Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Combustible Liquids
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON
Operations (FLC‐OPS)
Attendees
Guests:
John Cignatta Datanet Engineering, Inc.
Scott Ayers CPSC
Ruby Evans FM Global
Jeff Wanko OSHA
Agenda
1. Call to Order. Peter Willse, Chair, called the meeting to order at 1:00 P.M.
2. Introductions. Lisa Hartman, Staff Liaison, took attendance. No changes in the technical
committee were noted.
3. Approval of Minutes. The Second Draft Meeting minutes from Wednesday, June 22, 2016,
were approved.
4. Report of Committee Chair. Nothing new to report.
5. Staff Updates. L. Hartman provided a brief overview of the NFPA process and the Annual
2020 revision cycle schedule.
6. New Business
• 17.12 Explosion Control (Reserved)
Notes: Consider developing material/point to or extract material from NFPA 68.
Consider moving section 17.6 material to 17.12.
Action: TC member to submit PI
B) FLC-FUN Task group on NFPA 30 flammable liquid classification system (e.g. base on
flash point)
• Task Group Chair: David Nugent (david.nugent@globalriskconsultants.com)
• Task Group Members on behalf of FLC-OPS: Bob Benedetti, Dwight Havens
Dates for TC
Process Stage Process Step Dates for TC with CC
Public Input Closing Date* 6/27/2018 6/27/2018
Final Date for TC First Draft Meeting 12/05/2018 9/05/2018
Posting of First Draft and TC Ballot 1/23/2019 10/17/2018
Final date for Receipt of TC First Draft ballot 2/13/2019 11/07/2018
Final date for Receipt of TC First Draft ballot ‐ recirc 2/20/2019 11/14/2018
Public Input
Posting of First Draft for CC Meeting 11/21/2018
Stage (First Draft)
Final date for CC First Draft Meeting 1/02/2019
Posting of First Draft and CC Ballot 1/23/2019
Final date for Receipt of CC First Draft ballot 2/13/2019
Final date for Receipt of CC First Draft ballot ‐ recirc 2/20/2019
Post First Draft Report for Public Comment 2/27/2019 2/27/2019
Tech Session Association Meeting for Standards with CAMs 6/17/2020 6/17/2020
Appeals and Appeal Closing Date for Standards with CAMs 7/08/2020 7/08/2020
Issuance SC Issuance Date for Standards with CAMs 8/14/2020 8/14/2020
Public Input No. 128-NFPA 30-2018 [ Section No. 17.6.13 [Excluding any Sub-Sections] ]
Indoor areas where Class IA Class IA , or unstable liquids , or other liquids that are heated to or above their atmospheric boiling point are in use shall be
designed to direct flame, combustion gases, and pressures resulting from a deflagration away from important buildings or occupied areas through the use of
damage-limiting construction in accordance with NFPA 68 NFPA 68 .
Defining the conditions within a process that create the potential for an explosion hazard in a building/room is complicated and dependent on many things
such as fuel condition, process conditions, equipment arrangement, ambient conditions, and available ventilation. The criteria originally in NFPA 30 targets
the status of the fuel in use, i.e., a low boiling point liquid will potentially produce a large quantity of flammable vapor at normal conditions because of its
low boiling point. A similar fuel condition exists if any liquid is processed at or above its atmospheric boiling point. Any containment failure above the liquid
level will relatively quickly produce a large quantity of flammable vapor within a building or room.
Building/room explosion hazards are not a frequent event however they do occur and in some cases can produce scenarios that extend beyond the
building/room of origin (CAI / Arnel Chemical Plant Explosion in Danvers, MA – CSB Investigation). There are many processes that handle liquids at or
above their atmospheric boiling point. These processes produce an inherent potential for creating a large quantity of flammable vapor quickly that if ignited
will result in severe room/building damage.
17.6.13 Indoor areas where Class IA, or unstable liquids, or other liquids that are heated to or
above their atmospheric boiling point are in use shall be designed to direct flame, combustion
gases, and pressures resulting from a deflagration away from important buildings or occupied
areas through the use of damage-limiting construction in accordance with NFPA 68.
17.6.13.2 Where unstable liquids are in use, an approved engineered construction method that is
designed to limit damage from an explosion (deflagration or detonation, depending on the
characteristics of the liquid ) shall be used.
Justification:
Defining the conditions within a process that create the potential for an explosion hazard in a
building/room is complicated and dependent on many things such as fuel condition, process
conditions, equipment arrangement, ambient conditions, and available ventilation. The criteria
originally in NFPA 30 targets the status of the fuel in use, i.e., a low boiling point liquid will
potentially produce a large quantity of flammable vapor at normal conditions because of its low
boiling point. A similar fuel condition exists if any liquid is processed at or above its
atmospheric boiling point. Any containment failure above the liquid level will relatively quickly
produce a large quantity of flammable vapor within a building or room.
Building/room explosion hazards are not a frequent event however they do occur and in some
cases can produce scenarios that extend beyond the building/room of origin (CAI / Arnel
Chemical Plant Explosion in Danvers, MA – CSB Investigation). There are many processes that
handle liquids at or above their atmospheric boiling point. These processes produce an inherent
potential for creating a large quantity of flammable vapor quickly that if ignited will result in
severe room/building damage.
