Set 10

BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner,

vs.

RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO

HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO
VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER
and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998

Facts:

On December 12, 1996, then President Ramos enacted Administrative order no.
308, which laid down the ground work for the implementation of a National ID system.
The A.O. mandated major government agencies to pool their resources together to
implement a centralized data bank of all citizens which shall be used to streamline day
to day government transactions and minimize rampant red taping and corruption among
government employees.

Herein petitioner Senator Blas Ople, filed the case at bar questioning the said
A.O. on 3 grounds 1) implementation of a national ID system requires a legislative act,
as such A.O. no. 308 is usurpation of legislative functions. 2) that said A.O. tends to
infringe the right to privacy of citizens 3) the appropriation of funds for the
implementation of said A.O. is also an exclusive legislative function.

On the other hand, herein respondent as Executive Secretary refutes all said
arguments.

Issue:

1. Whether or not A.O. no. 308 is a valid exercise of the Executive power.

2. Whether or not the issuance of A.O. 308 by the President in establishing a

national computerized identification reference system is an unconstitutional
usurpation of the legislative powers of the Congress.
Ruling:

1. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

In holding the A.O. no. 308 as an invalid exercise of the Presidents Executive power,
the Court provided the following:

1. As raised by petitioner, A.O. no. 308 does indeed infringe upon the
legislature’s exclusive function as it laid down a system whereby compliance
therewith is a condition to transact with the government.
2. A.O. no. 308 is a potential threat to the Constitutional right to Privacy as it
allows the government to pool various data regarding an individual without
any clear concise direction as to the manner to keeping, safeguards against
improper use, and any definite answer as to what type of information may or
may not be used.
 But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the
overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's
right to privacy in clear and present danger.
3. A.O. no. 308 failed to substantiate any justifiable reason to allow the would
be infringement. To streamline government transactions and to remove red
taping was not sufficiently shown to be valid reasons to counter act the strict
protection of the individual’s right to privacy.

2. While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President
executes the laws.As head of the Executive Department, the President is the
Chief Executive.Corollary to the power of control, the President has the duty of
supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and
public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices
under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.Administrative
power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs.
 As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our
citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative
power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought
to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.From these
precepts, the Supreme Court holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. The dissenting opinions of the
Justices unduly expand the limits of administrative legislation and consequently
erode the plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is contrary to the
established approach defining the traditional limits of administrative legislation. As
well stated by Fisher: ". . . Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is
here that administrative legislation must he restricted in its scope and application.
Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that
Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are
entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an
independent source of power to make laws."
Thus, Adminisrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" was declared null and void for being
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME
CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO,
FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON,
RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S.
DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, and REP. JOKER
P. ARROYO,petitioners, 
vs.
TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Office of the
President; RENATO CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Executive Secretary
and Chairman of the Presidential review Committee on the Lotto, Office of the
President; PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE; and PHILIPPINE
GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 113375 May 5, 1994

FACTS:
(1) Petitioners contend that denial by the Office of the President of its protest and
the statement of 
Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that "only a court injunction can stop
Malacañang," and the imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease in February
1994, KI LOSBAYAN, with its co-petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition. 
In support of the petition, the petitioners claim that:
. . . X X THE OFFICE OF THE PRESI DENT, ACTING THROUGH RESPONDENTS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND/OR ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR
LEGAL AFFAIRS, AND THE PCSO GRAVELY ABUSE[D] THEI R DI SCRETI ON
AND/OR FUN CTI ONS TANTAMOUN T TO LACK OF JURISDI CTI ON AND/OR
AUTHORI TY IN RESPECTIVELY: 
(A) APPROVING THE AWARD OF THE CONTRACT TO, AND
(B) ENTERING INTO THE SO-CALLED "CONTRACT OF LEASE" WITH,
RESPONDENT PGMC FOR THE INSTALLATION, ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATI
ON OF THE ON-LINE LOTTERY AND TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
REQUIRED AND/OR AUTHORIZED UNDER THE SAID CONTRACT, CONSI DERING
THAT: 
a) Under Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO, the PCSO is prohibited from
holding and conducting
lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association,
company or entity";
b) Under Act No. 3846 and established jurisprudence, a Congressional franchise
is required before
Any person may be allowed to establish and operate said telecommunications system;
c) Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, a less than 60% Filipino-
owned and/or controlled corporation, like the PGMC, is disqualified from operating a
public service, like the said telecommunications system; and
d) Respondent PGMC is not authorized by its charter and under the Foreign
Investment Act (R.A. No. 7042)to install, establish and operate the on-line lot to and
telecommunications systems. 
(2) Public respondents Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, J r., Assistant
Executive Secretary Renato Corona, and the PCSO maintain that the contract of lease
in question does not violate Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42,
and that the petitioner's interpretation of the phrase "in collaboration, association or joint
venture" in Section 1 is "much too narrow, strained and utterly devoid of logic" for it
"ignores the reality that PCSO, as a corporate entity, is vested with the basic and
essential prerogative to enter into all kinds of transactions or contracts as may be
necessary for the attainment of itspurposes and objectives." 

