Bank of Phil. Islands, 23 SCRA 1117; and Air France
vs. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155). This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve
private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission
complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract.
The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a
contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract
between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an
actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is
no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here,
private respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual
relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot
by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent
actionable tort.
oppressive, or malevolent manner (Art. 2232, Civil Code; PNB vs. Gen.
Acceptance and Finance Corp., 161 SCRA 449).
Given the above premises and the factual circumstances here obtaining, it
would also be just as arduous to sustain the exemplary damages granted by the
courts below (see De Leon vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 166).
Nevertheless, the bank's failure, even perhaps inadvertent, to honor its credit
card issued to private respondent Luis should entitle him to recover a measure
of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code providing thusly:
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
Reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered where the court deems such
recovery to be just and equitable (Art. 2208, Civil Code). We see no issue of
sound discretion on the part of the appellate court in allowing the award thereof
by the trial court.

The Court finds, therefore, the award of moral damages made by the court a
quo, affirmed by the appellate court, to be inordinate and substantially devoid of
legal basis.

Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are intended to serve as an example

or as correction for the public good in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages (Art. 2229, Civil Code; see  Prudenciado vs. Alliance
Transport System, 148 SCRA 440; Lopez vs. Pan American World Airways, 16
SCRA 431). In criminal offenses, exemplary damages are imposed when the
crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances (Art. 2230, Civil
Code). In quasi-delicts, such damages are granted if the defendant is shown to
have been so guilty of gross negligence as to approximate malice (See Art.
2231, Civil Code; CLLC E.G. Gochangco Workers Union vs. NLRC, 161 SCRA
655; Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. CA, 176 SCRA 778).
In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if
the defendant is found to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
 liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its security guards.

21. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN,

PETITIONERS, VS. MARJORIE NAVIDAD, HEIRS OF THE LATE C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY, a. Case Filed
RESPONDENTS.[ G.R. No. 145804, February 06, 2003 ] complaint for damages

b. RTC Ruling (inc damages awarded, if any)

A. PARTIES “WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
1. Plaintiff/Complainant with Background/Position Title, Occupation, etc and against the defendants Prudent Security and JunelitoEscartin
NicanorNatividad – passenger of LRT ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following:
Marjorie Natividad – wife of Nicanor
“a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;
2. Defendant; same same   2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;
JunelitoEscartin – security guard assigned   3) Indemnity for the death of NicanorNavidad in the
Rodolfo Roman – LRT train operator sum of P50,000.00;
“b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;
B. ALLEGATIONS “c) Attorney’s fees of P20,000;
 Plaintiff's Claim “d) Costs of suit.
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven o’clock in the
evening, NicanorNavidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station “The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are
after purchasing a “token” (representing payment of the fare). While dismissed for lack of merit.
Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, “The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise
JunelitoEscartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached dismissed.”
Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two
apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was c. CA
adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, The appellate court promulgated its now assailed decision exonerating
delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At Prudent from any liability for the death of NicanorNavidad and, instead,
the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable thusly:
Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving
train, and he was killed instantaneously. “WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by
exonerating the appellants from any liability for the death of
On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent NicanorNavidad, Jr. Instead, appellees Rodolfo Roman and the Light
Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his death and are
against JunelitoEscartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit hereby directed to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appellees,
Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her the following amounts:
husband. a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;
b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;
 Defendant's Defense and/or Counterclaim c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross- d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and
claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied e) P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees.”
 The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have
then as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had
already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers
were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the
corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability, the
court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the
death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin
inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established
the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the
train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by
Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to
present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of
emergency brakes could not have stopped the train.
d. SC
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all
circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its
passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for
so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought
to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage.SThe statutory provisions
render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a)
through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account
of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the
common carrier’s employees through the exercise of due diligence
could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of such
death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been
negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of
the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its
employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the
injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. In the absence
of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred,
which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show,
the presumption would be that it has been at fault, an exception from
the general rule that negligence must be proved.
The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its
obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract
by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the
common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety
of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail
itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake
the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its
responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only
be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in
conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil Code. The premise, however,
for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the
employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be
made liable on the basis of the presumption juristantum that the
employer failed to exercise diligentissimipatris families in the selection
and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only
be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of
the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. Absent such a
showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the
common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on
the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual
obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission
causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in
culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a
liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which
breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes
a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-
delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing
the rules on tort to apply.
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs
of the late NicanorNavidad, this Court is concluded by the factual
finding of the Court of Appeals that “there is nothing to link (Prudent) to
the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its
employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x xx.” This finding of the
appellate court is not without substantial justification in our own review
of the records of the case.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman
himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be
absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the
LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and
Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or
negligence.
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is
untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the
 plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. It is an established rule that
nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.
22. AIR FRANCE, PETITIONER, VS. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO AND THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.[ G.R. No. L-
21438, August 28, 1966 ]
A. PARTIES
 Plaintiff/Complainant with Background/Position Title, Occupation, etc
Rafael Carrascoso – a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48
Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
 Defendant; same same
Air France – principal of Philippine Air Lines, Inc.
B. ALLEGATIONS
a. Plaintiff's Claim
On March 28, 1958, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine
Air Lines, Inc., issued to Carascoso a "first class" round trip airplane
ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, he travelled in
"first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced him to
vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because there was a
"white man”, who the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat.
When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, a commotion ensued, many
of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they
found out that Mr.Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the
white man, they came all across to Mr.Carrascoso and pacified
Mr.Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man"; and respondent
reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.
Because of the incident, respondent filed an action for damages for
breach of contract.
Respondent contended that he paid to and received from petitioner a
first class ticket.
b. Defendant's Defense and/or Counterclaim
But petitioner asserts the following:
1. That the said ticket did not represent the true and complete
intent and agreement of the parties;
2. That said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed
reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he
had tourist class protection; and
3. That the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that
he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend
upon the availability of first class seats.
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
a. Case Filed - action for damages for breach of contract
b. RTC Ruling (inc damages awarded, if any)
Petitioner tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis
Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although respondent paid for, and
was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to
confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony
of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidences
presented by the plaintiff which clearly show that the respondent was
issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation
whatever. It cannot be believe that after such confirmation, petitioner
had a verbal understanding with respondent that the "first class" ticket
issued to him by petitioner would be subject to confirmation in
Hongkong.
CFI ruled in favor of Carrascoso. It sentenced petitioner to pay
respondent P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare
between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-
Rome plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit
c. CA
CA slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket
from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in
all other respects", with costs against petitioner.
d. SC
ISSUES
Whether or not Carrascoso was entitled to the first class seat
Whether or not he is entitled to damages
1. Yes. Carrascoso was entitled to the first class seat. Exemplary damages are also well awarded since the action of the
respondent is based on a contract. In addition, the plaintiff’s act of
If airline companies would have the policy that a first-class-ticket ejecting the respondent in his first class seat is an act which was
holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact done in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an manner.
air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline.
There is no security for the passengers. It will always be an easy SC affirmed the decision of CA.
matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very
stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement
to the contrary. It is a rule that, a written document speaks a
uniform language. There must be adherence to the ticket issued by
the airline company. Since Carrascoso was given a “first class”
airplane ticket, he is entitled to such.

2. Yes. He is entitled to damages.

First, That there was a contract to furnish Carrascoso a first class

passage covering, among others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg;
Second, That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to
furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there
was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso
to leave his first class accommodation "after he was already,
seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which
he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations,
thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.

A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and

degree from any other contractual obligation because of the
relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. The contract
of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a
public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees,
could give ground for an action for damages. Petitioner's contract
with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of
Carrascoso's action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is
a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of
quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that, “any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.”

24. MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner,
vs.COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL,
INC., respondents. G.R. No. 115024             February 7, 1996
x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x
RICHARD LI, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES
VALENZUELA, respondents. G.R. No. 117944             February 7, 1996
A.FACTS
At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU 542 from
her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta
Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia
Ramon, heading towards the direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake
Street, she noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted
place where therewere people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit
help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire
was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car's condition, she parked
along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted
from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left
side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the
tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by
defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander
Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the
windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the
ground. She was pulled out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was
severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected
to the rest of the body. She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center
where she was found to have a "traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh
(above knee)". She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was
eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for the hospital confinement
(P120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg (P27,000.00) were paid by
defendants from the car insurance.
B. ALLEGATIONS
In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the amount of P1 million,
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and other medical and
related expenses amounting to a total of P180,000.00, including loss of
expected earnings.
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was on his way home,
travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was raining, visibility was affected and
the road was wet. Traffic was light. He testified that he was driving along the
inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the direction of Araneta
Avenue, when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San
Juan, with a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with
"full bright lights". Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the right to
avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which he
did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early
warning device, and the area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense that
the left rear portion of plaintiff's car was protruding as it was then "at a standstill
diagonally" on the outer portion of the right lane towards Araneta Avenue (par.
18, Answer). He confirmed the testimony of plaintiff's witness that after being
bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved to the right and hit another car parked
on the sidewalk. Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff
was reckless or negligent, as she was not a licensed driver
C.PROCEDURAL HISTORY
RTC
After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found
defendant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise held Alexander
Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly and severally liable for damages
pursuant to Article 2180.
As a result of the trial court's decision, defendants filed an Omnibus Motion for
New Trial and for Reconsideration
The trial court denied the motion. Defendants forthwith filed an appeal with the
respondent Court of Appeals.
CA
In a Decision rendered March 30, 1994, the Court of Appeals found that there
was "ample basis from the evidence of record for the trial court's finding that the
plaintiff's car was properly parked at the right, beside the sidewalk when it was
bumped by defendant's car."1 Dismissing the defendants' argument that the
plaintiff's car was improperly parked, almost at the center of the road, the
respondent court noted that evidence which was supposed to prove that the car
was at or near center of the right lane was never presented during the trial of
the case
theCourt of Appeals, in its decision, however, absolved the Li's employer,
Alexander Commercial, Inc. from any liability towards petitioner Lourdes
Valenzuela and reduced the amount of moral damages to P500,000.00. Finding
justification for exemplary damages, the respondent court allowed an award of
P50,000.00 for the same, in addition to costs, attorney's fees and the other
damages. The Court of Appeals, likewise, dismissed the defendants'
counterclaims.
Consequently, both parties assail the respondent court's decision by filing two
separate petitions before this Court. Richard Li, in G.R. No. 117944, contends
that he should not be held liable for damages because the proximate cause of
the accident was Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela's own negligence. Alternatively, he
argues that in the event that this Court finds him negligent, such negligence
ought to be mitigated by the contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
SC
ISSUE: WON Li was negligent in driving his company-issued Mitsubishi
Lancer
THE COURT RULED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE.
"Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue
risk of harm to others."23 It is the failure to observe that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury
One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence to Li's disingenuous
and patently self-serving asseverations. The average motorist alert to road
conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at the
speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the street, and the
road conditions on a principal metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard,
Li would have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if
he were alert - as every driver should be - to those conditions. Driving exacts a
more than usual toll on the senses. Physiological "fight or flight" 10 mechanisms
are at work, provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol,
exhaustion, drowsiness, etc.11 Li's failure to react in a manner which would have
avoided the accident could therefore have been only due to either or both of the
two factors: 1) that he was driving at a "very fast" speed as testified by
Rodriguez; and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol. 12 Either factor
working independently would have diminished his responsiveness to road
conditions, since normally he would have slowed down prior to reaching
Valenzuela's car, rather than be in a situation forcing him to suddenly apply his
brakes
WHETHER OR NOT VALENZUELA WAS LIKEWISE GUILTY OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN PARKING HER CAR ALONGSIDE
AURORA BOULEVARD, WHICH ENTIRE AREA LI POINTS OUT, IS A NO
PARKING ZONE
Valenzuela was not guilty of contributory negligence
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing
as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to
which he is required to conform for his own protection
Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of
Appeals,16 an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and
is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to
undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better
solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence
While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought, or
the opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the
conduct which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not
exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates
thoroughful care, but by the over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman
driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be
faulted for stopping at a point which is bothconvenient for her to do so and
which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire
boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where
she would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to
stop and assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora
Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a
threat to her safety and to other motorists. In the instant case, Valenzuela, upon
reaching that portion of Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake St., noticed that she
had a flat tire. To avoid putting herself and other motorists in danger, she did
what was best under the situation
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the standard
reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have
contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the
amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to
park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and
it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions.
THE LIABILITY OF ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC. LI'S EMPLOYER
We are of the opinion that Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly
and solidarily liable for the damage caused by the accident.
The employer's primary liability under the concept of  pater familias embodied by
Art 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual or tortious
in character. His liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised the diligence
of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees.
Once evidence is introduced showing that the employer exercised the required
amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the employer's burden is
overcome. The question of diligent supervision, however, depends on the
circumstances of employment.
It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes of their
employees with courtesy vehicles. These company cars are either wholly
owned and maintained by the company itself or are subject to various plans
through which employees eventually acquire their vehicles after a given period
of service, or afterpaying a token amount. Many companies provide liberal "car
plans" to enable their managerial or other employees of rank to purchase cars,
which, given the cost of vehicles these days, they would not otherwise be able
to purchase on their own.
Under the first example, the company actually owns and maintains the car up to
the point of turnover of ownership to the employee; in the second example, the
car is really owned and maintained by the employee himself. In furnishing
vehicles to such employees, are companies totally absolved of responsibility
when an accident involving a company-issued car occurs during private use
after normal office hours?
In most cases, providing a company car serves both purposes. Since important
business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of
situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimited use of a
company car therefore principally  serves the business and goodwill of a
company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who
actually uses the car, the managerial employee or company sales agent. As
such, in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose of
furthering the company's image, a company owes a responsibility to the public
to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually
unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue
capably and responsibly.
In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc.
In his testimony before the trial court, he admitted that his functions as Assistant
Manager did not require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he
was required quite often to perform work outside the office, visiting prospective
buyers and contacting and meeting with company clients. 30 These meetings,
clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours because, as a managerial
employee tasked with the job of representing his company with its clients,
meetings with clients were both social as well as work-related functions. The
service car assigned to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled
both Li - as well as the corporation - to put up the front of a highly successful
entity, increasing the latter's goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated
meeting between Li and its clients by providing the former with a convenient
mode of travel
In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction,
that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in
entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not
the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving
proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a
company car.31 Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating
that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said
company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and
severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela during the accident.

25. AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant,vs.FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-
appellee. G.R. No. L-12219            March 15, 1918
CASE BACKGROUND:
In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the defendant,
Frank Smith, Jr., the sum of P31,000, as damages alleged to have been caused
by an automobile driven by the defendant. From a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of La Union absolving the defendant from liability the
plaintiff has appealed.
FACTS:
The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place on
December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union.
It appears that upon the occasion in question the plaintiff was riding on his pony
over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant
approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of
about ten or twelve miles per hour.
As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn
to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken
the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the
man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning
signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity
of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right
side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this
was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side.  consequences.
The bridge is shown to have a length of about 75 meters and a width of 4.80
meters.
As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that
being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant
assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. The pony had not as
yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop.
Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to
the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach
directly toward the horse without diminution of speed.
When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse
getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently
to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then
standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the
animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its
head toward the railing. 
In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car
and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some
violence. From the evidence adduced in the case we believe that when the
accident occurred the free space where the pony stood between the automobile
and the railing of the bridge was probably less than one and one half meters. As
a result of its injuries the horse died.
The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and
required medical attention for several days.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant was guilty of negligence such as gives
rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done? (Yes)
RULING:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case
may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent
act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he
is guilty of negligence. 
The proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case
is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of
the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was
sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think
that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of
the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he
was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to
the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the
threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he
was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the
road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in
such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and
directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties
were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded
the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid
the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences,
without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

The decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. should
perhaps be mentioned in this connection. This Court there held that while
contributory negligence on the part of the person injured did not constitute a bar
to recovery, it could be received in evidence to reduce the damages which
would otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other party.

