Valerie Lopez

1 P.O. Box 291133

Phelan, California
2
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
3
COUNTY OF ORANGE
4 LIMITED CIVIL DIVISION

5 ) Case Number: 30-2015-00806367

)
6 Oaktree Investments, Inc., ) Related appeal 30-2015-00822162
PLAINTIFF )
7 ) DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S
vs. ) OPPOSITION AND DECLARATION OF IN
8 )
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO BE
)
9 ) RESTORED TO POSSESSION OF THE
Valerie A. Lopez ) PREMISES LOST TO ERRONEOUS
10 ) JUDGMENT REVERSED ON APPEAL;
DEFENDANT IN ERROR ) REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE #2 AND
11 )
WRITTEN OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF’S
)
12 ) (Code of Civil Procedure §908)
)
13 ) COURT ROOM NUMBER 66
) DATE : April 16, 2020
14 ) TIME: 1:30 P.M.
) [Continued Due to COVID-19 STATE OF
15 ) EMERGENCY]
)
16 )
)
17 COMES NOW, DEFENDANTS REPLY to PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION to DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO BE RESTORED TO POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES, AS FOLLOWS:
18

19
I. INTRODUCTION
20
To the court & attorneys of record defendant, (LOPEZ) submits this rebuttal to Plaintiff’s
21
opposition to Lopez’s Motion to be Restored to Possession of the Premises. Lopez currently
22
holds title, right of possession and ownership of her home:158 Center Street Orange
23
California when Appellant Division reversed the VOID judgment on 9/21/2018. The
24
Appellant division saw the through the fraud perpetrated on the court. Plaintiff & their
25 attorney anticipated that the Appellate Division would deny the appeal and sold Lopez’s at
26 their own risk to their co-conspirator John Leldon Gray J.D. Plaintiff & John Leldon Gray
27
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28 _____________________________________________________________________________
Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to be Restored of Premises
 1 J.D. knew the risk due to the pending appeal and chose to exercise a risky sale. The

2 judgment, writ of possession and Grant Deed issued to Plaintiff & John Leldon Gray J.D. are

3 VOID ab initio. The Appellate Division affirmed that Lopez was victim to a Wrongful

4 Foreclosure; Void Deed of Trust; Void Assignment. The effects of the Appellate Division’s

decision restored Lopez with her original right of possession, title and ownership of her home
5
per CCP § 2924f(b)(8)(A) & CC Section 2888. All that a trustee under a deed of trust has to
6
sell is an unproven mortgage lien, not title or ownership of the house. Plaintiff owners were
7
warned many times to cease and desist because the interloper trustee had no authority to
8
foreclosure. Lopez was not in default to an illegal contract; is a victim of identity theft; never
9
had rental agreement with Oaktree.
10
II. STATEMENT OF MISREPRESENTATION BY PLAINTIFF AND THEIR ATTORNEY
11
The plaintiff dismissed the case 30-2015-00806367 voluntarily on May 29, 2018 and not Lopez
12
in an effort to deprive the Court of Jurisdiction to render restitution of the wrongful eviction. It is obvious
13
that this dismissal of Plaintiff’s UD case was made on the opinion of the Appellate Division whose
14
findings are dispositive of the case. This dismissal was made after the Appellate court granted a fair trial
15
to Lopez. The Appellate decision is final and becomes res judicata: Wrongful Foreclosure; VOID Deed of
16
Trust; Void Assignment of Deed of Trust. Plaintiff’s dismissal affirmed the Appeal decision. Lopez has
17
been victimized by unfair treatment meted out to her by Oaktree—in misusing the unlawful detainer
18
action to illegal seize Lopez’s home and using unfair tactics in this litigation –by erroneous decisions of
19
the trial court—and now by the Plaintiff’s arguments to this court which are disingenuous i.e. telling court
20
that Lopez dismissed the case.
21 Lopez submits: Written Objection to Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice, a supplemental
22 Request of Judicial Notice and a declaration to support her Motion which is to be heard on April 16, 2020
23 in Courtroom 66 at 1:30. The hearing has been continued due to Emergency COVID 19 virus.
24 Continuation date is pending.