ISSUES:
(a) the locus standi of the petitioners, and
(b) the legality and validity of the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1 of R.A. No.
1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and
conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person,
association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign." 
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the challenged
Contract of Lease executed on 17 December 1993 by respondent Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and respondent Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation (PGMC)is hereby DECLARED contrary to law and invalid. 

RATIO:
No interpretation of the said provision to relax or circumvent the prohibition can
be allowed since the privilege to hold or conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, or
other similar activities is a franchise granted by the legislature to the PCSO. It is a
settled rule that "in all grants by the government to individuals or corporations of rights,
privileges and franchises, the words are to be taken most strongly against the
grantee .... [o]ne who claims a franchise or privilege in derogation of the common rights
of the public must prove his title thereto by a grant which is clearly and definitely
expressed, and he cannot enlarge it by equivocal or doubtful provisions or by probable
inferences. Whatever is not unequivocally granted is withheld. Nothing passes by mere
implication. 
DEAN JOSE JOYA, CARMEN GUERRERO NAKPIL, ARMIDA SIGUION REYNA,
PROF. RICARTE M. PURUGANAN, IRMA POTENCIANO, ADRIAN CRISTOBAL,
INGRID SANTAMARIA, CORAZON FIEL, AMBASSADOR E. AGUILAR CRUZ,
FLORENCIO R. JACELA, JR., MAURO MALANG, FEDERICO AGUILAR ALCUAZ,
LUCRECIA R. URTULA, SUSANO GONZALES, STEVE SANTOS, EPHRAIM
SAMSON, SOLER SANTOS, ANG KIU KOK, KERIMA POLOTAN, LUCRECIA
KASILAG, LIGAYA DAVID PEREZ, VIRGILIO ALMARIO, LIWAYWAY A. ARCEO,
CHARITO PLANAS, HELENA BENITEZ, ANNA MARIA L. HARPER, ROSALINDA
OROSA, SUSAN CALO MEDINA, PATRICIA RUIZ, BONNIE RUIZ, NELSON
NAVARRO, MANDY NAVASERO, ROMEO SALVADOR, JOSEPHINE DARANG, and
PAZ VETO PLANAS, petitioners, 
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), CATALINO
MACARAIG, JR., in his official capacity, and/or the Executive Secretary, and
CHAIRMAN MATEO A.T. CAPARAS, respondents.

G.R. No. 96541 August 24, 1993

FACTS

On August 15,1990, Chairman Caparas of the PCGG, signed the Consignment

Agreement with the authority given by the President Aquino on August 14,1990, through
former Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., allowing Christie's of New York to
auction off (82) Old Masters Paintings seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan
Museum of Manila and the (71) cartons of antique silverware in the custody of the
Central Bank of the Philippines, and such other property as may subsequently be
identified by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions of the
agreement which were alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President
Marcos, his relatives and cronies for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
scheduled January 11,1991.

