Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure

Author(s): Arlie Russell Hochschild

Reviewed work(s):
Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 85, No. 3 (Nov., 1979), pp. 551-575
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure
ArlieRussellHochschild
of California,Berkeley
University

This essay proposesan emotion-management perspectiveas a lens

throughwhichto inspectthe self,interaction, and structure.Emo-
tion,it is argued,can be and oftenis subjectto acts of management.
The individualoftenworkson inducingor inhibitingfeelingsso as
to renderthem"appropriate"to a situation.The emotion-manage-
mentperspective drawson an interactive accountof emotion.It dif-
fersfromthe dramaturgical perspectiveon the one hand and the
psychoanalytic perspectiveon the other.It allows us to inspectat
closerrangethaneitherof thoseperspectives therelationamongemo-
tive experience,emotionmanagement,feelingrules, and ideology.
Feelingrulesare seenas theside of ideologythatdeals withemotion
and feeling.Emotionmanagement is thetypeofworkit takesto cope
withfeelingrules.Meaning-making jobs, morecommonin the mid-
dle class,put morepremiumon the individual'scapacityto do emo-
tionwork.A reexamination in child rearingsug-
of class differences
gests that middle-classfamiliespreparetheirchildrenfor emotion
management moreand working-class familiespreparethemless. In
thisway each class preparesits childrento psychologicallyreproduce
theclass structure.

Social psychologyhas suffered under the tacit assumptionthat emotion,

because it seemsunbiddenand uncontrollable, is not governedby social
rules. Social rules,for theirpart, are seen as applyingto behaviorand
thought,but rarelyto emotionor feeling.If we reconsiderthe natureof
emotion2and the natureof our capacityto tryshapingit, we are struck
by theimperialscope of social rules.Significantlinksemergeamongsocial
structure,feelingrules,emotionmanagement, and emotiveexperience-links
I tryto tracein thisessay.The purposeis to suggestan area forinquiry.
I This paper summarizespart of the argumentpresentedin a forthcoming book. This
study has been generouslysupportedby a GuggenheimFellowship. Althoughgratitude
in footnoteslike this is (as this paper demonstrates)conventionalized,and although
conventionmakes authenticityhard to decipher,I want anyway to expressappreciation
to Harvey Faberman,Todd Gitlin,Adam Hochschild,Robert Jackson,JerzyMichaelo-
wicz, Caroline Persell, Mike Rogin, Paul Russell, Thomas Scheff,Ann Swidler, Joel
Telles, and the anonymousreviewersfor the AIS.
2 I defineemotionas bodily cooperationwith an image,a thought,a memory-a coop-
eration of which the individualis aware. I will use the terms"emotion" and "feeling"
interchangeably, although the term "emotion" denotes a state of being overcome that
"feeling"does not. The term"emotion management"is used synonymously with "emo-
tion work" and "deep acting."
@) 1979 by The Universityof Chicago. 0002-9602/80/8503-0003$02.00

AJS Volume 85 Number3 551

AmericanJournalof Sociology

Why is the emotiveexperienceof normaladultsin daily lifeas orderly

as it is? Why,generallyspeaking,do people feel gay at parties,sad at
funerals,happyat weddings?This questionleads us to examine,not con-
ventionsof appearanceor outwardcomportment, butconventionsoffeeling.
Conventions of feelingbecomesurprising onlywhenwe imagine,by con-
trast,what totallyunpatterned, unpredictable emotivelifemightactually
be like at parties,funerals,
weddings, and in thefamilyor worklifeof nor-
mal adults.
ErvingGoffman(1961) suggestsboth the surpriseto be explainedand
partof theexplanation:". . . We findthatparticipants willhold in check
certainpsychologicalstates and attitudes,forafterall, the verygeneral
rule that one enterinto the prevailingmoodin the encountercarriesthe
understanding thatcontradictory feelingswillbe in abeyance.... So gen-
erally,in fact,does one suppressunsuitableaffect, thatwe need to look at
offenses to thisruleto be reminded of its usual operation"(Goffman1961,
p. 23). If we take thispassage seriously,as I urgewe do, we may be led
back to theclassicquestionofsocialorderfroma particularvantagepoint-
thatof emotionmanagement. Fromthisvantagepoint,rulesseemto govern
how people tryor trynot to feelin ways "appropriateto the situation."
Such a notionsuggestsbow profoundlythe individualis "social," and
"socialized"to tryto pay tributeto official definitions
of situations,with
no less thantheirfeelings.
Let me pause to pointout thatthereare twopossibleapproachesto the
social orderingof emotiveexperience.One is to studythe social factors
thatinduceor stimulateprimary(i.e., nonreflective, thoughby definition
conscious)emotions-emotions passivelyundergone. The otheris to study
secondaryactsperformed upontheongoingnonreflective streamofprimary
emotiveexperience. The firstapproachfocuseson howsocial factorsaffect
whatpeoplefeel,thesecondon howsocial factorsaffect whatpeoplethink
and do about what theyfeel (i.e., acts of assessmentand management).
Those who take thefirstapproachmightregardthosewho take thesecond
as being"overlycognitive."But in factthetwoapproachesare compatible,
and indeedthe second,takenhere,relieson someaccumulationof knowl-
edgegarneredfromthefirst.3
If we takeas our objectof focuswhatit is peoplethinkor do aboutfeel-
3 For comprehensive, if somewhatdated, reviewsof the theoreticalapproaches to emo-
tion,see Hillman (1964), Carlson et al. (1959), Reymert(1950), and McDougall (1937).
These reviews exclude several more recent theoreticalattemptsby Tomkins (1962),
Arnold (1968), and Plutchik (1962). For a psychoanalyticaccount, see Rapaport
(1953). Also see Rabkin (1968), Sprout (1952), Scheff(1973, 1977a, 1977b), Levy
(1973), and Katz (1977). Various social scientistshave developed their approaches
via inspection of a particular emotion or feeling,as for example, jealousy (Davis
1936; Clanton and Smith 1977), envy (Foster 1972), embarrassment(Goffman1956;
Gross and Stone 1964), and love (Goode 1974; Swanson 1965). For a selectivereview
see Hochschild (1975).

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 EmotionWork

ings,severalquestionsemerge.First,withwhatassumptions aboutemotion
and situationdo we begin?In otherwords,(a) how responsive is emotion
to deliberateattemptsto suppressor evokeit? (b) What sociologicalap-
proachis mostfruitful? Second,whatare thelinksamongsocial structure,
ideology,feelingrules,and emotionmanagement? To beginwith,(c) are
therefeelingrules? (d) How do we knowabout them?(e) How are these
rulesused as baselinesin socialexchanges?(f) Whatin thenatureofwork
and childrearingmightaccountfordifferent waysadultsof varyingclasses
managetheirfeelings?I shall sketchoutlinesof possibleanswerswiththe
aim,in somemeasure,of refining thequestions.

TWO ACCOUNTS OF EMOTION AND FEELING

In orderto addressthefirstquestion,we mightconsidertwobasic accounts

of emotionand feelingfoundin social psychology:the organismic account
and theinteractive account.The twoapproachesdiffer in whattheyimply
aboutour capacityto manageemotion,and thusin whattheyimplyabout
theimportance of rulesabout managingit. I cannotdo fulljusticehereto
the questionof whatemotionis and how it is generated,norcan I offera
fullreactionto theampleliteratureon thatquestion.
Accordingto the organismic view,theparamountquestionsconcernthe
relationof emotionto biologicallygiven"instinct"or "impulse."In large
part, biologicalfactorsaccountfor the questionsthe organismictheorist
poses.The earlywritings of SigmundFreud (1911, 1915a, 1915b; see Lof-
gren 1968), CharlesDarwin ([1872] 1955), and in some thoughnot all
respects,WilliamJames (James and Lange 1922) fit this model.4The
concept"emotion"refersmainlyto stripsof experiencein whichthereis
no conflictbetweenone and anotheraspectof self; the individual"floods
out," is "overcome."The image that comesto mindis that of a sudden,
4 W. McDougall (1948) and, to some extent,S. S. Tomkins (1962) also fitthis classi-
fication.Both focuson the relationof emotionto drive or instinct(Tomkins elaborates
a relation between emotion and "drive signals" wherebyemotion is said to amplify
drive signals). The centralissues on which the two theoreticalcamps divide are fixity,
reflexivity,and origin. (1) The organismictheorists,unlike their interactivecounter-
parts, assume a basic fixityof emotion,based in biological givens. (2) They assume
that social interactiondoes not basically affectemotions; the social surface remains
what is implied by the term"surface." In the interactiveaccount. this is not the case.
Labeling, management,and expressionof feeling (more clearly differentiated by the
interactionists)are processeswhich can reflexively "act back" on emotion,and indeed
come to constitutewhat we mean by the term "emotion." (3) Again, the organismic
theoristsare more concernedwith tracingemotionback to its origins.For Freud and
James the originswere energicor somatic, and for Darwin, phylogenetic.The inter-
active theoristsare less concernedwith origin than with the interfaceof a situation
and experience.The focus on originleads the organismictheoriststo focus on com-
monalitiesbetween differentpeoples, and between people and animals. The focus on
social interfaceleads the interactioniststo focus on differences.
For recentinnovations
in the interactivetradition,see Kemper (1978) and Averill (1976).