25 Lopez recorded document approved by County of Orange County Counsel recorded on

26 12/9/2014 2014000529588 giving notice of Lopez’s interest in property which disclosed the VOID Deed

27
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28 _____________________________________________________________________________
Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to be Restored of Premises
 1 of Trust recorded 11/6/2005 200500898975. Doc. 2014000529588 gave notice of Lopez’s 7/23/2011

2 rescission of VOID Deed of Trust after defaulting respondents who chose not to explain illegal note.

3 Lopez exercised her right to demand proof of beneficiary ownership of note pursuant to California

4 Commercial Code§ 3-501(b)(2). A solution to illegal note is required.

5 III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

6 Doan Tran Dang, owner of Plaintiff was Noticed and warned at the 8/18/15 illegal auction to not

7 interfere with the pending administrative proceedings between Lopez and interloping trustee. At the

8 illegal auction, Dang was handed a copy of the Cease and Desist- Federal Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”)

9 notice dated 8/3/2015 issued to interloper trustee. The notice outlined the illegal acts of interloper trustee.

10 On 8/21/2015, Dang called Lopez’s attorney Charles Marshall and requested that Marshall assist

11 Dang get her money back. Dang realized she incurred a worthless lien. Dang refused to explain why she

decided to take part in an illegal auction and why should Lopez now pay for Dang’s error.
12
Unfair tactics were used in this litigation to obtain erroneous decisions of the trial court i.e. 1.
13
Plaintiff’s attorney supervising “gutter service” as exposed at unstipulated hearing 9/25/2015
14
administered illegally by Commissioner Luege who refused to recuse herself on 9/23/15. Silverstein’
15
gutter service is public knowledge and verified by street cameras; 2. Russell Bradford submitted his
16
investigative report on 12/21/15 to Judge Stafford affirming Dang never “verified” the complaint.
17
12/30/15, Dang affirmed to Lopez & other witnesses that she never verified the complaint. Dang stated, “I
18
let Silverstein handle it”. 3. “On Second Thought” Public Television interview with Valerie Lopez &
19
Steve Halsted ex-client of Steve Silverstein confirming unethical practices in UD by Steve Silverstein.
20
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WsFuirz7wQI&t=15s
21 On 3/3/16 , Lopez filed case 30-2016-00838694 – an Independent Action in Equity based on
22 fraud on the court to cancel the writ of possession, erroneous judgment, and obtain a TRO against
23 Plaintiff. Lopez’s effort to get a TRO was futile due to prejudice, and bias from the magistrates. The same
24 facts were presented which secured Appeal win. Plaintiff removed the Lis Pendens with magistrate help.

25 On 5/5/2016, Valerie Lopez was threatened by Steve Silverstein at the courthouse, “ By the time

26 we are done with you, you will be living in your car permanently”.

27
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28 _____________________________________________________________________________
Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to be Restored of Premises
 IV. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1
1. On or about 8/18/15, Plaintiff purchased a VOID security lien and not the home of
2
Valerie Lopez - CCP Section 2924f(b)(8)(A) and CC Section 2888.
3
2. On or about 8/25/15, Plaintiff owners chose to subject Valerie Lopez to Civil Limited
4
Administrative proceedings. Plaintiff knew they had no ownership, title, or right of
5
possession due to illegal lien which they purchased but filed case 30-2015-008-06367.
6
3. On or about 10/15/15, Judge Stafford took the decision under submission.
7
4. 10/23/15, Judge Stafford granted a VOID writ of possession and judgment to
8
Plaintiff. 10/23/15, Judge Stafford ruled in favor of Plaintiff regardless that Judge Stafford
9
had no authority to issue judgment and writ - CCP section 1161a because of evident complex
10
title issue. Judge Stafford’s decision on 10/23/15 violated the higher law under which this
11 state enforces the embodiment of constitutional law, places such statute outside of the
12 authority of the state to control the activities of the citizens. Though citizens of the state, the
13 citizens are vested with certain inalienable rights under the Sovereign, of which California is
14 a part. Judgment Void because Luege refused to recuse on 9/23/15.

15 5. On or about 11/23/15, Valerie Lopez filed the appeal.