On October 26,1990, Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo of COA submitted to

President Aquino the audit result on the Consignment Agreement that: (a) the authority
of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of
doubtful legality; (b) the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government; (c)
PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, (d) the
assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance, hence, their
disposal was prohibited by law. Then the new PCGG Chairman David M. Castro,
defended the contract made and refuting the allegations of Chairman Domingo on
November 15,1990. On that same date , Director of National Museum Gabriel S. Casal
issued a certification that the items subject of the Consignment Agreement did not fall
within the classification of protected cultural properties and did not specifically qualify as
part of the Filipino cultural heritage. Hence the petition was filed on January 7,1991

Petitioners raise the following issues:

A. whether petitioners have legal standing to file the instant petition;

B. whether the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware are embraced in
the phrase "cultural treasure of the nation" which is under the protection of the state
pursuant to the 1987 Constitution and/or "cultural properties" contemplated under R.A.
4846, otherwise known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act;"

C. whether the paintings and silverware are properties of public dominion on

which can be disposed of through the joint concurrence of the President and Congress;

D. whether respondent, PCGG has the jurisdiction and authority to enter into an
agreement with Christie's of New York for the sale of the artworks;

E. whether, PCGG has complied with the due process clause and other statutory
requirements for the exportation and sale of the subject items; and,

F. whether the petition has become moot and academic, and if so, whether the
above issues warrant resolution from this Court.

ISSUE

Whether the petition complies with the legal requisites of judicial inquiry

Whether petitioners has the legal standing & the actual controversy of the
petition.
RULING

In relation to the issue of the legal standing and the actual controversy, with the
allegation of the petitioners, “that the paintings were donated by private persons from
different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a
non-profit and non-stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts.“The
foundation's chairman was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was
Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of the paintings legally belongs to
the foundation or corporation or the members thereof. Similarly, the pieces of antique
silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries from
foreign countries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to them.
The confiscation of the properties by the Aquino administration however should not be
understood to mean that the ownership of the paintings has automatically passed on the
government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due
process and just compensation. The court held that one having no right or interest to
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action on the
premised of Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must
be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all
persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded
shall be joined as plaintiffs. And since the purpose of the petition for prohibition is to
enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a
particular date — 11 January 1991 — which is long past, the issues raised in the
petition have become moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus was
DISMISSED.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI
COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

G.R. No. 133250. May 6, 2003

Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim
areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the
Philippines (CDCP).

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D.
1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were
transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and
Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all
future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to
PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the
Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as
the FREEDOM ISLANDS.

Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a
Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250
hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to
AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement,
claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the “mother of
all scams”).

Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ
of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to
AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President
Estrada’s admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim
that the contract is null and void.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution

FACTS:

Yes

The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer
ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to
Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and
existing laws.

The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable

natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands
open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government
can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public
domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their
present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man.

Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,

ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation
of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
 PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can
classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no
longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of
the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the
1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, M.P., ORLANDO S.
MERCADO, M.P., HONORATO Y. AQUINO, M.P., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, M.P.,
DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, M.P., OSCAR F. SANTOS, M.P., ALBERTO G. ROMULO,
M.P., CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, M.P., ISIDORO E. REAL, M.P., EMIGDIO L. LINGAD,
M.P., ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, M.P., PEDRO M. MARCELLANA, M.P., VICTOR S.
ZIGA, M.P., and ROGELIO V. GARCIA. M.P., petitioners, 
vs.
HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF THE BUDGET and
VICTOR MACALINGCAG in his capacity as the TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987

Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177
(Budget Reform Decree of 1977)—as concerned citizens, members of the National
Assembly, parties with general interest common to all people of the Philippines, and as
taxpayers—on the primary grounds that Section 44 infringes upon the fundamental law
by authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys, amounting to undue delegation of
legislative powers and allowing the President to override the safeguards prescribed for
approving appropriations.

The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing
of the petitioners and held that one branch of the government cannot be enjoined by
another, coordinate branch in its performance of duties within its sphere of
responsibility. It also alleged that the petition has become moot and academic after the
abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom
Constitution (which was where the provision under consideration was enacted in
pursuant thereof), which states that “No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, however, the President…may by law be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items
of their respective appropriations.”
Issue:
1. W/N PD 1177 is constitutional

2. W/N the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed executive act

Held:
1. No.
The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law
be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege

granted under the Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer
funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to
any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to
whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from
which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely
disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue
delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed,
such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.

But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item
to another in the GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and
efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here

2. Yes. Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope of its
constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other
branches of the government has assumed to do as void, as part of its constitutionally
conferred judicial power. This is not to say that the judicial power is superior in degree
or dignity. In exercising this high authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they
are only the administrators of the public will.

Petition granted. Par. 1, Sec. 44 OF PD 1177 null and void.