Separate Opinions

MALCOLM, J., concurring:

After mature deliberation, I have finally decided to concur with the judgment in
this case. I do so because of my understanding of the "last clear chance" rule of
the law of negligence as particularly applied to automobile accidents. This rule
cannot be invoked where the negligence of the plaintiff is concurrent with that of
the defendant. Again, if a traveler when he reaches the point of collision is in a
situation to extricate himself and avoid injury, his negligence at that point will
prevent a recovery.

But Justice Street finds as a fact that the negligent act of the interval of time,
and that at the moment the plaintiff had no opportunity to avoid the accident.

Consequently, the "last clear chance" rule is applicable. In other words, when a
traveler has reached a point where he cannot extricate himself and vigilance on
his part will not avert the injury, his negligence in reaching that position
becomes the condition and not the proximate cause of the injury and will not
preclude a recovery.

26. MANDARIN VILLA, INC., petitioner,
vs.COURT OF APPEALS, and CLODUALDO DE JESUS, respondents. G.R.
No. 119850 June 20, 1996
FACTS:
In the evening of October 19, 1989, private respondent, Clodualdo de Jesus, a
practicing lawyer and businessman, hosted a dinner for his friends at the
petitioner's restaurant, the Mandarin Villa Seafoods Village Greenhills,
Mandaluyong City.
After dinner the waiter handed to him the bill in the amount of P2,658.50.
Private respondent offered to pay the bill through his credit card issued by
Philippine Commercial Credit Card Inc. (BANKARD). This card was accepted by
the waiter who immediately proceeded to the restaurant's cashier for card
verification.
Ten minutes later, however, the waiter returned and audibly informed private
respondent that his credit card had expired.Private respondent remonstrated
that said credit card had yet to expire on September 1990, as embossed on its
face. The waiter was unmoved, thus, private respondent and two of his guests
approached the restaurant's cashier who again passed the credit card over the
verification computer. The same information was produced, i.e., CARD
EXPIRED.
Private respondent and his guests returned to their table and at this juncture,
Professor Lirag, another guest, uttered the following remarks: "Clody [referring
to Clodualdo de Jesus], may problemaba? Bakakailangangmaghugasna kami
ngpinggan?"
Thereupon, private respondent left the restaurant and got his BPI Express
Credit Card from his car and offered it to pay their bill. This was accepted and
honored by the cashier after verification.Petitioner and his companions left
afterwards. The incident triggered the filing of a suit for damages by private
respondent.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS:
a. Petitioner insists that it is not negligent. In support thereof, petitioner
cites its good faith in checking, not just once but twice, the validity of the
aforementioned credit card prior to its dishonor.
It argues that since the verification machine flashed an information that
the credit card has expired, petitioner could not be expected to honor
the same much less be adjudged negligent for dishonoring it.
Further, petitioner asseverates that it only followed the guidelines and
instructions issued by BANKARD in dishonoring the aforementioned
credit card.
b. Petitioner also argues that private respondent's own negligence in not
bringing with him sufficient cash was the proximate cause of his
damage. It likewise sought exculpation by contending that the remark of
Professor Lirag is a supervening event and at the same time the
proximate cause of private respondent's injury.
ISSUES:
A. Whether or not petitioner is negligent under the circumstances
obtaining in this case? (Yes)
B. Whether or not respondent’s own negligence is the proximate cause of
his own damage? (No)
RULING:
First Issue
The test for determining the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the
reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The Point of
Sale (POS) Guidelines which outlined the steps that petitioner must follow
under the circumstances provides:
x xx           x xx          x xx
CARD EXPIRED
a. Check expiry date on card.
b. If unexpired, refer to CB.
b.1. If valid, honor up to maximum of SPL only.
b.2. If in CB as Lost, do procedures 2a to 2e.,
b.3. If in CB as Suspended/Cancelled, do not honor card.
c. If expired, do not honor card. 
A cursory reading of said rule reveals that whenever the words CARD
EXPIRED flashes on the screen of the verification machine, petitioner should
check the credit card's expiry date embossed on the card itself. If unexpired,
petitioner should honor the card provided it is not invalid, cancelled or otherwise
suspended. But if expired, petitioner should not honor the card.

In this case, private respondent's BANKARD credit card has an embossed

expiry date of September 1990. Clearly, it has not yet expired on October 19,
1989, when the same was wrongfully dishonored by the petitioner. Hence,
petitioner did not use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary
prudent person would have used in the same situation and as such petitioner is
guilty of negligence. In this connection, we quote with approval the following
observations of the respondent Court.

Second Issue

While it is true that private respondent did not have sufficient cash on hand
when he hosted a dinner at petitioner's restaurant, this fact alone does not
constitute negligence on his part. Neither can it be claimed that the same was
the proximate cause of private respondent's damage.

We take judicial notice of the current practice among major establishments,

petitioner included, to accept payment by means of credit cards in lieu of cash.
Thus, petitioner accepted private respondent's BPI Express Credit Card after
verifying its validity, a fact which all the more refutes petitioner's imputation of
negligence on the private respondent.

Neither can we conclude that the remark of Professor Lirag was a supervening
event and the proximate cause of private respondent's injury.

The humiliation and embarrassment of the private respondent was brought

about not by such a remark of Professor Lirag but by the fact of dishonor by the
petitioner of private respondent's valid BANKARD credit card.

If at all, the remark of Professor Lirag served only to aggravate the

embarrassment then felt by private respondent, albeit silently within himself.
28. MR. AND MRS. AMADOR C. ONGvs.METROPOLITAN WATER The body was placed at the edge of the pool and Abaño immediately applied
DISTRICT manual artificial respiration. Soon after, male nurse Armand Rule came to
render assistance, followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente who, after
being called by phone from the clinic by one of the security guards, boarded a
G.R. No. L-7664             August 29, 1958
jeep carrying with him the resuscitator and a medicine kit, and upon arriving he
injected the boy with camphorated oil. After the injection, Vicente left on a jeep
in order to fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines. Meanwhile,
Abaño continued the artificial manual respiration, and when this failed to revive
A. Parties him, they applied the resuscitator until the two oxygen tanks were exhausted.
a) Plaintiff/Complainant with Background, position title, occupation Not long thereafter, Dr. Ayuyao arrived with another resuscitator, but the same
became of no use because he found the boy already dead. The doctor ordered
that the body be taken to the clinic.The death was due to asphyxia by
Mr & Mrs. Amador Ong - parents
submersion in water.
Dominador Ong - a 14-year old high school student and
boy scout,

Ruben and Eusebio - his brothers

C. Allegations
b) Defendant
1. Plaintiff’s Claim -
Metropolitan Water District- owns and operates three recreational
swimming pools at its Balara filters, Diliman, Quezon City Plaintiffs spouses seek to recover from defendant, a government-owned
corporation, the sum of P50,000 as damages, P5,000 as funeral
expenses, and P11,000 as attorneys' fees, for the death of their son
B. Facts
Dominador Ong in one of the swimming pools operated by defendant.

In the afternoon of July 5, 1952,, Dominador Ong, a 14-year old high school
student and boy scout, and his brothers Ruben and Eusebio, went to
defendant's swimming pools. This was not the first time that the three brothers
2. Defendants defense or counterclaim
had gone to said natatorium for they had already been there four or five times
before. At about 4:35 p.m., Dominador Ong told his brothers that he was going
to the locker room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke. Upon Defendant admits the fact that plaintiffs' son was drowned in one of its
hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador in swimming pools but avers that his death was caused by his own
the small pool and so they did not see the latter when he left the pool. In that negligence or by unavoidable accident. Defendant also avers that it had
afternoon, there were two lifeguards on duty in the pool compound, namely, exercised due diligence in the selection of, and supervision over, its
Manuel Abaño and Mario Villanueva. employees and that it had observed the diligence required by law under
the circumstances.
Between 4:40 to 4:45 p.m., some boys who were in the pool area informed a
bather by the name of Andres Hagad, Jr., that somebody was swimming under
water for quite a long time. Another boy informed lifeguard Manuel Abaño of the
same happening and Abaño immediately jumped into the big swimming pool D. Issue
and retrieved the apparently lifeless body of Dominador Ong from the bottom.
 Whether the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the
negligence of defendant and/or its employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to
recover damages.

E. Procedural History
a. RTC Ruling

The lower court found that the action of plaintiffs is untenable and dismissed the
complaint without pronouncement as to costs.

b. CA Ruling

Plaintiffs took the case on appeal directly to this Supreme Court because the
amount involved exceeds the sum of P50,000.

c. SC Ruling

There is sufficient evidence to show that appellee has taken all necessary
precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident which
may cause their death. Thus, it has been shown that the swimming pools of
appellee are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator
and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors
so as to insure clear visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous place within
the area certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools. Appellee
employs six lifeguards who are all trained as they had taken a course for that
purpose and were issued certificates of proficiency. There is a male nurse and a
sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are
security guards who are available always in case of emergency.

The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved from the
bottom of the pool, the employees of appellee did everything possible to bring
him back to life. All of the actions to revive Dominador shows that appellee has
done what is humanly possible under the circumstances to restore life to minor
Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death.

29. FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY, petitioner,vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 130068 October 1, 1998
MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, petitioner,vs.PHILIPPINE PORTS
AUTHORITY and FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY, respondents. G.R.
No. 130150 October, 1998
A. PARTIES
The M/V PAVLODAR is flying under the flagship of the USSR, owned
and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company.
Manila International Port- MV Pavlodar, the vessel was assigned to
Manila International Port as its berthing space.
Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to
supervise the berthing of the vessel.
Appellant SenenGavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots'
Association to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the
vessel to Manila International Port
Ship Master of the vessel - Victor Kavankov
Philippine Ports Authority- Claiming damages on the damaged pier.
B. ALLEGATIONS
Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed
himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov,
beside him. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking
maneuvers.
When the vessel reached the landmark, Gavino ordered the anchor
dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the
bow. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However, the
anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not
slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. When Gavino
inquired what was all the commotion about, Kavankov assured Gavino
that there was nothing to it.
After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the
engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed
that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Before the right anchor and
additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into
the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier.
Per contract and supplemental contract of the Philippine Ports Authority
and the contractor for the rehabilitation of the damaged pier, the same
cost the Philippine Ports Authority the amount of P1,126,132.25 . The
vessel sustained damage too.
PETITIONER’S ALLEGATIONS:
Petitioner asserts that since the MV PAVLODAR was under compulsory
pilotage at the time of the incident, it was the compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino,
who was in command and had complete control in the navigation and docking
of the vessel. It is the pilot who supersedes the master for the time being in the
command and navigation of a ship and his orders must be obeyed in all
respects connected with her navigation. He was solely responsible for the
damage caused upon the pier apron, and not the owners of the vessel. It claims
that the master of the boat did not commit any act of negligence when he failed
to countermand or overrule the orders of the pilot because he did not see any
justifiable reason to do so. In other words, the master cannot be faulted for
relying absolutely on the competence of the compulsory pilot. If the master does
not observe that a compulsory pilot is incompetent or physically incapacitated,
the master is justified in relying on the pilot. 
RESPONDENT’S ALLEGATIONS:
Respondent PPA predictably in full agreement with the CA on the solidary
liability of FESC, MPA and Capt. Gavino, stresses the concurrent negligence of
Capt. Gavino, the harbor pilot, and Capt. Viktor Kabankov,  as the basis of their
solidary liability for damages sustained by PPA. It posits that the vessel was
being piloted by Capt. Gavino with Capt. Kabankov beside him all the while on
the bridge of the vessel, as the former took over the helm of MV Pavlodar when
it rammed and damaged the apron of the pier. Their concurrent negligence was
the immediate and proximate cause of the collision between the vessel and the
pier — Capt. Gavino, for his negligence in the conduct of docking maneuvers
for the safe berthing of the vessel; and Capt. Kabankov, for failing to
countermand the orders of the harbor pilot and to take over and steer the vessel
himself in the face of imminent danger, as well as for merely relying on Capt.
Gavino during the berthing procedure. 
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Philippine Ports Authority filed before the Regional Trial Court, a complaint for a
sum of money against Far Eastern Shipping Co., Capt. Senen C. Gavino and
the Manila Pilots' Association, praying that the defendants therein be held jointly
and severally liable to pay the plaintiff actual and exemplary damages plus
costs of suit.
RTC:
The trial court ordered the defendants therein jointly and severally to pay
the PPA the amount of P1,053,300.00 representing actual damages and
the costs of suit.5
COURT OF APPEALS:
Affirmed the findings of the court  a quo  except that if found no employer-
employee relationship existing between herein private respondents
Manila Pilots' Association (MPA, for short) and Capt. Gavino. 6 This being
so, it ruled instead that the liability of MPA is anchored, not on Article
2180 of the Civil Code, but on the provisions of Customs Administrative
Order No. 15-65, and accordingly modified said decision of the trial court
by holding MPA, along with its co-defendants therein, still solidarily liable
to PPA but entitled MPA to reimbursement from Capt. Gavino for such
amount of the adjudged pecuniary liability in excess of the amount
equivalent to seventy-five percent (75%) of its prescribed reserve fund.  SC found Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to such strict standard of care and
ISSUES:
The parties questioned the Court of Appeals decision:
1. in not holding Senen C. Gavino and the Manila Pilots' Association as
the parties solely responsible for the resulting damages sustained by the
pier deliberately ignoring the established jurisprudence on the matter;
2. in holding that the master had not exercised the required diligence
demanded from him by the circumstances at the time the incident
happened;
SUPREME COURT:
There is a presumption of fault against a moving vessel that strikes a stationary
object such as a dock or navigational aid. In admiralty, this presumption does
more than merely require the ship to go forward and produce some evidence on
the presumptive matter. The moving vessel must show that it was without fault
or that the collision was occasioned by the fault of the stationary object or was
the result of inevitable accident. In the absence of sufficient proof in rebuttal, the
presumption of fault attaches to a moving vessel which collides with a fixed
object and makes a prima facie case of fault against the vessel.  not alarm him because there was still time to drop a second anchor.
The task, therefore, in these cases is to pinpoint who was negligent — the
master of the ship, the harbor pilot or both.
A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and licensed, to conduct a
vessel into or out of ports, or in certain waters. the pilot supersedes the master
for the time being in the command and navigation of the ship, and his orders
must be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation. And when a
licensed pilot is employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his duty
to insist on having effective control of the vessel, or to decline to act as pilot.
Pursuant thereto, Capt. Gavino was assigned to pilot MV Pavlodar into Berth 4
of the Manila International Port. Upon assuming such office as compulsory pilot,
Capt. Gavino is held to the universally accepted high standards of care and
diligence required of a pilot.  He is not held to the highest possible degree of
skill and care, but must have and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded
by the circumstances, and usually shown by an expert in his profession.
diligence required of pilots in the performance of their duties. Prudence required
that he, as pilot, should have made sure that his directions were promptly and
strictly followed. Moreover, assuming that he did indeed give the command to
drop the anchor on time, as pilot he should have seen to it that the order was
carried out, and he could have done this in a number of ways, one of which was
to inspect the bow of the vessel where the anchor mechanism was installed.
Patently, Gavino miscalculated. He failed to react and undertake adequate
measures to arrest fully the momentum of the vessel after the anchor failed to
claw to the seabed. When he reacted, the same was even (haphazard). He
erroneously believed that only one (1) anchor would suffice and even when the
anchor failed to claw into the seabed or against a hard object in the seabed,
Gavino failed to order the other anchor dropped immediately.
The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no
less responsible for the allision. His unconcerned lethargy as master of the ship
in the face of troublousexigence constitutes negligence.A perusal of Capt.
Kabankov's testimony makes it apparent that he was remiss in the discharge of
his duties as master of the ship, leaving the entire docking procedure up to the
pilot, instead of maintaining watchful vigilance over this risky maneuver. Capt.
Kavankov admitted that all throughout the man(eu)vering procedures he did not
notice anything was going wrong, and even observed that the order given to
drop the anchor was done at the proper time. He even ventured the opinion that
the accident occurred because the anchor failed to take hold but that this did
It is apparent that Gavino was negligent but Far Eastern's employee Capt.
Kavankov was no less responsible for as master of the vessel he stood by the
pilot during the man(eu)vering procedures.
It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person
liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence,
concurring with one or more efficient causes other than piaintiff's, is the
proximate cause of the injury. It is no defense to one of the concurrent
tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone,
without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent
rortfeasor. 99 Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and
each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened,
the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had
against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances
of the case.
The Court of Appeals, correctly based MPA' s liability not on the concept of
employer-employee relationship between Capt. Gavino and itself, but on the
provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65. There being no
employer-employee relationship, clearly Article 2180 108 of the Civil Code is
inapplicable since there is no vicarious liability of an employer to speak of.
Nevertheless, a careful reading and proper analysis of the correlated provisions
lead to the conclusion that MPA is solidarily liable for the negligence of its
member pilots, without prejudice to subsequent reimbursement from the pilot at
fault.

