Authoritarianism in America New York: Werper Colling 2018 Author of the New York Time: besesollee THE WORLD ACCORDING TO STAR WARSinstitutions. That’ true for purposes of conserving critical resources. Bur ir also true for pusposes of drawing, publi attention and debate. In today zen engages can't be taken for banded a when the stakes are high and the polity Our “ie” is not what ie was. Nor is our “ m4 ‘Western liberal consumerist democracies, citi ed. It must be hus | preserved, treated asa resource to be deployed n some danger: AUTHORITARIANISM IS NOT A MOMENTARY MADNESS, BUT AN ETERNAL DYNAMIC WITHIN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES KAREN STENNER AND JONATHAN HAIDT INTRODUCTION Western liberal democracy seems to be in the grip of a mo- nentary madness, or so the story goes. All across the West, jrublics we might have hoped were evolving in linear fashion into more perfece democratic citizens have “suddenly” been overcome by a “wave” of “far-right” fervor. ‘They bristic with nationalism and anti-globalism, xenophobia, and isolation- ism, There are calls e ban immigration, to deport “illegals,” and to abandon asylum obligations. Migrants and refugees are seen as threats to national security: as terrorists in wait- ing or in the making. Significant public resources ate 10 be diverted to their surveillance and to thwarting the evils they would otherwise surely perpetrate. Beyond their depictionat “the enemy within,” they are deemed an existential threat to euleure and national idendty, competitors for jabs, and a brake on national prosperity, Leaders are exhorted to fa- vor their own countrymen over ‘alicns” and outsiders, and to shield them from the brutal forces of global trade with protectionism, These unexpected public demands seem to travel with an angry rejection ofthe leaders and instiutions that pulled these “politically incorrect” options from the policy menu. ‘There is a fundamentally antidemocratic mood afoot that has fost patience, in pacticulus, with the strictures of politi cal correctness In these conditions, formerly reviled patties and movements that once languished on the hinges have become viable—acceptable if not quite respectable. “The newfound popularity of these parties—some with past ot Present ties to Nazi idcology—is fucled by perceptions that the political mainstream has lost touch with those they are micant to represent, “Self-serving” political elites, leaders viewed as remove from regular folk but “pandering” to i nnorities, seem to Feed into a growing sense that “this is not my government” and “these are noe my people.” This may Well be the animating spisit at the heart of whathas come to be called “far-tight populism,” While the origins of these developments are open to ‘question, the purported outcomes have unquestionably been shocking 10 many. Donald Trump ascended to the Antica presidency, Partisanship and ideology aside, itis hard to imagine chat ‘Tiumps temperament and experience equip him for leadership of the fice world. Britain voted to exit the European Union in a history-changing veletenddam: And the French flirted dangerously with Le Front National, While (co many commentators’ palpable relief) Marine Le ” 35 percent of the presiden- populism might have been. ‘The same ean be Pen was ultimately held co ju tial vote, this can he s only compared with wh: ava victory over far said regarding; che recent performance of the Freedom Pury’ Norbert Hofer in Austria’ presidential lection, In both cases, the far-right populist andidate came close 1 winning the presidency of a major Western nation, and note, in neither ‘ase facing off against a contender fiom the traditional “lel or “right” Geert Wilders’ Purty for Freedom was blocked fom the Dutch goveining coalition, despite placing second, & 6 spite p B only via the determined callusion of ll his mainstreann opp rncnts. Recent general elections in iny and Austria have likewise seen a marked “populist” surge that upended Snor- inal” politics, Whatever these political brands might once have represented, “lei” versus “right” is being overturned in at new game of “insiders” versus “outsiders”... or so it POPULISM AS A PERSON-SITUATION INTERACTION So what is dlenly” come fiom? From its alleged suddenness, many ana- s far-right populism? And where has it “sud Iysts have arrived at explanations that are redolent of sudden ill health, By chis account, far-right populism is a momen. tary madness brought on by recent environmental stressors Gre global financial criss, the decline of manufsctucing the inevitable dislocations of globalism) and exploited by inresponsible leaders who deflect the patients’ anxicties ontoeasy scapegoats (migrants, refugees, terrorists) for their own 1 co this diagnosis is the notion that the political gain. Con patients’ ears are irrational and can bealleviated by more re sponsible treatment and the reduction of stress (by boosting the economy or increasing social supports). With appropri nterventions and the removal of toxic influences, it is ate thought that our populists will eventually “snap out of it” and come back to their senses. The social scientific literature on populism crosses many disciplines, and the concept is frequently and casually de: ployed-in both acade cannot do justice to it here. Many accounts converge on the idea that populism is a kind of “zeitgeist” in which the pure/real/true people are seen to be exploited by a remote! cortupt/self serving elite (c.g., Mudde 2004: 560). In what is pethaps the most explicit and detailed definition, popu and popular commentary. We een as “pit|ting] a virtuous and homogeneous people against set of elitesand dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sover ign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity, ancl voice” (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008: 3). From our per spective, the addition of these details—regarding the good 9s of the ingroup, and the outgroup’s intent ness and same! ne their values and identity—serves mostly w really more “eit wo undern reinforce our sense that populism per geist” than political ideology or enduring, predisposition On its own, it scems to us more a complaint about the eur rent state of the world (a perception of contemporary cowli tions) rather than a vision of the good life. Ie gains substance m and meaning only when fleshed ou and prefixed by some- thing ele, like fr-right populism: what Mudde and Kale wasser (2017) would call “host ideology.” Only then do we know both what our populists actually want (virwie andl homogencity the one right way fr the one rus people) and how they presently feel (that elites and dangerous “others” ate thw ing those desitcd ends) Broken down in this man ety we cam see that the pres: ent phenomenon of far-right populism Fis easily into the framework of a “person-situation interact fener thae heart of social psychology. ‘Ihis is the notion that Behavior at the isa function of the Person (stable pessonality and enduring : uurrent (ever shifting) Zinvinon tment: = 2 £). More poimedly, ic is neatly encompassed by an interaction that Sterner (2005) labeled the “wuichoi- Carian dynamic": intolerance of difference = authoritarian predisposition x normative threat. In this essay, we contend thac the political shocks roiling Western liberal democracies *€ present —which in reality began with rumblings in the ‘aits) interacting with thei 1990s—are more appropriately and efficiently conceived as products of this authoritarian dynamic, THE “AUTHORTARIAN OYNAaC* Aparsimonol ACCOUNT OF "FAR-RIGHT POPULISM" = Ji the opening paragraphs of this paper, we took care w draw out owo distinct but se ingly entangled components of the sument wave of far-right populism, ‘Ihese were (i) a multi beeeted demand for les diversity and dilference in society {the “far-right” component: a particular conception of the00 fie) and Gi) a crtgue of che faiths ears and in stitutions currently failing to deliver this life (the “populism component), presumably dae 1o their