CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Violations of which entitled
Based on the Lectures of
Atty. Vincent Paul Montejo
2013, 2014 & 2015 Transcriptions
With Case Rulings on Selected Cases
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the
governance and administration of a nation. It is
supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except
by the authority from which it emanates. It has been
defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the
nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a
system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and
establishes certain fixed principles on which
government is founded. The fundamental conception
in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which
all private rights must be determined and all public
authority administered.||| (Manila Prince Hotel v.
GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, [February 3, 1997], 335
PHIL 82-154)
JUDICIAL ELABORATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION
RULES FOR CONSTRUING CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS:
1) Constitutional provisions are generally
considered to be self-executing.
2) They are prospective in application.
3) Words or phrases must have to be construed
in their ordinary dictionary meaning unless
an express requirement of technical meaning
is intended.
4) Constitution should be construed not only to
address the problems of the present but it
must be construed in such a way that it would
also be able to address the uncertainties or
vagaries of the future.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN SELF-EXECUTING AND
THE NON SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS
Importance of Knowing the Distinction: Before
judicial review can be exercised, there is a need to
determine whether or not constitutional provision is
self-executing or not self-executing.
GENERAL RULE: Provisions in the constitution are
considered to be SELF-EXECUTING. There is no
need for an enabling act or an act of Congress for it to
be a direct source of a right. A person whose right
under the Constitution is violated may go directly to the
court to seek redress for such violation.
Constitutional provisions are generally considered to
be self-executing. Provisions are considered to be
direct sources of rights.
would entitle a party to go to court for purposes of
claiming that right.
EXCEPTIONS: By the express provision itself or by
the intent of the framers
 Article II-Declaration of Principles and State
Policies
 Provisions on Initiative and Referendum under
Article VI
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GSIS
G.R. NO. 122156, [FEBRUARY 3, 1997]
335 PHIL 82-154)
In case of doubt, the Constitution should be
considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended,
the provisions of the Constitution should be considered
self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or
whether, they shall be effective. These provisions
would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
body, which could make them entirely meaningless by
simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute. (Cruz, Isagani A., Constitutional Law, 1993
ed., pp. 8-10)
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing
nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied
from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the
same section which undoubtedly are not self-
executing. The argument is flawed. If the first and third
paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress
is still to enact measures to encourage the formation
and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos,
as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs
legislation to regulate and exercise authority over
foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in
the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic,
the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it
does not by its language require any legislation in
order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the
grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional
provision may be self-executing in one part and
non-self-executing in another.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws
or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it
in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable.
When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national 1
economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that —
qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when
our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be maintained
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of
any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is
no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own
inherent potency and puissance and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a
right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibiremedium.
PROSPECTIVE IN APPLICATION
The Constitution is not a penal law. Therefore, there is
no retroactive application on any of the provisions of
the Constitution.
MIRANDA V STATE OF ARIZONA
It was first copied or institutionalized in the 1973
Constitution. Any extra judicial confession taken prior
to our 1973 Constitution that did not comply with the
so called Miranda Warnings is not covered by the
exclusionary rule simply because the Miranda first saw
light under our 1973 Constitution.
EXCEPTION:APPLIED RETROACTIVELY
Section 2. XXX Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens.
REASON FOR RETROACTIVE APPLICATION: This
is applied retroactively to correct that situation where
there are children who were born under the 1935
circumstance but elected in the 1973 who may have
not been considered Natural Born Citizen having
performed an act to perfect or acquire Philippine
Citizenship.
In the 1973 Constitution, there was a definition of
who are natural born for the first time and these are
the persons who have not performed an act to acquire
or perfect Philippine citizenship. It did not however
specifically include those who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority if they
have been born under the 1935 Constitution of Filipino
Mother and foreigner father.
In the 1987 Constitution, that has been clarified by
the expansion of the definition of who are natural born,
this time specifically covering those who have elected
Philippine Citizenship under the provision of the 1935
Constitution.
COMMON USE RULE
DOMINGO VS. COMELEC
Reiterated in CHAVEZ VS JBC
The Supreme Court said under the maxim noscitur a
sociiswhere a particular different word or phrase is
ambiguous in itself, its correct construction maybe
made clear by considering the company words where
it founded.
CHAVEZ V JBC
Supreme Court clarified that the Common Use Rule is
based on the Latin maxim, VerbaLegis non
estresidendum- From the words of the statute, there
shall be no departure.
For two basic reasons:
1) The intent and objective of the framers of the
Constitution are already in the words and
phrases;
2) The Constitution is not supposed to be a
lawyers‘ or law students‘ or judges‘ document.
It is for everybody.
For this reason, ordinary dictionary meaning
of the words and phrases in the constitution
must be used.
EXCEPTION: Technical meaning is intended
by the framers to be used
 Residence - Residence as
qualification for public office under the
1987 Constitution means that you
have to be a domiciliary of that place.
 Reclusion Perpetua - In the Bill of
Rights, the threshold when right to bail
is a matter of right or discretion is the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
word reclusion perpetua is not in its
technical meaning. It is supposed to
be understood in its loose meaning, to
include life imprisonment. If the
person is charged with a crime
punishable by life imprisonment or
higher, then bail becomes a matter of
discretion.
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetuawhen
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required.
 Writ of habeas Corpus - there is only
a technical meaning if it is mentioned
in Article III or under Article VII,
Section 18 when the President
suspends the privilege of writ of
habeas corpus.
MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS 2
The constitution according to this case is supposed to
be understood as limitations on state power/powers of
state and its offices and not a grant of power. Section
1 of Article VI does not provide for the power of
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
Congress. It is a restatement; with or without that of today but those questions and issues that may be
congress, has the power to exercise. The same is true raised in the future.
with the Executive power under section 1 of Article VII
and of Judicial power under Section 1 of Article VIII. OBERGGEFELL v HODGES

Under the constitution, there is no specific provision
allowing the president to appoint so-called caretaker
officers or officials but the President can do the same
for it is part of his executive power to implement and
execute the law. It is based on its residual power.
US Supreme Court has ruled that liberty includes the
right of same-sex couples to get married because the
right to marry is part of the fundamental right to be
heard. It expanded it not only to include physical
restraint but right to marry also.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS MUST BE

CONSIDERED AS DYNAMIC

It must be construed not only to meet the issues or

questions of the day but must be appropriate for the
unfolding events of the indefinite future.

TAÑADA VS ANGARA

President of the Philippines entered and joined in the

World Trade Organization (WTO) and General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

ISSUE: Does it violate the provision on Section 10 of

Article XII?

XXX
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

XXX

The perfectionist provisions of the municipal statutes

of all the member states should give way to the
globalization of trade. Under our Section 10 of Article
XII, the constitution requires that the Philippines or the
State should develop a self reliant economy.

The SC said that such constitutional provision must be

interpreted to mean not what is required in 1987 when
it was enacted but also, it must be able to address the
uncertainties when the issue was raised later in 2000.
A measure of a good constitution is one capable of
being interpreted not only by the demands of today but
also of what should be demanded of the
future/vagaries of the future.

IBRALINA VS SUPT OF DIVISION SCHOOLS

40 years ago, this was not a violation of freedom of

religion. Flag is not a religious icon.

SC changed its ruling. The demands of the time

require a different interpretation.
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DATU ABAS KIDA V SENATE