There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since

both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single
injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury.

Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or

her owners are liable for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs
of the owners or those in charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the owners or
those in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all
natural and proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason of her
negligent management or navigation. 106

FESC's imputation of PPA's failure to provide a safe and reliable berthing place
is obtuse, not only because it appears to be a mere afterthought, being tardily
raised only in this petition, but also because there is no allegation or evidence
on record about Berth No. 4 being unsafe and unreliable, although perhaps it is
a modest pier by international standards. No error on the part of the Court of
Appeals in dismissing FESC's counterclaim.

This consolidated case treats on whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding
MPA jointly and solidarily liable with its member pilot. Capt. Gavino, in the 30. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. PEDRO RAMIREZ
absence of employer-employee relationship. G.R. No. 24084, 8 November 1925

A. PARTIES

BartolomeQuiaoit – the one who invited the accused, the victim and one
other witness to go for a hunting
Pedro Ramirez – defendant
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
VictorianoRanga – victim; the one who died from a gunshot wound
caused by the respondent
Agustin Menor – witness
B. ALLEGATIONS
1. Plaintiff’s Claim
On the night of 18 Feb. 1923, Bartolome invited Pedro,
Victoriano and Agustin to hunt in Mt. Balitok in Nueva Era, I.N.
Bartolome was left in a hut and the other three proceeded. Pedro
Ramirez who was carrying a shotgun happened to hunt a deer so
he told Victoriano and Agustin to stay where they are and watch
over the prey while Pedro enters the forest to get the prey;
According to Agustin, Pedro said, “Brothers, you stay here and I
am going to hunt with the lamp” and then after they parted ways, he
turned to them and turned toward them and fired” and the bullet hit
Victoriano
2. Defendant’s Claim
admits being the author of the shot which caused the death of
VictorianoRanga; that on that night after getting the first prey, he told
his companions to stay there, watching over the prey, while he was
going away looking for another; and so he did, because otherwise it
would have been hard for them to find the prey, if no one would have
been left there; that being far away from his companions, he seemed to
have seen with his lantern something like the eyes of a deer about fifty
meters from him and then he shot it; but much to his surprise, on
approaching what he thought was a deer, it proved to be his companion
VictorianoRanga. He also says that he did not expect to find his
companions in that spot, for he had warned them not to leave, but they
left, the place.
1. Case filed – Homicide
2. Ruling of the CFI
The CFI of Ilocos Norte found the defendant guilty with the
crime of homicide and sentenced him with the penalty of
imprisonment of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day and to indemnify the
mother of VictorianoRanga in the sum of P500.00
3. CA – n/a
4. SC – found the defendant guilty of Homicide through reckless
imprudence and sentenced the defendant to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of one (1) year and one (1) day of
prisioncorreccional.
The testimony of the two witnesses as to the distance of
the accused from them when he fired the gun for the second time is
contradictory.
There is also no evidence in the record which will show any
circumstances as to whether or not the deceased and the witness
Agustin Menor were in the same place where they were left by the
defendant, when the latter fired.
The night being dark like that when the event took place,
the hunter in the midst of a forest without paths is likely to get
confused as to his relative situation; and after walking around, he
may think having gone very far, when in fact he has not, from the
point of departure.
Since there existed no motive for resentment on the part of
the defendant against the offended party, the Court held that the act
complained of constitutes homicide through reckless
imprudence. The defendant, who was carrying a firearm to hunt at
nighttime with the aid of a lantern, knowing that he had two
companions, should have exercised all the necessary diligence to
avoid every undesirable accident, such as the one that
unfortunately occurred on the person of VictorianoRanga.

While the fact that the defendant, a few days after the
event, has offered to the mother of the deceased a carabao and a
horse by way of indemnity, indicates on the one hand that the
defendant admitted the commission of the crime, on the other it
shows that he performed that act without criminal intent and only
through a real imprudence.

31. XERXES ADZUARA y DOTIMAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES

A. PARTIES
 1. Private Complainant
Gregorio Martinez – owner and driver of the Toyota Corona; was
then executing a U-turn at the speed of 5 kph at the north-west
portion of Quezon Avenue going to Manila when the accident
occurred.
2. Defendant
Xerxes Adzuara- a law student; together with his friends were
cruising in a 4-door Colt Galant sedan along the stretch of Quezon
Avenue coming from the direction of EDSA towards Delta Circle at
approximately 40 kilometers per hours. Upon reaching the
intersection of 4th West Street their car collided with a Toyota
Corona sedan owned and driven by Gregorio Martinez.
B. ALLEGATIONS
1. Defendant and private complainant’s claims
Both petitioner and Martinez claimed that their lanes had green
traffic lights 3 although the investigating policeman Marcelo Sabido
declared that the traffic light was blinking red and orange when he
arrived at the scene of the accident an hour later.
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. Case filed- reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with
less serious physical injuries under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal
Code; Private complainant Martinez manifested his intention to
institute a separate civil action for damages against petitioner
2. RTC Ruling- convicted petitioner Xerxes Adzuara after trial and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of two (2) months and fifteen
(15) days of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P50,000.00
C. CA – petition directly filed to the SC affirmed the decision of the trial
court but deleted the fine of P50,000.00
D. SC
ISSUE: Is plaintiff guilty of the crime charged?
THE COURT RULED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE.
The Court finds that the defense version cannot prevail against the
prosecution version satisfactorily demonstrating that the subject accident
occurred because of Xerxes’ reckless imprudence consisting in his paying
no heed to the red light and making Galant car proceed at a fast clip as it
approached and entered the intersection. Petitioner testified that he was
driving slowly, about 40 kilometers per hour. This is refuted by the fact that
the colliding vehicles were thrown 20 meters away from the point of impact;
It bears to stress that the appreciation of petitioner’s post-collision behavior
serves only as a means to emphasize the finding of negligence which is
readily established by the admission of petitioner and his friend Renato that
they saw the car of Martinez making a U-turn but could not avoid the
collision by the mere application of the brakes. Negligence is the want of
care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an
absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties
and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably
require.
What degree of care and vigilance then did the circumstances require? At
half past 1:00 o’clock in the morning along an almost deserted avenue,
ordinary care and vigilance would suffice. This may consist of keeping a
watchful eye on the road ahead and observing the traffic rules on speed,
right of way and traffic light. The claim of petitioner that Martinez made a
swift U-turn which caused the collision is not credible since a U-turn is done
at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to
running straight ahead. Nonetheless, no evidence was presented showing
skid marks caused by the car driven by Martinez if only to demonstrate that
he was driving at a fast clip in negotiating the U-turn. On the other hand, the
speed at which petitioner drove his car appears to be the prime cause for his
inability to stop his car and avoid the collision. His assertion that he drove at
the speed of 40 kph.is belied by Martinez who testified that when he looked
at the opposite lane for any oncoming cars, he saw none; then a few
seconds later, he was hit by Adzuara’s car. The extent of the damage on the
car of Martinez and the position of the cars after the impact further confirm
the finding that petitioner went beyond the speed limit required by law and by
the circumstances.
It is a rule that a motorist crossing a thru-stop street has the right of way over
the one making a U-turn. But if the person making a U-turn has already
negotiated half of the turn and is almost on the other side so that he is
already visible to the person on the thru-street, the latter must give way to
the former. Petitioner was on the thru-street and had already seen the
Martinez car. 19 He should have stopped to allow Martinez to complete the
U-turn having, as it were, the last clear chance to avoid the accident which
he ignored. In fact, he never stopped. Rather, he claimed that on the
assumption that he was negligent, the other party was also guilty of
contributory negligence since his car had no lights on. 20 The negligence of
Martinez however has not been satisfactorily shown.chanrobles.com : virtual
lawlibrary

Petitioner insists that the traffic light facing him at the intersection was green
which only indicated that he had the right of way. But the findings of the court
a quo on the matter countervail this stance, hence, we see no reason to
disturb them.
32. G.R. No. 68102. July 16, 1992.*
GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO
G.R. No. 68103. July 16, 1992.*
CARMEN DAYRIT KOH, LETICIA KOH, JULIETA KOH TUQUERO, ARACELI
KOH MCKEE, ANTONIO KOH and ELIZABETH KOH TURLA vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA
MANALO
3. Plaintiffs
GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE – parents of the
minors George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and the
deceased Kim Koh McKee; were passengers of the Ford Escort;
were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478
CARMEN DAYRIT KOH, LETICIA KOH, JULIETA KOH
TUQUERO, ARACELI KOH MCKEE, ANTONIO KOH and
ELIZABETH KOH TURLA- are the wife and children, respectively,
of the late Jose Koh, were passengers of the Ford Escort were the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4477; Jose Koh was the driver of the
Ford Escort
4. Defendant
JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO - are the owners of
the cargo truck which figured in the mishap; a certain Ruben
Galang was the driver of the truck at the time of the accident.
D. ALLEGATIONS
3. Plaintiffs’ claims
Araceli Koh Mckee testified that when they were approaching the
bridge, two (2) boys tried to cross the right lane on the right side of
the highway going to San Fernando. Her father, who is the driver of
the car tried to avoid the two (2) boys who were crossing, he blew
his horn and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the two (2) boys.
They noticed the truck, their father switched on the headlights to
warn the truck driver, to slow down to give them the right of way to
come back to their right lane but the trick did not slow down.
4. Defendant’s claim
Private respondents alleged that Jose Koh was the person at fault
having approached the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang
which was on the right lane going towards Manila and at a
moderate speed observing all traffic rules and regulations
applicable under the circumstances then prevailing
E. Issue: Whether Jose Koh is negligent when it invaded the lane of the
truck and the collision happened in that lane
F. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
5. Cases filed-
a. an Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of
"Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and
Physical Injuries and Damage to Property"
b. Civil Case No. 4477 and No. 4478 (consolidated later)
6. RTC Ruling- RTC rendered a decision against the accused Ruben
Galang in the case; the consolidated two civil cases were dismissed
7. CA – affirmed the conviction of Ruben Galang;
reversed the set aside the dismissal of the consolidated two
civil cases; HOWEVER, upon motion of the respondents, the CA
reconsidered and set aside its earlier decision and affirmed in
toto the trial court's judgment
8. SC
No, Jose Koh is not negligent.
The test of negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is
manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any
reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid
running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where
they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane.
Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take
particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several
meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side of
the road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover, under what
is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in
a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider
the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought
about by his own negligence."
Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane of family to prevent the damage. The answers of the private
the car, the Court find that Jose Koh adopted the best means respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose
possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them. this defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.

Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent,
was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the
same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the
occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the
truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of
the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the
collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the
former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into
its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far
right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure
under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full
speed towards the car.

The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself

said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour
along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a
bridge  is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the
Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.

Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear
chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the
law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the
party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that
the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the
injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear
chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible
for the consequences thereof. Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is
not difficult to rule, that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing
to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the
proximate cause of the collision.
As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the
resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows
from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however,
is only  juris tantum, not  juris et de jure.  Their only possible
defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
33. CONSOLACION JUNIO, plaintiff and appellant, vs. THE MANILA
RAILROAD COMPANY, defendant and appellee.
[No. 37045. March 29, 1933]
A) PARTIES:
1.) Plaintiff a young woman 22 years of age, is the passenger of the
car that collided with the train of the defendant. The victim in the
present case.
2.) Defendant is the owner of the train that collided with the car where
the plaintiff was a passenger.
B) FACTS:
At about 11:40 o'clock on the night of April 13, 1930, the plaintiffs herein
with some other persons were traveling in a PU-Car on the road
between Calasiao and Santa Barbara. When they arrived at the
intersection of the road of the defendant's railway, the car tried to cross
the track and collided while the engine of the night express which left
Dagupan for Manila at 11 o'clock that same night and which was then
passing over the crossing in question at great speed. As a result of the
collision, the car was thrown some distance, plaintiff Junio's right leg
was amputated and her right arm fractured, and Soloria received
various injuries on her head.
The aforementioned crossing is situated in the town of Calasiao and the
same is presumed to be dangerous due to the fact that gates were
required at that crossing. (Section 83, Act No. 1459, as amended by Act
No. 2100.) On the night of the accident, the gates were not lowered and
there was no notice to the effect that they were not operated at night or
that they were temporarily out of order. However, a notice to the effect
that that was a railroad crossing was there.
In addition to the facts mentioned above, it has also been proved that
the gate in question was about three hundred (300) meters from the
railroad station at Calasiao; that on each side of the crossing there was
a wooden bar operated only during the daytime by a woman employee
of defendant, and that just before the crossing on one side, of the road
leading from the town of Calasiao there was a signpost bearing the
notice, "RAILROAD CROSSING", written crosswise.
The evidence also show that the car driven by the chauffeur, Pedro
Talbo, was an old Ford bearing number plates. PU-3636, which meant
that it was a hired car. The plate, Exhibit 2, was found by the engineer
on the side of the engine upon arrival at Paniqui, the next station, which
indicates that it was torn from the front of the radiator when the auto
collided with the right side of the engine of the night express.
The appellants were passengers who took the car in Bayambang and
were bound for Asingan, via Dagupan.
C) ALLEGATIONS:
1) The driver of the car alleges that he slowed down from 19 miles an
hour, at which rate he was then going, to 16 miles, and that he was
on the lookout for any approaching train.
2) The engineer, on the other hand, insists that he rang the bell and
sounded the whistle before reaching the crossing.
3) Both parties claim to be free from guilt, and if the defendant
company were completely so, the plaintiffs would have no cause of
action against it.
D) ISSUE: 1) Who was negligent? The driver of the car or the defendant?
2) WON the negligence of the driver can be imputed to its
passengers so as to bar them from the right to recover damages
suffered by them by reason of the accident.
E) PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
CASE FILED:
Consolacion Junio, a young woman 22 years of age, and Beatriz
Soloria, another young woman of 18 years, represented by her father,
Faustino Soloria, who was appointed her guardian ad litem, brought
these actions in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to recover
from the defendant, Manila Railroad Company, damages suffered by
them in an accident that occurred at the railroad crossing situated at the
outskirts of the town of Calasiao, Pangasinan, when the automobile in
which they were passengers collided with a locomotive belonging to the
aforementioned defendant. This is an appeal taken by them from the
judgment rendered by the trial court absolving the defendant, without
cost.
SC:
1) Both the driver and defendant were negligent.
From the evidence, it is obvious that the defendant as well as the
driver of the car in which the plaintiffs were passengers were
negligent, the former because, by installing the gates at the place or
crossing where the accident occurred, it had voluntarily imposed
upon itself the obligation to operate them even at night and to close
them every time a train passed in order to avoid causing injury to
the public. It has been said that the gates constitute an invitation to
the public to pass without fear of danger, and failure to operate
them conveniently constitutes negligence on the part of the
company.
The driver was, likewise, negligent because he did not comply with
his duty to slacken the speed of the car and to "look and listen"
before crossing the intersection and above all, because he did not
maintain a reasonable speed so as to permit him to stop any
moment if it were necessary in order to avoid an accident. If, in the
present case, the car had been running at a reasonable speed,
there is no doubt that he could have stopped it instantly upon
seeing the train from a distance of five meters.
2) No. Although this question is, perhaps, raised in this jurisdiction for
the first time, it is, nevertheless, a well recognized principle of law
that the negligence of a driver, who, in turn, is guilty of contributory
negligence, cannot be imputed to a passenger who has no control
over him in the management of the vehicle and with whom he
sustains no relation of master and servant. This rule is applied more
strictly when, as in the present case, hired cars or those engaged in
the public service, are involved.
The doctrine prevails in a few states that the contributory
negligence of the driver of a private conveyance is imputable to a
person voluntarily riding with him. But the general rule is that the
negligence of the driver of a vehicle is not to be imputed to an
occupant thereof who is ]injured at a crossing through the combined
negligence of the driver and the railroad company when such
occupant is without fault and has no control over the driver. And the
law almost universally now recognized is that when one accepts an
invitation to ride in the vehicle of another, without any authority or
purpose to direct or control the driver or the movements of the
team, and without any reason to doubt the competency of the
driver, the contributory negligence of the owner or driver of the
conveyance will not be imputed to the guest or passenger, so as to
bar him of the right to recover damages from a railroad company
whose negligence occasions injury to him at a crossing while he is
so riding. This rule has been applied in a number of cases involving
the corresponding relation between the driver of an automobile and
an occupant having no control over him. The rule is not confined to
cases of gratuitous transportation, but has been applied where a
conveyance is hired, and the passenger exercises no further control
over the driver than to direct him to the place to which he wishes to
be taken. Nor is any distinction made between private and public
vehicles, such as street cars and stages.
Although this question is, perhaps, raised in this jurisdiction for the first time, it
is, nevertheless, a well recognized principle of law that the negligence of a
driver, who, in turn, is guilty of contributory negligence, cannot be imputed to a
passenger who has no control over him in the management of the vehicle and
with whom he sustains no relation of master and servant. This rule is applied
more strictly when, as in the present case, hired cars or those engaged in the
public service, are involved.
The doctrine prevails in a few states that the contributory
negligence of the driver of a private conveyance is imputable to a
person voluntarily riding with him. But the general rule is that the
negligence of the driver of a vehicle is not to be imputed to an
occupant thereof who is ]injured at a crossing through the combined
negligence of the driver and the railroad company when such
occupant is without fault and has no control over the driver. And the
law almost universally now recognized is that when one accepts an
invitation to ride in the vehicle of another, without any authority or
purpose to direct or control the driver or the movements of the
team, and without any reason to doubt the competency of the
driver, the contributory negligence of the owner or driver of the
conveyance will not be imputed to the guest or passenger, so as to
bar him of the right to recover damages from a railroad company
whose negligence occasions injury to him at a crossing while he is
so riding. This rule has been applied in a number of cases involving
the corresponding relation between the driver of an automobile and
an occupant having no control over him. The rule is not confined to
cases of gratuitous transportation, but has been applied where a
conveyance is hired, and the passenger exercises no further control
over the driver than to direct him to the place to which he wishes to
be taken. Nor is any distinction made between private and public
vehicles, such as street cars and stages.

