1AC—Plan

The United States federal government should substantially increase

statutory restrictions on the executive power of the President of the
United States to conduct first-use nuclear strikes by enacting as
congressional-executive agreements
- Article 1 of Protocol II of The Treaty of Rarotonga,
- Article 1 of Protocol I of The Treaty of Pelindaba, and
- Article 1 of Protocol I of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zone Treaty.
 1AC—NPT

Advantage one is the NPT—

NPT tensions are at a breaking point – polarization over Article VI
and the ban treaty create a unique threat to the treaty’s resilience
Durkalec 18 (Dr. Jacek Durkalec, a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, June 29, 2018. “The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty at fifty: a midlife crisis.”
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2018/Also-in-2018/the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-at-fifty-a-midlife-
crisis/EN/index.htm)
On 1 July 1968, the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ( Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty ,
or NPT ) was opened for signature. Since then, the Treaty has become a cornerstone of international
efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to eventually eliminate them and to facilitate peaceful
use of nuclear energy. With the adherence of 190 countries, the NPT is close to universal world participation. In 1995 the Treaty was
extended indefinitely, after its initial period of 25 years. The NPT remains unique as there is no other international agreement based
on a bargain between nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states. The 185 non-nuclear countries pledge to abstain from acquiring
nuclear weapons. On their side of the bargain, the five recognised nuclear possessors – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom
and the United States – promise not to help non-weapon states get nuclear weapons and to seek the grand goal of nuclear
disarmament. For the benefit of all parties, the Treaty facilitates cooperation on peaceful applications of nuclear technology under
the watch of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The
non-proliferation record of the NPT is
not perfect , although the Treaty has helped curb the spread of nuclear weapons. Its
disarmament impact, however, is far more contentious, which helps explain the
broad support for the recent Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
(TPNW). With growing polarisation among the States Parties on the pace of nuclear
NPT , at 50, enters its midlife crisis . There are reasons to expect that amid this
disarmament, the
crisis the durability of the NPT will probably be tested as never before . Non-proliferation
record Scholars disagree on the extent to which the NPT has helped to stop nuclear proliferation, as its direct or indirect impact is
difficult to prove. Yet it can be, at least partially, credited with embedding the non-proliferation norm that is responsible for keeping
the number of countries armed with nuclear weapons lower than ten. As Lewis Dunn – an astute observer of the NPT – notes,
the Treaty has curbed proliferation pessimism, which was widespread in the 1960s. The increasing number of states adhering to the
Treaty has helped to reverse the perception that ‘ runaway’ or ‘cascading’ proliferation is
unavoidable. Even though there are many reasons why all but a few countries have refrained from acquiring nuclear weapons, the NPT might have helped some of them to crystallize their decisions by compelling them to make a choice.
After prolonged political and bureaucratic debates and taking into account various considerations, countries like Australia, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and West Germany decided that joining the Treaty would be in their best interest. In the case of countries allied
with the United States, the diplomatic efforts of the United States to convince them to join the Treaty, backed up by nuclear guarantees, significantly contributed to their final choices. For many states that never contemplated obtaining nuclear weapons, technical
and financial help with the peaceful use of nuclear technology was the main incentive for acceding to the Treaty. Only three countries decided to not adhere to the NPT from the outset: India, which carried out a “peaceful” nuclear test in 1974; Pakistan, which
conducted nuclear tests back to back with India in 1998; and Israel, which has neither confirmed nor denied that it has nuclear weapons. There are positive examples of countries that joined the NPT even though they initially acquired nuclear weapon capability or
were close to obtaining it. South Africa joined the NPT in 1991 after it had unilaterally dismantled its small arsenal. Argentina and Brazil acceded to the Treaty in the 1990s after they had mutually agreed to cease their weapons-related activities. Belarus, Kazakhstan
and Ukraine became NPT members after they gave up nuclear weapons they had inherited in 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Even though the decisions of these countries were prompted by factors other than the NPT, their accession to the Treaty
cemented these decisions and made them far more difficult to reverse. The non-proliferation score of the NPT is not perfect, as a number of countries have decided to cheat and pursue nuclear options while remaining NPT parties. Yet, because of the NPT, they have
had to pursue nuclear weapons covertly, constraining their efforts. In some cases, it has bought time for them to reconsider their nuclear options, or for outside intervention that has prevented further progress. For example, Libya’s pursuit of nuclear weapons for
almost 30 years was terminated in 2003, thanks to the diplomatic efforts of the United Kingdom and the United States, and a change of mind by the country’s leader, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. Iraq’s nuclear pursuit of almost 20 years was ended by the 1991 Gulf
War, and Syria’s decade-long efforts were disrupted by Israel’s 2007 attack on the covert Al Kibar nuclear reactor. Those NPT countries that have been caught cheating and have refused to abandon their clandestine programmes have paid a significant price for
noncompliance. North Korea, which in 2003 announced its withdrawal from the Treaty and soon acquired nuclear weapons capability, did it despite extensive international sanctions and political isolation. Sanctions imposed on Iran for its covert nuclear activities
were eased after the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and Iran’s renewed commitment to abide by its obligations under the Treaty. Without the NPT, the concerted global efforts to prevent, slow down, curb, punish and reverse the actions of Iran
and North Korea would be much more difficult. The Treaty gives legitimacy to the non-proliferation norm and to actions to enforce it. While the Treaty has significant loopholes, detection of illegal proliferation by its safeguards system has mobilised efforts to
strengthen verification and enforcement. The exposure of Saddam Hussein’s clandestine programme in 1991 led to improvements of the IAEA’s inspection authority with the 1997 Additional Protocol. The Protocol has been ratified by over 130 countries. The non-
proliferation impact of the NPT Treaty has been multiplied by a dense network of international initiatives and agreements created to support the NPT goals, including the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,
the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Nuclear Security Summits. Together, these multilateral efforts reinforce the non-proliferation regime and the NPT.

Article VI of the NPT commits all parties to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to
Disarmament progress

cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control”. There are differences among NPT parties on how to interpret this
article, and a nuclear-weapon-free world remains a distant vision . While there are sharp differences among the five NPT
nuclear-weapon states in terms of numbers and variety of nuclear capabilities, the roles attached to these capabilities and their attitudes toward
reductions, they all defend their disarmament records and their fidelity to Article VI. The United States argues that its overall nuclear arsenal is 88 per
cent smaller than its peak number. According to available data, between 1967 and 2017 the US arsenal shrank from 31,255 to 3,822 warheads. Russia
claims that it has decreased its nuclear arsenal by more than 85 per cent. Under the limits of the 2010 New START Treaty, the deployed strategic
nuclear arsenals of the two biggest nuclear possessors are now capped at their lowest level since the 1950s. The United Kingdom has announced the
reduction of its operational warheads to no more than 120. France states that it has reduced the airborne and sea-based components of its nuclear
deterrent forces by one third and capped its overall nuclear arsenal at 300 warheads. China, the only NPT nuclear weapon state that does not claim any
reductions, assures that its nuclear arsenal is at “the minimal level required by national security”. The nuclear weapon states argue that these and other
Article VI .
actions they have taken, including the voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, signify progress towards the goals envisioned in

Progress toward nuclear disarmament remains, however, the most serious bone of contention
within the NPT . While the nuclear weapon states highlight what they have achieved so far, a vast majority of
non-nuclear weapon states focus on what more needs to be done. Non-nuclear-weapon states
criticise nuclear possessors for slow progress and for not fulfilling their promises, including falling short of achieving a
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has not been ratified by China and the United States. While nuclear-weapon
states and US non-nuclear allies claim that further progress toward disarmament must take into account the overall security
environment, for the majority of non-nuclear-weapon states the time for nuclear disarmament is now and arguments from countries
Risks of the current crisis The history of the NPT is
relying on nuclear weapons are not convincing.
fraught with tensions and pessimism about the Treaty’s future . Four out of nine review
conferences concluded without a consensus statement. Over past decades, there has been a
prevailing perception among NPT observers that the Treaty is in bad shape and at
risk of becoming obsolete and eventually collapsing , because of proliferation
challenges and disputes about disarmament . Discord among the NPT parties
reached new levels on 7 July 2017 when 122 NPT members voted in favour of
TPNW , which embraces the goal of outlawing all nuclear weapons, including those
possessed by the five NPT nuclear weapon states. The TPNW was opened for signature in September
2017 and has already been signed by 59 countries and ratified by ten. According to its proponents, it represents an effective measure
the TPNW ,
under Article VI of the NPT by creating a legally binding prohibition on nuclear weapons. For countries opposing
including NATO Allies, the Treaty willnot only be ineffective but risks undermining the NPT .
The TPNW can be interpreted as a symptom of the NPT’s midlife crisis – an
expression of the frustration of non-nuclear weapon states, which have a deep
sense of remorse for slow disarmament progress. For its advocates, the TPNW is also an attempt to
give nuclear disarmament new youth and energy. Eventually, it may be possible for NPT members to
find a formula of compromise and agree to disagree on the new treaty . The
troubles on the horizon are not necessarily fatal , as the dissatisfaction of some States
Parties with disarmament progress does not seem sufficiently strong to warrant withdrawal from the NPT. So
far, at least, despite many worries, no state seems prepared to make that choice. The common denominator of both proponents and
opponents of the TPNW is that their main goal is to strengthen the NPT. Yet, the
TPNW further polarises the
NPT process at a time when longstanding points of tension take on new significance
in a changed security environment . Before any compromise on the TPNW can be achieved, the
resilience of the NPT will be tested as never before , which may have irreversible
and highly undesirable consequences . With the re-emergence of “great power
competition”, managing the disarmament demands of the TPNW supporters will
be increasingly difficult. Against the wishes of many non-nuclear weapon states, the role of nuclear weapons in
international politics is not decreasing but growing. Despite its past willingness to accept strategic nuclear reductions, Russia is
increasingly relying on nuclear weapons in its security and foreign policy, which was confirmed by President Putin in a speech on 1
March 2018when he revealed new investments into various exotic nuclear capabilities. Russia’s increased nuclear emphasis over
recent years has prompted the United States to respond. Even though US investments into supplementarynuclear capabilities are
modest compared to Russian programmes and do not increase the total number in the arsenal, disarmament advocates view them
equally and treat them all as yet another sign of disingenuousness on the part of nuclear-weapon states. While Chinese actions in the
nuclear weapons realm remain opaque, there is little doubt that China has been updating its nuclear arsenal to keep pace not only
with the United States and Russia, but also as a part of its strategic competition with India. Yet the U nited S tates and its NATO
Allies remain the primary target of the TPNW activists’ ire . Failure by China and the United States to
resolve the North Korea nuclear and missile problem, and a collapse of the JCPOA, will make it much more difficult for the NPT members to maintain
unity in tackling non-proliferation challenges. If Iran resumes the activities constrained by the JCPOA, it will make the non-proliferation landscape in
the Middle East even more fragile, adding to persisting tensions that are often channelled into NPT debate about the Middle East Weapons of Mass
Destruction-Free Zone.

This time is different – polarization has decimated cooperation on

non-prolif
Müller 17 (Dr. Harald Müller, Co-chair of the Working Group on Peace and Conflict Research of the German Foreign Office;
vice-president of the EU Consortium for Non-Proliferation; professor at the Goethe University Frankfurt; has served as a member of
German delegations to the NPT Review Conferences, member and chair of the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Board on
Disarmament Matters, member of the IAEA Expert Group on Multilateral Nuclear Arrangements and of the German Defense Review
Commission; Ph.D., international relations, Goethe University Frankfurt, February 10, 2017. “The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
in Jeopardy? Internal Divisions and the Impact of World Politics.” The International Spectator, Volume 52, No. 1, 12-27.
https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/doi/abs/10.1080/03932729.2017.1270088)
The future of the NPT Some NPT conferences have ended in failure , but never with lasting
consequences . Failure usually led to increased efforts in the following review cycle
to bridge the gaps and prepare for a viable compromise. This time could be
different , not least because of the influence of global trends . The failure of the 2015 RevCon
could then, in hindsight, be interpreted as the first significant sign of decay . Already in 2015, a few
governments – Russia, France, Egypt, but perhaps also Austria and other proponents of the Humanitarian Initiative – gave the
impression that the NPT was less important than their specific interests, values or positions. Russia and France
defended their nuclear weapons status during the NPT Review in such
confrontational language that compromise became very difficult and deep
divisions grew deeper. To these states, the stability of the NPT may appear less important than their position and
identity as nuclear weapon states. For Egypt, the quest for regional status seems to be more attractive than conceding maximum
demands for the sake of agreement. Some of the protagonists of the Humanitarian Initiative spoke as if the NPT were less worthy
than the desired ban treaty. Negotiations on a nuclear ban will begin in 2017 since the General Assembly voted in October 2016 for a
conference mandated to conduct such negotiations (UN General Assembly A /C.1/71/L.41). The NWS will probably not participate,
and some of their allies will also abstain. Some might attend, but their role will be unclear, and they will certainly become the target
of pressure and blame (which, of course, will not make participation overly attractive). A ban will not necessarily be deadly for the
NPT, but it depends. The
highest risk is a ‘simple’ ban treaty , consisting merely of the
prohibition of nuclear weapons, plus the usual formal points (like entry into force, depositary, etc). In this case,
NNWS [Non-Nuclear Weapon States] parties to the NPT could decide to leave the
‘ inferior’ older treaty in favour of the new one . A simple ban would not preserve the
undertakings on verification and export controls, and such a ‘legal gap’ would deal a fatal
blow to the non-proliferation regime . This shortcoming, however, could be avoided by adopting the relevant
articles of the NPT in the new treaty so that these undertakings would stay the same. Whether the majority of ban supporters would
endorse such a move remains to be seen. Since the NPT as an international institution needs the supporting
practices of its parties as its lifeblood , it is facing a major existential crisis today :
fewer and fewer states or groups of states are unconditionally committed to its
maintenance , strengthening and improvement . The NWS are pressing NNWS to
accept improvements in non-proliferation, while blocking many initiatives for
disarmament. Their allies try to propose a balanced package of measures, but come up against bounds on what they dare to
propose in disarmament terms when alliance strategies or relations with nuclear armed allies are at stake. The NAM is
blocking new non-proliferation steps , and the protagonists of the Humanitarian Initiative are in
danger of losing their enthusiasm for the NPT as a central instrument of nuclear
proliferation and nuclear disarmament in favour of a new ban treaty. The EU, formerly a strong actor in
the NPT (notably in 1995 and 2000), has turned into a lame duck due to the Austrian-French antagonism on disarmament.46
This is an unfortunate constellation for the stability of the NPT . For the coming review period,
the most likely scenario is the continuation of a weakening NPT ; possibilities of
reform and internal change are blocked by the stalemate of polarisation and the lack of
bridge-building actors . Ban negotiations will start but possibly not succeed as quickly as supporters would wish
because, once more, the devil is in the detail, and those still caring for the NPT will try to avoid damaging it. These efforts may take
time and lead to divisions within the ban community, without narrowing the gap between ban promotors and ‘nuclear states’, the
term by which the former lump together the nuclear weapon states and their allies. All the while, the
strong focus on
the ban may divert diplomatic and civil society resources from working for smaller interim
steps that might foster non-proliferation , nuclear security and maybe even disarmament. The 2020
RevCon would then probably fail again , with the NPT, even weaker , lingering on, under
ever more pressure from a negative global political environment. Less likely, but possible, is an even worse scenario,
the probability of which will increase continuously if global circumstances remain the same or
deterioriate , that is, a more confrontational US government, a Russian leadership that continues to pressure its
neighbours, brandishing nuclear weapons, and a Chinese government enhancing its assertion of territorial claims by military means.
In such a world, nuclear armament, not disarmament, would be the core of nuclear policy. The search for local partners in
strategically important regions could induce the NWS to relax their commitment to non-proliferation .
The crisis of the NPT would become salient . A 2020 RevCon in which, confronted with a
new wave of nuclear arms racing, a majority of NNWS [Non-Nuclear Weapon States] would
demand global acceptance of a freshly completed ban treaty while a majority of
NWS [Nuclear Weapon States] and their allies would blatantly refuse this request
could bring the treaty to the point of collapse . None of this is inevitable , as everything
depends on the contingent practice of numerous actors. Times could change again, cooperation could
grow among the major states, the incremental and ban approaches to nuclear
disarmament could be reconciliated , and the NPT stabilised . But the Treaty is a
child of political reason, and political reason seems to be in ever shorter supply
these days. We could face, in the words of Barbara Tuchman, another “ march of folly ”.47

NPT breakdown triggers a widespread nuclear cascade

Coe and Vaynman 15 (Andrew J. Coe, Assistant Professor at the School of International
Relations of the University of Southern California (USC) and an adjunct member of the research
staff of the Institute for Defense Analyses, and Jane Vaynman, Associate Director of the Institute
for Security and Conflict Studies and Research Instructor at the Elliott School of International
Affairs, Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University, co-founder of the Nuclear Studies
Research Initiative, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, held
positions with the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance at the U.S. Department
of State and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, B.A. in International Relations
from Stanford University with honors in security studies from the Center for International
Security and Cooperation, University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Southern Political
Science Association Volume 77 Number 4, October 2015. “Collusion and the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Regime.” http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.1086/682080.pdf?
acceptTC=true)
All players discount the future by d > 0, and all payoffs are common knowledge. Let St N be the set of states that have nuclear weapons at the end of period t. The per-period payoff of each state j∈S is vj(St N). We

the following “ breakdown ”

assume that, for any j ∈S, T ⊂S, and k ≠ j, vj(T) ≥ vj(T ∪ fkg): for any given state, the spread of nuclear weapons to other states is (weakly) bad. We also make

assumption if any state gets nuclear weapons and the superpowers will not collude to
: ,

prevent any other state from following then all states that do not have nuclear ,

weapons will seek them immediately In effect, if proliferation gets , and SN p S will be the unique equilibrium outcome.

started and is not stopped then it will snowball This nuclear domino theory ,is .6 was, and ,

widely believed and there is now substantial evidence for it

, at least among US policy makers, (Miller 2014a). The per-period payoffs of
the superpowers are vUS p p(St N) 1 a i(St N) 2 lUS(St N) and vSU p 2p(St N) 1 a½ 2i(St N) 2 lSU(St N). These represent the two different effects that proliferation can have on the superpowers’ interests, termed inter-alliance effects and intra-alliance effects, with
the relative importance of the latter given by a. First, proliferation may alter the balance of power between the superpowers’ alliances, represented by p(·). Because nuclear-armed clients would be stronger, the spread of weapons to a superpower’s clients might
strengthen its side relative to the other superpower’s. The change in sign of p(·) between the superpowers reflects the fact that what strengthens one side’s relative power must weaken the other’s. We assume that, for any T ⊂S and j ∉ T, p(T ∪ fjg) ≥ p(T) if j∈SUS, and
p(T ∪fjg) ≤ p(T) if j ∈SSU. In other words, the spread of nuclear weapons to one superpower’s ally (weakly) shifts the inter-alliance balance of power in that superpower’s favor.7 The second effect of proliferation is to alter the balance of power within each
superpower’s alliance, represented by the bracketed terms in the superpowers’ payoffs. A client that got nuclear weapons would no longer need to rely so heavily on its superpower patron, as its nuclear arms would partially substitute for a patron’s protection. Thus, a
nucleararmed client might be more assertive of its interests within the alliance or seek more autonomy from it. On the one hand, the patron’s loss of influence over a newly nucleararmed client would be good for the other superpower, who would face a less cohesive
opposing alliance and possibly find common interests with the erstwhile client. This is represented by i(·), which can be thought of as the total US influence over all states with respect to issues where US and Soviet interests are directly opposed. The sign of i(·)
changes between the superpowers because one’s loss of influence on such issues must be the other’s gain. We assume that, for any T ⊂S and j ∉ T, i(T ∪ fjg) ≤ i(T) if j ∈ SUS, and i(T ∪ fjg) ≥ i(T) if j ∈ SSU. That is, the spread of nuclear weapons to one superpower’s
ally is (weakly) bad for that superpower and (weakly) good for the other, as the ally may now act less consistently with the interests of its patron superpower and more consistently with those of the other superpower.8 On the other hand, the patron’s loss of influence
is not fully recouped by the other superpower, because newly nuclear-armed states achieve greater autonomy from both superpowers and so may pursue interests that neither superpower supports. Proliferation can thus shift influence, not just from one superpower
to the other but from the superpowers to the other states. This is represented by the functions lUS(·) and lSU(·), which can be thought of as each superpower’s loss of influence over nuclear-armed states on issues where the superpowers’ interests are not opposed. For
any T ⊂ S and j ∉ T, lUS(T∪fjg) ≥ lUS(T) and lSU(T∪fjg) ≥ lSU(T), so that these losses (weakly) grow as nuclear weapons spread. Power and influence, as we use the terms here, should be construed quite broadly. A state’s acquisition of nuclear weapons can affect a
superpower’s interests in many ways: deterring the superpower from using military force against that state; reducing its ability to coerce that state; triggering regional instability that might entrap the superpower or require its mediation; undermining the
superpower’s alliance structure by reducing the value of or need for its security guarantees; and absorbing strategic attention that a superpower might otherwise devote to other states; all in addition to the possibility of generating further proliferation (Kroenig 2009,
2010, 2014). Each of these can be understood in terms of p(·), i(·), and l· (·). As examples, the risk of entrapment increases l· , while the reduced ability to coerce a nuclear-armed Soviet client may decrease p (the Soviet alliance is more powerful) but increase i (the
freed client may drift toward the United States). For convenience, we normalize p(∅), i(∅), lUS(∅), and lSU(∅) to zero. We also assume that p(S) pi(S) p 0 and lUS(S) plSU(S) p l(S): if proliferation goes from zero to universal, the many resulting gains and losses in
power and competitive influence for each superpower will cancel out, and each will suffer the same total loss of noncompetitive influence. Finally, we assume that, for any T ⊂ S, (1 1 d) ∣i(T)∣ ≤ (d2 =1 2 d)l(S). That is, any momentary shift in influence between the

We look for a perfect

superpowers due to some states getting nuclear weapons is no larger than the loss of influence that would result from permanent universal proliferation. Collusion and nonproliferation

Bayesian equilibrium in which no state seeks nuclear weapons .9 We require that no individual state have an incentive to
deviate from nonproliferation, as is standard, but additionally that no coalition of states drawn from S and either superpower have an incentive to deviate together. A regime that managed to keep individual states in line but that could not prevent a concerted
breakout by a group of “spoilers,” possibly aided by a superpower, would not last long. Let S1 be composed of every state j ∈ S such that vj(j) 1 d jvj(S) 1 (1 2 j)vj(j) 1 d2 1 2 d vj(S) ≥ 1 1 2 d vj(∅). As we will explain,10 S1 is the set of potential spoilers. Proposition 1.

If
There is a universal nonproliferation equilibrium if and only if, for all j∈S1 , T ⊂S1 , and a∈ fUS, SUg: jd ≥ (1 2 j) (1 1 d)vj(j) 1 d2 1 2 d vj(S) 2 1 1 2 d vj(∅); (1) 1 1 2 d va(∅) 2 ∣T ∣c ≥ va(T) 1 d(1 2 t) ∣T∣ va(T) 1 d 1 2 (1 2 t) ∣T ∣ ½ va(S) 1 d2 1 2 d va(S). ð2Þ

this equilibrium exists , it is enforced by superpower collusion to stop the spoilers .

each state is deterred from seeking nuclear weapons in one of two ways
Under this equilibrium, .

First states are deterred by the fact that their acquisition

, most would lead to the of nuclear arms

breakdown of the nonproliferation regime leading other states to seek weapons , .

