CITIZENSHIP

SECTION 2
CO. VS. HRET
(G.R. No. 92191-92, July 30, 1991)
GUTIERREZ JR., J.
Facts:
The petitioners is asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of
Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative
district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The records
show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te
established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work. As
a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in
the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish an
enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the community. As Jose Ong Chuan grew
older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized
into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipina, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and,
thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice. The couple bore eight children, one of whom is
the private respondent who was born in 1948. The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He
decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar. The business prospered.
Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the father of the
private respondent, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed
with the Court of First Instance of Samar of application for naturalization on February 15, 1954. On April 28, 1955, the
CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
Issue: Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines
Held: YES. Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines natural-born (Filipino) citizens as: "Natural-born citizens
are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens." Article IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987 Constitution provides that: "Section 1. The
following are citizens of the Philippines: . . . (3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority." It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the  1987
Constitution in defining a natural-born Filipino citizen was to equalize the position of Filipino fathers and Filipino
mothers as to their children becoming natural-born Filipino citizens. In other words, after 17 January 1973, effectivity
date of the 1973 Constitution, all those born of Filipino fathers (with alien spouse) or Filipino mothers (with alien
spouse) are natural-born Filipino citizens. But those born to Filipino mothers prior to 17 January 1973 must still elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in order to be deemed natural-born Filipino citizens. The
election, which is related to the attainment of the age of majority, may be made before or after 17 January 1973. This
interpretation appears to be in consonance with the fundamental purpose of the Constitution  which is to protect and
enhance the people's individual interests, and to foster equality among them.

2. IN RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR OF VICENTE CHING

(BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999)
KAPUNAN, J:
FACTS: Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino,
was born in La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. Ching, after having
completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar
Examinations. He was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court
proof of his Philippine citizenship. The results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the
successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled. However, because of the
questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. He manifested that he elected Philippine
citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with C.A. No. 625. The OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected
Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present
jurisprudence.
ISSUE: Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time."
HELD: No. C.A.No.625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the
procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1, legitimate
children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines." However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe
a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. It is true that this clause has been
construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled
that three years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to
above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always
considered himself a Filipino. However, we cautioned in the case of Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect
Philippine citizenship is not indefinite: Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He
became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over 28 years
of age, or over 7 years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made "upon
reaching the age of majority." In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already 35 years old
when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over 14 years after he had reached the age
of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly
beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in
this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest
in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
election. The span of 14 years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his
intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon
reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine
citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process.
All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the
same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply
glossed over.

REPUBLIC V LIM
G.R. No. 153883, January 13, 2004
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Facts: The respondent, Chule Y. Lim, is an illegitimate daughter of a Chinese father and a Filipina mother, who never got
married due to a prior subsisting marriage of her father. The respondent petitioned that there were few mistakes as to
her citizenship and identity, to wit:
1. That her surname “Yu” was misspelled as “Yo”. She has been using “Yu” in all of her school records and in her
marriage certificate.
2. That her father’s name in her birth record was written as “Yo Diu To (Co Tian)” when it should have been “Yu Dio To
(Co Tian).”
3. That her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her father and mother
got married.
4. That she was entered as a legitimate child on her birth certificate when in fact, it should have been illegitimate. Both
the trial court and Court of Appeals granted the respondent’s petition.
Issue: The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Supreme Court on the following grounds:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the correction of the citizenship of respondent Chule Y. Lim from
“Chinese” to “Filipino” despite the fact that respondent never demonstrated any compliance with the legal
requirements for election of citizenship.
Held: 1. No. The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of electing Filipino
citizenship when she reached the age of majority as mandated in Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution and
Section 1 of the Commonwealth Act No. 625. The Supreme Court held that the two above provisions only apply to
legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of the respondent who was an illegitimate child considering that her
parents never got married. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a
Filipino upon birth, and as such, there was no more need for her to validly elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority. Also, she registered as a voter inside the country when she reached 18 years old. The exercise of the
right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition brought by the Republic is DENIED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

TECSON VS COMELEC
(GR NO. 161434 March 3 2004)
VITUG,J. .
Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino
(KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August
1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy
upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-
born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was
an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate
birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his
marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a
year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed the case for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26
January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC
en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court.The petition
likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would
stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
Issue: Whether or not FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the office of the President of the
Philippines.
Held: Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935
Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus
sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a “natural-born”
citizen of the Philippines. Jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ
and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from
the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20
August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of
Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou
are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by
both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate
in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy 
REPUBLIC v. SAGUN
(G.R. No. 187567, 15 February 2012)
Facts: Respondent in this case is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a
Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not
recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City. Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied
for a Philippine passport. Her application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation
on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her
election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same
on her birth certificate. In her petition, respondent averred that she was raised as a Filipino, speaks Ilocano and Tagalog
fluently and attended local schools in Baguio City, including Holy Family Academy and the Saint Louis University.
Respondent claimed that despite her part-Chinese ancestry, she always thought of herself as a Filipino. She is a
registered voter of Precinct No. 0419A of Barangay Manuel A. Roxas in Baguio City and had voted in local and national
elections as shown in the Voter Certification issued by Atty. Maribelle Uminga of the Commission on Elections of Baguio
City. She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship and such fact
should be annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport. After conducting
a hearing, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision on April 3, 2009 granting the petition and declaring respondent
a Filipino citizen. Hence, this petition by the Solicitor General. Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in finding
respondent as having duly elected Philippine citizenship since her purported election was not in accorda nce with the
procedure prescribed by law and was not made within a “reasonable time.” Petitioner points out that while respondent
executed an oath of allegiance before a notary public, there was no affidavit of her election of Philippine citizenship.
Additionally, her oath of allegiance which was not registered with the nearest local civil registry was executed when she
was already 33 years old or 12 years after she reached the age of majority. Accordingly, it was made beyond the period
allowed by law.
Issue: Whether respondent failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of
Philippine citizenship
Held: Yes. Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child
elected Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it
provided that “those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred
and thirty-five” are citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the
1987 Constitution which states that “those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of major ity” are Philippine citizens. It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and
1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative
effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of
a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if
the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution. Being a legitimate child,
respondent’s citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects
Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father a nd that
illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. An illegitimate child of a
Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines;
he automatically becomes a citizen himself. But in the case of respondent, for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she
must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. The statutory formalities of electing
Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil
registry. Records of the case at bar undisputably show that respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for
a valid election. Specifically, respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship.
The only documentary evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of
allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered, which was clearly not
within a reasonable time, which is 3 years from reaching the age of majority. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous
and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take
the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the
court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.