A passenger in the automobile of another having no control over

the owner driving the car or the operation of the car which he
occupied merely as passenger was not chargeable with
contributory negligence of the owner and driver at a railroad
crossing. (Carpenter vs. Atchison 195 Pac, 1073)
34. [No. L-8328. May 18, 1956]
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. SOTERO REMOQUILLO, in his
own behalf and as guardian of the minors MANUEL, BENJAMIN, NESTOR,
MILAGROS, CORAZON, CLEMENTE and AURORA, all surnamed MAGNO,
SALUD MAGNO, and the COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division),
respondents.
A) PARTIES:
1) Petitioner is the owner of the electric wire that electrocuted the late
Efren Magno.
2) Respondents are the heirs of the deceased Efren Magno.
B) FACTS:
On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio
Peñaloza, his stepbrother, located on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila, to
repair a “media agua” said to be in a leaking condition. The “media agua” was
just below the window of the third story. Standing on said “media agua”, Magno
received from his son thru that window a 3’ X 6’ galvanized iron sheet to cover
the leaking portion, turned around and in doing so the lower end of the iron
sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company
(later referred to as the Company) strung parallel to the edge of the “media
agua” and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his death by electrocution.
C) ISSUE: WON Petitioner Company is liable for the death of Efren
Magno.
D) PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
1) CASE FILED: His widow and children filed suit to recover damages from
the company.
2) RTC: After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in their favor —
P10,000 as compensatory damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryP784 as
actual damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryP2,000 as moral and
exemplary damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand P3,000 as attorney’s
fees, with costs. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the
judgment with slight modification by reducing the attorney’s fees from
P3,000 to P1,000 with costs. 3)
3) CA: The findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals which are
conclusive are stated in the following portions of its decision which we
reproduce below;
“The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire
stretched between poles on the street and carrying a charge of 3,600 volts. It
was installed there some two years before Peñaloza’s house was constructed.
The record shows that during the construction of said house a similar incident
took place, although fortunate]y with much less tragic consequences. A piece of
wood which a carpenter was holding happened to come in contact with the
same wire, producing some sparks. The owner of the house forthwith
complained to Defendant about the danger which the wire presented, and as a
result Defendant moved one end of the wire farther from the house by means of
a brace, but left the other end where it was.
“At any rate, as revealed by the ocular inspection of the premises ordered by
the trial court, the distance from the electric wire to the edge of the ‘media agua’
on which the deceased was making repairs was only 30 inches or 2 1/2 feet.
Regulations of the City of Manila required that ‘all wires be kept three feet from
the building. Appellant contends that in applying said regulations to the case at
bar the reckoning should not be from the edge of the ‘media agua’ but from the
side of the house and that, thus measured, the distance was almost 7 feet, or
more then the minimum prescribed. This contention is manifestly groundless,
for not only is a ‘media agua’ an integral part of the building to which it is
attached but to exclude it in measuring the distance would defeat the purpose of
the regulation. Appellant points out, nevertheless, that even assuming that the
distance, within the meaning of the city regulations, should be measured from
the edge of the ‘media agua’, the fact that in the case of the house involved
herein such distance was actually less than 3 feet was due to the fault of the
owner of said house, because the city authorities gave him a permit to construct
a ‘media agua’ only one meter or 39 1/2 inches wide, but instead he built one
having a width of 65 3/4 inches, 17 3/8 inches more than the width permitted by
the authorities, thereby reducing the distance to the electric wire to less than the
prescribed minimum of 3 feet.
“It is a fact that the owner of the house exceeded the limit fixed in the permit
given to him by the city authorities for the construction of the ‘media agua’, and
that if he had not done so Appellants wire would have been 11 3/8 (inches)
more than the required distance of three feet from the edge of the ‘media agua’.
It is also a fact, however, that after the ‘media agua’ was constructed the owner
was given a final permit of occupancy of the house.
The wire was an exposed, high tension wire carrying a load of 3,600 volts.
There was, according to Appellant, no insulation that could have rendered it
safe, first, because there is no insulation material in commercial use for such
kind of wire; secondly, because the only insulation material that may be
effective is still in the experimental stage of development and, anyway, its costs
would be prohibitive… ”
4) SC:
NO. After a careful study and discussion of the case and the
circumstances surrounding the same, we are inclined to agree to the
contention of Petitioner Company that the death of Magno was primarily
caused by his own negligence and in some measure by the too close proximity
of the “media agua” or rather its edge to the electric wire of the company by
reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the
subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the “media agua”. We fail to
see how the Company could be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due
diligence. Although the city ordinance called for a distance of 3 feet of its wires
from any building, there was actually a distance of 7 feet and 2 3/4 inches of
the wires from the side of the house of Peñaloza. Even considering said
regulation distance of 3 feet as referring not to the side of a building, but to any
projecting part thereof, such as a “media agua”, had the house owner followed
the terms of the permit given him by the city for the construction of his “media
agua”, namely, one meter or 39 3/8 inches wide, the distance from the wires to
the edge of said “media agua” would have been 3 feet and 11 3/8 inches. In
fixing said one meter width for the “media agua” the city authorities must have
wanted to preserve the distance of at least 3 feet between the wires and any
portion of a building. Unfortunately, however, the house owner disregarding the
permit, exceeded the one meter fixed by the same by 17 3/8 inches and
leaving only a distance of 2 1/2 feet between the “Media agua” as illegally
constructed and the electric wires. And added to this violation of the permit by
the house owner, was its approval by the city through its agent, possibly an
inspector. Surely we cannot lay these serious violations of a city ordinance and
permit at the door of the Company, guiltless of breach of any ordinance or
regulation. The Company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for
any illegal construction which reduces the distance between its wires and said
construction, and after finding that said distance of 3 feet had been reduced, to
change the stringing or installation of its wires so as to preserve said distance.
It would be much easier for the City, or rather it is its duty, to be ever on the
alert and to see to it that its ordinances are strictly followed by house owners
and to condemn or disapprove all illegal constructions. Of course, in the
present case, the violation of the permit for the construction of the “media
agua” was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it. Had
said “media agua” been only one meter wide as allowed by the permit, Magno
standing on it, would instinctively have stayed closer to or hugged the side of
the house in order to keep a safe margin between the edge of the “media
agua” and the yawning 2-story distance or height from the ground, and
possibly if not probably avoided the fatal contact between the lower end of the
iron sheet and the wires.
We may not hold said company as guilty of negligence or wanting in due
diligence in failing to insulate said wires. As to their proximity to the house it is
to be supposed that distance of 3 feet was considered sufficiently safe by the
technical men of the city such as its electrician or engineer.
Thus, the real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act
of Magno himself. When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the “media
agua” just below the third story window, it is to be presumed that due to his age
and experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or
carpenter and had training and experience for the job. So, he could not have
been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But
unfortunately, in the instant care, his training and experience failed him, and
forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-feet iron sheet with both hands
and at arm’s length, evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence and
discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms with the motion of
his body, thereby causing his own electrocution.
But even assuming for a moment that under the facts of the present case
the Defendant electric company could be considered negligent in installing its
electric wires so close to the house and “media agua” in question, and in failing
to properly insulate those wires (although according to the unrefuted claim of
said company it was impossible to make the insulation of that kind of wire),
nevertheless to hold the Defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno,
such supposed negligence of the company must have been the proximate and
principal cause of the accident, because if the act of Magno in turning around
and swinging the galvanized iron sheet with his hands was the proximate and
principal cause of the electrocution, then his heirs may not recover.
To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was
not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and
negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet
without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the street and at the
wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the latter’s length of 6
feet. For a better understanding of the rule on remote and proximate cause with
respect to injuries, we find the following citation
helpful:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient
cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for
such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because
of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if
an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition,
such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.”
35. HERMOGINA U. BULILAN vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT. G.R. No.
130057 December 22, 1998
A. PARTY/IES
Defendant – Hermogina U Bulilan, Cashier of Visaya State College
FACTS:
Petitioner Hermogina U. Bulilan was the Cashier of Visaya State
College of Agriculture (VISCA) whose responsibility, as such Cashier, was to
prepare the payroll of employees of said State College.
As the first quincina of the March payroll was due, petitioner withdrew
from the Land Bank Branch in Tacloban City, the needed amount. Since she
was scheduled to leave for Baguio City on the day the said payroll was to be
released, she and her staff rendered overtime service without pay, to make sure
that payment of salaries of the employees would be on time.
The methodology adopted by petitioner in preparing the salaries of
employees was by placing the net pay of every employee in individual pay
envelopes. When the corresponding amounts were put in the pay envelopes,
the same became too bulky for the Mosler safe of petitioner to accommodate.
Confronted with the problem, she placed such pay envelopes in a steel cabinet
without a lock. According to petitioner, when she left her office, she saw to it
that its main door was double-locked.
On the night of March 11, 1990, a robbery took place at the Cashier's
Office of VISCA resulting to the loss of government funds amounting to
P566,468.91. Because of what happened, petitioner cancelled her trip to Baguio
City and reported the incident to the authorities concerned.
B. ALLEGATIONS
Petitioner theorizes that what she did was what any reasonable person
would have done under the attendant facts and circumstances and therefore,
she should not be held liable for the effects of what she calls a fortuitous event
over which she had no control.
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. Pleading Filed (with COA) - Request for Relief of Accountability.
Petitioner wrote the Commission on Audit (COA) begging to be
relieved of accountability (Request for Relief of Accountability) for the
loss of subject government funds allegedly taken by robbers, invoking
Section 73 of P.D. 1445.
2. COA – denied petitioner’s request. The COA opined that the concrete
vault is more secured for safekeeping purposes compared to the
"unlocked storage cabinet" where the subject payroll money was placed.
While it is true that the concrete vault could not be seen directly by the
guard on duty at the lobby, the same is true also insofar as the storage
cabinet is concerned . . . The contention of Mrs.Bulilan that "the storage
cabinet is strategically placed in an area which can be seen directly by
the guard on duty" is misleading.
3. SC – affirmed COA
ISSUE: Whether petitioner should be relieved from accountability for
the loss of government funds which resulted from the robbery
THE COURT RULED IN THE NEGATIVE.
The action of respondent Commission on the matter accords with law and the
evidence.
After a careful examination of the records, it can be gleaned therefrom that the
findings of fact by the COA are duly supported by substantial evidence.
The Court is of the opinion, that the respondent Commission did not err in
finding the petitioner guilty of negligence.
Negligence is defined as "the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent man and reasonable man could not do.
Negligence is want of care required by the circumstances.
Negligence is therefore a relative or comparative concept. Its
application depends upon the situation the parties are in, and the
degree of care and vigilance which the prevailing circumstances
reasonably require. Conformably, the diligence which the law requires
an individual to observe and exercise varies according to the nature of
the situation in which happens to be, and the importance of the act
which he has to perform.
Applying the above contemplation of negligence to the case at bar, the
petitioner was negligent in the performance of her duties as Cashier. She
did not do her best, as dictated by the attendant circumstances, to
safeguard the public funds entrusted to her, as such Cashier.

Upon verification and ocular inspection it was found out that VISCA had a
concrete vault/room with a steel door secured by a big Yale padlock, which was
very much safer than the unlocked storage cabinet in which petitioner placed
the government funds in question. It is irrefutable that a locked vault/room is
safer than an unlocked storage cabinet.

Furthermore, it is worthy to consider against the petitioner her failure to follow

the frequency of deposit prescribed by Joint COA-MOF Circular No. 1-81.
It was firmly established that she did not make a single deposit during the
month of March, 1990. Had she complied with the said circular, the ill-fated
government funds would not have been exposed to the danger of robbery. Not
only that, the failure of petitioner to turn over to Ms.Anicia C. Fernandez, VISCA
Disbursing Officer, the payroll money and collections to be needed by the
school while she was out on travel was another indication of her non-
compliance with the internal rules of VISCA.