16 6. On or about 12/30/15, Plaintiff was forcibly evicted from her home on an illegal

17 judgment. Compulsory and punitive are incurred because of wrongful eviction.

18 7. On or about 12/31/2015, Lopez had a conversation with Doan Dang. Dang stated she

19 would deliver Lopez’s home back to Lopez if Valerie reimbursed Dang for lien.

8. On or about 1/10/16, Appraiser Lamar Banks completed an appraisal for Valerie

20
Lopez, and Valerie Lopez was able to secure required funds to pay Plaintiff’s owners.
21
9. On or about 1/16/16, Doan Tran Dang demanded from Lopez another $30,000 for her
22
attorney Steve Silverstein. Lopez and her investor refused to play into Dang’s extortion due
23
to public evidence of Dang’s possession of illegal judgment.
24
10. 12/9/16, Doan Tran Dang gave possession of Valerie Lopez’s home to John Leldon
25
Gray J.D., acting as trustee for his trust. John Leldon Gray J.D. is a co-conspirator and real
26

27
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Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to be Restored of Premises
 1 estate client of Doan Tran Dang. John Leldon Gray’s business Spearmint Rhino lap dance

2 enterprise is supported by the biggest banks.

3 11. 10/21/17, Lopez gave her oral arguments before the Appellate Panel.

4 12. 2/21/18 the remittitur was affirmed by the Appellate Division. The judgment was

reversed and remanded to the trial court for a fair trial to find “triable” factual issue: whether
5
Plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser of a property. Title, right of possession and ownership is
6
now held by Valerie Lopez per CCP Section 2924f(b)(8)(A) & CC Section 2888 with the
7
reversal of the void judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff’s 5/29/15 voluntary case dismissal
8
supports Lopez’s right to restitution as establishes the Appellate decision as final and res
9
judicata. The Appellate Division declared Lopez harmed by wrongful foreclosure &
10
wrongful eviction based on VOID Deed of Trust, Void Assignment. Lopez submits a
11
supplemental Request for Judicial Notice showing Exhibit #2 – lawful Grant Deed showing
12
Valerie Lopez holding superior title - the general rule for recording and lien priority is that
13
the first in time is first in right. Plaintiff’s Exhibit #1 Request for Judicial Notice is VOID ab
14 initio. Appeal decision deemed the Deed of Trust VOID, the assignment VOID, & reversed
15 the illegal judgment. John Leldon Gray’s J.D. Grant Deed is Void Ab initio.
16 13. On or about 5/23/18, trial was set for 6/23/18 by Judge Stafford so that the trial court
17 could determine a prevailing party and, if so, whether that party was Lopez or the Plaintiff.

18 14. On or about 5/29/18, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed case 30-2015-00806367. The

19 dismissal by the Plaintiff of the wrongful eviction was premised on Plaintiff and their co-

20 conspirator John Leldon Gray J.D. knew that they obtained illegal possession of Lopez’s

21 home while the matter was upon appeal.

22 15. It has been 1 year and 8 months since PLAINTIFF dismissal of case prior to the

6/23/18 trial. Plaintiff & John Leldon Gray J.D. knew that the Appeal was pending and chose
23
to assume the risk that if Lopez won the appeal, they would be subject to return the home to
24
Valerie Lopez. Ample notice was given to Plaintiff & John Leldon Gray J.D.: County land
25
records, Court Records, and mandatory California Association of Realtor disclosure -
26
Supplemental Statutory and Contractual Disclosures (SSCD) required for all transactions .
27
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Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to be Restored of Premises
 1 Doan Dang & John Leldon Gray J.D. were required to sign the SSCD disclosing the appeal

2 because if the judgment is reversed, the title, ownership and right of possession is reverted

3 back to Valerie Lopez. SSCD- Section 3H Are you seller aware if any of the following ?

4 Matters Affecting Title YES or NO SSCD- Section 3I Material facts or defects affecting the

Property not otherwise disclosed to the BUYER YES or NO.