political correctness and fidelity to values remote from what The People actu- sled up together, the wo components fuel the ally want. 1 populist fervor that now besets the West, From the perspec~ tive of n dynamic,” this “far-right pop- nts the activation of authoritarian predispositions (in the roughly one-third of the population who are so inclined) by perceptions of “normative threat lise” tangle (put mgse simply: threats unity and consensus, ot “one: ness and sameness"). ‘the predictable and well-understood (not sudden or surprising) consequences of activating this authoritarian dynamic—of “waking up” this latent endog: enous predisposition withthe application of exogenous nor ative thecat—are the kinds of strident public demands for greater oneness and sameness that we now hear all around us Stenner explicitly noted thatthe theory of the authorita ended ro explain “the kind of inteler ian dynamic v ance that seems to ‘come out of nowhers,’ that can spring up in colerant and intolerane cultures slike, producing, sudden changes in behavior that cannot be accounted for by slowly changing culeural traditions” (Stenner 2005: 136). In the remainder of this paper we will outline the theory of the authoritarian dynamic, briefly review available evi dence, and then examine whether this alternative account provides more compelling, and simpler explanation of pop ingly diverse cases of Trump, Breit ulisin across the seer and the National Front. We take advantage of an extraordi naty data set collected by EuroPulse in December 2016 that ives us deep insights into voting for populist candidates and causes in the United States, Britain, and France. ‘THE AUTHORITARIAN DYNAMIC HOW AUTHORITARIANISM IS DIFFERENT FROM CONSERVATISM, Stenner (2005, 20094) identified three distinc psycho cal profiles of people who are typically lumped together un- der the unhelpful rubric of “conservative,” and who tend {© vote for candidates designated as “right-wing.” ‘The ke ter ica largely comtentfie seléplacement, whose meaning is inconsistent across culcures and times, On this so-called Nght wing of politics, Stenner distinguished between what she called “laissez faire conservari tives,” and “authori status jo conserva- arians.” Ie is vital wo keep this only the authoritarians who shew ndencies and a willingness to support extremely illiberal measures (uch as the forced ex- al or religious groups) under certain cond » normative threat) tion in mind becaus persistent antidemocr: Laisser faire “conservatives” are NOL Conservative in any real sense, ‘They typically self-idemtify as classical liberals or libertarians. They strongly favor the free market and are usu ally pro-business, secking to thwar efforts to “socialist” or “left-wing” fervene in the economy and redistribute wealth, Psychologically speaking, they have nothing in common with authoritarians (Haide 2012). Authoritarians—those who demand authoritative constraints on the individual wwlly in all maners moral, political, and cacial—are sor genet averse ¢0 government intrusions into economic life. L ily found to be either ee ; ism or else inversely related to it, unrelated to authoritar ilk impli uted in intolerance of populism co any sig- nificant degree. ERSUS AUTHORITARIANISM VI “STATUS QUO CONSERVATISM! cally Status quo conservatives are those who are psycholo predisposed to favor stability and resist rapid chang a certainty. They ate ina sense the true conservatives: the crvatism is only mod- of Bdmund Burke, Sams quo conservatism is only estly associated with authoritarianism and intolerance, and only under very specific conditions, Ie tends to align with ncolerant attitudes and behaviors only where established in ‘ 4 accepted norms and practices are intolerant Ina culture af sable, long-established, institutionally sup. ported and widely accepted tolerance, status quo ee tism and authoritarianisin will essentially be unbitched, and status quo conservatism will lend licele support to intol attitudes and behaviors ; Contrast status quo conservatism then with authoritari isposition tw favor obedience, con eee ace oe Gand ng here of a psychological Bear in mind that we are speal ee predisposition and not of political ideology, nor of the « 10 that we make no el sitions of Donald Trump acter of political regimes. (Note about the psychological pre Marine Le Pen, or any other political leaden, Authoti anism is an attribute of the follower, not necessarily of the leader, and one does not need to be an authoriear nto suc cessfully deploy authoritarian rhetoric and attract author {arian followers) Authoritarianism is substantially heritable {McCourt et al. 1999; Ludeke, Johnson, and Bouchard 2013) and mostly determined by lick of “ope rience” (one of the “Big Five” perso 89 10 expe ty dimensions) and by cognitive limitations (Seenmer 2005); these are two fac tors that reduce one’s willingness and capacity (respectively) tw tolerate complexi y diversity, and difference tn conerant to status quo conservatism, authoritarianism is primarily driven not by aversion to change (difference over Lime) but by aversion to complexity diflerence across space) In a nutshell, authoritarians are ‘simple-minded avoiders ef eomplesiy more than clescd-minded avoiders of change" (Stenner 2009: 193), This distinction mattets for the chal lenges currently confionting liberal democracy because in the event of an “authoritarian revolution,” authoritarians may seek mass social change in pursuit of greater one ness and same *s, willingly overturning established institu ‘ions and practices that their (psychologically) conservative pects would be drawn to defend and picserve ‘To avoid tautology with the dependent vatiables we are "ying to explain—a problem chat plagued earlier research on The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al. 1950) Nenner (2005) usually gouges “latent” authoritarianism ‘sith a lowdevel measure of fundamental predisposition: ‘apically, respondents: choices among, child-rearing valu. 18imple, when asked what qualities should be aan children, anthoritatians tend to prioritize obedi- s anenadl ing well behaved over things For & aged i ence, good manners, and bei ing like independence, curiosity, and thinking for oneself. Pit ding this "bare bones” measure of authoritarianism aginst 1” and the whole roster of socio- ting ¢ any variety of “conserva ea demographic variables—inclucling education, income, gen Jer, class, and religiosity —Stenner (2005: 133; 2009: 152) hav shown via the World Values Survey that ani a is the principal determinant of gencral intolerance of differ: WHAT AUTHORITARIANISM DOES! es ane toward attitudes and behav Authoritarianism in eee iors vaio eon with sci ory ands i that enhance sameness and minimi nneractions in ways iy ok people, beliefs, and behaviors. It tends 10 pro acteristic array of functionally related cee duce a cha i all of which have the effect of glorifying, encouraging, isparaging, suppressing, and rewarding, uniformity and disparaging, supp ef difference. Since enkancing uniformity and min Fa 6 i cersity implicate others and require - exe imizing diversi eager cl avior, ultimately these stances ir . Gace (as in driving a black family from th: wcghborhood) and, more often, demands forthe use of neighbor . state) group authority (ie, coercion by th bat In the end, then, suppression of difference and << essitate autocratic social arrany ment of uniformity necessitate aut ents in which individual autonomy yields to. gro 14 authority. In this way, authoritarianism is far more than a personal distaste for difference, It becomes a normative worldview about the social value of obedience and confor- 'mity (versus freedom and difference), the prudent and just balance between group authority and individual autonomy (Duckite 1989), and the appropriate uses of (or limits on) that authority. This worldview induces bias against different others (racial and ethnic outgroups, immigrants and refu- gees radicals and dissidents, moral “deviants”), as well as Political demands