Thus, the Court concluded that the COA correctly denied petitioner's request for
relief from responsibility.
36. TEODORA ASTUDILLO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-33380             December 17, 1930
A. PARTIES
1. Plaintiff –TeodoraAstudillo, mother of the deceased victim
2. Defendant – Manila Electric Company
B. ALLEGATIONS
1. Claim
 About 6 o'clock in the evening of August 14, 1928, a group of boys or
young men (exact age not indicated) came to this public place. Two of
them named Juan Diaz Astudillo and AlejoPonsoy sauntered over to
where an electric post was situated. They were there looking out
towards Intramuros. For exactly what reason, no one will ever know, but
Juan Diaz Astudillo, placing one foot on a projection, reached out and
grasped a charged electric wire.The wire was connected with an
electric light pole situated near Santa Lucia Gate, Intramuros, in the City
of Manila. Death resulted almost instantly.
 Shortly thereafter, the mother of the deceased instituted an action in the
Court of First Instance of Manila to secure from the Manila Electric
Company damages in the amount of P30,000.
2. Defense
 The death of Juan Diaz Astudillo was due solely to his negligence and
lack of care, and that the company had employed the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the injury.
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. Case Filed – Complaint for Damages
2. CFI – ruled in favour of plaintiff; awarded the sum of 15,000,00.
3. SC – affirmed with modification; amount of damages reduced
ISSUE: Whether the defendant is liable to plaintiff for damages
THE COURT RULED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. AWARD OF DAMAGES
REDUCED TO 1,500.00
It is well established that the liability of electric light companies for damages for
personal injuries is governed by the rules of negligence. Such companies are,
however, not insurers of the safety of the public. But considering that electricity
is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric
companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The
duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place
where persons have a right to be. The poles must be so erected and the wires
and appliances must be so located the persons rightfully near the place will not
be injured. Particularly must there be proper insulation of the wires and
appliances in places where there is probable likelihood of human contact
therewith.
We cannot agree with the defense of the Manila Electric Company in the lower
court to the effect that the death of Juan Diaz Astudillo was due exclusively to
his negligence. He only did the natural thing to be expected of one not familiar
with the danger arising from touching an electric wire, and was wholly
unconscious of his peril. Had not the wire caused the death of this young
man, it would undoubtedly have been only a question of time when someone
else, like a playful boy, would have been induced to take hold of the wire, with
fatal results. The cause of the injury was one which could have been foreseen
and guarded against. The negligence came from the act of the Manila
Electric Company in so placing its pole and wires as to be within
proximity to a place frequented by many people, with the possibility ever
present of one of them losing his life by coming in contact with a highly charged
and defectively insulated wire. (NOTE: The electric pole presumably was
located by the municipal authorities and conforms in height to the requirements
of the franchise of the Manila Electric Company. The feeder wires are of the
insulated type, known as triple braid weather proof, required by the franchise.
The pole, with its wires, was erected in 1920. It was last inspected by the City
Electrician in 1923 or 1924. The pole was located close enough to the
public place, so that a person, by reaching his arm out the full length, would be
able to take hold of one of the wires. It would appear, according to the City
Electrician, that even a wire of the triple braid weather proof type, if touched by
a person, would endanger the life of that person by electrocution).
The company further defends in this court on the ground that it has not been
proven that the deceased is an acknowledged natural child of the plaintiff
mother. Technically this is correct. (Civil Code, art. 944). At the same time, it
should first of all be mentioned that, so far as we know, this point was not raised
in the lower court. Further, while the mother may thus be precluded from
succeeding to the estate of the son, yet we know of no reason why she cannot
be permitted to secure damages from the company when the negligence of this
company resulted in the death of her child.
We, therefore, conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to damages. But the
evidence indicative of the true measure of those damages is sadly deficient. All
that we know certainly is that the deceased was less than 20 years of age, a
student, and working in the Ateneo de Manila, but at what wages we are not
told. We are also shown that approximately P200 was needed to defray the
travel and funeral expenses. As would happen in the case of a jury who have
before them one of the parents, her position to life, and the age and sex of the
child, varying opinions, have been disclosed in the court regarding the estimate
of the damages with reference to the next of kin. Various sums have been
suggested, beginning as low as P1,000 and extending as high as P5,000. A
majority of the court finally arrived at the sum of P1,500 as appropriate
damages in this case. The basis of this award would be the P1,000 which have
been allowed in other cases for the death of young children without their having
been tendered any special proof of the amount of damages suffered, in
connection with which should be taken into account the more mature age of the
boy in the case at bar, together with the particular expenses caused by his
death.

As we understand the position of the Manila Electric Company on appeal, its

principal defense now is that it has fully complied with the provisions of its
franchise and of the ordinances of the City of Manila. It is undeniable that the
violation of franchise, an ordinance, or a statute might constitute negligence.
But the converse is not necessarily true, and compliance with a franchise, an
ordinance, or a statute is not conclusive proof that there was no
negligence. The franchise, ordinance, or statute merely states the minimum
conditions. The fulfillment of these conditions does not render unnecessary
other precautions required by ordinary care.

Near this place in the street of Intramuros is an electric light pole with the
corresponding wires.
37. NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION AND THE ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, Petitioners, v. THE
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ANDRES VENTURA,
ANTONIO FAJARDO, MARCELO FAJARDO, ALFONSO VENTURA AND
FLORENTINO VENTURA, Respondents. [G.R. No. 73919. September 18,
1992.]
A. PARTIES
1. Plaintiffs - Andres Ventura, Antonio Fajardo, Marcelo Fajardo, Alfonso
Ventura and Florentino Ventura, leasehold tenants
2. Defendant - NIA
FACTS:
It appears on record that plaintiffs/private respondents are leasehold tenants of
a parcel of land consisting of about five (5) hectares of riceland situated at
SitioDagat-dagatan, Sto. Rosario, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija.
Sometime in 1967, petitioner National Irrigation Administration (NIA for brevity)
constructed an irrigation canal on the property of Isabel and Virginia Tecson
which passed through the private respondents’ landholdings as said irrigation
canal traverses the Cinco-Cinco Creek which abuts said landholding. The
irrigation canal has two (2) outlets which provide private respondents’
landholdings with water coming from said canal and at the same time serve to
drain the excess water of said landholdings.
B. ALLEGATIONS
1. Claim
 Complainants alleged that the two (2) outlets constructed on both sides
of the irrigation canal were not provided with gates to regulate the flow
of water from the canal to their landholdings which resulted to the
inundation of said landholdings causing the former to sustain damages
consisting in the destruction of the planted palay crops and also
prevented them from planting on their landholdings.
2. Defense
 NIA is immune from suit for quasi-delict or tort and assuming NIA could
be sued, it is not liable for tort since it did not act through a special
agent as required under paragraph 6, Article 2180 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
 It also maintained that the cause of inundation of plaintiffs’ landholdings
was the check gate of the Cinco-cinco creek known as Tombo check
gate.
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. Case Filed - Complaint for the abatement of nuisance with damages
against petitioners NIA and/or the Administrator of the National
Irrigation Administration.
2. RTC – ruled in favour of complainants. The Court rendered judgement:
1) Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P35,000.00
representing damages: 2) Ordering defendant to pay P5,000.00 for
attorney’s fees and the cost of the suit."
Nonetheless, the court reduced the civil liability of the defendant
since there were typhoons and plant pests that reduced the harvests of
the plaintiffs and that there were benefits that accrued to the plaintiffs by
reason of said irrigation canal.
3. CA – affirmed in toto the RTC.
4. SC – affirmed the CA; Petition denied.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner NIA is immune from suit – NO
Whether NIA is liable for damages - YES
THE COURT RULED IN THE NEGATIVE.
The NIA "is not immune from suit, by virtue of the express provision of P.D. No.
552."
A reading of Section 2, sub-paragraph (f) of P.D. No. 552, 5 amending Republic
Act No. 3601 shows the granting to NIA the power "to exercise all the powers of
a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act." Paragraph 4 of said law also provide that
petitioner NIA may sue and be sued in court for all kind of actions, whether
contractual or quasi-contractual, in the recovery of compensation and damages
as in the instant case considering that private respondents’ action is based on
damages caused by the negligence of petitioners. This Court had previously
held that "the National Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a
juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere
agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary
functions" 6 as it has its own assets and liabilities as well as its own corporate
powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors.
Paragraph 6, Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states that:
"The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent;
but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task
done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be
applicable."
Article 2176 of said Code provides that:
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter."cralaw virtua1aw
library
accordance with the evidence and the law. As correctly held by the appellate
court:
"It has been established that the plaintiffs’ landholdings were actually inundated.
The testimonies by all the plaintiffs with respect to the amount of the loss they
suffered were not impugned by any contradictory evidence of the defendant. To
Our mind, these testimonies are sufficient proof to make the grant of damages
valid and proper. Besides, the amount awarded by the lower court is but just
and reasonable considering the circumstances of the case."

Thus, petitioners are liable for the damages caused by their negligent act. Said
the trial court:

"On the issue of negligence, plaintiffs through the testimonies of Andres

Ventura, Florentino Ventura and Prudencio Martin showed that the NIA
constructed irrigation canals on the landholding[s] of the plaintiffs by scrapping
away the surface of the landholding[s] to raise the embankment of the canal. As
a result of the said construction, in 1967 the landholdings of the plaintiffs were
inundated with water. Although it cannot be denied that the irrigation canal of
the NIA is a boon to the plaintiffs, the delay of almost 7 years in installing the
safety measures such as check gates, drainage[s], ditches and paddy
drains has caused substantial damage to the annual harvest of the
plaintiffs. In fact, Engineer Garlitos, witness for the defendant declared that
these improvements were made only after the settlement of the claim of Mrs.
Virginia Tecson, which was sometime in 1976 or 1977, while the irrigation canal
was constructed in 1976 [1967]. The testimonies of the plaintiffs essentially
corroborated by a disinterested witness in the person of Barangay Captain
PrudencioMartin, proved that the landholdings of the complainants were
inundated when the NIA irrigation canal was constructed without safety devises
thereby reducing their annual harvest of 30 cavans per hectare (portions
flooded). The failure [,] therefore, of the NIA to provide the necessary
safeguards to prevent the inundation of plaintiffs’ landholding[s] is the
proximate cause of the damages to the poor farmers.

As to the defenseproferred by NIA re cause of inundation, evidence showed

that the check gate existed long before the NIA irrigation canal was constructed
and there were no complaints from the plaintiffs until the canal of the NIA was
built. The uncontested testimony of barrio captain Prudencio Martin that the
former name of the sitio where the plaintiffs’ landholdings were located was
"HilerangDuhat" but was changed to SitioDagat-dagatan because of the
inundation was not without justification."
With regard to petitioners’ contention that the respondent appellate court erred
in awarding damages to private respondents, We find said court’s decision in
38. THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ENRIQUE
CLEMENTE, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.[ G.R. No. 8142, January
25, 1913 ]
A. PARTIES
1. Plaintiff/Complainant with Background/Position Title, Occupation, etc
Juan Garcia – a child 3 years of age, who was then and there passing
across the Dakota Street
2. Defendant; same same
Enrique Clemente - motorman of a street car No. 111
B. ALLEGATIONS
a. Plaintiff's Claim
That on or about the 17th day of June, 1912, in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said Enrique Clemente, at the time being and
acting as motorman of a street car No. 111 upon the line Pasay-
Cervantes of the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, a
corporation duly organized and doing business in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, and then and there directing and operating said
street car, as the motorman thereof, upon and along Dakota Street in
said city, and then and there being under the obligation as such
motorman of said street car to conduct and direct the same with due
care and caution, in order to avoid any accident which might occur to
the vehicles and pedestrians who were passing upon and over said
Dakota Street, said accused at said time and place voluntarily and
illegally, with reckless imprudence and with inexcusable negligence and
in violation of the ordinance pertaining to the matter, conducted and
directed said street car, without paying any attention to the pedestrians
who were crossing said street from one side to the other, in such a
manner that by reason of his lack of care and reckless negligence he
directed and conducted street car No. 111 against and over the body
and head of Juan Garcia, a child 3 years of age, who was then and
there passing across the said Dakota Street, dragging the body of said
child over said street-car track for a considerable distance, fracturing
and destroying its skull and causing instant death. That if said acts thus
performed by the accused had been done with malice or intentionally
he would be guilty of the grave crime of homicide.
b. Defendant/Appelant'sDefense and/or Counterclaim
The appellant in this case makes two contentions: First, that the trial
court had no right to find as a fact that the defendant had violated an
ordinance of the city of Manila, for the reason that said ordinance was
not introduced in evidence and there was no proof of its existence, a
court of general jurisdiction having no power or authority to take judicial
notice of the existence of a municipal ordinance or of the contents of an
ordinance admittedly existing. Second, that even though the right of
the court be conceded to take judicial notice of the existence or
contents of a municipal ordinance, still in this case there was no
evidence to support the finding that such ordinance had been violated.
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
a. Case Filed
homicide through reckless negligence
b. RTC
The finding of the court upon the trial is as follows:
"I am unable to conclude from the evidence that the defendant was
recklessly negligent in operating the car, as contemplated by the
section of the code upon which the complaint is based, but I am
satisfied that he was careless and negligent in the performance of his
duty and violated the regulations in relation to the running of street cars
as laid down by the ordinance of the city, and that homicide resulted
from his carelessness and negligence.
* * * * * * *
"I find the defendant, Enrique Clemente, not guilty as charged in the
complaint of homicide through reckless negligence or rather through
fearful negligence, but find him guilty of a violation of the regulations
through imprudence and negligence, which resulted in the death of the
child as alleged in the complaint, and sentence him to five months of
arresto mayor, and to pay the costs of the action."
c. SC
The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the accused is hereby
convicted of the crime of homicide committed through reckless
negligence, and is hereby sentenced to one year and one day of
prisioncorreccional with the accessories provided by law, with costs.
It is the duty of any person driving a vehicle in the public thoroughfares
to reduce the same to control, ready to be stopped at any moment, if he
sees a child below the years of understanding in such place that it can,
by any reasonable chance, place itself in a dangerous position with
respect to the vehicle. In such case the vehicle must be under such
control that, if the child, by some sudden or unexpected movement,
places itself in the way of the vehicle, it can be stopped in time to avert
injury. No one is able to determine what a child of that age will do, and
it is incumbent upon the driver of a vehicle, on seeing such child in the
street, to take such care that, no matter what, within reasonable limits,
the child may do, it will nevertheless be safe.
This defendant, so far as the great preponderance of the evidence is
concerned, took no adequate precautions to prevent the accident which
occurred. It is undoubted that he saw the child in the street, very
probably making its way toward the street-car track; yet he continued
the car at its maximum speed, without regard to what the child might
do. Such conduct cannot be permitted. Vehicles cannot be driven in
the public streets in such a way as to endanger the life of a child below
the thinking age who may have strayed upon the streets in search of its
mother, or who may be there.for any other reason. Having no judgment
of its own, the drivers of vehicles must substitute their judgment for its;
not having the intelligence to direct itself, men who drive cars or
vehicles must exercise their intelligence. It may be true, as defendant
claims, that the child by a sudden dart placed itself in front of the car,
but that is no excuse for the defendant. He should have anticipated
that very thing and should have acted accordingly.
The Penal Code recognizes and distinguishes three classes of
negligence in connection with homicide or other crimes: First, reckless
negligence, which consists in every act of improvidence (lack of
foresight), thoughtlessness, carelessness, negligence, unskillfulness
and imprudence, executed or done without taking those precautions or
measures which the most common prudence would require. For
example, discharging a firearm from the window of one's house and
killing a neighbor who just at the moment had leaned over the balcony
in front of the house. Leaving a loaded firearm on a chair or other place
within the reach of small children then in the house—one of whom picks
it up for the purpose of playing with it, and is killed by its discharge.
The facts in both of these cases constitute homicide by reckless
negligence, because death was produced by failure to exercise the
most ordinary and common care.
The second class is that in which the act is performed with simple
negligence or imprudence,i.e., with negligence less than reckless
negligence, but at the same time in violation of some ordinance or other
rule enacted by some competent body for the public good. An
illustration: The superintendent of a jail, in a moment of benevolence
and by mere tolerance, permits a prisoner to go out of the jail, who,
abusing the confidence and tolerance of the superintendent, escapes.
In such case, the superintendent has violated the rules and regulations
of jails which prohibit him from permitting a prisoner to leave the jail.
The escape of the prisoner, brought about by the superintendent's
infraction of the rules, makes him guilty of the crime of infidelity in the
custody of prisoners committed by simple imprudence with infraction of
the rules relating to prisons.
Finally, the Code recognizes as the third class that in which the
negligence can neither be called reckless, because it is impossible to
foresee the evil produced, nor negligence with a violation of rules,
because in reality no rules are violated. It is called simple imprudence
or negligence, and is punished as a misdemeanor in paragraph 3 of
article 605 (Spanish) of the Penal Code. An example of this class is
presented in a case where the driver of a cart, passing along the street
at the speed prescribed by the ordinance and leading his team by a
strap attached to the bridle or head, in a moment of distraction, on
turning a corner, does not see that there is a child asleep in the gutter
on the side of the team opposite to him; by reason whereof the child is
run over by the cart and killed. The act cannot be denominated purely
accidental, because, if he had been paying strict attention to his duty,
he would have seen the child and very likely would have been able to
avoid the accident. Nor can it be called reckless negligence, because
he was not able to foresee the extremely unusual occurrence of a child
being asleep in a gutter. Neither was there a violation of an ordinance,
because he was driving his vehicle entirely in conformity therewith.
Such act is qualified, then, as simple imprudence or negligence,
punishable as a misdemeanor.
We are aware that the crime of homicide through an act of simple
negligence which violates an ordinance or regulation is not necessarily
included in the crime of homicide through reckless negligence. The
latter crime might possibly be committed without the violation of an
ordinance or regulation. In that event it would not include the crime of
homicide through an act of simple negligence which violates an
ordinance or regulation. The courts have not yet gone so far as to hold
that, where there is an acquittal of the greater crime and a conviction of
a lesser crime not included in the greater and not charged in the
information, an appeal from a conviction of the lesser crime opens the
way to a conviction of the greater crime in the appellate court if the
evidence is there found sufficient; nor has there been such holding in a
case where two crimes, neither one,included in the other, and from their
nature having no legal relation to each other, were charged in the same
information, and an acquittal was had as to the higher and a conviction
as to the lower.