MA V. FERNANDEZ, JR.,
[G.R. No. 183133; July 26, 2010 ] Perez, J.:
Facts: Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr., Valeriano Cabiling Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Arceli Ma, Nicolas Ma, and
Isidro Ma are the children of Felix Ma, a Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina. Petitioners were all born
under the 1935 Philippine Constitution. They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for
almost 60 years; they spent their whole lives, studied and received their primary and secondary education in the
country; they do not speak nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan, and do not know any
relative of their father; they have not even traveled abroad; and they have already raised their respective families in the
Philippines. During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of
Registration (ACRs). Immediately upon reaching the age of 21, they claimed Philippine citizenship in accordance with
Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that “(t)hose whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship” are citizens of the Philippines. Thus, on
15 August 1969, Felix, Jr. executed his affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took his oath of allegiance before
then Judge Jose L. Gonzalez. Balgamelo did the same before a notary public. In 1978, Valeriano took his oath of
allegiance before then Judge Salvador C. Sering, the fact of which the latter attested to in his Affidavit. Having taken their
oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the necessary documents registered in the
civil registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625. More than 30 years after they elected
Philippine citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so. On the other hand, there is no showing that Valeriano
complied with the registration requirement. Individual certifications issued by the Office of the City Election Officer,
COMELEC show that all of them are registered voters of Barangay Washington, Precinct No. 0015A since June 1997, and
that records on previous registrations are no longer available because of the mandatory general registration every 10
years. Moreover, aside from exercising their right of suffrage, Balgamelo is one of the incumbent Barangay Kagawads in
Barangay Washington, Surigao City. The Bureau of Immigration received the Complaint-Affidavit of a certain Mat G.
Catral alleging that Felix Ma and his 7 children are undesirable and overstaying aliens. Mr. Catral, however, did not
participate in the proceedings, and the Ma family could not but believe that the complaint against them was politically
motivated because they strongly supported a candidate in Surigao City in the 2004 National and Local Elections.
Issue: W/N public respondents are undocumented and/or improperly documented aliens
Held: Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It was only the
registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that was belatedly done.
We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and
they should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election. We are not prepared to state that the
mere exercise of suffrage, being elected public official, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other
similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship can take the place of election of citizenship. What we now say is
that where, as in petitioners’ case, the election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within the
constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of election beyond the frame should be
allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done. The
actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the
Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship. In a contract of
partnership, we said that the purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties; that failure to register the contract
does not affect the liability of the partnership and of the partners to third persons; and that neither does such failure
affect the partnership’s juridical personality. An unregistered contract of partnership is valid as among the partners, so
long as it has the essential requisites, because the main purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties, and it
can be assumed that the members themselves knew of the contents of their contract. The non-registration of a deed of
donation does not also affect its validity. Registration is not a requirement for the validity of the contract as between the
parties, for the effect of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons. Likewise, relevant is the pronouncement that
registration is not a mode of acquiring a right. In an analogous case involving an unrecorded deed of sale, we reiterated
the settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. Registration does not confer ownership. It is not a
mode of acquiring dominion, but only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large.
Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant case, registration is the confirmation of
election as such election. It is not the registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under
Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming
the fact that citizenship has been claimed. The petitioners timely took their oath of allegiance to the Philippines. This
was a serious undertaking. It was commitment and fidelity to the state coupled with a pledge “to renounce absolutely
and forever all allegiance” to any other state. This was unqualified acceptance of their identity as a Filipino and the
complete disavowal of any other nationality. Petitioners have passed decades of their lives in the Philippines as Filipinos.
Their present status having been formed by their past, petitioners can no longer have any national identity except that
which they chose upon reaching the age of reason. Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of
the petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The
failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the election and resultingly negate the permanent
fact that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition of
appropriate administrative penalties, if any. The documents they submitted supporting their allegations that they have
already registered with the civil registry, although belatedly, should be examined for validation purposes by the
appropriate agency, in this case, the Bureau of Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the administrative orders
and other issuances of the Bureau of Immigration and the Department of Justice shall be complied with within a
reasonable time.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BATUIGAS