for authoritative constraints on their be- havior. The latter will typically include leyal disctimination against minorities and restrictions on immigration, limits ‘on fice speech and association beh id the regulation of moral » via policies re cl cheit p ding abortion and home itive enforcement). senmality WHEN AUTHORITARIANISM DOES THIS heory of the “authoritarian dynamic” tells us ex actly sehen authoricarianism docs these things, making it 2 useful tool for understanding the current wave of popu As noted earlier, the authoritarian dynamic posits that invol- evant behavior isa fanction ofthe interaction ofan enduring psychological predisposition with transient environmental conditions oFnormative threat. Stenner contends that in the absence of a common identity rooted in (the usual case in our large, di ce oF ethnicity se, and complex modem ‘us” an “us"—that make us one and the same—ate common authority (oneness) and shared values (sameness). Accordingly, for authoritatians, sucieties), the things that mak esthe conditions most threatening to oneness and sameness are questioned or questionable authorities and values, eg., disrespect for leaders and instieutions, authorities unwor- thy of respect, and lack of conformity with or consensus in nd beliefs. This is what Stenner has termed group norms “pormative threat,” or “threats to the normative order” Stenner (2005) demonstrated the prevalence and sig- authoritarian dynamic with many different nificance of th kinds of data, showing that the incolerance produced by au- is substantially magnified when respondents: thoritasianis + perceive that the public and political elites are ideologically distant, or that leaders on all sides have 2005: 57, from che Jee them down (see Ste Durham Community Survey, 1997) + are experimentally exposed to seemingly real news coverage about “leaders unworthy of our trust,” or “Fractured public opinion? where “no one agrees on anything anymore” (see Figure | below, from the Gulnral Revolution Fxperiment 1995, reported in Stenner 2005) are being interviewed at « time of high variance ing, some particularly in public opinion (e.g.sd fiactious week in US history, as determined by the survey responses to the General actual variance Social Survey 1972-2000, sce Stenner 2005: 314) + ate living in « place (egy some nation of the world) marked by high variance in public opinion (see Ste 2005: 314, from the World Values Survey 1990-1995) 106 we tel Ro Shear ome 4 — 8" eorng Team FIGURE 1. Elects ol authoritenanis Guns fects o authoraansn on general itaerance of diene 9 "al manipulation o| teat. Reprint rom Stennos 2009, In every case, normative th s Normative threat dramatically increased the influcnce of authoritarianis ‘ iat intolerance of ji ‘cial, political, and moral, The laiter constitute Non general the authoritarian’s classic “defensive arsenal,” conce wich difereniating, defending, and lorfing te conditions that appear to threaten “us? by esi a discriminating against “them? racial and ethnic mines Ss inmigrits and fae, poll dient, rc and moral “deviants.” Notice that the activation of the au thoritavian dynamic by collective threat in one domain wll {yPclly boot the ply of thse casi ads nd be haviors across all domains, ‘Thus, should fe rs about Mus- its will usually provokeauthorivarians to a whole panoply “of sympathetic “vibrations,” which might include surdens demands to limie wands to limic rights and procections for “domestic”racial/ethnic minorities, to restrict free speech and assem: iby, and to deploy state authority to write moral strictures into public policy, e.g. to roll back gay rights and “crack down’ on criminals Without a theoretical framework that pulls all these seemingly disparate behaviors together—as functionally rclaced elements of the authoritarian’s classic defensive stance—contemporary analysts can be left puzzling over (for example) why support for the death penalty and for the public whipping of scx criminals" should turn out to be the strongest “predictors” ofa vote in favor of Brexit (Kaufmann 2016). ‘The authoritarian dynamic offers such a framework, which here we will test using recent EuroPulse daca on pop list voting across the US, UK, and France, ‘THE EUROPULSE DATA SET AND ‘OUR ANALYSIS PLAN DATA: EUROPULSE DECEMBER 2016 ‘he EuroPulse survey is conducted each quarter by Dalia Research (Germany). Dalia uses 4 proprietary sofeware plat form to reach respondents through web-enabled devices as they interact with a wide range of websites and apps, Dalia seeks out users fitting the required profile for the task and offers them access 1o premium content in exchange for si vey completion.? ‘This should reach a more representative slice of the relevant population and interview them under more natural conditions than is possible (for example) ise ing email invitations to that atypical portion of a population that has sufficient interest, time, and energy to register for AUIMOICTANANDMIS NOT A MOMEHTARY AtAOWESS research panels and complete omplete surveys on any topic fir mod- est material rewards ne One ofthe world’ largest omnibus surveys, HuroPubse fy conducted across all ovemty-eight EU countries, in twenty. one different languages. Four times a year the ForePulse aid interviews census representative sample of 10,000 Europeans to track public opinion on av \ ] satiety of copies. In the unique insance of the EuroP alse survey cond ei over December 2-11, 2016—just a few weeks after US voters elected President Trump on November § Daliaadded a rep- fssentative US sample to the EuroPulse mix, "Ther stated pur. Pose was to enable researchers ta detect any commonalitis in Populist suppore across the US and for Bre ope (including voting nthe UK and for the National Front ia Brance), Publicly issuing a "Research Challenge” to that effect EXCLUDING NON-WHITES FROM ANALYSES The EuroPulse. ‘Plus-US data set of December 2016 in- cluded 12,235 respondents: n=1,052 in the US sample and - 1,283 across the European Union. eee siven the nature of our research questions, we excluded non-whites from the current pe leaving a in the US (which also excluded Hispanics) and n=10,500 tcross the EU. As explained elsewhere (Stenner 2005), this is noe to say that authorie cased ‘arianism is necessarily expressed in a fundamentally different manner depending i ee cxhniciy, OF majority/minority scacus, than among whites veross Europe and the US. It is just thae the demarcation ‘of ingroups and ourgroups, and delineation of the norms 9allegiance, might vary. porities to which one owes allegi MWe would noc cpec, for amps, ey aortas mone, Afvicar American leaders of the Black Lives Mat- ter mavement to propel chem toward & vote es Jr movement (0 oie fe Donald or North African Muslim immigrants Tay any peor tm athoviaian- e attracted (by ; it 7 whe ‘ "1 Front, Excluding non-white left us & ism) to the Nationa sample of 11,161 respondents from twenty- ries, esent search ose of special intesest in our present search ae cei populist voting across the US for a common dynam f (1-661), UK (n=1,256), and France (n=1,285). DEPENDENT VARIABLE: POPULIST VOTING 1 analyses—our prin « dependent variable throughout out : ae interest —was the probability of voring for ipal outcome of eae for the US sample, this was list candidates and causes. I a is ecember) of rellected by respondent sl-epore (in ne ; : =) ted for Donald Trump in the presidential election Sl oe the UK, the dependent variable havi st a few weeks prior % respondent } IEreport of having voted a few mon earlier in the British referendum of June 23 in Soe ing the Buropean Union. For our French saanple, pop c roting, was indicated by self-reports of intended yore in the be h would be the presidential elec tupcoming election, which tion of April/May 2017 “There is mostly good cortesper i andthe et neidence of both vo turnout an! ve and the real incide idence berween these self reports aa heeee in these elections, although our starting sample « seem to over-represent Americans who tured out (0 vote) 190 eid and to under represent Britons voting to leave the European Union, probably due to some combination of selection aud social desirabilicy bias (Karp and Brockington 2005). Survey respondents are disproportionately likely t0 vote, and people tend to over-report engaging in civic behaviors such as vor- ing, Similadly, it may be that chose groups that leaned toward exiting Europe were disinclined subsequently ro broadcast that, as well as generally less disposed to answering surveys.