Table of Contents

FIR : First Information Report – Section 154

CrPC....................................................................1
Purpose and Object of FIR..................................2
Evidentiary value of a First Information Report. 3
Section 157 of the Evidence Act.........................3
Pandurang Chandrakant Mhatre v. State of
Maharashtra.........................................................6
Uses of FIR, which are non-confessional in
nature, for evidentiary purposes..........................6
FIR as substantive evidence................................7
CASE LAWS.......................................................9
FIR : First Information Report – Section 154 CrPC

An information given under sub-section (1) of section 154 CrPC is commonly

known as first information report (FIR) though this term is not used in the
Criminal Procedure Code (in short CrPC).

It is the earliest and the first information of a cognizable offence recorded by

an officer-in-charge of a police station. It sets the criminal law in motion and
marks the commencement of the investigation which ends up with the
formation of opinion under section 169 or 170 CrPC, as the case may be, and
forwarding of a police report under section 173 CrPC. It is quite possible and it
happens not infrequently that more information than one are given to a police
officer-in-charge of a police station in respect of the same incident involving
one or more than one cognizable offences.

In such a case he need not enter every one of them in the station house diary
and this is implied in section 154 CrPC. Apart from a vague information by a
phone call, the information first entered in the station house diary, kept for
this purpose, by a police officer-in-charge of a police station is the first
information report- FIR postulated by section 154 CrPC. All other information
made orally or in writing after the commencement of the investigation into the
cognizable offence disclosed from the facts mentioned in the first information
report and entered in the station house diary by the police officer or such
other cognizable offences as may come to his notice during the investigation,
will be statements falling under section 162 CrPC. No such
information/statement can properly be treated as an FIR and entered in the
station house diary again, as it would in effect be a second FIR and the same
cannot be in conformity with the scheme of CrPC
 
Purpose and Object of FIR

The purpose of registration of FIR is manifold that is to say

(1) To reduce the substance of information disclosing commission of a
cognizable offence, if given orally, into writing.
(2) If given in writing to have it signed by the complainant.
(3) To maintain record of receipt of information as regards commission of
cognizable offences.
(4) To initiate investigation on receipt of information as regards commission of
cognizable offence.
(5) To inform Magistrate forthwith of the factum of the information received
Evidentiary value of a First Information Report

The statements made to the police are if three categories- a) A statement

which has been recorded as an First Information Report ( herein after referred
to as FIR) b) statement recorded by the police in the course of investigation c)a
statement recorded by the police but not falling under the above (a) and (b)
category.

None of the above statements can be considered as substantive evidence, that

is to say, as evidence of facts stated therein. Because it is not made during
trial, it is not given on oath, nor is it tested by cross- examination. If the person
making any such statement to the police subsequently appears and gives
evidence in court at the time of trial, his former statement could , however be
used to corroborate or to contradict his testimony according to the provisions
of the Evidence Act, 1872.

Section 157 of the Evidence Act is as follows:

“In order to corroborate the testimony of a witness, any former statement
made by such a witness relating to the same fact, at or about the time when
the offence took place, or before any authority legally competent to
investigate the fact may be proved.”

Further, Section 145 of the Evidence Act provides:

“A witness may be crossed-examined as to previous statements made by him

in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without
such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but if it is intended to
contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before writing can be proved,
be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of
contradicting him.”

These normal rules of making previous statements have been substantially

modified in respect of statements falling under category (b) above.

Further, it may be noted that if any statement made to a police amounts to a

confession, such a confession cannot be proved against a person accused of
any offence. However, this bar on proof of confession made to a police officer
is partially lifted by Section 27 of the Evidence Act which provides:
“… When any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information
received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police
officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or
not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.”

The FIR is not substantive evidence, but it can be used to corroborate the
informant under Section 157 of the Evidence Act, or to contradict him under
Section 145 of the Act, if the informant is called as a witness at the time of
trial. Obviously, the FIR cannot be used for the purposes of corroborating or
contradicting any witness other than the one lodging the FIR.

The FIR can have better corroborative value if it is recorded before there is
time and opportunity to embellish or before the informant’s memory fails.
Undue or unreasonable delay in lodging the FIR therefore, inevitably gives rise
to suspicion which puts the court on guard to look for the possible motive and
the explanation and consider its effect on the trustworthiness or otherwise of
the prosecution version. The fact that the FIR does not contain the names of
the accused or of the eyewitnesses, is normally an important circumstance, but
the omission loses its significance if the FIR is from a person other than an
eyewitness.

If the FIR is given to the police by the accused himself, it cannot possibly be
used either for corroboration or contradiction because the accused cannot be
a prosecution witness, and he would very rarely offer himself to be a defense
witness under section 315 of the code. Moreover, if the FIR is of a confessional
nature it cannot be proved against the accused informant, because according
to Section 25 of the Evidence Act, no confession made to a police officer can be
proved as against a person accused of any offence. But it might become
relevant under section 8 of the Evidence Act as to his conduct. If FIR given by
thee accused person is non- confessional, it may be admissible in evidence
against the accused as an admission under section 21 of the Evidence Act, or
again, as showing his conduct under section 8 of the Evidence Act.