The measure of a good constitution is capable of

construction not only to answers the issues of the case

COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA

THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial Review is based on these considerations.
1) SEPARATION OF POWERS
The reason why the constitution requires the
court to perform its tasks to determine whether
it is encroachment of constitutionally limited
powers is because of the Principle of
Separation of Powers.
Under this principle, each department has its
own set of powers and one cannot exercise
the power of another.
The problem with this separation of powers is
that we also have to contend with:
1) SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND
BALANCE
The reason on separation of powers is to
prevent or to prohibit the concentration of
power in one that it might result into
arbitrariness. That is why there is parallel
rule on checks and balance.
2) INTERDEPENDENCE AMONG THE
GOVERNMENT
While the separation of powers are put into
our system to ensure that there is no over
concentration of power in one branch, the
principle admits of interdependence. For a
more harmonious exercise of government or
state power, all the branches of government
must work interdependent with each other.
2) PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
The presumption of constitutionality simply
states that laws or acts which are subject of a
petition on judicial review exercise are
presumed to be constitutional.
3) CO-EQUALITY
When a question on the constitutionality of an
act is raised before the courts, the court will
initially refuse to exercise judicial review
because it should respect the acts or exercise
by the other co-equal branches. Because of
this respect of co-equal branches courts will
not easily exercise judicial review unless, the
following conditions are met.
FOUR CONDITIONS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW:
1) There must be actual case or controversy.
2) It must be raised at the earliest opportunity.
3) It must have to be raised by the proper party.
4) The constitutional question must be the very
lismota of the case.
RULE OF THUMB: When the question is presented,
go and look for the conditions. Missing one, some and
all, the petition shall be dismissed. The exception is if
there is a case already decided by the court.
JUDICIAL REVIEW is an exception. It not a power
exactly by the court but it is a duty of the court when
there is encroachment into the constitutional allocation
of powers.
ANGARA V ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Congress created an electoral commission. Congress
also made a deadline for filing of protests.
ISSUE: Who has the power to fix the date or deadline
for filing of protests? Is it the Congress or is it the
Electoral Commission created by Congress specifically
to decide election protests?
Supreme Court has the task of determining which has
the power or authority under the Constitution. When
the Supreme Court exercises judicial review it is not
acting as the supreme than the others branches or
officers of the government. It is actually performing a
duty required of it under the Constitution because that
constitution is supreme. So, that is the principle of
SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of
government. Who is to determine the nature, scope
and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has
provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert
any superiority over the other departments; it does
not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all
that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution.||| (Angara v. 4
Electoral Commission, G.R. No. 45081, [July 15,
1936], 63 PHIL 139-187)
Also, when that question comes, the court is now
actually exercising its power but is exercising a duty
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
based on several other principles like separation of
powers, its constitutional obligation to exercise review
powers when it is necessary.
It is also dependent upon some other principles like
presumptions of constitutionality. When a law or an
act of an officer is raised before the courts on
seemingly constitutional questions, there is always a
presumption of constitutionality. Unless it is clear that
the four conditions are present, it is the only time the
court would have to exercise its duty, not the power, of
judicial review.
Judicial review, prior to the 1987 Constitution, is a
discussion, a concept and a theory. It has been
incorporated in the 1987 Constitution under Section 1,
Article 8. The definition of judicial power has been
expanded to include in its second phrase what we
know then as judicial review.
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
So, if there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on any branch or
instrumentality of the government, the court may
exercise judicial power as well. But correctly
understood, that should be judicial review powers and
not judicial powers per se.
JUDICIAL POWER PER SE involves only the rights of
the court to settle legal conflicts which are judiciable
and legally determinable. A JUDICIAL REVIEW
POWER is the extraordinary power of the courts to
look into the acts of coordinate branches of
government or officers as part of its duty.
APPROPRIATE CASE OR CONTROVERSY
In relation to appropriate case or controversy; two
things must be considered:
a. What is an appropriate petition?
b. What kind of petition of cases can you
raise a constitutional question?
CANDARI V DONASCO
This is a case involving an election of cooperative
officials where there were two sets of officers of the
cooperative. The respondents were actually elected by
the general membership while the case was pending
before the RTC.
RTC dismissed the case reasoning that the issue
hinges on who is the set of officers validly elected by
the general membership has already been settled by
reason of the elections. There is no actual case or
controversy. CA reversed.
SC sustained the RTC. Actual case or controversy
simply means that there is a justiciable issue which is
required to be resolved by the court or there is a
necessity of a court resolution to afford the parties
relief based on law upon the questions or issues
raised.
The Cooperative Code provides that the general
membership would be the ones who will have to elect
the set of officers, and since the set of officers have
been duly elected by the general membership, then
there is no more case or controversy, no need for a
judicial determination or a resolution of the issues.
Supreme Court describes an actual case or
controversy as one involving a conflict of legal rights
and assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible to
judicial resolution.
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK VS DSWD
Appropriate case is a characterization of assertion of
brutal claims susceptible to judicial resolution.
WHAT ARE APPROPRIATE PETITIONS?
You all have your petitions under Rule 65. Normally, it
is certiorari under Rule 65 because it is a jurisdictional
question. It may also include mandamus or prohibition.
Is a petition for declaratory relief a proper action to
raise the constitutional question before the
Supreme Court? NO. The SC has no jurisdiction over
petition for declaratory relief. You can either raise it
before the lower courts or CA but never the Supreme
Court.
KALIPUNAN NG MAHIHIRAP V ROBREDO
Supreme Court found petitions for certiorari and
mandamus to be inappropriate petitions because of
the nature of the controversy, subject of those petition.
A reading of this provision (Section 28 (a) and (b) of
RA 7279) clearly shows that the acts complained of
are beyond the scope of a petition for prohibition and
mandamus. The use of the permissive word "may"
implies that the public respondents have discretion
when their duty to execute evictions and/or demolitions
shall be performed.
5
But in almost all cases, where there is a question of
constitutionality, it is by certiorari and prohibition or
prohibition and mandamus.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 ISSUE OF RIPENESS
The concept of ripeness states that there is already a
violation or an impending violation that if the acts
sought to be declared unconstitutional, is not
prevented or is not declared unconstitutional, it will
most likely be ripe for violation and so it is likewise ripe
for judicial adjudication.
LAMP V SEC OF DBM
This involves the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF). LAMP is a group of lawyers, who raised
the issue of constitutionality of the practice or policy of
the distribution of the PDAF through the DBM by
allowing members of congress discretion as to how the
money would be spent.
PDAF is a congressional insertion in the General
Appropriations Bill, which becomes the General
Appropriations Law. The practice of giving lump sum
amounts to members of congress directly, which we
know then as ―pork barrel‖, has been abolished. What
came in its stead was the practice of congressional
insertions where the allocations for members of
congress are inserted in the agencies.
After the budget is approved, the DBM now orders the
release of these monies. DBM releases these through
or under the discretion of the respective members of
both houses, where they would want the money to be
released and for what project. And since the
documentation is complete, where there is supposedly
the COA Allowance, pre-audit, not post-audit, then the
money in these events would be given even if the
intended beneficiary is a ghost beneficiary.
LAMP filed a petition questioning that: whether or not it
is a valid exercise of congressional prerogative as well
as the executive policy to allow members of congress
to exercise discretion as to where the money should
go based on the appropriated items in the
appropriations bill or appropriations law.
ISSUE: Is the issue ripe for judicial determination?
SC said yes, because while the money or monies may
have been released already, this is a continuing thing.
The annual appropriations is done every year.
Supreme Court mentioned that in the Philippines, the
issue of ripeness is interpreted as actual injury to the
plaintiff. If there is no injury to the plaintiff that is
impending, the issue is not ripe for judicial
determination. You cannot file a petition seeking for
unconstitutionality because it is not yet ripe. So it is
dependent upon the injury suffered by the party or
person seeking its declaration of unconstitutionality.
ARAULLO V AQUINO
This is the DAP case. Question there is the
appropriateness of the petition filed because they filed
certiorari and prohibition filed under Rule 65. The
question of jurisdiction by the President to implement
the DAP and to prohibit the president from
implementing the DAP.
FUNA v MECO
This case involves the Manila Exchange and Cultural
Office in Taiwan. Since we do not have formal and
official diplomatic relations with Taiwan because of the
One-China policy, all our ―consular needs‖ in Taiwan is
taken cared of by MECO.
What was filed here is a petition for mandamus to
compel the COA to audit all the funds received by
MECO because employers are supposed to pay to the
Philippine Government for every Filipino worker
employed and all visa applications of visiting tourists.
Is the petition for mandamus proper?
Supreme Court did not dismiss the petition and found
it to be proper because it is a question to compel a
ministerial act on the part of COA to conduct an audit
on all government funds regardless of wherever it may
be found.
ON MOOTNESS
Court did not dismiss the mandamus petition on the
ground of mootness
First. The petition makes a serious allegation that the
COA had been remiss in its constitutional or legal duty
to audit and examine the accounts of an otherwise
auditable entity in the MECO.
Second. There is paramount public interest in the
resolution of the issue concerning the failure of the
COA to audit the accounts of the MECO. The propriety
or impropriety of such a refusal is determinative of
whether the COA was able to faithfully fulfill its
constitutional role as the guardian of the public
treasury, in which any citizen has an interest.
Third. There is also paramount public interest in the
resolution of the issue regarding the legal status of
the MECO; a novelty insofar as our jurisprudence is
concerned. We find that the status of the MECO—
whether it may be considered as a government
agency or not—has a direct bearing on the country’s 6
commitment to the One China policy of the PROC.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 ON LEGAL STANDING
We sustain petitioner‘s standing, as a concerned
citizen, to file the instant petition.
The rules regarding legal standing in bringing public
suits, or locus standi, are already well-defined in our
case law. Again, We cite David, which summarizes
jurisprudence on this point:
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled
from the cases decided by this Court.Taxpayers,
voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be
accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met:
(1) The cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
(3) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious
interest in the validity of the election law in question;
(4) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing
that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and
(5) For legislators, there must be a claim that the
official action complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.
We rule that the instant petition raises issues of
transcendental importance, involved as they are with
the performance of a constitutional duty, allegedly
neglected, by the COA. Hence, We hold that the
petitioner, as a concerned citizen, has the requisite
legal standing to file the instant mandamus petition.
IMBONG V OCHOA
This involves the RH law, whether the question in RH
law is ripe for adjudication.
ON ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY
An actual case or controversy means an existing case
or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest
the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to
adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy
scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.
The controversy must be justiciable-definite and
concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. In other words, the
pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion
of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof,
on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible
and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There
ought to be an actual and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness.101 A
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. For a case to be considered
ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something has then been accomplished or performed
by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence
of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a
result of the challenged action. He must show that he
has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of102
X XX
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual
case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for
judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law
and its implementing rules have already taken effect
and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have
already been passed, it is evident that the subject
petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated
earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is
so because medical practitioners or medical providers
are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the
RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public
health officers who are threatened to be dismissed
from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other
benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter
NOW.
ON LOCUS STANDI AND
TRASNCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal
and substantial interest in a case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
113
the challenged governmental act. It requires a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional 7
questions.
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge"
embodies the rule that one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from
challenging the constitutionality of the statute
grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons
not before the court. This rule is also known as the
prohibition against THIRD-PARTY STANDING.
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that
"the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence,
can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public
interest."116
X XX
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents, not only to the public, but also to the
bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for
the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically
affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life
and health, the freedom of religion and expression and
other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the
fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive
health have already caused deep division among a
broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no
doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental
importance warranting immediate court adjudication.
More importantly, considering that it is the right to life
of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at
issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken
away before taking action.
RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY
If you are charged criminally and your defense is that
the law is unconstitutional, you can raise it as a
defense because you have to raise it at the earliest
opportunity and that is when you are charged at the
Court of First Instance. That it is unconstitutional,
either as applied or under the overbreadth doctrine if it
involves your free speech rights and freedom of
religion. Raise it as a defense otherwise, you will not
be allowed to file it later even if you file a petition for
certiorari because you have not raised it at the earliest
opportunity.
If there is a violation or there is a threatened or
impending violation, it must not be too late where there
no more need for the court to decide on the issue
because it has become moot or academic
HACIENDA LUISITA VS. PARC
Hacienda Luisita formed the Farmworkers Agrarian
Reform Movement or FARM. FARM wanted the court
to declare Sec. 31 of RA 8857, which allows stock
distribution as an option instead of actual distribution
of land as invalid. It revealed that the intent in the
constitution of agrarian reform is to distribute lands
and not to allow the distribution of shares of stocks in
the corporation.
However, the record shows that some members of the
FARM had already benefited from the stock
distribution option based on the SDOP which is the
subject of the main case for review. And in took them
more or less 14 years from the from the time the Stock
Distribution Option Plan was approved by the PARC,
before they have asked for invalidation of Sec. 31 of
RA8857.
SC said, it was not raised at the earliest opportunity
because the facts of the case would show that they
have already benefited from the stock distribution
option, and it would be too late for them to question it
now since they have taken so long to raise the
constitutional question.
CONCEPT OF MOOTNESS
A case is deemed moot and academic when, by
reason of the occurrence of a supervening event, it
ceases to present any justiciable controversy. Since
they lack an actual controversy otherwise cognizable
by courts, moot cases are, as a rule, dismissible.
The rule that requires dismissal of moot cases,
however, is not absolute. It is subject to exceptions. In
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, this Court
comprehensively captured these exceptions scattered
throughout our jurisprudence:
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical
formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise
moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation
of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character
of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved;third, when constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case
is capable of repetition yet evading review.
When by reason of a supervening event, the petition or
the question raised has become moot and academic.
When there is a supervening event that renders a
petition moot or academic, there is no more need to
render a resolution of the case, but the SC may still
opt to decide the constitutional question because or
under any of the following circumstances: (GV-EN-PR)
a. There is a grave violation of the constitution
b. The exceptional character of the situation,
where there is paramount public interest
involved, meaning the question is NOVEL
8
c. The constitutional issue is raised and it
requires formulation of foregoing
principles, to guide the bench, the bar and
the public
d. The case is capable of repetition
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 GALICTO VS AQUINO
This case questions the validity of the then order of
Pres. Aquino to suspend the payment of all allowances
and additional benefits and bonuses to those
connected with GOCCs.
Galicto raised the issue of whether it is within the
powers of the president to issue that executive order
when the charters of these GOCCs allow them to
determine how much they will be receiving.
However, in the meantime, while this case was
pending before the SC, congress enacted a new law
standardizing ―the salaries, benefits, and other
remuneration‖ owing to members or members of the
board of GOCCs. So the issue has become moot.
SC said a moot case is one that ceases to present
a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of
no practical use or value. It becomes moot when it
no longer presents a judicial controversy because
the issues involved have become academic, or the
matter in dispute has already been dissolved,
hence, no one is entitled to judicial intervention.
IDEALS VS PSALM
This involves the sale of the Angat Hydro-Electric
Power Plant, sold to the Korea Water Resource
Corporation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the Angat Hydro-
Electric Power Plant to a foreign corporation is in
violation of the water rights provision under Art. XII of
the Constitution
The issue of mootness was raised because PSALM,
the entity under the EPIRA Law which is authorized to
sell all these facilities has raised the fact that the
notice of award were already given or issued to the
Korean firm, so that whatever is intended to be
stopped could no longer be stopped after the
successful conduct of bid and that the winning bidder
has been issued the notice of award.
SC said it is not yet moot because it is a continuing
violation. The water rights provision in the
Constitution is a continuing right claimable by
those who are entitled to them. If utilization of
water resources is reserved to Filipino citizens,
then for so long as that right is violated, then the
issue could never have been mooted even if there is
the issuance of the notice by PSALM.
FUNA VS VILLAR
This involves the terms of office of members of the
Constitutional Commissions.
Commissioner Villar was appointed to a 7-year term in
the COA. When he was a Commissioner, the position
of Chairperson of COA became vacant. PGMA
appointed him to become the Chairperson.
The issue here is whether as the new Chairperson,
should he serve for a full term of 7 years or should he
serve only for the unexpired term of the departing
chairperson. But when PNOY became president,
(Villar) true to his word, as he had said that he would
resign, he in fact resigned. So that issue that whether
he will serve a new 7-year term or will serve only for
the unexpired term, there is no need to render or issue
a ruling on that considering that that issue has already
become moot.
ISSUES: Whether Funa has legal standing; whether
the issue has become moot; and what is the exception
thereto.
SC made an exception and said that even if the issue
has become moot and academic, the court may
still resolve it if the following conditions are
present: (1) if there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest involved;
(3) when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of
repetition.
This actually is teaching or symbolic function as one of
the functions of judicial review. Because it is capable
of repetition, meaning, the issue if not resolved can be
raised thereafter as it is. It is recurring.
BELGICA VS OCHOA
This the case involving PDAF. While the 2013 GAA
(General Appropriations Act) has already been passed
and implemented, though the issue has become moot
or academic already, the SC opted to review it and
said that this case falls under the 4 exceptions.
1. IS THERE A GRAVE VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION?
Yes. There is an allegation of the violation of the
separation of powers, non-delegation of legislative
powers, issue on checks and balances, and
accountability, as well as local autonomy.
2. IS THE ISSUE OF EXCEPTIONAL
CHARACTER OR A PARAMOUNT PUBLIC
INTEREST?
Yes. The PDAF system, in which significant amount of 9
the funds are spent and continue to be utilized,
presents a situation of exceptional character and
matter of paramount public interest.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 3. IS THERE A NEED TO FORMULATE
CONTROLLING PRINCIPLES?
Yes. There is a practical need for an objective ruling
for the question on PDAF‘s constitutionality.
4. IS IT CAPABLE OF REPETITION?
Yes. The relevance of the issue does not cease
because the preparation, passage, and
implementation of the national budget is an annual
event. So even if the question is of past
appropriations, since the appropriations and budget is
an annual thing, SC thought it would be proper to
resolve the issue even in the present case technically
is considered moot or academic.
RAISED BY THE PROPER PARTY
Legal standing or Locus Standi is given:
a. When the person can show that he will
personally suffer actual or threatened injury
because of the questioned act.
b. The injury is clearly traceable to the
challenged action
c. The injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action
 CITIZEN SUIT – If it was an ordinary citizen
raising a question of constitutionality, his legal
standing or locus standi is based on the fact that
his right is violated or there is an impending
violation. Further, violation of that right is to be
addressed or assuaged by a favorable court‘s
decision.
In a civil action, real party in interest, as defined in
the Rules of Civil Procedure, is allowed to file a
case because there is a violation of his private
right.
The only difference is that in civil procedure it is a
private suit while judicial review it is a public suit.
Former involves a private right and the other
involves a public right violation. That is the only
difference between real party in interest in civil
actions and real party in interest in
constitutional cases.
 TAXPAYER‟S SUIT– This is filed if the issue on
constitutionality involves public spending or
spending of public money.
DELA LLANA VS CHAIRPERSON
DelaLlana is a lawyer who has raised the issue of the
validity of a COA Resolution, deleting the requirement
of pre-audit for some government transactions. The
constitution provides for the general power of the
COA, to conduct audit on any entity including those
invoking or enjoying fiscal autonomy. But the
constitution does not require pre-audit for everything,
only post-audit on some entities.
COA has audit powers over any entity which received
government funds because the basis of COA audit
powers is the nature of the funds it is going to audit. If
it is public funds, regardless of whom the beneficiary
is, COA has the power to conduct an audit. Even if it is
an NGO or a GOCC without original charter, if it has
received public funds, COA has right to audit that
entity.
ISSUE: Does he have legal standing?
If it involves disbursement or expenditure of public
funds, a person may be given legal standing in the
concept of a taxpayer. DelaLlana was granted legal
standing as a taxpayer.
 VOTER‟S SUIT – This is filed if the constitutional
question involves right to suffrage (to run for public
office, or to be allowed to vote) under the
Constitution.
 LEGISLATOR‟S SUIT – This is filed by a member
of Congress over a constitutional question
involving a law.
If a bill is passed by the Congress and the
President signs it into law it becomes effective. A
legislator has a right to question its
constitutionality because he has the obligation, if
not duty, to enact and pass only bills which do not
violate the Constitution.
DOCTRINE OF TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE
The doctrine requires that there is:
a) public character of the fund or asset involved
b) clear case of constitutional disregard
c) lack of any other direct party with legal
standing
This must be a question of discretion. The
transcendental importance doctrine is a rule made by
the SC based on its exercise of judicial review to be
able for the court to decide issues even if judicial
review should not have been exercised, because of
the transcendental importance of the issue raised.
NOTE: The rules on IGR or Transcendental
importance as exception to the strict rule on legal
standing must have to be used when there are prior
cases already decided. Otherwise, we must have to
dismiss the petition because the petitioner has no legal
standing.
10
CAPALLA VS VILLAR
This involves Archbishop Capalla, Archbishop
Emeritus of the archdiocese of Davao. This was on the
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
validity of the acquisition by the COMELEC of the
PCOS machines.
Capalla was given legal standing because of the so
called transcendental importance of the issue.
Transcendental importance is a rule which the courts
on its discretion will allow a petition to prosper even if
not all of conditions are present more so on legal
standing of the party raising the issue because
transcendental importance requires that there is a
constitutional violation, it involves a public asset, and
third there is no proper party to raise the constitutional
question.
CHAVEZ VS. JBC
This case involves the composition of the JBC.
Originally, there will two members from the congress
attending the official sessions of the JBC: one (1)
member from the House of Representatives, and
some other time, a member of the House of Senate.
They later changed it by allowing 1 member from
senate and 1 member from the lower house, and each
will have half a vote for the 7-man band.
Does Chavez have legal standing because he was
one of the nominees for the position of Chief
Justice?
SC said that he has legal standing as a taxpayer.
Because if there will be expenditure, disbursement of
public funds for the expenses of the JBC, and these
expenses will have no legal basis if they violate the
Constitution, then any taxpayer can have a right to
raise an issue.
Because of the transcendental importance of the
issue, even if he did not have legal standing, the
petition can prosper.
INTERGENERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Generation of the present can bring a case on a public
right violation of the constitution for the benefit of the
generation of tomorrow.
OPOSA VS FACTORAN
It was based on the issue of the issuance or renewal
of Timber License Agreement (TLA). If it will be
continued, our forest cover will be lost and the
generation of tomorrow will no longer have the
healthful and balance ecology which protected under
our Constitution.
Section 16. The State shall protect and advance
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.
Because of the nature of the issue involved that, it is
not for the generation of the present but for future
generation, the court has given legal standing under
the concept of intergenerational responsibility.
NOTE: This should come as a matter of exception.
MUST BE THE VERY LIS MOTA OF THE CASE
SC cannot dispose of the case without resolving the
constitutional question. Stated differently, the
constitutional question must have to be resolved
because the court cannot go any way but to meet the
question head on.
FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: CHECKING,
LEGITIMATING, AND SYMBOLIC
THEORIES OR FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
1) NEGATIVE OR CHECKING FUNCTION -
When a petition is granted and a
CONSTITUTIONAL question is resolved and
the SC would declare the act in question as
unconstitutional, then in effect, the court has
exercised its checking or negative function. It
negates the validity of the act in question.
2) POSITIVE OR LEGITIMATING FUNCTION -
In positive or legitimating function, the
constitutional question is resolved, and the
court will declare that the law or act in
question that the law or act in question is NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
We use the phrase not unconstitutional (in the
double negative) to emphasize the
presumption of constitutionality.
DOCTRINE OF RELATIVE CONSTITUTIONALITY -
law which has not been previously declared as not
unconstitutional may be later declared as
unconstitutional because of altered situations or
change in the circumstances
3) SYMBOLIC OR TEACHING FUNCTION -
when the question need no longer be resolved
because the question has become moot or
academic. A supervening fact has transpired
which no longer require a decision on the
case.
This is an exception to the strict compliance
with the conditions of judicial review. Even if
one, some, or all of the conditions for judicial
review are not present, the court may still
resolve the constitutional question because of
its symbolic or teaching function.
11
Largely, it is to serve as guiding rules or
principles to the bench, bar, and legal students
because the issue is capable of repetition.
ALL COURTS CAN EXERCISE JUDICIAL REVIEW
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
All courts can exercise JUDICIAL REVIEW, based on
two things;
1. YOU MUST RAISE THE QUESTION IN THE
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY
If the case is before the trial court, you must raise
the constitutional question in the trial court.
[Refer to previous discussion on Criminal Cases]
The SC in a very old case has said, ―that all
courts, higher courts included, has the power to
declare a law to be unconstitutional although
judicial reference must be exercised by the
lower court.‖ Lower courts are not without
jurisdiction because it has, only that if it can be
avoided, the lower court must not declare it to be
unconstitutional.
2. Section 5, Article VIII, under paragraph 2
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of
lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation,order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.
Meaning, it is part of the appellate jurisdiction of the
SC in the constitution. There has been a prior ruling by
the lower court, subject to the review powers of the
SC, eventually.
YNOT VS IAC
While lower courts have the power to exercise judicial
review, it should refuse to resolve it if it can be
avoided, owing its deference to the fact that it is a
lower court.
When it is a law subject for a declaration of
unconstitutionality, it is a law enacted by congress,
and in the tripartite system of government, it is the SC
which is co-equal with congress or the president. It is
not the lower court.
But if the lower court cannot refuse or avoid ruling on
the constitutional question, then it must. First, it is
because it has jurisdiction. Second, and importantly, it
is its duty, being a court, to resolve the constitutional
question. But in doing so it must avoid ruling on it
based on the wisdom or policy of the questioned act or
statute.
BROKENSHIRE VS MINISTER OF LABOR
This case highlights the principle that while lower
courts may declare an act or law as
unconstitutional, quasi-judicial bodies do not have
that power.
Judicial review in this present Constitution is just and
extension of judicial power. Judicial review can only be
exercised by entities which have judicial power to
begin with. Quasi-judicial tribunals do not have or
cannot exercise judicial power. Their power to resolve
issues or claims before their respective jurisdiction or
under their respective jurisdiction is largely based on
their power to implement the law. They do not have
the right or power to interpret the law, much more the
power to declare a law unconstitutional.
ONGSUCO VS MALONES
Wage orders issued by regional wage boards can be
implemented by quasi-judicial tribunals like your DOLE
director or you NLRC. But in doing so, those officers or
offices are only implementing the law, as part of their
executive function. It‘s quasi-judicial because they
have the right or power to resolve claims involving
these wage orders.
But to declare the wage orders as unconstitutional is
beyond their authority since they do not exercise
judicial power to begin with, much more judicial review
powers.
EFFECTS OF DECLARATION OF
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
NCC Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not
be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent
with the Constitution, the former shall be void and
the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (5a)
TRADITIONAL EFFECT - the void law is considered
to have not been part of our judicial system. It is
considered to be not having been enacted at all,
therefore, it is not the source of any obligation, right, or
office, or any of those which would be the origin of
liabilities or obligations.
12
―All laws must conform to the Constitution. If a law is
inconsistent with the Constitution, the law shall be
void, the constitution shall govern.‖
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
If that were to be applied in any and all cases, then
there is a question of what will happen to those acts
which were done or which were omitted to be done
pursuant to that law, before it was declared
unconstitutional.
EXCEPTION: OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE
The period of efficacy or effectivity of that law from
its promulgation and effective date up to the time it
is declared by the courts as unconstitutional is an
Operative Fact.
SC said they (acts during the operative fact) should be
given legal effects. If they are legal or valid under that
law while the law was still effective, they should be
respected. If they were invalid under that law, while it
was still effective, operative fact doctrine will not
validate those invalid acts.
WHEN SHOULD THE TRADITIONAL VIEW BE
APPLIED AND WHEN SHOULD THE OPERATIVE
FACT DOCTRINE BE APPLICABLE?
 TRADITIONAL CONCEPT: When the law in
question, when it was made effective, resulted
into violations, damage or prejudice resulting
to another, the traditional effect of declaration
of unconstitutionality will be applied so that
whatever damage, prejudice or violation
committed will be corrected.
 OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE: But if there
was no violation of rights, damage or prejudice
caused by reason of that law being effective, if
that law is eventually declared as
unconstitutional, then the operative fact
doctrine will be applied.
NOTE: If a question is asked on operative fact,
whether you give effect to those acts done or omitted
to be done based on a law which was subsequently
declared unconstitutional, do not apply the operative
fact doctrine unless there is a court ruling by the
supreme court on that issue because it is not a rule
but an exercise of discretion.
If there is none, never apply the operative fact
doctrine. Apply the traditional concept Article 7 of the
New Civil Code.
SERRANO DE AGBAYANI VS PNB
This is a case on the moratorium law. The SC applied
what we know then, what is being repeated today as
the Operative Fact Doctrine that for the period of the
time that the law has been effect up to the time that
the law was declared unconstitutional, one cannot
close his eyes to that time like it never happened, like
that law never existed because in fact, that law
existed, acts and omissions were made or were not
made pursuant to that law. So whatever was done or
omitted to be done pursuant to that law for that period
of efficacy of that law shall be operative.
One must remember that the operative fact doctrine
is a question or a matter of discretion. It is a rule of
equity and not a rule of law.
BALDOVINO VS ALUNAN
This was a reorganization of the Department of
Tourism, where an executive order was issued. The
EO was subsequently declared unconstitutional
because of violation of security of tenure of
government employees. The reorganization based on
that EO was declared to have not created any
movement. Those who have been eased out and all
those who have been promoted or demoted by reason
of the reorganization were all made to return to their
previous position because that EO was not considered
to have been written at all. Article 7 of the Civil Code
will apply and not the operative act doctrine.
ARAULLO VS. AQUINO
In both cases, the SC mentioned Operative Fact
Doctrine.
In Araullo ruling, SC held that the doctrine applies to
all those funds already distributed even in
violation of the constitution, the cross-boarder
transfers etc. but the operative fact doctrine does
not apply to the authors who knew from the very
beginning that what they were doing were in
violation of the Constitution.
The operative fact doctrine is not only applied in
statutes, it is also applied in executive issuances.
DOCTRINE OF OPERATIVE FACT WAS
APPLICABLE
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the
existence of the law or executive act prior to the
determination of its unconstitutionality as an
operative fact that produced consequences that
cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded.
In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act
but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to
the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law
produces no effect. X XX It applies only to cases
where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only
when the extraordinary circumstances have met the
stringent conditions that will permit its application.
We find the doctrine of operative fact applicable to the
adoption and implementation of the DAP. Its
application to the DAP proceeds from equity and fair 13
play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and
its related issuances could not be ignored or could no
longer be undone.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
To be clear, the doctrine of operative fact extends
to a void or unconstitutional executive act. The
term executive act is broad enough to include any
and all acts of the Executive, including those that
are quasi legislative and quasi-judicial in nature.
X XX the doctrine of operative fact can apply
only to the PAPs that can no longer be undone,
and whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on
the validity of the DAP, but cannot apply to the
authors, proponents and implementors of the
DAP, unless there are concrete findings of good
faith in their favor by the proper tribunals
determining their criminal, civil, administrative
and other liabilities.
ON LEGAL STANDING
In addition, considering that the issues center on the
extent of the power of the Chief Executive to
disburse and allocate public funds, whether
appropriated by Congress or not, these cases pose
issues that are of transcendental importance to the
entire Nation, the petitioners included. As such, the
determination of such important issues call for the
Court‘s exercise of its broad and wise discretion "to
waive the requirement and so remove the
impediment to its addressing and resolving the
serious constitutional questions raised."
COCOFED VS REPUBLIC
SC said that it is also applicable to executive orders
or executive issuances. It is not limited to statutes.
HACIENDA LUISITA VS. PRESIDENTIAL
AGRARIAN REFORM COMMITTEE
This case involves the Stock Distribution Option, SDO
which SC declared to be unconstitutional because the
Agrarian Reform Law, based on R.A. 6657, mandates
that these beneficiaries must be given lands. But in a
span of 14 years, some were already given shares. SC
applied the operative fact doctrine. Those who were
given shares cannot be given lands anymore.
POLITICAL QUESTION VS JUSTICIABLE
QUESTION
When the 1987 Constitution included this expanded
definition of judicial power, the right of the courts to
look into whether the other government branches have
acted outside or without any authority or jurisdiction
resulting to lack or excessive jurisdiction, the common
belief is that anything now can be subject to court
review.
METROBANK VS TOBIAS
Metrobank filed a criminal complaint for estafa against
Tobias, and on appeal to the DOJ Secretary, the DOJ
Secretary ruled that there is no probable cause against
Tobias. Metrobank went to the SC wanting judicial
review to be exercised.
SC reiterated the rule that determination of probable
cause in criminal cases is an executive function and it
is beyond the courts to review. The court cannot
exercise judicial review and cannot impose its wisdom
on the executive conduct determination of probable
cause since it is within their jurisdiction. And there is
no exceptionunless there is a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Finding none, then the courts could not review.
POLITICAL QUESTION is question by which the
people in their sovereign capacity will have to decide
or to whom discretionary authority has been delegated
to the political branches of government (executive and
legislative) to decide.
Courts cannot answer or resolve these questions. If
the question still remains with policy determination,
wisdom on administration or executive act, these are
still within the political question concept.
OPOSA VS FACTORAN
While judicial power has been expanded to include
judicial review now in the Constitution, what is covered
by political question doctrine has never been
obliterated or diminished totally because there are still
matters which remain to be political questions, a
question which the people in their sovereign capacity
will have to decide or to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the political branches
of government to decide, meaning the legislative and
executive branch.
VINUYA VS ROMULO
This case involves the comfort women during the
Japanese occupation. They have tried to bring their
case against the Japanese government, and nothing
happened. So, they officially asked the state through
DFA Secretary Romulo to make their claim against
Japan for an official apology and reparation to the ICJ.
Sec. Romulo refused. They filed a case for
mandamus.
ISSUES: Should the Philippine government initiate the
filing of the case? Can they compel the Philippine gov‘t
to file their case in the ICJ? The ultimate question is
can the court compel the Phil. gov‘t to file their claims
in the ICJ?
SC said that is a political question because it affects
foreign relations. Whether the Philippine
government should take the cudgels for these 14
women, is not a justiciable question. It is a matter
of foreign relations, and in the matters of foreign
relations. It is part of executive determination
based on policy and wisdom whether or not they
would seek such demand for justice or they would
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
not do anything, otherwise it might affect their
relations. Courts cannot impose to the executive PHILIPPINES AS A STATE
when it is a matter of wisdom or policy.
CIR V CAMPOS RUEDA
GARCIA VS DRILON 42 SCRA 23 (1971)

This case involves the constitutionality of VAWC, R. A. A State is a politically organized sovereign community,
9262. Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of independent of outside control, bound by ties of
9262 because it violates equal protection. nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, and
acting through government functioning under a regime
SC said that when the question involves, policy, of law.
wisdom, experience, reasons behind legislation,
they are political questions. They are not for the ELEMENTS OF A STATE
courts to decide because they are not justiciable
questions. They remain as political questions. 1) Territory
2) People
3) Sovereignty
4) Government

TERRITORY

It is a fixed portion of the surface of the earth inhabited

by the people of a state.

ARTICLE I: NATIONAL TERRITORY - The national

territory comprises the Philippine archipelago,
with all the islands and waters embraced therein,
and all other territories over which the Philippines
has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its
terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its
territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular
shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters
around, between, and connecting the islands of
the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines.

COMPOSITION (PA-O-T-EEZ)

1) The Philippine Archipelago; and

2) Other territories over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction
3) The territorial sea, the sea bed, the subsoil,
the insular shelves and other submarine area
4) 200-Mile Exclusive Economic Zone

THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO

METHODS OF DETERMINING THE BASELINES

1) STRAIGHT LINE METHOD (SBM) - a series

of straight lines connecting the outer points of
islands, rocks, and reefs along a deeply
indented coastline.
15
The Philippines follow the SBM (under RA 3046 (June
17, 1961).
Under the ―archipelagic doctrine,‖ the enclosed area is
considered only as one integrated whole.

COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA

 2) NORMAL BASELINE METHOD (NBM) -
determines the low tide mark (low water line), 200-MILE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
and that is where the counting of the normal
baseline should begin EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
UNDER PD 1599 (1978)
A baseline is used to determine the following:
Sec. 1. There is established an exclusive economic
1) The internal waters (not more than 12 miles zone extending "to a distance of two hundred
from the BL); nautical miles beyond and from the baselines from
2) The 200-mile EEZ; and which the territorial sea is measured. Provided, That
where the outer limits of the zone as thus
3) Other territorial waters. determined overlap the exclusive economic zone
of an adjacent or neighbouring state, the common
THE ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE boundaries shall be determined by agreement with
the state concerned or in accordance with
pertinent generally recognized principles or
 AS A CONCEPT: It is a body of water studded
international law on delimitation."
with islands, or the islands surrounded with
water. It is viewed as a unity of islands and Sec. 4. Other states shall enjoy in the exclusive
waters forming one unit in contrast to a economic zone freedoms with respect to navigations
continent, which is a single mass of land. and overflight, the laying of submarine cables and
pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the
 PURPOSES:
sea relating to navigation and communications.‖
1) To protect the territorial integrity of a state; PURPOSES:
2) To preserve economic interests; and
1. Sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve
3) To safeguard national security. and manage the natural resources, living or
non-living, renewable or non-renewable of the
seabed, subsoil, and super-adjacent waters.
OTHER TERRITORIES OVER WHICH THE
PHILIPPINES HAS SOVEREIGNTY OR 2. Economic exploitation and exploration of the
JURISDICTION resources of the zone such as the production
of energy from the water, currents and winds.
There was a change in phraseology from the 1973 to 3. Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with respect to
the 1987 Constitution with respect to our claims over the establishment and utilization of artificial
some territories. islands, off-shore terminals, installations and
structures; the preservation of the marine
1973 CONSTITUTION 1987 CONSTITUTION environment, including the prevention and
control of pollution and scientific research.
Those belonging to the Those territories over
Philippines under historic which the Philippines has 4. Such other rights as are recognized by
or legal title sovereignty and international law.
jurisdiction
OTHER STATES ARE PROHIBITED FROM USING
Under the 1987 Constitution, it does not refer only to THE ZONE TO:
territory of the past; it would also be inclusive of
territories over which we will exercise jurisdiction at 1) Explore or exploit any resources;
some other future time if we can afford it. 2) Carry out any search, excavation or drilling
operations;
On whether our claim over Sabah claim has been
dropped, the framers of the 1987 Constitution made it 3) Conduct any research;
clear that it has not been dropped. It would also fall
4) Construct or operate any artificial island, off-
within the phrase ―those territories which the
shore terminal, installation, or other structure;
Philippines would exercise sovereignty and
jurisdiction.‖ Our claim is not largely based on historic 5. Perform any activity which is contrary to, or in
title or legal title. derogation of, the sovereign rights and
16
jurisdiction herein provided.