* In any case, only those who said they voted (or intended to vote, in the case of France) wore retained in the fallowing analyses, leaving final sample sizes of 451, 858, and 1,045 for che US, UK, and France, respectively. Our dependent variable was scored “1” for a vote in favor of Trump, Brevit, or Le Pen, and “0” otherwise. We analyzed each of these three vote choices separ ly, since they reflect very different But we synthesized our finding the three counties, decision context pce our main goal was ultimately eo identify commonalities in the forces driving populist voting across liberal democracies, MAIN EXPLANATORY VARIABLE: AUTHORITARIAN PREDISPOSITION We followed our previous practice in forming a “bare bones” measure of authoritarianism from. respondents choices among, paits of child-rearing values. As always, we sought a measure that reflected something more akin to a deep-seated, enduring pol ical “personality” than a current policy attiuudes that could do so across widely varying cul- ‘ures with different ingroups and ourgroups, dissidents and amdeviants; and that did not make specific reference to objects, actors, or events that featured in current political contests and might be the very subjets of our inquiries, We formed our measure of authoritarian predisposi n from responses to the following four EuroPulse icems: “Which is more important for a child to have? Indepen- dence ( Respect for elders? Obedience f Self-teliance? Con idleration for others | Good behavior? Curiosity J Good jan (each seor- manners?” Responses considered ; ing °1°) were respect for elders, obedience, good behavior, and good manners. Alternativdy, preference a children being independent, self-reliant, considerate, ans ey flecced the inverse of authoritarianism (cach seoring Any inability or refusal to choose between a pair of values, (don't have an opinion’) was considered a neutral response (scoring “0.5"). After summing, these four components, 1g seale to be of one-unit range, and re-scoring the re f a point on “0” (to ease interpretation of in suthoricarian centering its n n teraction coefficients), our final measure ol predisposition ranged across nine points fiom ~0.5 10 +0.5. ' measure, about a third of white re According to r spondents across these ewenty-nine liheral democracies proved to be authoritarian 1 some degre, inthe sense of passing the neutral midpoint of the scaleand leaning roward f i ces, Specifically, 33 per authoritarianism in their value choices. Speci I 33 Ps é cent were authoritarian, 37 percent were non-authoritarian, and 29 percent were “balanced” or neutral. KEY INTERACTION CONDITION: NORMATIVE THREAT We constructed aa overall measure of “normative threat from several key sentiments found in the ButoPulse survey. ‘We sought to reflect three core components of threat to the normative onder: loss of societal consensus, loss of coui- dence in leaders, and loss of confidence in institutions First, the closest sentiment we could find in the Faro Pulse survey ro perceived loss of consensus was the express feeling that one counery was “going in the weong direc tion? (either “very wrong” ot “somewhat wrong’) in response {0 the question “Over the past 5 years, bas {the United States / ‘the United Kingdom | France] gone mor re in the right oF wrong din Second, we n casuured general loss of confidence in lead- ers by means of stiong, agreement with the statement “Gor ernment is cantrlled by the rch lite,” which readers right ‘scopnize as an item sometimes deployed in measures of Populiso, (Recall our earlier assertion that so-called popu lise nriments might more simply be understood as percep. ions of normative threat.) ‘Third, we wanted ton ure loss of confidence in gov- way that captured both dissati- the curene government and disillusion with democratic government more gencrally. To thisend, we com. bined ordinal cae responses to wo question: “How sats ar you with te way democracy works in your country?” (which ranged across four points from “ery satisfied” up to “not at att satsfied”), and “What is your opinion ofthe government in (whe United Stats ! the United Kingdom 1 France|?” (which ferment institutions in a faction with 193ranged across five points from “very positie” 10 “very neg sive”), Summing these ovo equally weighted components created a finely graduated nineteen-point measue reflecting “dissatisfaction with democratic governmen Finally, our overall measure of normative threat stan dardized and summed these three equally weighted compo- nents and re-scored the result to be of one-unit range. This overall scale (deployed in all subsequent analyses) ranged across seventy-five points from "-.5” to “.5," centered on a midpoint of “0.” OTHER EXPLANATORY VARIABLES ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS. An adequate test of the explanatory power of the authoriear ian dynamic in this domain muse necessarily also control far the economic “distress” thavis ing populist sentiments and voting behavior. A number of scholars have noted recently that economic factors actually seem rather weak and inconsistent predictors of populism and intolerance, particularly compared with value conflict and cultural “backlash” (see Inglehart and Norris 2017) Stenner (2005) previously found that, to the extent that economic factors did predict expressions of intolerance, the effect tended to be confined to negative retrospective evalua tions of the national economy, which might be felt asa kind of collective threat by authoritarians (although the effects of such threats were rarely as powerful er consistent as the classic normative threats), In contrast, Stenner found that personal evonomic distress tends ro either be inconsequen 98 tial ov actually ; tually diminish the impact of authoritarianism on intolerance, perhaps i fr «, perhaps by distracting authoritarian irom theit problematic concern with the fate of the collec improving” their behavior es thereby Kinsey the EuroPuke survey measured the standard er evaluations, including four items asking for retrespective and prospective evaluations of both the na~ tional economy and one’s awn household fi: Retrospective i ne evaluation-national economy: “How think the general economic situation a [the United States / the United Kingdom / France] has changed over the past 12. months? (thas... gota lor better, gor a little better, stayed the same, got a litele worse, got a lov worse, I don't know).” Prospective evaluation-national economy: “How do you expect the general economic situation in United States / the United Kingdom / a i change over the next 12 months? (Ie will... get 2 lot better, gota little better, stay the same, get a lide worse, get alot worse, dorit know)” Retrospective evaluation-houschold finances: ‘Compared to 12 months ago, your household financial situation is... (a lot better, a litle ie the same, a like worse, a lot worse, dont Prospective evaluation-houschold finances: “Huy do you expect the financial position of y 195houschold to change over the next 12 months? ewill , .. (get alot berter, geca litte better, say the same, ger a litle worse, got a loc worse, don't know)” ‘As noted, these diserete evaluations (whose pairwise cor- relations here ranged from .20 10 .54) have typically been found to exert varying influence on intolerant and populist sentiment, and were thus left as separate variables in our model MODELS AND METHODS employed logistic regression to analyze cach of our di chotomous measures of populist voting, as a function of the authoritarian dynamic—the