For these states, the resultant widespread proliferation would be worse than
abiding by the nonproliferation regime , even if it meant giving up the chance to be the first, and temporarily the only, state to acquire nuclear weapons. However,

other states—the spoilers—have the opposite preference These states would .

actually prefer seeking nuclear weapons, even if all other states followed, to
complying with the nonproliferation regime along with the other states . This preference is formalized in the
condition defining S1 . The right side is the value of abiding by the regime, while the left side is the value of cheating on it: the spoiler enjoys sole possession of nuclear weapons temporarily, but eventually all other states get nuclear weapons as well. Obviously,

the spoilers cannot be deterred from seeking weapons by the threat of the regime’s
subsequent breakdown, since they actually prefer this outcome. Instead they are
deterred by the prospect that, if they seek nuclear weapons and are detected, the
superpowers will collude to stop them, so that the resources invested in a nuclear
program will be lost . In condition (1) above, the left side is the expected cost of pursuing nuclear weapons (sacrificing the investment d if caught and stopped), while the right side is the expected benefit of going undetected

Thus, this condition specifies that, for any spoiler, the

and getting nuclear weapons, over and above the value received from abiding by the regime.

expected cost of cheating on the regime outweighs the expected benefit. These
spoilers are not just a theoretical possibility . India sought nuclear weapons despite surely knowing that Pakistan would follow and preferring that it not; it is hard to

In a world without
believe that North Korea would have been deterred from pursuing nuclear weapons if it thought that South Korea, or any other country, would get them in response. counterfactual

superpower enforcement of nonproliferation it is easy to imagine other spoilers , . For

instance, WestGermany, which had to contend with the massive conventional forces of theWarsaw Pact and the uncertain reliability of its US security guarantee, might have resorted to nuclear arms in spite of the likelihood that other European states would follow.
For their part, the superpowers enforce nonproliferation because the cost of doing so is outweighed by the losses they will suffer from proliferation if they shirk. For each possible set of spoilers, and each superpower, condition (2) above requires that the
superpower’s value of enforcing the regime at least equal its value of shirking, wherein the superpower allows the set of spoilers to get nuclear weapons but soon faces proliferation by the other states.11 This result synthesizes the grand bargain and cartel views of the
nonproliferation regime and also exposes the flaws of each view when considered on its own. The grand bargain envisions a set of states that agree to eschew nuclear weapons so long as other states also do so. And, indeed, this is an apt description of the way the
equilibrium looks from the point of view of the nonspoiler states. These states prefer nonproliferation to widespread proliferation, are willing to give up weapons themselves to support the former, and will renege only if other states cheat on the bargain. These states

In the absence of superpower

abide by the regime voluntarily rather than being coerced into compliance by the superpowers. However, this in itself is not enough to make the regime viable.

enforcement , the spoiler states would seek nuclear weapons, and in response,
other states would pursue nuclear weapons, and yet more states would acquire
weapons in response to these, so that proliferation would eventually be
widespread To make the regime—and the underlying grand .12 The grand bargain is thus not robust to spoilers.

bargain among the nonspoilers—viable, the spoilers must be coerced into

nonproliferation, so that it is safe for the nonspoilers to abide by their bargain . From the
spoilers’ point of view, then, the nonproliferation equilibrium looks much more like the cartel: the superpowers collude to strong-arm these states into the regime. The flaw in the cartel view is that because this enforcement is expensive for the superpowers, it is only
worth doing if, by coercing just a few states, the superpowers can make nonproliferation among a much wider set of states possible. Thus, the superpowers are willing to form a cartel only because many states do not need to be strongarmed into nonproliferation at
all. In short, the cartel is needed to render the grand bargain robust to spoilers, and the grand bargain is needed to make the cartel affordable. The origins and roles of the NPT We first discuss the origins of the NPT in a shift in the superpowers’ perceptions of the

We
effects of proliferation. We then explain how the NPT itself affects the underlying parameters that govern the viability of the nonproliferation regime. This in turn leads to the observable implications of our theory that are tested in the subsequent section.

use the following result to make explicit how the regime’s viability is affected by
the parameters of our model . Proposition 2. The nonproliferation equilibrium only exists if a, j are high enough and c is low enough, and it is more likely to exist if t is higher and FS1 F is lower. Recall that a governs the importance of the intra-alliance effects (a superpower loses influence over a nuclear-armed client) relative to the inter-alliance effects (a superpower’s side
gets stronger with nuclear-armed clients) of proliferation. In the limiting case where a p 0, there are no intra alliance effects and proliferation simply increases one side’s power and decreases the other’s by the same amount, so that proliferation is zero-sum. Then, for any set of states that get nuclear weapons, one superpower will be left at least equally well off by this proliferation. This superpower will be unwilling to pay the costs of enforcing nonproliferation against these states, and anticipating this, the other superpower will
not try either, since enforcement would fail without the first superpower’s help. So, if proliferation is zero-sum, neither superpower will ever enforce nonproliferation in equilibrium. As a rises from zero, proliferation has increasingly strong intra-alliance effects. Because one superpower’s loss of influence over a nuclear-armed client is not fully recouped by the other, proliferation becomes increasingly negative-sum. Now, if nuclear weapons spread far enough, both superpowers could be left worse off because of their net loss of
influence. Once a is high enough, the anticipated joint loss of influence from proliferation will outweigh the costs of stopping it and the superpowers will become willing to institute a nonproliferation regime. Essentially, a controls the size of the net benefits to the superpowers from nonproliferation. The superpowers’ perceived value of a changed over the course of the early Cold War, explaining why the regime was not instantiated until the late 1960s. In principle, the superpowers could have pushed the NPT forward as early as
the 1950s, once both had nuclear weapons and established alliances and thus something potentially to lose from further proliferation. However, until well into the 1960s, each superpower instead saw substantial advantages to be gained from selective proliferation to certain of their clients. The United States perceived nuclear cooperation and weapons-sharing with its European allies to be a valuable counter to the USSR’s superior conventional forces, and these initiatives were prioritized over nonproliferation. As late as the mid-
1960s, the US interest in sharing weapons with West Germany in the form of the multi-lateral force (MLF), adamantly opposed by the Soviets, was an important obstacle to creating the regime (Brands 2007). High-level US officials also privately advocated the consideration of giving weapons to India and Japan, reasoning that this would help to balance the threat from nuclear-armed China.13 For its part, the USSR greatly facilitated China’s development of the bomb in the 1950s, providing expertise and materials and even
building a model weapon intended for China to copy (Timerbaev 1999). In short, both superpowers focused on the inter-alliance effects as opposed to the intra-alliance effects of proliferation, suggesting that they perceived the importance of the latter (i.e., a) to be low. The experience of dealing with newly nuclear—and newly obstreperous—allies led the superpowers to reassess the intraalliance effects of proliferation, raising their perceived value of a. The estrangement of China from the USSR allowed the United States to play
one against the other, while the ructions France generated in NATO were surely to the USSR’s liking. However, after ending its alliance with the USSR, China proselytized for a more radical version of communist ideology that neither superpower favored, while France sought to preserve control over its remaining colonies against both superpowers’ desires for colonial independence. In the United States, elites increasingly recognized that nonproliferation was needed to limit the superpowers’ joint loss of influence. High-level

deliberations after China’s nuclear test led to the United States dropping its support for the MLF in favor of establishing a nonproliferation regime (Brands 2007). A similar evolution of views took place in the Soviet Union (Potter 1985). With both superpowers weighing the intraalliance effects of proliferation more heavily, both became more willing to pay the costs of enforcement under a nonproliferation regime, and so the NPT was agreed. Thus, the increase in a explains the origins of the NPT. The
NPT contributes to the viability of the incipient nonproliferation regime in four ways. First, the inspections that nonnuclear signatories are required to accept increase the chance that a covert nuclear weapons program will be detected and subsequently

stopped (raising j). This decreases the willingness of spoilers to try to cheat under the regime and thus also renders enforcement cheaper for the superpowers.
Second, the same inspections also make it easier to catch a superpower surreptitiously helping a state with its program or simply allowing it to proceed (increasing t). This increases the willingness of each superpower to enforce nonproliferation, secure in the
knowledge that the other superpower is doing its part and thus that their efforts will be effective, and it decreases the temptation to enable favored states to get nuclear weapons. Third, the willingness of non–nuclear states to sign the NPT, and thus voluntarily

This lowers the super powers’ perceived costs of

subject themselves to better monitoring, reveals that most states are not spoilers.14

enforcing the regime (by decreasing FS1 F), because it enables the superpowers to
confirm that only a few holdouts will have to be strong-armed into
nonproliferation the NPT served as a device to coordinate all states on the . And, finally,

nonproliferation equilibrium , rather than the widespread proliferation that might

otherwise result By leading nonspoilers to expect nonproliferation to be upheld , .

it encouraged them to abide by it and contribute to the superpowers’ efforts to

enforce the regime , lowering the costs of enforcement Our theory of the (c).

nonproliferation regime offers observable implications , and the origins and roles of the NPT within it, at least three . First, our model assumes
that collusion between the superpowers is central to the regime’s establishment and enforcement, so the first implication is that this collusion should have taken place during negotiations over the regime and in reactions to states’ noncompliance with the regime. H1.
The superpowers will collude with one another on nonproliferation concerns and press one another to comply with their side of the collusion terms. Second, the theory implies that the superpowers should pressure the other states into joining the NPT. If a state
refused to join, it would increase the difficulty of catching it pursuing nuclear weapons covertly, undermine the willingness of other states to join and comply with the treaty, and thereby increase the superpowers’ costs of enforcing the regime. Since each superpower
ought to have more leverage over its own clients than other states, we expect that each would be held responsible for policing its own clients, while the other superpower would be expected not to interfere in or obstruct this policing. We also expect the superpowers to
apply this pressure only when it is actually perceived as necessary to induce a state to join the NPT and only when it is perceived to have some chance of success. H2. Each superpower will pressure other states, especially its own clients, to join the NPT, focusing its
efforts on cases where pressures are likely to be both necessary and effective, and neither superpower will undermine the other’s efforts. Third, the superpowers should collude to stop any state that is revealed to be (potentially) pursuing nuclear weapons, as doing
otherwise could lead to the breakdown of the regime. Here again, we expect that each superpower would be most involved in the policing of its own clients, while the other superpower would be expected not to aid the erstwhile client. H3. Each superpower will apply
 EMPIRICAL
pressure to prevent other states, especially its own clients, from moving toward acquiring nuclear weapons. Neither superpower will offer assistance to a state suspected to be pursuing a nuclear weapons program.

TESTS We turn now to testing these observable implications of our theory. Looking at archival and secondary sources, we

evaluate the history of nonproliferation-related interactions between the superpowers, superpower responses to those states that hesitated to join the NPT, and, finally, superpower responses to suspicions of nuclear weapons programs in various states. We also demonstrate that neither the grand bargain nor the cartel theory can account for the evidence on its own. Extensive documentation of our sources, the set of cases we employ, and our coding of data are available in the appendix. Hypothesis 1: Superpowers collude over
nonproliferation While we do not expect collusion to be explicit in all cases, a total absence of observable collusion would call our theory into question. We examined declassified documentation of private meetings between the superpowers to assess whether collusion occurred, focusing on episodes particularly relevant to nonproliferation, that is, the NPT negotiations and instances when states came under suspicion of pursuing nuclear weapons. We found ample evidence that when the superpowers discussed proliferation issues,
they did so in collusive terms. The United States and the Soviet Union had numerous disputes in negotiating the NPT, and the process was at times seriously stalled due to their disagreements (Brands 2007). However, when it came to dealing with other states, their discussions became remarkably cooperative. First, the superpowers sought to coordinate their mutual efforts to corral states into the treaty. In joint meetings in 1967 and 1968, high-level US and Soviet officials discussed concerns over which states would join and
measures the superpowers were taking to promote signature of the treaty. They reported on prospects for signature among their respective allies, Japan and Latin American countries, in the case of the United States, and Romania and some African countries, in the case of the Soviet Union. After the NPT was opened for signature, senior US and Soviet officials exchanged explicit assessments of whether Japan, Brazil, Argentina, and India would sign, and they expressed hopes that the other superpower would use its leverage to
cajole the holdouts.15 The United States and the USSR also worked together to control the process of the treaty negotiations; drafts of the treaty were prepared privately by the superpowers before being presented to other states (Swango 2014). Finally, the superpowers often presented a united front to the rest of the international community, and this evidence of their collusion was noticed by other states. For example, Soviet and US delegations regularly coordinated their strategies on nonproliferation discussions at the UN
General Assembly (Quester 1981, 228). While the superpowers attempted to keep their cooperation private, numerous states, including US and Soviet allies, decried the treaty’s discriminatory nature, referring not to the official discrimination between nuclear haves and have-nots but to the US-Soviet hegemony they saw the regime as entrenching. We also found instances of explicit US-Soviet collusion in responding to suspicious nuclear activity by another state. In surveying cases where a state was suspected of pursuing a
nuclear weapons program, we find that such states were most often pressured by their patron superpower, without comment or interference by the other superpower. In this respect, collusion is implicit in the other superpower’s acquiescence to the patron’s pressure. However, there are at least two cases—North Korea and South Africa—where collusion was explicit in requests from one superpower to the other to police the state in question. In the mid-1980s, US satellites detected the construction of a nuclear reactor at
Yongbyon. US officials approached the Soviet Union, highlighting its obligations under the NPT and calling into question its provision of nuclear technology assistance to North Korea. The USSR responded positively, and during the next visit to Moscow of North Korean KWP Secretary Kang Song San, the USSR pushed for North Korea to sign the NPT, offering to provide new nuclear energy reactors if it did (Mazarr 1995, 40–41). The episode shows the United States pressing the USSR to act on the obligation implicit in the
superpowers’ collusion and the USSR willing to comply and even offer incentives. It suggests that the DPRK proliferation issue was not one of opposition between the two superpowers but rather cooperation. We observe a similar incident in the case of South Africa but with the roles reversed. In July 1977, a Soviet reconnaissance satellite detected a site for a possible South African nuclear test. The USSR passed the information to the United States, with a personal request from Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter for
assistance in stopping the test (Richelson 2007, 278). Several days later Carter replied to Brezhnev that the US assessment was in agreement. Collusion in pressuring South Africa continued during the following months, and declassified memos refer to ongoing “quiet cooperation” on the issue.16 This cooperation was kept private. Publicly, Soviet newspapers alleged that the United States was helping South Africa with a nuclear program. However, declassified documents reveal a recognition on the United States’ side that the
USSR was likely using the South Africa issue to divert attention from international criticism of the superpowers failing to curb the growth of their own arsenals.17 This connection between private and public approaches suggests that the superpowers had a considerable understanding of each others’ real interests in preventing proliferation. Our findings reinforce the conclusions of the most recent historiography of the NPT, which has documented the superpowers’ discussions of mutual interests in maintaining dominant
positions within their alliances, their support for the NPT over allied opposition, and their attempts to control the drafting of the treaty itself (Brands 2006, 2007; Gavin 2004, 2010; Popp 2014; Swango 2014). Our points on the superpowers’ coordination of efforts to get treaty signatures and cooperation in dealing with suspected nuclear weapons programs in South Africa and North Korea contribute important new examples to the increasingly strong body of evidence on collusion between the superpowers over nonproliferation.
Hypothesis 2: Superpowers pressure states to join the NPT The superpowers have a clear interest in other states joining the NPT, as this signals their commitment to eschew nuclear weapons and eases the monitoring of that commitment. Our theory also implies that the number of states the superpowers need to pressure to join should be relatively small; most states should join the treaty voluntarily. To evaluate this hypothesis, we assess how the superpowers acted toward those states they judged as technologically capable of,
and potentially interested in, seeking nuclear weapons. Such states would pose the greatest threats to the nonproliferation regime, since states that lacked either capability or interest would be unlikely to acquire nuclear weapons even if they stayed out of the treaty. Because our theory posits that the superpowers are the main enforcers of nonproliferation, our selection of cases relies on the superpowers’ own contemporary assessments of which states were worrisome. We intentionally do not use present-day assessments of states’
historical nuclear interest and capability. Such assessments would pose an unfair test for the theory because the superpowers were, at the time, simply unaware of what would later be revealed about certain states’ nuclear programs and thus would not be predicted to do anything about these programs. For the United States’ side, we use a series of intelligence estimates from 1957 to 1974 that assess states’ technological capability for, and, after 1960, interest in, developing nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the analogous
documents are not available from the Soviet side. The documents we do have indicate that the United States saw the Eastern bloc states as under the tight control of the USSR, which would not allow them to develop nuclear weapons.18 From the Soviet side, certain Eastern European states were likely considered nuclear-capable, and the USSR would probably have added North Korea to the list, as the state had received Soviet nuclear assistance in the 1950s and 1960s (Szalontai and Radchenko 2006). We also use other
declassified documents, containing superpower assessments of states’ positions on the NPT, to evaluate whether the superpowers were uncertain or suspicious of a given state’s intent toward nuclear weapons. As long as some doubt remains, we expect the superpowers to explicitly pressure the state to join the treaty. However, if a state expresses a resolute position against the treaty and it becomes apparent to the superpower that no feasible measures would alter its position, then it would be reasonable for the superpower to
reassess whether any available pressure is worth exerting. Additionally, if a state delays joining the NPT but the superpowers are confident that this is driven by something other than an interest in nuclear weapons, then we do not expect the superpowers to apply pressure. We then assess superpower behavior toward each state. In some cases, the superpowers took no action; in others, their actions involved only informational meetings and diplomatic discussions with the state in question; and in still others, the superpowers
resorted to stronger pressures, such as explicit threats or offers of benefits in exchange for joining the treaty. In the results presented in table 1, a coding of“yes” indicates that the observed superpower behavior is consistent with our theory’s expectations. A coding of “partial” means that the limited historical record is supportive for the theory, but additional information would be needed for a more confident assessment. A coding of “mixed” implies that we found mixed support for the theory: the superpowers pursued the
expected action, but they did so either to a lesser extent or inconsistently. Finally, a “no” coding indicates evidence of superpower behavior opposed to our expectations, such as assisting a state in avoiding NPT signature or failing to pay attention to a possible nuclear state’s rejection of the NPT. To summarize, we see that a number of states assessed to be nuclear-capable did not join the NPT completely voluntarily. Rather, when voluntary participation did not appear forthcoming, these states were pressured, largely as expected
though not always successfully, by the superpowers. By contrast, but also as expected, the superpowers paid little attention to clear joiners. We also observe some interesting changes in the level of pressure applied in cases where doubts regarding signature are introduced or dispelled. South Korea, for example, was an early supporter of the NPT, and there is initially little action by the United States to persuade it to sign the treaty. However, when South Korea was identified as having nuclear capabilities and delayed ratifying the
treaty in the early 1970s, the United States applied pressure to encourage speedier ratification. In the case of Israel, pressure and incentives were attempted until it became clear to key negotiators that Israel had already developed a nuclear device, so that no available means of pressure would be effective. In no case did we find any evidence of one superpower undermining the other’s efforts to pressure a state into joining. Finally, we note that the evidence does not support either the grand bargain or the cartel theory alone. If the
grand bargain theory were correct, then all states should be better off with the NPT and all should join voluntarily given that they expect others to do so. This was clearly not the case, and for a number of states, the superpowers had to go to considerable lengths to ensure their participation. Additionally, the fact that this pressure was at times ineffective suggests that some states had very strong incentives to stay out of the treaty, even as most others joined. If, instead, the cartel view is correct, then all states would have to be
pressured to join the treaty and all would do so with a desire to cheat. However, the evidence shows that numerous nuclear-capable states, even those that had previously considered weapons programs, joined the regime with little or no pressure from the superpowers. Hypothesis 3: Superpowers pressure states not to proliferate As in the previous hypothesis, if a state is suspected of making a move toward nuclear weapons, its patron superpower ought to have the most leverage over it, and so we expect its patron to be the one to
apply pressure while the other superpower refrains from assisting the aspirant. With nonaligned states, we expect that either or both superpowers would apply pressure and neither should assist the errant state in any way. To test this, we considered all cases where a state became suspected of pursuing a nuclear weapons program, and we evaluated the superpowers’ response. Our findings are presented in table 2. In each case, we assess what the superpowers perceived about a state’s activity and how they responded. A coding of
“yes” indicates that the superpower acted as our theory predicts, taking steps to restrain a client’s progress toward nuclear weapons or its access to dual-use nuclear technology needed to make progress in the future. As before, a coding of “mixed” means that the superpowers sought to restrain the proliferant but that it did so either to a lesser extent or inconsistently. “Partial” implies that the limited historical record is supportive for the theory but that additional information would be needed to reach a confident assessment.
Finally, a “no” coding indicates that the superpower did not behave as our theory predicts, instead aiding a client state with a nuclear weapons program or turning a blind eye to apparent attempts to proliferate. We find general support for hypothesis 3, with a few mixed cases. In the majority of cases, the superpower patron of each nuclear aspirant intervened with threats or incentives to prevent the nuclear program from progressing, so that the “policing” element of superpower relations with nuclear aspirants is clear. Examples
of policing actions by the superpowers included direct instructions to stop the suspicious activity, threats to withdraw some military or economic support, restrictions on suppliers and access to technology, and highlevel diplomatic pressure. By contrast, we find no cases where the opposing superpower provided assistance, reassurance, or any support for the fledgling nuclear state. To investigate this point, we surveyed a wide range of primary and secondary sources for evidence that such assistance occurred, and we also looked
for any accusations that might have been made by one superpower against the other for such a transgression. Although it is difficult to prove that neither superpower sought to lure away the opponent’s ally by offering nuclear support, we have not located any evidence of such behavior in all the cases surveyed. Neither the grand bargain nor the cartel theory fit this evidence. The nuclear weapons states were widely perceived as reneging on their end of the grand bargain. No significant disarmament on the part of any of the
nuclear-weapons states occurred until the very end of the Cold War. Moreover, there is no evidence that NPT membership increased a state’s chance of receiving nuclear energy assistance (Fuhrmann 2009b). Despite this, hardly any of the non–nuclear weapons states cheated on the regime; those few that did were not motivated by the need to punish the nuclear-weapons states for not disarming, and these were stopped from getting nuclear weapons not by the prospect that others would follow but by the intervention of the

superpowers. None of these three facts is consistent with the grand bargain theory. While the superpowers’ enforcement of nonproliferation is consistent with the cartel view, the small number of cases in which such enforcement was needed is not. Most states showed no interest in bucking the nonproliferation regime and abided by it voluntarily, without pressure from the superpowers. IMPLICATIONS We conclude by discussing the implications of our study for the broader literature on nuclear proliferation .

Hymans argues that the fundamental question for students of proliferation is

(2010)

why so few of the nuclear-capable states ended up acquiring nuclear weapons : some six

Our answer is that once superpowers realized

nuclearweapons states out of more than 40 estimated to be nuclearcapable by 1970. the

nonproliferation was necessary to preserve their influence and set about colluding
to enforce it many states chose not to realize their latent nuclear capacity , . A few of these states

most preferred nonproliferation

refrained because they were deterred by the punishment the superpowers would impose if they were caught seeking nuclear weapons. But did so because they

to widespread proliferation and were confident enough that the superpowers , they

would be able to curtail proliferation to voluntarily forgo weapons for themselves .