THE TERRITORIAL SEA, THE SEA BED, THE OTHER STATES ARE ALLOWED TO USE THE
SUBSOIL, THE INSULAR SHELVES AND OTHER ZONE FOR:
SUBMARINE AREA

COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA

 1) Navigation and over flight;
2) Laying of submarine cable and pipelines;
3) Other lawful uses related to navigation and
communication.
IN CASE OF OVERLAPPING OF EEZS, THE
COMMON BOUNDARIES ARE TO BE DETERMINED
BY:
(i) Agreement and
(ii) international rules on delimitations.
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
30 April 1982
The exclusive economic zone which shall not extend
beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines, from which
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, is
recognized in the UNCLOS, of which the Philippines is
a signatory.
Its concept is that although it is not part of the territory,
exclusive economic benefit is reserved for the country.
IS THE EEZ PART OF PHILIPPINE TERRITORY?
 First 12 nautical miles is part of Philippine
territory,
 Outside of the first 12 NM up to the 200-
mile limit are no longer part of Philippine
territory; they are Philippine part of EEZ.
If there is incursion outside the first 12 nautical miles,
there can be no violation of Philippine laws, as
Philippine laws are not effective outside the first 12
NM. It will be a violation of our rights under the EEZ in
the UNCLOS.
And for historical purposes, 12 nautical mile is an
improvement of what used to be the CANNON-SHOT
RULE.
PEOPLE
DIFFERENT MEANING OF THE WORD “PEOPLE”
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
1) INHABITANTS - The right of an individual to
be secure in his person is guaranteed by the
Constitution, which declares the popular right
of the people and which indisputably applies to
both citizens and foreigners in this country
Qua Chee Gan v Deportation Board, 1963.
2) CITIZENS; and
3) ELECTORS
CITIZENSHIP
Citizenship is personal and more or less permanent
membership in a political community. It denotes
possession within that particular political community of
full civil and political rights subject to special
disqualifications. Reciprocally, it imposes the duty of
allegiance to the political community. The core of
citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that
is, the right to participate in government principally
through the right to vote, the right to hold public office
and the right to petition the government for redress of
grievance.
Spanish No “Filipino citizen” or “citizens of
Regime the Philippines”
Native inhabitants of the country were
referred to as ―the subjects of Spain‖
or ―Spanish subjects‖. The local
inhabitants who were native to the
islands were referred to as ―indios‖ in
the church records of the Spanish
Government.
Treaty of Filipino status of the native inhabitants
Paris of the islands shall be determined by
the US Congress.
Philippine Term ―citizens of the Philippines‖ first
Bill of 1902 came about
 Those who were native
inhabitants or
 all inhabitants of the Philippine
islands from April 11, 1899,
who resided in the islands and
who opted not to preserve
their allegiance to the crown
of Spain
NOTE: Those born between April
11, 1899 up to July 1, 1902,based on
the decisions of the Supreme Court,
were considered as citizens of the
Philippines because children born
within that time in the country shall
follow citizenship acquisition on
territoriality or JUS SOLI
 Their children born
subsequent thereto
17
Jones Law Copied and adopted the definitions of
or the ―citizens of the Philippines‖ under the
Philippine Philippine Organic Act or the Philippine
Autonomy Bill of 1902
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
Act of 1916
1935 Acquisition of citizenship by reason of
Constitution blood relations or JUS SANGUINIS
1) Those at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution as
Filipino citizens;
2) If a person is born of foreigner
parents but who at the time of
the adoption of the 1935
Constitution was already
elected to the public office in
the Philippines is also
considered a Filipino citizen;
NOTE: They are not natural-
born.
This is the other instance (other
is in Philippine Bill of 1902)
when foreigners were
considered as Filipino citizens
without going through
naturalization
3) Those whose fathers are also
citizens of the Philippines;
4) those whose mothers are
citizens but fathers are
foreigners who elected
Filipino citizenship at the
age of majority shall be
considered citizens of the
Philippines;
5) Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law.
1973 1) Those who are citizens of the
Constitution Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution;
1987 2) Those whose fathers or
Constitution mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
3) Those born before January 17,
1973, of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of
majority; and
4) Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law.
NOTE: In the 1973 and the 1987
constitutions, if you are a citizen at the
time of adoption of any of those
constitutions, you will be considered a
citizen of the Philippines but that does
not define whether you are natural
born or not natural born.
TWO CLASSIFICATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP
a. NATURAL BORN CITIZEN or
b. NATURALIZED CITIZEN
NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN
In the Constitution, public officers, would require as
qualification that they must be natural-born citizens.
For NATIONAL OFFICES, as required in the
Constitution, they require natural born status.
1)President;
2)Vice-President;
3)Members of Congress;
4)Justices of the Supreme Court and Lower
Collegiate Courts;
5)Ombudsman and Deputies;
6)Constitutional Commission Members;
7)Central Monetary Authority Members; and
8)Commission on Human Rights Members.
The term ―natural born‖ was first defined in the 1973
Constitution which has been expanded in the 1987
Constitution:
1973 Those who are citizens from birth
Constitution without having to perform an act to
perfect or acquire their citizenship
are considered natural born.
NOTE: From birth should not
refer to ―performance of any act‖
but should refer to ―the fact of
citizenship‖.
1987 The definition of natural born has
Constitution been expanded – the child who
had to elect Filipino citizenship
based on the 1935 Constitution is
also considered a natural born
citizen.
BENGZON V HRET 18
When a former natural born is repatriated under the
existing laws, the SC said that what the person
acquires after being repatriated is his former
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
status. If he was formerly natural born and lost it
because he was naturalized abroad, if he
subsequently reapplies, he acquires his former status -
natural born.
Just go through the usual process of taking an oath
then you are deemed to have reacquired it. No other
formalities required.
Such person who has been repatriated performed an
act to reacquire citizenship but why he still considered
a natural born because from birth, he is a citizen of the
Philippines.
TECSON V COMELEC
SC clarified that if the status of the child born under
the 1935 Constitution of Filipino mother and a
foreigner father is illegitimate, under our civil law,
the illegitimate child must follow the citizenship of
the mother.He does not need to elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority
because since birth, he is deemed to be a Filipino.
If the child however is legitimate, the child follows
the citizenship of the foreigner father.Upon
reaching the age of majority, if he would opt or
elect Filipino citizenship then he would eventually
become a Filipino citizen. And he will be
considered a Filipino Citizen from birth.
ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
Election is made under Commonwealth Act No. 625
(CA 625) which is a 1941 law but which is still good
law.
Election requires certain formalities:
1) Execution of sworn statement or affidavit of the
fact of election;
2) Execution or signing of the oath of allegiance to
the Philippine Constitution; and
3) Subsequent registration of these documents
with the local civil registry, among others.
These requirements are supposed to be strictly
complied because there is only one form of election
and the election is formal.
NOTE: If the mother is deemed to have acquired the
citizenship of the foreigner husband after marriage, by
operation of law of the foreigner husband, child born of
that marriage will always have the right to elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.
But if the mother has applied for naturalization in the
country of the foreigner husband, the question to be
asked is: is there a Filipino mother when the child was
conceived?
 If there is still a Filipino mother when the child
was at least conceived, even if the child was
born when there is no more Filipino mother to
talk about because she has been naturalized,
the child will still have the right to elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.
 If the mother, at the time of conception, has
already been naturalized fully in the country of
the foreigner husband, there is no more
Filipino mother to talk about and the child born
of that marriage will not fall into the category of
a child born of a Filipino mother and a
foreigner. In which case, the child cannot elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.
MA V FERNANDEZ
SC applied liberality in the three requirements
This involves children of the Filipino mother and a
foreigner father under the 1935 Constitution. When
they reached the ages of majority, respectively, they
complied with the documentary requirements but
failed to register the same. This is not failure to
elect but failure to register the sworn oath of
allegiance and the sworn oath of election.SC said
that they should not be deprived of becoming a
Filipino citizen because they have actually elected
Philippine citizenship.They were allowed to register
these documents despite the lapse of 14 years.
According to SC, registration is not the fact of
election.The fact of election is the execution of
sworn statement having chosen to become
Filipino citizens and the execution of the oath of
allegiance. Registration of these documents will
only confirm the fact of election.
Besides the fact that they are Filipino citizens is
continuing; it is never lost, being a child of or children
of Filipino mother.
WHEN SHOULD BE THE CHILD ELECT FILIPINO
CITIZENSHIP?
When the Constitution provides or requires upon
reaching the age of majority, it is not literally on the
day of his 21st birthday (which was the age of majority
at that time). It must have to be within reasonable
time after he attains the age of majority.
Based on a 1948 DOJ opinion/ruling on the matter,
three (3) years is within the so-called reasonable time
frame or term.
IN RE: CHING
316 SCRA 1 (1999)
19
Three-year period is not a hard and fast rule. It
could be longer than that, provided the delay is
justified and reasonable.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
But in the case of Ching, which came about 14 years
after, the SC said that surely does not fall under the
term “reasonable time”.
REPUBLIC VS LIM
419 SCRA 123 (2004)
This involves an illegitimate child where the SC said
that if a child is illegitimate, she need not elect
Philippine citizenship because she is already a
citizen by birth because the citizenship of an
illegitimate child follows the citizenship of the
Filipino mother.
REPUBLIC VS. SAGUN,
666 SCRA 321 (2012)
What the SC added as a requirement is that
apparently under CA 625, only a foreigner can
choose to elect. You are a foreigner because of your
foreigner father. According to the SC, you must have
to have registered yourself as an alien and therefore,
you are holder of an Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR), and must have applied or has
filed a petition for the cancellation of the ACR.If
there is no such cancellation, seemingly, there is
no valid election. But again, CA 625 simply requires
those three.
T
he SC said the court is not ready to decide or to
conclude that there is such an informal mode of
acquiring or electing Philippine citizenship. The rule
should only mean that there is no other way but
there is only a formal mode under CA 625 in
electing Filipino citizenship. There is no informal
mode.
The matter of the additional requirements the SC may
have stated could either be:
1) An obiter because it is not required under CA
625; or
2) Just a procedural matter which one must have
to comply with before he is allowed to
effectively elect Philippine citizenship.
VILANDO VS HRET
656 SCRA 17 (2011)
This involves a qualification of a member of Congress,
Limkaichong, who was born of a foreigner father and a
Filipino mother. When she was born, the father was
already naturalized as a Filipino. When the decision of
naturalization is issued by the court, it is not effective
until the two (2) year waiting period is over and
complied with, and a summary hearing is done to
determine whether the applicant continues to have all
the legal qualifications and none of the
disqualifications.
ISSUES: Whether Limkaichong is a natural born
considering the questionable status of his father on the
validity of the naturalization decree; Whether it is
within the powers of HRET to rule on the issue of
citizenship of Limkaichong as a member of Congress
where it is collaterally attacked or where the decision
as to the naturalization of the father has been
collaterally attacked
SC said it could not be done. It was correct for the
HRET to presume that the decision on the
naturalization of the father was valid and therefore,
having been born of a Filipino father at the time she
was born even if it was questionable then or
questionable now, she is a natural born citizen having
been born of a Filipino father.
ONG VS HRET
The father is Chinese while the mother is Filipino.
When the child was still a minor, the foreigner father
applied for naturalization in the Philippines and was
eventually granted. Father became a naturalized
citizen.
ISSUE: What happens to the citizenship of the
children?
Applying our naturalization laws, being that the
children follows the citizenship of the father, meaning
they become Filipinos also.
ISSUE: Whether the child is natural born or
naturalized Filipino
They are Filipinos. In the case of Ong, as in the case
of Vilando, the SC said that they have effectively
elected Philippine citizenship from day 1 up to now,
they are acting as if they are Filipinos. Those acts
effectively prove or show that they have elected
Filipino citizenship.
THESE CASES SHOW INVARIABLY TWO (2)
THINGS:
1)There is a FORMAL MODE of election based on
CA 625;
2)There is also an INFORMAL MODE of election.
(These cases are merely obiter)
IN RE: MALLARE, 158 PHIL 50 (1974)
Child was born of a Filipino mother and a foreigner
father before the 1935 Constitution. Child elected
Philippine Citizenship before CA 625 was even issued.
The SC said that the fact that Mallare had acted as if
he were Filipino (exercise of the right of suffrage,
voting, running for office) would show that he had
informally elected Philippine citizenship.
20
CO V. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, 199 SCRA 692 (1991)
In Co, he was a member of Congress who was also
born of the same circumstance. But when he was nine
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 years old, his Chinese father was naturalized as a
Filipino. When he reached 21, he did not execute the
documents required by CA 625.
ISSUE: Was there a valid election?
There was an obiter and the SC said that he did not
elect formally because he had already elected
informally, citing actions which this person during his
majority age would show that he had effectively
chosen to become Filipino citizen – like he studied in
Philippine schools from childhood to college; he took
up an accountancy exam reserved only for Filipino
citizens; he voted; he run for public office and
eventually he was elected to Congress. All these acts
show that he had effectively chosen to become Filipino
citizen in an informal manner.
REPUBLIC V. LIM
419 SCRA 123 (2004)
The SC said she had also performed acts to show that
she had informally chosen to become a Filipino citizen.
According to Atty. Montejo: The reason why they
are considered to be obiter is not because they were
the bases for declaring that they have elected because
the election in both cases have not been put in issue.
The issue there was whether there was a need for
them to elect Philippine citizenship. So according to
the SC, there is no need for them to elect Philippine
citizenship.
NATURALIZED CITIZENS
THERE ARE TWO (2) WAYS:
1) JUDICIAL NATURALIZATION under
Commonwealth Act 473 (CA 473); and
2) ADMINISTRATIVE NATURALIZATION under
Republic Act 9139 (RA 9139)
TWO (2) MATTERS TO COMPLY WITH:
1) Substantive requirements; and
2) Procedural requirements.
JUDICIAL NATURALIZATION
SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS [ARCPEN]
1) AGE - the applicant must have to be of legal age
(18)
2) RESIDENCY - must have been a resident of the
Philippines for at least 10 years.
This can be lowered to 5 years under special
circumstances:
 If the applicant is a foreigner male married to a
Filipino woman.
If a Filipino male is married to a foreigner
woman, that foreigner woman
automatically becomes a Filipino citizen
without going through any judicial
proceedings except just to execute a
document stating that she is not
disqualified by law.
3) CHARACTER - good moral character
4) PROPERTY - P5, 000worth of property. You may be
excluded from the P5,000 property requirement if
you are engaged in some form of gainful livelihood.
5) EDUCATION - refers to the minor children of the
male applicant. The minor children must have to be
schooled in Philippine schools which teach among
others, Philippine Constitution, Philippine
government and the school must not have been
exclusive to foreigners.
6) NOT OTHERWISE DISQUALIFIED BY LAW.
LIST OF DISQUALIFICATIONS: (C POV W DMG)
a) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral
turpitude;
b) Polygamists or believers in the practice of
polygamy;
c) Persons opposed to organized government or
affiliated with any association or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines
opposing all organized governments;
d) b. Persons defending or teaching the
necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault, or assassination for the success and
predominance of their ideas;
e) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the
Philippines is at war, during the period of such
war;
f) Persons suffering from mental alienation or
incurable contagious diseases;
g) Persons who, during the period of their
residence in the Philippines, have not mingled
socially with the Filipinos, or who have not
evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
the customs, traditions, and ideals of the
Filipinos;
h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose
laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become
naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
21
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA

JUDICAL NATURALIZATION:
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
1) There must have to be a filing of a declaration
of intention at least one (1) year before the
filing of a petition.
PURPOSE: To give the government or the State
sufficient lead time to verify the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications of the
applicant.
It is filed with the Office of the Solicitor General
because the Solicitor General is the lawyer of
the Republic of the Philippines.
REPUBLIC VS LI CHING CHUNG
SC ruled that the filing of the declaration of
intention at least one year prior to the actual filing
of the petition is a mandatory requirement. If a
petition for naturalization is filed in court before
the lapse or minimum of 1 year, the petition is null
and void, and the decision rendered by reason of
the invalid declaration is considered null and void
as well.
As held in TAN V. REPUBLIC,"the period of one year
required therein is the time fixed for the State to make
inquiries as to the qualifications of the applicant. If this
period of time is not given to it, the State will have no
sufficient opportunity to investigate the qualifications of
the applicants and gather evidence thereon. X
XXStated otherwise, the waiting period will unmask the
true intentions of those who seek Philippine citizenship
for selfish reasons alone, such as, but not limited to,
those who are merely interested in protecting their
wealth, as distinguished from those who have truly
come to love the Philippines and its culture and who
wish to become genuine partners in nation building.
X XX
The law is explicit that the declaration of intention must
be filed one year prior to the filing of the petition for
naturalization. Republic v. Go Bon Lee51 likewise
decreed that substantial compliance with the
requirement is inadequate.
The only exception to the mandatory filing of a
declaration of intention is specifically stated in Section
6 of CA No. 473 X XX
Unquestionably, respondent does not fall into the
category of such exempt individuals that would
excuse him from filing a declaration of intention one
year prior to the filing of a petition for naturalization.
Contrary to the CA finding, respondent‘s premature
filing of his petition for naturalization before the
expiration of the one-year period is fatal.
2) Filing of the petition
3) Hearing
4) Decision
When the decision is favorable to the applicant, the
decision will not become automatically effective. It will
have to wait for two (2) years waiting period.
The purpose of said period is for the state to determine
whether the applicant continues to have all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
5) After the two-year waiting period, there is a
summary hearing to determine the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
6) Thereafter, the ACR is cancelled and the
issues of the Certificate of Naturalization to
the applicant.
EFFECT OF NATURALIZATION TO THEIR WIFE
AND MINOR CHILDREN
a) Before the wife shall be considered to have
derived the citizenship of the applicant husband,
she must only prove that she has none of the
disqualifications.
b) The minor children will be treated differently if
they are born here or born outside and found here
or found outside:
i. If they are born and resides in the
Philippines during the grant, they are
automatically citizens; (NATURALIZED)
ii. If they are born in but were outside the
Philippines, they are required to execute a
document indicating that they would
want to become Filipino citizens;
(NATURALIZED)
22
iii. Those who are not born and are outside
the Philippinesat the time of the grant of
naturalization, they must have to indicate
and file the necessary document during
their minority before the appropriate
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 government office where they are found,
that they would want to become Filipino
citizens; otherwise, they lose their
citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. (NATURALIZED)
iv. Then for those children born after the
naturalization, they are considered
Filipino citizens because they are now born
of a Filipino father. (NATURAL BORN)
NOTE: If a child is born of naturalized parents after
they have become naturalized, then they are natural-
born citizens.
But if the parents are foreigners and the father is
naturalized and the mother derives it and the child,
also a foreigner originally, becomes a Filipino, such
child is not considered natural born because they are
not Filipino Citizens from birth.
GO VS. REPUBLIC
Petitioner failed to prove that his witnesses are
credible.
While there is no showing that petitioner‘s witnesses
were of doubtful moral inclinations, there was likewise
no indication that they were persons whose
qualifications were at par with the requirements of the
law on naturalization. Simply put, no evidence was
ever proffered to prove the witnesses‘ good standing in
the community, honesty, moral uprightness, and most
importantly, reliability. As a consequence, their
statements about the petitioner do not possess the
measure of "credibility" demanded of in naturalization
cases.
Further, petitioner‘s witnesses only averred general
statements without specifying acts or events that
would exhibit petitioner‘s traits worthy of the grant of
Philippine citizenship. For instance, a statement in
their affidavits as to petitioner‘s adherence to the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution is not
evidence, per se, of petitioner‘s agreement and zeal to
Philippine ideals. These appear to be empty
declarations if not coming from credible witnesses.
It bears stressing that the CA was correct in finding
that the testimonies of petitioner‘s witnesses only
proved that he mingled socially with Filipinos. While
almost all of the witnesses testified that they knew
petitioner since birth and that they had interacted with
petitioner‘s family in times of celebration, this did not
satisfy the other requirements set by law, that is, a
genuine desire to learn and embrace the Filipino ideals
and traditions.
ADMINISTRATIVE NATURALIZATION:
SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS
RA 9139 (administrative proceedings) is reserved for
those who were born in the country as foreigners.
The parents are foreigners The same substantive
requirements are applicable:
1) AGE - must have to be legal age
2) RESIDENCY - must have to be residents in
the Philippines from the time they were born
or “from birth”.
The minimum residency requirement therefore
is 18 yearsbecause they must have to be here
and stayed here from the time they are born
up to the time the application is filed.
In administrative naturalization, the residency
requirement is changed to ―from birth‖
because this is especially applicable to those
who were born here but have remained to be
foreigners and has not become Filipinos. To
make it easier for them, they are allowed to file
for a decree of naturalization administratively.
3) CHARACTER - good moral character
4) PROPERTY - P5,000worth of property,
except if you are engaged in some form of
gainful livelihood.
5) EDUCATION - Unlike in judicial
naturalization wherein education is only
required for children, this refers to the
applicant also. From birth, he must have
studied in Philippine schools and these
schools must have to teach Philippine
Government and Constitution.
6) NOT OTHERWISE DISQUALIFIED BY LAW-
almost the same.
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
1) There is no declaration of intention.
2) The petition to be admitted as Philippine citizen
is filed with the Special Commission on
Naturalization which is with the DOJ and
3) There is not much hearing.
4) All you have to do is pay the fee and you will
have to pay also for the wife and the children
if they are not Filipinos. This means that the
foreigner born in the country is married to a
foreigner also.
NOTE: In judicial, there is a 2 year waiting period. In
administrative, there is no waiting period simply
because the applicant is born in the country. 23
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 DISTINCTION BETWEEN JUDICIAL REPUBLIC VS BATUIGAS
NATURALIZATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE
NATURALIZATION Foreigner woman married a Filipino male.
In all cases of citizenship where the declaration of
citizenship has been sought, the SC has maintained
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATIVE the view that there is no proceeding in our system
where a person files a case/petition to declare him
a Filipino citizen.
The default is that it is It is allowable that a
the husband or father woman would file for This case of Batuigasis an exception because the wife
who will file for the naturalization under RA here should have benefited from Sec 15 of CA 473 -
rights of the wife or the 9139 because she is born that when a foreigner woman marries a Filipino male,
children. in the Philippines of the woman automatically becomes a Filipino citizen.
foreigner parents and has All that the woman will have to show in the
since birth resided in the administrative proceeding is that she is not disqualified
country. by law.

Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine

Husband who should The woman is the
file and the grant will applicant. The grant to the
redound to the benefit woman will redound to her
of the wife (foreigner) children but will not
and of the children. benefit the husband if he
is a foreigner.
citizenship through either judicial naturalization under
CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic
Act No. 9139 (the "Administrative Naturalization Law
of 2000"). A third option, called derivative
naturalization, which is available to alien women
married to Filipino husbands is found under
Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:

GO V REPUBLIC "any woman who is now or may hereafter be

C.A. No. 473 provides that after hearing the petition for
citizenship and receipt of evidence showing that the
petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications required by law, the competent court
may order the issuance of the proper naturalization
certificate and the registration thereof in the proper
civil registry.
On the other hand, Republic Act (R.A.)No. 9139
provides that aliens born and residing in the
Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by
administrative proceeding by filing a petition for
citizenship with the Special Committee, which, in view
of the facts before it, may approve the petition and
issue a certificate of naturalization.
In both cases, the petitioner shall take an oath of
allegiance to the Philippines as a sovereign nation.
If a Filipino-man marries a foreigner-woman, the
foreigner-woman will automatically become a Filipino
citizen.
If the man is foreigner and the woman is a Filipina,
the residency requirement for the foreigner husband
will be no longer from 10 years but 5 years.There is
no automatic grant to citizenship status to the
foreigner husband.
married to a citizen of the Philippines and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines."
Under this provision, foreign women who are
married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso
facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary
for them to prove that they possess other
qualifications for naturalization at the time of their
marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to
judicial naturalization.
X XX
Records however show that in February 1980,
Azucena applied before the then Commission on
Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the cancellation
of her Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No.
03070541 by reason of her marriage to a Filipino
citizen. The CID granted her application. However, the
Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it
found no sufficient evidence that Azucena‘s husband
is a Filipino citizen42 as only their marriage certificate
was presented to establish his citizenship.
Having been denied of the process in the CID,
Azucena was constrained to file a Petition for judicial
naturalization based on CA 473. While this would have
been unnecessary if the process at the CID was 24
granted in her favor, there is nothing that prevents her
from seeking acquisition of Philippine citizenship
through regular naturalization proceedings available to
all qualified foreign nationals. The choice of what
option to take in order to acquire Philippine citizenship

COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA

rests with the applicant. In this case, Azucena has
chosen to file a Petition for judicial naturalization under
CA 473. The fact that her application for derivative
naturalization under Section 15 of CA 473 was denied
should not prevent her from seeking judicial
naturalization under the same law. It is to be
remembered that her application at the CID was
denied not because she was found to be disqualified,
but because her husband‘s citizenship was not proven.
Even if the denial was based on other grounds, it is
proper, in a judicial naturalization proceeding, for the
courts to determine whether there are in fact grounds
to deny her of Philippine citizenship based on regular
judicial naturalization proceedings.
DENATURALIZATION PROCEEDINGS
It is through which the naturalization decree is revoked
or annulled.
WHERE TO FILE? Filed with the same court which
granted the naturalized status
GROUNDS: Grounds are provided in the same law on
naturalization.
There is a disputable presumption that if a person
goes back to his country of origin and stays there for
one (1) year, or in any place outside the country and
stays there for two (2) years, and this is done within
the five (5)-year period from the grant of the
naturalized status, then he can be subjected to
denaturalization proceedings.
LOSS AND REACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP
Article IV, Sec. 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or
reacquired in the manner provided by law (CA 63).
Article IV, Sec. 4. Citizens of the Philippines who
marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by
their act or omission they are deemed, under the law
(CA 63) to have renounced it.
Under Commonwealth Act 63 (CA 63), there are
seven (7) grounds for loss of Citizenship:
1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
GO GULLIAN V. GOVERNMENT
Expatriation is a constitutional right. No one can be
compelled to remain a Filipino if he does not want to.
YU VS. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
169 SCRA 364 (1989)
He was a naturalized Filipino, who when he travelled
abroad on a business trip represented himself to be a
foreign national; he never used his Philippine
documents and never represented himself to be a
Filipino.
Express renunciation was held to mean a
renunciation that is made known distinctly and
explicitly and not left to inference or implication.
Yu, with full knowledge and legal capacity, after having
renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization
as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior
status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of
his Portuguese passport and represented himself as
such in official documents even after he had become a
naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or
reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine
citizenship.
AZNAR V. COMELEC
185 SCRA 703 (1990)
This case involves the citizenship status of former
Cebu Governor LitoOsmeña.
The SC said that the fact that a person is a holder of
an ACR does not amount to express renunciation.
Gov. Osmeña is born to a Filipino father, a grandson
of a Filipino and so he is a natural born Filipino.
Compared to Yu Case, if you are a natural born
citizen, it would take more evidence to prove that you
have lost your citizenship by express renunciation. But
if you are of naturalized status, considering your
citizenship status in the Philippines is merely a grant or
a privilege and not a birth right, your acts may be
construed and may constitute express renunciation,
even if in a natural born citizen they would not be
considered as such.
VILANDO VS HRET
Her mother was registered as a foreigner and a holder
of ACR. SC reiterated the rule that being a holder of
an ACR or that you have registered to be a
foreigner only proves one fact – that you have
registered as such. It does not prove your
citizenship status. What it amounts to is that you just
registered as a foreigner. But whether you are a
Filipino or not is not determined by the fact that
you are a holder of an ACR.
3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
support the constitution or laws of a foreign
country upon attaining 21 years of age or
more;
4) By rendering services to, or accepting
commission in, the armed forces of a foreign 25
country;
5) By cancellation of the of the certificates of
naturalization;
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 6) By having been declared by competent
authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed
forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a
plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted;
and
7) In the case of a woman, upon her marriage
to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force
in her husband's country, she acquires his
nationality.
NOTE: In the 1973 and 1987 Constitution,
mere marriage does not result to automatic
loss of citizenship. A Filipino woman marrying
a foreigner husband can only lose her
citizenship if there are acts that she has
performed that will eventually make her lose
her Filipino status. The same is true in the
1987 Constitution.
REACUISITION OR REPATRIATION
Reacquisition can either be by:
i. Naturalization proceedings
ii. By direct act of Congress
iii. Repatriation
For reacquisition, the 1995 law which is Republic Act
8171 (RA 8171) gives repatriation proceedings to two
(2) types of citizens:
1) Natural born Filipino women who married
foreigners who lost their citizenship by reason
of marriage. If the marriage status or marital
status has been severed, she may opt to be
repatriated; and
2) Those natural born Filipino citizen who, by
reason of political or economic reasons,
were forced to be naturalized elsewhere.
Then we have Republic Act 9225 (RA 9225), an
August 2003 law, which is the “Dual Citizenship
Reacquisition or Retention Act” which would result
to dual citizenship for those covered. They cover:
1. Natural born Filipino citizens who lost their
Philippine status by reason of naturalization in
a foreign country regardless of reason or
2. Those who would eventually lose their
citizenship status because of naturalization
proceedings in a foreign country.
BENGZON III V. HRET
357 SCRA 545 (2001)
Bengzon III was a former natural born who was
naturalized in the US having served in the army. He
went back, repatriated under RA 8171.
―From birth‖ refers to citizenship and not to the fact
that the person has not performed any act to perfect or
acquire citizenship. If a Filipino citizen (natural born)
has validly repatriated himself to reacquire his
Philippine citizenship, what he reacquires is his former
status as natural born citizen.
Bengzon performedan act to perfect or acquire his
citizenship. He applied for repatriation. But even then,
the SC said the phrase should refer to your citizenship
from birth and not to the absence of performance of
any act to perfect or acquire your citizenship.
SOBEJANA-CONDON V. COMELEC
678 SCRA 267 (2012)
She was married to an Australian. She applied for and
was granted a naturalized status as an Australian
citizen. She came back in the country in time for the
2007 elections, run for Mayor in her town, but she lost.
So her citizenship status was never questioned.
She applied for reacquisition under RA 9225. She
executed the sworn oath of allegiance which is the
only requirement under RA 9225 (aside from the
payment of registration fees), and submitted it and
filed it with the appropriate government office.
What she did not comply was the requirement of
Section 5 thereof.
 Section 5 requires, among others, that if you
would want to run for an ELECTIVE
POSITION you must have to execute, in a
separate document, a sworn statement
renunciating any and all foreign citizenship.
 If you would be in an APPOINTIVE POSITION
in any government you would have to execute
sworn statement renunciating any and all
foreign allegiances. You may have more
than one citizenship but only one allegiance.
IS DUAL CITIZENSHIP TREATED IN OUR
CONSTITUTION? NO. It is treated in a provision in the
Local Government Code (LGC) as a disqualification.
When she came back and took her oath under RA
9225, her renunciation of foreign allegiances –
Australian citizenship to be specific – was never
notarized.
She ran again in 2010 and this time she won as
Mayor. So her citizenship was questioned on her dual
citizenship, because she continued to have dual
citizenship because of the absence of the required
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.
It is opined that she is disqualified because she is of 26
dual citizenship. The requirement of RA 9225 is
simple – just execute the sworn statement. Her
renunciation not having been duly notarized does
not comply with the law, and the SC said failure to
comply with a very simple requirement under the
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
law means that she continued to have dual
citizenship which is a disqualification under the
LGC.
MAQUILING VS COMELEC
The person involved is a Mayor in Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte. He was a Filipino citizen, formerly natural
born, who has lost it but reacquired it under RA 9225
and then executed a sworn renunciation of all foreign
citizenship, including his American citizenship. But he
travelled several times to the US using his American
passport and made public representations that he was
an American in his travels when his Philippine
passport was not yet issued.
ISSUE:Whether or not the mayor was disqualified
under Sec 40(d) of the Local Government Code -
Those with dual citizenship
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one‟s
foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act
of representation as to one‟s nationality and
citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship
regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an
elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
DUAL ALLEGIANCE
Constitution does not prevent or prohibit dual
citizenship. What is referred to in the Constitution is
dual allegiance which is inimical to national
interest which shall be dealt with in accordance
with law.
Each country or state is to determine who its citizens
are. If a person‘s citizenship is at issue, what will be
used to determine the question is the law of the
country where his citizenship is at issue.
A person can have dual citizenship and most of
these situations are involuntary, not until RA 9225
was passed. But before RA 9225, dual citizenship
could arise because of involuntary acts on the part of a
person, viz:
a. Because of the application of the laws of
two states a person may have dual
citizenship;
b. A person who is married to a foreigner may
be considered a dual citizenship –
c. Children born of that marriage will also
become dual citizens;
d. If the person is born of Filipino parents in a
country which follows jus solias a mode of
acquiring citizenship from birth, then that child
may become a dual citizen.

(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines
shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws
and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath.
DUAL ALLEGIANCE on the other hand is viewed
from the perspective of the person. It does not follow
that a person of dual citizenship has dual allegiance as
well, because the application of the laws of two states
may make him a dual citizen. If he owes allegiance
only to one of these states, then he is not guilty of
having dual allegiance.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009,

or just eleven days after he renounced his American
citizenship, he recanted his Oath of
36
Renunciation that he "absolutely and perpetually
renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s)
himself of full employment of all civil and political rights
38
and privileges of the United States of America."

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act

of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of
his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by
repatriation. However, by representing himself as an
American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively
reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such
reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant
Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by
using his US passport. 27

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing

one‘s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado‘s bid for
public office, as it effectively imposed on him a
disqualification to run for an elective local position.

COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA


SOVEREIGNTY
Art. XVI, Sec. 3 Section 3. The State may not be
sued without its consent.
The IMMUNITY FROM SUIT DOCTRINE provided
under Art 16 Sec 3, is not a grant of Immunity from
the State. It is a restatement that the State cannot be
sued. The State can only be sued if it has consented.
The discussion of this Court in Department of
Agriculture v. National Labor Relations
Commission32 on the doctrine of non-suability is
enlightening.
The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that
‗(t)he State may not be sued without its consent,‘
reflects nothing less than a recognition of the
sovereign character of the State and an express
affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it
from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very
essence of sovereignty. x xx[A] sovereign is exempt
from suit, not because of any formal conception or
obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends. True, the doctrine, not too infrequently,
is derisively called „the royal prerogative of
dishonesty‟ because it grants the state the
prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against
it by simply invoking its nonsuability. We have had
occasion to explain in its defense, however, that a
continued adherence to the doctrine of non-
suability cannot be deplored, for the loss of
governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the
performance of its multifarious functions would be
far greater in severity than the inconvenience that
may be caused private parties, if such fundamental
principle is to be abandoned and the availability of
judicial remedy is not to be accordingly restricted.
REPUBLIC V. VILLASOR
54 SCRA 83 (1973)
The State may not be sued without its consent. A
corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from
such a basic concept is that public funds cannot be
the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the
consent to be sued had been previously granted
and the state liability adjudged. This is based on
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by law. The functions and
public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion
of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law.
REASONS:
a) POSITIVIST THEORY: There can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the
laws on which the right depends.
KAWANANAKOA V POLYBLANK
The state is not suable for practical
consideration and based on the theory that
there is no violation of right against the
state which makes the laws for which the
rights commenced.
b) SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY:If the State is
amenable to suits, all its time would be
spent defending itself from suits and this
would prevent it from performing its other
functions.
The doctrine is also available to foreign States
insofar as they are sought to be sued in the courts of
the local State. The added basis in this case is the
PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF
STATES, under which one State cannot assert
jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par
in parem non habet imperium. To do so would "unduly
vex the peace of nations." (Cruz)
WHEN IS A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE:
1. When the republic is sued by name,
2. An unincorporated entity is sued
DOH v PHIL PHARMA
In this case, the DOH, being an "unincorporated
agency of the government"39 can validly invoke the
defense of immunity from suit because it has not
consented, either expressly or impliedly, to be sued.
Significantly, the DOH is an unincorporated agency
which performs functions of governmental character.
The ruling in Air Transportation Office v. Ramos40 is
relevant, viz:
An unincorporated government agency without any
separate juridical personality of its own enjoys
immunity from suit because it is invested with an
inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for
damages against the agency cannot prosper;
otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is
violated. However, the need to distinguish between an
unincorporated government agency performing
governmental function and one performing proprietary
functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in
favor of the former because its function is
governmental or incidental to such function; it has not 28
been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was
not in pursuit of a necessary function of government
but was essentially a business.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 3. Public officer is sued in an official
capacity.
In all these 3 instances, the common denominator is
that any adverse ruling the ultimate liability will rest
upon the state, it must have to require the State to
appropriate money from the public treasury to pay
the adverse decision.
If the result of the case will make the government
appropriate funds of the public treasury or would
have to give up public property, then that is a suit
against the state.
WHEN IS A SUIT NOT AGAINST THE STATE
1) When the suit is filed against an incorporated
entity.
When a case is filed against any of GOCCs, do not
apply State Immunity not only because they are
separate and different entities but because any
monetary liability against them will not require
disbursement from the public treasury. Therefore all
their assets may be levied, garnished, whatsoever
because it is not part of the funds of public treasury.
They are public funds but they are not part of the State
in the public treasury requiring legislative authorization
in the form of an appropriation.
2) When the purpose of the suit is to compel an
officer charged with the duty of making
payments pursuant to an appropriation made
by law in favor of the plaintiff to make such
payment.
BEGOSA V. CHAIRMAN, PHILIPPINE VETERANS
ADM.,32 SCRA 466 (1970)
The doctrine of non-suability has no application
where the suit against such a functionary had to
be instituted because of his failure to comply w/
the duty imposed by statute appropriating public
funds for the benefit of plaintiff or claimant. The
suit is not against the State because it has
acknowledged its liability to the plaintiff through
the enactment of an appropriation law. The suit is
intended to compel performance of a ministerial
duty.
3) When from the allegations in the complaint, it
is clear that the respondent is a public officer
sued in a private capacity.
SHAUF V CA
191 SCRA 713 (1990)
While the doctrine of non-suability appears to prohibit
only suits against the state without its consent, it is
also applicable to complaints filed against officials of
the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state
itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,
such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay
the damages awarded against them, the suit must be
regarded as against the state itself, although it has not
been formally impleaded. It is a different matter where
the public official is made to account in his capacity as
such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights
of plaintiff. Inasmuch as the State authorizes only
legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
govt. officials or officers or acts in excess of the
powers vested are not acts of the State, and an
action against the officials or officers by one
whose rights have been invaded or violated by
such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a
suit against the State within the rule of immunity of
the State from suit.
4) The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used
as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
REPUBLIC V SANDOVAL
220 SCRA 124 (1993)
The principle of state immunity from suit does not
apply, as in this case, when the relief demanded by
the suit requires no affirmative official action on the
part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of any
obligation w/c belongs to the State in its political
capacity, even though the officers or agents who are
made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of
a title of the state and as its agents and servants. In
this case, while the Republic is sued by name, the
ultimate liability does not pertain to the govt. Although
the military officers were discharging their official
functions when the incident occurred, their
functions ceased to be official the moment they
exceeded their authority. Immunity from suit
cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-
accountability nor grant a privileged status not
claimed by any other official of the Republic.
Moreover, this is not a suit against the State with its
consent. (a) The recommendation made by the
Mendiola Commission regarding indemnification of the
heirs and the victims of the incident by the government
does not in any way mean that liability automatically
attaches to the State. The Commission was merely a
fact-finding body and its recommendation was not final
and executory. (b) Whatever acts or utterances that
President Aquino may have done or said, the same
are not tantamount to the State having waived its
immunity from suit.
5) When the action is not in personam with the
government as the named defendant, but an 29
action in rem that does not name the
government in particular.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 REPUBLIC V. FELICIANO
148 SCRA 424
A suit against the government for the recovery of
possession and ownership of land based on a
possessory information was disallowed by the SC on
the ground that a suit for the recovery of property is
an action "in personam" which seeks to bring the
State to court just like any private person who is
claimed to usurp a piece of property. What the
plaintiff should have done was to apply for a judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Sec. 48(b) of CA
141, which is an "action in rem", i.e., one directed
against the whole world, and not the government in
particular. Moreover, the Proclamation is not a
legislative act.
CONSENT TO BE SUED
State may be sued if there is consent. Because it is
a sovereign right, there must have to be waiver or
consent granted by Congress.
As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However,
if it consents, either expressly or impliedly, then it may
be the subject of a suit.
There is express consent when a law, either special or
general, so provides.
On the other hand, there is implied consent when the
state "enters into a contract or it itself commences
litigation."
However, it must be clarified that when a state enters
into a contract, it does not automatically mean that it
has waived its non-suability.
The State "will be deemed to have impliedly waived its
non-suability [only] if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietary or private capacity.
[However,] when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity[,] x xx no such waiver may be
implied."
Statutory provisions waiving [s]tate immunity are
construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of immunity
is in derogation of sovereignty.
REPUBLIC V FELICIANO
148 SCRA 424
The consent of the State to be sued must emanate
from statutory authority. Waiver of State Immunity
can only be made by an act of the legislative body.
The Proclamation of the President of the Philippines
recognizing private rights to the land cannot be the
source of consent, since the Proclamation is not a
legislative act.
HOW IS CONSENT GIVEN?
1) Express Consent
2) Implied Consent
EXPRESS CONSENT
It is express when there is a law passed by congress
which authorizes the case to proceed.
A) MONEY CLAIMS ARISING FROM CONTRACT
There is an old law COMMONWEALTH ACT 3083
which is the general consent that allows you to sue
the state for any claims arising from contract,
express or implied.Such law requires claims to be
filed first before the Commission On Audit (COA).If the
COA does not have money to pay, then you have to
file a case in court.
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 3083 - AN ACT
DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY
BE SUED
Section 1. Complaint against Government. —
Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Government
of the Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits
to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability
arising from contract, expressed or implied, which
could serve as a basis of civil action between private
parties.
Sec. 2. A person desiring to avail himself of the
privilege herein conferred must show that he has
presented his claim to the Insular Auditor 1 and that
the latter did not decide the same within two months
from the date of its presentation.
Sec. 3. Venue. — Original actions brought pursuant to
the authority conferred in this Act shall be instituted in
the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of
the province were the claimant resides, at the option of
the latter, upon which court exclusive original
jurisdiction is hereby conferred to hear and determine
such actions.
Sec. 4. Actions instituted as aforesaid shall be
governed by the same rules of procedure, both original
and appellate, as if the litigants were private parties.
Sec. 5. When the Government of the Philippine Island
is plaintiff in an action instituted in any court of original
jurisdiction, the defendant shall have the right to assert
therein, by way of set-off or counterclaim in a similar
action between private parties.
Sec. 6. Process in actions brought against the 30
Government of the Philippine Islands pursuant to the
authority granted in this Act shall be served upon the
Attorney-General 2 whose duty it shall be to appear
and make defense, either himself or through
delegates.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
Sec. 7. Execution. — No execution shall issue upon
any judgment rendered by any court against the
Government of the Philippine Islands under the
provisions of this Act; but a copy thereof duly certified
by the clerk of the Court in which judgment is rendered
shall be transmitted by such clerk to the Governor-
General, 3 within five days after the same becomes
final.
Sec. 8. Transmittal of Decision. — The Governor-
General, 4 at the commencement of each regular
session of the Legislature, 5 shall transmit to that body
for appropriate action all decisions so received by him,
and if said body determine that payment should be
made, it shall appropriate the sum which the
Government has been sentenced to pay, including the
same in the appropriations for the ensuing year.
Sec. 9. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
COMMONWEALTH ACT 327 - AN ACT FIXING THE
TIME WITHIN WHICH THE AUDITOR GENERAL
SHALL RENDER HIS DECISIONS AND
PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF APPEAL THERE
FROM.
Sec. 1. In all cases involving the settlement of
accounts or claims, other than those of accountable
officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the
same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and
holidays, after their presentation. If said accounts or
claims need reference to other persons, office or
offices, or to a party interested, the period aforesaid
shall be counted from the time the last comment
necessary to a proper decision is received by him.
With respect to the accounts of accountable officers,
the Auditor General shall act on the same within one
hundred days after their submission, Sundays and
holidays excepted.
In case of accounts or claims already submitted to but
still pending decision by the Auditor General on or
before the approval of this Act, the periods provided in
this section shall commence from the date of such
approval.
Sec. 2. (amended by Sec. 50 of PD 1445 and by Sec.
35, Chapter 5, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V,
Administrative Code of the Philippines)
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 18, 1938.
Sec. 50. Appeal from decisions of the
Commission.--The party aggrieved by any decision,
order, or ruling of the Commission may within thirty
days from his receipt of a copy thereof appeal on
certiorari to the Supreme Court in the manner provided
by law and the Rules of Court. When the decision,
order, or ruling adversely affects the interests of any
government agency, the appeal may be taken by the
proper head of that agency. (PD 1445.)
Sec. 35. Appeal from Decision of the Commission.-
- Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a
copy thereof in the manner provided by law and the
Rules of Court. When the decision, order or ruling
adversely affects the interest of any government
agency, the appeal may be taken by the proper head
of that agency. (Subtitle B, Title I, Book V,
Administrative Code of the Philippines.)
Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution now gives a different
procedure. All money claims are to be filed with
COA, which has 60 days within which to act. If it
fails to so act, the claimant must wait anyway.
Once a decision has been made, he has, within 30
days to appeal by certiorari to the SC.
B) INCORPORATION OF GOCCS
The other form of express consent is when the
government incorporates a Government Owned
and Controlled Corporation (GOCC) with an
original charter.
When the government creates a corporation, it
invariably provides this corporation a separate
entity and with the capacity to sue and be sued. If
the government entity is given the capacity to be sued,
the suit encompasses any kind of action, including
one from tort.
2 TYPES OF GOCC:
1) Originally incorporated under the corporation
code but which majority of shares of stocks
have been given to the state.(Manila hotel
incorporated)
2) When the government creates a corporation by
enacting a law creating it and providing funds
thereof.
There is an original charter. One of the provisions
of the charter provides that the GOCC has the
capacity to sue and liability to be sued.
IMPLIED CONSENT
By reason of the acts of the state, it is deemed to have
consented itself to be sued. The most common is
when it enters into proprietary acts.
A) GOVERNMENT ENTERS INTO BUSINESS
CONTRACTS
If the State enters into a contract, it means it has
lowered its level into an ordinary party. But while it 31
is true, it is not actually correct that any act of entering
the contract would mean an implied waiver because
only those contracts entered into not in
governmental capacity or entered in business or
proprietary concept would constitute as valid
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
consent. The rule has been that it is not the fact that
you enter into contract but the nature of the
contract entered into.
 If it is in its sovereign or governmental
capacity there is no waiver or consent.
 If it is business or proprietary capacity, then
there is deemed to be implied consent.
GOVERNMENTAL ACTS are strictly those that are
required for government to exist.
Utilities are not necessary; they are merely for the
convenience of the public. Even if there is no
electricity, the government can exist.
When the government is in the performance of
governmental function (jure imperii), even if it
enters into a contract with private persons, it
cannot be sued without its consent.
Example: The Phil Air Force ordered new helicopters.
They ordered from a foreign supplier, the government
did not pay the value. Can it sue?
If the contract is entered into in governmental
capacity, then there is no implied consent. You must
proceed to file under Act 3083.
TIP: Do not commit the mistake of saying that yes
because there is implied consent because the act of
the state is governmental function, not proprietary
function.
The decision of the court will not be executed based
on your ordinary rules of execution under the rules of
court. You must have to present it to the COA and
COA will fund it and COA will submit to the president
as part of the national expenditure program. Congress
may consider it and make appropriations to be taken
for the next year budget.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. RUIZ
136 SCRA 487 (1985)
It has been necessary to distinguish between
sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure
gestionis). The result is that State immunity now
extends only to acts jure imperii.
A state may be said to have descended to the level
of an individual and can thus be deemed to have
tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it
enters into business contracts. The rule does not
apply where the contract relates to the exercise of
its sovereign functions.
In this case the contract for the repair of wharves and
piers at the naval base in Subic was held to be in line
with the governmental function of the US Government
and so the immunity existed. The projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the
defense of both the US and the Philippines,
indisputably a function of the government of the
highest order; they are not utilized for, nor dedicated
to, commercial or business purpose.
B) INEQUITABLE TO CLAIM IMMUNITY
ROYAL PREROGATIVE OF DISHONESTY is used
when the state erroneously claims immunity
because it is dishonest for it to claim it. If the state
therefore is going to claim immunity and the court will
find that it is inequitable, then the court will rule that
there has been consent or waiver.
In cases of waiver of consent based on the rule of
equity, it is largely limited to actual expropriation
cases.Under the rules of court, if the state would want
to expropriate, it has to file a petition for expropriation
and it has to make a deposit for the initial value of the
property and writ of possession. First part is the
determination of the propriety of the expropriation.
Second part is the determination of just compensation.
But if the state actually takes property without
going through this proceeding, the property owner
can file a case against the state in order to claim
just compensation because even if there is no
consent that is express, that is considered implied.
This action of property owner to claim compensation is
actually called INVERSE CONDEMNATION. An action
for inverse condemnation does not prescribe by
reason that it is not based on the right under any
law but based on the Constitution. If it were based
on ordinary civil code provision then the prescription
rule applies.
NOTE: But since it is a rule of equity, it is not for us to
apply when there is no prior case decided by the
Supreme Court on it.
C) GOVERNMENT INITIATES A COMPLAINT OPEN
TO COUNTERCLAIM
State is considered to have descended to an ordinary
person and opened itself to any form of claims.
It is not always that the state is open to counterclaim
if it initiates litigation. There are other instances
where the state enters in litigation to claim an
affirmative defense of immunity.It is not considered
implied consent.
It is not the fact that the state enters into litigation.
It is the nature of the relief which the state seeks in
the litigation.
32
FROILAN VS ORIENTAL PAN SHIPPING
12 SCRA 276, GR L-6060 (SEPT. 30, 1950)
By filing its complaint in intervention, the government
in effect waived its right of non-suability. Stated
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
otherwise, by taking the initiative in an action
against a private party, the State surrendered its
privileged position and came down to the level of
the defendant. The latter automatically acquires,
within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims
and other defenses he might have against the State.
SCOPE OF CONSENT
Act No.3083 Sec. 1. Subject to the provisions of
this Act, the Government of the Philippines hereby
consents and submits to be sued upon any
moneyed claim involving liability arising from
contract, express or implied, which could serve as
a basis of civil action between private parties.
The scope of consent is only valid if it is strictly a suit
against the state. When a money judgment is given
against the government, the ordinary rule for execution
would not apply, for the consent of the government to
be sued is only up to the point of judgment. If it does
not pay, it cannot be compelled to pay by attachment
or otherwise
The adverse decision of the state would have to be
presented to COA. COA will determine if there is
money. If none, it will submit to the Congress for it to
be included in the appropriations bill. The congress
may or may not fund it.
COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS
VS SAN DIEGO
31 SCRA 616 (1970)
The universal rule that where the State gives its
consent to be sued by private parties either by general
or special law, it may limit claimant's claim "only up to
the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution" and that the power of the Courts end
when the judgment is rendered, since government
funds and properties may not be seized under
writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of
public policy. Disbursements of public funds must
be covered by the corresponding appropriations
as required by law. The functions and public
services rendered by the State cannot be allowed
to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law.
SCOPE OF CONSENT UNDER A CHARTER
When consent to be sued is provided by the charter,
the consent does not stop with the rendition, but goes
up to the satisfaction of the judgment.
PNB v CIR
81 SCRA 314 (1978)
The SC held that since the PHHC had the capacity to
be sued, any judgment against it could be enforced by
a writ of execution, and its funds could even be
garnished.
SUABILITY VS LIABILITY
If there is a waiver of consent, then you can sue
but that does not mean the state is liable.
 SUABILITYmeans that you have been given
the opportunity to prove that the state is
liable. Suability is dependent upon the lack or
absence of consent of the state to be sued
 LIABILITYis dependent on the facts or
evidence and the applicable laws of the
case.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GUINTO
A distinction should first be made between suability
and liability. Suability depends on the consent of
the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law
and the established facts.The circumstance that a
state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is
liable; on the other hand, it can never be held
liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability
is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has
allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive
its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the
chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the
municipality insists that "he was on his way to the
Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the
repair of San Fernando's municipal streets.‖ In the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity
of the performance of official duty is presumed
pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of the
dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining
to his office.
MERRITT V GOVERNMENT
OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
34 PHIL 311
Merittfigured in an accident by a hospital ambulance.
There was an act entitled an Act authorizing E.
Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the
Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-
General of said Islands to appear in said suit. This
is an example of an express consent made in the form
of law.
By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives
its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede
its liability to the plaintiff, or create any cause of 33
action in his favor, or extend its liability to any
cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a
remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability and submit
itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right
to interpose any lawful defense.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 QUASI-DELICT COMMITTED
BY A SPECIAL AGENT
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. xxx The State is responsible in like
manner when it acts through a special agent, but
not when the damage has been caused by the
official to whom the task done properly pertains, in
which case what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be
applicable. xxx (Civil Code.)
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code establishes a rule of
liability, not suability. Therefore, the government
may be held liable under this article only if it first allows
itself to be sued through any of the accepted forms of
consent.
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code allows a suit against the
government for quasi-delicts committed by the
government when acting through special agents
(those performing non-regular functions). But if the
tortious act was committed by a regular employee,
the injured party could only bring a suit for
damages against the employee in his personal
capacity.
A SPECIAL AGENT is one who receives a definite
and fixed order or commission, foreign to the
exercise of the duties of his office, if he is a public
official. The special agent acts in representation of the
state and executes the trust confided to him. This
concept does not apply to any executive agent who
is an employee of the active administration and
who on his own responsibility performs the
functions which are inherent in and naturally
pertain to his office and which are regulated by law
and the regulations.
Municipal corporationsare agencies of the State
when they are engaged in governmental functions
and therefore should enjoy the sovereign
immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject
to suit even in the performance of such functions
because their charter provided that they can sue
and be sued.
When a public officer is sued in his official
capacity, the ultimate liability is to the state. It
means that the damage resulting from the act and
incurred by the party is from the official acts of the
Public Officers. It must have been done properly,
not attended by conditions which would take the
liability way from the state like if he acted in bad
faith or negligently, was acting outside of his
powers. If any of these are attendant in the acts
complaint of, the liability will rest on the public
officers and not on the state in which case it will
not be considered as a suit against the state.
DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY / SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
FROM SUIT OF FOREIGN STATES
Art 2, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as
an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations.
We follow the concept of immunity from suit because
of Art 2, Section 2.
Under Art 2 on the Doctrine of Incorporation,
generally accepted principles of international law are
deemed incorporated as forming part of the law of the
land. Equality among sovereigns is a generally
accepted principle in international law. One sovereign
cannot be placed under the jurisdiction of another
sovereign and vice-versa, otherwise it will result into
vexing the peace among nations.
We follow in the International Law the principle which
refers to EQUALITY AMONG EQUALS - the
Sovereign States should be equal that they cannot
be accountable to another sovereign unless it
violates peace among nations. Immunity from suit
among equals is part of parens habets imperio.
If it were a foreign state per se, there is no other
employer or officer involved, supposedly the immunity
is absolute.
If it were to be heads of State, we follow still the so-
called THEORY OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY.
President is immune from the processes of host
country
If it wererepresentatives of foreign country, then there
is ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY or RELATIVE IMMUNITY.
1963 CONVENTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
IN VIENNA
Representatives of State, Ambassadors, Public
Ministers, Consuls, and those in the list enjoy
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY because they represent the
Foreign Sovereign. They are not subject to the
processes of the host country whether or not it is
personal liability or official liability and in all civil,
criminal and administrative cases.
The only recourse of the host country is to declare
this person as PERSONA NON GRATA. In
international law, that is the only recourse for those
who enjoy absolute immunity from the host country.
They declare him as persona non grata and request 34
him to leave because his privilege of staying is no
longer applicable. If he refuses, then that is the time
that the person be subjected to all processes because
he is no longer covered by any immunity.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 1963 VIENNA CONVENTION ON
CONSULAR RELATIONS
CONSULAR OFFICES OF STATES refer to their
commercial documents for transactions. The 1963
Convention on Consular Relations only cover
RELATIVE IMMUNITY on the official functions of
consular officers and employees.
Example: Say your visa was denied for the
5th time and you suffered damages you
cannot sue the consular officer because it is
his official function.
For their personal and private liabilities, the
convention does not apply.
Example: If a consul rents a house for his
residence and has not paid, he can be charge
for unlawful detainer, or ejectment or be asked
to pay.
2014 BAR EXAMS: An Italian ambassador with an
ambassador status in another country went to the
Philippines for vacation. He went to one of the resorts
in the Philippines and he decided to pick up some
boys. He was arrested for pedophilia.
ISSUE: Whether he is immune from the application of
the Philippine laws because he is an Italian
ambassador or with an ambassador status but not to
the Philippines.
The Philippines was not the host country. If you are
elsewhere, then you do not enjoy diplomatic
immunity. In the host country they are immune from
all kinds of laws (absolute immunity): criminal, civil, or
administrative. The only remedy of the host country is
to compel the departure of that person with immunity,
to refer him as a persona non grata and his diplomatic
papers will be revoked. He will have no right to be
received by the host country.
OFFICERS OR OFFICIALS WHO ARE SUED IN
THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY
If an American Officer is sued in his official capacity
where the ultimate liability rests on the American
government, then immunity shall be claimable.
But in case he is not sued in his official capacity
because the liability is personal, then the suit may
prosper.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS and
GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS
United Nations (UN), because of the special
circumstance of the agreement of the Philippines
among others to join the UN, is immune from the
processes of the Philippines. UN as an organization
and all offices under it are given immunity. All of
these and the officers can enjoy ABSOLUTE
IMMUNITY from the applicability of the laws of the
host country. This is because of the nature of their
functions, to prevent the host country from meddling,
controlling and affecting the nature of their functions.
But with respect to all other non-governmental or
governmental organizations like in ASEAN
countries, they are exempt from liability under the
concept of RELATIVE IMMUNITY. One must have to
determine based on the host agreement, what is the
extent of their liabilities or immunities.
Example: Asian Development Bank (ADB)
is immune except when it has to do something
with its banking functions. If a labor case is
filed, it can be dismissed considering the
immunity granted to it by the countries based
on the agreement. (LIANG VS. PEOPLE,
MARCH 26, 2001)
These conventions, treaties and agreements can
grant immunity but they are not granted immunity
because they are immune under state immunity.
State Immunity only refers to the state and the
officers acting for and in behalf of state. Their
immunities are brought about not because they
are representatives of the states but by reason of
these documents (treaties, conventions) which the
Philippines is a signatory.
OTHER IMMUNITIES
Impeachable officers –Because the Constitution
provided that they can be removed from office through
an impeachment proceeding, to some extent, they
have immunity on any or all cases which would
effectively remove them from office because if
these cases filed on them will remove them from
office before they are impeached, these cases
cannot prosper.
IMPEACHABLE OFFICERS:
1) President
RULE ON IMMUTABILITY - The President cannot be
sued during his incumbency. During the incumbency
the president is ABSOLUTELY IMMUNE. It is not only
with respect to cases which will effectively remove him
from office. It covers criminal, civil or administrative
cases.
Nonetheless, he enjoys immunity different altogether
from other impeachable officers. The president is
absolutely immune from any suit during his
incumbency regardless when the cause of action
has existed and regardless of the nature of the 35
cause even if that will not effectively remove him.
After his incumbency, the president enjoys
RELATIVE IMMUNITY, he is not immune for non-
official acts for those acts which resulted to injury
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
damage or similar other claims. If these are
attended by abuse of power, he can be held
THE STRUCTURE AND POWERS
accountable after his incumbency. But for those OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT:
official acts properly done within the limits, even if LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
resulting to damage he will be immune from suit even
after his incumbency. (CONGRESS)
NOTE: Cases against the office of the president is not POWERS OF THE CONGRESS MAY BE
against the President but it is against the decisions of CLASSIFIED INTO:
the Office of the President under the DOCTRINE OF
QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY. a. LEGISLATIVE- The power to make laws
includes the power to alter and repeal them.
2) Vice-President
3) Members of the Supreme Court The legislative power includes the specific powers
of:
A Justice of the SC could not be charged a. Appropriation
administratively for disbarment because one of the b. Taxation and
qualifications of a justice is that he should be a lawyer c. Expropriation
and if a disbarred, automatically therefore he would be
removed. It will not prosper until and unless they are b. NON-LEGISLATIVE - The Congress also
impeached first. discharges powers of a non-legislative nature,
among them are:
4) Members of the Constitutional Commission
5) Ombudsman a. Canvass of the presidential elections;
b. Declaration of the existence of a state of
war
c. Confirmation of appointments through the
Commission on Appointments,
presidential appointments;
d. Amendment or revision of the constitution
e. Impeachment

COMPOSITION, QUALIFICATIONS,
AND TERM OF OFFICE

A) SENATORS

Art VI Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of

twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by
the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be
provided by law.

Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is

a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the
day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of
age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and
a resident of the Philippines for not less than two
years immediately preceding the day of the
election.

Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be

six years and shall commence, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election. No Senator shall serve for
more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the
36
continuity of his service for the full term of which
he was elected.

B) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA

Art VI Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list.
For three consecutive terms after the ratification of
this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory.Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in
this section.
Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House
of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at
least twenty-five years of age, able to read and
write, and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the day
of the election.
Section 7. The Members of the House of
Representatives shall be elected for a term of three
years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by
law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following
their election. No Member of the House of
Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Art IX-C Sec Section 6. A free and open party system
shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice
of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article.
Section 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party,
organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for
those registered under the party-list system as
provided in this Constitution.
Section 8. Political parties, or organizations or
coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall
not be represented in the voters‘ registration boards,
boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or
other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to
appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
Art XVIII Section 7. Until a law is passed, the
President may fill by appointment from a list of
nominees by the respective sectors, the seats
reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (2),
Section 5 of Article VI of this Constitution.
The increase of salaries under Section 10 prohibits
the increase in salaries to take effect during the term
of the Congress.
Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives shall be determined by
law. No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the full term of all
the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase.
The word term is used in singular form to indicate that
all the terms of the members of that congress must
have expired already. Count the limitation based on
the term served not the number of years in office.
RESIDENCY
The Constitution has used the word residence but the
Supreme Court has consistently defined it as
domicile.
The reason for requiring residence as domicile in
an old case is that:
a. Entitles or allows the person to know the
needs of his constituents in terms of
legislation;
b. On the part of electors, for them to know the
candidates
DOMICILE means the place where you establish
your residence and even if you are absent, you
have the intention of returning (animus revertandi),
and the intention is permanent (animus manendi).
It is your legal residence or domicile and not your
actual residence. It does not require physical presence
all the time. But it requires you have the intention to
return even you are absent on that place
37
.
PRINCIPLES OF DOMICILE
There is only one domicile of origin. A person can
only have one domicile either domicile of origin or
domicile of choice.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
Domicile can be changed from origin to a new one
if those conditions are satisfied:
1. Bona fide intention to change his old
residence;
2. Actual abandonment of the old to acquire a
new one;
3. Performance or commission of acts indicating
he is abandoning the old and acquiring a new
one.
Minor children will always follow the domicile of their
parent. If they are now of the age of majority:
1) They will maintain Domicile of Origin or
2) They could get or have a new domicile
(Domicile of Choice)
A wife or husband in any case, in compliance with
the family code provision in establishing conjugal
home and dwelling, can necessary have another
actual residence but this does not necessarily
mean a domicile of origin or domicile of choice but
actual residence.
Wives under the NCC or the FC may maintain a
residence other than their legal residence because
spouses are required to maintain a conjugal dwelling.
The conjugal dwelling may not necessarily be the legal
residency of the spouse.
SABILI V COMELEC
In the present case, the parties are in agreement that
the domicile of origin of Sabili was Brgy. Sico, San
Juan, Batangas. He claims that he abandoned his
domicile of origin and established his domicile of
choice in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, thereby
making him qualified to run for Lipa City mayor. On the
other hand, respondent COMELEC held that no such
change in domicile or residence took place and,
hence, the entry in his Certificate of Candidacy
showing that he was a resident of Brgy. Pinagtong-
ulan, Lipa City constituted a misrepresentation that
disqualified him from running for Lipa City mayor.
RULING AS TO EVIDENCE PRESENTED:
The Income Tax Returns of petitioner presented below
showed that petitioner had been paying his Income
Tax (2007 and 2008) to the Revenue District Office of
Lipa City. In waving aside his Income Tax Returns, the
COMELEC held that these were not indications of
residence since Section 51(B) of the National Internal
Revenue Code does not only state that it shall be filed
in a person‘s legal residence, but that it may
alternatively be filed in a person‘s principal place of
business.
The sworn affidavit of the barangay chair of Pinagtong-
ulan that petitioner is a resident of Lipa City does not
help petitioner‘s case because it was not shown that
the term "resident" as used therein carries the same
meaning as domicile, that is, not merely bodily
presence but also, animus manendi or intent to return.
Petitioner‘s actual physical presence in Lipa City is
established not only by the presence of a place
(Pinagtong-ulan house and lot) he can actually live in,
but also the affidavits of various persons in Pinagtong-
ulan, and the Certification of its barangay captain.
Petitioner‘s substantial and real interest in establishing
his domicile of choice in Lipa City is also sufficiently
shown not only by the acquisition of additional property
in the area and the transfer of his voter registration,
but also his participation in the community‘s socio-civic
and religious life, as well as his declaration in his ITR
that he is a resident thereof.
We therefore rule that petitioner has been able to
adduce substantial evidence to demonstrate
compliance with the one-year residency requirement
for local elective officials under the law.
ROMUALDEZ VS COMELEC
She has never lost his domicile of origin because that
is where she will return whenever she wants. \
A married woman or man can maintain his domicile of
origin even if he has established a family home
elsewhere.
AQUINO VS COMELEC
He was a legal resident of Tarlac. He wanted to run in
Makati. So, he rented a house therein, without residing
in it.
SC said there were no acts performed that would show
that he abandoned the old and acquired a new one. All
his businesses private or official were still in Tarlac.
The only thing that would indicate his actual residence
is the lease in an apartment unit and nothing more.
MITRA VS COMELEC
Mitra wanted to run as governor of the province. He
wanted to change his residence from Puerto Princesa
to a municipality. He bought an old fertilizer mill
warehouse and in the mezzanine, that is where he
resided. There are evidences to show that the
residence or feed mill was devoid of any luxury which
is inconsistent to his status as a Mitra.
SC reversed the finding of COMELEC en banc that
Mitra was not able to change his residence. SC said
those are non-legal standard which are subjective.
The law only requires three:
a. There is a good faith intention to change his
old residence, ; 38
b. Actual abandonment of the old to acquire a
new one;
c. Performance of acts indicating he is
abandoning the old.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
Such assessment, in our view, based on the interior
design and furnishings of a dwelling as shown by and
examined only through photographs, is far from
reasonable; the COMELEC thereby determined the
fitness of a dwelling as a person‘s residence based
solely on very personal and subjective assessment
standards when the law is replete with standards that
can be used. Where a dwelling qualifies as a
residence – i.e., the dwelling where a person
permanently intends to return to and to remain– his or
her capacity or inclination to decorate the place, or the
lack of it, is immaterial.
ASSISTIO VS AGUIRRE
Asistio is from Caloocan. The family are well known to
be from there. What is indicated in the COC is not an
existing address. Respondent arguedthat he is not a
legal resident of Caloocan and he is not a resident
because of a non-existing address.
SC said that does not indicate that the person change
his domicile because you can only change your
domicile by compliance of the three requisites. SC
ruled that domicile is not easily lost. To successfully
effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an
actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which
correspond with that purpose. There must be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must
be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the
place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City
since his birth or for more than 72 years. His family is
known to be among the prominent political families in
Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as
Caloocan City Second District representative in the
House of Representatives, having been elected as
such in the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In
2007, he also sought election as City Mayor. In all of
these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city.
Taking these circumstances into consideration,
gauged in the light of the doctrines above enunciated,
it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and
continues to qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. There
is no showing that he has established domicile
elsewhere, or that he had consciously and voluntarily
abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. He should,
therefore, remain in the list of permanent registered
voters of Precinct No. 1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan
City. That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate
of Candidacy for Mayor, both for the 2007 and 2010
elections, a non-existent or false address, or that he
could not be physically found in the address he
indicated when he registered as a voter, should not
operate to exclude him as a voter of Caloocan City.
These purported misrepresentations in Asistio‘s COC,
if true, might serve as basis for an election offense
under the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), or an action
to deny due course to the COC. But to our mind, they
do not serve as proof that Asistio has abandoned his
domicile in Caloocan City, or that he has established
residence outside of Caloocan City.
APPORTIONMENT OF DISTRICTS
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far
as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative
(4) Within three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on
the standards provided in this section.
Section 5, Article 6 allows new districts to be
established. But if there is an increase in the
population, new districts may be added.
The 250,000 in population is only required for the
first district created other than what the Constitution
has provided meaning additional laws. It does not
require that it be exactly 250,000. Nearer to that is
good and the basisfor that is the MIDTERM
POPULATION CENSUS.It means in between election
to be certified by the National Statistical Coordinating
Board that there is an increase in population.
NAVAL V COMELEC
REAPPORTIONMENT is "the realignment or change
in legislative districts brought about by changes in
population and mandated by the constitutional
requirement of equality of representation."
The aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize
population and voting power among districts. The
basis for districting shall be the number of the
inhabitants of a city or a province and not the number
of registered voters therein.
The rationale behind reapportionment is the
constitutional requirement to achieve equality of
representation among the districts.
SEMA VS COMELEC
ARMM Congress or ARMM legislative body cannot
apportion districts.
ALDABA VS COMELEC
In the reapportionment of districts, the population is
39
based on mid-year figures per declaration certified by
the National Statistical and Coordination Board
(NSCB).
AQUINO III VS COMELEC
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
The creation of a province requires either the
population or the land and not both plus the data.
But that was not applied with reference to the area if it
were to be an island province.
NAVARRO VS ERMITA
If a province is created, it must have:
i. INCOME OF 100M. In the local government
code it‘s 20M, but because of the several
decisions, it has been increased to 100M,
AND
ii. TERRITORY OF 2,000 SQUARE
KILOMETRES, OR 250,000 IN POPULATION
This is with reference to the Dinagat Province. The
2,000 square km area is not required if it were to
be applied to an island province.
MARIANO VS COMELEC
This case involves the law creating Makati City from
what used to be the municipality of Makati. At the time
the City of Makati was established, the population
count was 450,000. When it was established into a
city, the law provided for 2 congressional districts.
It was questioned before the SC that it could not be
because the Constitution says for City, there must
have to be at least 250,000 for it to have 1 district and
by analogy, according to the petitioner, there has to be
another 250,000,or 500,000 total population, for it to
have 2 districts.
SC said no. Only as to the 1st district is the 250,000
mandatory. The additional district need not comply
with the 250,000 population count. HOWEVER, it must
be near 250,000 benchmark, like 200,000.
NOTE: When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, the
discussion would should that the 250,000 is applied
and is also applicable to provinces. In fact in the
ordinance attached to the 1987 Constitution, the
200,000 population was used as a factor as well to
grant more districts in 1 province.
PARTY LIST SYSTEM
The party-list system is a constitutional innovation that
would expand opportunities for electoral participation
to those who cannot hope to win in the legislative
district elections, but who may generate votes
nationwide equivalent to what a winner in the
legislative district election would garner. 33 In short,
the party-list system operates on the theoretical
assumption that a party-list group has national
constituency whose interests, concerns, or ideologies
call for representation in the House of
Representatives. (COCOFED-Philippine Coconut
Producers Federation, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
207026, [August 6, 2013])
ANG ATONG PAGLAUM VS COMELEC
(1) National, regional and sectoral parties and
organizations can participate in the party list
systems elections;
(2) National and regional parties do not need to
represent the marginalized and
underrepresented or those lacking on well-
defined political constituents; they can just
be a political party.
(3) Political parties can participate provided
they do not fill candidates in the legislative
districts except when they do so under the
sectoral wing which must have to be
separately registered as such;
(4) Sectoral parties may either represent:
marginalized and underrepresented, or
those lacking in well-defined political
constituencies. It is not required that both
must have to be represented;
NOTE: In the ANG BAGONG BAYANI case, parties
must represent both, those marginalized and
underrepresented, and lacking well-defined political
constituencies.
(5) Majority of the members of those
representing the marginalized and
underrepresented sector must belong to
the marginalized and underrepresented
sector they represent.
(6) Majority of the members of those
representing the sector lacking in well-
defined political constituencies must also
belong to those lacking in well-defined
political constituencies sector they
represent.
NOTE: In the ANG BAGONG BAYANI case, there
was a requirement which Fr. Bernas called as
IDEOLOGICAL REQUIREMENT: either you must be a
member of that sector or you must have to represent
the ideology.
(7) Any party shall not be disqualified; if some
of its nominees are disqualified, provided,
at least one nominee is qualified.
QUALIFICATIONS are the same as that of district
representatives. The only difference would be:
 RESIDENCE- They are not required to be
residents of that district because they are
not district representatives but they must 40
have to be residents of the Philippines.
 Those representing the youth sector – They
must have to be up to the age of thirty (30)
only.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA

LAYUG V. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 192984, [FEBRUARY 28, 2012]
683 PHIL 127-140
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives
are of two kinds: (1) members who shall be elected
from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.In this case, Buhay Party-List was
entitled to two seats in the House that went to its first
two nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and
William Irwin C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother
Mike, being the fifth nominee, did not get a seat and
thus had not become a member of the House of
Representatives. Indubitably, the HRET has no
jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike's
qualifications.
Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the
qualifications of Buhay Party-List, as it is vested by
law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the
COMELEC. Section 6 of said Act states that "the
COMELEC may motuproprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel,
after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition . . . ." Accordingly, in the case of Abayon vs.
HRET, We ruled that the HRET did not gravely abuse
its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto against AangatTayo party-list
and Bantay party-list insofar as they sought the
disqualifications of said party-lists.
AMORES VS HRET
Villanueva, representing CIBAC, was allowed to finish
his term despite the fact that he was already more
than 30.
ABANG LINGKOD VS COMELEC
The Abang Lingkod attached to their petition
photographs which are photoshopped. They were
showing that they are feeding the malnourished
children.
It was cancelled because they have no track record
and they falsified a part of their petition.
ISSUE: Whether Abang Lingkod has a track record of
advocacy
Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or
organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no
longer required to adduce evidence showing their track
record, i.e.,proof of activities that they have
undertaken to further the cause of the sector they
represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns
of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the
ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are
geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which they
represent.
If at all, evidence showing a track record in
representing the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors is only required from nominees of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented who do not
factually belong to the sector represented by their
party or organization. (Abang Lingkod Party List v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206952,
[October 22, 2013])
LIST OF 5 NOMINEES
RA 7941 Section 8. Nomination of Party-List
Representatives. Each registered party, organization
or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later
than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of
names, not less than five (5), from which party-list
representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the
required number of votes.
In ANG ATONG PAGLAUM case, the Supreme Court
said, there is only a need for one (1) nominee to be
qualified even if four (4) of the nominees are
disqualified. The party cannot be disqualified due to
that fact of disqualification of four (4) other nominees.
COCOFED VS COMELEC; ANAD VS COMELEC
In those 2 cases, SC stated the requirement to submit
the 5 list of nominees is mandatory. The party is not
allowed to submit a list of less than 5 nominees
because it is for not the party to comply with the law
alone but it is to allow the public the Freedom of
Information to know who the nominees are.
COCOFED V. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 207026, [AUGUST 6, 2013]
COCOFED's failure to submit a list of five nominees,
despite ample opportunity to do so before the
elections, is a violation imputable to the party under
Section 6 (5) of RA No. 7941.
Pursuant to the terms of Section 8 of RA No. 7941, the
Court cannot leave to the party the discretion to
determine the number of nominees it would submit. A
contrary view overlooks the fact that the requirement
of submission of a list of five nominees is primarily a
statutory requirement for the registration of party-list
groups and the submission of this list is part of a
registered party's continuing compliance with the law
to maintain its registration.
The fact that a party-list group is entitled to no more 41
than three seats in Congress, regardless of the
number of votes it may garner, does not render
Section 8 ofRA No. 7941 permissive in nature.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY
V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. NO. 206987,
[SEPTEMBER 10, 2013]
As found by the COMELEC, ANAD, for unknown
reasons, submitted only three nominees instead of
five, in violation of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 7941 (An Act
Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives
through the Party-List System, and Appropriating
Funds Therefor).
Compliance with Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 is
essential as the said provision is a safeguard against
arbitrariness. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 rids a party-
list organization of the prerogative to substitute and
replace its nominees, or even to switch the order of the
nominees, after submission of the list to the
COMELEC.
ALLOCATION OF 20% SEAT
OF PARTY LIST SYSTEM
Constitutionally, there is a requirement of 2% to be
entitled to a “one to one” seat in the lower house
while there is a maximum of three (3) seats for
every party.
VETERANS MANPOWER
Only parties which garnered at least 2% of the
votes cast for the party list can be given seats.
BANAT VS COMELEC
SC clarified the seat allocation. SC clarified that the
2% requirement (2% of the total number of votes
cast after the party list) is only required for the
purposes of giving a partyGUARANTEED SEATS.
The allocation of seats would follow this procedure:
i. Rank the parties based on the votes garnered.
ii. Determine the 20% allocation for the party list
based on the total membership of the house,
including the party list.
iii. Determine the vote percentage of the party -
Total number of votes garnered by the party
divided by the total number votes cast for the
party list
iv. Give one seat each to all parties who garnered
at least 2%. This is referred to as
GUARANTEED SEAT.What should remain is
referred to as the REMAINING SEATS.
v. The remaining seats shall be given to the
parties listed from top to bottom again based
on their percentages. No rounding off (Unless
.9%)
Example: There are 50 seats based in the 20%
allocation and there are 20 parties who has 2%.
Deduct the 20 seats to the 50 in our 20% which will
give a remaining 30 seats. To fill up the 30 seats,
multiply the vote percentage of the party by the
remaining seats. Party has a 4.4% multiply it with 30.
The product there will be allotted number of seat for a
party. In no case the party is allowed more than 3
seats.
Even if a party has not garnered at least 2%, it will be
entitled to a seat in Congress. Because of the number
of votes garnered by the top parties, they would be
entitled to additional seats from the remaining seats
based on their percentages. Bu the maximum
allowable seat for the party shall not be more than
three (3).
THREE TERM LIMITATION
The rationale behind the term limitations is to avoid
over-concentration of power in 1 person if he is made
to serve more than what the law allows. It is also to
infuse newer blood into politics
The three-term limitation applies or follows what is
known as the ELECTED AND SERVE RULE.
Originally in the 2007 elections, we follow the 2%
requirement. If a party has not garnered at least 2% of
the total number of votes cast under the party list
systems election, it was not entitled to a seat. It was
only changed in 2009 when theBanat ruling was made.
For those parties which originally were not entitled to
seats but eventually in the 2009 decision were entitled
to seats, some members of Congress under the party
list who were benefited by the Banat ruling, is of the
opinion based on the COMELEC opinion also that they
are still entitled to another term in the 2016 elections.
 In Latasa, the issue arose as a result of the
conversion of a municipality into a city. The
then municipal mayor attempted to evade the
application upon him of the three-term limit
rule by arguing that the position of a city
mayor was not the same as the one he
previously held. The Court was not convinced
and, thus, declared that there was no
interruption of the incumbent mayor's
continuity of service.
 In Lonzanida, a candidate ran for the
mayoralty post and won in three consecutive
elections. While serving his third term, his
opponent filed an election protest. Months
before the expiration of the mayor's third term,
he was ousted from office. He ran again for 42
the same post in the immediately succeeding
election. A petition was thereafter filed
assailing his eligibility to run as mayor on the
ground of violation of the three-term limit rule.
The Court ruled that the mayor could not be
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 considered as having served a full third term.
An interruption for any length of time, if due to
an involuntary cause, is enough to break the
elected official's continuity of service.
 In Borja, the mayor of Pateros died and was
succeeded in office by the vice mayor. In the
two immediately succeeding elections, the
latter vied for and won the mayoralty post.
When he ran for the same position for the third
time, his disqualification was sought for
alleged violation of the three-term limit rule.
The Court ruled that when he assumed the
position of mayor by virtue of succession, his
service should not be treated as one full term.
For the disqualification to apply, the candidate
should have been thrice elected for and had
served the same post consecutively.
 In Aldovino, preventive suspension was
imposed upon an elected municipal councilor.
The Court ruled that the said suspension did
not interrupt the elective official's term.
Although he was barred from exercising the
functions of the position during the period of
suspension, his continued stay and
entitlement to the office remain unaffected.
 In Bandillo, a case decided by the COMELEC,
Gainza and Milaor were added to five of the
ten towns, which used to comprise Camarines
Sur's old First District, to form the new Second
District. The COMELEC declined to apply the
three-term limit rule against the elected
Provincial Board member on the ground that
the addition of Gainza and Milaor distinctively
created a new district, with an altered territory
and constituency.
ABUNDO V COMELEC
This somehow modified the old ruling in the case of
ALDOVINO V COMELEC on the applicability of the
―term limitation".
In the case of ALDOVINO V. COMELEC, the term
limitation rule requires two conditions.
i. Person must have been elected in that
position.
ii. He must served in that capacity.
If the person has succeeded to the position
like vice-governor to governor because the
position of governor became vacant, the
period of time spent by the vice-governor
who succeeded the governor would not be
considered term for purposes of the term
limitation which is 3-TERM.
In ABUNDO V COMELEC, SC came up with the
following pronouncements:
1) When a permanent vacancy occurs in an
elective position and the official merely
assumed the position pursuant to the
RULES ON SUCCESSION under the LGC,
then his service for the unexpired portion
of the term of the replaced official cannot
be treated as one full term.
If the official runs again for the same position
he held prior to his assumption of the higher
office, then his succession to said position is
by operation of law and is considered an
involuntary severance or interruption.
2) An elective official, who has served for
three consecutive terms and who did not
seek the elective position for what could be
his fourth term, but later won in a RECALL
ELECTION, had an interruption in the
continuity of the official‟s service. He had
become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the
3rd term up to the recall election, a private
citizen.
3) The abolition of an elective local office due
to the CONVERSION OF A MUNICIPALITY
TO A CITY does not, by itself, work to
interrupt the incumbent official‟s continuity
of service. It does not amount to a voluntary
interruption of office.
4) PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION is not a term-
interrupting event as the elective officer‟s
continued stay and entitlement to the office
remain unaffected during the period of
suspension, although he is barred from
exercising the functions of his office
during this period.
5) When a candidate is proclaimed as winner
for an elective position and assumes
office, his term is interrupted when he
LOSES IN AN ELECTION PROTEST and is
ousted from office, thus disenabling him
from serving what would otherwise be the
unexpired portion of his term of office had
the protest been dismissed. The break or
interruption need not be for a full term of three
years or for the major part of the 3-year term;
an interruption for any length of time, provided
the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break
the continuity of service.
6) When an official is defeated in an election
protest and said decision becomes final
after said official had served the full term 43
for said office, then his loss in the election
contest does not constitute an interruption
since he has managed to serve the term
from start to finish. His full service, despite
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 the defeat, should be counted in the
application of term limits because the
nullification of his proclamation came after the
expiration of the term.
Abundo, in the 2001 and 2007 elections, won but in
2004 election he was not proclaimed as winner after
the election but after the election protest that he filed.
He served as mayor for a little over 1 year.
ISSUE: Is he eligible to run in 2010 election?
SC made that new rule as in this case: if the person
has not been proclaimed as the winner but in an
election protest, he was eventually proclaimed as
winner, that term of office should not be counted
in his favor for the purpose of term continuity in
the 3 term limitation because SC said that the term
of office must have been fully served.The
requirement that it must be fully served is not existing
as mere principle.
The rule now should be: you must be elected in
that position and must have fully served that
particular term of office for the purpose of
applying that 3-term limitation.Any interruption in
the service because of preventive suspension
other than having lost in election protest will not
be considered as voluntary interruption for
purposes of term limitation.
The principle may also applied it to Members of
Congress.Members of the house of representatives or
party-list representatives may not be able to serve 4th
consecutive term even if he may have transferred to
another party or they become district representative,
as the case maybe.
NAVAL V. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 207851, [JULY 8, 2014]
Naval alleges that the First, Second and Third
Legislative Districts of Camarines Sur are not merely
renamed but are composed of new sets of
municipalities. With the separation of Gainza and
Milaor from the other eight towns which used to
comprise the Second District, the voters from the Third
Legislative District are no longer the same ones as
those who had elected him to office in the 2004 and
2007 elections.
It likewise bears noting that the actual difference in the
population of the old Second District from that of the
current Third District amounts to less than 10% of the
population of the latter. This numerical fact renders the
new Third District as essentially, although not literally,
the same as the old Second District. Hence, while
Naval is correct in his argument
that Sanggunian members are elected by district, it
does not alter the fact that the district which elected
him for the third and fourth time is the same one which
brought him to office in 2004 and 2007.
QUALIFICATIONS OF REGISTRANTS
IN PARTY LIST SYSTEM
LAYOG VS COMELEC
Questions involving eligibility and qualifications of
parties registering and joining in the party list
electionsare under the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC:
But once the party has been declared a winner and
its nominee or nominees proclaimed by the
COMELEC,jurisdiction lies with the electoral
tribunal.
Once the candidate has been proclaimed, despite
the fact that he has not yet assumed office
because June 30 has not yet come to pass,
jurisdiction lies with the electoral tribunal.
BARBERS VS. BIAZON
When Biazon was proclaimed as winning senator on
that 12th seat, the case of qualification or lack of
qualification filed by the protestant was supposed to
have been lodged in the COMELEC because
jurisdiction now lies with the appropriate electoral
tribunal.
LOKIN VS COMELEC
Lokin‘sname appeared in the first list of CIBAC, but
Villanueva filed another list where the name of Lokin
does not appear. Lokin filed a petition with the
COMELEC and asked the COMELEC to reinstate him
as the second nominee because CIBAC is entitled to 3
nominees. Eventually, CIBAC won and was entitled to
3 seats. The issue of who shall be the 2nd or 3rd
nominees was still unsolved.
ISSUE: Which has the jurisdiction- the COMELEC or
the Electoral Tribunal?
SC said that it is with the COMELEC because it is
not an election protest.The petition of Lokin with
the COMELEC was not to question the
qualification of the person who was made as
nominee but it is a question of him being the
supposed correct or proper nominee since based
on party list systems act, once a list has been
submitted to the COMELEC, the list cannot be
changed or the order of the name in the list as well
as the list itself cannot be changed unless for valid
causes.
The valid causes would be based on these:
a. Removed from the party for valid causes;
b. Voluntarily resigned from the party.
44
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 ELECTION
A) REGULAR ELECTION
Art VI Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law,
the regular election of the Senators and the Members
of the House of Representatives shall be held on the
second Monday of May.
Because of the synchronization of election, 12
senators are elected every 3 years.
B) SPECIAL ELECTION
Art VI Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or
in the House of Representatives, a special election
may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner
prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives thus elected shall serve
only for the unexpired term.
Art IX C Section 11. Funds certified by the
Commission as necessary to defray the expenses for
holding regular and special elections, plebiscites,
initiatives, referenda, and recalls, shall be provided in
the regular or special appropriations and, once
approved, shall be released automatically upon
certification by the Chairman of the Commission.
To implement this provision of the Constitution,
Congress passed R.A. No. 6645, which provides in
pertinent parts:
SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at
least eighteen (18) months or in the House of
Representatives at least one (1) year before the next
regular election for Members of Congress, the
Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution
of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, certifying to the existence of such
vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold a
special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in
recess, an official communication on the existence of
the vacancy and call for a special election by the
President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall
be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member
of the House of Representatives thus elected shall
serve only for the unexpired term.
Republic Act No. 7166, Section 4. Postponement,
Failure of Election and Special Elections. – x xx In
case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate
or House of Representatives at least one (1) year
before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall
call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy not
earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety
(90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy.
However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the
special election shall be held simultaneously with the
next succeeding regular election.
TOLENTINO VS COMELEC
Special election for purposes of the Senate must
not be within a 18 month period immediately
preceding a regular election. If outside of that
period,there may be a special election.
Any Special Election in the Philippines requires
general notice to the public (RULE ON
NOTIFICATION)
Exception: 13th Senator to fill the vacancy within 18
month period before regular elections
SC had maintained that there was no need for a
general notice because when the law on the
Synchronization of election was passed and published
providing that the special elections will be conducted
simultaneously with the regular election, there is
already sufficient notification.
SALARIES, PRIVILEGES, and
DISQUALIFICATIONS
Art VI Section 10. The salaries of Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives shall be
determined by law. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives
approving such increase.
There is no law limiting the passage of the law
decreasing salaries. As to increase, the prohibition is
not as to passage of law granting increase but the
efficacy of the law granting the increase. It shall not
take effect until all the term of office of all members of
the approving congress had expired.
Art XVIII Section 17. Until the Congress provides
otherwise, the President shall receive an annual
salary of three hundred thousand pesos; the Vice-
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, and the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, two hundred forty
thousand pesos each; the Senators, the Members
of the House of Representatives, the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Chairmen
of the Constitutional Commissions, two hundred
four thousand pesos each; and the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty
thousand pesos each.
BATERINA V SINGSON
45
In 2010, Rep. Singson of Ilocos was arrested in
Hongkong International Airport for carrying 6.7 grams
of cocaine. After plea bargaining, he pleaded guilty
and was sentenced to over 1 year imprisonment.
Having served in the election after the sentence was
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
laid down with finality, Baterina and Singson ran for
the 2013 elections. The petition for disqualification and
petition to deny due course to the COC was denied by
the COMELEC and eventually, Singson won. The
matter was referred to the HRET. The HRET
dismissed the protest on the ground that the conviction
of possession of drugs is not a ground for
disqualification.
The disqualification was based on Sec. 12 of the
Omnibus Elections Code, where conviction of a crime
by final judgment – among others – including moral
turpitude, is a ground for disqualification. It was not
because of the constitutional requirements of
qualification.
The SC eventually dismissed the petition filed against
the HRET and said that the COMELEC and HRET did
not commit grave abuse of discretion.
1) The petition with the SC was filed outside the
30-day reglamentary period. Decisions from
the HRET are reviewable under Article IX-A,
Sec. 9 to the SC via Rule 64, in relation to
Rule 65.
2) Petitioner Baterina needed to prove the
existence of the foreign judgment of
conviction. What was presented here was a
downloaded and printed copy from the
internet.
3) On the issue of moral turpitude, which is
on the qualification aspect, SC said that
drug possession does not involve moral
turpitude. Drug possession and use, not
sale and trafficking, does not involve moral
turpitude.
SC said that what defines moral turpitude is
the character or kind of public act. It is not only
that it is mala prohibita, but it must be
inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself,
not the statute fixing penalties, characterizes
or defines it as one involving moral turpitude.
FREEDOM FROM ARRESTS
Art VI Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House
of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable
by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session.
Xxx
If beyond six years, the privilege is not applicable.
The reason for this is to ensure that there is
continued democratic representation of the
constituents
In 1973 Constitution in In 1987 Constitution
relation to 1935 there is no more
Constitution, the restriction provided
privilege is claimable congress is in session,
only while the member regardless of whether
of congress is going to the member is going to,
or while attending in or coming from or
while having proper attending in session, he
session. is privileged from arrest.
For the entire duration, the privilege from arrest is
claimable even while congress is in actual
temporary recess.
“Session" in our constitution today is to commence
first Monday of July and to continue for one year,
inclusive of those actual recess and exclusive of the
final adjournment, which is 30 days from the opening
of the next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays,
Sundays and legal holidays.
Section 15. The Congress shall convene once every
year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular
session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and
shall continue to be in session for such number of
days as it may determine until thirty days before the
opening of its next regular session, exclusive of
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President
may call a special session at any time.
CASES OF JALOSJOS AND PIMENTEL
The nature of this privilege which is to grant
members of Congress continued legislative
function in order not to deny their constituents
democratic representation of office.
SPEECH AND DEBATE CLAUSE
Art VI Section 11. xxx No Member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof.
They cannot claim the privilege outside of
congress because based on the rules of discipline
section 16 (3) of Art VI, their own peers can find them
liable for what congress would determine as disorderly
behavior.
Reasons for the privilege is for them not be
harassed by any threat of arrest or liability for the
speech that they have made but they are not
immune from arrest from their own peers finding
them liable based on the rules of their respective
houses when the speech orally made or utterance
made is considered disorderly made.
QUALIFICATIONS: INCOMPATIBLE AND 46
FORBIDDEN OFFICE
Art VI Section 13. No Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives may hold any other
office or employment in the Government, or any
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term
without forfeiting his seat.
Neither shall he be appointed to any office which
may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was
elected.
INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE
An incompatible office is any other office or
employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries
An incompatible office is one which a member of
Congress cannot take if he does not forfeit his
seat in Congress.
The basic reason here is to make sure that
members of congress remain to be loyal to their
particular position of office. There should be no
trafficking in their public positions.
EXCEPTIONS TO INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE:
EX-OFFICIO POSITIONS - Members of congress can
take other positions which are allowed to be taken as
ex-officio. There is no new appointment required.
There is only designation. There is no additional
benefit, remuneration, salary or wage otherwise, it
would be a violation of the rule against Double
Compensation. The additional task is included in the
primary function of the office and deemed paid by the
principal office.
LIBAN VS GORDON
Is the PNRC positions considered to be an
incompatible office because the incompatibility
arises from the fact that it is a GOCC?
PNRC is not a GOCC but is an entity SUI GENERIS. It
is not part of government. It is not GOCC even if it has
an original charter in the Philippines.
There was no incompatibility.
FORBIDDEN OFFICE
A forbidden office is any office which may have
been created or the emoluments thereof increased
during the term for which he was elected.
A forbidden office is one where the member of
Congress cannot take even if he would forfeit his
seat in congress.
RATIONALE:To disallow the possibility that the
member of Congress will force the appointing authority
in exchange for some privilege and that privilege is to
be appointed to that particular office.
OTHER PROHIBITIONS
Art VI Section 14. No Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives may personally appear as
counsel before any court of justice or before the
Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested
financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office.
He shall not intervene in any matter before any office
of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where
he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
Being in business is not a prohibition but if the
member of the Congress has a financial interest in
a contract with government or with respect to any
action which requires his intervention as a
member of Congress then, there is a prohibition.
At most, while members of congress are prevented
from having financial interest in any contracts,
franchise or dealings with government, they are not
actually prevented from engaging in business, they are
not required to unload over their interest. At most the
constitution and the applicable law which is RA 3019
require them to disclose all their financial interest and
they are also required under the same law to submit
their annual SALN.
Technically, there is no prohibition for a member
of Congress to practice his profession except for
lawyers appearing as counsels in any of the
courts, tribunals, including the electoral tribunalto
avoid any undue influence on the part of the persons
to decide or resolve issues or cases because they are
members of Congress
BELGICA VS OCHOA
This case involves the PDAF.
SC said that granting legislators the lumpsum post
enactment legislative identification powers
deludes congressional oversight in violation of
Sec 14, Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
Under the system of PDAF, SC noted that the P26- 47
27B allocated to congress was in a form of
INTERMEDIATE APPROPRIATION.Appropriation
according to SC based on the constitution must
have to be a specific sums of money for specific
items of expenditure. What the 2013 budget provide
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
as freedom funds in the total amount of P27B where
all lumpsum appropriation for each member of the
senate and of the lower house with each member
having the power to identify which projects are to be
funded and to whom the project should go. SC said
that is invalid oversight functions because they
themselves have participated in the budget execution
which to begin with they do not have.
DUTY TO DISCLOSE
Art VI Section 12. All Members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of
office, make a full disclosure of their financial and
business interests. They shall notify the House
concerned of a potential conflict of interest that
may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of
which they are authors.
As to business interest, there is only a duty to
disclose, and the duty to disclose. Members or
officers and employees of government must have to
disclose their Assets, Liabilities, and Networth (SALN):
 In compliance with the RA 1319 of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
 If there is a possible conflict of interest.
If there is no possible conflict of interest brought about
by authorship in a proposed or internal legislation,
there is no duty to disclose required from the members
of Congress.
INTERNAL GOVERNMENT
ELECTIONS OF OFFICERS
Art VI Section 16. (1). The Senate shall elect its
President and the House of Representatives, its
Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective
Members. Each House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary.
SANTIAGO V GUINGONA
SC said in this case that the term majority or minority
is defined differently in different context, for example in
relation to quorum.
For there to be a Quorum there must have to be a
majority of the members of the house. In cases of
elections of the Senate president and Speaker of the
house, in ordinary election, majority must be
understood to be plurality
QUORUM
Art VI Section 16. (2) A majority of each House
shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a
smaller number may adjourn from day to day and
may compel the attendance of absent Members in
such manner, and under such penalties, as such
House may provide.
QUORUM is any number sufficient to transact
business. It is required that the quorum be a majority
of all the members of each house. It is required before
a House or Congress can perform any act with legal
implications as representative body.
Based on the provisions of the Constitution, a number
smaller than the quorum cannot do business except
to two things:
i. Adjourn for lack of quorum and call for a
session in a date specific and
ii. Compel attendance of the members who were
absent in order for them to constitute a
quorum.
In a Quorum, the term majority should be more
than half
SANTIAGO V GUINGONA (298 SCRA 756)
The case speaks of the term ―majority‖ in different
contexts. If you talk about elections, where the winner
is by mere plurality, it is the most numerous. In multi-
party elections, it‘s the person who garners the most
number of votes, even if that number is not 50% +1.
AVELINO VS CUENCO
There were 22 senators present in the house of
senate, 1 was in the hospital, 1 was abroad. When
only 22 were present, 10 walked out, 12 remained.
SC said, that is a majority; there was quorum. The
number should be reckoned at 23 because one is
outside the Philippines and beyond the jurisdiction of
the House or Senate. More than half of 23 is 12.
There was a valid business, the resolution declaring
the position of senate president was considered to be
validly passed.
The term majority also for purposes of majority
leader, majority speaker, means the party which
has the most number of members in that house.
The MINORITY LEADER is supposed to be elected
from among the minority party members.
The following are the quorum and majority voting
required:
Election of Officers Simple majority
(Plurality)
To impose penalty less Simple majority 48
than suspension or
expulsion
To suspend or expel a Qualified majority 2/3
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
member votes RULES OF PROCEEDING