interaction of authoritar- ian predisposition with our overall measure of normative neat Note thar each of these models also originally included ascontrols the four discrete items reflecting economic evalu ations, 2s well as the interactions of those evaluations with authoritarianism. With sample size rimmed by the elimina- tion of non-whites and non-voters, it was important not to overload the models, particularly in view of their estima- tion via logistic regression, ‘Thus, if any of these evaluations or thcir interactions proved statistically insignificant, they vere removed from the model in question. ‘The full models and raw results (logit coefficients) from which the findings presented here in the ext are derived are reported in Appen- dix F, Table 1, at www.KarenStenner.com under “Reposi- 196 tory” (including resules for the economic control variables) culated from those raw results are also reported there in Appendix B, Table 2. Here in the text i ‘The conditional coefficients (marginal effects) If, we present succinctly in fable 1 (below) only our core findings regarding the impact of the authoritarian dynamic, as conveyed via changes in the pre- dicted probability of voting for populist candidates and causes, given different predispositions to authoritarianism, and varying conditions of normative threat. YADLE 1, PROBABILITY OF VOTING FOR POPULIST CANDIDATES AND CAUSES: ‘ump, Brevi and Le Pen (2010-2017) ing] DeVoting fortum) [for Bree) | for Le Pe) flocs af ‘over independent imeraction | Increasing X changes Px hom variables (X): conditions: o . ‘Antberisarantons | bh nara ei rome | gy 87° | 30-»,9% | 1.6 ‘fuid norman | 21 63° | 38.68" | 07> 31 ‘flew mrmaive seawman| ast [aya |r Vt pdiaon pirat vies (548 lane oi Sigoeed | ay oat | ae-~0 | ov se prelspotion Nos Piston: dred faite esa anaes in Append Fle | at teuxn KarenSentercon wader “Repastar’* pict arp < OSBefore turning our focus to the authorivarian dynamic, wwe note first that aushoritarianisa did indeed prove to be the main “background” determinant of populise voting across all three countries in our investigation. That is to say, there ‘was no socio-demographic variable whose impact on popu- lise voring, exceeded that of our basic hild-rearing, values” not education, income, reli- measure of authoritariani rural residence. We found that gion, gender, age, or utb: the impuct of authoricarianism was substantial even ordinary conditions—among, those not feeling particularly reasing the probability of a threatened (or reassured) populise vote by about .42, 30, and .24 in the US, UK, and France, respectively (see Appendix K ‘lable 2, upper panel}. Put more simply, even given middling perceptions of Americans ranged fom normative threat in their poli of voting for Trump as about a .21 to a .63 probab authoritarianism went from its lowest t0 its highest ley- els (Gee ‘Table 1, page 197). Similarly, highly authoritar ian Britons had about a 68 percent likelihood, and their non-authoritarian peers about a 38 percent chance, of vor ing to leave the European Union when perceptions of nor- mative threat were unremarkable, And under those same ian Fveach conditions, about 31 percent of highly author voters would likely opt for Le Pen, compared co only about 7 percent of their non-authoritarian compatriots A.NOTE ON INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS Note that all the statements dircctly above simply represent akernative ways of describing the results presented in the 198 upper pane! of Table 1 (page 197), across the row labeled “if mid normative threat.” ‘Ihis seems the appropriate place to pause and ensure we have clarity first on some important issues of methodology and terminology. For us, the “im- pact” of any independent variable (e.g., authoritarianism) is the difference in expected outcomes (c.g., in the likeli hood of voting for Trump) between those scoring at the extremes (highly authoritarian versus. non-authoricarian) of that explan: ory variable, Technically, it is the change predicted in the dependent variable for a one. + the change in the prob- ability of populist voting in response to a one: in the independent variable, nit increase n authoritarianism. Recall we scored all our variables such that a “one-unit increase” always entails moving, across the full range (from lower to upper bound) of the explana- tory variable, c.g., it is the difference beoveen the very non-authoritarian and the highly authoritarian, ‘the change that such an increase induces in the likelihood of populist voting is, in our terminology, the “impact” of that explana ariable. Ceucially, we expect thae this impact will vary under dif ferent conditions, eg, given conditions of normati sssurance. This varying impact is reflected by the vary ing, magnitude and direction of the conditional coefficients we report in Appendix F, Table 2, and Likewise by t ness and direction of the slopes in the associated I ac 3 (below), ‘Ihe reader can refer to Appendix F, Table 1 the full results from which these conditional coefficients and slopes were derived.Frotablty of Votig for aca FIGURE 2: Inpact af authortarianiem on voting fer populist cancdates and ‘cavsee for those who perceive low voreus high normative throat. RESULTS IMPACT OF AUTHORITARIANISM ON POPULISM, GIVEN VARYING NORMATIVE THREAT Figure 2 (opposite) depicts the impact upon voting for pop ulise candidates and causes of moving across the fall range of the authori yachovitarian ianism measure (from very non up to highly authoritarian) as the variable with which it inceracts—normavive dhreat—is held, in turn, at very high and low levels. ‘these diferent slopes graphically reflect what we have called the author varying effects of authoritarianism under conditions of nor mative threat and reassurance. ian dynamic: they represent the reflect the ‘The thie constituent pancls of Figure probability of voting for'Trump, Brexie, and Le Pen, respec tively. All these authoritarianiom x normative thveat interac ions proved to be very substantial and highly significant (sce Appendix F; ‘Table 1). As anticipated, the impact of authoritarianism was greatly magnified (steepened) under conditions of normative threat, For example (see Figure 2, upper panel), we found that authoritarianism increased the probability of voting for Tiump by about .80 under con ditions of high normative threat, with the likelihood of a ‘Tiump vore ranging from only about 7 percent (for non authoritatians) to about 87 percent (for authoricarians) among disillusioned respondents who saw their govern- ment as controlled by rich clites and their country headed in the “wrong direction.” Note that the steepness of these slopes and their end points (botia specified above) align, re- spectively, with the marginal elfeets reported in Appendix F, 201“Table 2, and with che marginal probabilities presented here in Table 1 (page 197). Much the same pattern was evident for the UK (see Fig tute 2, middle panel), where we found chat authoritarianism increased the probability of voting to leave the European Union by about .64 given conditions of high normative threat, with the likelihood of favoring Brexit ranging from about 30 percent (for non-authoritarians) to about 93 per- cent (for author democracy itself were al found sorely wanting (see Table 1, page 197). Likewise reganing the electoral appeal of the National Front in France (see Figure 2, lower panel). Here rians) when leaders, governments, and we found that authoritarianism increased the probability of voting for Le Pen by about.75 given high normative threat, elihood of a vore for the National Front ranging, from about 11 percent (among non-authoritarians) to about 84 percent (among authoritarians) given wholesale loss of confidence in democratic government and leadership (see ‘Table |, page 197). Notice that throughout Figure 2, this impressive impact of authoritarianism is ing under conditions of great normative rea effectively flawcened to virtually noth: surance, Le, when people are sure their country is