Moreover, we presented evidence ,

These latter states’ willing compliance with nonproliferation made the regime’s enforcement affordable for the superpowers.

consistent with this answer that superpowers explicitly colluded to create the , the

nonproliferation regime cajole worrisome states into joining and complying and to the few with

Within this regime, the NPT serves to ease detect ion of cheating by either these
it.

states or the superpowers, to identify potential spoilers, and finally to coordinate

states’ expectations on widespread nonproliferation This strongly suggests that .

the nonproliferation regime substantially reduced , and the treaty that coordinated states onto behaving in accordance with it,

proliferation relative to what would occur in its absence , have red . To explain this, we need to specify exactly what is meant by “the regime”

in
and “its absence,” since the latter is the appropriate counterfactual for assessing the regime’s overall effect. In our theory, the regime is an equilibrium which the superpowers are able and willing to enforce nonproliferation because of the voluntary compliance

The absence of the regime is an

of non–spoiler states, whose support is driven by the expectation that others will either not seek weapons or be stopped from getting them.

equilibrium in which states expect spoilers to get nuclear weapons and others to
follow eventually resulting in widespread proliferation so that many non–spoiler
, ,

states are unwilling to eschew nuclear weapons, which in turn makes the
superpowers unwilling to stop them To conclude that . The NPT coordinates the movement of all states from the latter equilibrium to the former.

the regime did not substantially reduce proliferation , one of two claims would
have to be true: first, that breakdown would not occur in the absence of the
regime : the numerous states that were initially—or might in response become—
interested in nuclear weapons would prefer to abstain , even knowing that they
would not be stopped and that proliferation would eventually be widespread ; or,
second, that in the absence of the NPT to coordinate states on nonproliferation,
the superpowers would be able and willing to stop proliferation , even given that
many states were seeking nuclear weapons and would thus have to be coerced. The

history of states’ nuclear decision making and of the superpowers’ attitudes

toward proliferation presented here shows that neither claim is plausible . By

contrast, the most recent previous research concludes that the regime has had little effect on proliferation (Sagan 2011). Although several studies find that NPT membership is associated with a reduced risk of seeking or getting nuclear weapons (Fuhrmann 2009a,
2012; Jo and Gartzke 2007; Kroenig 2010), some have suggested it may only be that NPT members are mostly those states that do not want nuclear weapons anyway, so that the treaty does not constrain states so much as screen them (Fuhrmann 2012; Jo and

Gartzke 2007).19 Similarly, Hymans (2006) and Solingen (2007) argue that the regime only appears successful
because it prohibits things that few states want . Fuhrmann (2009b, 2012) shows that NPT membership has little effect on the provision of peaceful nuclear
assistance, and that, having received such assistance, NPT membership has little effect on a state’s subsequent pursuit of nuclear weapons. Jo and Gartzke (2007) find that the adoption of the NPT (measured by the proportion of states that are members) is not
associated with a reduction in the initiation of weapons programs, and Kroenig (2010) finds that the establishment of the NPT does not itself affect the provision of sensitive nuclear assistance. Finally, Hymans (2012) argues that it is managerial incompetence due to

Our theory
domestic politics, rather than the nonproliferation regime, that explains why states seeking nuclear weapons after the regime’s creation have been less likely to succeed and have taken much longer to get them when they do.

yields different interpretation of these findings that is consistent with the regime
a

substantially reducing proliferation overall . Even if NPT membership serves only to screen voluntary compliers, the wide joining of the NPT may still have a large effect

Hymans and Solingen

by reinforcing the superpowers’ belief that enforcement will be affordable and thus that the regime is viable. States that comply may simply not want nuclear weapons, as (2006) (2007) find, but

depends
this likely on the belief that most other states are not seeking them and in
in many cases

other cases on the belief that pursuing weapons would bring international
pressure —both beliefs that only exist because of the regime . The fact that the receipt of peaceful nuclear assistance and its link to
nuclear weapons programs are unaffected by whether a state is an NPT member, as Fuhrmann (2009b, 2012) shows, is also explicable within our framework. The existence of the regime makes peaceful nuclear assistance less dangerous, regardless of whether the

the regime makes a subsequent breakdown

recipient is an NPT member, because even if an occasional state receiving assistance ends up getting nuclear weapons,

into widespread proliferation less likely . Similarly, the regime makes the rare provision of weapons-relevant nuclear assistance more tempting to some potential suppliers, who

inally, though
can be assured that any resulting proliferation will be isolated. So it is not surprising that the establishment of the regime is not associated with a reduction in such assistance, as Kroenig (2010) found. F

Hymans (2012) is surely right that incompetence played an important role in the
long timelines of later nuclear programs, the regime’s prevention of a broad
market in nuclear weapons likely also contributed . We close with the hope that scholars of the politics of nuclear weapons will find this study helpful in
developing new avenues for research and interpreting new findings. Our theory and evidence provide an overarching picture of the constellation of states’ interests in and expectations about nuclear weapons that gave rise to the nonproliferation regime. This theory
is built upon, but also clarifies and integrates, previous research on particular elements of this constellation. It should thus form a solid foundation for further research, including theorizing about the evolution of the nonproliferation regime since the Cold War’s end,
evaluating present-day fears about a “nuclear tipping point,” and explaining the occurrence of and responses to the challenges to the regime posed by North Korea, Iran, and others.

Prolif causes nuclear terrorism and war via brinksmanship and

preemptive strikes
Kroenig 15 (Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government and
School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 2015. “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?” Journal
of Strategic Studies, Volume 38, Issue 1-2, 2015)

The spread of nuclear weapons poses at least six severe threats to international
peace and security including: nuclear war , nuclear terrorism , global and regional
instability, constrained US freedom of action, weakened alliances , and further
nuclear proliferation. Each of these threats has received extensive treatment elsewhere and this review is not intended
to replicate or even necessarily to improve upon these previous efforts. Rather the goals of this section are more modest: to usefully
bring together and recap the many reasons why we should be pessimistic about the likely
consequences of nuclear proliferation. Many of these threats will be illuminated with a discussion of a case of
much contemporary concern: Iran’s advanced nuclear program. Nuclear War The greatest threat posed by the spread of
nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons , the
greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic
nuclear war. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear
weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus-year tradition of nuclear
non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again
simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns
like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting later in the decade and the
Great Recession of the late 2000s.48 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his
lifetime. Before
reaching a state of MAD , new nuclear states go through a transition
period in which they lack a secure- second strike capability. In this context, one or both
states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first . For example, if
Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even
though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel
might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a
devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and
survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran
will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force . In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways
that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a
splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might , therefore, decide to launch a
preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive
might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes
preemptive action . Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran,
might feel use them or lose them pressures . That is, in a crisis, Iran might decide to
strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed . Third, as Thomas
Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise
attack.49 If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief
that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second .
Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli–Iranian
crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating
first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, there
is still a risk of nuclear war . Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational
leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current
nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. Iran’s theocratic government,
contains leaders who
despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it
hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We
cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some
leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-
destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter
leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above,
nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce
nuclear-armed adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.50 This strategy might
be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to
the nuclear level. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western
Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority.51 As Russia’s conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War,
Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of
nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate
a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And
finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency.
Second, as was also discussed above, leaders can make a ‘threat that leaves something to
chance’.52 They can initiate a nuclear crisis . By playing these risky games of nuclear
brinkmanship , states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a
less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear
war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close . And scholars have
documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.53 When we think about future nuclear
crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, with fewer sources of stability than existed during the
Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that a future crisis could result in a
devastating nuclear exchange . Nuclear Terrorism The spread of nuclear weapons also
increases the risk of nuclear terrorism .54 While September 11th was one of the greatest tragedies in
American history, it would have been much worse had Osama Bin Laden possessed nuclear weapons. Bin Laden declared
it a ‘religious duty’ for Al- Qa’eda to acquire nuclear weapons and radical clerics
have issued fatwas declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad
against the West.55 Unlike states, which can be more easily deterred, there is little
doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them.56 Indeed, in
recent years, many US politicians and security analysts have argued that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to US national
Analysts have pointed out the tremendous hurdles that terrorists would have to
security.57
overcome in order to acquire nuclear weapons.58 Nevertheless, as nuclear weapons
spread, the possibility that they will eventually fall into terrorist hands increases .
States could intentionally transfer nuclear weapons , or the fissile material required to build them,
to terrorist groups. There are good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but,
as nuclear weapons spread , the probability that a leader might someday purposely
arm a terrorist group increases . Some fear, for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hizballah,
might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no state would ever intentionally
transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, a
new nuclear state , with underdeveloped security
procedures, might be vulnerable to theft , allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or
ideologically-motivated insiders to transfer dangerous material to terrorists. There is
evidence, for example, that representatives from Pakistan’s atomic energy establishment met with Al-Qa’eda members to discuss a
possible nuclear deal.59 Finally, a nuclear-armed state could collapse , resulting in a breakdown
of law and order and a loose nukes problem. US officials are currently very concerned about what would
happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this problem is only further
amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a government with a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that
Washington has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a nightmare if a nuclear-armed Iran suffered a breakdown in
Regional Instability The spread of
authority, forcing us to worry about the fate of Iran’s nuclear arsenal.
nuclear weapons also emboldens nuclear powers , contributing to regional
instability . States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct military attack
from other states, but states with nuclear weapons can be confident that they can
deter an intentional military attack, giving them an incentive to be more aggressive
in the conduct of their foreign policy. In this way, nuclear weapons provide a shield
under which states can feel free to engage in lower-level aggression . Indeed, international
relations theories about the ‘stability-instability paradox’ maintain that stability at the nuclear level contributes to conventional
Historically , we have seen that the spread of nuclear weapons has emboldened
instability.60
their possessors and contributed to regional instability . Recent scholarly analyses
have demonstrated that, after controlling for other relevant factors, nuclear-
weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear -weapon states
and that this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less
experience with nuclear diplomacy.61 Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that
Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged them to initiate
militarized disputes against India.62 Currently, Iran restrains its foreign policy because it fears major military retaliation from the
United States or Israel, but with nuclear weapons it could feel free to push harder. A nuclear-armed Iran would
likely step up support to terrorist and proxy groups and engage in more aggressive
coercive diplomacy. With a nuclear-armed Iran increasingly throwing its weight around in the region, we could
witness an even more crisis prone Middle East. And in a poly-nuclear Middle East
with Israel, Iran, and, in the future, possibly other states, armed with nuclear weapons, any one of those crises
could result in a catastrophic nuclear exchange .

Even one accident or misperception triggers our impact

Thakur 15 (Ramesh Thakur, Director of the Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament in the Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University. 2015.
“Nuclear Weapons and International Security.” Routledge)

The world faces two existential threats: climate change and nuclear Armageddon . Those
who reject the first are derided as denialists; those dismissive of the second are
praised as realists. Nuclear weapons may or may not have kept the peace among various
groups of rival states; they could be catastrophic for the world if ever used by both sides in
a war between nuclear-armed rivals ; and the prospects for their use have grown
since the end of the Cold War. Even a limited regional nuclear war in which India and
Pakistan used 50 Hiroshima-size (15kt) bombs each could lead to a famine that
kills up to a billion people. 1 Having learnt to live with nuclear weapons for 70 years (1945–2015), we have
become desensitized to the gravity and immediacy of the threat. The tyranny of
complacency could yet exact a fearful price with nuclear Armageddon . The
nuclear peace has held so far owing as much to good luck as sound stewardship.
Deterrence stability depends on rational decision -maker s being always in office on all sides: a
dubious and not very . reassuring precondition It depends equally critically on
there being no rogue launch , human error or system malfunction : an impossibly high bar.
For nuclear peace to hold, deterrence and fail-safe mech anism s must work
every single time . For nuclear Armageddon, deterrence or fail-safe
mechanisms need to break down only once . This is not a comforting equation.
It also explains why, unlike most situations where risk can be mitigated after disaster strikes, with nuclear weapons all risks must be
mitigated before any disaster. 2 As
more states acquire nuclear weapons, the risks multiply
exponentially with the requirements for rationality in all decision-makers ; robust
c ommand- and - c ontrol systems in all states ; 100 percent reliable fail-safe
mechanisms and procedures against accidental and unauthorized launch of
nuclear weapons; and totally unbreachable security measures against terrorists
acquiring nuclear weapons by being able to penetrate one or more of the growing
nuclear facilities or access some of the wider spread of nuclear material and
technology.

Nuclear terrorism causes extinction—misattribution errors, miscalc

and high tensions spark global nuclear conflict
Hayes 18 (Peter Hayes, Director of the Nautilus Institute and Honorary Professor at the
Centre for International Security Studies at the University of Sydney, January 18, 2018. “NON-
STATE TERRORISM AND INADVERTENT NUCLEAR WAR.”
https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/non-state-terrorism-and-inadvertent-
nuclear-war/)
We now move to our conclusion. Nuclear-armed states can place themselves on the edge of
nuclear war by a combination of threatening force deployments and threat rhetoric. Statements by US and North Korea’s leaders and supporting amplification by state and private media to
present just such a lethal combination. Many observers have observed that the risk of war and nuclear war, in Korea and globally, have increased in the last few years—although no-one can say with authority by
how much and exactly for what reasons. However, states are restrained in their actual decisions to escalate to conflict and/or nuclear war by conventional deterrence, vital national interests, and other institutional
and political restraints, both domestic and international. It is not easy, in the real world, or even in fiction, to start nuclear wars.[19] Rhetorical threats are standard fare in realist and constructivist accounts of
inter-state nuclear deterrence, compellence, and reassurance, and are not cause for alarm per se. States will manage the risk in each of the threat relationships with other nuclear armed states to stay back from the
brink, let alone go over it, as they have in the past. This argument was powerful and to many, persuasive during the Cold War although it does not deny the hair-raising risks taken by nuclear armed states during

, the multi-polarity of nine nuclear weapons states interacting in a four-

this period. Today

tiered nuclear threat system means that the practice of sustaining nuclear threat
and preparing for nuclear war is no longer merely complicated, but is now
enormously complex in ways that may exceed the capacity of some and perhaps all
states to manage, even without the emergence of a fifth tier of non-state actors to add further unpredictability to how this
system works in practice. The possibility that non-state actors may attack without advance warning as to the time,
place, and angle of attack presents another layer of uncertainty to this complexity as to how
inter-state nuclear war may break out. That is, non-state actors with nuclear weapons or threat goals and
capacities do not seek the same goals, will not use the same control systems, and will use radically different organizational
procedures and systems to deliver on their threats compared with nuclear armed states. If used tactically for immediate terrorist
effect, a non-state nuclear terrorist could violently attack nuclear facilities, exploiting any number of vulnerabilities in fuel cycle
facility security, or use actual nuclear materials and even warheads against military or civilian targets. If a persistent, strategically
oriented nuclear terrorist succeed in gaining credible nuclear threat capacities, it might take hostage one or more states or cities. If
such an event coincides with already high levels of tension and even military collisions between the non-nuclear forces of nuclear
armed states, then a non-state
nuclear terrorist attack could impel a nuclear armed state to
escalate its threat or even military actions against other states , in the belief that this
targeted state may have sponsored the non-state attack, or was simply the source of the attack,
whatever the declared identity of the attacking non-state entity. This outcome could trigger these states to go onto one or
more of the pathways to inadvertent nuclear war , especially if the terrorist attack was on a high value and high risk
nuclear facility or involved the seizure and/or use of fissile material. Some experts dismiss this possibility as so
remote as to be not worth worrying about. Yet the history of nuclear terrorism globally and in the
Northeast Asian region suggests otherwise . Using the sand castle metaphor, once built on the high tide line, sand castles
may withstand the wind but eventually succumb to the tide once it reaches the castle—at least once, usually twice a day. Also,
theories of organizational and technological failure point to the coincidence of multiple, relatively insignificant driving events that
interact or accumulate in ways that lead the “metasystem” to fail, even if each individual component of a system works perfectly.
Thus, the potential catalytic effect of a nuclear terrorist incident is not that it would of itself lead to a sudden inter-state nuclear war;
but that at
a time of crisis when alert levels are already high , when control systems on
nuclear forces have already shifted from primary emphasis on negative to positive
control, when decision making is already stressed , when the potential for
miscalculation is already high due to shows of force indicating that first-use is nigh, when rhetorical threats promising
annihilation on the one hand, or collapse of morale and weakness on the other invite counter-vailing threats by nuclear adversaries
or their allies to gain the upper hand in the “contest of resolve,” and when organizational cybernetics may be in play such that
purposeful actions are implemented differently than intended, then a
terrorist nuclear attack may shift a
coincident combination of some or all of these factors
to a threshold level where they collectively lead to
a first-use decision by one or more nuclear-armed states . If the terrorist attack is timed or happens to coincide with high
levels of inter-state tension involving nuclear-armed states, then some or all of these tendencies will likely be in play anyway—precisely the concern of those who posit pathways to inadvertent nuclear war as
outlined in section 2 above. The critical question is, just as a catalyst breaks some bonds and lets other bonds form, reducing the energy cost and time taken to achieve a chemical reaction, how would a nuclear
terrorist attack at time of nuclear charged inter-state tension potentially shift the way that nuclear threat is projected and perceived in a four or five-way nuclear-prone conflict, and how might it affect the potential
pathways to inadvertent nuclear war in such a system? Such a pervasive incremental effect is shown in Figure 6 below. Any one or indeed all of these starting nuclear control profiles may be disputed, as might the
control profile at the end of the response arrow. (In Figure 6, each nuclear state responds to a terrorist nuclear attack by loosening or abandoning negative controls against unauthorized use, and shifts towards
reliance mostly on positive procedural controls biased towards use). But each nuclear armed state will make its moves in response to the posited terrorist nuclear attack partly in response to its expectations as to
how other nuclear armed states will perceive and respond to these moves, as well as their perception that an enemy state may have sponsored a terrorist nuclear attack—and considered together, it is obvious that
they may not share a common image of the other states’ motivations and actions in this response, leading to cumulative potential for misinterpretation and rapid subsequent action, reaction, and escalation. It is
also conceivable—although intuitively it would seem far less likely–that a terrorist nuclear attack at such a conjuncture of partly or fully mobilized nuclear armed states might induce one or more of them to stand
down, slow down its decision making or deployments, establish new communication channels with potential nuclear enemy states, and even make common cause to hunt down and eliminate the non-state nuclear
terrorist entity, or coordinate operations to respond to the threat of a second terrorist nuclear attack—the credibility of which would be high in the aftermath of a successful initial non-state nuclear attack. As

a terrorist nuclear attack could (wittingly or unwittingly) spark off a

Robert Ayson concluded: In considering the ways in which

wider nuclear exchange government leaders are entitled to be just as worried about their own actions—how they
would respond to a terrorist nuclear attack and how that response might get very catastrophically out of control—as about the
terrorist act per se. If so, states
need to do more than consider the best ways to prevent
terrorists from acquiring, deploying and then detonating a nuclear weapon . They also
need to think about how they can control themselves in the event of a nuclear terrorist attack (even if some might suggest this risks
handing the terrorist a premature and unnecessary victory by giving them indirect influence over the choices states make).[20]

The plan resolves conflict over the ban treaty by restoring political
will in the NPT
Ingram 17 (Paul Ingram, Executive Director of the British American Security Information
Council (BASIC), a think tank focusing on nuclear disarmament, previous Project Leader for the
Oxford Research Group, an international security policy think tank, BA in Politics and
Economics from the University of Oxford, June 2017.
“Renewing Interest in Negative Security Assurances.”
http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/NSAs-June2017_0.pdf)
The Nuclear Weapon States and their allies have criticised the Ban Treaty talks currently
in progress in New York as disruptive to a more measured step-by-step negotiated process. For this criticism to hold any

validity they need to show will and progress in their approach, something sadly lacking of
late . Declaratory policy is a crucial part of that agenda. NSAs could become a touchstone for nuclear
armed states’ political will to engage. Minimalist responses , such as simple
restatements of existing NSAs , will be insufficient and interpreted as mean-spirited .
Demands for tighter and legal Negative Security Assurances [NSAs] - the promises
made by nuclear armed states not to use nuclear weapons against certain states that do
not possess them - may soon see a come-back. They are particularly attractive to those states who
recognise the need for concrete disarmament gains but who feel uncomfortable
with the Ban approach. Several European states submitted a paper to the UN Open Ended Working Group in April 2016 proposing a
discussion to strengthen existing NSAs. 1 This was in part to find realistic multilateral progress on reducing the salience of nuclear weapons. These
governments are now considering options to promote this initiative. Nuclear Weapon States would do well to consider cooperating with this effort.
The costs to them are minimal ( after all, their possession of nuclear weapons is in
relation to other states with nuclear weapons ), but the signals from inaction are
deeply undesirable and could further undermine their legitimacy . Their resistance is bound up by their deep
attachment to ambiguity, but they appear to undervalue its downsides. Not least, nuclear deterrence requires a level of clarity in signalling that is
Why NSAs? The security justification for all existing nuclear arsenals is to protect against threats from other
undermined by ambiguity.

It is an established norm
nuclear-armed states (with the exception of Israel, which does not acknowledge its nuclear arsenal).
within the international community that nuclear threats against states without
nuclear weapons are unacceptable. China and India have issued full no-first use
declarations , and categorically state that they would under no circumstances
threaten Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) with nuclear weapons . Yet, most
Nuclear Weapon States , particularly those who see themselves as the most
responsible (such as the U nited S tates, the UK and France), remain reluctant to give unconditional
guarantees not to threaten nuclear attack to states without nuclear weapons , and
have resisted calls to make them legally binding . Ambiguity lies at the heart of nuclear postures. In the minds of
decision-makers there are several principal reasons for it: 1. If states specify the circumstances that would trigger their use of nuclear weapons, adversaries could
operate with relative safety right up to that line, and then call that bluff if they cross it. The state may feel compelled to use their nuclear weapons to retain credibility (save face) and ‘restore deterrence’. Prior
clarity removes freedom of action away from the leadership. Of course, this considers nuclear weapons in isolation, when there exist numerous other forms of military and non-military deterrence. It is widely
recognised that for nuclear deterrence to be effective at all, other capabilities at lower levels of conflict are essential, otherwise this concern over red lines occurs in any case. After all, nuclear deterrence is simply
not credible at these lower levels. 2. Ambiguity might deliver deterrent results further down the line of escalation (within the band of ambiguity) even when the nuclear armed state itself has no intention to
threaten use. 3. There may be unforeseen circumstances in which a future leadership could threaten a nuclear response to achieve deterrence. 4. Tightening NSAs could be irreversible over time. If a nuclear-armed
state needs to ‘reset’ its NSAs (perhaps as security situations deteriorate) this could send undesirable signals and worsen international security at a sensitive moment. This resistance to irreversibility gives away a
deep assumption of commitment to indefinite nuclear postures that contradicts diplomatic commitments to a world free of nuclear weapons. Irreversibility is an important notion within the diplomatic process;
but it is this very irreversibility that creates resistance to agreement. 5. Ministries of Defence are institutionally resistant to limiting their options in advance of any conflict, particularly after they have allocated
substantial resources to the acquisition and upkeep of the capabilities concerned. This freedom of action is often seen as a sign of their sovereignty in an uncertain future strategic security environment. 6.
Attention drawn to scenarios that might merit a threat to use nuclear weapons could focus public attention on these scenarios and generate unwelcome debate on whether this threat would be justified. On the
other hand, it may also highlight the state’s dependence upon nuclear deterrence and thus strengthen resistance to any evolution in policy or move away from nuclear deployments. Equally, the downsides of ‘too
much’ ambiguity include: 1. Deterrence credibility requires some level of specificity and clarity in communicating intent, otherwise adversaries can underestimate or otherwise misread the intent of the leadership
in the Nuclear Weapon State. There needs to be some confidence on the part of the state being deterred that the nuclear threat is genuine, but will not be exercised unless it transgresses strong boundaries. A
strengthening nuclear taboo could tempt future bluff calling. 2. Ambiguity is no friend to a Nuclear Weapon State offering extended deterrence assurances to its allies. Dennis Healey, when UK Defence Secretary
in the 1960s, famously said that it takes 5% credibility to deter the Soviets but 95% credibility to assure allies. Allies are more clearly 2 reassured if their nuclear sponsor’s arsenal and posture is clearly there to

3. Ambiguity undermines nuclear legitimacy

deter the nuclear state they also feel threatened by. A more ambiguous posture is less assuring.

within the international community. NNWS are not only seeking to improve their
own security by insulating themselves from nuclear threat; they also look to the nuclear armed states to act
with responsibility and restraint more generally towards the international community. If nuclear armed
states show little willingness to act with such restraint and be specific about when
they would or would not consider nuclear use it harms the trust in their
commitment to their NPT obligations . 4. Exceptions to NSAs draw attention to
nuclear threats that are deeply unacceptable to a majority of the international
community, or trigger undesirable responses from those states that lie outside the guarantees.
Withdrawal of these exceptions would be a recognition from the Nuclear Weapon States of the boundaries to nuclear deterrence within the
Non-proliferation & disarmament NSAs are critical signals of
international community.