To declare existence of Qualified majority 2/3 Even without a Constitutional provision allowing
state of war votes in joint session, Congress or any of its committees to promulgate
voting separately rules of proceedings, it can promulgate its own
rules. This is based on the Latin maxim “ex
To grant Emergency Simple majority necessitate rei” or by reason of necessity. Congress or
powers to the any of its committees to properly discharge its
President functions, it must have the power to promulgate its
own rules of procedure.
To choose Simple majority in joint
President/VP in case of session, voting The rules in any proceeding in any committee
a tie, when Congress separately must have to be published. If the previous Congress
acts as a canvassing has published its rules, the subsequent Congress must
body republish the rules even if the former rules were just
adopted.
To decide an issue of Qualified majority 2/3
President‟s temporary votes in joint session, Art VI Section 16 (3) Each House may determine the
incapacity during his voting separately rules of its proceedings xxx
term of office Art VI SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective committees
To confirm the choice Simple majority, may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
of the member of voting separately accordance with its duly published rules of
Congress to become procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
Vice President affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

To tackle the report of Simple majority in joint (1) It must be published as required by the
the President when the session, voting jointly constitution.
President exercises
Commander-in-chief (2) The rights of persons appealing or affected in those
powers investigations or inquiries in aid of legislation must
have to be protected.
To concur in an Simple majority required
amnesty proclamation and with concurrence of Persons may be required to appear under pain of
2/3 votes of Senate contempt. They cannot refuse the subpoena or notice
issued by the house during an inquiry in aid of
To concur to treaties Qualified majority 2/3 legislation if there is no claim of privilege. But even if
entered by the votes they are compelled to attend, they cannot be
Executive subjected to question which would tend to
incriminate them otherwise it will be violative of
Amend/revise the ¾ vote in joint session their right against self-incrimination.
Constitution but voting separately
(Congress constitutes DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS
itself as constituent
assembly) Art VI Section 16 (3) Each House may xxx punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend
Amend/revise Qualified 2/3 vote in both or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when
Constitution by houses by joint session imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
Constitutional but voting separately
Convention What constitutes disorderly behavior is dependent on
the house concerned.It may be changed from
Referendum to call a Simple majority by both congress to congress. It can be included in internal
Constitutional houses in joint session rules what should constitute disorderly behavior.
Convention but voting separately
If the penalty is Suspension or Expulsion, a qualified
2/3 majority vote is required and if the penalty is 49
suspension it cannot be more than what is provided
for in the constitution.