headed in the Fight direction and feel confident in the workings of democracy, positive about the government, and unconcerned about elite machinations. Although the marginal effects are not statisti cally s hint in these pictures that under these reassuring societal nificant in the case of reassurance, we see at least a conditions, authoritarians might even be repelled by pops 1 movements, seemingly lending more of their support 10 mainsticam parties and Ieaders when the normative oxder seems intact and functional, and worthy of their allegiance. Keep in mind itis noe that people become less authoritar- ian under these conditions, only that their authoritarianism produces intolerance. Their inherent predispo sitions remain intact but huent, awaiting only the sounding of the next societal alarm—about immigrant hordes, moral decay, political disarray—to kick back into action and haul out the defensive arsenal. IMPACT OF NORMATIVE THREAT ON POPULISM, GIVEN VARYING AUTHORITARIANISM. Some of this becomes clearer still when viewed from a dif- ferent angl Figure 3 (page 204) simply tales that same authoritarianism % normative threat interaction and depicts it fom the other side, this time showing how the impact upon populism of normative threat (of moving from the lower bound of the scale, reflecting great reassurance, up to the upper bound, indicating extreme threat) depends on the predispositions of the perceiver: whethe or non-authoritarian authoritarian When considered from this alternacive perspective, the potential political power of the authoritar dynamic is readily apparent. In the lower panel of Table 1 (page 197), wwe see chat increasing feelings of normative threat intensi- fied autraction wo populism even among those of “balanced” disposition (ac least outside che US), who were driven a con siderable way toward voting for Bresit and nearly halfway 20aProbably of Voting for Tame df ota jor Broxt q 3 é oe mative Tht or populist candidates and RGURE 3. Impact of normative threat on voting for popu aut, for these wh are ow versus high in authoritarianism, 204 to accepting the National Front as feelings of normative threat soared. But this impact of normati c chreat on popu list voting was basically dowbled for those of authoritarian disposition, As anticipated, it was authoritarians—heavily rested in the normative order that fills theie world with oneness and sumeness—who were by Far the most reactive to normative threat (see Figure 3). For example, we cal laced that rising normative threat increased authoritarians’ probability of voting for Ti p by about .58 (sce Appen- Table 2), boosting their likelihood of a Trump vote from about 31 percent, among these feeling reassured about the polity, up to about 87 percent, for those convinced their world was coming apart (sce Table 1, page 197). We detected the same forces at work in the UK sample (see Figure 3, middle panel), where ve found that mounting threats to the normative order drove authoritarians toward Icaving the European Union, boosting their likelihood of fa- voring Brexit from about 27 percent, when feeling roundly reassured, up 0 about 93 percent, once highly threatened (see Table 1, page 197). An even starker picture was painted for France (sve Figure 3, lower panel), Here we saw the accu mulation of normative threat incecase authoritarian’ prob- ability of voting for the National Front by about .80, lifting their prospects of tapping Le Pen for the presidency from as litde as 4 percent, given constant reassurance, 10 as much as 84 percont, in the lave of intense normative diteat (see ‘Table 1, page 197), Finally, our evaluation of the evidence is not complete until we consider how normative threat affects those at thelower bound of the authoritarian spectrum. Actors ewo de cades of empirical research, we cannot think of a significant cxception (0 the finding that normative threat tends either to leave non-authoritarians utterly unmoved by the things that catalyze authoritarians or to propel them toward being ¢ 2 Tn previous (what one might conceive as) their “best investigations, this has seen non authoritarian move toward positions of greater tolerance and respect for diversity n= er the very conditions that scem to propel authoritarians toward increasing intolerance. Ina nutshell, authorica jans more act moré like auchoritarians, and non-authori fike their antithesis, under these conditions. As authoritari- ans move to shore up their defense of oneness and san roa authoritarians may redouble their own efforts on behalf of the “open sociery.” Based now on th te uthoritarians’ “activation” —in defense of iy latest evidence, it seems that no freedom and diversity over obedience and confor include to share this vision of the good! life. Certainly this appears to hold ar least for non- sians in che contemporary United Stares: see Fig- jection of populist candidates:ane cuss shat fa authorita see Fig: upper panel, for a stark depiction of this “classi ion under conditions of normative threat, Iris so- polariza bering, indeed to ponder the self-Facling properties of this dy ceptions of normative threat produce i olarix increasing mative threat—which is surely implicated in our debilieat- nic —where pero fon that in turn further exacerbates not ing contemporary “culture wats” (eealso Hetherington and ‘Weiler, 2009). 208 ECONOMIC FACTORS WEAK AND INCONSISTENT ‘The one empirical task that remains is to compare the im- pact of the authoritarian dy {mic on support for populist candidates and causes with that of economic “distress,” va iously conceived. As noted at the outset, the notion that populist acticudes and behaviors are driven, in some way, by economic distress i one of the most com offered for the c the GFC, the dec dislocations of glabal on accounts in the wake of rent “wave” of popilis < of manufacturing, and the inevitable sm. It is « highly “rational” account of the populist phenomenon, with economics and material ism atts core, and analysts offering these kinds of accounts sometimes go to considerable lengths even to reframs festly nonmaterial explanations in materialistic terms, For example, there is the argument that anti-immigrant senti ment is not ceally (or only) about immigration, but instead (or additionally) a means of expressing economic fears and displacing them onto the immigrants (refugees, minorities, guest workers, tcrrorists-in-the-making) who are purport- cally stealing the natives’ jobs and draining communal se sources that ought to be reserved for the locals, Onr own investigation finds the evidence in support of the notion that populism is mosily fueled by economic distress «o be weak and inc 4 however that distress is conceptualized, Preliminary analyses confirmed chat the four economic evaluations available in the EuroPalse data (retrospective and prospective evaluations of the national economy and household finances) represented distinet sen- timents, and ought co be entered separately in our model.In terms of both the magnicude and direction of their ef- fects, these four variables exerced widely varying, influence on populism (in contrast to the various components of nor- mative threat), as a review of the economic results in Appen- dix F will confirm. This persisted even without controlling for authoritarianism and notmative threat, and regardless of whether the model included interactions between authori- tarianism and the various economic components. We found that the elfeets of these economic evaluations mes, large and were cither weak and inconsistent of, some’ Evaluations of household finances seemed counterincuiti mostly inconsequential as predictors of populist voring {which accords with the generally modest effects discemed for income). Perceptions of (past) national economic decline had some mixed effects (including, in the case of France, in interaction with authoritarianism), but certainly seemed co ‘Trump. Yet even that fi propel some voters towar ng sits ely counterintuitive resule, with side by side with a seem positive