In the case at bar, however, we have both the higher and the lower
degrees of the same crime charged in the information. We have, also,
a case in which the commission of the homicide was accompanied by a
violation of the ordinance, and in which, therefore, the crime of
homicide through an act of negligence which violates an ordinance was
included in the crime of homicide by an act of reckless negligence. This
is a case where, as a matter of fact, the one was included in the other.
Under the authorities, therefore, an appeal from a conviction of the
lower grade opens the whole case for reconsideration by this court
upon all the evidence, and requires us in the performance of our duty to
pronounce such a judgment in the premises as in conscience we ought.
39. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., INC., PETITIONER,
VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES ANTONIO ESTEBAN AND
GLORIA ESTEBAN, RESPONDENTS.[ G.R. No. 57079, September 29, 1989
A. PARTIES
 Plaintiff/Complainant with Background/Position Title, Occupation, etc
Spouses Antonio Esteban And Gloria Esteban
 Defendant; same same
PLDT
B. ALLEGATIONS
1. Plaintiff's Claim - Negligent Act/s of D; Relief/s Prayed for
This case had its inception in an action for damages instituted in the
former Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental by private
respondent spouses against petitioner Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company (PLDT, for brevity) for the injuries they sustained
in the evening of July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of
earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken
by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. The
complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the
open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping
darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. As a result of the
accident, respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her
arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the
respondent husband suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of the
jeep was shattered.
2. Defendant's Defense and/or Counterclaim
PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the injuries
sustained by respondent spouses were the result of their own
negligence and that the entity which should be held responsible, if at all,
is L.R. Barte and Company (Barte, for short), an independent contractor
which undertook the construction of the manhole and the conduit
system.
Accordingly, PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte alleging
that, under the terms of their agreement, PLDT should in no manner be
answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the negligence or
carelessness of Barte or any of its employees.
In answer thereto, Barte claimed that it was not aware nor was it
notified of the accident involving respondent spouses and that it had
complied with the terms of its contract with PLDT by installing the
necessary and appropriate standard signs in the vicinity of the work
site, with barricades at both ends of the excavation and with red lights
at night along the excavated area to warn the traveling public of the
presence of excavations.
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
b. Case Filed
action for damages
c. RTC Ruling (inc damages awarded, if any)
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, the
decretal part of which reads:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING considerations the defendant
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company is hereby ordered (A) to
pay the plaintiff Gloria Esteban the sum of P20,000.00 as moral
damages and P5,000.00 exemplary damages; to plaintiff Antonio
Esteban the sum of P2,000.00 as moral damages and P500.00 as
exemplary damages, with legal rate of interest from the date of the filing
of the complaint until fully paid. The defendant is hereby ordered to pay
the plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees. (B) The third-party
defendant is hereby ordered to reimburse whatever amount the
defendant-third party plaintiff has paid to the plaintiff. With costs
against the defendant."
From this decision both PLDT and private respondents appealed, the
latter appealing only as to the amount of damages. Third-party
defendant Barte did not appeal.
d. CA
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision reversing the decision of the
lower court and dismissing the complaint of respondent spouses. It
held that respondent Esteban spouses were negligent and
consequently absolved petitioner PLDT from the claim for damages.
e. SC
ISSUE
Whether Petitioner PLDT should be held liable for the injuries sustained by
the respondents
The accident which befell private respondents was due to the lack of
diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to
negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT.
First. Plaintiff's jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson
Street. If it had remained on that inside lane, it would not have hit the
ACCIDENT MOUND.
Second. That plaintiff's jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to
hit the ACCIDENT MOUND could have been corroborated by a picture
showing Lacson Street to the south of the ACCIDENT MOUND.
Third. Plaintiff's jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as
plaintiff-husband claimed. At that speed, he could have braked the
vehicle the moment it struck the ACCIDENT MOUND. The jeep would
not have climbed the ACCIDENT MOUND several feet as indicated by
the tiremarks in Exhibit B. The jeep must have been running quite fast.
If the jeep had been braked at 25 kilometers an hour, plaintiffs would
not have been thrown against the windshield and they would not have
suffered their injuries.
Fourth. If the accident did not happen because the jeep was running
quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to
swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb over the ACCIDENT
MOUND, then plaintiff-husband had not exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family to avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he
should not have run on dim lights, but should have put on his regular
lights which should have made him see the ACCIDENT MOUND in
time. If he was running on the outside lane at 25 kilometers an hour,
even on dim lights, his failure to see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time to
brake the car was negligence on his part. The ACCIDENT MOUND
was relatively big and visible, being 2 to 3 feet high and 1-1/2 feet wide.
If he did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time, he would not have
seen any warning sign either. He knew of the existence and location of
the ACCIDENT MOUND, having seen it many previous times. With
ordinary precaution, he should have driven his jeep on the night of the
accident so as to avoid hitting the ACCIDENT MOUND.
The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent
Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of
his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as
one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to
recover damages.[30] The perils of the road were known to, hence
appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By exercising
reasonable care and prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could
have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming
arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of
petitioner.
The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented
the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the
public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private
respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was
not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep
of respondents to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden
swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound.
As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty, such as
the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes
the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would
have prevented the injury.[31] It is basic that private respondents
cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise
due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal
norm and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of
caution for his own protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio
Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident,
notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a
resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday
and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations
there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger,
hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.
34. [No. L-8328. May 18, 1956]
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. SOTERO REMOQUILLO, in his
own behalf and as guardian of the minors MANUEL, BENJAMIN, NESTOR,
MILAGROS, CORAZON, CLEMENTE and AURORA, all surnamed MAGNO,
SALUD MAGNO, and the COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division),
respondents.
E) PARTIES:
3) Petitioner is the owner of the electric wire that electrocuted the late
Efren Magno.
4) Respondents are the heirs of the deceased Efren Magno.
F) FACTS:
On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio
Peñaloza, his stepbrother, located on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila, to
repair a “media agua” said to be in a leaking condition. The “media agua” was
just below the window of the third story. Standing on said “media agua”, Magno
received from his son thru that window a 3’ X 6’ galvanized iron sheet to cover
the leaking portion, turned around and in doing so the lower end of the iron
sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company
(later referred to as the Company) strung parallel to the edge of the “media
agua” and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his death by electrocution.
G) ISSUE: WON Petitioner Company is liable for the death of Efren
Magno.
H) PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
5) CASE FILED: His widow and children filed suit to recover damages from
the company.
6) RTC: After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in their favor —
P10,000 as compensatory damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryP784 as
actual damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryP2,000 as moral and
exemplary damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand P3,000 as attorney’s
fees, with costs. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the
judgment with slight modification by reducing the attorney’s fees from
P3,000 to P1,000 with costs. 3)
7) CA: The findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals which are
conclusive are stated in the following portions of its decision which we
reproduce below;
“The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire
stretched between poles on the street and carrying a charge of 3,600 volts. It
was installed there some two years before Peñaloza’s house was constructed.
The record shows that during the construction of said house a similar incident
took place, although fortunate]y with much less tragic consequences. A piece of
wood which a carpenter was holding happened to come in contact with the
same wire, producing some sparks. The owner of the house forthwith
complained to Defendant about the danger which the wire presented, and as a
result Defendant moved one end of the wire farther from the house by means of
a brace, but left the other end where it was.
“At any rate, as revealed by the ocular inspection of the premises ordered by
the trial court, the distance from the electric wire to the edge of the ‘media agua’
on which the deceased was making repairs was only 30 inches or 2 1/2 feet.
Regulations of the City of Manila required that ‘all wires be kept three feet from
the building. Appellant contends that in applying said regulations to the case at
bar the reckoning should not be from the edge of the ‘media agua’ but from the
side of the house and that, thus measured, the distance was almost 7 feet, or
more then the minimum prescribed. This contention is manifestly groundless,
for not only is a ‘media agua’ an integral part of the building to which it is
attached but to exclude it in measuring the distance would defeat the purpose of
the regulation. Appellant points out, nevertheless, that even assuming that the
distance, within the meaning of the city regulations, should be measured from
the edge of the ‘media agua’, the fact that in the case of the house involved
herein such distance was actually less than 3 feet was due to the fault of the
owner of said house, because the city authorities gave him a permit to construct
a ‘media agua’ only one meter or 39 1/2 inches wide, but instead he built one
having a width of 65 3/4 inches, 17 3/8 inches more than the width permitted by
the authorities, thereby reducing the distance to the electric wire to less than the
prescribed minimum of 3 feet.
“It is a fact that the owner of the house exceeded the limit fixed in the permit
given to him by the city authorities for the construction of the ‘media agua’, and
that if he had not done so Appellants wire would have been 11 3/8 (inches)
more than the required distance of three feet from the edge of the ‘media agua’.
It is also a fact, however, that after the ‘media agua’ was constructed the owner
was given a final permit of occupancy of the house.
The wire was an exposed, high tension wire carrying a load of 3,600 volts.
There was, according to Appellant, no insulation that could have rendered it
safe, first, because there is no insulation material in commercial use for such
kind of wire; secondly, because the only insulation material that may be
effective is still in the experimental stage of development and, anyway, its costs
would be prohibitive… ”
8) SC:
NO. After a careful study and discussion of the case and the
circumstances surrounding the same, we are inclined to agree to the
contention of Petitioner Company that the death of Magno was primarily
caused by his own negligence and in some measure by the too close proximity
of the “media agua” or rather its edge to the electric wire of the company by
reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the
subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the “media agua”. We fail to
see how the Company could be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due
diligence. Although the city ordinance called for a distance of 3 feet of its wires
from any building, there was actually a distance of 7 feet and 2 3/4 inches of
the wires from the side of the house of Peñaloza. Even considering said
regulation distance of 3 feet as referring not to the side of a building, but to any
projecting part thereof, such as a “media agua”, had the house owner followed
the terms of the permit given him by the city for the construction of his “media
agua”, namely, one meter or 39 3/8 inches wide, the distance from the wires to
the edge of said “media agua” would have been 3 feet and 11 3/8 inches. In
fixing said one meter width for the “media agua” the city authorities must have
wanted to preserve the distance of at least 3 feet between the wires and any
portion of a building. Unfortunately, however, the house owner disregarding the
permit, exceeded the one meter fixed by the same by 17 3/8 inches and
leaving only a distance of 2 1/2 feet between the “Media agua” as illegally
constructed and the electric wires. And added to this violation of the permit by
the house owner, was its approval by the city through its agent, possibly an
inspector. Surely we cannot lay these serious violations of a city ordinance and
permit at the door of the Company, guiltless of breach of any ordinance or
regulation. The Company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for
any illegal construction which reduces the distance between its wires and said
construction, and after finding that said distance of 3 feet had been reduced, to
change the stringing or installation of its wires so as to preserve said distance.
It would be much easier for the City, or rather it is its duty, to be ever on the
alert and to see to it that its ordinances are strictly followed by house owners
and to condemn or disapprove all illegal constructions. Of course, in the
present case, the violation of the permit for the construction of the “media
agua” was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it. Had
said “media agua” been only one meter wide as allowed by the permit, Magno
standing on it, would instinctively have stayed closer to or hugged the side of
the house in order to keep a safe margin between the edge of the “media
agua” and the yawning 2-story distance or height from the ground, and
possibly if not probably avoided the fatal contact between the lower end of the
iron sheet and the wires.
We may not hold said company as guilty of negligence or wanting in due
diligence in failing to insulate said wires. As to their proximity to the house it is
to be supposed that distance of 3 feet was considered sufficiently safe by the
technical men of the city such as its electrician or engineer.
Thus, the real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act
of Magno himself. When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the “media
agua” just below the third story window, it is to be presumed that due to his age
and experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or
carpenter and had training and experience for the job. So, he could not have
been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But
unfortunately, in the instant care, his training and experience failed him, and
forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-feet iron sheet with both hands
and at arm’s length, evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence and
discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms with the motion of
his body, thereby causing his own electrocution.
But even assuming for a moment that under the facts of the present case
the Defendant electric company could be considered negligent in installing its
electric wires so close to the house and “media agua” in question, and in failing
to properly insulate those wires (although according to the unrefuted claim of
said company it was impossible to make the insulation of that kind of wire),
nevertheless to hold the Defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno,
such supposed negligence of the company must have been the proximate and
principal cause of the accident, because if the act of Magno in turning around
and swinging the galvanized iron sheet with his hands was the proximate and
principal cause of the electrocution, then his heirs may not recover.
To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was
not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and
negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet
without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the street and at the
wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the latter’s length of 6
feet. For a better understanding of the rule on remote and proximate cause with
respect to injuries, we find the following citation
helpful:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient
cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for
such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because
of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if
an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition,
such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.”
42. E. M. WRIGHT, plaintiff-appellant,vs.MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT found. It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the
CO. G.R. No. L-7760             October 1, 1914 vehicle under the conditions described.

FACTS:
The defendant is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street railway in
the city of Manila and its suburbs, including the municipality of Caloocan. The
plaintiff's residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along which defendant's
tracks run, so that to enter his premises from the street plaintiff is obliged to
cross defendant's tracks.
A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the
ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and
falling, the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a
wheel, this might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what
his condition; and to conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober man
would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to draw a conclusion which
enters the realm of speculation and guesswork.

On the night of August 8, 1909, plaintiff drove home in a calesa and in crossing
the tracks to enter his premises the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell,
causing the vehicle with the rails, resulting in a sudden stop, threw plaintiff from
the vehicle and caused the injuries complained of.
It is undisputed that at the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks on the night in
question not only the rails were above-ground, but that the ties upon which the
rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the ground,
thus making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of
the street.
Mere intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to
be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. It is the
general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of
ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care
is required than by a sober one. If one's conduct is characterized by a proper
degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober. 

It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in maintaining its tracks as

described, but it is contended that the plaintiff was also negligent in that he was
intoxicated to such an extent at the time of the accident that he was unable to
take care of himself properly and that such intoxication was the primary cause
of the accident.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE:

The trial court held that both parties were negligent, but that the plaintiff's
negligence was not as great as defendant's and under the authority of the case
of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co. apportioned the damages and awarded plaintiff a
judgment of P1,000.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plaintiff was negligent? (No)

RULING:

As is clear from reading the opinion, no facts are stated therein which warrant
the conclusion that the plaintiff was negligent. The conclusion that if he had
been sober he would not have been injured is not warranted by the facts as
43. THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BAGGAY, JR., Defendant- because of the violent death of the woman Bil-liingan. This cause was instituted
Appellant.G.R. No. 6659. September 1, 1911 separately from the other, No. 1109, for lesiones.

After trial and proof that the defendant was suffering from mental aberration, the
SYLLABUS judge on April 28 rendered the judgment cited above, whereupon the
defendant’s counsel appealed to this court.
CIVIL LIABILITY IN CRIME; INSANE PERSONS. — Civil liability generally
accompanies criminal liability, because every person liable criminally is also By another writing of June 27, the same counsel asked for immediate
liable for reparation of damage and for indemnification for the harm done; but by suspension of execution of the judgment, because it had been appealed and
express provision of the penal laws there may be civil liability even when the had not become final.
perpetrator is held to be exempt from criminal liability.
He also requested annulment of the sale at public auction of the property
Such is the case of a lunatic or demented person who, in spite of his deranged attached by the sheriff or his deputy under order of the court, for making
mind is still-reasonably and justly liable with his property for the consequences indemnification with the defendant’s property in accordance with said judgment,
of his acts, even though they be performed unwittingly. as the attachment had been executed upon the property of the non-Christian
woman named Dioalan and of other persons and not upon that of the
Law and society are under obligation to protect him, and, when so declared defendant.
liable with his property for reparation and indemnification, he is still entitled to
reservation of what is necessary for his decent maintenance, but this protection ISSUE: The question raised on the appeal filed in this case by counsel for the
does not exclude liability for damages caused to those who may have the insane defendant, Baggay, jr., is solely whether he, notwithstanding that he was
misfortune to suffer the consequences of his acts. held exempt from criminal liability, has nevertheless incurred civil liability, with
obligation to indemnify the heirs of the murdered woman and to pay the costs.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE:
RULING:
This is an appeal by the defendant from the judgment rendered on April 28,
1910, whereby he was declared exempt from criminal liability but was obligated Article 17 of the Penal Code states:
to indemnify the heirs of the murdered woman, Bil-liingan, in the sum of P1,000,
to pay the costs in the case and to be confined in an institution for the insane "Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable."
until further order of the court.