553
 AmericanJournalof Sociology

automaticreflexsyndrome-Darwin'sinstantsnarlexpression, Freud'sten-
sion dischargeat a givenbreakingpointof tensionoverload,Jamesand
Lange's notionof an instantaneous unmediatedvisceralreactionto a per-
ceived stimulus,the perceptionof which is also unmediatedby social
influences.
In thisfirstmodel,social factorscan enterin onlyin regardto howemo-
tionsare stimulatedand expressed(and even here Darwin took the uni-
versalistposition) (see Ekman 1972, 1973). Social factorsare notseen as
an influenceon how emotionsare activelysuppressedor evoked.Indeed,
emotionis characterized by the fixityand universality of a knee-jerkre-
actionor a sneeze.In thisview,one could as easilymanagean emotionas
one could managea kneejerk or a sneeze.If theorganismic theoristwere
to be presentedwiththe conceptof feelingrules,he or she wouldbe hard
put to elucidatewhat theserulesimpingeon, or whatcapacityof the self
couldbe calledon to tryto obeya feelingrule (see Hochschild1977). Re-
centattemptsto linkan organismic notionof emotionto social structure,
suchas Randall Collins's(1975) wonderfully bold attempt,sufferfromthe
problemsthat were implicitin the organismicaccountto beginwith.By
Collins,as by Darwinon whomhe draws,emotionsare seen as capacities
(or susceptibilities)
withina person,tobe automatically triggered,
as Collins
developsit, by one or anothergroupin controlof theritualapparatusthat
does the "triggering"(1975, p. 59). A whollydifferent avenue of social
control,thatof feelingrules,is bypassed,becausetheindividual'scapacity
to tryto,or trynotto feel-that to whichtheruleapplies-is notsuggested
by theorganismic modelwithwhichCollinsbegins.
In the interactiveaccount,social influences permeateemotionmorein-
sistently, moreeffectively,and at moretheoretically positediunctures.In
large part,sociopsychological factorsaccountforthe questionsthe inter-
active theoristposes. The writingsof Gerthand MIills(1964), Goffman
(1956, 1959, 1961, 1967, 1974), Lazarus (1966), La7arus and Averill
(1972), Schachterand Singer(1962), Schachter(1964), Kemper(1978),
Averill(1976). and aspectsof late Freudianand neo-Freudianthoughtfit
thismodel.To invokethe Freudianvocabulary,theimagehereis not that
of a "runawayid," but of an ego and superego,actingupon,shaping,nag-
ging,howeverineffectively, temporarily,or consciously,the id.5 Emotion
is sometimespositedas a psychobiological meansof adaptation-an ana-
5 The stresson will (included in the concept of ego, but not all that "earo"refersto)
is not a clean divider of the organismicfrom the interactivetheorist.Schachterand
Gerth and Mills, whom I see as membersof the interactivecamp, lay no particular
stresson volition.Goffmanstressesthe phenomenathat call tacitlyforwill. He stresses
the patternedresultsof it, but provides no theoreticalaccount of will itself.He posits
no actor qua emotionmanagerwho mightaccomplishthe acts that,by inference,must
get accomplishedto pull offthe encountershe describesso well. In my view, we must
reinstitutea self capable of experiencingemotion and of working on it in socially
patternedways. (On the issue of will,see Piaget in Campbell [1976]; Solomon [1973].)

554
 EmotionWork

logue to otheradaptivemechanisms, such as shiveringwhencold or per-

spiringwhenhot.But emotiondiffers fromtheseotheradaptivemechanisms,
in that thinking,perceiving,and imagining--themselves subjectto thein-
fluenceof normsand situations-areintrinsically involved.
As in the firstmodel,social factorsaffecthow emotionsare elicitedand
expressed.However,in addition,social factorsguide the microactions of
labeling (Schachter1964; Schachterand Singer 1962; Katz 1977), in-
terpreting (Gerthand Mills 1964), and managingemotion(Lazarus 1966).
These microactions, in turn,reflectback on that whichis labeled,inter-
preted,and managed.They are,finally, to whatwe call "emotion"
intrinsic
(see Schafer 1976). Emotion, in thissecond school of thought,is seen as
moredeeplysocial. Lazarus's (1966) workin particularlends empirical
weightto the interactivemodel. It suggeststhat normaladults,such as
universitystudentson whomhe conductedexperiments, have a considerable
capacityto control emotion.It is more controlthan one mightexpectfrom
a smallchild,an insaneadult, or an animal,from all of which Freudin his
earlierwritingsand Darwin drewinspiration. But since it is the emotive
experienceof normaladults we seek to understand, we would do well to
beginwiththeinteractive account.6

The InteractiveAccountof Emotionand Social Psychology

If emotionsand feelingscan to somedegreebe managed,howmightwe get
a conceptualgraspof themanagingact froma social perspective? The in-
teractiveaccountof emotionleads us into a conceptualarena "between"
the Goffmanian focuson consciously designedappearanceson theone hand
and the Freudianfocuson unconsciousintrapsychic eventson the other.
The focusof Mead (1934) and Blumer(1969) on conscious,active,and
responsivegesturesmighthave been mostfruitful had not theirfocuson
deeds and thoughtalmostentirely obscuredtheimportance of feeling.(See
Shott [1979] foran attemptto consideremotionfroma symbolicinter-
actionistperspective.)The selfas emotionmanageris an idea thatborrows
frombothsides-Goffmanand Freud-but squarescompletely withneither.
Here I can onlysketchout a fewbasic borrowingsand departures, focusing
on thedepartures.

ErvingGoffman
Goffman guidesour attentionto social patternsin emotiveexperience.He
catchesan irony:momentto moment, theindividualis activelynegotiating
6 My own account of emotiondraws on that proposed by Katz (1977). For Katz emo-
tion is generatedby a "schematic discrepancy,"that is, a discrepancybetween the
individual's schemata and his currentperception,memory,or imaginingof an event
or object. Also see the interestingwork of Lazarus, Kanner, and Folkman (1979).