[G.R. NO. 183110. OCTOBER 7, 2013]
DEL CASTILLO, J:
Facts: Doctrine: “It is universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife of one of
its citizens could have had no other objective that to maintain a unity of allegiance among the members of the family.”
Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur and that she has all the qualifications
required under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473. After
all the jurisdictional requirements mandated by Section 9 of CA 473 had been complied with the OSG filed its Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known
lucrative trade. Azucena married Santiago Batuigas, a natural-born Filipino citizen. After her stint in Talisayan High
School, Azucena and her husband, as conjugal partners, engaged in the retail business of and later on in
milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra. As proof of their income, Azucena submitted their joint annual tax returns and
balance sheets. The business name and the business permits issued to the spouses' store, 'Azucena's General
Merchandising,' are registered in Santiago's name. Azucena countered that although she is a teacher by profession, she
had to quit to help in the retail business of her husband. She contended that the definition of "lucrative trade/income"
should not be strictly applied to her. Being the wife and following Filipino tradition, she should not be treated like male
applicants for naturalization who are required to have their own "lucrative trade." The OSG then appealed the RTC
judgment to the CA, contending that Azucena failed to comply with the income requirement under CA 473. The OSG
maintained that Azucena is not allowed under the Retail Trade Law (RA No. 1180) to engage directly or indirectly in the
retail trade. Hence, she cannot possibly meet the income requirement. And even if she is allowed, her business is not a
"lucrative trade" within the contemplation of the law or that which has an appreciable margin of income over expenses
in order to provide for adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work. The OSG likewise
disputed Azucena's claim that she owns real property because aliens are precluded from owning lands in the country.
Issue: Whether or not Azucena’s Petition for Naturalization should be granted.
Ruling: Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization under CA
473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the "Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"). A
third option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found
under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that: "[a]ny woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of
the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines." The Court
acknowledged that the main objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an alien wife is to maintain a unity of
allegiance among family members, thus: It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and
identity that a husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should be
different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband's interests in property and business activities
reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership and be denied to the wife, nor that she
herself cannot, through her own efforts but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare
instances should the identity of husband and wife be refused recognition, and we submit that in respect of our
citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances where the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of
the Revised Naturalization Law. This case however is not a Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship but
rather a Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473. In the first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and
asks a court to declare or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In the second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an
alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire the privilege of becoming a Philippine citizen based on requirements
required under CA 473. Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of
that privilege.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF BAN UAN

(G.R. No. L-22496. February 26, 1974)
FERNANDO, J.:
Facts: Petitioner arrived in the Philippines in 1923, staying first at 207 Echague St., Manila, from 1923 to 1949.
Thereafter he transferred to Puerto Princesa, Palawan for the years 1950 to 1951, then to Coron, also in that province in
1952. In 1959, he went to live at Cuyo, Palawan, his residence at the time his petition for naturalization was heard. He is
married to one Susana Lim with three children, namely, Grace L. Ong, born on November 30, 1967; Raymond L. Ong,
born on February 12, 1959; and Maria Susana Ong, born on April 8, 1961. As set forth in his petition, his trade or
profession was that of an employee, with an average income of four thousand pesos. His employer was his mother-in-
law. 1 It must be added that while his petition spoke of his place of residence as Cuyo, with reference likewise to Coron,
he did also testify as to having lived at 207 Echague St., Manila from 1923 to 1949. Based on the facts presented, the
petitioner prevailed on the lower court. However, two grounds are relied upon in the Court for reversal, namely, failure
to state in the petition the present and all the former places of residence of applicant and lack of a lucrative income.
Either one ought to have sufficed for denial of the petition.
Issue: Whether or not Bang Uan shall be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines
Held: No. It is one of the qualifications required in the Naturalization Act that petitioner must be worth either not less
than P5,000.00 or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation. Some of the earlier decisions
stressing how essential such a requirement is came from the pen of former Chief Justice Bengzon, in the cases
respectively of Lim v. Republic, Tiong v. Republic, and Swee Din Tan v. Republic. In the language of the Chief Justice: ‘It is
not enough for an applicant for naturalization not to be a financial burden upon the community. He must, also, have a
"lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation." And this qualification has been construed to mean, not only that he is
not a beggar, a pauper or indigent, but, also, that his financial condition must be such as to permit him and the members
of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with
the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization.’ Considering the absence of lucrative income, petition
must be denied.