acknowledgement that NNWS have reduced their freedom (and sovereignty) by joining
international non-proliferation arrangements from which all states benefit from. Weak NSAs are
an affront to this commitment and to the very idea of a cosmopolitan international community. NSAs have
been a consistent and at times high-profile demand of the NNWS [Non-Nuclear
Weapon States] within the NPT process . They are an important tool in the international
community’s management of nuclear security and proliferation . They also reduce the freedom of action for nuclear

armed states. The strength of particular NSAs on offer is therefore an indication of a

nuclear armed state’s willingness to accept such restrictions for the wider benefits
they bring. These focus particularly on encouraging NNWS to stick to their obligations and thereby strengthen confidence
in the non-proliferation regime . The impact of NSAs goes further than the security calculations of the states directly
an expression of the bargain at the heart of the NPT, an invitation
involved. They are

for Nuclear Weapon States to demonstrate political will in reducing the salience of
nuclear weapons. In this respect they are also a modest disarmament measure. NSA exceptions Strengthening NSAs
essentially means reducing the number of exceptions and enshrining the guarantee in
law . The exceptions to negative security assurances (NSAs) have at times involved: ● States that attack in alliance with a nuclear armed state ● States that are deemed to be in breach of their non-proliferation obligations ● States that use chemical or biological weapons By and large, the NSA exceptions expressed by most nuclear armed

states are determined by military scenario planning. These exceptions are included to ensure that NSAs will not constrain any options that may be seriously contemplated by a future leader. If NSAs are only ever issued for situations in which the probability that nuclear weapons would be used is zero, this calls into question the whole point of NSAs
beyond clarifying existing positions. A nuclear armed state can use its NSAs to diplomatically signal its intentions to resist or encourage trends towards reduced salience of nuclear weapons, and in moving towards a sole purpose for nuclear weapons (in deterring nuclear use or blackmail). The effort to tighten NSAs should therefore be seen as part of a
broader framework to reduce the acceptability of nuclear use against certain states (without nuclear weapons) or in certain circumstances, particularly if this tightening is achieved in a multilateral context. Alliance  (currently Russia) When NSAs were proposed in the context of the Cold War there was a fear that they could be manipulated by adversaries
hiding behind their NNWS allies. The NSAs were ‘harmonised’ in declarations at the UN Security Council by the ‘P5’, with the exception of China, on the eve of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, with the objective of creating a positive environment. China restated that it would never under any circumstances threaten nuclear weapons
against any NNWS. The exclusion for states operating in alliance with a Nuclear Weapon State has since been dropped by the United States, UK and France but remains for Russia, whose military doctrine includes nuclear use against an overwhelming conventional attack in which the very existence of the state was under threat. Such an exclusion is only
unnecessary if an aggressive NNWS could gain a significant conventional advantage whilst protected from nuclear use by its alliance with a Nuclear Weapon State. This may make theoretical sense is simply not a credible scenario. Compliance  (currently US, UK and France) The 1995 NSAs were explicitly seen by France, the UK and the United States as
acknowledgement of the sacrifice made by NPT NNWS in their renunciation of nuclear weapons. This attitude has persisted. In contrast, those states outside the Treaty, or those NNWS which these Nuclear Weapon States deem to be in noncompliance with the Treaty, do not enjoy the benefits of their NSAs, even if they do not possess nuclear weapons
and thus present no immediate nuclear threat. This is explicitly ‘intended to underscore the security benefits of adhering to and fully complying with the NPT’. In other words, NSAs are a reward 3 for good behaviour. And yet, the implied nuclear threat that arises in the exception undermines the norm that nuclear armed states should not threaten
nuclear use against other states without nuclear weapons. It also supports the interpretation that nuclear weapons bring diplomatic influence, increases their utility, and therefore attraction, and perversely could weaken nuclear non-proliferation. If there are to be sanctions levelled against states for not joining or complying with the NPT, there are many
other options that would not undermine the norm against threatening states without nuclear weapons. If a nuclear armed state was concerned about the possibility of facing a NNWS that might have cheated on its commitments to the NPT and actually deployed a nuclear weapon arsenal, then it should make explicit reference to that belief that it faced a
real and present danger of nuclear attack and that its nuclear threat was intended to deter that specific danger, rather than to the non-compliance with the Treaty. Other WMD (currently UK and France) True to the concerns of our time, the latest French Presidential statement refers its guarantee to those states ‘that respect their international obligations
for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’. The current British NSA 4 explicitly talks of ‘reserv[ing] the right to review this assurance if the future threat, development or proliferation of these weapons [chemical and biological] make it necessary’. The Obama Administration dropped such references in its 2010 NSA, though for a decade the
United States had implied it would consider the use of nuclear weapons to deter chemical or biological use. Operational chemical and biological weapons cannot be compared with nuclear weapons in terms of their level of impact and perceived military utility. Retaining reference to the possibility of nuclear deterrence against these weapons (something
that was only first thought of in the late 1990s), only encourages states to keep hold of the option of developing these weapons as a balance against nuclear weapons. It also legitimises the practice in other nuclear armed states of retaining their own ambiguity in relation to chemical weapons, a position that Israel may adopt were it ever to leave the

the only internationally legally-binding NSAs are those

shadows and confirm its possession of nuclear weapons. Legally-binding So far

established within NWFZs [Nuclear Weapon Free Zone] Nuclear Weapon regional nuclear weapon free zones ( ).

States have been invited to sign protocols to the zone treaties promising not to use
or threaten nuclear attack on any of the member states many . They have proven to be reluctant to restrict their freedom of action in the first instance, but

have signed the protocols to most of the treaties concerned, which therefore cover
the majority of states in legal guarantees . the But those protocols are conditional, and include the exceptions declared by Nuclear Weapon States on a case-by-case basis. And unfortunately,

only NWFZ protocol that has been ratified by the US Congress is that covering
Latin America. The South East 5 Asia NWFZ still has no protocols from any Nuclear Weapon States. There also remain notable regions left outside, particularly in crucial regions such as Europe, the Middle East and East
Asia. Nuclear Weapon States also typically respond to demands for legally-binding NSAs by pointing out that their existing NSA declarations, in the form of governmental or Presidential announcement, are legally binding on those public servants responsible for
planning and executing any nuclear attacks. This may not be reassuring to other states. Pronouncements from a particular President or government can presumably be reversed by similar pronouncements from the same or successor individuals at any point. The
consensus 1995 NPT Final Document recommended further steps be considered which ‘could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument’, an aspiration that has been repeated several times since but which has not materialised. The existing legal
guarantees connected to NWFZs could be seen as a model for any attempt to achieve global coverage not limited by region. Alternatively, if there is no NWFZ in place regional NSAs could be issued by states or groups of states within the region or from outside as an
initial step towards establishing the NWFZ. A NNWS or state that is ambiguous is just as able to issue a nuclear NSA (politically or legally-binding), even if it does not acknowledge possession of nuclear weapons. NNWS clearly value the idea and legitimacy of legally-
binding NSAs, and that value alone should mean that it is an avenue worth pursuing. However, with the state of international negotiations on nuclear weapons issues and in particular the stymied status of the CD, and the challenges in getting any treaty ratified by
the US Congress, it may be that a strong political route is preferable for the time being. NSA credibility and verification This may be a good point to ask the question: do NSAs, legally binding or otherwise, have sufficient credibility to merit all this attention? NWS
officials often express scepticism of no first use (NFU) on the grounds that they could be ignored, so why not with security guarantees? Can those asked to believe the assurances take them at face value? Agreements made in peacetime may have little force in conflict,
and there are no realistic means to fully verify the efficacy of such declarations. After all, in a crisis, will a Nuclear Weapon State be contained if its leadership thought itself caught between observing international law and protecting its vital interests or resisting
invasion? A case would undoubtedly be considered in such circumstances that under Article 51 of the UN Charter a state would be within its rights to use or threaten nuclear weapons even against those to which it had previously issued an NSA, when facing its own
destruction or that of its allies. This ‘inherent right to self-defence as recognised under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter’ is explicitly referred to in NATO’s Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR) as an NSA exception for its three Nuclear Weapon
States. 6 The Russian annexation of Crimea and its support for irregular forces in eastern Ukraine appear to directly contradict its security commitments made to Ukraine alongside the United States and UK under the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. Whatever the
legal interpretation, it is clear that this action has undermined confidence in the commitment Russia may have to its existing or future promises when it comes to security guarantees. It also weakens the salience of NSAs more generally. Similarly, the attitude
apparently taken by the Clinton Administration in the 1990s, when it expanded NATO into central and eastern Europe in apparent contradiction to its promises to Soviet and early Russian leadership around the end of the Cold War, has harmed Russian confidence
in guarantees that may be issued by NATO states. So why are NNWS so keen on NSAs? The value of NSAs (and for that matter, NFU) comes in establishing norms governing nuclear weapons. The weapons themselves are after all deployed to send strong signals,
rather than to actually fight nuclear war, so if the circumstances of those deployments also involve explicit public limitations on their threat or use then those signals, the very purposes of their deployment, are affected. An NSA can never fully guarantee to a NNWS
that it will never be threatened or attacked by nuclear weapons, but those NSAs acknowledge that it would be illegitimate to do so. A nuclear armed state that breaks its guarantees and threatens nuclear use pays a very high price for doing so in terms of its standing,
and would likely affect its ability to operate with any support within the international community. In that respect, NSAs reassure NNWS, by explicitly acknowledging their security needs in the wider nuclear weapons calculations. NWS that complain the Ban Treaty
does not adequately account for their security needs could take note of the mirror need here! NSAs, like almost all other multilateral agreements, tend to benefit and protect the weak against the strong within international society. It is possible to introduce
verification procedures for NSAs and other declaratory policies. If military guidance and regulations, exercises and training were sufficiently transparent it could be confirmed that the scenarios involved all conformed to the declaratory policy. Venues for Talks
Conference on Disarmament NSAs are one of four core issues in front of the CD, the others being outer space, a fissile material cut-off treaty, and nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, the CD has been in deadlock for almost twenty years, and the NSA issue has gone
nowhere beyond official statements and informal meetings. Whilst the CD would certainly be the appropriate venue to negotiate harmonised legally-binding NSAs in a convention, this may not be the best route for the short- to medium-term. The CD could be used
for informal discussions; after all, the expertise and the capacity exists in Geneva for such conversations, but the action may better reside in New York. UN Security Council The UN Security Council was an important venue in harmonising political NSAs in the 1995
declarations. This could be a model for a Nuclear Weapon State-led initiative in the future, but this would require extensive talks elsewhere to develop possibilities for strengthened and harmonised NSAs. P5  Process The most obvious place to do this would be the ‘P5
Process’, an initiative that so far has been strong on potential but weak on delivery. It offers a relatively safe venue for talks amongst the Nuclear Weapon States, and has already started to talk about strategic stability and posture. NSA offers would be an obvious
additional area of merit for discussion, and potentially for initial declarations, though such declarations would have greater legitimacy and force if they were later formalised at the UN Security Council. NPT The NPT Preparatory Committees and particularly Review
Conferences are important venues for assessing progress, for floating ideas, for laying down markers, and for establishing cooperative action by groups of states. But these venues have not proved to be effective in hosting on-going constructive talks. NATO NATO
member states, some of whom are members of other groups such as the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) or are behind this latest request for stronger NSAs, have some influence over NATO nuclear posture. Could NATO declare NSAs that go
further than its Nuclear Weapon State members, or play a role in helping to strengthen their NSAs? NATO has not discussed such an option, explicitly declaring that such policies are the unilateral preserve of its the Nuclear Weapon State members, as they ultimately
decide on the use of their nuclear weapons. But NATO discusses nuclear posture in its nuclear planning and high level groups (NPG and HLG) and published its last deterrence and defence posture review (DDPR) in May 2012. 7 Clearly, NATO is in the business of
harmonising declaratory policy in some areas, particularly in regards to nuclear posture as relevant to the European theatre. So logically, it should be possible for NATO to declare NSAs that were tighter than those of its individual members without legally or
politically limiting their actions independently of NATO. It simply chooses not to. Perhaps it is time for some of its members to propose just such an idea. One reason for doing so is that NATO could consider NSAs a low-bar (not too sensitive) non-proliferation area
for discussion with Russia in the NATO-Russia Council. Conclusion States proposing a tightening of NSAs talk of a treaty or a protocol to the NPT enshrining such guarantees, and reducing exceptions. The approach to all this is critical. Nuclear Weapon States will be
opposed to such an assertive approach for a number of reasons already identified. Any effort by NNWS to impose or pressure Nuclear Weapon States into agreeing a protocol will almost certainly fail. There is a belief in their defence and diplomatic establishments
that harmonisation will be far more difficult than it was in 1995, reflecting differing security situations and approach to doctrine. And of course harmonisation might open up the temptation to race to the bottom. Such resistance, alongside the obvious observation
that the strategic environment and appetite for arms control appears to be deteriorating, has led some to propose that the NSA ambition should be limited to a restatement of existing guarantees as a way of holding the line against the temptation to weaken them.
Such statements could again be coordinated in the UN Security Council, much as those in 1995 were. They would of course be stronger if they also included the other nuclear-armed states that are not permanent members of the Security Council. The problem with
this approach is that it will be seen as weak by the majority of states in the international community, with little to no value in terms of establishing trust in the political will of the states reissuing the NSAs. It will close down rather than open up, the issue for further
strengthening of NSAs, and will thus be seen as a strongly conservative response. So what is the alternative? It will take some time and sensitivity to overcome the obstacles to stronger NSAs, but ought to be possible if the initiative is handled in a non-confrontational

The objective of strengthening and harmonising NSAs as a parallel or alternative track to the
manner.

Ban Treaty should be seen by Nuclear Weapon States as an opportunity to

demonstrate political will and responsible nuclear governance . They would do well to consider
their own initiatives in this area, including attempts to harmonise and strengthen their NSAs. This should be a priority discussion area within the so-
called ‘P5 process’, discussions at the United Nations in New York or Geneva, or in working papers within the NPT review process. It could sit within a
broader discussion of declaratory policy, particularly as in this area the Chinese appear to be more progressive than their fellow Nuclear Weapon States,
and would therefore presumably be more open to such initiatives. The attitude from the Nuclear Weapon States
on NSAs will be seen by many as a touchstone for their commitment to any moves
toward a world free of nuclear weapons . If they oppose stronger NSAs , being an archetypal,
relatively achievable and conservative step-by-step proposal, this will only be interpreted by other states as

confirmation that they will indefinitely cling onto their nuclear weapons [nukes] ,
their ambiguous postures, and the perceived status they bring. This can only lead to increasing frustration by
other states whose security is directly threatened.
NSAs are the primary factor in nuclear decisionmaking – only the aff
creates progress towards fulfilling Article VI disarmament
commitments
Graham and Tomero 2K (Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., President of the Lawyers
Alliance for World Security (LAWS), served as President Clinton's Special Representative for
Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Disarmament, and led the US Delegation to the 1995 NPT
Review and Extension Conference; Leonor Tomero, the LAWS Program Director for Western
Europe and Latin America, August 2000. “"Obligations For Us All": NATO & Negative Security
Assurances.” The Acronym Institute. http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/archive/49nato.htm)

With the end of the Cold War, the proliferation of nuclear weapons has become the major
threat to international security . Our principal line of defence against this threat is a
sustained commitment by the international community to address the danger and take
significant steps to support and enhance the credibility and effectiveness of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty ( NPT ) regime. The NPT embodies a fundamental bargain : the
non-nuclear-weapon states agree to submit to international verification that they
will never acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for a pledge from the nuclear-
weapon states to work toward eliminating these weapons entirely . The negative
security assurances ( NSAs - the pledges by NPT nuclear-weapon states not to use
nuclear weapons against NPT non-nuclear-weapon states unless attacked by such a
state in alliance with a nuclear-weapon state) made in the context of the NPT
regime play a central role in upholding the credibility of this bargain . As NATO
continues an internal review of its nuclear doctrine, recent suggestions that the NSAs related to the NPT do not bear on NATO policy
(even though three of the five states that made the negative security assurances are members of NATO) negatively impact the NPT
regime. The role and implications of the negative security assurances deserve close examination in the context of the commitments
of NPT parties, especially NATO states that identify nuclear proliferation as a significant threat. Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd
Axworthy eloquently emphasized these commitments under the NPT in his address to the North Atlantic Council on May 24, 2000:
"The nuclear-weapon states made particular undertakings, but there are obligations for us all. As the world's pre-eminent security
Alliance, we have a leadership role to play in realizing the promise of New York. Our on-going review of NATO's non-proliferation,
arms control and disarmament policies should set our agenda for doing so… We must all make our nuclear posture in NATO
coherent with our non-proliferation and disarmament posture in New York and Geneva… In the NPT and in the Conference on
Disarmament, we are confronted regularly with the argument that if nuclear weapons are good for NATO, then they are good for
others too. The
contradiction in our declaration policy undermines the credibility of
our non-proliferation and disarmament efforts ." Strengthening the NSAs represents
an important and achievable step toward fulfilment of the commitments undertaken pursuant
to Article VI of the NPT and, in the short term, strengthening the NPT regime. They have
significant political importance in reducing the prestige value of nuclear weapons ,
which is an integral part of the nuclear arms control and disarmament process. Historical Overview In the 1960s, as the

number of states possessing nuclear weapons rose to five, there were projections that 20-30 additional states would acquire nuclear weapons over the next two decades, and if such a scenario had occurred, there would have likely been many more in the following decades. As part of an effort to stem the trend toward the widespread proliferation of
nuclear weapons, 62 states signed the NPT on July 1, 1968, the first day the Treaty was open for signature. During the NPT negotiations, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) states sought negative security assurances from the nuclear-weapon states, arguing that after all, if the non-nuclear-weapon states were to foreswear nuclear weapons, the least the
nuclear weapons states could agree to was not to threaten or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states.1 In 1965, the United Arab Republic (UAR) rejected the idea of bilateral security guarantees, claiming that it would result in "a situation where vast areas were divided under a nuclear trusteeship of this or that Power."2 Several non-
nuclear-weapon states requested that assurances or guarantees from the nuclear-weapon states accompany or be included in the emerging non-proliferation treaty. Soviet Premier Kosygin proposed (on February 1, 1966 in the Soviet draft of the Non-Proliferation Treaty) "a clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
States parties to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons on their territory."3 The UAR, Mexico, Nigeria, and India (ultimately not a signatory of the NPT) supported this initiative. UAR Ambassador Khallaf submitted treaty language that incorporated Kosygin's proposal, specifying that "each nuclear-weapon state undertakes not to use, or threaten to
use, nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state Party to this Treaty which has no nuclear weapons on its territory."4 Romania and Switzerland made similar proposals. US President Lyndon Johnson had assured nations that did not seek nuclear weapons that they would, if the need arose, enjoy strong US support "against nuclear blackmail
threat,"5 but the United States refused to accept the Soviet proposal. Canada also refused such a proposal arguing that reaching a consensus to include it in the Treaty would prove difficult, and attempting to do so would unacceptably prolong negotiations. Canadian representative Burns suggested instead that the nuclear-weapon states make parallel
declarations that could include negative security assurances. More specifically he proposed that the nuclear-weapon states pledge in these declarations "not to use nuclear weapons against non-aligned non-nuclear parties."6 In the beginning of 1968, the revised draft treaty still did not include any security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon states.7 In
the thirteenth session of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission (ENDC), certain non-nuclear-weapon states voiced their regret regarding the absence of any such assurances and the Federal Republic of Germany stated that the treaty should ban nuclear blackmail against the non-nuclear-weapon states. Romanian Ambassador Ecobesco again
requested that the nuclear-weapon states include an undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states.8 In March 1968, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom agreed to offer some positive security assurances.9 Such assurances generally refer to action that would be taken by the
Security Council or by its permanent members to assist an NPT non-nuclear-weapon state if it was attacked or threatened with nuclear weapons. However, US Ambassador de Palma stated that the draft treaty did not include security assurances because the issue proved "too difficult and complicated to be reduced to a treaty provision."10 Thus, NATO
concerns about the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact and the credibility of the Western Alliance's "flexible response" policy, as well as the Soviet Union's reluctance to give negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states members of NATO, precluded any agreement among the nuclear-weapon states on negative security guarantees
at that time.11 Only China (not a NPT party until 1992) unilaterally pledged a no first use policy. Ten years later, in 1978, US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, at the First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, formally stated that the United States would not use nuclear weapons against an NPT non-nuclear-weapon state party unless attacked by
such a state in alliance with a nuclear-weapon state. Specifically, the United States pledged to "not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed
forces, or its allies, by any state allied to a nuclear-weapon state or associated with a nuclear-weapon state in carrying out or sustaining the attack." The United Kingdom and the Soviet Union also individually pledged similar NSAs. No exception was made in the 1978 NSA declarations to allow for nuclear retaliation against (or pre-emption of) attacks
involving chemical or biological weapons, or indeed any weapon except in the context of an attack in alliance with a nuclear weapons state (this exception was principally aimed at the Warsaw Pact members). China's policy of no first use, declared when it acquired nuclear weapons in 1964, represents the strongest commitment by a nuclear-weapon state
not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT or any other state: it makes no exceptions and applies to all states (the declaration reads "at all times and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons").12 During the Cold War, mutual fear on both sides of the Iron Curtain prevented further progress
in this area as the nuclear-weapon states denied repeated requests by non-nuclear-weapon states for the NSAs to be made legally-binding. The primary reason lay in distrust across the East-West divide. It was contended that non-nuclear-weapon states in the Warsaw Pact countries, as an alliance, possessed conventional superiority over NATO, and were
closely allied to the Soviet Union. For its part, the Soviet Union argued that NATO stationed nuclear weapons on the national territories of its non-nuclear-weapon state members. NSAs in the Post-Cold War World The Warsaw Pact has now passed into history and the danger of thermonuclear war has abated. The principal threat to US and international
security in this new era is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly of nuclear weapons. Fissile material may be diverted or sold illegally to states of proliferation concern or fall into the hands of terrorists. Stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons is thus a crucial priority if we are to ensure future security, build toward enhanced
stability and peace and strengthen international cooperation in the post-Cold War era. Militarily, the United States and the NATO Alliance currently maintain conventional superiority over any possible adversary. Only acquisition of nuclear weapons could threaten US or NATO military superiority on the battlefield. Threatening to use nuclear weapons
against an NPT non-nuclear-weapon state party undermines the credibility of a strong US and NATO conventional deterrent, and may incite proliferation by emphasizing our sole strategic vulnerability. If US military and NATO forces need to reserve the option of threatening a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT with nuclear weapons to deter
chemical or biological attacks for example, then certain NPT non-nuclear-weapon states such as Iran or Egypt, who face equally immediate (and perhaps even more proximate) chemical and biological threats, may be encouraged to adopt a similar approach by pursuing nuclear weapons. Maintaining the option to introduce nuclear weapons first into a
future conflict thus reduces US leverage to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In turn, if the United States and NATO are not able to stop nuclear proliferation and a future opponent acquires nuclear weapons, the United States and NATO would be significantly limited in what they could accomplish and where they could intervene. This political

The five nuclear-weapon states

leverage remains crucial to controlling proliferation in many states. For example in 1994, the United States effectively contributed to a change in the Indian Government's plans with respect to testing a nuclear device .

reaffirmed, and to a degree harmonized , their political commitments not to threaten NPT non-nuclear-

weapons states parties with nuclear weapons in the context of the NPT extension in 1995, and in effect when signing the relevant
protocols to the African, South Pacific, and Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone ( NWFZ ) Treaties. The protocols
to these NWFZ Treaties strengthen the NSAs as they require the nuclear weapons
states (they have all signed the relevant protocols) not only to refrain from the use
of nuclear weapons against the states parties to the NWFZ Treaties, but also from
the threat of use of nuclear weapons. In accordance with the original 1978 NSAs, the United States maintained the only exception that
this assurance would be invalidated if such a state attacks the United States in alliance with a nuclear-weapon state. Moreover, as reaffirmed and harmonized y 1995 b