FACTS: Article 18 of the same code says:

About the 4th of October, 1909, several persons were assembled in the
defendant’s house in the township of Peñarrubia, Abra, Province of Ilocos Sur, "The exemption from criminal liability declared in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, and 10 of
for the purpose of holding a song service called "buni" according to the Tinguian article 8 does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced,
custom, when he, the non-Christian Baggay, without provocation suddenly subject to the:
attacked the woman Bil-liingan with a bolo, inflicting a serious wound on her
head from which she expired immediately; and with the same bolo he likewise "(1) In cases 1, 2, and 3, the persons who are civilly liable for acts committed by
inflicted various wounds on the women named Calbayan, Agueng, Quisamay, a lunatic or imbecile, or a person under 9 years of age, or over this age and
Calapini, and on his own mother, named Dioalan. under 15, who has not acted with the exercise of judgment, are those who have
them under their authority, legal guardianship or power, unless they prove that
For this reason the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the court of Ilocos Sur, there was no blame or negligence on their part.
dated February 15, charging the non-Christian Baggay, jr., with murder,
"Should there be no person having them under his authority, legal guardianship,
or power, or if such person be insolvent, the said lunatics, imbeciles, or minors
shall answer with their own property, excepting that part which is exempted for
their support in accordance with the civil law."

True it is that civil liability accompanies criminal-liability, because every person

liable criminally for a crime or misdemeanor is also liable for reparation of
damage and for indemnification of the harm done, but there may be civil liability
because of acts ordinarily punishable, although the law has declared their
perpetrators exempt from criminal liability.

Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person who, in spite of his irresponsibility
on account of the deplorable condition of his deranged mind, is still reasonably
and justly liable with his property for the consequences of his acts, even though
they be performed unwittingly, for the reason that his fellows ought not to suffer
from the disastrous results of his harmful acts more than is necessary, in spite
of his unfortunate condition.

Law and society are under obligation to protect him during his illness and so
when he is declared to be liable with his property for reparation and
indemnification, he is still entitled to the benefit of what is necessary for his
decent maintenance, but this protection does not exclude liability for damage
caused to those who may have the misfortune to suffer the consequences of his
acts.

According to the law, the persons in the first place liable are those who have the
insane party under their care or guardianship, unless they prove that there was
no blame or negligence on their part; but if the demented person or imbecile
lack a guardian or some person charged with his care, or if the latter be
insolvent, then his own property must meet the civil liability of indemnifying or
repairing the damage done, and for this reason judges and courts in rendering
judgment in a criminal cause prosecuted against an insane or demented
person, even when they hold the accused exempt from criminal liability, must fix
the civil liability of the persons charged with watching over and caring for him or
the liability of the demented person himself with his property for reparation of
the damage and indemnification for the harm done, unless the offended party or
the heirs of the person murdered expressly renounce such reparation or
indemnification.
45. ELIAS S. CIPRIANO and/or E.S. CIPRIANO ENTERPRISES, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MACLIN ELECTRONICS, INC.,  reimbursement for the value of the Kia Pride. In reply, petitioner denied liability
G.R. No. 107968 October 30, 1996
A. Parties
a) Plaintiff/Complainant with Background, position title, occupation
Elias S. Cipriano is the owner of E.S. Cipriano Enterprises, which is
engaged in the rustproofing of vehicles
b) Defendant
Maclin Electronics, Inc.,- customer who brought a car for
rustproofing
B. Facts
Petitioner Elias S. Cipriano is the owner of E.S. Cipriano Enterprises, which is
engaged in the rustproofing of vehicles, under the style Mobilkote. On April 30,
1991, private respondent Maclin Electronics, Inc., through an employee,
brought a 1990 model Kia Pride People's car to petitioner's shop for
rustproofing. The car had been purchased the year before the Integrated Auto
Sales, Inc. for P252,155.00.
3
The vehicle was received in the shop under Job Order No. 123581,   which
showed the date it was received for rustproofing as well its condition at the time.
Neither the time of acceptance nor the hour of release, however, was specified.
According to the petitioner, the car was brought to his shop at 10 o'clock in the
morning of April 30, 1991 and was ready for release later that afternoon, as it
took only six hours to complete the process of rustproofing.
In the afternoon of May 1, 1991, fire broke out at the Lambat restaurant, which
petitioner also owned, adjoining his Mobilkote rustproofing shop. The fire
destroyed both the shop and the restaurant, including private respondent's Kia
Pride. The car had been kept inside the building, allegedly to protect it from
theft. Petitioner claimed that despite efforts to save the vehicle, there was
simply not enough time to get it out of the building, unlike three other cars which
had been saved because they were parked near the entrance of the garage. 4
On May 8, 1991, private respondent sent a letter to petitioner, demanding
on the ground that the fire was a fortuitous event. This prompted private
respondent to bring this suit for the value of its vehicle and for damages against
petitioner.
C. Allegations
1. Plaintiff’s Claim -
Petitioner invoked Art. 1174 of the Civil Code and denied liability for the loss
which he alleged was due to fortuitous event. He later testified that he employed
an electrician who regularly inspected the lighting in his restaurant and
rustproofing shop. In addition, he claimed he had installed fire-fighting devices
and that the fire was an accident entirely independent of his will and devoid of
any negligence on his part. He further averred that private respondent's car was
ready for release as early as afternoon of April 30, 1991 and that it was private
respondent's delay in claiming it that was the cause of the loss.
Petitioner explained that rustproofing involved spraying asphalt-like materials
underneath a motor vehicle so that rust will not corrode its body and that the
materials and chemicals used for this purpose are not inflammable. Therefore,
he could not be made to assume the risk of loss due to fire. He also claimed
that he was not required to register his business with the Department of Trade
and Industry, because he was not covered by P.D. No. 1572.
2. Defendants defense or counterclaim
private respondent argued that petitioner was liable for the loss of the car even
if it was caused by a fortuitous event. It contended that the nature of petitioner's
business required him to assume the risk because under P.D. No. 1572,
petitioner was required to insure his property as well as those of his customers.
F. Issue
whether petitioner was required to insure his business and the vehicles received
by him in the course of his business and, if so, whether his failure to do so
constituted negligence, rendering him liable for loss due to the risk required to
be insured againstProcedural History
d. RTC Ruling
The trial court sustained the private respondent's contention that the "failure of
defendant to comply with P.D. No. 1572 is in effect a manifest act of negligence
which renders defendants [petitioner herein] liable for the loss of the car even if
the same was caused by fire," 6 even as it ruled that the business of
rustproofing is "definitely covered" P.D. No. 1572. Since petitioner did not
register his business and insure it, he must bear the cost of loss of his
customers. As already noted, the court ordered petitioner to pay private
respondent P252,155.00 with interest at 6% per annum  from the filing of the
case and attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00.
recoverable damages in the judgment of the court. Since in this case there is no
justification for the award of attorney's fees in the decision of the trial court, it
was error for the Court of Appeals to sustain such award.
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated November 18, 1992, of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the award of attorney's fees is
DELETED.

e. CA Ruling

On Appeal, the decision was affirmed.

f. SC Ruling

The contention of the petitioner is without merit. The SC hold that both
questions must be answered in the affirmative.

Thus, P.D. No. 1572, §1 requires service and repair enterprises for motor
vehicles, like that petitioner's, to register with Department of Trade and Industry.
As condition for such registration or accreditation, Ministry Order No. 32
requires covered enterprises to secure insurance coverage. Rule III of this
Order provides in pertinent parts: 12

The insurance policy of the following risks like theft, pilferage, fire, flood and
loss should cover exclusively the machines, motor vehicles, heavy equipment,
engines, electronics, electrical airconditioners, refrigerators, office machines
and data processing equipment, medical and dental equipment, other
consumer mechanical and industrial equipment stored for repair and/or service
in the premises of the applicant.

There is thus a statutory duty imposed on petitioner and it is for his failure to
comply with this duty that he was guilty or negligence rendering him liable for
damages to private respondent. While the fire in this case may be considered a
fortuitous event, 13 this circumstance cannot exempt petitioner from liability for
loss.

We think, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the award of
attorney's fees by the lower court. The reason for this is that it is not sound
policy to penalize the right to litigate. It can not simply be inserted as an item of
46. HONORIA DELGADO VDA. DE GREGORIO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.GO CHONG BING, defendant-appellee. G.R. No. 7763        December 2,
1957
A. PARTIES
1. Defendant was the owner of a truck. He had a driver and a cargador
or driver's helper by the name of Francisco Romera.
2. The plaintiffs appellants' in this action are Gregorio's widow and his
children.
B. ALLEGATIONS
Defendant was the owner of a truck. He had a driver and a cargador or
driver's helper by the name of Francisco Romera. Defendant ordered
Romera to drive his truck, with instructions to follow another track driven by
his driver and help the latter in crossing Sumlog river which was then
flooded, should it be unable to cross the river because of the flood. Romera
at that time was not a licensed driver. He only had a student's permit. The
truck started from the town of Lupon at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon,
driven by Romera. Some persons boarded the truck and among them was
one policeman by the name of VenancioOrfanel. While the truck was on the
way, it made a stop and then Orfanel took the wheel from Romera, while the
latter stayed on the driver's left, reclined on a spare tire inside of the truck.
While the truck was being driven by Orfanel, with another truck ahead of it
driven by defendant's driver it so happened that they came to a truck that
was trying to park on the left side of the road. Romera suggested to Orfanel
that he shift to low gear and Orfanel did so. But as they approached the
parking truck, and in order to avoid colliding with it, Orfanel swerved the
truck towards the right. It so happened that at that time two pedestrians were
on the right side of the road, As the truck had swerved to the right and was
proceeding to hit the said pedestrians, Romera told Orfanel to apply the
brake, but Orfanel instead of doing so put his foot on the gasoline and the
truck did not stop but went on and hit and run over one of the pedestrians, by
the name of Quirico Gregorio. The plaintiffs appellants' in this action are
Gregorio's widow and his children. Orfanel was prosecuted for homicide with
reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced
accordingly.
1. Plaintiff's Claim - Negligent Act/s of D; Relief/s Prayed for
To sustain the theory that defendant's cargador Francisco Romera was
negligent, plaintiffs introduced one Javier A. Dayo as a witness. According to
this witness the truck was speeding at the rate of 20 miles an hour. According to
him also, while the truck was about pass by the house of one Lucio, running at
a speed per hour, he heard Romera shouting "hand brake! hand brake!"; that
both Orfanel and Romera tried to turn the driver's wheel to the left and direct the
truck towards also the left to avoid the collision. According to his witness also,
Romera gave the wheel to Orfanel voluntarily upon the request of the latter.
2. Defendant's Defense and/or Counterclaim
Defendant testified that he gave positive instructions to Romera not to allow
anybody to drive the truck, and Romera himself testified that he had warned
Orfanel that his master prohibited him from allowing anybody to drive the truck,
but that as Orfanel was a uniformed policeman and insisted that he drive the
truck, and that as he believed that the policeman knew how to drive, he let him
drive the truck.
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
RTC Ruling
The court a quo dismissed the action on the ground that as the death or
accident was caused by an act or omission of a person who is not in any
way related to the defendant, and as such act or omission was punishable
by law, and as a matter of fact he had already been punished therefor, no
civil liability should be imposed upon the Ornafel.
CA:
Against this decision the plaintiffs have appealed contending that when
defendant permitted his cargador, who was not provided with a driver's
license, to drive the truck, he thereby violated the provisions of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law and that this constitutes negligence per se.
SC:
We are of the belief that defendant's claim that Romera gave the wheel to
the policeman for fear of, or out of respect for, the latter, and because he
believed that the latter had both the ability and the authority to drive the
truck, especially as he himself had only a student's permit and not a driver's
license.
It is evident that the proximate, immediate and direct cause of the death
of the plaintiffs' intestate was the negligence of Orfanel, a uniformed
policeman, who took the wheel of the truck from defendant's cargador, in
spite of the protest of the latter. The reason for absolving the defendant
therefor is not because the one responsible for the accident had already
received indemnification for the accident, but because there is no direct
and proximate causal connection between the negligence or violation of
the law by the defendant to the death of the plaintiff's intestate.

But admitting for the sake of argument that the defendant had so violated
the law, or may be deemed negligent in entrusting the truck to one who is
not provided with a driver's license, it is clear that he may not be declared
liable for the accident because his negligence was not the direct and
proximate cause thereof. In order that a person may be held guilty for
damage through negligence, it is necessary that there be an act or
omission on the part of the person who is to be charged with the liability
and that damage is produced by the said act or omission.
47. MERCEDES M. TEAGUE vs. ELENA FERNANDEZ, et.al.
G.R. No. L-29745, 4 June 1973
A. PARTIES
Mercedes Teague – operator of Realistic Institute, a vocational school
for hair and beauty culture
Elena Fernandez and other respondents (Not named in the caption of
the case) – siblings of Lourdes Fernandez, the deceased
B. ALLEGATIONS
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
FACTS STATED BY THE CA
At about four o'clock in the afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire
broke out in a store for surplus materials located about ten meters away
from Realistic Institute. Soler Street lay between that store and the
institute. Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in the Realistic
Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter, a panic ensued.
Four instructresses and six assistant instructress of the Institute
were present and they, together with the registrar, tried to calm down
the students, who numbered about 180 at the time, telling them not to
be afraid because the Gil-Armi Building would not get burned as it is
made of concrete, and that the fire was anyway, across the street.
They told the students not to rushout but just to go down the
stairway two by two, or to use the fire-escapes. The panic, however,
could not be subdued and the students, with the exception of the few
who made use of fire-escapes kept on rushing and pushing their way
through the stairs, thereby causing stampede therein.
As a result, Lourdes sustained injuries to wit: lacerations in both
eyes and on the upper lip, contused abrasions in different parts of the
body, internal hemorrhage and fractures in the second and third right
ribs. The cause of death, according to the autopsy report, was "Shock
due to traumatic fractures of the ribs with perinephric hematoma and
lacerations of the conjunctiva of both eyes."
Plaintiff’s Claim
- That Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila
refers to public buildings and hence did not apply to the Gil-Armi
building which was of private ownership.
- that the obligation to comply with the ordinance devolved upon the
owners of the building and therefore it is they and not the petitioner
herein, who is a mere lessee, who should be liable for the violation
- According to the her "the events of fire, panic and stampede were
independent causes with no causal connection at all with the
violation of the ordinance."
1. Case filed – Action for damages
2. Ruling of the CFI – ruled in favor of Teague and dismissed the case
(the reason for the dismissal was not stated)
3. CA – reversed the judgment and sentenced Teague to pay damages
in the sum of P11,000.00 with interest.
Teague was negligent and such negligence was the proximate cause
of the death of Lourdes.
Basis: Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila.
Said provision reads as follows:
Sec. 491.Firepro of partitions, exits and stairways. - ... All buildings
and separate sections of buildings or buildings otherwise known as
accessorias having less than three stories, having one or more
persons domiciled therein either temporarily or permanently, and all
public or quasi-public buildings having less than three stories, such as
hospitals, sanitarium, schools, reformatories, places of human
detention, assembly halls, clubs, restaurants or panciterias, and the
like, shall be provided with at least two unobstructed stairways of not
less than one meter and twenty centimeters in width and an inclination
of not less than forty degrees from the perpendicular, in case of large
buildings more than two stairways shall likewise be provided when
 required by the chief of the fire department, said stairways shall be
placed as far apart as possible.
The alleged violation of the ordinance above-quoted consisted
in the fact that the second storey of the Gil-Armi building had only one
stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2 meters each,
although at the time of the fire the owner of the building had a second
stairway under construction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual l
4. SC –
ISSUE: Whether or not P should be held negligent for the death of
Lourdes. – YES
to evacuate the building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen, was
bound to happen under emergency conditions if there was only one
stairway available. It is true that in this particular case there would have
been no overcrowding in the single stairway if there had not been a fire
in the neighborhood which caused the students to panic and rush
headlong for the stairs in order to go down. But it was precisely such
contingencies or event that the authors of the ordinance had in mind,
for under normal conditions one stairway would be adequate for the
occupants of the building. 