Though, generally speaking the content of an FIR can be used only to

contradict or corroborate the maker thereof, there may be cases where the
content becomes relevant and can be put to some other use also. Omission of
important facts affecting the probabilities of the case, are relevant in judging
the veracity of the prosecution case.
The Supreme Court has observed on the said subject matter, stating that “the
first information report gives information of the commission of a cognizable
crime. It may be made by the complainant or by any other person knowing
about the commission of such offence. It is intended to set the criminal law in
motion. Any information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence is
required to be reduced to writing by the officer in charge of the police station
which has to be signed by the person giving it and the substance thereof is
required to be entered into a book kept by such officer in such form as the
State Government may prescribe. It cannot be used as evidence against the
person making it, if in case, he himself is accused in the matter, neither to
corroborate or contradict other witnesses. It is not the requirement of law that
the minutest details be recorded in the Fir lodged immediately after the
occurrence. The fact of the state of mental agony of the person making who
generally is the victim himself , If not dead, or the relations or associates of the
deceased victim apparent under the shock of the occurrence reported has
always to be kept in mind.”

The FIR is the first version of the incident as received by the police. The
statements in the FIR must naturally get their due weight. An FIR is not a
substantive piece of evidence. The Court has to consider other evidence for
deciding whether a case should stand or fall. An FIR, being not a substantive
evidence, it can be used as a previous statement for the purposes of either
corroborating its makers or for contradicting him. The statement of a victim of
rape in cross- examination which was not there in the FIR could not be used for
contradicting her.

FIR is not an encyclopedia. It is only to set the law in motion. It need not
elaborate but should contain necessary allegations to constitute cognizable
offences. As per section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code, stating the use of
FIR, “a FIR is not a substantial piece of evidence. It can only be used for
corroborating or contradicting its maker. It cannot be used to corroborate or
contradict other witnesses…” Further," corroboration of its maker is
permissible, but the first information report cannot be used as substantive
evidence or corroborating a statement of third party…”The fact that a minute
details are not mentioned should not be taken to mean the non- existence of
the fact stated. An FIR was made by close relatives of the deceased. Its
reliability was not allowed to be doubted on the ground that it was highly
improbable that a close relative would leave the victim in a hospital and would
himself go to the police station, particularly so when other relatives had also
arrived at the hospital. There was no delay in recording the FIR and sending the
challanto the court. Absence of the names of the accused in the inquest report
was of no value because the investigating officer and the officer conducting
inquest were not questioned on that point.

Pandurang Chandrakant Mhatre v. State of Maharashtra

It was held, that it is fairly well settled that first information report is not a
substantive piece of evidence and it can be used only to discredit the
testimony of the maker thereof and it cannot be utilised for contradicting or
discrediting the testimony of other witnesses. Although first information report
is not expected to be encyclopaedia of events, but an information to the police
to be “first information report” under Section 154(1) must contain some
essential and relevant details of the incident. A cryptic information about
commission of a cognizable offence irrespective of the nature and details of
such information may not be treated as an FIR. An FIR recorded without any
loss of time is likely to be free from embroideries, exaggerations and without
anybody intermeddling with it and polluting and adulterating the same with
lies. The purpose of, FIR is to obtain the earliest account of a cognizable
offence, before there is an opportunity for the circumstances to be forgotten
and embellished. It is well settled that FIR is not a substantive piece of
evidence and can be used to corroborate or contradict the statement of the
maker thereof. It is also equally established that trustworthiness of the
prosecution story can also be judged from the FIR. Besides first information
report is relevant as it may be a part of the res gestae.

For the purpose of summoning someone mentioned in a FIR but has not been
charge sheeted, the FIR can be taken into consideration because it is evidence
at that stage. Where an FIR is registered on the basis of a written complaint
submitted to the police and there was no mention of the presence of some
persons as eye- witnesses in it, it was held that the presence of those eye-
witnesses was rightly disbelieved.

As already said, the FIR is not substantive evidence; however its importance as
conveying the earliest information regarding the occurrence of a crime cannot
be disputed. Moreover, it can be used to corroborate the informant under
Section 157 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872, or contradict the witness under
Section 145 of the same Act if the informant is called as a witness in the trial.

Uses of FIR, which are non-confessional in nature, for evidentiary purposes :

1. For corroboration purposes: It cannot be ignored altogether and can be used
to corroborate the statement of the eyewitnesses.
2. For contradicting the evidence of person giving the information.
3. For proving as an admission against the informer.
4. For refreshing informer’s memory.
5. For impeaching the credit of an informer.
6. For proving informer’s conduct.
7. For establishing identity of accused, witnesses & for fixing spot time as
relevant facts under Section 9, the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Moreover, FIR can even become substantial evidence in following

circumstances:1. During declaration when a person deposing about the cause
of his death had died (that is, a dying declaration). In such case FIR will become
admissible under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

2. When the injuries are being caused in the presence of Station House officer
in a police station and the injured makes a statement to the SHO saying that
accused was injuring him.