NSA statements by the U nited S tates, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France, and
joined with China's no first use doctrine, the NSA regime is an integral part of the
political basis on which the NPT was indefinitely extended. As the NPT came under scrutiny in preparation for the
1995 Review and Extension Conference, Indonesia, acting on behalf of the NAM, requested at the Third NPT Preparatory Committee
Meeting that the NSAs be made universal, unconditional, and legally-binding. While the nuclear-weapon states did not comply with
this request, a reaffirmation of the NSAs by the five nuclear-weapon states became a politically necessary minimum for securing the
indefinite extension of the NPT without conditions. US Vice-President Al Gore explained the significance of updating and
reaffirming the NSAs in the context of making the NPT permanent: "[T]he fourth argument made against the indefinite extension of
the Treaty is that the Treaty exposes non-nuclear states to the risk of intimidation by nuclear-weapon states…Since the nuclear-
weapon states clearly understand that damaging the NPT also damages their security, they have strong motives to refrain from
nuclear threats, and instead to provide credible assurances designed to allay the concerns of others. That is why…President Clinton
issued a declaration providing robust positive and negative security assurances. Each of the four nuclear-weapon states has provided
parallel statements."13 The five nuclear-weapon states thus reaffirmed to the then-173 NPT non-nuclear-weapon
states parties that the five would not use their nuclear weapons against states
parties to the NPT who were renouncing forever the acquisition of nuclear
weapons. The NSAs thereby became intrinsic to the NPT as its basic bargain was
reinforced. Again, as in 1978, no exception was made for chemical and biological weapons. These NSA pledges are referenced
in UN Security Council Resolution 984 (1995). Without this renewed commitment, the NPT likely
would not have been extended indefinitely. The NSAs thus represent a crucial
element of the NPT regime and a primary factor in the decision of prominent NPT
non-nuclear-weapon states parties, including leaders of the NAM, not to pursue
nuclear weapons . Wavering on the NSAs? Certain US statements and NATO
proclamations regarding nuclear weapons use policy made in recent years appear
to be potentially inconsistent with the NSAs and thus to an extent undermine these
commitments. In December 1997 President Clinton issued Presidential Directive (PDD) 60 which may preserve the option of US retaliation with nuclear weapons against an attack involving
chemical or biological weapons.14 US Defence Secretary Cohen also reaffirmed this position when he rejected the German proposal in late 1998 that NATO adopt a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons in
future conflicts. In this context, Secretary Cohen claimed that "the ambiguity involved in the issue of the use of nuclear weapons contributes to our own security, keeping any potential adversary who might use
either chemical or biological [weapons] unsure of what our response would be."15 In addition, the US Administration declared upon signing the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (ANWFZ, or Pelindaba, Treaty)
protocols that Protocol I of the Treaty "will not limit options available to the United States in response to an attack by an ANFZ party using weapons of mass destruction."16 The Administration argued that in the
event of a NWFZ member state (such as Libya) attacking the United States with chemical or biological weapons, the United States could invoke the long-standing international law doctrine of belligerent reprisal.
This doctrine holds that if a state is attacked by another state in violation of international law, and an attack with chemical or biological weapons would violate the Geneva Protocol which is considered part of
customary international law binding on all states, the state attacked is freed from all international commitments with regard to the attacking state, and therefore has the option to respond with whatever weapons it
may choose, including nuclear weapons. However, the response must be proportionate and necessary to stop any further attack; thus, it is unlikely that a response with nuclear weapons would ever be justified by
this doctrine (except perhaps in the unlikely case of a strategic biological weapon attack on a major city, which left hundreds of thousands dead). NATO retains the option to use nuclear weapons first in future
conflicts as part of its deterrence posture, despite NSA commitments by the three NATO nuclear-weapon states. For the Alliance, nuclear weapons are still considered essential to preserving peace in the post-Cold
War world.17Moreover, it has allegedly reaffirmed its right to use nuclear weapons in retaliation against a chemical or biological attack in the classified document MC 400/2, setting out NATO's new military
doctrine.18 These statements undermine general US (and French and British) commitments for the past 22 years - re-affirmed in 1995 - that nuclear weapons will not be used (or threatened in NWFZ Treaties)

Undermining this pledge erodes the credibility of the nuclear-

against NPT non-nuclear-weapon states .
weapon states and weakens the NPT regime. In this context, making NSAs legally-binding
would be a significant step toward strengthening the NPT regime. The NPT 2000 Review
Conference At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, certain leading non-nuclear-weapon states parties, such as the NAM led by
Indonesia, and Mexico, which was speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand,
South Africa, and Sweden), again raised their concern that the NSA commitments were not being taken seriously by the nuclear-
weapon states.19 As a result, Egypt renewed its demand that the NSAs be made legally-binding.20 Canada also supported this
initiative.21This issue was of particular importance during the Conference as many states parties questioned the continued viability
of the NPT regime in the context of renewed efforts by the United States to pursue a national missile defence program that might
lead to a renewed nuclear arms race and the US Senate rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) last fall.22 It is
notable that for the first time in this context, many
NATO non-nuclear-weapon states appeared to
publicly lend their support to the request by the NAM states for legally-binding
negative security assurances. Together, Germany, Norway, Italy, the Netherlands,
and Belgium proposed language to bridge the differences between the nuclear-
weapon states and the NAM. The Conference thus agreed that: "[L]egally-binding security assurances by the five
nuclear-weapon states to the non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would
strengthen the non-proliferation regime. The Conference calls on the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005
Review Conference on this issue."23 Conclusion: Next Steps Making
NSAs legally-binding , for example as a
protocol to be attached to the NPT, would be an important step forward , responding effectively
to repeated calls for such a move from many non-nuclear-weapon states parties. Such
positive actions are urgently needed , as tensions between the nuclear-weapon
states and the non-nuclear-weapon states have grown somewhat since 1996. Furthermore,
strengthening the NSAs would demonstrate a significant commitment by the U nited
S tates to the multilateral effort to stem nuclear proliferation , at a time when many
states, including allies , are becoming concerned that the US is shifting toward
unilateralism and retreating from international commitments, a development that
could spell disaster for the NPT . Since CTBT ratification and national missile defence issues have become
politicised in the United States, especially in the run-up to the Presidential elections, these problems are more difficult to resolve in
In comparison , legally-binding NSAs offer a low-profile option to shore
the short-term.
up the potential erosion of international confidence in this NPT regime . Legally-
binding NSAs would also reaffirm and clarify the US NSA commitment not to
retaliate against non-nuclear-weapon states with nuclear weapons in the case of a
chemical or biological attack, in the face of repeated statements to the contrary .
Strengthening the NSAs would contribute to decreasing the incentives for certain
states to potentially opt for the acquisition of nuclear weapons in response to the
continued high political prestige value of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the
United States and NATO are known to be capable of exercising a devastating
conventional retaliation in response to any future CBW attack, thus maintaining a
strong deterrent against any such attacks. In the context of the NATO Review, a majority of Alliance
members likely would not oppose - and many would actively advocate - a policy of not introducing nuclear weapons into future
conflicts, a reform currently strongly opposed by the United States. Remedying the inherent contradiction between the Alliance's
current policy of reserving the right to use nuclear weapons first and the NATO nuclear-weapon states' NSA pledges should be a
principal objective of the Review. At a minimum, NATO should pledge not to use nuclear weapons against NPT non-nuclear-weapon
states, thereby bringing its stated policy in line with the NPT states parties' commitment under the Treaty. These steps would
contribute to reducing the role of nuclear weapons to that of core deterrence - deterring only the use of other nuclear weapons - and
thereby lowering the political prestige value of nuclear weapons. Ten years after the end of the Cold War, as threats to US and
reducing the political prestige value of nuclear weapons
international security have evolved,
would have important implications for discouraging other states from acquiring
nuclear weapons. This in turn would strengthen the NPT regime, while preserving
US and NATO military superiority and concomitant ability to help ensure future
peace and stability. The NPT regime stands as our first line of defence.
Strengthening this regime is an essential part of working to preserve US, Allied
and world security for the coming decades.
 1AC—TPNW
Advantage two is the ban treaty—
It’s gaining momentum among allies due to nuclear overreliance
Fetter and Wolfstahl 18 (Steve and Jon, Prof of Public Policy @ Univ of Maryland +
Associate at the Belfer Center - Harvard Univ/former Special Assistant to the President of the
United States for National Security Affairs and senior director at the National Security Council
for arms control and nonproliferation, "No First Use and Credible Deterrence," Journal for
Peace and Nuclear Disarmament,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/25751654.2018.1454257)
US nuclear posture under President Trump is also likely to widen a growing schism in
the global nonproliferation and disarmament process. The Nuclear Weapons Ban
Convention, which was completed in 2017 without participation by any nuclear weapon state, may enter
into force within the next few years. The Convention would outlaw possession of nuclear weapons and the use
or threat of use such weapons by its signatories. There is a global campaign working to push US
allies covered by nuclear extended deterrence to sign the treaty , and thereby
reduce America’s requirement for maintaining some of its nuclear capabilities .
The shift of US nuclear policy under President Trump to include greater reliance on
nuclear weapons and more circumstances when nuclear weapons might be used
will add energy and enthusiasm for supporters of the nuclear weapons ban
convention. But if the U nited S tates does not need to rely on nuclear weapons in
most circumstances and can reduce the role of nuclear weapons in maintaining
the security of itself and its allies, doing so would be an important step toward
reinforcing extended deterrent relationships because it would reduce the
momentum of nuclear weapons ban convention movement. If the goal of US nuclear policy is, in
part, to provide the greater assurances of our commitment to the security of Japan and other
US allies , we must continue to balance our military requirements for defense and
deterrence with our broader support for nonproliferation and disarmament.
Over-reliance on the former and disregard for the latter can lead to domestic
political decisions in countries such as Japan and in North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( NATO)
states to join the ban , directly weakening America’s ability to protect and defend
its system.

One ally caving will generate a norms cascade

Gibbons 17 (Rebecca Davis Gibbons Visiting Assistant Professor at Bowdoin College Ph.D. in
Government with a concentration in International Relations from Georgetown University. Ex-
Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the RAND Corporation July 14, 2017 The Nuclear Ban
Treaty: How Did We Get Here, What Does It Mean for The United States?
https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/the-nuclear-ban-treaty-how-did-we-get-here-what-does-
it-mean-for-the-united-states/)

The immediate worries about the treaty are unlikely to play out, but
in the longer term, this milestone could
challenge public perceptions about morality of possessing nuclear weapons. A
common criticism of the ban effort is that that the treaty will not result in the
elimination of a single nuclear weapon. In the near future, this is correct. Yet this
criticism misrepresents the strategy of the nuclear ban campaigners . Advocates
envision the treaty as an interim step to nuclear disarmament through its role in
delegitimizing nuclear weapons and the doctrines of nuclear deterrence and
extended deterrence. With the adoption of a legally binding treaty, negotiated at
the United Nations, disarmament advocates will call attention to the illegitimacy of
all nuclear weapons-related activities . As Beatrice Fihn, executive director of the International Campaign to
Abolish Nuclear Weapons, explained in March, “We will identify what kind of behavior is now illegal ,
under this treaty, and start criticizing governments for doing those actions, even if they haven’t
signed on to the treaty … It’s a long-term perspective. I think we will work to rally the public in
countries .” Having the treaty in place provides the campaign with a tool to increase
public awareness and spread its message about the humanitarian impact of
nuclear weapons. The treaty allows citizens to ask their governments, “Why are we
not members of this treaty?” Because most nuclear weapons states spend little time
explaining to their populations the reasons why they possess nuclear weapons, it is
plausible the humanitarian frame for nuclear weapons will, in the long run, become more
relevant to the public ( especially in democratic states with active civil society organizations). The
humanitarian frame and the treaty could gain prominence as more states sign on to
the treaty and pressure others to join. If one or several states under the nuclear
umbrella join the treaty due to domestic and international pressure , it could help push
other reluctant states in this direction, in what scholars call a “ norm cascade .” The
U nited S tates has significant influence on its alliance partners , but if the nuclear
ban campaign becomes a popular movement within these countries , domestic
pressure will compete with pressure from foreign governments – and the domestic
constituency could win out . There is precedent for this : In the 1980s, public
opinion in New Zealand favored rejecting visits from U.S. naval vessels due to
concerns about nuclear propulsion and nuclear weapons. The U.S. visits became a topic
in the 1984 election, and the winning Labor government subsequently prohibited U.S. naval visits. One way the
ban movement could gain salience sooner would be an event that reminds people of
the horrific effects of nuclear weapons, such as an accident involving a nuclear weapon or limited use. The
nuclear ban campaign is small compared to the nuclear freeze movement in the 1980s,
in part because there is less fear surrounding nuclear weapons. Were this to change, the campaign could become much more
widespread.

The plan is the goldilocks compromise that prevents ban treaty

expansion
Gartner 18 (Heinz Gartner, professor for political science in Vienna, and currently at the
Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, an advisor to Austria’s
Ministry of Defense, and a member of the advisory board of the International Institute for
Peace, Summer 2018. “The Ban on Nuclear Weapons, Negative Security Assurances, and NATO
States.” https://homepage.univie.ac.at/heinz.gaertner/wp-
content/2018/07/CI_paper_2018.pdf)
Opponents of the ban treaty complain that it would polarize the international
community . This is not the intention of the nonnuclear weapon states. Essentially, there are two opposing views on security. The nuclear and
non-nuclear NATO-members feel better protected with nuclear weapons, while the non-nuclear states believe they are more secure without. The
root cause of polarization pre-dates the adoption of the ban treaty . Non-nuclear weapon
states felt betrayed that the nuclear-armed states did not meet their disarmament
obligations under Article VI of the NPT ,15 which states that ‘each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a
treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control’. Non-nuclear
states feel that
their sacrifice – the renunciation of nuclear weapons – was in the end for naught .
This caused a rift between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states;
the intention of the ban treaty is to close this gap . However , the US
Administration’s 2018 NPR identifies a contradiction between disarmament and
non-proliferation. The ban treaty effort ‘seeks to inject disarmament issues into
nonproliferation fora, potentially damaging the non-proliferation regime’ .16 It is not
only signatories of the ban treaty, but also nonnuclear NATO-states which have expressed concerns about the humanitarian consequences of the use of
nuclear weapons. Advocates of the ban treaty argue that the populations of the NATO-allies would be in even greater danger, because they are the
primary targets in a nuclear exchange between nuclear-weapon states. Thus the intention of the ban treaty was not to deepen divisions, but rather
create an environment where security is indivisible. Non-nuclear weapon states say that the advantage of not being a primary target of a nuclear-
weapon state should be distributed to all non-nuclear weapon states, whether they are NATO members or not. This was the primary reason for joining
the NPT in the first place. The risk that nuclear weapons may be used, and their existence in the first place, pose threats to the security of any given
population.17 It
appears that nuclear-armed states will not join the treaty any time soon ,
nor give up their nuclear weapons. Is there room for compromise? 18 What could
they offer to non-nuclear weapon states instead ? Nuclear states could promise not
to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states . Negative Security Assurances
( NSAs )19 are guarantees by nuclear weapon states to those that have renounced
them. These NSAs are enshrined in the documents of the NPTreview conferences
and in the Nuclear Posture Review of former US President Obama . The Nuclear Posture
Review20 of the Trump administration reaffirms the NSAs of earlier administrations: ‘The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.’ This is
not asking for too much . NSAs are less of a commitment than non-first use
pledges . An unconditional NSA commitment by nuclear weapon states would
remove all non-nuclear weapon states from the target list . In contrast, a true non-first use doctrine
would have to remove conventional, chemical and biological weapons from the target list, and would apply to non-nuclear and nuclear states alike.
These NSAs must be legally binding in order to be meaningful. Nuclear weapon
states would have to sign and ratify the legally binding protocols of the treaties on Nuclear
Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs ), which contain NSAs . These NSAs are the only

commitments of nuclear weapon states to these treaties . The initiative to create a NWFZ in the Middle
East failed to gain much traction, however, despite hopes that the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons would give the idea new momentum.

Empowering the ban treaty emboldens Russia and China aggression

and crushes US extended deterrence
Harries 17 (Matthew, managing editor of Survival, and a research fellow at the International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), "The Real Problem With a Nuclear Ban Treaty,"
http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/15/real-problem-with-nuclear-ban-treaty-pub-68286)

The nuclear- ban-treaty movement has a problem. It is not so much that a ban will be useless, or that it will undermine the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty—although those things might well be true. The problem is that, when one moves past abstract principles to what the ban will
actually do in practice, the target of the treaty is clear: intentionally or not, it is
an attack on the nuclear-armed
democracies —the U nited S tates, in particular—and their allies to the near-
exclusive benefit of Russia and China . It is an uncomfortable point to make. A world without nuclear weapons would be,
in the long term, a better world than today’s, and one hesitates to get in the way of those who are trying to reach that goal. But, with treaty negotiations
about to start at the UN, it
is time to be blunt about the practical implications of a ban, as
opposed to its principled ambitions. The main way for a ban treaty to achieve
anything of substance is to throw grit into the bearings of U.S. extended
deterrence . It could do so by various means. It might contribute to pressure to withdraw U.S.
nuclear weapons from their NATO host countries in Europe, or at least pressure on those countries
not to procure replacements for their nuclear-capable aircraft. More broadly, it might make it harder for NATO to

present a united front against Russian nuclear saber rattling —a direct threat to existing global
norms of nuclear restraint— by pitching the alliance back into fractious debates about the role

of nuclear weapons, on which a delicate consensus has been reached in recent

years. As a leaked U.S. non-paper made clear in the run-up to the UN General Assembly vote to authorize the start of negotiations, a ban
treaty signed by U.S. allies or partners could set up legal obstacles to carrying out
extended-deterrence -related operations. This could affect not just NATO, but
perhaps also East Asia especially , via a prohibition on the transit of nuclear
weapons through national territory, airspace, or waters, and a prohibition on
participating in nuclear planning or subscribing to nuclear doctrines. The ban’s advocates also
hope that it will affect nuclear procurement choices in France or the UK—especially the UK, where there is a tradition of effective disarmament protest,
although even there the consensus around nuclear deterrence now seems fairly settled. What
the ban treaty will not do ,
however, is encourage Russia or China (let alone North Korea) to disarm , or even to participate more actively in

bilateral or multilateral arms control initiatives. How could it? Civil society movements in those countries will
not be pressuring their governments to make reductions or to halt existing
modernization programs. Moral pressure is not a guiding factor in Russian or
Chinese decisionmaking on national security . The logic of a ban treaty, which relies on generating such pressure,
applies to countries where there is a direct connection between activism and the making of nuclear policy. Supporters of the ban might hope that
enforced constraints on the nuclear-armed democracies and their allies will encourage restraint on the part of other, less democratic nuclear-armed
states. But this argument willfully misunderstands the motives for Russian and Chinese nuclear armament. Those countries’ nuclear programmes are
primarily driven not by U.S. extended nuclear deterrence per se—nor, it need hardly be said, by British and French nuclear modernization—but rather,
A global nuclear restraint regime is badly needed—
in the long run, by U.S. conventional military strength.

but it will have to be negotiated with the active participation of at least several of
the nuclear-armed states . Meanwhile, there are other important existing initiatives, including the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (which is still to enter into force) and a future Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (about which negotiations have
could be starved
not even begun), as well as potential new ones, such as limits on nuclear-armed cruise missiles. These important efforts
of diplomatic oxygen thanks to the attention that will be devoted to the ban treaty.
And, yes, the arrival of a ban is likely to make the NPT’s difficult politics even more
fraught, undercutting the authority of a vital treaty . In other words, a ban will not reduce
the role of nuclear weapons in the international system—except, perhaps, by reducing the credibility
of U.S. extended deterrence . That, in turn, could have its own pernicious side effects, including undermin ing
the security of the Baltic states , encouraging North Korean adventurism , and lending
weight to calls for U.S. allies to embark on nuclear-weapons programs of their
own. Such steps would make a world without nuclear weapons even more distant.

US-Russia war causes extinction

Fisher 15 (Max, Foreign affairs columnist at VOX, "How World War III became possible,"
6/29, http://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war)

That is why, analysts will tell you, today's tensions bear far more similarity to the period before
World War I : an unstable power balance, belligerence over peripheral conflicts,
entangling military commitments, disputes over the future of the European order, and
dangerous uncertainty about what actions will and will not force the other party into conflict. Today's Russia ,
once more the strongest nation in Europe and yet weaker than its collective enemies, calls to mind the turn-of-the-
century German Empire, which Henry Kissinger described as "too big for Europe, but too small for the world." Now,
as then, a rising power, propelled by nationalism, is seeking to revise the European
order . Now, as then, it believes that through superior cunning, and perhaps even by proving its might, it can force a larger role
for itself. Now, as then, the drift toward war is gradual and easy to miss — which is exactly what makes it so dangerous. But there
is one way in which today's dangers are less like those before World War I , and more
similar to those of the Cold War: the apocalyptic logic of nuclear weapons . Mutual suspicion,
fear of an existential threat, armies parked across borders from one another, and
hair-trigger nuclear weapons all make any small skirmish a potential armageddon .
In some ways, that logic has grown even more dangerous. Russia, hoping to compensate for its conventional military forces'
relative weakness, has dramatically relaxed its rules for using nuclear weapons . Whereas Soviet
leaders saw their nuclear weapons as pure deterrents, something that existed precisely so they would never be used, Putin's view
Russia's official nuclear doctrine calls on the country to
appears to be radically different.
launch a battlefield nuclear strike in case of a conventional war that could pose an
existential threat. These are more than just words: Moscow has repeatedly signaled its willingness and preparations to use
nuclear weapons even in a more limited war. This is a terrifyingly low bar for nuclear weapons use ,
particularly given that any war would likely occur along Russia's borders and thus not far from Moscow. And it suggests Putin has
adopted an idea that Cold War leaders considered unthinkable: that a "limited" nuclear war, of small warheads dropped on the
battlefield, could be not only survivable but winnable. "It’s not just a difference in rhetoric. It’s a whole different world," Bruce G.
Blair, a nuclear weapons scholar at Princeton, told the Wall Street Journal. He called Putin's decisions more dangerous than those of
any Soviet leader since 1962. "There’s a low nuclear threshold now that didn’t exist during the Cold War." Nuclear theory is complex
and disputable; maybe Putin is right. But many theorists would say he is wrong, that the logic of nuclear warfare means a
"limited" nuclear strike is in fact likely to trigger a larger nuclear war — a
doomsday scenario in which major American, Russian, and European cities would
be targets for attacks many times more powerful than the bombs that leveled Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even if a
nuclear war did somehow remain limited and contained, recent studies suggest that
environmental and atmospheric damage would cause a "decade of winter " and mass
crop die-outs that could kill up to 1 billion people in a global famine.