555
AmericanJournalof Sociology

a courseof action,but in the long run,all the actionseemslike passive

acquiescenceto social convention.The conserving of conventionis not a
passivebusiness.Goffman's approachmightsimplybe extendedand deep-
enedby showingthatpeoplenot onlytryto conform outwardly, but do so
inwardlyas well. "When theyissue uniforms, theyissue skins" (Goffman
1974) couldbe extended:"and twoinchesof flesh."
Yet, ironically,
to studywhyand underwhatconditions "participants ...
hold in checkcertainpsychological states. . ." (Goffman1961,p. 23), we
are forcedpartlyout of the perspective whichgave birthto the insight.I
shall tryto showwhythisis so, whatthe remediesmightbe, and how the
resultscould be conceptuallyrelated to aspects of the psychoanalytic
tradition.
First,Goffman, forreasonsnecessaryto his purpose,maintainsforthe
mostparta studieddisregardforthelinksbetweenimmediatesocial situa-
tionsand macrostructure on the one hand,and individualpersonality on
theother.If oneis interested in drawinglinksamongsocialstructure, feeling
rules,and emotionmanagement, thisstudieddisregardbecomesa problem.
Goffman's "situationism"is a brilliantachievement, one that mustbe
understood as a development in theintellectual historyofsocialpsychology.
Earlierin the centurya numberof classicworkslinkedsocial structure to
personality, or "dominantinstitutions"to "typical identities,"and thus
also relatedfindings in sociologyand anthropology to thosein psychology
or psychoanalytic theory.These studiesappeared a numberof fields-in
in
anthropology, Ruth Benedict (1946); in psychoanalysis, Erich Fromm
(1942), Karen Horney (1937), and Erik Erikson (1950); in sociology,
David Riesman(1952, 1960), Swansonand Miller (1966), and Gerthand
Mills (1964).
Possiblyin responseto thisparadigmGoffman proposedan intermediate
levelof conceptualelaboration, "between"social structure and personality.
His focusis on situations,episodes,encounters. The situation,the episodi-
cally emergent encounter, is not onlynearlydivorcedfromsocial structure
and frompersonality; he evenseemsto intendhissituationism as an analytic
substitutefor these concepts (see Goffman1976, p. 77). Structure,he
seemsto say,can be notonlytransposed but reduced"in and down,"while
personalitycan be reduced"up and out" to thestudyofhere-now, gone-then
interactionalmoments.
Each interactional episodetakeson the characterof a minigovernment.
A cardgame,a party,a greeting on thestreetexactsfromus certain"taxes"
in the formof appearanceswhichwe "pay" forthesake of sustainingthe
encounter. We are repaidin thecurrency of safetyfromdisrepute.(Thanks
to HarveyFarbermanfordiscussionon thispoint.)
This modelof the situationqua minigovernment, whileusefulforGoff-
man'spurposes,leads us away fromsocial structure and personality-two

556
 EmotionWork

conceptswithwhichany studyof feelingrulesand emotionmanagement

wouldbe wise to deal.7To studywhyand underwhatconditions"partici-
pants ... hold in checkcertainpsychological states. . ." (Goffman1961,
p. 23), we are forcedout of thehere-now, gone-then situationism and back,
in part at least, to thesocial structure and personality model.We are led
to appreciatethe importanceof Goffman's work,as it seemshe does not,
as the criticalset of conceptualconnecting tissuesby whichstructure and
personality, realin theirownright,are moreprecisely joined.
Specifically,if we are to understandthe originand causes of changein
"feelingrules"-this undersideof ideology-we are forcedback out of a
studyof theimmediate situationsin whichtheyshowup, to a studyofsuch
thingsas changingrelationsbetweenclassesor thesexes.
If we are to investigatethe ways people try to manage feeling,we
shall have to posit an actorcapable of feeling,capable of assessingwhen
a feelingis "inappropriate," and capable of tryingto managefeeling.The
problemis thatthe actorGoffman proposesdoes not seemto feelmuch,is
not attunedto, does notmonitorcloselyor assess,does notactivelyevoke,
inhibit,shape-in a word,work on feelingsin a way an actorwouldhave
to do to accomplishwhat Goffman says is, in fact,accomplishedin one
encounterafteranother.We are leftknowingabout "suppressivework"as
a finalresult,but knowingnothingof the processor techniquesby which
it is achieved.If we are to argue thatsocial factorsinfluencehow we try
to managefeelings, if we are to carrythe social that far,we shallhave to
carryour analyticfocusbeyondthe "black box" to whichGoffman ulti-
matelyrefersus.
Goffman'sactors activelymanage outer impressions, but theydo not
activelymanageinnerfeelings.For example,a typicalGoffmanian actor,
Preedyat the beach (Goffman1959), is exquisitelyattunedto outward
appearance,but his glances inward at subjectivefeelingare fleeting
and blurred.The very topic, sociologyof emotion,presupposesa hu-
man capacity for,if not the actual habit of, reflecting on and shaping
innerfeelings,a habit itselfdistributed variouslyacross time,age, class,
and locale. This variationwoulddrop fromsightwerewe to adopt an ex-

7Time: to link the momentaryact of emotion work with the concept of personality,
we must alter our perspectiveon time. An emotive episode and the attemptto shape
it is, afterall, a briefstrip of time. Situationssuch as Goffmanstudies are also short.
The focus is on the act, and the act ends, so to speak, when the theatercloses and
starts again when it reopens. If we extend Goffman'sanalysis, by speaking now of
"deep" acting, we, like him, are focusingon short episodes, on "stills" from which
long movies are composed. The notion of personalityimplies a fairlydurable, trans-
situationalpattern.The Casper Milquetoast personalitymay lead an anxietyavoidant
life of 73 years. Not momentarystills, but many decades are at issue. Again, we
must shift our situationistfocus at the structuralend when we come to speak of
institutions,which live even longer than people do.

557
AmericanJournalof Sociology

clusivefocuson the actor'sattentiveness to behavioralfacadeand assume

a uniform passivityvis-a-visfeelings.
This skewin the theoretical actoris relatedto whatfrommyviewpoint
is anotherproblem:Goffman's conceptof acting.Goffman suggeststhatwe
spenda gooddeal of effort managingimpressions-that is, acting.He posits
only one sortof acting-the directmanagement of behavioralexpression.
His illustrations,though,actuallypointto twotypesof acting-the direct
management of behavioralexpression(e.g., thegiven-off sigh,theshoulder
shrug),and the management of feelingfromwhichexpressioncan follow
(e.g., the thoughtof some hopelessproject). An actor playingthe part
of King Lear mightgo about his task in two ways. One actor,following
the Englishschoolof acting,mightfocuson outwarddemeanor,the con-
stellationof minuteexpressionsthat correspondto Lear's sense of fear
and impotentoutrage.This is the sortof actingGoffman theorizesabout.
Anotheractor,adheringto theAmericanor Stanislavskyschoolof acting,
mightguide his memoriesand feelingsin such a way as to elicitthe cor-
responding expressions.
The firsttechniquewe mightcall "surfaceacting,"
the second"deep acting."Goffman fails to distinguishthe firstfromthe
second,and he obscuresthe importance of "deep acting."Obscuringthis,
we are leftwiththeimpression thatsocial factorspervadeonlythe"social
skin,"the tried-for outerappearancesof theindividual.We are leftunder-
estimating thepowerof the social.
In sum,if we are to accept the interactiveaccountof emotionand to
studythe selfas emotionmanager,we can learnfromGoffman about the
linkbetweensocial ruleand feeling.But to elaboratethisinsightwe might
well selectivelyrelax the theoreticalstricturesGoffman has stoicallyim-
posed againsta focuson social structure and on personality.

Freud

The need to replaceGoffman's "black-boxpsychology"withsome theory

of self,in thefullsenseof theterm,mightseemto lead to Freudianor neo-
Freudian theory.Yet, here,as with Goffman, only some aspects of the
Freudianmodelseem usefulto my understanding of conscious,deliberate
efforts to suppressor evoke feeling.I shall brieflydiscusspsychoanalytic
theoryto showsomepointsof departure.
Freud, of course,dealt with emotions,but forhim theywere always
secondaryto drive.He proposeda generaltheoryof sexualand aggressive
drives.Anxiety,as a derivativeof aggressiveand sexual drives,was of
paramountimportance, while a wide rangeof otheremotions,including
joy, jealousy,depression,weregivenrelativelylittleattention.He devel-
oped,and manyothershave sinceelaborated,the conceptof ego defenses
as generallyunconscious,involuntary means of avoidingpainfulor un-