5
16. Dang acted as John Leldon Gray’s real estate agent. John Leldon Gray J.D. claims to
6
own as real estate company – authenticated FACEBOOK
7
pagehttps://www.facebook.com/JGrayTandem. Both knew that by exercising the sale of
8
Lopez’s home that they each risked having to return Lopez’s home. This home was not an
9
owner occupied for the Plaintiff or John Leldon Gray J.D. John Leldon Gray J.D. resides at
10
11 Canyon Rim Newport Coast, CA 92657. Not returning Lopez her home would be
11
unfounded and inequitable because her home was forcibly taken by Plaintiff who knew their
12
judgment was illegal.
13
17. The voluntary dismissal of the case prior to the 6/23/18 trial was an admittance of
14 guilt and now the Appeal decision is final-res judicata (wrongful foreclosure and eviction;
15 VOID Deed of Trust; VOID Assignment) Cravens v. Bd. of Equalization (1997) 52
16 Cal.App.4th 253, 257-258; see also Hartbrodt v. Burke (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 168, 175.)
17
V. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
18
A. RESTORATION OF POSSESSION AFTER EXECUTION OF THE WRIT OF
19 POSSESSION IS PROPER
20 As a general rule, when a judgment is reversed on appeal, the appellant is entitled to

21 restitution for all things lost by reason of the judgment. (Levy v. Drew (1935) 4 Cal.2d 456,
459.) This principle is embodied in California statutory law and settled equitable principles.
22
(§ 908; Munoz v. MacMillan (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 648, 657-658 (Munoz).)Section 908
23 provides that, upon the reversal or modification of a judgment, "the reviewing court may
24 direct that the parties be returned so far as possible to the positions they occupied before the
enforcement of or execution on the judgment or order. In doing so, the reviewing court may
25
order restitution on reasonable terms and conditions of all property and rights lost by the
26
erroneous judgment or order, so far as such restitution is consistent with rights of third
27
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Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to be Restored of Premises
 parties and may direct the entry of a money judgment sufficient to compensate for property
1
or rights not restored. The reviewing court may take evidence and make findings concerning
2 such matters or may, by order, refer such matters to the trial court for determination." Even if
3 the reviewing court has not ordered restitution, the trial court whose order or judgment has

4 been reversed on appeal has the inherent authority to afford restitutionary relief. (Munoz,
supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 657; see Shubert v. Bates (1947) 30 Cal.2d 785, 789 (Shubert);
5
Gunderson v. Wall (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1060, 1065 (Gunderson); Rogers v. Bill &
6 Vince's, Inc. (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 322, 324 (Rogers); 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed.
7 2008), Appeal, § 900, p. 964.) " 'The fundamental rule guiding the court in [such]
proceeding[s] [i]s, so far as possible, to place the parties in as favorable a position as they
8
could have been in had the judgments not 6 been enforced pending appeal.' [Citation.]"
9
(Gunderson, at p. 1065.) A person whose property has been taken under a judgment is
10 entitled to restitution as a matter of right if the judgment is reversed or set aside, unless
11 restitution would be inequitable. (Id. At p. 1064; Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo (1953)
121 Cal.App.2d 616, 619 (StocktonTheatres).)
12
Numerous courts have applied these principles in the unlawful detainer context.
13
(See Shubert, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 789; Munoz, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 658; Stockton
14 Theatres, supra, 121 Cal.App.2d at p. 619; Erickson v. Boothe (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 644,

15 648.) When a landlord who has secured a writ of possession evicts a

tenant before the appellate rights of the tenant have been exhausted, the landlord assumes the
16
risk it will be subject to a full accounting and restitution if the judgment granting the writ of
17 possession is reversed on appeal. (Erickson v. Boothe, supra, 127 Cal.App.2d at p. 649.) The
18 Munoz court explained that after a reversal in an unlawful detainer action, "restitution can be