China aggression escalates

Lowther and Littlefield 15 (Adam and Alex, Director, School of Advanced Nuclear
Deterrence Studies - Air Force Global Strike Command + professor at Feng Chia University,
"Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America," 8/11,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-
america/)

For the United States and its allies and partners in Asia, China’s aggressive efforts to assert questionable claims in
the South and East China Sea, enforce a disputed Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), build the rocket/missile and naval
create a situation
capabilities needed to invade Taiwan, and build a substantial ballistic missile capability all work to
where conflict between the U.S. and the PRC could occur and rapidly escalate . Given
that American political and military leaders have a poor understanding of Chinese ambitions and particularly their opaque nuclear
thinking, there is ample reason to be concerned that a future conflict could escalate to a
limited nuclear conflict . Thus, it is worth taking a look at the PRC with an eye toward offering insight into Chinese
motivation and thinking when it comes to how a possible crisis over Taiwan could escalate to the
use of nuclear weapons . Chinese Capabilities In their latest estimate, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris assess
that the Second Artillery Corps possesses forty long-range nuclear missiles that can strike the United States if fired from China’s
eastern seaboard and an additional twenty that could hit Hawaii and Alaska. The challenge for China, is reaching the East Coast –
home to the nation’s capital and largest economic centers. To overcome this challenge China is also developing its JL-2 submarine-
launched ballistic missile (SLBM) which is a sea-based variant of the DF-31 land-mobile long-range missile that will go to sea on Jin-
class submarines. China may also be developing a new mobile missile, the DF-41, which will carry multiple warheads, giving the
Chinese a way to potentially defeat an American ballistic missile defense system. It is worth noting that the quantity, though not the
quality, of China’s nuclear arsenal is only limited by its dwindling stock of weapons grade plutonium. This raises the question; to
what end is China developing and deploying its nuclear arsenal? Chinese Motivation The textbook answer is straightforward.
China seeks a secure second (retaliatory) strike capability that will serve to deter
an American first strike. As China argues, it has a “no-nuclear-first policy” which makes its arsenal purely defensive –
while its other capabilities such as cyber are offensive. Potential nuclear adversaries including Russia, India, and the United States
are fully aware that China’s investment in advanced warheads and ballistic missile delivery systems bring Delhi, Moscow, and, soon,
Washington within reach of the “East Wind.” While
not a nuclear peer competitor to either Russia
or the U.S., China is rapidly catching up as it builds an estimated 30-50 new
nuclear warheads each year. While American leaders may find such a sentiment unfounded, the PRC has a strong
fear that the United States will use its nuclear arsenal as a tool to blackmail (coerce) China into taking or not taking a number of
actions that are against its interests. China’s fears are not unfounded. Unlike China, the United States maintains an ambiguous use-
policy in order to provide maximum flexibility. As declassified government documents from the 1970s clearly show, the United
States certainly planned to use overwhelming nuclear force early in a European conflict with the Soviet Union. Given American
nuclear superiority and its positioning of ballistic missile defenses in Asia, ostensibly to defend against a North Korean attack, China
sees its position and ability to deter the United States as vulnerable. Possible Scenario While there are several scenarios where
a conflict over Taiwan
conflict between the United States and China is possible, some analysts believe that
remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows .
Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political
domination could incur the wrath of the United States . To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the
region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal
threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan. If thwarted in its initial efforts to
stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland
China. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the
Chinese. Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will
include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate
to the use of a nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing de-
escalation. In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in
sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since
Taiwan is a domestic
matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression . This, in the minds of
the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China. It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an
asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional
military campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the
United States – far more is at stake for China than it is for the United States. In essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a
successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without making too crude a point, the nuclear option
provides more bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually assured destruction ( MAD ) is not part of China’s
strategic thinking – in fact it is explicitly rejected – the PRC will see the situation very differently than the United States.
China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the United States. It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical
objectives. However, China
does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core
security interests, including reunification with Taiwan . Reunification is necessary for China to
reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a
literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military
hegemony in its own neighborhood. China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance
with the historical and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S.
military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished. China’s relationship with the Philippines, which lies just to the
south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically. Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon,
it is actively seeking to supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing may take a
longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be responsive to a domestic
audience that demands ever higher levels of prosperity. Central to China’s ability to guarantee that prosperity is the return of
too many
Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies. Unfortunately,
Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests to China and the
lengths to which China will ultimately go in order to guarantee them – even the
use of nuclear weapons . Should China succeed it pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional
territorial disputes bilaterally and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side. China sees
the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will
likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence
high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits in response to
remarks by then-President Lee Teng-hui, ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. The U.S. brought an end to the mainland’s
antics when the U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits. Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou,
China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan.
China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced in 1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the
next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-
guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate a crisis or capitulate. While the scenario described is certainly not inevitable, the
fact than many American readers will see it as implausible if not impossible is an example of the mirror-imaging that often occurs
when attempting to understand an adversary. China is not the United States nor do Chinese leaders think like their counterparts in
the United States. Unless we give serious thought to possible scenarios where nuclear
conflict could occur, the
United States may be unprepared for a situation that escalates beyond its ability to
prevent a catastrophe .
 1AC—CEA
Advantage three is CEA—
Emerging technology risks nuclear escalation and extinction – new
arms control agreements are key
Klare 18 (Michael T. Klare, professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting
fellow at the Arms Control Association, December 2018. “The Challenges of Emerging Technologies.”
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-12/features/challenges-emerging-technologies)
In every other generation, it seems, humans
develop new technologies that alter the nature of
warfare and pose fresh challenges for those seeking to reduce the frequency,
destructiveness, and sheer misery of violent conflict . During World War I, advances in chemical
processing were utilized to develop poisonous gases for battlefield use, causing massive casualties; after the war, horrified publics
pushed diplomats to sign the Geneva Protocol of 1925, prohibiting the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, and other lethal gases.
World War II witnessed the tragic application of nuclear technology to warfare, and much of postwar diplomacy entailed efforts to
prevent the proliferation and use of atomic munitions. Today, a whole new array of technologies —artificial
intelligence ( AI ), robotics , hypersonics , and cybertechnology , among others—is
being applied to military use , with potentially far-ranging consequences . Although the
risks and ramifications of these weapons are not yet widely recognized, policymakers will be compelled to
address the dangers posed by innovative weapons technologies and to devise
international arrangements to regulate or curb their use . Although some early
efforts have been undertaken in this direction, most notably, in attempting to prohibit the deployment of
fully autonomous weapons systems, far more work is needed to gauge the impacts of these technologies and to
forge new or revised control mechanisms as deemed appropriate. Tackling the arms
control implications of emerging technologies now is becoming a matter of ever-
increasing urgency as the pace of their development is accelerating and their
potential applications to warfare are multiplying . Many analysts believe that the utilization
of AI and robotics will utterly revolutionize warfare , much as the introduction of tanks, airplanes,
and nuclear weapons transformed the battlefields of each world war. “ We are in the midst of an ever
accelerating and expanding global revolution in [AI] and machine learning, with
enormous implications for future economic and military competitiveness,”
declared former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work , a prominent advocate for
Pentagon utilization of the new technologies.1 The Department of Defense is spending billions of
dollars on AI, robotics, and other cutting-edge technologies , contending that the U nited
S tates must maintain leadership in the development and utilization of those technologies lest its rivals use them to secure a future
military advantage. China and Russia are assumed to be spending equivalent sums , indicating
the initiation of a vigorous arms race in emerging technologies . “Our adversaries are presenting
us today with a renewed challenge of a sophisticated, evolving threat,” Michael Griffin, U.S. undersecretary of defense for research
and engineering, told Congress in April. “We are in turn preparing to meet that challenge and to restore the technical overmatch of
the United States armed forces that we have traditionally held.”2 In accordance with this dynamic, the United States and
its rivals are pursuing multiple weapons systems employing various combinations
of AI, autonomy, and other emerging technologies . These include, for example, unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned surface and subsurface naval vessels capable of being assembled in swarms, or “wolfpacks,” to locate
enemy assets such as tanks, missile launchers, submarines and, if communications are lost with their human operators, decide to
strike them on their own. The Defense Department also has funded the development of two advanced weapons systems employing
hypersonic technology: a hypersonic air-launched cruise missile and the Tactical Boost Glide (TBG) system, encompassing a
hypersonic rocket for initial momentum and an unpowered payload that glides to its destination. In the cyberspace
realm, a variety of offensive and retaliatory cyberweapons are being developed by the
U.S. Cyber Command for use against hostile states found to be using cyberspace to endanger U.S. national security. The
introduction of these and other such weapons on future battlefields will transform
every aspect of combat and raise a host of challenges for advocates of responsible
arms control . The use of fully autonomous weapons in combat, for example, automatically raises questions about the
military’s ability to comply with the laws of war and international humanitarian law, which require belligerents to distinguish
between enemy combatants and civilian bystanders. It is on this basis that opponents of such systems are seeking to negotiate a
binding international ban on their deployment. Even more worrisome, some of the weapons now in development, such as unmanned
anti-submarine wolfpacks and the TBG system, could theoretically endanger the current equilibrium in nuclear relations among the
major powers, which rests on the threat of assured retaliation by invulnerable second-strike forces, by opening or seeming to open
various first-strike options. Warfare in cyberspace could also threaten nuclear stability by
exposing critical early-warning and communications systems to paralyzing attacks and
prompting anxious leaders to authorize the early launch of nuclear weapons .
These are only some of the challenges to global security and arms control that are
likely to be posed by the weaponization of new technologies . Observers of these developments,
including many who have studied them closely, warn that the development and weaponization of AI
and other emerging technologies is occurring faster than efforts to understand
their impacts or devise appropriate safeguards . “Unfortunately,” said former U.S. Secretary of the Navy
Richard Danzig, “the uncertainties surrounding the use and interaction of new military
technologies are not subject to confident calculation or control .” 3 Given the
enormity of the risks involved , this lack of attention and oversight must be
overcome. Mapping out the implications of the new technologies for warfare and arms control and devising effective
mechanisms for their control are a mammoth undertaking that requires the efforts of many analysts and policymakers around the
world. This piece, an overview of the issues, is the first in a series for Arms Control Today (ACT) that will assess some of the most
disruptive emerging technologies and their war-fighting and arms control implications. Future installments will look in greater
depth at four especially problematic technologies: AI, autonomous weaponry, hypersonics, and
cyberwarfare. These four have been chosen for close examination because, at this time, they appear to be the
furthest along in terms of conversion into military systems and pose immediate
challenges for international peace and stability . Artificial Intelligence AI is a generic term used to describe a variety of techniques for investing machines with
an ability to monitor their surroundings in the physical world or cyberspace and to take independent action in response to various stimuli. To invest machines with these capacities, engineers have developed complex algorithms, or computer-based sets of rules, to
govern their operations. An AI-equipped aerial drone, for example, could be equipped with sensors to distinguish enemy tanks from other vehicles on a crowded battlefield and, when some are spotted, choose on its own to fire at them with its onboard missiles. AI
can also be employed in cyberspace, for example to watch for enemy cyberattacks and counter them with a barrage of counterstrikes. In the future, AI-invested machines may be empowered to determine if a nuclear attack is underway and, if so, initiate a retaliatory
strike.4In this sense, AI is an “omni-use” technology, with multiple implications for war-fighting and arms control.5 Many analysts believe that AI will revolutionize warfare by allowing military commanders to bolster or, in some cases, replace their personnel with a
wide variety of “smart” machines. Intelligent systems are prized for the speed with which they can detect a potential threat and their ability to calculate the best course of action to neutralize that peril. As warfare among the major powers grows increasingly rapid and
multidimensional, including in the cyberspace and outer space domains, commanders may choose to place ever-greater reliance on intelligent machines for monitoring enemy actions and initiating appropriate countermeasures. This could provide an advantage on

nuclear “crisis stability.” Analysts worry that

the battlefield, where rapid and informed action could prove the key to success, but also raises numerous concerns, especially regarding

machines will accelerate the pace of fighting beyond human comprehension and
possibly take actions that result in the unintended escalation of hostilities, even leading to use of
nuclear weapons . Not only are AI-equipped machines vulnerable to error and
sabotage , they lack an ability to assess the context of events and may initiate
inappropriate or unjustified escalatory steps that occur too rapidly for humans to
correct. “Even if everything functioned properly, policymakers could nevertheless effectively lose
the ability to control escalation as the speed of action on the battlefield begins to
eclipse their speed of decision-making,” writes Paul Scharre, who is director of the technology and national
security program at the Center for a New American Security.6 As AI-equipped machines assume an ever-growing number and range
of military functions, policymakers will have to determine what safeguards are needed to
prevent unintended, possibly catastrophic consequences of the sort suggested by
Scharre and many others. C onceivably, AI could bolster nuclear stability by providing enhanced intelligence about enemy intentions and reducing the risk of misperception and miscalculation; such options
also deserve attention. In the near term, however, control efforts will largely be focused on one particular application of AI: fully autonomous weapons systems. Autonomous Weapons Systems Autonomous weapons systems, sometimes called lethal autonomous
weapons systems, or “killer robots,” combine AI and drone technology in machines equipped to identify, track, and attack enemy assets on their own. As defined by the U.S. Defense Department, such a device is “a weapons system that, once activated, can select and
engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.”7 Some such systems have already been put to military use. The Navy’s Aegis air defense system, for example, is empowered to track enemy planes and missiles within a certain radius of a ship at sea
and, if it identifies an imminent threat, to fire missiles against it. Similarly, Israel’s Harpy UAV can search for enemy radar systems over a designated area and, when it locates one, strike it on its own. Many other such munitions are now in development, including
undersea drones intended for anti-submarine warfare and entire fleets of UAVs designed for use in “swarms,” or flocks of armed drones that twist and turn above the battlefield in coordinated maneuvers that are difficult to follow. 8 The deployment of fully
autonomous weapons systems poses numerous challenges to international security and arms control, beginning with a potentially insuperable threat to the laws of war and international humanitarian law. Under these norms, armed belligerents are obligated to
distinguish between enemy combatants and civilians on the battlefield and to avoid unnecessary harm to the latter. In addition, any civilian casualties that do occur in battle should not be disproportionate to the military necessity of attacking that position.
Opponents of lethal autonomous weapons systems argue that only humans possess the necessary judgment to make such fine distinctions in the heat of battle and that machines will never be made intelligent enough to do so and thus should be banned from
deployment.9 At this point, some 25 countries have endorsed steps to enact such a ban in the form of a protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). Several other nations, including the United States and Russia, oppose a ban on lethal

autonomous weapons systems could

autonomous weapons systems, saying they can be made compliant with international humanitarian law.10 Looking further into the future ,
pose a potential threat to nuclear stability by investing their owners with a
capacity to detect, track, and destroy enemy submarines and mobile missile
launchers. Today’s stability, which can be seen as an uneasy nuclear balance of
terror, rests on the belief that each major power possesses at least some
devastating second-strike, or retaliatory, capability, whether mobile launchers for
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs), or both, that are immune to real-time detection and safe from a first
strike. Yet, a nuclear-armed belligerent might someday undermine the deterrence equation by employing undersea drones to
pursue and destroy enemy ballistic missile submarines along with swarms of UAVs to hunt and attack enemy mobile ICBM
Even the mere existence of such weapons could jeopardize stability by
launchers.
encouraging an opponent in a crisis to launch a nuclear first strike rather than
risk losing its deterrent capability to an enemy attack. Such an environment would
erode the underlying logic of today’s strategic nuclear arms control measures , that
is, the preservation of deterrence and stability with ever-diminishing numbers of
warheads and launchers, and would require new or revised approaches to war
prevention and disarmament.11 Hypersonic Weapons Proposed hypersonic weapons, which can travel at a speed of more than five time the speed of
sound, or more than 5,000 kilometers per hour, generally fall into two categories: hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles, either of which could be armed with nuclear or conventional warheads. With hypersonic glide vehicle systems, a rocket carries
the unpowered glide vehicle into space, where it detaches and flies to its target by gliding along the upper atmosphere. Hypersonic cruise missiles are self-powered missiles, utilizing advanced rocket technology to achieve extraordinary speed and maneuverability. No

China, Russia, and the United States are developing hypersonic

such munitions currently exist, but

weapons of various types . The U.S. Defense Department, for example, is testing the components of a hypersonic glide vehicle system under its Tactical Boost Glide project and recently awarded a $928 million
contract to Lockheed Martin Corp. for the full-scale development of a hypersonic air-launched cruise missile, tentatively called the Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon.12 Russia, for its part, is developing a hypersonic glide vehicle it calls the Avangard, which it
claims will be ready for deployment by the end of 2019, and China in August announced a successful test of the Starry Sky-2 hypersonic glide vehicle described as capable of carrying a nuclear weapon.13 Whether armed with conventional or nuclear warheads,
hypersonic weapons pose a variety of challenges to international stability and arms control. At the heart of such concerns is these weapons’ exceptional speed and agility. Anti-missile systems that may work against existing threats might not be able to track and

the
engage hypersonic vehicles, potentially allowing an aggressor to contemplate first-strike disarming attacks on nuclear or conventional forces while impelling vulnerable defenders to adopt a launch-on-warning policy. 14 Some analysts warn that

mere acquisition of such weapons could “ increase the expectation of a disarming

attack .” Such expectations “encourage the threatened nations to take such actions
as devolution of command-and-control of strategic forces, wider dispersion of
such forces, a launch-on-warning posture, or a policy of preemption during a
crisis.” In short, “ hypersonic threats encourage hair-trigger tactics that would increase
crisis instability.”15 The development of hypersonic weaponry poses a significant
threat to the core principle of assured retaliation, on which today’s nuclear
strategies and arms control measures largely rest . Overcoming that danger will
require commitments on the part of the major powers jointly to consider the risks
posed by such weapons and what steps might be necessary to curb their
destabilizing effects. The development of hypersonic munitions also introduces added problems of proliferation. Although the bulk of research on such weapons is now being conducted by China, Russia, and the United
States, other nations are exploring the technologies involved and eventually could produce such munitions on their own eventually. In a world of widely disseminated hypersonic weapons, vulnerable states would fear being attacked with little or no warning time,
possibly impelling them to conduct pre-emptive strikes on enemy capabilities or to commence hostilities at the earliest indication of an incoming missile. Accordingly, the adoption of fresh nonproliferation measures also belongs on the agenda of major world

Cyberattack Secure operations in cyberspace, the global web of information streams tied to the internet, has become
leaders.16

essential for the continued functioning of the international economy and much else besides. An extraordinary tool for many
purposes, the internet is also vulnerable to attack by hostile intruders, whether to
spread misinformation, disrupt vital infrastructure, or steal valuable data. Most of
those malicious activities are conducted by individuals or groups of individuals seeking to enrich themselves or sway public opinion.
It is increasingly evident, however, that governmental bodies, often working in conjunction with
some of those individuals, are employing cyberweapons to weaken their enemies
by sowing distrust or sabotaging key institutions or to bolster their own defenses
by stealing militarily relevant technological know-how . Moreover, in the event of a crisis or
approaching hostilities, cyberattacks could be launched on an adversary’s early-warning,
communications, and command and control systems, significantly impairing its
response capabilities.17 For all these reasons, cybersecurity, or the protection of cyberspace
from malicious attack, has become a major national security priority .18 Cybersecurity, as perceived by U.S.
leaders, can take two forms: defensive action aimed at protecting one’s own information infrastructure against attack; and offensive action intended to punish, or retaliate against, an attacker by severely disrupting its systems, or to deter such attack by holding out
the prospect of such punishment. The U.S. Cyber Command, elevated by President Donald Trump in August 2017 to a full-fledged Unified Combatant Command, is empowered to conduct both types of operations. In many respects then, the cyber domain is coming
to resemble the strategic nuclear realm, with notions of defense, deterrence, and assured retaliation initially devised for nuclear scenarios now being applied to conflict in cyberspace. Although battles in this domain are said to fall below the threshold of armed

skirmishes in cyberspace that erupt into violent conflict ,

combat (so long, of course, as no one is killed as a result), it is not difficult to conceive of

for example if cyberattacks result in the collapse of critical infrastructure , such as the
electric grid or the banking system. Considered solely as a domain of its own, cyberspace is a fertile area
for the introduction of regulatory measures that might be said to resemble arms control , although referring to cyberweapons rather than
nuclear or conventional munitions. This is not a new challenge but one that has grown more pressing as the technology advances.19 At what point, for example, might it be worthwhile to impose formal
impediments to the cyber equivalent of a disarming first strike, a digital attack that would paralyze a rival’s key information systems? A group of governmental experts was convened by the UN General Assembly
to investigate the adoption of norms and rules for international behavior in cyberspace, but failed to reach agreement on measures that would satisfy all major powers.20 More importantly, it is essential to

cyberspace might spill over into the physical world, triggering armed
consider how combat in

combat and possibly hastening the pace of escalation . This danger was brought into bold relief in
February 2018, when the Defense Department released its latest Nuclear Posture Review report, spelling out the Trump
administration’s approach to nuclear weapons and their use . Stating that an enemy
cyberattack on U.S. strategic command and control systems could pose a critical
threat to U.S. national security, the new policy holds out the prospect of a nuclear
response to such attacks . The United States, it affirmed, would only consider using nuclear weapons in “extreme circumstances,” which could include attacks “on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command
and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities.”21 The policy of other states in this regard is not so clearly stated, but similar protocols undoubtedly exist. Accordingly, management of this spillover effect from cyber- to conventional or even nuclear
conflict will become a major concern of international policymakers in the years to come. The Evolving Arms Control Agenda To be sure, policymakers and arms control advocates will have their hands full in the coming months and years just preserving existing
accords and patching them up where needed. At present, several key agreements, including the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the 2015 Iran nuclear accord are at significant risk, and there are serious doubts as to whether the United States and

As time
Russia will extend the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty before it expires in February 2021. Addressing these and other critical concerns will occupy much of the energy of key figures in the field for some time to come.

goes on , however, policymakers will be compelled to devote ever-increasing attention to the

military and arms control implications of the technologies identified above and others that may emerge in
the years ahead . Diplomatically, these issues logically could be addressed bilaterally, such as through the currently stalled U.S.-Russian nuclear stability talks, and when appropriate in various multilateral forums. Developing all
the needed responses to the new technologies will take time and considerable effort, involving the contributions of many individuals and organizations. Some of this is already underway, in part due to a special grant program on new threats to nuclear security
initiated by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.22 Far more attention to these challenges will be needed in the years ahead. More detailed discussions of possible approaches for regulating the military use of these four technologies will be explored subsequently in
ACT, but here are some preliminary thoughts on what will be needed. To begin, it will be essential to consider how the new technologies affect existing arms control and nonproliferation measures and ask what modifications, if any, are needed to ensure their
continued validity in the face of unforeseen challenges. The introduction of hypersonic delivery systems, for example, could alter the mutual force calculations underlying existing strategic nuclear arms limitation agreements and require additional protocols to any
future iteration of those accords. At the same time, research should be conducted on the possible contribution of AI technologies to the strengthening of existing measures, such as the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which rely on the constant monitoring of
participating states’ military and military-related activities. As the weaponization of the pivotal technologies proceeds, it will also be useful to consider how existing agreements might be used as the basis for added measures intended to control entirely novel types of
munitions. As indicated earlier, the CCW can be used as a framework on which to adopt additional measures in the form of protocols controlling or banning the use of armaments, such as autonomous weapons systems, not imagined at the time of the treaty’s initial

signing in 1980. Some analysts have suggested that the Missile Technology Control Regime could be used as a model for a mechanism intended to prevent the proliferation of hypersonic weapons technology. 23 Finally, as the above discussion suggests , it
will be necessary to devise entirely new approaches to arms control that are designed to
overcome dangers of an unprecedented sort . Addressing the weaponization of AI, for example, will prove
exceedingly difficult because regulating something as inherently insubstantial as algorithms will defy the precise labeling and
stockpile oversight features of most existing control measures. Many of the other systems described above, including autonomous
and hypersonic weapons, span the divide between conventional and nuclear munitions and raise a whole other set of regulatory
problems. Addressing these challenges will not be easy, but just as previous generations of policymakers found ways of
controlling new and dangerous technologies, so too will current and future generations contrive novel solutions to
new perils.