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pleasantaffect.Finallythenotionof "inappropriate affect"is used to point

to aspectsof the individual'sego functioning and not used to pointto the
social rulesaccordingto whicha feelingis or is notdeemedappropriateto
a situation.
The emotion-management perspectiveis indebtedto Freudforthegeneral
notionof what resourcesindividualsof different sortspossess foraccom-
plishingthetaskof emotionwork(as I have definedit) and forthenotion
ofunconscious involuntary emotionmanagement. The emotion-management
perspective differsfromtheFreudianmodelin its focuson thefullrangeof
emotionsand feelingsand its focuson consciousand deliberateefforts to
shape feeling.Fromthisperspective, we notetoo that"inappropriate emo-
tion"has a clearlyimportant socialas wellas intrapsychicside.
Let me briefly illustratethedifferencesbetweenthetwoperspectives. In
Shapiro'swell-known workon "neuroticstyle,"he givesan example:
An obsessive-compulsive patient-a sober,technically mindedand active
man-was usuallyconspicuouisly lackingin enthusiasm or excitement
in
circumstances thatmightseemto warrant them.On one occasion,as he
talkedabouta certain prospectof his,namely, thegoodchanceof an im-
portantsuccessin his work,his soberexpression was momentarily
inter-
ruptedby a smile.Aftera fewmoreminutes duringwhichhe
of talking,
maintainedhissoberness onlywithdifficulty, he beganquitehesitantly
to
speakof certainhopesthathe had onlyalludedto earlier.Thenhe broke
intoa grin.Almostimmediately, however, he regainedhisusualsomewhat
worriedexpression. As he didthis,he said,"Of course,theoutcomeis by
no meanscertain," andhe saidthisin a tonethat,if anything,wouldsug-
gestthe outcomewas almostcertainto be a failure.Aftertickingoff
severalof the specificpossibilities
fora hitch,he finallyseemedto be
himselfagain,so to speak.[Shapiro1965,p. 192,emphasis mine]
What seemsinteresting about thisexamplediffers accordingto whether
one takes the psychiatricperspectiveor the emotion-management per-
spective.First,to the psychiatrist in the case above, what circumstances
warrantwhat degreeand type of feelingseemsrelativelyunproblematic.
A doctor"knows"what inappropriate affectis; the main problemis not
so much to discernmisfitsof feelingto situationbut to explain them
and to cure the patient of them. From the emotion-management per-
spective,on the otherhand, the warrantingfunctionof circumstances
is problematic.Further,the meansused to assess thiswarranting function
may well be the same for a psychiatristas for a salesclerkor school
disciplinarian.For, in a sense we all act as lay psychiatristsusing un-
examinedmeansof arrivingat a determination about just "what" circum-
stanceswarrant"that much"feelingof "that sort."
What the psychiatrist,the salesclerk,and the schooldisciplinarianmay
shareis a habitof comparing, situation(e.g., highopportunity,associated
with an accomplishment at work) withrole (e.g., hopes,aspirations,ex-

559
AmericanJournalof Sociology

pectationstypicalof, and expectedfrom,thoseenactingthe role). Social

factorscan enterin, to alterhow we expecta role to be held,or played.
If, forexample,thepatientwerea "sober,technically mindedand active"
womanand if the observer(rightlyor wrongly)assumedor expectedher
to value familyand personalties overworldlysuccess,less enthusiasmat
the prospectof advance mightseem perfectly "appropriate."Lack of en-
thusiasmwould have a warrantof that social sort.Again,if the patient
was an antinuclearactivistand his discoveryhad implications fornuclear
energy,thatwould alter the hopes and aspirationshe mightbe expected
to have at workand mightwarrantdismay,not enthusiasm.
We assess the "appropriateness" of a feelingby makinga comparison
betweenfeelingand situation,not by examiningthe feelingin abstracto.
This comparisonlends the assessor a "normal" yardstick-a socially
normalone-from which to factorouit the personal meaningsystems
whichmay lead a workerto distorthis view of "the" situationand feel
inappropriately with regard to it. The psychiatristholds constantthe
sociallynormalbenchmark and focuseson whatwe have just factoredout.
The studentof emotionmanagement holds constantwhat is factoredout
and studiesthe sociallynormalbenchmark, especiallyvariationsin it.
There is a seconddifference in what,fromthe twoperspectives, seems
interesting in the above example.Fromthe emotion-management perspec-
tive,whatis interesting is the characterand directionof volitionand con-
sciousness.From the psychiatricperspective, what is of moreinterestis
pre-willand nonconsciousness. The man above is not doingemotionwork,
thatis, makinga conscious,intendedtryat alteringfeeling.Insteadhe is
controlling his enthusiasmby "being himself,"by holding,in Schutz's
term,a "naturalattitude."He "no longerneeds to strugglenot to grin;
he is not in a grinningmood" (Shapiro 1965, p. 164). In orderto avoid
affective deviance,someindividualsmayfacea hardertask thando others,
thetaskof consciously workingon feelingsin orderto makeup for"a nat-
ural attitude"-explanablein psychoanalyticterms-that gets themin
social trouble.The hysteric workingin a bureaucratic settingmayface the
necessityformoreemotionworkthantheobsessivecompulsivewho fitsin
more naturally.
In sum, the emotion-management perspectivefostersattentionto how
people tryto feel,not,as forGoffman, how people tryto appear to feel.
It leads us to attendto howpeopleconsciouslyfeeland not,as forFreud,
how people feelunconsciously. The interactiveaccountof emotionpoints
to alternatetheoreticaljunctures-betweenconsciousnessof feelingand
consciousnessof feelingrules,betweenfeelingrules and emotionwork,
betweenfeelingrulesand social structure. In the remainderof thisessay,
it is thesejunctureswe shallexplore.

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 EmotionWork

EMOTION WORK

By "emotionwork"I referto theact oftrying to changein degreeor quality

an emotionor feeling.To "workon" an emotionor feelingis, forour pur-
poses,the same as "to manage"an emotionor to do "deep acting."Note
that"emotionwork"refersto theeffort-theact of trying-and notto the
outcome,whichmay or may not be successful.Failed acts of management
stillindicatewhatideal formulations guidethe effort, and on thataccount
are no less interesting thanemotionmanagement thatworks.
The verynotionof an attemptsuggestsan activestancevis-'a-vis feeling.
In my exploratory studyrespondents characterized theiremotionworkby
a varietyof activeverbforms;"I psychedmyselfup.... I squashedmy
angerdown.. . . I triedhardnot to feeldisappointed.. . . I mademyself
have a good time.. . . I triedto feelgrateful.. . . I killedthehope I had
burning."There was also the activelypassive form,as in, "I let myself
finallyfeelsad."
Emotionwork differsfromemotion"control"or "suppression."The
lattertwotermssuggestan effort merelyto stifleor preventfeeling."Emo-
tionwork"refersmorebroadlyto theact of evokingor shaping,as wellas
suppressing, feelingin onself.I avoid the term"manipulate"because it
suggestsa shallownessI do notmeanto imply.We can speak,then,of two
broad typesof emotionwork:evocation,in whichthecognitivefocusis on
a desiredfeelingwhichis initiallyabsent,and suppression, in whichthe
cognitivefocusis on an undesiredfeelingwhichis initiallypresent.One
respondent, goingout with a priest20 years her senior,exemplifies the
problemsof evocativeemotionwork: "Anyway,I startedto tryand make
myselflike him.I made myselffocuson theway he talked,certainthings
he'd donein thepast.... WhenI was withhimI did likehimbut I would
go homeand writein my journalhow muchI couldn'tstandhim. I kept
changingmy feelingand actuallythoughtI reallyliked him wlhileI was
withhimbuta coupleofhoursafterhe was gone,I reverted back to different
feelings...."8 Anotherrespondent exemplifiesthe work,not of working
feelingup, but ofworkingfeelingdown:
Last summerI was goingwitha guyoften,and I beganto feelvery
abouthim.I knewthough,
strongly thathe had just brokenup witha
8 The illustrationsof emotion work come from a content analysis of 261 protocols
given to students in two classes at the Universityof California, Berkeley,in 1974.
Many of the illustrationscome fromanswers to the question, "Describe as fullya,nd
concretelyas possible a real situation,importantto you, in which you experienced
eitherchanginga real situation to fit your feelingsor changingyour feelingsto fita
situation.What did it mean to you?" Three coders coded the protocols.The findings
will be reportedin a later study. I will only mentionhere that 13% of the men but
32% of the women were coded as "changing feeling"instead of changingsituation,
and of those who changed feelings,far more women reported doing so agentially
rather than passively.