CHUA KIAN LAI V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

[G.R. NO. L-37443. SEPTEMBER 11, 1974.]
AQUINO, J.:
Facts: Chua Kian Lai, the petitioner, was born on October 27, 1903 in Amoy, China. He arrived in the Philippines in 1914
on board the SS Lim An. In 1922 he married Ty Siok Cheng at Amoy. They begot ten children. The eldest was born in
Fookien, China and the last child in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. Since his arrival in the Philippines Chua Kian
Lai resided at the following places: (1) Nueva Street, Manila; (2) Benavides Street, Manila; (3) San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City; (4) 3-5 Estrella Street, Binondo, Manila, and 741-5 Padilla Street, San Miguel, Manila. He is a businessman
with an investment in various enterprises amounting to P60,000. The petition for naturalization was filed on September
24, 1959. Inasmuch as the petitioner took no step to take his oath, the Solicitor General on February 29, 1966 filed a
motion to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. The court directed the petitioner to file a motion to be allowed to
take his oath. He filed that motion. On the date set for the hearing of the motion to take the oath, the petitioner and his
counsel did not appear.
Issue/s: Whether or not petitioner Chua Kian Lai should be allowed to take his oath of allegiance.
Ruling: One qualification for Philippine citizenship is that the petitioner "must be of good moral character". That
circumstance should be specifically alleged in the petition (Secs. 2[3rd] and 7, Com. Act No. 473). The State, in its brief,
notes that Chua Kian Lai did not aver in his petition that he is a person of good moral character. He simply made a
blanket allegation that he had "all the qualifications required of Commonwealth Act No. 473" (6 Record on Appeal). That
general statement is not sufficient. Section 7 of the law provides that the petitioner should set forth in his petition, inter
alia, "a declaration that he has the qualifications required by this Act, specifying the same". The omission of that specific
averment nullifies his petition. The law explicitly requires that the applicant should indicate in his petition "his present
and former places of residence" (Sec. 7, Com. Act No. 473). That requirement is designed to facilitate the verification of
petitioner's activities which have a bearing on his petition for naturalization, especially as to his qualifications and moral
character, either by private individuals or by investigative agencies of the government, by pointing to them the localities
or places wherein appropriate inquiries may be made (Keng Giok vs. Republic, 112 Phil. 986). Moreover, the suppression
of that information might constitute a falsehood, which signifies that the applicant lacks good moral character and is
not, therefore, qualified to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. Noncompliance with that important requirement
renders the publication incomplete and, consequently, affects the court's jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. It
warrants the dismissal of the petition. The Solicitor General also points out that the petitioner, a businessman, who has
ten children, five of whom were still dependent on him for support in 1961, when he testified, and whose annual income
was P6,500, cannot be regarded as having a "lucrative trade" (Sec. 2[4th], Com. Act No. 473). That income is not
adequate to enable him and the members of his big family "to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the
prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity at this stage of civilization" (Watt vs.
Republic, L-20718, August 30, 1972, 46 SCRA 683 and nine other cases). Failure to satisfy the property or income
requirement is another ground for denying applicant's petition for naturalization. WHEREFORE, Chua Kian Lai’s petition
to take the oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen, is reversed and the granting of his petition for naturalization is set
aside.

LI TONG PEK vs REPUBLIC

(G.R. No. L-20912, November 29, 1965)
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Facts: Petitioner was born on August 8, 1921 in Chingkang, China. He arrived at Manila on August 12, 1930 where he
resided until 1931. Sometime in 1931, he left the Philippines for Amoy, China, where he studied for about three years. In
1934, he returned to the Philippines and resided in Manila for about a year, while in 1935 up to the present he resided in
Naga City. He married one Josefa Dy Liaco Chua-Unsu, a Chinese citizen, with whom he begot eight children, namely,
Peter, Josena, Lily, Andrew, John, Tenny, James and Philip, who were all born in Naga City. Peter, Josena and Lily are at
present enrolled in the Anglo-Chinese School, while his son Andrew is enrolled in the Hope Christian School, both
schools being recognized by our government where Philippine history, government and civics are taught. Petitioner and
his family are all living in a house which they built in 1961 on the property of petitioners' mother-in-law situated in Naga
City. In 1947, he was employed in the Naga Ricemill which was owned by his brother with a salary of P80.00 a month. In
1957, he began to receive a daily wage of P10.00 from the same employer, but was paid his wage only when he worked
and he usually worked only for six days a week. On the average, the monthly compensation he received ranges from
P240.00 to P260.00. In 1957, he also became the cashier and bookkeeper of said employer where from then on up to
1959 he received an average salary of P3,000.00 per annum. In February, 1962, his brother raised his daily compensation
to P15.00 and whenever his employer realized profits he was given bonus at the end of the year. In 1958, his wife
worked as a cashier for one Yu Ka Koh, a distributor of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Company, who was paid a
compensation of P250.00 a month in addition to a possible annual bonus of P1,000.00 at the end of the year. Petitioner
complied with all the requirements for his application for naturalization. Petition having been granted by the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur in a decision rendered on September 27, 1962, the government took the present appeal
contending that the court erred in granting the petition notwithstanding the fact that petitioner does not have a
lucrative income that would give him a stable economic situation as provided by law and that he did not place his
children of school age in schools recognized by our government where the students are predominantly Filipinos
Issue: Whether or not the CFI of Camarines Sur erred in granting the petitioner’s application for naturalization.
Held: Court found merit in the contention that petitioner does not possess a lucrative income to give him the economic
sufficiency within the purview of the law for it appears that considering the wages he was given during the period he
was employed in the Naga Ricemill it can be said that his average monthly salary would only amount to P390.00. In the
light of the long line of decisions rendered by the Court on this matter, such income is indeed far from being lucrative
not only because petitioner has a big family, being a father of eight children, but especially considering the high cost of
living and the low purchasing value of our currency during the present time. It is true that petitioner's wife also works as
cashier of a certain Yu Ka Koh, a distributor of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Company from which she is given a salary
of P250.00 a month, but such additional income would appear to be immaterial for under the law the petitioner should
be the one to possess "some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation" to qualify him to become a Filipino
citizen.
The claim that the four children were only enrolled by him either in the AngloChinese High School or in the Hope
Christian School, operated in Naga City, which, though recognized by our government, are however run by Chinese
mentors. The least that can be said is that said institution being predominantly, if not exclusively, attended by Chinese
students are operated primarily for the education of Chinese children, since they are being supervised by Chinese
citizens. This is an indication that by enrolling his children in said schools petitioner has not evinced a sincere desire to
become a Filipino citizen as should be expected from one who desires to embrace our citizenship.