BUT—the treaty process kills US arms control leadership and makes

future agreements impossible – transitioning to CEA’s is key
Rubin 10 (James P. Rubin, teaches at Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs, was an assistant secretary of
state for public affairs during the Clinton administration, November 21, 2010. “Farewell to the Age of the Treaty.”
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/22/opinion/22rubin.html?
mtrref=www.google.com&mtrref=www.nytimes.com&gwh=10F5B6905865575196AB481C91500605&gwt=pay)

arms control treaty is

DESPITE months of negotiations on Capitol Hill, Senate approval of President Obama’s New Start
in serious jeopardy . And it raises the question: Are treaties , and in particular arms
control treaties , even worth the trouble anymore? In fact, most of our international objectives on
arms control and other matters can be met much more easily with domestic actions. For much of
the world, treaty ratification is a simple matter. In parliamentary systems like
those in Britain and France, ratification is virtually automatic, because the
government also controls the legislature. In China, it is a mere formality ordered from the top. But the
same treaties that are so easily ratified in other countries are, for good or ill, often
left to languish in the Senate , where 67 votes are needed for approval . The result is
international frustration with American leadership , as many widely shared goals —
from children’s rights to a ban on nuclear weapons testing — are held hostage by a small group of
senators , who often represent a tiny percentage of the American public. Treaties on arms control, with
elaborate legal definitions and verification procedures, were necessary during the
cold war because the Soviet Union was a closed society, in which military programs were closely guarded
secrets. And given the high stakes involved, treaties helped ensure that large-scale cheating could be detected in time to respond.
But that era is long gone. The freer flow of information makes American and
Russian military programs and arms negotiations far more transparent,
rendering formal treaties less important. At the same time, the ratification process can
create a perverse effect : in the case of New Start, Republican senators led by Jon Kyl of Arizona are
holding up the treaty to force the Pentagon to increase spending on the
modernization of nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems. Their demand comes
despite the more than $180 billion already committed to modernization over the next decade and assurances from retired military
commanders and former secretaries of defense that the treaty wouldn’t undermine America’s nuclear deterrent. The trouble is that
spending more money on nuclear modernization would undercut a key purpose of the treaty, which is
to demonstrate to the world that the two countries are reducing their reliance on
nuclear weapons — and thus strengthen our leverage against states like Iran and North Korea, which seek to enter the
nuclear club. Ratification , in short, creates a platform for partisan grandstanding wholly at
odds with the treaty itself . Fortunately, there is an alternative : we could achieve
roughly the same results without signing a treaty. International negotiations would
still be needed , but instead of a binding treaty , the administration could commit to
pursuing Congressional action to accomplish the agreed terms. The effect would be the same , but
the process would be much easier at home, requiring a simple majority in the Senate,
instead of two-thirds . This strategy is already being used on climate policy. After the Senate failed to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol on climate change that was negotiated during the Clinton administration, it became clear that any treaty to cut greenhouse
gas emissions would be a lost cause. In recent years negotiators have continued to pursue international climate agreements, but with
the understanding that adherence would occur through domestic energy legislation that the rest of the world could then examine
and assess. The same model could work for nuclear arms control . If the Senate continues to stall on
New Start, Moscow and Washington could simply set the same level of 1,550 strategic warheads through domestic legislation and
exchange deployment plans consistent with the treaty’s other provisions. Crucial verification procedures, especially on-site
inspections, could be established through executive agreements, which may not even require legislative approval. In any case, it is
hard to imagine Congress opposing a bill to monitor Russia’s nuclear forces. Further arms-control efforts planned by the Obama
administration — reducing strategic nuclear forces, prohibiting nuclear weapons testing and controlling the production of special
nuclear material — could be handled in the same way. True, the Russians might prefer the legal imprimatur of a treaty. But given the
they would probably be willing to adjust . For reasons that go beyond the Senate, the era of
alternative,
treaty-making may largely be over . Thanks to decades of global efforts, the international system has most of the
rules it needs in the areas of human rights, terrorism, crime and nonproliferation. What’s more important is for individual
governments to muster the will to enforce them. Treaties still have their uses, but they should be reserved for rare cases, like the
creation of a mutual defense pact or perhaps President Obama’s vision for the elimination of nuclear weapons. In most
circumstances, the bright light of national laws will work just fine .

The Senate has cemented a norm that arms control agreements must
be concluded through the treaty process—the plan would challenge to
upend this
Spiro 01 (Peter Spiro, the Charles Weiner Chair in international law, Rusk Professor of Law at the University of Georgia Law
School, where he also served as Associate Dean for Faculty Development, former law clerk to Justice David H. Souter of the U.S.
Supreme Court, Professor Spiro was ranked in the top 15 nationally among international law scholars, 2001. “Treaties, Executive
Agreements, and Constitutional Method.” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=266969)
1. Arms Control Agreements and Mutual Security Pacts.- As Ackerman and Golove, as well as other proponents
of full
interchangeability , are quick to stress," the Arms Control and Disarmament Act
[ACDA] of 1961 expressly contemplated the approval of arms control accords as
congressional-executive agreements [CEAs] ." It is also true that an important
component of the SALT I negotiations , the 1972 Interim Agreement on Strategic
Offensive Arms, was approved by joint resolution . 67 But that is hardly the end of
the story . Every arms control agreement since 1972 has been approved as a
treaty .6 That practice has been more than a matter of political choice on the part of the
executive branch. Since at least 1991 ,169 the Senate has formally expressed its institutional
opinion that arms control agreements must be submitted as treaties . In consenting
to ratification of the 1991 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the
Senate declared its intent to approve international agreements that would
obligate the U nited S tates to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of
the United States in a militarily significant manner only pursuant to the Treaty
Power as set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution . 170 Other
recent agreements have included similar declarations , to the point that it appears
to have assumed the status of boilerplate .17' Ackerman and Golove dismiss these statements as "empty
senatorial pronunciamentos." ' 72 That seems to substantially underestimate their significance, as more recent practice is bearing
out. Leaving aside the fact that Ackerman and Golove repeatedly resort to similar evidence in attempting to establish that the
congressional-executive agreement before 1944 was not yet accepted as constitutional, the Senate's insistence on the use of the
Clinton Administration
treaty form in this context is evidently amounting to something more than mere gestures. The
acceded to the Senate's position in reversing a decision to submit the 1997 CFE Flank
Agreement as a congressional-executive agreement [CEA] . The pact was submitted
as a treaty after the initial decision drew constitutional fire from the Senate
majority leader, and the President's about-face did not even attempt to defend full
interchangeability in the arms control context.174 That leaves the assertion of full interchangeability
rather the emptier proposition. We now have a consistently stated constitutional position on
the part of the Senate that has been accepted by at least one chief executive. Can it be doubted
that had the moderately controversial Chemical Weapons Convention or the highly controversial Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty been submitted as a congressional-executive agreement that they would
have sparked at least constitutional skirmishes , and possibly more pitched conflicts? 75 The Arms Control
Act may still be on the books, but one might wonder whether the provision permitting legislative approval of arms control
agreements still represents good law. 76

The plan forces the senate to cave – that rewrites congressional

norms and cements a legal precedent that encourages future arms
control CEAs
Weiss 92 (Jack S. Weiss, Law Clerk to the Hon. Lourdes G. Baird, United States District Court, Central District of
California., Editor-in-Chief, UCLA Law Review, 1992. “The Approval of Arms Control Agreements as Congressional Executive
Agreements.” 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1533)

CONCLUSION The chemical weapons agreement may be concluded as a congressional-executive agreement should the
Time, courts, and practice
executive branch, the Senate, and the House reach the proper political accommodation.
have eroded the sharp edges from Article II, section 2 of the Constitution . Over time, it
has become clear that the political process provides each branch with a sufficient
opportunity to protect its prerogatives in the making of America's international
agreements. The Supreme Court has endorsed this development, and it seems consistent with
the more democratic nature of our form of government. Should the President submit the chemical weapons
agreement to Congress as a congressional-executive agreement [CEA] , the
House's interests in America's international agreements will be best served if it seizes
the opportunity to establish a record that will support the conclusion of future
arms control agreements as congressional-executive agreements . The House Foreign Affairs
and Judiciary Committees should hold hearings regarding the role of Congress in the approval of America's international
Only by establishing a comprehensive case for the constitutionality of
agreements.
approving the chemical weapons agreement as a congressional-executive agreement
will the House ensure that the chemical weapons agreement stands as a precedent for
the nation's future international commitments.
Trump and Congress will capitalize on that precedent to pass new
arms control CEA’s
Courtney and Thielmann 18 (William Courtney, adjunct senior fellow at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND
Corporation, and former U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan, Georgia and a U.S.-Soviet commission to implement the Threshold Test
Ban Treaty, Greg Thielmann, board member of the Arms Control Association, former office director in the Department of State's
intelligence and Research Bureau (INR), and former senior staffer on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, November 27,
2018. “Congress Can Save Arms Control.” https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/11/congress-can-save-arms-control.html)

Obtaining a two-thirds margin for Senate advice and consent on a new nuclear
treaty could prove infeasible . But narrow control of the Senate by Republicans and
the House by Democrats could facilitate cross-over voting required to secure a
majority vote in both chambers for an executive agreement . There is precedent .
Pacts with foreign countries on civilian nuclear cooperation (PDF)are approved this way on a bipartisan basis. There are early
indications that the new Congress will assert itself on nuclear arms control . The
likely chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sen. Jim Risch (R-
Idaho), has secured assurances that a senatorial observer will be included in
nuclear negotiations with North Korea. The likely chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee, Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.), has signaled that he will push
for constraints on the development of new nuclear weapons . Pragmatic
cooperation between the Trump administration and Congress could pave the way for
negotiated arrangements that, while not easy to achieve, hold the potential to reduce
nuclear risks .
 1AC—Solvency
The plan creates binding no-first-use commitments to the non-
nuclear member states of the Central Asian, South Pacific, and
African nuclear free zones
Davenport 17 (Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy at the Arms Control
Association, masters degree in peace studies from the Kroc Institute for International Peace
Studies at the University of Notre Dame, member at the Council on Foreign Relations and serves
on the Board of Directors for the Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellowship, July 2017. “Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) At a Glance.” https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nwfz)

*Highlighting in charts is for reference and is not read; Any *NOTES*

added are not part of the original card text and have been added by
UGA*
What is a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone? A nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) is a specified region in which countries
commit themselves not to manufacture, acquire, test, or possess nuclear weapons. Five
such zones exist today, with four
of them spanning the entire Southern Hemisphere . The regions currently covered
under NWFZ agreements include: Latin America (the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco),
the South Pacific (the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga), Southeast Asia (the 1995 Treaty
of Bangkok) Africa (the 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba) and Central Asia (the 2006
Treaty of Semipalatinsk). Background Initial efforts to create an area free of nuclear weapons began in the late 1950s with several
proposals to establish such a zone in Central and Eastern Europe. Poland offered the first proposal-named the Rapacki Plan after the Polish foreign
minister-in 1958. The Rapacki Plan sought to initially keep nuclear weapons from being deployed in Poland, Czechoslovakia, West Germany, and East
Germany, while reserving the right for other European countries to follow suit. The Soviet Union, Sweden, Finland, Romania, and Bulgaria also floated
similar proposals. All these early efforts, however, floundered amidst the U.S.-Soviet superpower conflict, although the Rapacki Plan would serve as a
model to the nuclear-weapon-free zones that were eventually set up in other regions of the globe. Article VII of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT), which entered into force in 1970, affirms the right of countries to establish specified zones free of nuclear weapons. The UN General Assembly
reaffirmed that right in 1975 and outlined the criteria for such zones. Within these nuclear-weapon-free zones, countries may use nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes. Protocol for Nuclear Weapon States Each treaty establishing a nuclear-
weapon-free zone includes a protocol for the five nuclear-weapon states recognized
under the NPT-China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States-to sign and ratify. These protocols,
which are legally binding , call upon the nuclear-weapon states to respect the status of the zones and not
to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against treaty states-parties. Such declarations of non-use of nuclear
weapons are referred to as negative security assurances [NSAs] . For more information, see
Nuclear Declaratory Policy and Negative Security Assurances. However, the five nuclear-armed countries have at times

signed and ratified a NWFZ [Nuclear Weapon Free Zone] protocol and declared
conditions reserving the right to use nuclear weapons in certain scenarios against parties
to a nuclear-weapon-free zone. For instance, the United States signed the protocol for the African nuclear-weapon-free zone in April 1996 with a
declaration that it would reserve the right to respond with all options, implying possible use of nuclear weapons, to a chemical or biological weapons
attack by a member of the zone. None of the nuclear-weapon states have signed the relevant protocol for the treaty creating a zone in Southeast Asia
because of concerns that it conflicts with the right of their ships and aircraft to have freedom of movement in international waters and airspace and
problems with the definitions of territory, since includes exclusive economic zones and continental shelves. The
other three zones
do not explicitly rule out the transit of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon states
through the zones, and the general practice of nuclear-weapon states is not to
declare whether nuclear weapons are aboard their vessels . In addition to nuclear-weapon-free zones,
there are treaties and declarations, which are not covered by this fact sheet, banning the deployment of nuclear weapons in Antarctica, Mongolia, on the
seabed, and in outer space. Basic Elements of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties Duration: The treaties are to remain in force
indefinitely . Yet, each treaty includes a withdrawal option for states-parties. With the exception of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which simply
requires three months' advance notice before a withdrawal can take effect, all the NWFZ treaties require 12 months' advance notice for a state-party to
end its treaty obligations. Conditions: None of the treaties can be subjected to conditions by its non-nuclear-weapon states-parties. Verification: Each
state-party adopts comprehensive safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which verifies that states-parties are
not pursuing nuclear weapons illicitly. The Central Asian NWFZ goes a step further in requiring that states in the region adopt the IAEA's Additional
Protocol, which provides for expanded monitoring. Territory Covered: Each zone applies to the entire
territories of all of its states-parties . Territory is understood to include all land holdings, internal waters, territorial seas,
and archipelagic waters. The Latin American treaty also extends hundreds of kilometers from the states-parties' territories into the Pacific and Atlantic
Oceans, but the nuclear-weapon states, citing their freedom at sea, assert that this does not apply to their ships and aircraft that might be carrying
nuclear weapons. A dispute also exists over the inclusion of the Chagos Archipelago, which includes the U.S. military base at Diego Garcia in the Indian
Ocean, as part of the proposed African nuclear-weapon-free zone. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom recognizes Diego Garcia as being
subject to the Pelindaba Treaty.

***NOTE: Charts from the article on the status of treaties that the
Aff ratifies – the plan ratifies protocol II of The Treaty of
Rarotonga (South Pacific); protocol I of The Treaty of Pelindaba
(Africa); protocol I of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zone Treaty – We’ve highlighted the selected protocols***

The Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America and the Caribbean) Opened for
signature: February 14, 1967 Entered into force: October 23, 2002[1]
States-Parties Signed Ratified
Antigua and Barbuda October 11, 1983 October 11, 1983
Argentina September 27, 1967 January 18, 1994
Bahamas November 29, 1976 April 26, 1977
Barbados October 18, 1968 April 25, 1969
Belize February 14, 1992 November 9,
1994
Bolivia (Plurinational February 14, 1967 February 18,
State of) 1969
Brazil May 9, 1967 January 29, 1968
Chile February 14, 1967 October 9, 1974
Colombia February 14, 1967 August 4, 1972
Costa Rica February 14, 1967 August 25, 1969
Cuba March 25, 1995 October 23,
2002
Dominica May 2, 1989 June 4, 1993
Dominican Republic July 28, 1967 June 14, 1968
Ecuador February 14, 1967 February 11,
1969
El Salvador February 14, 1967 April 22, 1968
Grenada April 29, 1975 June 20, 1975
Guatemala February 14, 1967 February 6, 1970
Guyana January 16, 1995 January 16, 1995
Haiti February 14, 1967 May 23, 1969
Honduras February 14, 1967 September 23,
1968
Jamaica October 26, 1967 June 26, 1969
Mexico February 14, 1967 September 20,
1967
Nicaragua February 15, 1967 October 24, 1968
Panama February 14, 1967 June 11, 1971
Paraguay April 26, 1967 March 19, 1969
Peru February 14, 1967 March 4, 1969
Saint Kitts and Nevis February 18, 1994 April 18, 1995
Saint Lucia August 25, 1992 June 2, 1995
Saint Vincent and the February 14, 1992 February 14,
Grenadines 1992
Suriname February 13, 1976 June 10, 1977
Trinidad and Tobago June 27, 1967 December 3,
1970
Uruguay February 14, 1967 August 20, 1968
Venezuela (Bolivarian February 14, 1967 March 23, 1970
Republic of)
Protocol ratification by nuclear-weapon states:
Protoco Subject States Ratified
l
Protocol Jurisdictional France, United Kingdom, United
I responsibility States
Protocol Negative security China, France, United Kingdom,
II assurances United States, Soviet Union[2]

The Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific) Opened for signature: August 6, 1985
Entered into force: December 11, 1986
States-Parties Signed Ratified
Australia August 6, 1985 December 11, 1986
Cook Islands August 6, 1985 October 28, 1985
Fiji August 6, 1985 October 4, 1985
Kiribati August 6, 1985 October 28, 1986
Nauru July 17, 1986 April 13, 1987
New Zealand August 6, 1985 November 13, 1986
Niue August 6, 1985 May 12, 1986
Papua New Guinea September 16, 1985 September 15, 1989
Samoa August 6, 1985 October 20, 1986
Solomon Islands May 29, 1987 June 27, 1989
Tonga August 2, 1996 December 18, 2000
Tuvalu August 6, 1985 January 16, 1986
Vanuatu September 16, 1995 February 9, 1996
Protocol ratification by nuclear-weapon states:
Protocol Subject States Ratified
Protocol I* Prohibition on the manufacture, France, United Kingdom
stationing and testing of any
nuclear explosive device
Protocol II Negative security assurances China, France, United Kingdom,
Soviet Union[2]
Protocol III Ban on nuclear testing in nuclear- Soviet Union[2]
weapon-free zone
*(open only to France, the United Kingdom and the United States)
The Treaty of Bangkok (Southeast Asia)
Opened for signature: December 15, 1995
Entered into force: March 27, 1997
States-Parties Signed Ratified
Brunei Darussalam December 15, 1995 November 22, 1996
Cambodia December 15, 1995 March 27, 1997
Indonesia December 15, 1995 April 10, 1997
Lao People’s December 15, 1995 July 16, 1996
Democratic
Republic
Malaysia December 15, 1995 October 11, 1996
Myanmar December 15, 1995 July 17, 1996
Philippines December 15, 1995 June 21, 2001
Singapore December 15, 1995 March 27, 1997
Thailand December 15, 1995 March 20, 1997
Vietnam December 15, 1995 November 26, 1996
Protocol ratification by nuclear-weapon states: 
 None. Five nuclear weapons states and ASEAN members met in July 2012 to sign the
treaty protocol. The treaty commission, however, postponed the signing of the protocol
until November, requesting more time to review reservations that several of the NWS
indicated that they would attach during ratification.

The Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa) Opened for signature: April 11, 1996 Entered into force:
July 15, 2009
States-Parties Signed Ratified
Algeria April 11, 1996 February 11, 1998
Angola April 11, 1996 June 20, 2014
Benin April 11, 1996 September 4, 2007
Botswana June 9, 1998 June 16, 1999
Burkina Faso April 11, 1996 August 27, 1998
Burundi April 11, 1996 July 15, 2009
Cameroon April 11, 1996 September 28, 2010
Cape Verde April 11, 1996 -----
Central African Republic April 11, 1996 -----
Chad April 11, 1996 January 18, 2012
Comoros April 11, 1996 July 24, 2012
Congo January 27, 1997 November 26, 2013
Cote D’Ivoire April 11, 1996 July 28, 1999
Democratic Republic of the April 11, 1996 -----
Congo
Djibouti April 11, 1996 -----
Egypt April 11, 1996 -----
Equatorial Guinea February 19, 2003
Eritrea April 11, 1996 -----
Ethiopia April 11, 1996 March 13, 2008
Gabon April 11, 1996 June 12, 2007
Gambia April 11, 1996 October 16, 1996
Ghana April 11, 1996 June 27, 2011
Guinea April 11, 1996 January 21, 2000
Guinea-Bissau April 11, 1996 January 4, 2012
Kenya April 11, 1996 January 9, 2001
Lesotho April 11, 1996 March 14, 2002
Liberia July 9, 1996 -----
Libya April 11, 1996 May 11, 2005
Madagascar December 23, 2003
Malawi April 11, 1996 April 23, 2009
Mali April 11, 1996 July 22, 1999
Mauritania April 11, 1996 February 24, 1998
Mauritius April 11, 1996 April 24, 1996
Mozambique April 11, 1996 August 28, 2008
Namibia April 11, 1996 March 1, 2012
Niger April 11, 1996 February 22, 2017
Nigeria April 11, 1996 June 18, 2001
Rwanda April 11, 1996 February 1, 2007
Sao Tome & Principe July 9, 1996 -----
Senegal April 11, 1996 October 25, 2006
Seychelles July 9, 1996 May 23, 2014
Sierra Leone April 11, 1996 -----
Somalia February 23, 2006 -----
South Africa April 11, 1996 March 27, 1998
Sudan April 11, 1996 -----
Swaziland April 11, 1996 July 17, 2000
Togo April 11, 1996 July 18, 2000
Tunisia April 11, 1996 October 7, 2009
Uganda April 11, 1996 -----
United Republic of Tanzania April 11, 1996 June 19, 1998
Zambia April 11, 1996 April 6, 1998
Zimbabwe April 11, 1996 April 6, 1998
Protocol ratification by nuclear-weapon states:
Protocol Subject States Ratified
Protocol I Negative security assurances China, France, Russia, United
Kingdom
Protocol II Ban on nuclear testing in zone China, France, Russia, United
Kingdom
Protocol Jurisdictional responsibility France
III*
*(open only to France and Spain)
Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty *NOTE: This Treaty
is known as the Treaty of Semipalatinsk*
Opened for signature: September 8, 2006 Entered into force: March 21, 2009
States-Parties Signed Ratified
Kazakhstan September 8, 2006 February 19, 2009
Kyrgyzstan September 8, 2006 July 27, 2007
Tajikistan September 8, 2006 January 13, 2009
Turkmenistan September 8, 2006 January 17, 2009
Uzbekistan September 8, 2006 May 10, 2007
Protocol ratification by nuclear-weapon states:
Protocol Subject States Ratified
Protocol I* Negative security assurances China, France, Russia, United
Kingdom
*United States signed but has not ratified