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AmericanJournalof Sociology

girla yearago becauseshe had gottentoo seriousabouthim,so I was

afraidto showanyemotion.I alsowasafraidofbeinghurt,so I attempted
to changemyfeelings.I talked myselfinto not caringabout Mike . . .
butI mustadmitit didn'tworkforlong.To sustainthisfeelingI had to
almostinventbad thingsabout him and concentrateon themor continue
to tell myselfhe didn't care. It was a hardeningof emotions,I'd say. It
a lot of workand was unpleasant,
took- becauseI had to concentrate
on
anythingI couldfindthatwas irritating
abouthim.
Oftenemotionworkis aided by settingup an emotion-work system,for
example,tellingfriendsof all theworstfaultsof thepersonone wantedto
fall out of love with,and thengoingto thosefriendsforreinforcement of
thisviewof theex-beloved.This suggestsanotherpoint: emotionworkcan
be done by the selfupon the self,by the selfupon others,and by others
upon oneself.
In each case theindividualis consciousof a momentof "pinch,"or dis-
crepancy,betweenwhat one does feeland whatone wantsto feel (which
is, in turn,affectedby whatone thinksoneoughtto feelin sucha situation).
In response,the individualmay tryto eliminatethe pinchby workingon
feeling.Both the sense of discrepancyand the responseto it can varyin
time.The managingact,forexample,can be a five-minute stopgapmeasure,
orit can be a morelong-range gradualeffort
suggestedby theterm"working
through."
Thereare varioustechniquesof emotionwork.One is cognitive: the at-
temptto changeimages,ideas; or thoughtsin the serviceof changingthe
feelingsassociatedwiththem.9A secondis bodily: the attemptto change
somatic- orotherphysicalsymptoms ofemotion(e.g.,trying to breatheslow-
er, tryingnot to shake). Third,thereis expressive emotionwork: trying
to changeexpressivegesturesin theserviceof changinginnerfeeling(e.g.,
tryingto smile,or to cry). This differs fromsimpledisplayin that it is
directedtowardchangein feeling.It differs frombodilyemotionworkin
thattheindividualtriesto alteror shapeone or anotheroftheclassicpublic
channelsforthe expressionof feeling.
Thesethreetechniques aredistincttheoretically,
buttheyoften,ofcourse,
go together in practice.For example:

9 There may be various types of cognitive emotion work. All can be described as
attemptsto recodifya situation.By recodificationI mean reclassification of a situation
into what are previouslyestablishedmental categoriesof situations.As in an initial,
more automaticcodificationof a situation,deliberaterecodification means asking onself
(a) What categoryin my classificationschema of situationsfits this new situation?
(the schema may include blame-insituations,blame-outsituations,credit-insituations,
credit-outsituations,etc.), and (b) What categoryin my classificationschema of emo-
tions fitsthe emotion I'm feelingrightnow? (i.e., is it anger, general anxiety,disap-
pointment?). In deliberate recodifications,one tries to change the classificationof
outward and inward reality. (To translate this idea into Lazarus's framework,we
might speak of the individual tryingconsciously to alter his or her appraisal of a
situationso as to change the coping process [Lazarus 1966].)

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 EmotionWork

I was a starhalfback in highschool.BeforegamesI didn'tfeeltheup-

surgeof adrenalin-ina word I wasn't"psyched up." (This was due to
emotional difficulties and stillexperience-Iwas also
I was experiencing
an A studentwhosegradesweredropping.) Havingbeen in the past a
emotional,
fanatical, intenseplayer,a "hitter"recognizedby coachesas a
veryhardworkerand a playerwith"desire,"thiswas veryupsetting. I
did everythingI could to get myself"uip." I would try to be outwardly
"rah rah" or get myselfscared of my opponents-anythingto get the
adrenalin I triedto looknervousand intensebeforegames,so at
flowing.
leastthecoacheswouldn'tcatchon.... WhenactuallyI wasmostly bored,
or in anyevent,not"up." I recallbeforeonegamewishing I was in the
standswatchingmycousinplayforhis school,ratherthan"outhere."
Emotionworkbecomesan objectof awarenessmostoften,perhaps,when
the individual'sfeelingsdo not fitthe situation,that is, when the latter
doesnotaccountforor legitimate feelingsin thesituation.A situation(such
as a funeral)oftencarrieswithit a properdefinition of itself("this is a
timeof facingloss"). This official framecarrieswithit a senseofwhatit is
fittingto feel (sadness). It is whenthistripartiteconsistency amongsitua-
tion,conventionalframe,and feelingis somehowruptured,as when the
bereavedfeelsan irrepressible desireto laugh delightedly at the thought
of an inheritance, thatruleand management comeintofocus.It is thenthat
themorenormalflowof deep convention-themorenormalfusionof situa-
tion,frame,and feeling-seemslikean accomplishment.
The smoothlywarmairlinehostess,the ever-cheerful secretary, the un-
irritatedcomplaintclerk,the undisgustedproctologist, the teacherwho
likes everystudentequally,and Goffman's unflappablepokerplayermay
all have to engagein deep acting,an actingthatgoeswellbeyondthemere
orderingof display.Workto makefeelingand frameconsistent withsitua-
tionis workin whichindividualscontinually andprivately engage.But they
do so in obeisanceto rulesnotcompletely of theirownmaking.

FEELING RULES

We feel.We tryto feel.We wantto tryto feel.The social guidelinesthat

directhow we want to tryto feelmay be describableas a set of socially
shared,albeitoftenlatent(not thoughtabout unlessprobedat), rules.In
whatway,we mayask, are theserulesthemselves knownand howare they
developed?10
10 That we can single out such a thing as "feelingrules" is itselfa commentaryon
the ironic posture of the self legitimatedin modern culture. Modern urban cultures
fostermuch more distance (the stance of the observingego) from feelingthan do
traditional cultures. Jerzy Michaelowicz, a graduate student at the University of
California,San Diego, observed that traditionaland tight-knitsubculturesput people
directlyinside the frameworkof feelingrules and remove ironic distance or sense
of choice about them. He reportedon some researchin which one Hassidic rabbi was
asked, "Did you feel happy at the Passover ceremony?" "Of course!" came the in-
credulous reply.

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AmericanJournalof Sociology

To beginwith,let us considerseveralcommonformsof evidencefor

feelingrules.In commonparlance,we oftentalkaboutour feelings or those
of othersas if rightsand dutiesapplieddirectlyto them. For example,we
oftenspeak of "havingthe right"to feelangryat someone.Or we say we
"should feel moregrateful"to a benefactor.We chide ourselvesthat a
friend'smisfortune, a relative'sdeath,"shouldhave hit us harder,"or that
another'sgood luck,or our own,shouldhave inspiredmorejoy. We know
feelingrules,too,fromhowothersreactto whattheyinferfromouremotive
display.Anothermay say to us, "You shouldn'tfeel so guilty;it wasn't
yourfault,"or "You don't have a rightto feeljealous, givenour agree-
ment."Anothermay simplydeclarean opinionas to the fitof feelingto
situation,or may cast a claim upon our managerialstance,presupposing
this opinion.Othersmay questionor call foran accountof a particular
feelingin a situation,whereastheydo not ask foran accountingof some
othersituatedfeeling(Lymanand Scott 1970). Claimsand callingsforan
accountcan be seen as rule reminders. At othertimes,a personmay,in
addition,chide,tease,cajole, scold,shun-in a word,sanctionus for"mis-
feeling."Such sanctionsare a clue to the rulestheyare meantto enforce.
Rightsand dutiesset out theproprieties as to the extent(one can feel
"too" angryor "not angryenough"),thedirection(one can feelsad when
one shouldfeelhappy), and the durationof a feeling,giventhesituation
againstwhichit is set. These rightsand dutiesof feelingare a clue to the
depthof social convention, to one finalreachof socialcontrol.
There is a distinction,in theoryat least,betweena feelingruleas it is
knownby our senseof whatwe can expectto feelin a givensituation,and
a ruleas it is knownby oursenseof whatwe shouldfeelin thatsituation.
For example,one mayrealistically expect(knowingoneselfand one'sneigh-
bor's parties) to feelboredat a large New Year's Eve partyand at the
sametimeacknowledge thatit wouldbe morefitting How-
to feelexuberant.
ever,"expectto feel"and "shouldideallyfeel"oftencoincide,as below:
Marriage, chaos,unreal,completely in manywaysthanI imag-
different
ined.Unfortunately we rehearsed the morning of our weddingat eight
o'clock.The wedding was to be at eleveno'clock.It wasn'tlikeI thought
(everyone wouldknowwhatto do). Theydidn't.Thatmademe nervous.
My sisterdidn'thelpmegetdressedor flatter me (nordidanyonein the
dressing roomuntilI askedthem).I was depressed. I wantedto be so
happyonourwedding day.I neverdreamed howanyonewouldcryat their
wedding. A wedding is "thehappyday" of one'slife.I couldn'tbelieve
thatsomeof mybestfriends couldn'tmakeit to mywedding and that
addedto a lot oflittlethings.
So I startedoutto thechurch andall these
thingsthatI alwaysthought wouldnothappenat mywedding wentthrough
mymind.I brokedown-I criedgoingdown."Be happy"I toldmyself.
Thinkof thefriends, and relatives
thatarepresent. (But I finally
said to
myself, "Hey peoplearen'tgetting married, you are. It's forRich [my
husband]andyou.") Fromdownthepretty longaislewe lookedat each