3. When the informer who has written the FIR or read it, fails to recall memory
those facts but is, sure that the facts were correctly represented in FIR at the
time he wrote it or read it.

FIR as substantive evidence

Machchi Singh v. State of Punjab,
CITATION: AIR 1983 SC 957:1983 Cr LJ 1457

Facts:
A feud between two families has resulted in tragic consequences. Seventeen
lives were lost in the course of a series of five incidents which occurred in quick
succession in five different villages, situated in the vicinity of each other, in
Punjab, on the night between August 12 and August 13, 1977. The seventeen
persons who lost their lives and the three who sustained injuries included men,
women and children related to one Amar Singh and his sister PiaroBai. In this
connection one Machhi Singh and his eleven companions, close relatives and
associates were prosecuted in five sessions cases, each pertaining to the
concerned village in which the killings took place. Machhi Singh was the
common accused at each trial. The composition of his co- accused differed
number-wise and identity-wise from trial to trial. At the conclusion of the
series of trials, the accused found guilty were convicted under appropriate
provisions. Four of them were awarded death sentence, whereas sentence of
life imprisonment was imposed on nine of them. They were also convicted for
different offences and appropriate punishment was inflicted on each of them
in that behalf. The order of conviction and sentence gave rise to five murder
references and fourteen appeals by the convicts before the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana. Having lost their appeals and the death sentences having
been con-firmed, the appellants have come in appeal by way of special leave.

Issues:
(a) What normal guidelines are to be followed so as to identify the "rarest of
rare cases" formula for imposing death sentence, as spelled out in Bachan
Singh v. State of Punjab, [1980] 2 SCR 864;

(b) Reliability of eye witnesses to a crime under light shed by the lantern in a
village to identify connect an accused to the crime;

(c) invocation of the doctrine of benefit of doubt; and

(d) the effect of non-summoning the magistrate for recording Dying

declaration.

Judgment On Issue:
The order of conviction (passed by the Sessions Court and affirmed by the High
Court) is inter-alia based on the dying declaration of Mukhtiar Singh. He was
fired at and injured soon after midnight in the early morning of August.

He was removed to hospital on that very day. His police statement (which has
been subsequently treated as a dying declaration) was recorded on the 16th
i.e. three days after the assault. He died on the 18th, two days later. The
evidence shows that he was in fit condition to make a statement and his
statement was truly and faithfully recorded. His statement has been
considered to be genuine and true by the Sessions Court and the High Court. It
is true that the dying declaration has not been recorded by a magistrate. But
then the evidence shows that Mukhtiar Singh was making good recovery and
having regard to the condition of his health, no danger to his life was
apprehended. It was in this situation that a magistrate was not summoned.
Thus, no fault can be legitimately found on this score. Besides, the only
question of importance now is as regards the creditworthiness of the
statement which has been recorded. Since this statement has been found to
be genuine and true nothing can detract from its value. The evidence provided
by the dying declaration is by itself good enough to support the order of
conviction. But this is not all. Also available is the evidence of Ujagar Singh and
his daughter-in-law, Munibai. The evidence of these two witnesses lends full
corroboration to the dying declaration of the victim, and has been rightly relied
upon by the Sessions Court and the High Court. There is no reason to view the
evidence doubtfully. The presence of these two witnesses in the household
was natural. Their evidence shows that on hearing the report of gun they had
concealed themselves behind a herd of cattle and had witnessed the incident
from there. The Supreme Court had no reason to disagree with the view of the
Sessions Court and the High Court that their evidence is reliable. There is no
substance in the argument that the culprits could not have been identified as
the light shed by the lantern was not adequate to enable identification. The
finding of guilt is thus fully supported by evidence. The Supreme Court
accordingly confirmed the same unhesitatingly.

CASE LAWS

# KantilalShivabhaiThakkar v. State of Gujrat, 1990 Cri LJ 2500

# Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 119
# BijoySingh v. State of Bihar, AIR 2002 SC 1949
# Kalyan v. State of U.P, (2001) 9 SCC 632
# KanikLalthakur v. State of Bihar, 2003 CrJL 375 (Pat)
# Utpal Das v. State of W.B., AIR 2010 Sc 1894
# Baldev Sings vs. State of Punjab – (1990) 4 SCC 692 ; State of Gujarat vs.
Anirudhsing – (1997) 6 SCC 514.
# State of M.P. vs. Surbhan – AIR 1996 SC 3345.
# Dharmendra Singh v. State of U.P, 1998 Cr.LJ 3889
# Hem Raj v. Raja Ram, AIR 2004 SC 1489
# (2009) 10 SCC 773
# Gulshan Kumar v. State, ILR (1993) 2 Del 168
# Sivrani v. Suryananrain, 1994 CrLJ 2026 (All.)
# BhimappaJinnappaNaganur v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1993 SC 1469
# Anonymous, “Feature: First Information Report”,
# Anonymous, “Feature: First Information Report”,
# Lalaram, (1953) MB 343; Machchi Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC
957:1983 Cr LJ 1457