evaluations of dhe economic ftir apparently asso Gated with support for both Trump and Brexit (see Appen, dix F), Of course, the direction of causality remains unclear Given that these hopeful sentiments were measured affer the ing, voted for ‘vote in each case, it is quite possible that h “Trump!Bresit, these voters consequently felt more optimis- tic about the future. It is plausible that a vote for ‘Trump may have reflected i some part dissatisfaction with past cconomie progress together with hope for a future economic suraround. Ifso, this would make Americas choice of a bil Fionaire businessman for president an expression not just ol aoe unleavened economic fear and disappointment but abo at leasta touch of economic hope and optimism for the future. Inany case, what we found is thac there is no real pattern to be discerned in regard to economicinfluences across cither the components or the different polities. This would accord with the inconsistent findings typically reported by others, and with the general state of uncertainty scgarding whether we are truly confronting a “wave” of pop- ulism (and whether i¢ is surging or has stopped), and also with the continuing disagreement over the direc salty between anti mn of eau nmigrant sentiment and professions of distress. We refer here to the dispute over whether our “popu perceptions of financial/economic threat and projecting 5" are typically starting with (eal or invagined) that onto easy targets like immigrants, or whether they ate starting with their opposition to immigration and—due to the constraints of political correceness—merely expressing that as economic distress (viz. “the immigrants are stealing our jobs’). We think the totality of evidence tends to favor the latter, a theme we will return to below. DISCUSSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DOES NOT BREED DEMOCRATS p ascended to the American presidency, Britain exited Europe, and the French flirted with dhe National Front be- cause Western liberal democricies have now exceeded many people’ capacity to tolerate them—to live with them, and in chem, “This is hard to accept until one comes t0 terms1, First, people are not empty vessels with vo critical rea waiting to be filled with appreciation and enthusiasm for democratic processes. It is pethaps ironic char tolerance of difference is now threatened by liberal democras’ refusal to recognize thaemany of their fellow citizens ace... different. We all come into the world with distinct personalities, which is to say, predisposed to want, need, and fear different things, including particular social arrangements. Presumably, soci- eties with a diverse mix of complementary characters tended to survive and adapt to changing environments in human evolution, Notwithstanding son necks, these different person: eriarian, open and closed, riske-seeking and risk-averse, 10 name but a few—have over time distributed themselves all around the world. “Ihis means there are plenty of would-be liberal democrats languishing in autoctacies, and many au- ”Fiberal democ- ancient migration boule- tics authoritarian and lib choritarians struggling along under “vibrant” Second, there is remarkably little evidence that living in a liberal democracy generally makes people more democratic including those and tolerant. ‘This means that most soci “blessed” with democracies—will persistently harbor a cer tain proportion of residents (by our calculations, roughly 3 thir!) who will always find diversity difficult co colerate. That predisposition, and chose limitations, may be hugely immov able. And this is th f right about normative threat serving as a critical catalyst for these charactets, then the things that multiculcaralists be lieve will help people appreciate and thrive in democracy a0 capetiencing difference, talking about difference, displaying and apple ding, difference—are the very conditions that en. courage authoritarian not to the h ights of tolerance, but «0 their intolerance extren Democracy in general, and tolerance in particular, might actually he better served by an abundance of common and unifying rituals, institutions, and processes, IS ANYBODY LISTENING? Democratic enthusiasts and multiculturalists sometimes make the mistake of thinking we are at an enlightened point in human history (Fukuyama 1992) when all these different personalities daily experiencing the joys of incceasing liberty and democracy— ‘ ieevolving in a ily predictable and linear fashion into more perfect democratic citizens. This is why the populise “wave” strikes many observers momentary mach ness that “comes out of the bluc,” and why these “ nuts that seem to fuel these moven s are often considered merely the products of frustration, hacred, and manipulation by i responsible populist kader n rainly not setious, legitimate preferences that a democracy must attend to. When authoritarians raise concerns about say, the rates or sources of immigration, they are not acta saying, “I'm. scared I might lose my jab,” but in fact, “Uhis is ue me very uncomfortable and I don't like where our country is headed.” Moreover, “Nobody will let me say so, and only tu s that if Trump had not come along, a ‘Trump-like figure would have materialized eventually. It may be the case that many Republicans would have voted for anyone marketed under ump-like figure} is listening to me.” Our senthe Republican brand, And Hillary Clinton may well have won if FBI director James Comey had not made his ill timed announcement. And it scems likely chat Russian interfer ence tilted the outcome, Bu one must still explain why Trump like figute was even within reach of che presidency, rrumpelike figures are popping up all over, and and why cxtements that crities thought would why the outrageous s surely destroy their candidacies seem to be the very things that most thrill their supporters and solidify their bases. Trump publicly inviting Russia to hack into Clintonis from a number of private emails was shocking to ma perspectives, but pethaps the most prominent was the lack of horror expressed by many of his supporters at what might conceivably be characterized as treason, When be ing interviewed about his forcign policy, Tiump assured the Families” of us that he himself would happily “take o sentially, making a public dec suspected ISIS terroris \gness to commit war crimes. Far from laration of his will provoking horror, Trumps many astonishing s all indelibly infused with dassic authoricarian sentimenes ion by ments and stances—were greeted with a kkind of exhi his supporters. It became clear that a kurge portion of the American people felt the nation’s political leaders had not just failed them buc actually did not represent them, Here “represent” goes well beyond mere political representat to something more primitive, like “belonging,” In essence “You are not us.” In this state of mind, it no longer seemed beyond the pale to publicly invite a dangerous and long, standing adversary co spy on the country’s leaders, oF ex tol the effec ss of war crimes for nipping, tectorism in the bud. The gleeful reactions of Trump's supporters to hi fongman” posturing attested to their anger and biccerness regarding the “political correctness” of the “lib- eral elite,” and the ple sure they seemed co detive from watching someone who sounds like “us? f nally sticking to “th = . IMMIGRATION POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSE Clearly, immigration policy is the flashpoint for populism and offers a critical starting point for any new effores at civil peace, If citizens say chey'te concerned about the race of im- ation, we ought to at least consider the possibility tha they'te concerned about the rate o Seaiies f immigration, and not merely masking a hateful racism or displacing their economi woes onto easy scapegoats Common sense and historical experience tell us that dhere is some rate of newcomers into any community that is too high to be suscainable—that can overwhelm ot even damage the host and make things worse for both