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 EmotionWork

other'seyes. His love for me changedmy whole being. From that point
on we joined arms.I was relievedand the tensionwas gone. In one sense
it meantmisery-but in the truesense of two people in love and wanting
to share life-it meant the world to me. It was beautiful.It was inde-
scribable.
In any given situation,we ofteninvestwhat we expect to feel with
idealization.To a remarkableextenttheseidealizationsvary socially.If
the"old-fashioned bride"above anticipatesa "right"to feeljealous at any
possiblefutureinfidelity,
the young"flowerchild" below rejectsjust this
right.
. . .when I was livingdown south,I was involvedwitha groupof people,
friends.We used to spend most eveningsafterwork or school together.
We used to do a lot of drugs,acid, coke or just smoke dope and we had
this philosophythat we were very communaland did our best to share
everything-clothes, money,food,and so on. I was involvedwiththis one
man-and thoughtI was "in love" withhim.He in turnhad told me that
I was very importantto him. Anyway,this one woman who was a very
good friendof mine at one time and this man startedhaving a sexual
relationship, supposedlywithoutmy knowledge.I knewthoughand had a
lot of mixedfeelingsabout it. I thought,intellectually,
thatI had no claim
to the man,and believedin fact that no one shouldever try to own an-
otherperson.I believedalso thatit was none of mybusinessand I had no
reasonto worryabout theirrelationship together,forit had nothingreally
to do withmy friendship witheitherof them.I also believedin sharing.
But I was horriblyhurt,alone and lonely,depressedand I couldn'tshake
the depressionand on top of those feelingsI feltguiltyforhavingthose
possessivelyjealous feelings.And so I would continuegoingout withthese
people everynight,and tryto suppressmy feelings.My ego was shattered.
I got to the pointwhereI couldn'teven laugh around them.So finallyI
confronted my friendsand left for the summerand traveledwitha new
friend.I realizedlater what a heavy situationit was, and it took me a
longtimeto get myselftogetherand feel wholeagain.
Whetherthe conventioncalls fortryingjoyfullyto possess, or tryingcasual-
ly not to, the individual compares and measures experience against an
expectationoftenidealized. It is leftformotivation ("what I want to feel")
to mediate between feelingrule ("what I should feel") and emotion work
("what I tryto feel"). Some of the time many of us can live with a certain
dissonance between "ought" and "want," or between "want" and "try to."
But the attempts to reduce emotive dissonance are our periodic clues to
rules of feeling.
A feeling rule shares some formal properties with other sorts of rules,
such as rules of etiquette, rules of bodily comportment,and those of social
interaction in general (Goffman 1961). A feeling rule is like these other
kinds of rules in the followingways: It delineates a zone withinwhich one
has permission to be free of worry,guilt, or shame with regard to the sit-
uated feeling.Such zoning ordinances describe a metaphoricfloorand ceil-

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 AmericanJournalof Sociology

ing,therebeingroomformotionand play betweenthetwo.Like otherrules,

feelingrulescan be obeyedhalfheartedly or boldlybroken,the latterat
varyingcosts.A feelingrulecan be in varyingproportions externalor in-
ternal.Feelingrulesdiffercuriouslyfromothertypesof rulesin thatthey
do not apply to actionbut to whatis oftentakenas a precursorto action.
Therefore theytendto be latentand resistantto formalcodification.
Feelingrulesreflectpatternsof social membership. Some rulesmay be
nearlyuniversal,such as therulethatone shouldnot enjoykillingor wit-
nessingthe killingof a humanbeing,includingoneself.1"Otherrulesare
unique to particularsocial groupsand can be used to distinguish among
themas alternategovernments or colonizersofindividualinternalevents.

FRAMING RULES AND FEELING RULES: ISSUES IN IDEOLOGY

Rules formanagingfeelingare implicitin any ideologicalstance; theyare

the"bottomside" of ideology.Ideologyhas oftenbeenconstrued as a flatly
cognitiveframework, lackingsystematicimplicationsforhow we manage
feelings,or, indeed,forhowwe feel.Yet, drawingon Durkheim(1961),12
Geertz(1964), and in parton Goffman (1974), we can thinkof ideologyas
an interpretive framework thatcan be describedin termsof framing rules
and feelingrules.By "framing rules"I referto therulesaccordingto which
we ascribedefinitionsor meaningsto situations.For example,an individual
can definethesituationofgettingfiredas yetanotherinstanceofcapitalists'
abuse of workersor as yet anotherresultof personalfailure.In each case,
theframemayreflect a moregeneralruleaboutassigning blame.By "feeling
rules"I referto guidelinesforthe assessmentof fitsand misfitsbetween
feelingand situation.For example,accordingto one feelingrule,one can
be legitimately angryat the boss or company;accordingto another,one
cannot.Framingand feelingrulesareback to backand mutuallyimplyeach
other.

11 But this,too. seems to be culturallyvariable. Erving Goffmanpoints out that hang-

ings in the 16th centurywere a social event that the participantwas "supposed to
enjoy," a rule that has since disappeared in civilian society.
12 Durkheim, in The ElementaryForms of Religious Life, conveys just this under-
standingof the relation of world view to feelingrules: "When the Christian,during
the ceremoniescommemoratingthe Passion, and the Jew, on the anniversaryof the
fall of Jerusalem,fast and mortifythemselves,it is not in giving way to a sadness
which they feel spontaneously.Under these circumstances,the internal state of the
believeris out of all proportionto the severe abstinencesto which theysubmit them-
selves. If he is sad, it is primarilybecause he consentsto beingsad. And he consentsto
it in order to affirmhis faith" (Durkheim 1961, p. 224). Again, "An individual . . . if
he is stronglyattached to the societyof which he is a member,feels that he is morally
held to participatingin its sorrows and joys; not to be interestedin them would be
equivalent to breakingthe bonds unitinghim to the group; it would be renouncing
all desire for it and contradictinghimself"(1961, p. 446, emphasesmine).