17.11.9
Local or spot ventilation to control special fire or health hazards, if provided, shall be permitted to be utilized for up to 75 percent 50 percent of
the required ventilation.
As was discussed during the March 14, 2018 FLC-OPS Pre-First Draft Meeting, the existing allowance for up to 75% local ventilation in lieu of low-level
mechanical exhaust ventilation was based on subjective reasoning. Local exhaust ventilation can be very effective when it is properly designed,
maintained and utilized. However, in many cases, such as with flexible suction point ventilation assemblies, operations personnel don’t always effectively
utilize local ventilation.
This proposal will ensure that at least .5 cfm/ft2 (.15 M3 / M2) low level mechanical ventilation is provided in areas where flammable liquids are openly
transferred thus reducing the likelihood of accumulation of flammable vapors in concentrations potentially approaching their lower flammable limit.
17.11.11
The mechanical ventilation system for processig areas shall be equipped with an airflow switch or other equally reliable method that is
interlocked
This is to include requirements similar to 18.6 into the ventilation requirements for Processing Areas.
flame, combustion gases, and pressures resulting from a deflagration away from important buildings or occupied areas through the use of
damage-limiting construction in accordance with NFPA 68 or explosion prevention methods in NFPA 69.
17.12.2 The damage-limiting construction design shall be in accordance with recognized standards and shall be acceptable to the authority
having jurisdiction. (See A.9.16.1.)
17.12.3 Where unstable liquids are in use, an approved engineered construction method that is designed to limit damage from an explosion
(deflagration or detonation, depending on the characteristics of the liquid) shall be used.
Moves explosion control requirements in Chapter 17 from Construction (17.6.13) to appropriate reserved Section (17.12). While the proposed 17.12.1
makes general reference to NFPA 68, specific extracts from this document may be appropriate based on TC review.
18.6.5.1
The mechanical ventilation system for dispensing areas shall be equipped with an airflow switch or other equally reliable method that is
interlocked to sound an audible alarm upon failure of the ventilation system. Dispensing operations shall immediately be stopped upon loss or
failure of the ventilaton system.
Section 18.6 provides a number of important engineering and operational controls to ensure the ventilation Basis of Safety is provided and maintained
during the dispensing of flammable (and heated combustible liquid) operations. While Section 18.6.5.1 requires the installation and initiation of an alarm
in the event of ventilation failure, there is no requirement to cease dispensing operations. This is proposed with the Public Input.
A.17.4.3
Minimum distances provided in Table 17.4.3 are extracts from similar tables in Chapter 22. Process vessels are at greater risk of upset and
experience a wider range of process parameters (e.g., flow, temperature, pressure, level, reactivity, vapor density, and potential for vapors to
reach ignition sources if released) when compared to storage tanks. Evaluations for minimum distance should take these factors into account
and establish the “stability” of the material and the maximum pressure in the vessel(s), taking into consideration credible process deviations and
the design and reliability of safeguards that prevent or control process upsets. Minimum distances to property lines, important buildings, and
public ways should consider the risk (i.e., likelihood and consequence) to persons, property, and adjacent processes and storage from vapor
cloud ignition, blast overpressure, and thermal flux (i.e., burn injury and adjacent structure fire). See also 17.15.3.
Additional guidance can be found in the following documents:
(1) NFPA 497, Recommended Practice for the Classification of Flammable Liquids, Gases, or Vapors and of Hazardous (Classified) Locations
for Electrical Installations in Chemical Process Areas
(2) NFPA 551, Guide for the Evaluation of Fire Risk Assessments
(3) AIChE Guidelines for Evaluating Process Plant Buildings for External Explosions and Fires
(4) AIChE Guidelines for Facility Siting and Layout
(5) AIChE Guidelines for Vapor Cloud Explosion, Pressure Vessel Burst, BLEVE and Flash Fire Hazards
(6) SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering
(7) SFPE Engineering Standard on Calculating Fire Exposures to Structures
(8) SFPE Engineering Standard on Calculation Methods to Predict the Thermal Performance of Structural and Fire Resistive Assemblies
(9) SFPE Engineering Guide: Predicting 1st and 2nd Degree Skin Burns from Thermal Radiation
(10) SFPE Engineering Guide to Fire Exposures to Structural Elements
(11) SFPE Engineering Guide: Assessing Flame Radiation to External Targets from Pool Fires
(12) SFPE Engineering Guide to Fire Risk Assemssement
(13) API RP 500, Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations at Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class I,
Division 1 and Division 2
(14) ANSI/API RP 505, Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations at Petroleum Facilities Classified as
Class I, Zone 0, Zone 1 and Zone 2
(15) API RP 752, Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Buildings
(16) API RP 753, Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Portable Buildings
The SFPE Standard on Calculation Methods to Predict the Thermal Performance of Structural and Fire Resistive Assemblies provides a methodology on
how to calculate the heat transfer to the structure that is part of the analysis described in Section A.17.4.3. The SFPE Guide to Fire Risk Assessment
provides a methodology on how to perform a fire risk assessment that is described in A.17.4.3.
A.17.10.2
This might require liquid drainage floor assemblies, curbs, scuppers, or special drainage systems to control the spread of fire. Annex A of
NFPA 15 provides information on this subject.
Liquid drainage floor assemblies may be used as an alternative to other listed containment and/or drainage systems.