19 recovered in the underlying unlawful detainer action when a judgment for the landlord is
reversed or in a separate [breach of contract] action instituted to recover losses incurred as a
20
result of a reversed judgment."4 (Munoz, at p. 658.) Whether a party is entitled to restitution
21 following reversal presents a question calling for judicial discretion. (Gunderson, supra, 196
22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1065; Munoz, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 655-656.) The trial court's
ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of manifest abuse of discretion.
23
(Munoz, at p. 662.) Analysis of Restitution The trial court must exercise its discretion
24
because Lopez is entitled to restitution as a matter of law. Lopez does not need to file a
25 separate complaint seeking this relief for two reasons. First, citing section 908 (which
26 authorizes an appellate court to order restitution after a reversal) and Munoz (which
expressly recognized the restitution right), the appellate division ordered that Lopez be
27
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Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to be Restored of Premises
 provided an "appropriate trial which would have resulted in restitution based on the VOID
1
deed and assignment.[]" to restore her "so far as possible to the position [she] occupied
2 before the enforcement . . .of the judgment." Under settled appellate principles, this order
3 was binding on the trial court and the court had the affirmative obligation to follow the

4 mandatory direction. (See Rice v. Schmid (1944) 25 Cal.2d 259, 263 ["Where a reviewing
court reverses a judgment with directions . . . the trial court is bound by the directions
5
given."]; Butler v. Superior Court (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 979, 982 [trial court is not
6 authorized to materially depart from appellate directions on remand]; see also People v.
7 Dutra (2006) 145 Cal.App.4 th 1359, 1365-1367.) Second, even without an order from the
reviewing court, the party prevailing on appeal may seek restitutionary relief through a
8
motion in the remanded matter, rather than by filing a new complaint or filing an independent
9
action. (Gunderson, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1065 ["Following reversal, a party may seek
10 restitution from the trial court by a motion ' "in the original action itself . . . , or . . . in a
11 separate action instituted 8 for that purpose," ' " italics added]; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure,
supra, Appeal, § 900, p. 965 ["successful appellant may make a motion in the trial court, and
12
obtain restitution in this summary proceeding"]; accord Ward v. Sherman (1909) 155 Cal.
13
287, 291; Rogers, supra, 219 Cal.App.2d at pp. 324-326; Stockton Theatres, supra, 121
14 Cal.App.2d at p. 620.) The party entitled to seek restitution is not required to file additional

15 pleadings because the power to restore benefits lost exists by virtue of section 908 and the
trial court's equitable powers. (Schubert, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 789 [referring to section 957,
16
the former version of section 908]5; see Rogers, supra, 219 Cal.App.2d at pp. 324-326.)
17 Further, " 'the fact that [a] judgment was merely set aside and that no final
18 judgment was entered . . . does not prevent restitution.' " (Stockton Theatres, supra, 121

19 Cal.App.2d at p. 623.) If the appellate court vacates the judgment and orders a new trial, a
person who has satisfied the judgment may be entitled to restitution depending on the
20
circumstances. (See Rodgers v. Bill & Vince's, Inc., supra, 219 Cal.App.2d at pp. 324-326;
21 see also Shubert, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 788; Stockton Theatres, at p. 623; 9 Witkin, Cal.
22 Procedure, supra, Appeal, § 903, p. 966.)
Additionally, a party cannot defeat the opposing party's right to a restitution
23
hearing by dismissing the action before the opposing party has had the opportunity to
24
seek restitution. (Schubert, supra, 30 Cal.2d at pp. 789-790; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure,
25 supra, Appeal, § 903, p. 966.) "[W]hile the plaintiff has the right to dismiss the action
26 before trial, where no counterclaim or request for affirmative relief has been filed, that right,
after a trial and reversal of the judgment, is subject to the right of the defendant to
27
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Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to be Restored of Premises
 restoration of benefits lost by virtue of the erroneous judgment. The court has inherent power
1
to enforce that right, unaffected by the right of the plaintiff to dismiss the action. The
2 existence of the power to restore benefits after reversal flows from the rule that upon reversal
3 the action is as though it had never been tried, and the court will, where justice requires it,