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 EmotionWork

It followsthatwhenan individualchangesan ideologicalstance,he or

she dropsold rulesand assumesnewones forreactingto situations, cogni-
tivelyand emotively.A sense of rightsand dutiesapplied to feelingsin
situationsis also changed.One uses emotionsanctionsdifferently and ac-
ceptsdifferent sanctioningfromothers.For example,feelingrulesin Ameri-
can societyhave differed formen and womenbecause of the assumption
thattheirnaturesdiffer basically.The feminist movement bringswithit a
new set of rulesforframingtheworkand familylifeof menand women:
the same balance of prioritiesin workand familynow ideallyapplies to
men as to women.This carrieswithit implicationsforfeeling.A woman
can nowas legitimately (as a man) becomeangry(ratherthansimplyupset
or disappointed)over abuses at work,sinceherheartis supposedto be in
thatworkand she has therightto hope,as muchas a manwould,forad-
vancement. Or, a manhas therightto feelangryat thelossofcustodyifhe
has shownhimselfthe fitterparent."Old-fashioned"feelingsare now as
subjectto new chidingsand cajolingsas are "old-fashioned" perspectives
on thesame arrayof situations.
One can defyan ideologicalstancenotsimplyby maintaining an alterna-
tive frameon a situationbut by maintaining an alternativeset of feeling
rightsand obligations.One can defyan ideologicalstanceby inappropriate
affectand by refusing to perform theemotionmanagement necessaryto feel
what,accordingto the officialframe,it would seem fitting to feel.Deep
actingor emotion work, then,can be a form of obeisanceto a givenideologi-
cal stance,lax emotionmanagement a clue to an ideologylapsedor rejected.
As some ideologiesgain acceptanceand othersdwindle,contending sets
of feelingrulesrise and fall.13Sets of feelingrulescontendfora place in
people'smindsas a governing standardwithwhichto comparethe actual
lived experienceof, say, the seniorprom,the abortion,the wedding,the
birth,thefirstjob, thefirstlayoff,thedivorce.Whatwe call "the changing
climateof opinion"partlyinvolvesa changedframing of the "same" sorts
of events.For example,each of twomothersmay feelguiltyabout leaving
hersmallchildat day care whileworkingall day. One mother,a feminist,
mayfeelthatshe shouldnot feelas guiltyas she does. The second,a tradi-
tionalist,may feelthatshe shouldfeelmoreguiltythan,in fact,she does
feel.
Part of what we referto as the psychologicaleffectsof "rapid social
change,"or "unrest,"is a changein the relationof feelingrule to feeling
and a lack of clarityaboutwhattheruleactuallyis, owingto conflicts and
13 Collins suggeststhat ideologyfunctionsas a weapon in the conflictbetweencontend-
ing elites. Groups contend not only for access to the means of economic production
or the means of violence but also for access to the means of "emotion production"
(1975, p. 59). Rituals are seen as useful tools for forgingemotional solidarity (that
can be used against others) and for settingup status hierarchies(that can dominate
those who findthat the new ideals have denigratingeffectson themselves).

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AmericanJournalof Sociology

contradictions betweencontending sets of rules.Feelingsand framesare

deconventionalized,but notyet reconventionalized. We may,like themar-
ginalman,say, "I don'tknowhowI shouldfeel."
It remainsto notethatideologiescan function, as RandallCollinsrightly
notes( 1975), as weaponsin theconflictbetweencontending elitesand social
strata.Collinssuggeststhatelitestryto gain access to the emotivelifeof
adherentsby gaininglegitimate access to ritual,whichforhimis a formof
emotivetechnology. Developinghis view,we can add thatelites,and indeed
social groupsin general,struggleto assertthe legitimacyof theirframing
rules and theirfeelingrules. Not simplythe evocationof emotionbut
laws governingit can become,in varyingdegrees,the arena of political
struggle.

FEELING RULES AND SOCIAL EXCHANGE

The seemingly staticlinksamongideology,feelingrules,and emotionman-

agementcome alive in the processof social exchange.Studentsof social
interactionhave meanttwo thingsby the term"social exchange."Some
have referred to theexchangeof goodsand servicesbetweenpeople (Blau
1964; Simpson1972; Singelmann1972). Others(G. H. Mead) have re-
ferredto an exchangeof gestures,withoutthe cost-benefit accountingre-
ferredto in thefirstusage.Yet acts of display,too,maybe considered "ex-
changed"in the limitedsense that the individualveryoftenfeelsthat a
gestureis owed to oneselfor another.I refer,then,to exchangeof acts of
displaybased on a prior,sharedunderstanding of patternedentitlement.
Any gesture-a cool greeting,an appreciativelaugh, the apologyfor an
outburst-is measuredagainsta priorsense of what is reasonablyowed
another,giventhe sortof bond involved.Againstthis backgroundmea-
sure,somegestureswillseemmorethanample,othersless.
The exchangeof gestureshas, in turn,two aspects; it is an exchangeof
displayacts (Goffman1969,1967)-that is, of surfaceacting-and also an
exchangeof emotionwork-that is, of deep acting.In eithercase, rules
(displayrulesor feelingrules),once agreedupon,establishtheworthof a
gestureand are thusused in socialexchangeas a mediumofexchange.Feel-
ing rulesestablishthebasis of worthto be ascribedto a rangeof gestures,
includingemotionwork.Emotionworkis a gesturein a social exchange;
it has a functionthereand is not to be understoodmerelyas a facetof
personality.
Thereseemto be twowaysin whichfeelingrulescomeintoplay in social
exchange.In the first,the individualtakes the "owed" feelingto heart,
takesit seriously.For example,a youngwomanon the eve of her college
graduationfeltanxiousand depressedbut thoughtthatshe "oughtto feel
happy," and that she "owed this happiness"to her parentsformaking

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 EmotionWork

her graduationpossible.The parentsfeltentitledto a seriesof gestures

indicatingher pleasure.The younggraduatecould "pay" her parentsin
emotivedisplay,a surfaceactingdissociatedfromher "real" definition of
the situation.Goingone step further, she could pay themwitha gesture
of deep acting-of tryingto feel.The mostgenerousgestureof all is the
act of successfulself-persuasion,
of genuinefeelingand framechange,a
deep actingthatjells, thatworks,thatin theend is notphony(since it is
whattheemotionis) thoughit is nonetheless nota "natural"gift.
The secondway feelingrulescomeintoplay in exchangeis shownwhen
the individualdoes not take the affectiveconvention seriously;he or she
plays withit. For example,an airportobservation:There are two airline
ticketagents,one experienced,one newon thejob. The newagentis faced
withthetaskof rewriting a complexticket(involvingchangeofdate,lower
fare,and creditof the difference
betweenthepreviousand presentfareto
be made towardan air travelcard,etc.). The newticketagentlooksforthe
"old hand,"whois gone,whilethecustomers in lineshiftposturesand stare
intentlyat the new agent.The "old hand" finallyreappearsafter10 min-
utes,and the following conversationtakesplace: "I was lookingforyou.
You're supposedto be my instructor." Old hand: "Gee," withan ironic
smile,"I am reallysorry.I feelso bad I wasn'there to help out" (they
both laugh). The inappropriate feeling(lack of guilt,or sympathy)can
be playeduponin a way thatsays,"Don't takemynonpayment in emotion
work,or display workpersonally.I don't want to work here. You can
understand that."The laughterat an ironicdistancefromtheaffective con-
ventionsuggestsalso an intimacy;we do notneedtheseconventions to hold
us together.Whatwe shareis thedefianceof them.

COMMODITIZATION OF FEELING

In the beginning we asked how feelingrulesmightvaryin salienceacross

social classes.One possibleapproachto thisquestionis via theconnections
amongsocial exchange,commoditization of feeling,and the premium,in
manymiddle-class jobs,on thecapacityto managemeanings.
Conventionalized feelingmay come to assumethe propertiesof a com-
modity.When deep gesturesof exchangeenterthe marketsectorand are
boughtand sold as an aspect of labor power,feelingsare commoditized.
Whenthemanagergivesthecompanyhis enthusiastic faith,whentheair-
line stewardessgivesher passengersher psyched-upbut quasi-genuine re-
assuringwarmth, whatis sold as an aspectoflaborpoweris deep acting.
But commoditization of feelingmaynothave equal salienceforall social
classes.It mayhave moresalienceforthemiddleclass thanfortheworking
class. The way each class socializesits childrenmay,furthermore,prepare
themforfuturedemandsfortheskillof emotionmanagement.