CEAs are key due to accompanying domestic legislation – that’s the

only way to prevent Trump circumvention
Yoo 11 (John Yoo, Professor of Law, Berkeley Law School, University of California at Berkeley;
Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, November 2011. “Rational Treaties: Article II,
Congressional-Executive Agreements, and International Bargaining.”
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3225&context=clr)
Congressional-executive agreements [ CEAs ], by contrast, may present the opposite trade-off on signaling
information versus commitment. Adopting an international agreement by the Article I statutory route sends a less credible signal
because of
about the reliability of revealed information because of the lower number of votes required for approval. But
differences in terminating procedures , congressional-executive agreements [ CEAs ] may send a
stronger signal than Article II treaties about commitment. Unlike treaties ,
congressional-executive agreements [ CEAs ] require legislative approval before termination
because of their different constitutional pathways. Recall the constitutional difference between
treaties and congressional-executive agreements. Treaties are executive acts-hence the location of the
advice-and-consent clause in Article II alongside the similar provision for the
appointment of executive branch officers. The location of the treaty power in
Article II was an important piece of evidence for the courts in Goldwater in
agreeing that the President could terminate treaties and that the courts had no
authority to review the decision.1 28 The constitutional argument for presidential termination of treaties mimics
the argument for presidential removal of subordinate officers. While the Senate must consent to the appointment of major officers of
the government, the Constitution remains silent about their removal. The Constitution has been understood to grant removal to the
President, except in certain circumstances, because the Senate's consent is a specific exception to what would have been a general
executive power to both appoint and remove unilaterally. Similarly, the Constitution is silent about treaty termination, but the lower
courts have read it as remaining with the President because the Senate's advice-and-consent role is a specific exception to a general
executive authority to make or terminate treaties. 129 Congressional-executive agreements [ CEAs ],
by contrast , are
statutes . They are passed using the same process as other laws enacted within
Congress's Article I, Section 8 powers. They combine the approval of the
international agreement with the necessary domestic implementing legislation . As
with removal or treaties, the Constitution only sets out the process for the affirmative enactment of a statute. Article I does not
Unlike removal or treaties , however, the
explicitly address the negative act of terminating the law.
Constitution has not been understood to allow for alternate methods for reversing
an earlier statute. If Congress or the President wants to terminate a federal law,
they must enact a second law overriding the first. One exception might be judicial review, but a court's
striking down of a federal law conceptually amounts to no more than judicial refusal to enforce a law, rather than the actual removal
statutes must be reversed by later-in-time statutes .
of the law from the U.S. Code. Generally,
Hence , a President who wishes to withdraw from a congressionalexecutive agreement [ CEA ]
must convince a majority of Congress to consent. And the supermajority nature of
enactment works against breaking the international commitment . The President needs not
only 51% of the House, but also fifty-one Senators. If the twenty-five smallest states oppose terminating the congressional-executive
agreement, the President may need to persuade Senators who represent as much as 84% of the population to consent. And, taking
into account the Senate filibuster rule, the President may even need to win over Senators who represent as much as 90% of the
nation's population. That is not quite the 93% needed for two-thirds of the Senate, but a high political cost nonetheless. The
difference between treaty and statutory termination allows the U nited S tates to
send signals of varying credibility about its commitment to keep an international
promise . Treaties will send a lesser signal of commitment than congressional-executive
agreements [ CEAs ] because of the President's power to unilaterally terminate the
former . The President's main domestic cost will arise from opposition political parties and interest groups that support the
policies in the treaty. A President would suffer those same costs in terminating a
congressional-executive agreement, but he must go to the greater effort of
assembling majorities in both the House and Senat e. These audience costs could be significant,
especially if opposition aligns along differences in state geography or population. The additional political
resources required to terminate a statute provides a credible signal , at the time of
the signing of the international agreement , of commitment. This trade-off between treaties and
congressional-executive agreements may help explain some consistencies in U.S. practice. Some scholars, such as Ackerman and
Golove. insist that the
instruments should be fully interchangeable , 130 and others, such as
Hathaway, argue that they already are.1 31 These scholars claim that congressionalexecutive agreements are
easier to ratify and more justified as a matter of democratic theory. Nevertheless, the United States has continued to use treaties for
significant political agreements, such as the Treaty of Versailles, U.N. Charter, NATO, and the settlement of the Cold War in Europe.
It still chooses the Article II treaty form for armscontrol pacts, such as the ABM Treaty, SALT, the INF and START agreements, the
chemical weapons convention, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and now the New START. If full interchangeability were correct,
Presidents should always use the Article I route , even for political and arms-control
agreements . In fact, if interchangeability were correct, a President could take a treaty rejected by the Senate (such as the Treaty of Versailles or the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty) and resubmit it for simple majority approval as a statute. This appears to have never happened. Supporters of interchangeability might claim that Presidents
still choose treaties because the Senate demands it. Senators who are concerned about maintaining their institution's prerogatives could threaten to block any international
agreements that come through Article I, rather than Article II. The smallest states should have the greatest interest in preserving the Senate's constitutional place. They
demanded the creation of the Senate as the price of the Constitution's creation and ensured that the Senate would have a veto over any form of federal lawmaking.' 32 It would
require the twenty-five smallest states, which today represent 16% of the population, to band together to block all congressional-executive agreements, so that a mere 7% of the
population through the one-third smallest states can block any future treaty. Ackerman and Golove, however, claim that the Senate gave up any effort to play defense in the wake
of World War II, when it allowed the IMF and Bretton Woods through as congressional-executive agreements, rather than treaties. 133 Nor did any defenders of the Senate's
prerogatives appear when NAFTA-perhaps the last international agreement to spur widespread public debate (Vice President Gore publicly debated 1992 presidential candidate
Ross Perot on national radio and television over NAFTA's merits)- went through Congress by simple majorities.134

Only Congress solves – their CPs are the squo

Ingram 17 (Paul Ingram, Executive Director of the British American Security Information
Council (BASIC), a think tank focusing on nuclear disarmament, previous Project Leader for the
Oxford Research Group, an international security policy think tank, BA in Politics and
Economics from the University of Oxford, June 2017.
“Renewing Interest in Negative Security Assurances.”
http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/NSAs-June2017_0.pdf)
The N uclear W eapon S tates and their allies have criticised the Ban Treaty talks currently in progress in New York as disruptive to a more
measured step-by-step negotiated process. For this criticism to hold any validity they need to show will and progress in their

approach, something sadly lacking of late . Declaratory policy is a crucial part of that agenda. NSAs could

become a touchstone for nuclear armed states’ political will to engage .

Minimalist responses , such as simple restatements of existing NSAs , will be
insufficient and interpreted as mean-spirited . Demands for tighter and legal
Negative Security Assurances [NSAs] - the promises made by nuclear armed states not
to use nuclear weapons against certain states that do not possess them - may soon see a come-back.
They are particularly attractive to those states who recognise the need for concrete disarmament gains but who feel
uncomfortable with the Ban approach. Several European states submitted a paper to the UN Open Ended Working Group in April 2016 proposing a
discussion to strengthen existing NSAs. 1 This was in part to find realistic multilateral progress on reducing the salience of nuclear weapons. These
governments are now considering options to promote this initiative. Nuclear Weapon States would do well to consider cooperating with this effort. The
costs to them are minimal (after all, their possession of nuclear weapons is in relation to other states with nuclear weapons), but the signals from
inaction are deeply undesirable and could further undermine their legitimacy. Their resistance is bound up by their deep attachment to ambiguity, but
they appear to undervalue its downsides. Not least, nuclear deterrence requires a level of clarity in signalling that is undermined by ambiguity. Why
NSAs? The security justification for all existing nuclear arsenals is to protect against threats from other nuclear-armed states (with the exception of
Israel, which does not acknowledge its nuclear arsenal). It is an established norm within the international community that nuclear threats against states
without nuclear weapons are unacceptable. China and India have issued full no-first use declarations, and categorically state that they would under no
circumstances threaten Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) with nuclear weapons. Yet, most Nuclear Weapon States, particularly those who see
themselves as the most responsible (such as the
U nited S tates, the UK and France), remain reluctant to give
unconditional guarantees not to threaten nuclear attack to states without nuclear
weapons, and have resisted calls to make them legally binding . Ambiguity lies at the heart of nuclear
postures. In the minds of decision-makers there are several principal reasons for it: 1. If states specify the circumstances that would trigger their use of
nuclear weapons, adversaries could operate with relative safety right up to that line, and then call that bluff if they cross it. The state may feel compelled
to use their nuclear weapons to retain credibility (save face) and ‘restore deterrence’. Prior clarity removes freedom of action away from the leadership.
Of course, this considers nuclear weapons in isolation, when there exist numerous other forms of military and non-military deterrence. It is widely
recognised that for nuclear deterrence to be effective at all, other capabilities at lower levels of conflict are essential, otherwise this concern over red
lines occurs in any case. After all, nuclear deterrence is simply not credible at these lower levels. 2. Ambiguity might deliver deterrent results further
down the line of escalation (within the band of ambiguity) even when the nuclear armed state itself has no intention to threaten use. 3. There may be
unforeseen circumstances in which a future leadership could threaten a nuclear response to achieve deterrence. 4. Tightening NSAs could be
irreversible over time. If a nuclear-armed state needs to ‘reset’ its NSAs (perhaps as security situations deteriorate) this could send undesirable signals
resistance to irreversibility gives away a deep
and worsen international security at a sensitive moment. This

assumption of commitment to indefinite nuclear postures that contradicts

diplomatic commitments to a world free of nuclear weapons . Irreversibility is an
important notion within the diplomatic process ; but it is this very irreversibility that creates resistance to
agreement. 5. Ministries of Defence are institutionally resistant to limiting their options in advance of any conflict, particularly after they have allocated
substantial resources to the acquisition and upkeep of the capabilities concerned. This freedom of action is often seen as a sign of their sovereignty in an
uncertain future strategic security environment. 6. Attention drawn to scenarios that might merit a threat to use nuclear weapons could focus public attention on these
scenarios and generate unwelcome debate on whether this threat would be justified. On the other hand, it may also highlight the state’s dependence upon nuclear deterrence and
thus strengthen resistance to any evolution in policy or move away from nuclear deployments. Equally, the downsides of ‘too much’ ambiguity include: 1. Deterrence credibility
requires some level of specificity and clarity in communicating intent, otherwise adversaries can underestimate or otherwise misread the intent of the leadership in the Nuclear
Weapon State. There needs to be some confidence on the part of the state being deterred that the nuclear threat is genuine, but will not be exercised unless it transgresses strong
boundaries. A strengthening nuclear taboo could tempt future bluff calling. 2. Ambiguity is no friend to a Nuclear Weapon State offering extended deterrence assurances to its
allies. Dennis Healey, when UK Defence Secretary in the 1960s, famously said that it takes 5% credibility to deter the Soviets but 95% credibility to assure allies. Allies are more
clearly 2 reassured if their nuclear sponsor’s arsenal and posture is clearly there to deter the nuclear state they also feel threatened by. A more ambiguous posture is less
assuring. 3. Ambiguity undermines nuclear legitimacy within the international community. NNWS are not only seeking to improve their own security by insulating themselves
from nuclear threat; they also look to the nuclear armed states to act with responsibility and restraint more generally towards the international community. If nuclear armed
states show little willingness to act with such restraint and be specific about when they would or would not consider nuclear use it harms the trust in their commitment to their
NPT obligations. 4. Exceptions to NSAs draw attention to nuclear threats that are deeply unacceptable to a majority of the international community, or trigger undesirable
responses from those states that lie outside the guarantees. Withdrawal of these exceptions would be a recognition from the Nuclear Weapon States of the boundaries to nuclear
deterrence within the international community. Non-proliferation & disarmament NSAs are critical signals of acknowledgement that NNWS have reduced their freedom (and
sovereignty) by joining international non-proliferation arrangements from which all states benefit from. Weak NSAs are an affront to this commitment and to the very idea of a
cosmopolitan international community. NSAs have been a consistent and at times high-profile demand of the NNWS within the NPT process. They are an important tool in the
international community’s management of nuclear security and proliferation. They also reduce the freedom of action for nuclear armed states. The strength of particular NSAs
on offer is therefore an indication of a nuclear armed state’s willingness to accept such restrictions for the wider benefits they bring. These focus particularly on encouraging
NNWS to stick to their obligations and thereby strengthen confidence in the non-proliferation regime. The impact of NSAs goes further than the security calculations of the
states directly involved. They are an expression of the bargain at the heart of the NPT, an invitation for Nuclear Weapon States to demonstrate political will in reducing the

salience of nuclear weapons. In this respect they are also a modest disarmament measure. NSA exceptions Strengthening NSAs essentially
means reducing the number of exceptions and enshrining the guarantee in law .
The exceptions to negative security assurances (NSAs) have at times involved: ● States that attack in alliance with a nuclear armed state ● States that
are deemed to be in breach of their non-proliferation obligations ● States that use chemical or biological weapons By and large, the NSA exceptions
expressed by most nuclear armed states are determined by military scenario planning. These exceptions are included to ensure that NSAs will not
constrain any options that may be seriously contemplated by a future leader.If NSAs are only ever issued for
situations in which the probability that nuclear weapons would be used is zero,
this calls into question the whole point of NSAs beyond clarifying existing
positions. A nuclear armed state can use its NSAs to diplomatically signal its intentions to
resist or encourage trends towards reduced salience of nuclear weapons , and in moving towards a

sole purpose for nuclear weapons (in deterring nuclear use or blackmail). The effort to tighten NSAs should
therefore be seen as part of a broader framework to reduce the acceptability of
nuclear use against certain states (without nuclear weapons) or in certain
circumstances, particularly if this tightening is achieved in a multilateral context. Alliance (currently Russia) When NSAs were proposed in
the context of the Cold War there was a fear that they could be manipulated by adversaries hiding behind their NNWS allies. The NSAs were
‘harmonised’ in declarations at the UN Security Council by the ‘P5’, with the exception of China, on the eve of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension
Conference, with the objective of creating a positive environment. China restated that it would never under any circumstances threaten nuclear
weapons against any NNWS. The exclusion for states operating in alliance with a Nuclear Weapon State has since been dropped by the United States,
UK and France but remains for Russia, whose military doctrine includes nuclear use against an overwhelming conventional attack in which the very
existence of the state was under threat. Such an exclusion is only unnecessary if an aggressive NNWS could gain a significant conventional advantage
whilst protected from nuclear use by its alliance with a Nuclear Weapon State. This may make theoretical sense is simply not a credible scenario.
Compliance (currently US, UK and France) The 1995 NSAs were explicitly seen by France, the UK and the United States as acknowledgement of the
sacrifice made by NPT NNWS in their renunciation of nuclear weapons. This attitude has persisted. In contrast, those states outside the Treaty, or those
NNWS which these Nuclear Weapon States deem to be in noncompliance with the Treaty, do not enjoy the benefits of their NSAs, even if they do not
possess nuclear weapons and thus present no immediate nuclear threat. This is explicitly ‘intended to underscore the security benefits of adhering to
and fully complying with the NPT’. In other words, NSAs are a reward 3 for good behaviour. And yet, the implied nuclear threat that arises in the
exception undermines the norm that nuclear armed states should not threaten nuclear use against
other states without nuclear weapons. It also supports the interpretation that nuclear weapons bring diplomatic
influence, increases their utility, and therefore attraction, and perversely could weaken nuclear non-proliferation .
If there are to be sanctions levelled against states for not joining or complying with the NPT, there are many other options that would not undermine
the norm against threatening states without nuclear weapons. If a nuclear armed state was concerned about the possibility of facing a NNWS that might
have cheated on its commitments to the NPT and actually deployed a nuclear weapon arsenal, then it should make explicit reference to that belief that it
faced a real and present danger of nuclear attack and that its nuclear threat was intended to deter that specific danger, rather than to the non-
compliance with the Treaty. Other WMD (currently UK and France) True to the concerns of our time, the latest French Presidential statement refers its
guarantee to those states ‘that respect their international obligations for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’. The current British NSA 4
explicitly talks of ‘reserv[ing] the right to review this assurance if the future threat, development or proliferation of these weapons [chemical and
biological] make it necessary’. The Obama Administration dropped such references in its 2010 NSA, though for a decade the United States had implied
it would consider the use of nuclear weapons to deter chemical or biological use. Operational chemical and biological weapons cannot be compared
with nuclear weapons in terms of their level of impact and perceived military utility. Retaining reference to the possibility of nuclear deterrence against
these weapons (something that was only first thought of in the late 1990s), only encourages states to keep hold of the option of developing these
weapons as a balance against nuclear weapons. It also legitimises the practice in other nuclear armed states of retaining their own ambiguity in relation
to chemical weapons, a position that Israel may adopt were it ever to leave the shadows and confirm its possession of nuclear weapons. Legally-binding
So far the only internationally legally-binding NSAs are those established within
regional nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs). Nuclear Weapon States have been invited to sign protocols to the
zone treaties promising not to use or threaten nuclear attack on any of the member states. They have proven to be reluctant to restrict their freedom of
action in the first instance, but many have signed the protocols to most of the treaties concerned, which therefore cover the majority of states in legal
guarantees. But those protocols are conditional, and include the exceptions declared by Nuclear Weapon States on a case-by-case basis. And
unfortunately, the only NWFZ protocol that has been ratified by the US Congress is that covering Latin America. The South East 5 Asia NWFZ still has
no protocols from any Nuclear Weapon States. There also remain notable regions left outside, particularly in crucial regions such as Europe, the Middle
Nuclear Weapon States also typically respond to demands for legally-binding
East and East Asia.

NSAs by pointing out that their existing NSA declarations , in the form of governmental or
Presidential announcement , are legally binding on those public servants responsible for planning
and executing any nuclear attacks. This may not be reassuring to other states .
Pronouncements from a particular President or government can presumably be reversed by similar
pronouncements from the same or successor individuals at any point . The
an internationally
consensus 1995 NPT Final Document recommended further steps be considered which ‘could take the form of

legally binding instrument’ , an aspiration that has been repeated several times since but which has not
materialised . The existing legal guarantees connected to NWFZs could be seen as a model for any attempt to achieve global coverage not
limited by region. Alternatively, if there is no NWFZ in place regional NSAs could be issued by states or groups of states within the region or from
outside as an initial step towards establishing the NWFZ. A NNWS or state that is ambiguous is just as able to issue a nuclear NSA (politically or legally-
binding), even if it does not acknowledge possession of nuclear weapons. NNWS [Non-Nuclear Weapon States]
clearly value the idea and legitimacy of legally-binding NSAs, and that value alone
should mean that it is an avenue worth pursuing . However, with the state of international negotiations on
nuclear weapons issues and in particular the stymied status of the CD, and the challenges in getting any treaty ratified by the US

Congress , it may be that a strong political route is preferable for the time being. NSA credibility and
verification This may be a good point to ask the question: do NSAs, legally binding or otherwise, have sufficient credibility to merit all this
attention? NWS officials often express scepticism of no first use (NFU) on the grounds
that they could be ignored, so why not with security guarantees? Can those asked
to believe the assurances take them at face value? Agreements made in peacetime may have little force
in conflict, and there are no realistic means to fully verify the efficacy of such declarations. After all, in a crisis, will a Nuclear
Weapon State be contained if its leadership thought itself caught between observing international law and protecting its vital interests or
resisting invasion? A case would undoubtedly be considered in such circumstances that under Article 51 of the UN Charter a state would be within its
rights to use or threaten nuclear weapons even against those to which it had previously issued an NSA, when facing its own destruction or that of its
allies. This ‘inherent right to self-defence as recognised under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter’ is explicitly referred to in NATO’s Deterrence
and Defence Posture Review (DDPR) as an NSA exception for its three Nuclear Weapon States. 6 The Russian annexation of Crimea and its support for
irregular forces in eastern Ukraine appear to directly contradict its security commitments made to Ukraine alongside the United States and UK under
the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. Whatever the legal interpretation, it is clear that this action has undermined confidence in the commitment Russia
may have to its existing or future promises when it comes to security guarantees. It also weakens the salience of NSAs more generally. Similarly, the
attitude apparently taken by the Clinton Administration in the 1990s, when it expanded NATO into central and eastern Europe in apparent
contradiction to its promises to Soviet and early Russian leadership around the end of the Cold War, has harmed Russian confidence in guarantees that
So why are NNWS so keen on NSAs? The value of NSAs (and for that
may be issued by NATO states.

matter, NFU) comes in establishing norms governing nuclear weapons. The weapons themselves are
after all deployed to send strong signals, rather than to actually fight nuclear war, so if the circumstances of those deployments also involve explicit
public limitations on their threat or use then those signals, the very purposes of their deployment, are affected. An
NSA can never
fully guarantee to a NNWS that it will never be threatened or attacked by nuclear
weapons, but those NSAs acknowledge that it would be illegitimate to do so. A
nuclear armed state that breaks its guarantees and threatens nuclear use pays a
very high price for doing so in terms of its standing, and would likely affect its
ability to operate with any support within the international community. In that
respect, NSAs reassure NNWS, by explicitly acknowledging their security needs in
the wider nuclear weapons calculations. NWS that complain the Ban Treaty does not adequately account for their
security needs could take note of the mirror need here! NSAs, like almost all other multilateral agreements, tend to benefit and protect the weak against
the strong within international society. It is possible to introduce verification procedures for NSAs
and other declaratory policies. If military guidance and regulations, exercises and training were sufficiently
transparent it could be confirmed that the scenarios involved all conformed to the
declaratory policy . Venues for Talks Conference on Disarmament NSAs are one of four core issues in front of the CD, the others being
outer space, a fissile material cut-off treaty, and nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately , the CD has been in deadlock for almost twenty years,

and the NSA issue has gone nowhere beyond official statements and informal meetings .
Whilst the CD would certainly be the appropriate venue to negotiate harmonised legally-binding NSAs in a convention, this may not be the best route
for the short- to medium-term. The CD could be used for informal discussions; after all, the expertise and the capacity exists in Geneva for such
conversations, but the action may better reside in New York. UN Security Council The UN Security Council was an important venue in harmonising
political NSAs in the 1995 declarations. This could be a model for a Nuclear Weapon State-led initiative in the future, but this would require extensive
talks elsewhere to develop possibilities for strengthened and harmonised NSAs. P5 Process The most obvious place to do this would be the ‘P5 Process’,
an initiative that so far has been strong on potential but weak on delivery. It offers a relatively safe venue for talks amongst the Nuclear Weapon States,
and has already started to talk about strategic stability and posture. NSA offers would be an obvious additional area of merit for discussion, and
potentially for initial declarations, though such declarations would have greater legitimacy and force if they were later formalised at the UN Security
Council. NPT The NPT Preparatory Committees and particularly Review Conferences are important venues for assessing progress, for floating ideas, for
laying down markers, and for establishing cooperative action by groups of states. But these venues have not proved to be effective in hosting on-going
constructive talks. NATO NATO member states, some of whom are members of other groups such as the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative
(NPDI) or are behind this latest request for stronger NSAs, have some influence over NATO nuclear posture. Could NATO declare NSAs that go further
than its Nuclear Weapon State members, or play a role in helping to strengthen their NSAs? NATO has not discussed such an option, explicitly
declaring that such policies are the unilateral preserve of its the Nuclear Weapon State members, as they ultimately decide on the use of their nuclear
weapons. But NATO discusses nuclear posture in its nuclear planning and high level groups (NPG and HLG) and published its last deterrence and
defence posture review (DDPR) in May 2012. 7 Clearly, NATO is in the business of harmonising declaratory policy in some areas, particularly in regards
to nuclear posture as relevant to the European theatre. So logically, it should be possible for NATO to declare NSAs that were tighter than those of its
individual members without legally or politically limiting their actions independently of NATO. It simply chooses not to. Perhaps it is time for some of
its members to propose just such an idea. One reason for doing so is that NATO could consider NSAs a low-bar (not too sensitive) non-proliferation
area for discussion with Russia in the NATO-Russia Council. Conclusion States proposing a tightening of NSAs talk of a treaty or a protocol to the NPT
enshrining such guarantees, and reducing exceptions. The approach to all this is critical. Nuclear Weapon States will be opposed to such an assertive
approach for a number of reasons already identified. Any effort by NNWS to impose or pressure Nuclear Weapon States into agreeing a protocol will
almost certainly fail. There is a belief in their defence and diplomatic establishments that harmonisation will be far more difficult than it was in 1995,
reflecting differing security situations and approach to doctrine. And of course harmonisation might open up the temptation to race to the bottom. Such
resistance, alongside the obvious observation that the strategic environment and appetite for arms control appears to be deteriorating, has led some to
propose that the NSA ambition should be limited to a restatement of existing guarantees as a way of holding the line
against the temptation to weaken them. Such statements could again be coordinated in the UN Security Council, much as those in 1995 were. They
would of course be stronger if they also included the other nuclear-armed states that are not permanent members of the Security Council. The problem
with this approach is that it will
be seen as weak by the majority of states in the international
community , with little to no value in terms of establishing trust in the political will of the states
reissuing the NSAs. It will close down rather than open up, the issue for further strengthening of NSAs, and will thus be seen as a strongly conservative
response. So what is the alternative? It will take some time and sensitivity to overcome the obstacles to stronger NSAs, but ought to be possible if the
initiative is handled in a non-confrontational manner. The objective of strengthening and harmonising NSAs as a parallel or alternative track to the Ban
Treaty should be seen by Nuclear Weapon States as an opportunity to demonstrate political will and responsible nuclear governance. They would do
well to consider their own initiatives in this area, including attempts to harmonise and strengthen their NSAs. This should be a priority discussion area
within the so-called ‘P5 process’, discussions at the United Nations in New York or Geneva, or in working papers within the NPT review process. It
could sit within a broader discussion of declaratory policy, particularly as in this area the Chinese appear to be more progressive than their fellow
The attitude from the Nuclear
Nuclear Weapon States, and would therefore presumably be more open to such initiatives.

Weapon States on NSAs will be seen by many as a touchstone for their

commitment to any moves toward a world free of nuclear weapons . If they oppose
stronger NSAs , being an archetypal, relatively achievable and conservative step-by-step proposal, this will only be
interpreted by other states as confirmation that they will indefinitely cling onto
their nuclear weapons , their ambiguous postures, and the perceived status they bring. This can only lead to
increasing frustration by other states whose security is directly threatened.