old and new members. Its also common sense that newcomers are more difficult to integrate than others — expecially when re are clashing values and lifestyles. Some Imight, accordingly, need to be more carefully selected, ot more heavily supported and resourced t0 encou igeand aid thei «ssimilation. All these things must be considered when formulating a successful immigration policy (Lait 2016). Ignoring these issues is not helpful to cither the hosts or the anaintain that the hest com- newcomers. It is implausible co ma i cosfully integrate any kind of newoomer at munity can succe’ a y rate whatsoever, and ics unreasonable to assert that any other suggestion is racist, ‘As noted, we already have some idea of what the te- anus f J cohesion are in many other comtexts, quirements for social « zane 1 surely types and degrees of affinity berwcen host -s of entty, and methods of support There are nd newcomers, Fate: re nd inclusion that facilicate successful in- nity, Prank consideration of these acceptance of immigration policy {four liberal democracies their assimilation tegration into the comm natcers is the key to bro: and vital to the continued nee ee Hor all the reasons we have « " a tial for free currently known, but are knowable. It is est ties hese issues openly, and a maiter of great societies to discuss the empirically investigate these parameters ee 1 hard evidence. Most obviously if and sectle the matter with i i ed ‘able wo discuss these kinds of questions openly, they ew a co mainstream political de could simply be incorporated int ped by bates and effectively managed by = fuel for intolerant social movements immigration policies normal political processes, cutting, much of the : cr important benefit of better aaa ating improverents i sec ck oie 4 the prospects of radicalization ion and cohesion are likely to redu 7 and error, since these phenomena may be dives in large part, by the disintegration of perpetrarors from families and communities DEMOCRACY’S CORE DILEMMA, AND A CRITICAL CROSSROADS. Alchough we have paid great attention here to the role played by normative threat in the populist phenomenon, one critical thing t0 note about authoritarians is chat th are not especially inclined to perceive normative (or indeed, any other kind of) threat—they are just especially reactive when they do. If anything, authoritarians, by their very ature, want to believe in authorities and institutions; they want to feel they part of a cohesive community. Ac cordingly, they seem (if anything) to be modestly inclined coward giving authorities and institutions the benefit of the doubt, and lending them their support unt these seem incapable of msine the moment ning “normative orden.” As our observation of the mechanics of the authoritarian dy: namic made cleat, authoritarians are highly reactive and highly mal le. Depending on their ass nent of shift ing cavironmental conditions, they cin be moved from indifference, even positions of modest tolerance, to ag. grewsive demands ¢0 “crack down” on immigrants, minori- ties, “deviants,” and dissidents, employing the full force of st ys the current state we find ourselves in can easily be made much worse, or much bet ter, by how we come together and respond to this now in terms of attending, wo people’s needs for oneness and same- ness; for identity, cohesion, and belongings for pride and honor; and for institutions and leaders they can respect. This should take the place of demeaning and ridiculing au thoricarians, ignoring their needs and preferences (whichracy to treat a third of is an undemocratic way for a demos ack €0 its citizens), and simply waiting for them to “come bi no sane, rea their senses.” Ic is condescending to say tha sonable person could want the things they want, dherefore they must be unhinged or else are being manipulated. 2 perpetual But this is no momentary madness. [1 feature of human societies: a latent pool of need that lurks beneath the surface and seems to be activared most cer- ainly by things that constituce the very essence of liberal democracy—things such as «the experience or perception of disobedience 10 group anhorties or authorities unworthy of spect rnonconformity to group norms er norms proving questionable, lack of consensus in group values and Deli and, in general, diversity and freedom ‘Fun amok? (Stermer 2003: 17). Liberal democracy has now exceeded many people's ca pacity co tolerate ie, And absent proper understanding of and dynamics of this populist moment, well pments an the or meaning, citizens, political parties, likely 10 respond co these movements in ways thy only w exacerbate their negative features and enciscly possibilities. ‘The same warning goes out 10 all rld_ post and gov at serve miss their of Western Europe and the English-speaking wor Brexit. Worst of all, we might miss che real opportunities fora thoughtful, ocher-regarding reconciliation of pwo cri ical parts of our human nature: the desite to fiberate wl m6 enable the individual, and the impetus to prote ne I, and the impetus to protect and serve ‘We have shown that the far-right populist wave that seemed to “come out of nowhere” did not in fact come out of nowhere, Ie is not a sudden madness, of virus, ot tide, oF even just a copycat phenomenon—the emboldening, of bigots and despots by others’ electoral successes, Rather, i nig chat sits just beneath the surface of any haan society—including in the advanced liberal democracies at the heart of the Western world—andl cam be aetinated by core elements of liberal democracy itself. Liberal democracy can become its own undoing be is somet cause its core elements activare forces that unde nin and its best features constrain it from vigorously protece- ing, itself, So it seems we are not at the “end of (Fukuyama 1992), The “last man” is not a perfected liberal democrat. Liberal democracy may not be the “final form of human government.” And intolerance is not a thing of the pas , fuvute itis very much a thing of the present, and of the REFERENCES Adorno, Theodor, Ele Frenkel-Rraaswvik t Elke Frenkel-Rrunswik, and D. J. Levinson. 1950, anecathritarien Paso. NewYork: apes a Ro bertazai, Daniele, and Duncan McDonnell. 2008, Fenty Hirst Century Populiom, The Specter of Western Furepesn Demoonasy. United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan Duck, John. 1989, “Authoritarianism and Group [denification: A vt New ofa Old Construct.” dtc Petal, 01) 63-84 haya, Fen 1992, The End of Wary und the Fu Man, Now fork: Free Pres,Maid, Jonathan, 2012. 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This section a n draws on argomenis and evidence first presented in Stenaer (205, 2009s, 20090), 'The eer fee othe onginals for farther details and discussion 2 Interns of collec millions of potential sponds chiou {hemi apeand ves whore esse nennnudy rd actos hey demographic atributes and secre according wo census methodology, Dalits platform approaches Sere ee ck kas ee eae eae ae ad cen satis btn est i MUM ee ey ine 2016 pec eledontcompardia te Sb poren chr Summary edn wi sample) [a Br : ay to vove in the referendum, which exactly matches our British sample self reported raenoate. But az noted, our sample secms 10 in, 72 percent of those registered nurned ote ung hav, 32 pe wong ae European Union in rea, compared to 43 percent in our san Our lige do cheap nthe renchoxe,nhee 78 poreet of aoe no ee ig atin hen en the ea beetles mpd othe Mee Pee Simple wh sd dy inet wo vote). And 2 percent ima cpa ov i nid ompa 2s rcent of nple who said they intended to do so). 4 Noveshar this simply an unabtrsive mean of 7 it nce nt eet ekier how respondents were rsd or how they. atc pendent wee redo how they 1 peoplewe dase a being of authoxiran tet cay dose ner a centet. In fact, when required to “describe [their] political views: sldvgecl 2 poe of hme etbrtrachre oto the“lefewing” oon while 58 percent chupe one of eh eight sano Arh st on aa percent placed themselves left of center and 45, eae themselves right of center, : eee Peres fneed hildren a9