In re PETITION FOR ADMISSION AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHIU BOK alias DAVID CHIU vs. THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
[G.R. No. L-33568. June 20, 1988.]
Padilla, J;
Facts: This is an appeal interposed by the Government from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del
Norte, dated 26 September 1968, in Naturalization Case No. R58 which declared that the petitioner Chiu Bok alias David
Chiu possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines and
granted his application for naturalization. In support of its appeal, the Government, represented by the Solicitor General,
enumerated several grounds for the disqualification of the petitioner, foremost of which is, that the petitioner
did not conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the
Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community where he resides. The
appellant recalled that, sometime in 1959, the petitioner had filed a petition for naturalization with the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del Norte. After hearing, the lower court declared the petitioner qualified to be admitted a
citizen of the Philippines. However, on appeal, the Court reversed the judgment and dismissed the petition for
naturalization on the ground that the petitioner did not have a lucrative income decent enough to maintain his family.
The Court also found that — "Petitioner’s use of an alias, without authority, as provided for in Commonwealth Act No.
142, is in clear violation of that law, the Anti-Alias Law, and render him all the more disqualified to obtain Philippine
citizenship. It shows that the said petitioner is not a person of irreproachable character. (See Lim Bun v. Republic of the
Philippines, G.R. No. L-12822, April 26, 1961)." In his second petition for naturalization, filed on 26 April 1967, where
the judgment, now appealed, was rendered, the petitioner claimed that the grounds for the denial of his first petition
are “not anymore existing at the present and have been cured."
Issue: Whether or not the petition for naturalization should be granted
Held: To sustain his claim, the petitioner presented his income tax returns for the years 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, and
1967, wherein it is shown that his net income for said years are P4,626.09, P7,686.12, P8,413.19, P9,605.03 and
P9,651.26, respectively. The petitioner also presented a copy of the order issued by the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Norte on 21 September 1966 in Sp. Proc. No. R-464, wherein his use of an alias was legalized. Since
lucrative income is to be reckoned with as of the filing of the application for naturalization, petitioner’s net income for
the year 1967, when the application for naturalization was filed, which is P9,651.25, should be determinative of the
issue. This amount, however, is not lucrative enough to support the petitioner’s family within the purview of the
Naturalization Law, for that would give him at most a monthly income of P804.27. Since the petitioner’s family consists
of eight (8) members, including himself and his wife, what belongs to each member, per capita, would be only P100.53 a
month. Unless the petitioner has other income not duly reported, this amount can hardly be considered lucrative
considering the present high cost of living and the low purchasing power of the peso and the fact that three
(3) of his children are studying in Cebu City, and he has to pay for their board and lodging and other incidental
expenses. Thus, in Keng Giok vs. Republic, where the income of the petitioner in 1956 was P8,687.50, the Court held that
such income could not be considered substantial or lucrative, since petitioner had five (5) minor children as dependents
and, as such, their monthly income, per capita, was only P103.42. LibLex In Cu King Nan vs. Republic, 9 the Court
considered the average annual income of from P8,000.00 to P9,000.00 in 1960, as still not lucrative, considering that the
petitioner had a wife and eight (8) children to support. This reason, alone, is sufficient to support a reversal of the
decision appealed from and the denial of the application for naturalization. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one entered dismissing the petition for naturalization filed in
Naturalization Case No. R-58 of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte. With costs against the petitioner-
appellee. SO, ORDERED.
VILANDO VS. HRET
(G.R. No. 192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011)
MENDOZA, J.
Facts: In the May 14, 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of
the First District of Negros Oriental. She won over the other contender, Olivia Paras. On May 25, 2007, she was
proclaimed as Representative by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on the basis of Comelec Resolution No. 8062 issued
on May 18, 2007. On July 23, 2007, she assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives. Meanwhile,
petitions involving either the disqualification or the proclamation of Limkaichong were filed before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) which reached the Court. The petitions, which questioned her citizenship, were filed against
Limkaichong by her detractors: Louis Biraogo (G.R. No. 179120); Olivia Paras (G.R. Nos. 179132-33); and Renald F.
Vilando (G.R. Nos. 179240-41). These three (3) petitions were consolidated with the petition for certiorari filed by
Limkaichong (G.R. Nos. 178831-32) assailing the Joint Resolution issued by the COMELEC which resolved the
disqualification cases against her. On April 1, 2009, the Court granted the aforesaid petition of Limkaichong, reversed the
Joint Resolution of the Comelec, dismissed the three (3) other petitions, and directed the petitioners to seek relief
before the HRET by way of a petition for Quo Warranto. On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F.
Vilando (Vilando), as taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district concerned, filed
separate petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET. These petitions were consolidated by the
HRET as they both challenged the eligibility of one and the same respondent. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was
a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed. They alleged that she was born to a father
(Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio
Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter. Also, they invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of
Limkaichong's citizenship, which necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of the naturalization certificate of Julio
Sy. For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. She averred that the acquisition
of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and in order and had already attained the status of  res judicata.
Further, she claimed that the validity of such citizenship could not be assailed through a collateral attack.  On March 24,
2010, the HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the House of
Representatives.
Issue: Whether or not Limkaichong is a Filipino citizen
Held: YES. Indubitably, with Limkaichong's father having been conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows
that she is a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father. Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the
subsequent issuance of certificate of naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached
majority age. Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or
by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the
respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen.