4 place the parties as nearly as may be in the condition in which they stood previously."
(Shubert, at pp. 789-790.) This principle is consistent with the rule that a party facing an
5
adverse ruling on a dispositive motion in a trial court cannot avoid the impact of an
6 impending adverseruling by dismissing the case. (See Cravens v. Bd. of Equalization (1997)
7 52 Cal.App.4 th 253, 257-258; see also Hartbrodt v. Burke (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 168, 175.) A
party is not permitted to dismiss to avoid a trial court's " ' determinative adjudication' " in an
8
attempt to "unfairly 'wipe the slate clean.' " (Cravens, at pp. 256-257.) A fortiori, a party
9
cannot escape an adverse appellate court ruling by simply dismissing the underlying case.
10
B. REQUESTING A STAY WOULD HAVE BEEN FUTILE
11
Regardless whether a stay was pending on appeal or not, the Plaintiff to the unlawful
12
detainer action assumed the risk that had the appeal been won that the Plaintiff would be
13 required to return the property.
14 Plaintiff & co-conspirator John Leldon Gray J.D. took that risk. The Plaintiff lost on that
15 risk. The Stay request pending appeal would have been futile for several reasons including -
the lower court demonstrated bias and prejudice: 1.) The court lacked subject matter
16
jurisdiction from the “get go.” Appearing for the first appearance before Commissioner
17
Luege on 9/23/15, Lopez informed the court prior to session that Lopez would not stipulate
18 to the commissioner -Rule 2.818(b)(3). While in session on 9/23/15, Lopez stated for record
19 that Luege did not have jurisdiction for Luege refusal to recuse herself. The commissioner
rendered illegal orders on 9/23/15 & 9/25/15 regardless of Lopez’s 9/23/15 non-stipulation to
20
commissioner. Deceptively, commissioner had Lopez’s special appearance attorney sign a
21
stipulation agreement on 9/25/2015 in violation of California Constitution Art I, Sect 7, for
22 deprivation of due process and opportunity to be heard by a judge. The stipulation agreement

23 was not signed by Lopez as required by Rule 2.818(b)(3). The jurisdiction of a court
commissioners or any temporary judge to try a cause derives from the party’s stipulation, a
24
judgment entered by a court commissioner would be void. In re Horton, 54 Cal. 3d 82, 90
25 (1991). The jurisdiction of a court commissioner, or any other temporary judge to try a cause
26 derives from the parties’ stipulation. Rooney v. Vermont Investment Company Corp. 10 Cal.

27 3d.at p. 360.
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28 _____________________________________________________________________________
Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to be Restored of Premises
 Thus, in absence of a proper stipulation, the judgment entered by the court commissioner
1
in this case would be void. (People v. Tijerina, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p 49; In re Frye(1983) 150
2 Cal. App. 3d 407, 409-410[197 Cal. Rptr. 755] 2.) The unauthorized overreach by Luege
3 beyond the limited scope of Rule 2.818(b)(3) began due process (procedural & substantive),

4 equal protection & privacy, fundamental rights violations. Luege released the case to Judge
Stafford. The violations continued in Stafford’s courtroom. Judge Stafford knew that the case
5
should have been dismissed due to Luege refusing to comply with Rule 2.818(b)(3)-VOID ad
6 initio. Judge Stafford was amendable to the Plaintiff’s attorney & refused to examine Lopez
7 evidence. Stafford is receiving illegal payments not permitted by California Constitution Art
6 Sect 19 and 17, Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 3E2&3E1, 18 U.S.C. 1346 Intangible Right
8
To Honest Services & Constitution Art 6 Clause 2. Stafford is required to disclose the
9
conflict of interest whether he thought was significant or not due to County employee to
10 serve as witness for Lopez. Citizens Utils.Inc.V.Superior Court(1963)59 c2d 805,844 The
11 petitioner maybe excused from complying with its requirement if he or she can show that
objection would be futile. People vs. Welch 1993 5 C4th 228,237-and cases cited.
12

13 VI. CONCLUSION
14
C.C.P §908 provides for restitution of assets collected pursuant to an erroneous judgment
15 reversed on appeal. The trial court will not abuse its discretion by awarding Valerie Lopez
16 restitution & declare Valerie Lopez eligible for compensatory & punitive damages. Beach

17 Break Equities, LLC v. Lowell (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 847, 852 [ This principle is embodied in
California statutory law and settled equitable principles."].)
18
Therefore, Defendant is entitled to restitution and to be restored to her original position
19
she was in before the wrongful eviction and to be compensated for all her damages, as a
20 matter of fact and law
21

22 Date: April 3, 2020

23
_______________________
24 Valerie Lopez, Defendant, In Pro Per
25

26

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28 _____________________________________________________________________________
Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to be Restored of Premises