As to the contention of the P that Sec. 491 is inapplicable, it can

be construed from the text of the ordinance, that it is not ownership
which determines the character of buildings subject to its requirements,
but rather the use or the purpose for which a particular building is
utilized. Thus the same may be privately owned, but if it is devoted to
any one of the purposes mentioned in the ordinance - for instance as a
school, which the Realistic Institute precisely was - then the building is
within the coverage of the ordinance. Indeed the requirement that such
a building should have two (2) separate stairways instead of only one
(1) has no relevance or reasonable relation to the fact of ownership, but
does have such relation to the use or purpose for which the building is
devoted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

As to the second contention of the plaintiff - The contention

ignores the fact that it was the use of the building for school purposes
which brought the same within the coverage of the ordinance; and it
was the petitioner and not the owners who was responsible for such
use.
It is true that the petitioner's non-compliance with the ordinance
in question was ahead of and prior to the other events in point of time,
in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the building.
But the violation was a continuing one, since the ordinance was a
measure of safety designed to prevent a specific situation which
would pose a danger to the occupants of the building. That
situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become necessary
48. BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, CARIDAD O. BERNARDO as Guardian Ad Litem for Minors
JOJO, JEFFREY and JO-AN, all surnamed BERNARDO, and GUILLERMO
CANAVE, JR., respondents.
A. PARTIES
1. Plaintiff
CARIDAD O. BERNARDO - hired an automobile from the
defendant taxicab company for a trip to Cavite Viejo; was driven
and controlled by a chauffeur supplied by the taxicab company
2.Defendants
 THE MANILA RAILROAD Co- owner of the train which struck
the automobile hired by the plaintiffs
 BACHRACH GARAGE & TAXICAB Co – owner of the
automobile hired by the plaintiffs
B. ALLEGATIONS
1. Plaintiffs claim
Journey to Cavite Viejo was made without incident but, on the
return trip, while crossing the tracks of defendant railroad company
in the barrio of San Juan, municipality of Cavite Viejo, the
automobile was struck by a train and the plaintiffs injured; the driver
of the automobile drove his machine upon the railroad tracks
without observing the precautions which ordinary care and
prudence would require, without reducing speed and without taking
any precaution looking to determining whether there was danger
from a train or locomotive.
2. Defendant’s claim
 BACHRACH GARAGE & TAXICAB Co-
1. It alleged that there was a custom established among automobile
drivers of Manila by which they habitually drove their cars over railroad
crossings in the manner in which the automobile was driven by
defendant’s servant on the occasion in controversy; to prove this, the
President of the company testified that all of its drivers drive in that
way; also they cited the testimony of a witness living near the scene of
the crime that , as a general rule, automobiles passed over the
railroad crossing without changing speed.
2. The appellant also contended with much vigor that the plaintiffs cannot
recover for the reason that the negligence of the driver of the
automobile, if any, was imputable to them, they having permitted the
driver to approach and pass over the railroad crossing without the use
of ordinary care and diligence to determine the proximity of a train or
locomotive, and having made no effort to caution or instruct him or
compel him to take reasonable care in making the crossing
3. They assail the decision of the trial court in finding that Manila railroad
is not negligent and averred that the railroad company did not maintain
either a flagman or protecting gates at the grade crossing where the
accident occurred, while the sign "Railroad Crossing" was broken on the
side toward the road; that trees and undergrowth had been permitted to
grow on and adjoining the right of way, and houses were constructed
thereon, in such manner as to obstruct the view of persons approaching
the railroad track until within a few meters thereof; and that the
approach to the crossing is twisting
4. It further alleged that the driver was competent and had a long and
satisfactory record, having driven cars for the defendant for 5 or 6 years
without accident or misadventure, and that his negligence, if any, in
attempting to pass over the crossing on the occasion before us, cannot
legally be imputed to the taxicab company so as to make it liable for the
damages resulting therefrom
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. Case filed- action for damages
2. RTC Ruling- trial court dismissed the complaint on the merits as
to the Manila Railroad Company and held the defendant taxicab
company liable for damages to the plaintiffs in various amounts
5. CA – petition directly filed to the SC
6. SC
ISSUE:Whether or not BACHRACH GARAGE & TAXICAB Co is
liable to the plaintiffs
Yes.
On the first assignment of error of the defendant, the Court said that
for the moment admitting the existence of the custom,that a
practice which is dangerous to human life cannot ripen into a
custom which will protect anyone who follows it. To go upon a
railroad crossing without making any effort to ascertain the
approach of a train is so hazardous an act and one so dangerous to
life, that no one may be permitted to excuse himself who does it,
provided injury results. One who performs an act so inherently
dangerous cannot, when an accident occurs, take refuge behind
the plea that others have performed the same act safely.
On the second assignment of error, The Court ruled that a person
who hires a public automobile and gives the driver directions as to
the place to which he wishes to be conveyed, but exercises no
other control over the conduct of the driver, is not responsible for
acts of negligence of the latter or prevented from recovering for
injuries suffered from a collision between the automobile and a
train, caused by the negligence either of the locomotive engineer or
the automobile driver. . Ordinarily where one rides in a public
vehicle with the driver thereof and is injured by the negligence of a
third person, to which negligence that of the driver contributes, his
contributory negligence is not imputable to the passenger unless
said passenger has or is in the position to have and exercise some
control over the driver with reference to the matter wherein he was
negligent.
On the third assignment of error, the Supreme Court said that it is
not negligence on the part of the railroad company to maintain
grade crossings, even in populous districts; nor is it negligence not
to maintain a flagman at such crossings. It is true that a railroad
company is held to greater caution in the more thronged streets of
the densely populated portions of the city than in the less
frequented streets in suburban parts or in towns; but this does not
mean that it is negligence to maintain grade crossings in such
densely populated portions or that it is negligent not to maintain a
flagman at crossings located in such districts. It simply means that
the company in operating its trains over such crossings must
exercise care commensurate with the use of crossings in any give
locality. And as to the existence of trees, it was proven that there
was no obstruction in the railroad.
As to the last assignment of error, the Supreme Court said that it
was the duty of the company not only to furnish a suitable and
proper car and select a competent operator, but also to supervise
and, where necessary, instruct him properly. That when an injury is
caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of
the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee or in supervision over him after the selection, or both;
and that presumption is juristantum and not juris et de jure, and
consequently may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and
supervision the he has exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved
from liability.
In this case the company failed to comply with one of the essential
requirements of the law of negligence in this jurisdiction, that of
supervision and instruction, including the promulgation of proper
rules and regulations and the formulation and publication of proper
instructions for their guidance in cases where such rules and
regulations and instructions are necessary. To repeat, it was found
by the trial court, and that finding is fully sustained by the record,
that it was the custom of the driver who operated the machine on
the night of the accident, to approach and pass over railroad
crossings without adequate precautions, and that such custom was
known to and had been sanctioned by the officials of the taxicab
company, the president of the company testifying that none of its
drivers, especially the one who operated the machine on the night
of the accident, to approach and pass over railroad crossings
without adequate precautions, and that such custom was known to
and had been sanctioned by the officials of the taxicab company,
the president of the company testifying that none of its drivers,
especially the one who operated the car on the night of the
accident, were accustomed to stop or even reduce speed or take
any other precaution in approaching and passing over railroad
crossings, no matter of what nature, unless they heard "the signal
of a car."
49. BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, CARIDAD O. BERNARDO as Guardian Ad Litem for Minors
JOJO, JEFFREY and JO-AN, all surnamed BERNARDO, and GUILLERMO
CANAVE, JR., respondents.
C. Issue: Whether or notBENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC is
liable for damages
D. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Parties
1. Plaintiff
 CARIDAD O. BERNARDO –widow of Jose Bernardo
ordered BENECO to pay them damages
 JOJO, JEFFREY and JO-AN- minor children of Jose and
Caridad
 Jose Bernardo – deceased; managed a stall at the Baguio
City meat market
2. Defendant
a. BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC- electric
company and distributor in Banguio
b. GUILLERMO CANAVE, JR- jeepney owner
B. ALLEGATIONS
1. Plaintiffs claim
At around 7:50 in the morning, Jose together with other meat
vendors went out of their stalls to meet a jeepney loaded with
slaughtered pigs in order to select the meat they would sell for the
day. Jose was the very first to reach the parked jeepney. Grasping
the handlebars at the rear entrance of the vehicle, and as he was
about to raise his right foot to get inside, Jose suddenly stiffened
and trembled as though suffering from an epileptic seizure. Romeo
Pimienta who saw Jose thought he was merely joking but noticed
almost in disbelief that he was already turning black. In no time the
other vendors rushed to Jose and they discovered that the antenna
of the jeepney bearing the pigs had gotten entangled with an open
electric wire at the top of the roof of a meat stall. Pimienta quickly
got hold of a broom and pried the antenna loose from the open
wire. But shortly after, Jose released his hold on the handlebars of
the jeep only to slump to the ground. He died shortly in the
hospital..
2. Defendant’s claim
It averred that it was third-party defendant Canave's fault or
negligence which was the proximate and sole cause, or at least the
principal cause, of the electrocution and death of Jose Bernardo.
1. Case filed- action for damages
2. RTC Ruling- the trial court ruled in favor of the Bernardos and
3. CA – affirming with modification the decision of the RTC
4. SC
Yes.
There is no question that as an electric cooperative holding the
exclusive franchise in supplying electric power to the towns of
Benguet province, its primordial concern is not only to distribute
electricity to its subscribers but also to ensure the safety of the
public by the proper maintenance and upkeep of its facilities. It is
clear to us then that BENECO was grossly negligent in leaving
unprotected and uninsulated the splicing point between the service
drop line and the service entrance conductor, which connection was
only eight (8) feet from the ground level, in violation of the
Philippine Electrical Code. BENECO's contention that the accident
happened only on January 14, 1985, around seven (7) years after
the open wire was found existing in 1978, far from mitigating its
culpability, betrays its gross neglect in performing its duty to the
public. By leaving an open live wire unattended for years, BENECO
demonstrated its utter disregard for the safety of the public. Indeed,
Jose Bernardo's death was an accident that was bound to happen
in view of the gross negligence of BENECO.
BENECO theorizes in its defense that the death of Jose Bernardo
could be attributed to the negligence of Canave, Jr., in parking his
jeepney so close to the market stall which was neither a parking
area nor a loading area, with his antenna so high as to get
entangled with an open wire above the Dimasupil
store. But this line of defense must be discarded. Canave was well
within his right to park the vehicle in the said area where there was
no showing that any municipal law or ordinance was violated nor
that there was any foreseeable danger posed by his act. One thing
however is sure, no accident would have happened had BENECO
installed the connections in accordance with the prescribed vertical
clearance of fifteen (15) feet.
46. ELIAS S. CIPRIANO and/or E.S. CIPRIANO ENTERPRISES, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MACLIN ELECTRONICS, INC.,  reimbursement for the value of the Kia Pride. In reply, petitioner denied liability
G.R. No. 107968 October 30, 1996
D. Parties
a) Plaintiff/Complainant with Background, position title, occupation
Elias S. Cipriano is the owner of E.S. Cipriano Enterprises, which is
engaged in the rustproofing of vehicles
b) Defendant
Maclin Electronics, Inc.,- customer who brought a car for
rustproofing
E. Facts
Petitioner Elias S. Cipriano is the owner of E.S. Cipriano Enterprises, which is
engaged in the rustproofing of vehicles, under the style Mobilkote. On April 30,
1991, private respondent Maclin Electronics, Inc., through an employee,
brought a 1990 model Kia Pride People's car to petitioner's shop for
rustproofing. The car had been purchased the year before the Integrated Auto
Sales, Inc. for P252,155.00.
3
The vehicle was received in the shop under Job Order No. 123581,   which
showed the date it was received for rustproofing as well its condition at the time.
Neither the time of acceptance nor the hour of release, however, was specified.
According to the petitioner, the car was brought to his shop at 10 o'clock in the
morning of April 30, 1991 and was ready for release later that afternoon, as it
took only six hours to complete the process of rustproofing.
In the afternoon of May 1, 1991, fire broke out at the Lambat restaurant, which
petitioner also owned, adjoining his Mobilkote rustproofing shop. The fire
destroyed both the shop and the restaurant, including private respondent's Kia
Pride. The car had been kept inside the building, allegedly to protect it from
theft. Petitioner claimed that despite efforts to save the vehicle, there was
simply not enough time to get it out of the building, unlike three other cars which
had been saved because they were parked near the entrance of the garage. 4
On May 8, 1991, private respondent sent a letter to petitioner, demanding
on the ground that the fire was a fortuitous event. This prompted private
respondent to bring this suit for the value of its vehicle and for damages against
petitioner.
F. Allegations
3. Plaintiff’s Claim -
Petitioner invoked Art. 1174 of the Civil Code and denied liability for the loss
which he alleged was due to fortuitous event. He later testified that he employed
an electrician who regularly inspected the lighting in his restaurant and
rustproofing shop. In addition, he claimed he had installed fire-fighting devices
and that the fire was an accident entirely independent of his will and devoid of
any negligence on his part. He further averred that private respondent's car was
ready for release as early as afternoon of April 30, 1991 and that it was private
respondent's delay in claiming it that was the cause of the loss.
Petitioner explained that rustproofing involved spraying asphalt-like materials
underneath a motor vehicle so that rust will not corrode its body and that the
materials and chemicals used for this purpose are not inflammable. Therefore,
he could not be made to assume the risk of loss due to fire. He also claimed
that he was not required to register his business with the Department of Trade
and Industry, because he was not covered by P.D. No. 1572.
4. Defendants defense or counterclaim
private respondent argued that petitioner was liable for the loss of the car even
if it was caused by a fortuitous event. It contended that the nature of petitioner's
business required him to assume the risk because under P.D. No. 1572,
petitioner was required to insure his property as well as those of his customers.
G. Issue
whether petitioner was required to insure his business and the vehicles received
by him in the course of his business and, if so, whether his failure to do so
constituted negligence, rendering him liable for loss due to the risk required to
be insured againstProcedural History
g. RTC Ruling
The trial court sustained the private respondent's contention that the "failure of
defendant to comply with P.D. No. 1572 is in effect a manifest act of negligence
which renders defendants [petitioner herein] liable for the loss of the car even if
the same was caused by fire," 6 even as it ruled that the business of
rustproofing is "definitely covered" P.D. No. 1572. Since petitioner did not
register his business and insure it, he must bear the cost of loss of his
customers. As already noted, the court ordered petitioner to pay private
respondent P252,155.00 with interest at 6% per annum  from the filing of the
case and attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00.
recoverable damages in the judgment of the court. Since in this case there is no
justification for the award of attorney's fees in the decision of the trial court, it
was error for the Court of Appeals to sustain such award.
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated November 18, 1992, of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the award of attorney's fees is
DELETED.

h. CA Ruling

On Appeal, the decision was affirmed.

i. SC Ruling

The contention of the petitioner is without merit. The SC hold that both
questions must be answered in the affirmative.

Thus, P.D. No. 1572, §1 requires service and repair enterprises for motor
vehicles, like that petitioner's, to register with Department of Trade and Industry.
As condition for such registration or accreditation, Ministry Order No. 32
requires covered enterprises to secure insurance coverage. Rule III of this
Order provides in pertinent parts: 12

The insurance policy of the following risks like theft, pilferage, fire, flood and
loss should cover exclusively the machines, motor vehicles, heavy equipment,
engines, electronics, electrical airconditioners, refrigerators, office machines
and data processing equipment, medical and dental equipment, other
consumer mechanical and industrial equipment stored for repair and/or service
in the premises of the applicant.

There is thus a statutory duty imposed on petitioner and it is for his failure to
comply with this duty that he was guilty or negligence rendering him liable for
damages to private respondent. While the fire in this case may be considered a
fortuitous event, 13 this circumstance cannot exempt petitioner from liability for
loss.

We think, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the award of
attorney's fees by the lower court. The reason for this is that it is not sound
policy to penalize the right to litigate. It can not simply be inserted as an item of