13. EDISON SO v. REPUBLIC

(G.R. NO. 170603 January 29, 2007)
CALLEJO, SR., J:
FACTS: On February 28, 2002, petitioner Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for Naturalization under C.A. No. 473,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Attached to the petition were the Joint Affidavit of
Atty. Adasa, Jr. and Salcedo; and So's Certificate of Live Birth, Alien Certificate of Registration, and Immigrant Certificate
of Residence. The trial court concluded that petitioner had satisfactorily supported his petition with evidence.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, appealed the decision to the CA. Respondent countered that
R.A. No. 9139 (which took effect on August 8, 2001 and where the applicant's age requirement was lowered to 18 years
old), refers only to administrative naturalization filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization; it does not apply to
judicial naturalization before the court. Respondent, through the OSG, avers that its failure to oppose the petition
before the court a quo does not preclude it from appealing the decision of the RTC to the CA; it is even authorized to
question an already final decision by filing a petition for cancellation of citizenship. Lastly, respondent reiterates its
argument that petitioner's character witnesses are not qualified to prove the former's qualifications.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 9139 applies to petitions for naturalization by judicial act.
HELD: No. Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing
him or her with the privileges of a citizen. Under current and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may
become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization
pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress
bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws - the former
covers all aliens regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their
lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and
loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions. To reiterate, the intention of the legislature in
enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more
encouraging which is administrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a
need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A. No.
473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to
prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only
implication is that, a native-born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the
prescribed qualifications and disqualifications. In the instant case, petitioner applied for naturalization by judicial act,
though at the time of the filing of his petition, administrative naturalization under R.A. No. 9139 was already available.
Consequently, his application should be governed by C.A. No. 473. Also, petitioner's witnesses clearly did not personally
know him well enough; their testimonies do not satisfactorily establish that petitioner has all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications prescribed by law. In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not
only his own good moral character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible
persons.56 Within the purview of the naturalization law, a "credible person" is not only an individual who has not been
previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has no police record; who has not perjured in the past;
or whose affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What must be credible is not the declaration made but the person
making it. This implies that such person must have a good standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and
upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a good
warranty of the applicant's worthiness.

SECTION 3

YU VS DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
(GR NO. 83882 January 24 1989)
PADILLA, J.
Facts: Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971,valid for five (5)
years and renewed for the same period upon presentment before the proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his
naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued
Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said
Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. While still a citizen of the Philippines who
had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines," he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies
registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.To the mind of the Court, the foregoing
acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through
naturalization. 
Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s acts constitute renunciation of his Philippine citizenship
Held: YES. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon
naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal
of his Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a
naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his
maintenance of Philippine citizenship. Pleadings submitted before this Court after the issuance of said TRO have
unequivocally shown that petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The material facts are not only
established by the pleadings they are not disputed by petitioner. A rehearing on this point with the CID would be
unnecessary and superfluous. denial, if any, of due process was obviated when petitioner was given by the Court the
opportunity to show proof of continued Philippine citizenship, but he has failed. Philippine citizenship, it must be
stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient.

FRIVALDO V COMELEC
G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989
PANGANIBAN, J.,
FACTS: Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The
League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not
a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as American
citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.
ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen at the time of his election on January 18, 1988.
HELD: Petition denied, Juan G. Frivaldo is not a citizen of the Philippines and disqualified from serving as the Governor of
the Province of Sorsogon, vacancy shall be filled by the elected Vice-Governor.
1. Local Government Code section 42 indicates that a candidate for local elective office must be a citizen of the
Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where is running.
2. Omnibus Election Code section 117 states that a qualified voter, among other qualifications, must be a citizen of the
Philippines.
3. The Court rules that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election as the evidence shown
from the certification of US District Court of North California stating that he is a citizen of the Philippines.
4. Frivaldo’s argument that he reacquire his Philippine citizenship through the participation in the election which in his
view repatriated him to which the Court refutes that there are proper methods to which one can reacquire citizen ship
either through Direct Act of Congress, Naturalization or Repatriation to which Frivaldo did not access to.
5. Only citizens of the Philippines which have one allegiance can run in local elective office.

LABO VS. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989]
Facts: In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo
warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that he was naturalized
as an Australian after he married an Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an
Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian
when he married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian was later
declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if he’s considered as an Australian, his lack of
citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him
by a vast majority.
Issues: 1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can replace Labo in the event
Labo is disqualified.
Held: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was naturalized as an
Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian. It was his act of subsequently
swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian
passport to return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he
is a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his
Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian
citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be
declared as a Filipino through an act of Congress – none of this happened. Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public
office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should not overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of
Baguio could not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had they known he is
Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at
least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their
city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he should be declared the
mayor by reason of Labo’s disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second highest number of vote. It would be
extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency,
the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates
that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that
office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no
measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.

REPUBLIC V. DE LA ROSA
[G.R. No. 104654, June 6, 1994]
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section
25 of the Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 28, Manila, which re-admitted private respondent as a Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A.
No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473); and (2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private respondent on February
27, 1992. On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization captioned to be re-admitted as citizen of
th Philippines. The respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the publication of the
said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutive weeks, the
last publication of which should be at least six months before the said date of hearing. On January 14, 1992, private
respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule, that it shall be done on January instead of having it on
March, " where he manifested his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. The motion was granted
and the hearing was moved on February. Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed
Decision and held that Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by
naturalization, thereby vesiting upon him, all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen After receiving a
copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal directly with the Supreme
Court.
Issue: WON the petitioner was duly re-admitted o his citizenship as Filipino.
Held: No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE his office
and to SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and
executory. No pronouncement as to costs. The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities:
(1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order
advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last
publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment;
and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.