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AmericanJournalof Sociology

WhenI speakofsocialclass,it is not strictly speakingto income,educa-

tion,or occupationalstatusthatI refer, butto something roughlycorrelated
to these-the on-the-jobtaskof creatingand sustainingappropriate mean-
ings.The bankmanager,theIBM executive,forexample,maybe required,
in part,to sustaina definition of self,office,
and organization as "up and
coming,"or "on thego," "caring,"or "reliable,"meaningsmosteffectively
sustainedthroughacts upon feeling.Feelingrulesare of utmostsalience
in jobs such as these; rule remindersand sanctionsare more in play.
It is not,as ErichFrommsuggests, thatthemodernmiddle-class man"sells
his personality," but that,moreprecisely,manyjobs call foran apprecia-
tionof displayrules,feelingrules,and a capacityfordeep acting.
Working-class jobs more oftencall for the individual'sexternalbe-
haviorand theproductsof it-a car partassembled,a truckdelivered500
milesaway,a road repaired.The creationand sustaining of meaningsgoes
on, but it is not such an important aspectof work.Physicallaboris more
commoditized, meaning-making and feeling,less. Surely,too, thereare
working- or lower-class
jobs thatdo requirethecapacityto sustainmeanings
and to do so, whennecessary, by emotionwork;thejobs of prostitute(El-
merPascua,workin progress)and personalservantrequirefeelingmanage-
ment.But to theextentthatmeaning-making worktendsto be middle-class
work,feelingrulesare moresalientin themiddleclass.
Thereare jobs,likethatofsecretary or airlinestewardess,withrelatively
low financialrewardsand littleauthority, whichnonetheless requirea high
degreeof emotionand displaymanagement. Such jobs are oftenfilledby
women,manyof whomcomefromthemiddleclass. Suchworkersare espe-
cially important as a sourceof insightabout emotionmanagement. Being
less rewardedfortheirworkthan theirsuperiors,theyare morelikelyto
feeldetchedfrom,and be perceptiveabout,the rulesgoverning deep act-
ing. Deep actingis less likelyto be experiencedas part of the self and
morelikelyto be experienced as partof thejob. Justas we can learnmore
about "appropriatesituation-feeling fits"by studyingmisfits,so too we
can probablyunderstand commoditized feelingbetterfromthoseforwhom
it is a salientformof alienation(see Kanter's[1977] excellentchapterson
secretaries).

CLASS, CHILD REARING, AND EMOTION WORK

Middle-and working-class parentstendto controltheirchildrenin different

ways (Kohn 1963, 1969; Bernstein1971). Given the generalpatternof
each class tendsto prepareits childrenwiththe skills
class inheritance,
necessaryto "its" typeof workenvironment and to pass on class-appro-
priateways.
Middle-classparentstendto controlvia appeals to feeling,and thecon-

570
 EmotionWork

trolis moreof feeling.14 The working-class parent,by contrast,tendsto

controlvia appeals to behavior,and thecontrolis moreof behaviorand its
consequences(Kohn 1963; Bernstein1971). That is, themiddle-class child
is morelikelyto be punishedfor"feelingthewrongway,or seeingthings
in thewronglight,"or havingthe"wrongintention," whereastheworking-
class child is morelikelyto be punishedforwrongbehaviorand its con-
sequences.The class difference in socializationamountsto different
degrees
of trainingforthecommoditization of feeling.This is yetanotherway the
class structurereproduces itself.(Thanksto CarolinePersellforthispoint.)
It maywell be that,especiallyamongthemiddleclass,a corresponding
value is now placed on "authenticity," on thingsas they"trulyare" or
"once were."Authenticity, whichLionelTrillinghas describedas the"new
moralvirtue,"whenit refersto unworked-over feeling,may be rendered
scarceforthosein themeaning-making sector.For thissector,thepattern
may be that of conventionalizing feeling,puttingit on the market,and
lookingfor"authenticity" (see Trilling1972).15

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Why,we asked at the beginning, do we feel in ways appropriateto the

situationas muchof thetimeas we do? One suggestedansweris: because
we activelytryto managewhatwe feelin accordancewithlatentrules.In
orderto elaboratethissuggestion
we consideredfirstthe responsiveness of
emotionto acts of managementas it is treatedin theorganismic
and inter-
activeaccountof emotion.Accordingto theinteractive account,we are not
14 As Kohn comments,". . . middle class mothersare far more likely to punish their
son physicallyfor what they call loss of temper than for behavior definedas wild
play. They appear to findthe child's loss of temper,but not his wild play, particularly
intolerable" (1963, p. 308). Again, ". . . The interviewreportsindicate that the dis-
tinctionbetween wild play and loss of temperwas most often made in termsof the
child's presumedintent,as judged by his precedingactions . . . if his actions seemed
to stem fromthe frustrationof not having his own way, theywere judged to indicate
loss of temper" (Kohn 1963).
15 Accordingto Trilling,the place of "sincerity,"as a moral virtue, has been taken
(Trilling'sverb is "usurped") by "authenticity."Sincerityrefersto the relationbetween
innerfeelingand outward display. Trillingoffersmany definitionsof authenticity, but
one seems to referto the relationbetween the self as emotion managerand the inner
feelingsso managed.He citesWordsworth'spoem "Michael" about a veryold shepherd:
"When Michael, afterhaving lost his son Luke to the corruptionof the city,continues
to build the sheepfold which he and the boy had ceremoniallybegun together,his
neighborsreportof him that sometimeshe sat the whole day, 'and never liftedup a
single stone"' (1972, p. 93). There is no act of self upon feeling; he is not psyching
himself"up" or "down," he is not "lettinghimself"feel grief,or deliberately"getting
into" his grief.It is on thisaccount called "authentic,"and deemed nowadays valuable.
What now ironicallyunderminesauthenticity,as a virtue,is the cultural beliefin the
mutabilityof inner feelingand the individual's capacity, with therapeuticguidance
or otherwise,via "emotion work" or otherwise,to change fundamentallywhat is not
implacablyascribed afterall.

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 AmericanJournalof Sociology

alwayspassivevis-a-visan uncontrollable floodof feeling,and thoseocca-

sionaleffortsto activelyshape our feelingcan sometimes be effective.Tak-
ing thisaccountI beganto articulatetheemotion-management perspective
firstby distinguishing it fromthe dramaturgical perspectiveon the one
hand and the psychoanalytic perspectiveon the other.I thensuggested
some links amongemotiveexperience,deep acting,and feelingrules. In
turn,feelingruleswereseen as the bottomside of ideologyand therefore
subjectto thesamepressuresforchangeas are ideologies.
Conventions of feeling(i.e., what one is supposedto feel) are used in
social exchangebetweenindividuals.Individualsoperatetheirexchanges
accordingto a priorsense of what is owed and owing.Individualssee
themselves as beingowedand as owinggesturesof emotionwork,and they
exchangesuch gestures.People bond,in the emotivesense,eitherby ful-
fillingthe emotiverequirements situationscall forth(e.g., the graduate
tryingto feel happy) or by holdingjust theserequirements to one side
(the ironicticketagentacknowledging thesincerefeeling"due" theother
evenwhileplayingwiththatnotionof debt).
Justas gesturesof emotionworkcan be exchangedin private,so they
can be exchangedin the marketplace,as an aspect of what is sold and
boughtas laborpower.In such a case we can speak of the "commoditiza-
tion" of emotionwork.This prevailsmoreforworkerswhosejob it is to
make and sustainmeanings(e.g., "this is an up-and-coming company";
"this is a pleasant,safe airplane")-jobs foundmorein the middleclass.
Commoditization is less salient for those in physicallabor or nonsocial
mentallabor,morecommonin theworkingclass. A reexamination of class
differencesin childrearingsuggeststhatmiddle-class familiespreparetheir
childrenforemotionmanagement more,working-class familiesless. Each,
in this way, preparesits childrento psychologically reproducethe class
structure.
The emotion-management perspectivecan be applied to any numberof
areas. We know littleabout how feelingrules vary in contentfromone
occupationto another.The funeralparlordirector,the doctor,the com-
plaintsclerk,the day-careworkerall apply a sense of "should" to the
situated feelingsthat emergein the course of a week. How do these
"shoulds"differ?Crosscutting occupationaland class differences, theyare
likelyto exhibitculturaldifferences associatedwithgenderand ethnicity.
Indeed,a goodplace to studychangein feelingruleswouldbe thestrataof
personsforwhomtherightof mento cry,or feelfearful, is extendedover
a greaterrangeof situations,and forwhomthe rightof womento open
angeris extendedover a larger,sanction-free, zone. How has this set of
feelingrules,as theunderside offeminist ideology,alteredtheunderstanding
betweenmen and womenas to what feelingsare latently"owed" and
"owing"? We need to ask how different sexes, classes, and ethnicand

572
 EmotionWork

religiousgroupsdifferin the sense of what one "ought to" or "has the

rightto" feelin a situation.How different
is the burdenof hiddenwork
tryingto obey latent laws? Finally,in whose interestare these feeling
rules?Some managingof feelingpromotesthesocial good. Some does not.
Surelytheflightattendant'ssensethatshe "shouldfeelcheery"does more
to promoteprofitforUnitedthanto enhanceherowninnerwell-being.

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