MOY YA LIM YAO VS. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

[G.R. NO. L-21289, OCTOBER 4, 1971] BARREDO, J:
Facts: Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made
in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a
Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great
(grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month. She was permitted to come into the Philippines and was
permitted to stay for a period of one month. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of
P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or
before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the
Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions,
petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines. On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with
Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of
respondent to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her
authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one
and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or
Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino
neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To obtain permanent
admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate
Philippine Consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the Officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a
Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act.” does not
apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become Filipino citizens or
acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally bestows upon them the right to stay in the Philippines
permanently or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities may neither deport
them nor confiscate their bonds.
Issue: Whether or not an alien who married a naturalized Filipino is lawfully naturalized.
Ruling: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized,
becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the
same law. Likewise, an alien woman married an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizens, provided that she does not suffer from any
of the disqualifications under said Section 4. The Constitution itself recognizes as Philippine citizens "Those who are
naturalized in accordance with law" (Sec. 1 [5], Article IV). Citizens by naturalization, under this provision, include not
only those who are naturalized in accordance with legal proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but also those
who acquire citizenship by "derivative naturalization" or by operation of law, as, for example, the "naturalization" of an
alien wife through the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien woman to a citizen. The leading idea or
purpose of Section 15 was to confer Philippine citizenship by operation of law upon certain classes of aliens as a legal
consequence of their relationship, by blood or by affinity, to persons who are already citizens of the Philippines.
Whenever the fact of relationship of the persons enumerated in the provisions concurs with the fact of citizenship of the
person to who they are related, the effect is for said person to become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. "Ipso facto"
as here used does not mean that all alien wives and all minor children of the Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of
relationship, necessarily become such citizens also. Those who do not meet the statutory requirements do not ipso facto
become citizens; they must apply for naturalization in order to acquire such status. In respect of those persons
enumerated in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of the Philippines is the operative fact which establishes the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by them. Necessarily, it also determines the point of time at which such citizenship
commences.

BENGSON III VS. HOUSE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

(G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001)
KAPUNAN, J.:
Facts: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that “no
person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.” Cruz was a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US
Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a
Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine
Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other,
“rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.”
Whatever doubt remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in
1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps. In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such
Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran
for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over
petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection. Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution. Hence, HRET rendered its decision
dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.
Issue: Whether or not Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-
born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Held: Yes. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by
law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the three (3) modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen
through naturalization, repatriation, and direct act of Congress. Repatriation may be considered under various statutes
by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) services in the armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino
woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. Further, R.A. No. 2630 provides in Sec. 1 that, “any person who
had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United
States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the
same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance
shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.” Hence, having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the
Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the
aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he
acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or
return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

ALTAJEROS V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

[G.R. NO. 163256. NOVEMBER 10, 2004.]
AZCUNA, J.:
Facts: Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004
national and local elections. On January 15, 2004, private respondents Jose Almiñe Altiche and Vernon Versoza,
registered voters of San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a petition to disqualify and to deny due course or
cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy that "petitioner was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign
country." Private respondents alleged that based on a letter from the Bureau of Immigration dated June 25, 2001,
petitioner was a holder of a permanent U.S. resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration and an Immigration
Certificate of Residence issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Although respondent had petitioned for his repatriation
as a Filipino citizen under Republic Act No. 8171 on 17 December 1997, this did not restore to respondent his Filipino
citizenship, because Section 2 of the aforecited Republic Act No. 8171 specifically provides that "repatriation shall be
effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil
registry and in the Bureau of Immigration." On March 25, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and
attached new documents to prove that he had completed all the requirements for repatriation, which thus entitled him
to run for an elective office. COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration on grounds that the evidence which can be
considered in the Motion for Reconsideration are those which were submitted during the hearing and is already a part
of the records, in which the new evidence submitted by the respondent has just recently been submitted. Based on the
information relayed to by the COMELEC, petitioner's namewas retained in the list of candidates voted upon by the
electorate in the said municipality. Hence, the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy was never
implemented.
Issue/s: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in affirming the Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division.
Ruling: The law is clear that repatriation is effected "by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration." In this case, petitioner took his Oath of
Allegiance on December 17, 1997, but his Certificate of Repatriation was registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City
only on February 18, 2004, and with the Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004. Petitioner, therefore, completed all
the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position, but before the
elections. It will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess
citizenship, unlike that for residence and age. The Court cannot fault the COMELEC en banc for affirming the decision of
the COMELEC, First Division, considering that petitioner failed to prove before the COMELEC that he had complied with
the requirements of repatriation. Petitioner submitted the necessary documents proving compliance with the
requirements of repatriation only during his motion for reconsideration, when the COMELEC en banc could no longer
consider said evidence. The COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision is
a ground for a motion for reconsideration (Rule 19, Section 1). The evidence referred to in the above provision and to be
considered in the Motion for Reconsideration are those which were submitted during the hearing and attached to the
respective Memoranda of the parties which are already part of the records of the case. In this regard, the evidence of
the respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of the petitioners.

SECTION 5

AZNAR vs COMELEC
(G.R. No. 83820, May 25, 1990)
PARAS, J.:
Facts: On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with the
COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections. On January 22,
1988, the Cebu-PDP Laban, as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar, in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial
Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is
allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America. On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a
Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam
Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration
(ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958,
respectively. Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to continue canvassing but to
suspend the proclamation. Private respondent maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate
child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid
and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the
Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered
voter in the Philippines since 1965. On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to
proclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, private respondent was proclaimed the
Provincial Governor of Cebu. Thereafter, COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been timely
filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen. Hence, the present petition
Issue: Whether or not private respondent is a Filipino citizen.
Held: The petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the
modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a
foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by
any of the three or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship. That private respondent had been naturalized as a
citizen of the United States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien
certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and
"being an American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S.
Naturalization Laws." Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who Filipino citizens are and who are not.
Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States does not concern the court.By
virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino remains. Considering
the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is
an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. Mere Certification that he is an American does not mean that
he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities and citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation
of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. The renunciation needed
to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine
citizenship when there is no renunciation, either " express" or "implied".

ERNESTO MERCADO v. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO

(G.R No. 135083, May 26, 1999)
Mendoza, J;
Facts: Edu Manzano, Ernesto Mercado and Gabriel Daza were candidates for Vice Mayor of Makati City during
the May 11, 1998 elections. A certain Ernesto Mamaril filed a petition for disqualification on Manzano contending that
Manzano is an American citizen thus suspending the proclamation of the private respondent. COMELEC's Second
Division granted the petition cancelling the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on May 7, 1998 on the grounds
that dual citizens are disqualified under Sec 40 of the Local Government Code from running any elective
position. Manzado filed a motion for reconsideration on May 8, 1998 and the motion remained pending even
after the election. The petitioner, Mercado sought to intervene in the case for disqualification which was
opposed by the private respondent. On August 19, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution reversing
the decision of the COMELEC's Second Division, declaring that private respondent Manzano is qualified to run
for Vice mayor of Makati. Pursuant to the resolution rendered by the COMELEC enbanc, on August 31, 1998,
the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as the Vice Mayor of the city of Makati. Thus, this
petition for Certiorari praying to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare private
respondent Manzano, disqualified to hold the office Vice Mayor of Makati.
Issues: Whether or not there was a valid election of citizenship?
Held: Yes, there was a valid election of citizenship. It should suffice that upon filing of certificates for candidacy,
such persons with dual citizenship have elected their Philippine citizenship to terminate their dual citizenship. In
private respondent’s certificate of candidacy, he made these statements under oath on March 27, 1998: “I am a
Filipino citizen…Natural-born”. “I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.” “I am
eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto…”The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual-citizen.

SOBEJANA-CONDON VS. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012)
REYES, J.
Facts: The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On
December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas
Condon. On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine
Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention
and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003." The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn  Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra,
Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian
citizen. The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She
again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the
highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan and Luis M. Bautista, (private respondents)
all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions forquo warranto questioning the petitioner's eligibility
before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner's disqualification from holding her elective post on the
ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 9225. The
petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen.
She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied
with Section 5 (2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian
citizenship.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified to run for elective office for failure to renounce her foreign citizenship
Held: YES. The petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian
citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of
Section 5 (2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
To obviate the fatal consequence of her inutile renunciation, the petitioner pleads the Court to interpret the "sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship" in Section 5 (2) to be a mere pro forma requirement in conformity with
the intent of the Legislature. She anchors her submission on the statement made by Representative Javier during the
floor deliberations on H.B. No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the Court's duty to interpret the law according to its true intent is exercised only
when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning. The first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law. As
such, when the law is clear and free from any doubt, there is no occasion for construction or interpretation; there is only
room for application. Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 9225 is one such instance.

4. JAPZON vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(G.R. No. 180088 January 19, 2009)
CHICO-NAZARIO, J:
FACTS: Both petitioner Japzon and private respondent Ty were candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007. On 15 June 2007, Japzon filed before the
COMELEC a Petition to disqualify and/or cancel Ty’s Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material
misrepresentation. He averred that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter Samar to spouses Ty (a Chinese) and Sumiguin (a Filipino). Ty eventually
migrated to the USA and became a citizen thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed
his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any
foreign country. While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually resided
there for one year immediately preceding the date of election as required under Section 39 of the LGC of 1991. In fact,
even after filing his application for reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the USA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ty is a natural-born Filipino and complied with the one-year residency requirement for running
for public office.
HELD: YES. R.A. No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain his Philippine
citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A
close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born
Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition
or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, R.A. No. 9225 treats citizenship
independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual
citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may
establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen. Residency in the
Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run for public office.
That Ty complied with the second requirement is beyond question. On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary public. By the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office
of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already effectively
renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine citizenship. Ty’s reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship under RA No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his
domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Ty merely had
the option to again establish his domicile in General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new
domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of
choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth. Ty’s intent to establish a new domicile of choice in the
Municipality became apparent when, immediately after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2 October 2005, he
applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was at General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar. For the years 2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the local tax jurisdiction of
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by paying community tax and securing CTCs from the said
municipality stating therein his address as General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Thereafter, Ty applied for and was
registered as a voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC, et al.

GR Nos. 221697, GR No. 221698-700, March 8, 2016
Perez, J.:
FACTS: In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May
24, 2005. Grace Poe was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Jaro, Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN
KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to
Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.
On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition, who then
eventually demise on February 3, 2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and finally
went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005. On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that
she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine
Passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as appointed Chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American
citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquisition of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped
using her American passport. Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and
that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground
that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.
On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified as candidate for
Presidency.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen. (2) Whether or not Poe satisfies
the 10-year residency requirement.
HELD: YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the constitutional
requirement that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency. (1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are
Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as
an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently
providing 99% chance that Poe’s biological parents are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstantial evidence are
admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence. (2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class,
natural born- citizens as based on the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be
natural born citizens. (3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country
where they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law. As to the residency issue, Grace
Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain
permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the
Philippines. Starting May 24, 2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of
her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual application to
reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was granted by the SC.