If the person or member is expelled temporarily, the

constituents are deprived of representation

COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA

congress but the constituents have another
opportunity of electing another representative.The
deprivation of democratic representation is limited for
the time the vacancy occurs because they have the
chance to elect another representative.
But in a case of suspension, if the suspension
period is not limited by the constitution then the
constituents will be deprived of democratic
representation until the suspension is lifted.
SANTIAGO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
A case for the violation of RA 3019 or the Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act was filed against Santiago when
she was still Commissioner. But when the order of
suspension was handed down by the Sandiganbayan,
she was already re-elected in the Senate.
ISSUE: Whether or not a member of the Senate could
be suspended by the Court other than the Senate
Under the RULES OF DISCIPLINE, under Section 16,
it seems to suggest that only the Senate can suspend
or penalize its members by suspension for what is
known as disorderly behaviour.
The power of Congress to penalize its members
for what is known as disorderly behaviour as
defined by them is the power granted to Congress.
But, it does not prevent the imposition of
preventive suspension under RA 3019 because it
is not a penalty which Section 16 is.This is a form
of preventive suspension pending or after filing
valid information and pending investigation
leading to trial.
JOURNAL AND CONGRESSIONAL RECORDS
Art VI Section 16 (4) Each House shall keep a
Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its
judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and
nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth
of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its
proceedings.
JOURNALS are records of what is done and passed
in a legislative assembly. They are useful not only for
authenticating the proceedings but also for the
interpretation of laws through a study of the debates
held thereon and for informing the people of the official
conduct of their respective legislators.
ENROLLED BILL has been defined as one which has
been duly introduced, finally passed by both
houses, signed by the proper officers of each,
approved by the governor (or president) and filed
by the secretary of state.
FARINAS VS THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
417 SCRA 503
Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill
by the Speaker of the House and the Senate
President and the certification of the Secretaries of
both Houses of Congress that it was passed are
conclusive of its due enactment.
FIELD VS CLARK
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in
the said case of as follows: ―The signing by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the
President of the Senate, in open session, of an
enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two
houses of such bill as one that has passed
Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses,
through their presiding officers, to the President, that a
bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the
sanction of the legislative branch of the government,
and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the
constitutional requirement that all bills which pass
Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill,
thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited
in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that
has passed Congress should be deemed complete
and unimpeachable.
PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE JOURNAL
US VS PONS
34 PHIL 729 (1916)
While there are no adjudicated cases in this
jurisdiction upon the exact question whether the courts
may take judicial notice of the legislative journals, it is
well settled in the United States that such journals
may be noticed by the courts in determining the
question whether a particular bill became a law or
not. The result is that the law and the adjudicated
cases make it our duty to take judicial notice of the
legislative journals of the special session of the
Philippine Legislature of 1914. These journals are not
ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual time of the
adjournment. They show, with absolute certainty that
the Legislature adjourned sine dieat 12 o'clock
midnight on February 28, 1914.
From their very nature and object the records of the
Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary,
and to inquiry into the veracity of the journals of the
Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have
said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the
letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the
Philippine Government was brought into existence, to
invade a coordinate and independent department of 50
the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate
powers and functions of the Legislature.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 WHAT MATTERS ARE REQUIRED TO BE
INDICATED IN THE JOURNAL ACCORDING TO
THE CONSTITUTION
1. Votes of the third and final reading of the bill;
2. Veto message of the President;
3. Votes from the re-passing of a bill vetoed by
the President;
4. Votes on any questions on the request of 1/5
of members present, and;
5. Summary Proceedings.
JOURNAL ENTRY RULE
VS ENROLLED BILL THEORY
MABANAG VS LOPEZ VITO
78 PHIL 1
As to these matters, the journal entry‟s probative
value would always prevail because they are
constitutionally required to be entered and
recorded in the Journal. But when the question
involves what the law is or the contents of
legislation then the enrolled bill has probative
value and would always prevail.
But if the provision is not difficult, it is clear, whatever
may appear in legislative journals will not prevail over
the letter and spirit of the legislation, the enrolled bill
shall prevail.
SESSIONS
(1) REGULAR SESSIONS
Art VI Section 15. The Congress shall convene once
every year on the fourth Monday of July for its
regular session, unless a different date is fixed by
law, and shall continue to be in session for such
number of days as it may determine until thirty days
before the opening of its next regular session,
exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.
xxx
Section 16 (5) Neither House during the sessions
of the Congress shall, without the consent of the
other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any
other place than that in which the two Houses shall be
sitting.
GUEVARRA VS INOCENTES
This case highlights the principle that there is only one
Congress.
SCruled that when one House is already in recess
or as adjourned, automatically the other House
would also adjourn, and therefore, there will be no
session of Congress to be considered because
Congress will function if both houses are in
function.
(2) SPECIAL SESSIONS
Art VI Section 15. xxx The President may call a
special session at any time.
Art VII Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o‟clock
in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in
the offices of the President and Vice-President
occurs, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call and within seven days, enact
a law calling for a special election to elect a
President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier
than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from
the time of such call. xxx The convening of the
Congress cannot be suspended nor the special
election postponed. xxx
Section 11. Whenever the President xx is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, xxx
the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose,
the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session,
within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its
rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the
last written declaration, or, if not in session, within
twelve days after it is required to assemble,
determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses,
voting separately, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise,
the President shall continue exercising the powers
and duties of his office.
Section 18. The President xxx suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of
at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside
by the President. Upon the initiative of the President,
the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-
four hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call.
51
Technically, special sessions can be called only if
Congress is not in regular session or is not in
actual session because it is in a recess:
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 1. When there is a vacancy in both the offices of
the President and VP. There is a need to
enact a law calling for special elections so that
without the need of call, Congress must have
to convene.
2. When there is a declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privileges of the writ, in
order to receive the report of the President on
such declaration or suspension. It is required
that Congress, without need of call, must have
to convene in session to receive such report.
(3) JOINT SESSIONS
A) VOTING SEPARATELY
1) Choosing the President (Art VII Sec 4)
2) Determining the President‘s Temporary
Disability (Art VII Sec 11)
3) Confirming the nomination of a Vice-President
(Art VII Sec 9)
4) Declaring a State of War (Art VI Sec 23 (1))
5) Amending the Constitution (Art XVII Sec 1(1))
The manner of voting in joint-sessions is generally
separate.It is in order, when the constitution requires
each house to vote, they will have to carry the same
weight despite the number.
When congress acts as the national canvassing body
for the President and Vice President in an election, as
canvassing body, it has the authority to proclaim the
winners. if there is a tie, the congress shall decide the
tie by choosing from among the candidates in a tie
who shall become the President and Vice President as
the case maybe. The problem is, what the other house
will choose A and the other house will choose B
because A & B are tie. Then who shall become the
president in that situation.
B) VOTING JOINTLY
 To Revoke or Extend Martial Law or
Suspension of Privilege of Habeas Corpus
(Art VII Sec 18)
This is the only instance when there is one session
which is held jointly and the voting is supposed to be
joint.
This is to avoid situation where congress cannot be in
session for lack of quorum because members of
congress have been arrested based on experience
when martial law was declared.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Art VI Section 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal,
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Section 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the
Commission on Appointments shall be constituted
within thirty days after the Senate and the House
of Representatives shall have been organized with
the election of the President and the Speaker. The
Commission on Appointments shall meet only while
the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman
or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such
powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it.
JURISDICTION OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
If the case involves elections, returns and,
qualifications of the members of Congress, it shall be
under the jurisdiction of the electoral tribunal, and their
power is is exclusive because of the use of the term
―sole Judge‖ of all these contests.
 ELECTIONS- conduct of the elections which
starts with the listing and registration of voters,
election campaigning, the casting and the
counting of votes.
 RETURNS - canvassing of the returns and the
proclamation.
 QUALIFICATIONS –grounds for quo warranto
cases ranges from disloyalty to the state and
questions of eligibility or qualifications.
JURISDICTION OF THE COMELEC VIS-A-VIS THE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
The reckoning point where the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunal will arise with respect to those
issues is when the person has already been
proclaimed. Apparently, the operative fact of the
grant of jurisdiction to the Electoral Tribunal is the
act of proclamation.
However, in the recent case of REYES VS
COMELEC, which involves the son of one of the sitting
justices of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court said
that it is based on a valid proclamation. If the
proclamation is not valid or that there is no basis
for the proclamation, then there is no proclamation 52
at all and the jurisdiction will still remain with the
COMELEC.
Decisions of the COMELEC in division are
“reviewable” in the COMELEC en banc in a motion
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
for reconsideration. After the COMELEC en banc, it
will go to the Supreme Court under Rule 64 in
relation to Rule 65 on certiorari.
If it goes to the Electoral Tribunaland decided by it
without grave abuse and discretion, then that‟s the
end of it. But if it is resolved by the ET attended by
grave abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court can
always review such decisions under Rule 65.
LOCSIN VS HRET
Issues re-examining the ballots are questions of fact
and when the decision of the ET has been rendered in
such a way that all the rules in the examination or
appreciation of ballots have been followed, we follow
the basic principles in petitions for review on certiorari
in Rule 65 that this is not an issue involving errors of
fact but only errors of jurisdiction. Re-examination of
the ballots, according to the Supreme Court, is a
question of fact. When you file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 in the Supreme Court, there should be
no factual issue involved, as a general rule.
VINZONS-CHATO VS COMELEC
This cases involves the CF cards. COMELEC has
issued the rules on election protest based on the
automation election system. Protestant must identify. If
the protestant protests at least 50% of the total
number of precincts, then he must identify at least
25% of that as pilot precincts. The pilot precincts will
have to be re-examined and if there is a “reasonable
recovery” of the votes by the protestant, then the
remaining 75% will have to be re-examined as well.
But if there is no ―reasonable recovery‖ of votes in the
pilot precincts constituting 25%, then the COMELEC
may stop the election protest.
ISSUE: Was it an error of jurisdiction on the part of
the HRET not to have dismissed the protest on
account of lack of reasonable recovery.
The Supreme Court said that it is based on the
discretion of the Electoral Tribunal because the protest
procedure used the word may. It can opt to dismiss it
or re-examine the cards.
Also, even if technically he has not assumed
his office but the term of office has begun or
the candidate has won, or has been
proclaimed, the COMELEC is ousted of
jurisdiction.
TANADA VS COMELEC
This involves a petition to declare a candidate as
nuisance by the COMELEC. But despite the decision
of the COMELEC to declare the candidate as nuisance
candidate, his name was not taken off from the ballot.
Eventually, Tanada lost. He wanted the votes for a
certain Alvin John Tanada be counted for him. So he
filed a petition for protest before the HRET to annul the
proclamation of the winning candidate and to have the
votes cast in favor of the nuisance candidate be
counted for him.
Once there is proclamation and the issue is with
respect to election, returns and qualifications, it shall
now be lodged with the ET.
Case law states that the proclamation of a
congressional candidate following the election divests
the COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the
proclaimed representative in favor of the HRET. The
phrase "election, returns and qualifications" refers to
all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's
title. In particular, the term "election" refers to the
conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the
holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and
counting of the votes; "returns" refers to the canvass of
the returns and the proclamation of the winners,
including questions concerning the composition of the
board of canvassers and the authenticity of the
election returns; and "qualifications" refers to matters
that could be raised in a quo warrantoproceeding
against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty
or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his CoC.
In the foregoing light, considering that Angelina had
already been proclaimed as Member of the House of
Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon
Province on May 16, 2013, as she has in fact taken
her oath and assumed office past noon time of June
30, 2013, the Court is now without jurisdiction to
resolve the case at bar. As they stand, the issues
concerning the conduct of the canvass and the
resulting proclamation of Angelina as herein discussed
are matters which fall under the scope of the terms
"election" and "returns" as above-stated and hence,
properly fall under the HRET's sole jurisdiction.
LAYUG VS COMELEC
The first question raised was whether ―Buhay Party-
List‖ is disqualified to participate in the party list
elections because it is representing the religious
sector, which is a sector identified in the law as not
allowed to join. Second question is the qualification of
Mike Velarde. It appears however that MV is the 5th
nominee of Buhay, and ―Buhay Party-List‖ got the
maximum 3 seats.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC or the Electoral
Tribunal has jurisdiction on these issues
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides
that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of its
Members. Section 5 (1) of the same Article identifies 53
who the "members" of the House are:
Sec. 5. (1).The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area
in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Underscoring added).
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives
are of two kinds: (1) members who shall be elected
from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. In this case, Buhay Party-List was
entitled to two seats in the House that went to its first
two nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and
William Irwin C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother
Mike, being the fifth nominee, did not get a seat and
thus had not become a member of the House of
Representatives. Indubitably, the HRET has no
jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike's
qualifications.
Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the
qualifications of Buhay Party-List, as it is vested by
law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the
COMELEC. Section 6 of said Act states that "the
COMELEC may motuproprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel,
after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition . . . ." Accordingly, in the case of Abayon vs.
HRET, We ruled that the HRET did not gravely abuse
its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto against AangatTayo party-list
and Bantay party-list insofar as they sought the
disqualifications of said party-lists.
Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review
decisions, orders, or resolutions of the COMELEC
provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the
1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 37 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure that has jurisdiction to
hear the instant petition.
JALOSJOS VS COMELEC
The qualification of Jalosjos was questioned with the
COMELEC but the elections went through. Jalosjos
was proclaimed a winner. The issue of his qualification
has not yet been settled. It should be transferred to the
jurisdiction of the electoral tribunal.
While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the
power to decide all questions affecting elections, such
power is not without limitation. It does not extend to
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests
solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the
Senate or the House of Representatives.
The Court has already settled the question of when the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and when that of
the HRET begins. The proclamation of a congressional
candidate following the election divests COMELEC of
jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed
Representative in favor of the HRET.
Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order
dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos had already been
proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the
election. Thus, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of his
qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga
Sibugay.
REYES V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. NO. 207264, [JUNE 25, 2013]
According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of
its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed because
pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive
jurisdiction to be the "sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications" of the
Members of the House of Representatives.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, however, the COMELEC
retains jurisdiction for the following reasons:
First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the
issue of petitioner's qualifications, as well as over the
assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is
duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred
that she has filed such action. HcTIDC
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after
the candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution
Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of
the House of Representatives because, primarily, she
has not yet assumed office. To repeat what has earlier
been said, the term of office of a Member of the House
of Representatives begins only "at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following their election." Thus, until
such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.
A) COMPOSITION
LEGISLATIVE COMPONENT shall be filled up based
on PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. This is
based on actual membership in a particular party.
There is no more rounding up to give more
representation to some and thereby depriving
representation to the others. 54
B) NATURE OF FUNCTION: QUASI-JUDICIAL
Even in the Constitution, it uses the term, ―sole judge
of all contests relating to elections, returns and
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
qualifications,‖ still they are exercising quasi-judicial
functions because only the Supreme Court and the
lower courts created under the law are considered
to exercise judicial powers based on Section 1.
However, being sole judges, they are to act as if they
were judges. The ones sitting there representing
their respective parties on the basis of
proportional representation will have to end their
partisan relationship with the parties that
nominated them. As such, they enjoy security of
tenure that they can only be removed for cause.
C) INDEPENDENCE OF THE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNALS
Based on the THEORY OF INDEPENDENCE OF
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, it is independent from
Congress despite its legislative component. It is
also independent from the court despite its judicial
component. It is also independent from the parties
which nominated them to sit in the electoral
tribunal.
Party-list loyalty may be a ground for removal. But the
party-list loyalty must be based on other acts other
than deciding a case against a party-mate.
BONDOC VS PINEDA
One of the members of Congress was forced to resign
from the electoral tribunal or forced to be removed
because the party which nominated him considered
his membership terminated for acts of disloyalty.
SC clarified that the member of a party can be
removed from a party, thereby, removing in the
electoral tribunal on acts of disloyalty for certain
causes except voting against a party‟s interest.
D) JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
Decisions of the electoral tribunal are as a
GENERAL RULE final and non-appealable not
subject to review except Judicial Review by the
Supreme Court under Rule 65 on the question or
issue of jurisdiction.
VILANDO VS HRET
Decisions of the HRET, though they are supposed
to be considered complete in itself and final, can
always be subjected to judicial review on proper
cases. They are not immune from judicial
interference if the court, in the exercise of its so-
called extraordinary jurisdiction to determine
whether the electoral tribunal has acted with grave
abuse of discretion, they can actually review
decisions on the electoral tribunal.
Well-settled is the principle that the judgments of the
HRET are beyond judicial interference. The only
instance where this Court may intervene in the
exercise of its so-called extraordinary jurisdiction is
upon a determination that the decision or resolution of
the HRET was rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a
clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of
its power to constitute a denial of due process of law,
or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated
error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of
discretion that there has to be a remedy for such
abuse. In this case, there is no showing of any such
arbitrariness or improvidence. The HRET acted well
within the sphere of its power when it dismissed
the quo warranto petition.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
Art VI Section 18. There shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and
twelve Members of the House of Representatives,
elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Chairman of the
Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie.
The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission. The Commission
shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
Section 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the
Commission on Appointments shall be constituted
within thirty days after the Senate and the House
of Representatives shall have been organized with
the election of the President and the Speaker. The
Commission on Appointments shall meet only while
the Congress is in session, at the call of its
Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to
discharge such powers and functions as are herein
conferred upon it.
NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENTS
There are 24 members in the Commission, 12 from
each house and to be filled up on the basis of
proportional representation and the Senate
President shall sit as the chair.
It is purely executive in character because this is in
relation to or in conjunction with the appointing powers
of the President. The limited authority of the CoA is to
confirm or reject certain appointments made by
the President for those positions falling under the first
sentence of Sec 16 of Article VI.
55
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 POWERS OF CONGRESS
A) GENERAL PLENARY POWERS
Art VI Section 1. The legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to
the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.
Grant of legislative power to congress is general
or plenary subject to the limitations as may be
provided for by the Constitution.
LIMITATIONS ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER
1. SUBSTANTIVE Limitations and
2. PROCEDURAL Limitations.
SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS
a) EXPRESS SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS
1) ART III BILL OF RIGHTS
The phraseology of Article 3 uses the negative word,
―no‖ generally as a matter of design to emphasize that
these are limitations to State authority. No law can be
passed in violation all those specific provisions under
Art 3.
2) ART VI SEC 25 AND 28
Art VI SECTION 25. (1) The Congress may not
increase the appropriations recommended by the
President for the operation of the Government as
specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner
of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by
law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced
in the general appropriations bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation
therein.
Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its
operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for
the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for
approving appropriations for other departments
and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the
purpose for which it is intended, and shall be
supported by funds actually available as certified
by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposed therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer
of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions
may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices
from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular
officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to
be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to
such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress
shall have failed to pass the general
appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the
general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal
year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain
in force and effect until the general appropriations
bill is passed by the Congress.
The most important thing there is Section 25(2). With
respect to appropriations, there shall be no provision
or enactment in the General Appropriations Bill unless
it pertains to some appropriations therein.
BELGICA V OCHOA
There are two things that Section 25(2) requires:
(1) There must have to be a specific item to be
funded. This will be a program, activity or Plan which
is a national expenditure program.
(2) Specific sum of money. How much should go in a
specific activity, program or plan?
SC said that the PDAF in its present form is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 25(2) and
Section 29 which says that no money shall be paid out
of the treasury unless pursuant to an appropriation
made by law and that the appropriations there is
referring to is Section 25(2).
PDAF, in providing for roughly P25B for all members
of Congress, both Senate and House of
Representatives, is a form of INTERMEDIATE
APPROPRIATIONS. When Congress is authorized by
the Constitution to appropriate funds from the public
treasury, it requires that it should be made by
Congress as a Congressional body and not by
individual legislators who has discretion on what
program, activity or plans to fund and how much of
these they intend to fund will be funded for. It should
be the Congress.
ARAULLO V AQUINO
B. Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI
of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: "No
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law. 56
The OSG posits, that no law was necessary for the
adoption and implementation of the DAP because of
its being neither a fund nor an appropriation, but a
program or an administrative system of prioritizing
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
spending; and that the adoption of the DAP was by
virtue of the authority of the President as the Chief
Executive to ensure that laws were faithfully executed.
SC agrees with the OSG‘s position.
The DAP was a government policy or strategy
designed to stimulate the economy through
accelerated spending. In the context of the DAP‘s
adoption and implementation being a function
pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during
the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional
mandate to faithfully execute the laws, including the
GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or
to implement the DAP. Congress could appropriate but
would have nothing more to do during the Budget
Execution Stage. Indeed, appropriation was the act by
which Congress "designates a particular fund, or sets
apart a specified portion of the public revenue or of the
money in the public treasury, to be applied to some
general object of governmental expenditure, or to
some individual purchase or expense." As pointed out
in Gonzales v. Raquiza: ‗"In a strict sense,
appropriation has been defined ‗as nothing more than
the legislative authorization prescribed by the
Constitution that money may be paid out of the
Treasury,‘ while appropriation made by law refers to
‗the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a
particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment
of debt or dues from the State to its creditors.‘"
On the other hand, the President, in keeping with his
duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient
discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt
the budget to changes in the country‘s economic
situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the
purpose. He could pool the savings and identify the
PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of
savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of
the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve
appropriation in the strict sense because the money
had been already set apart from the public treasury by
Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the
Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress
under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
SECTION 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be
uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the
Presidentto fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as it may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national development program of
the Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or
convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used
for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall
be exempt from taxation.
OWWA under the DOLE has paid the priests celebrate
Sunday Mass for Filipino domestics in HongKong. Is
the payment of the salary of the priests celebrating
mass valid and constitutional?
NO because when the priest is to be paid with public
funds or chaplains or pastors, they must be paid
because they are employees of the government
rendering religious services for those penal
institutions, but not in any other capacity.
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be
passed without the concurrence of a majority of all
the Members of the Congress.
3) ART XIV SEC 4(3)
Art XIV Sec 4 (3) All revenues and assets of non-
stock, non-profit educational institutions used
actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties.
Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate
existence of such institutions, their assets shall be
disposed of in the manner provided by law.
Proprietary educational institutions, including
those cooperatively owned, may likewise be
entitled to such exemptions, subject to the
limitations provided by law, including restrictions on
dividends and provisions for reinvestment.
4) ART VI SEC 29
Art VI SECTION 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated,
applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when
such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned
to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium.
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special
purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out
for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a
special fund was created has been fulfilled or
abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to 57
the general funds of the Government.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA

NAZARETH VS VILLAR
This was decided before the DAP and PDAF. This
case also involves the transfer of funds because
Section 25(5) mentions allowable transfers of funds.
Basically, transfer of funds under the Constitution,
as a general rule is not allowed. It can only be
allowed under 4 conditions:
(1) There is a law authorizing the officers
mentioned, namely, the President, Vice-
President, Speaker of the House, Chief
Justice, and chairpersons of Constitutional
Commissions;
(2) There must have to be savings.
ARAULLO V. AQUINO III
―Savings‖means that there is savings either because
(1) Project which was identified in the
appropriations has been completed and there
is an excess or
(2) They decided to forego with the actual
implementation of the project.
(3) Excess in Revenue Collection
Budget Secretary forced ―savings‖ to exist by not
releasing the amounts appropriated by Congress for
its implementation. Technically, that is allowed under
the DOCTRINE OF EXECUTIVE IMPOUNDMENT.
When the budget is proposed and Congress
authorizes it by the General Appropriations Bill, the
approved budget has no corresponding liquid or cash.
That is why the National Budget includes sources of
financing.
The only thing which cannot be done with respect
to impoundment is with the Judiciary and the
Constitutional Commissions.There can be no
impoundment for those supposed to enjoy fiscal
autonomy.If there is money available, it must be
released to them.
(3) Transfer of funds require that it be used to
augment the items already included in the
Appropriations Bill
AUGMENTATION - There is an item which is allowed
in the GAA to be part of the expenditure but there is
some amount lacking. It could not be completed for
some reason. So that could be augmented by savings
from other items, also allowed in the GAA.
(4) They shall be used in the same office; no
CROSS-BORDER TRANSFER.
NAZARETH VS VILLAR
There was a law - Magna Carta for the benefits of
DOST employeeswhich states that the benefits shall
be funded by law under the General Appropriations
Act. One regionasked the President to release the
benefits to them. President signed it and agreed that it
be released. However, thebenefits under the Magna
Carta were not funded under the General
Appropriations Act.
SC said that it cannot be done. When Congress
authorizes a program, plan or activity to be funded and
authorizes a specific sum, that is budget legislation or
authorization. Conversely, if Congress did not
include the proposed program, plan or activity to
be funded in the GAA or though provided therein
but with a lesser amount, it means that Congress
has disallowed that.
The benefits due to the DOST employees as stated in
the Magna Carta was never included in the GAA, then
Congress has not allowed or authorized those benefits
to be paid. It cannot be possible under the allowable
transfer of funds that the President can fund that
benefit, simply because Congress has not authorized it
to be given.
BUDGET EXPENDITURE AND FINANCING
There are two basic items there:
i. PROGRAMMED funds - used for approved
projects
ii. UNPROGRAMMED funds - projects are
approved to be funded provided there is an
excess in revenue collections
5) ART VI SEC 30
Art VI SECTION 30. No law shall be passed
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and concurrence.
That has been the subject of an earlier case involving
RA 6770 (The law creating the Office of the
Ombudsman) which provided for an appellate
jurisdiction with the Supreme Court which was enacted
by the Congress without the prior concurrence or
approval. The Supreme Court held that it is an
unconstitutional provision.
58
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 6) ART VI SEC 31
Art VI SECTION 31. No law granting a title of
royalty or nobility shall be enacted.
B) IMPLIED SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS
1) PROHIBITION AGAINST DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER
DOCTRINE OF NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS
APPLICABLE IN ALL BRANCHES OF
GOVERNMENT
Delegation of power is the exception because the
rule is non-delegation. They are not allowed to
delegate it further unless there is what we know as
ALLOWABLE DELEGATION.
IN ALLOWABLE DELEGATION, THERE ARE 2
TESTS:
(1) COMPLETENESS OF STATUTE TEST and
(2) SUFFICIENCY OF STANDARD TEST
COMPLETENESS OF STATUTES - When the law
leaves Congress, the law is supposed to be complete
in itself. It must have sufficient limitations.
Example:Labor code provision which allows
RWTB (Regional Wage Tripartite Board) the
power to fix minimum wage. In the Labor
Code, there are certain factors or guidelines to
consideron how the minimum wages per
region will have to be fixed.
Congress is not expected to know all these specific
details in terms of legislation to address the particular
human activity. So these administrative agencies have
been created by law and given these special functions
thru delegation by the Congress, to fill in the details of
the particular legislation affecting their offices.
Unless there is an abuse, such as when the
administrative agency has provided for a rule in
relation to the law, which would provide more than
what the law has allowed, then these rules and
regulations would have to be considered as consistent.
SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION - This is the power of
administrative offices to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement the provisions of the law.
LIMITATIONS:
1) The rule-making power must not contravene
the Constitution;
2) It must be consistent with delegated
authority;
INWARD-TURNING LEGISLATION - When congress
delegates the power (subordinate legislation) to a
particular government agency, the grant of power is
supposed to be complete. Congress cannot withhold
the power to approve, or make these rules effective
dependent upon the approval of congress.
ABAKADA VS PURISIMA
562 SCRA 251 (2008)
The factual setting was that congress allowed an
administrative body to enact the implementing rules
and regulations with respect to the Attrition Law.
However, congress said, before this IRR would be
implemented it has to have prior congressional
approval and that the Supreme Court said is inward
turning legislation. When the power to propose or
promulgate IRR is delegated, it fully delegates it. It
cannot be subjected to prior approval of congress for
its efficacy because supposedly must have to provide
for the standards and if the standards are met then it
should be effective pursuant to the delegated
authority.
ON PDAF: To grant individual members of Congress
the power to identify projects out of the approved lump
sum by Congress as a body is a form of inward turning
legislation. When the budget is approved by Congress
in its truest sense, it is supposed to be the
congressional authorization for the implementation or
execution of the budget. Based on the budgetary
process, once the budget submitted by the Executive
to Congress is approved, the 3rd phase of the budget
process or procedure is budget execution. To make
individual members of congress approve expenditure
before an appropriation is released to the actual
beneficiaries because of the arrangement in the PDAF
that amounts to an inward-turning legislation which is
unconstitutional.
Several practices like mediation procedure or the
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) which are done
outside of court are NOT delegated exercise of judicial
power because judicial power strictly construed is
exercised only by A SUPREME COURT AND SUCH
OTHER LOWER COURTS AS MAY BE PROVIDED
FOR BY LAW (Section 1, Article VIII)
Can that Presidential Decree establishing the
Judiciary Development Fund be repealed by the
Congress? It may not be as easy as sayingyes,
because you have to consider certain constitutional
provisions. The budget of the Judiciary, though it will
pass through the same processes as all other
branches of the government, under Section 25(1) of
Article 6, there is also another provision in the
Constitution which says that the budget of the
Judiciary shall not be diminished. It can only be equal
to the present rate but it can never go down from the
current year‘s amount. 59
That is exactly the reason why the budget for the
construction of courthouses is not under the funds of
the Judiciary. If you include that in the Judiciary‘s
budget, and all of the Halls of Justice are made first
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
class, the Congress can never diminish or lower down
the budget of the Judiciary. That is why, all the
infrastructures of the Judiciary are not under the funds
of the Judiciary.
DISINI VS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly
delegated its power when it gave the Cybercrime
Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the
power to formulate a national cybersecurity plan
without any sufficient standards or parameters for it to
follow.
In order to determine whether there is undue
delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted
two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves
the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate,
the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The
second test mandates adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of
the delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot.
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it
directed the CICC to formulate and implement a
national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the
position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient
standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a
definition of cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies,
risk management approaches, actions, training, best
practices, assurance and technologies that can be
used to protect cyber environment and organization
and user‘s assets. This definition serves as the
parameters within which CICC should work in
formulating the cybersecurity plan.
Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is
consistent with the policy of the law to "prevent and
combat such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their
detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the
domestic and international levels, and by providing
arrangements for fast and reliable international
cooperation." This policy is clearly adopted in the
interest of law and order, which has been considered
as sufficient standard. Hence, Sections 24 and 26(a)
are likewise valid.
EXCEPTION TO NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE
A) DELEGATION TO THE PRESIDENT
Art VI Sec 23 (2) In times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease
upon the next adjournment thereof.
This is what is known as EMERGENCY POWERS.
The delegation to the President under Section 23 of
the so-called emergency powers is allowed provided
that there is a declaration made by Congress of
delegated authority.
The reason why in case of war or declared national
emergency the President can exercise delegated
power is to do away with the delay that may be
brought about by the usual legislative process
provided that the limitations in Section 23 are all
complied with.
Sec 28 (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the
President to fix within specified limits, and subject
to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
B) DELEGATION TO THE PEOPLE
Art VI Section 32. The Congress shall, as early as
possible, provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby
the people can directly propose and enact laws or
approve or reject any act or law or part thereof
passed by the Congress or local legislative
bodyafter the registration of a petition therefor
signed by at least ten per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
In its original context, this is supposed to be a power
which has been retained by the people in its sovereign
capacity but because of the need for an enabling law,
the initiative and referendum as provided in the
Constitution can be considered as delegated authority.
C) DELEGATION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
RA 7160 LGC Section 16. General Welfare. - Every
local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate,
or incidental for its efficient and effective governance,
and those which are essential to the promotion of the
general welfare.
(GENERAL GRANT)Within their respective territorial
60
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and
support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety,
enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.
The Delegation to Local Governments is the only
exception to the principle in law that there has to be
some legal basis of an act or power of government to
be exercised. But the delegation to local
government has no historical basis except by
reason of time immemorial practice.
Because of the Local Government Code of 1991, we
now have a legal basis for granting legislative authority
to local government units. Section 16 of the LGC or
the general welfare clause is the usual basis for the
exercise of police power of local governments in 2
forms:
1) SPECIFIC GRANT of Congress, which is a
law enacted by it and
2) GENERAL GRANT which is provided in the
2nd sentence of Section 16 of the LGC.
The allowance granted to local governments to
legislate was based on the need of local legislation
which only the Sanggunian can properly address.
The reason is because of the fact that legislative
assemblies or councils are in the best position to
determine what is needed for local legislation that
congress in the national scope of things will not be
able to determine what the local demands are in terms
of legislation.
The only limitation there is that it should only pertain
to local matters.
UMALI V COMELEC
Catanduanes city was subjected to a plebiscite to be
considered as a highly urbanized city to be taken out
from the province of Nueva Ecija. A question was
raised on who should vote on the plebiscite - should it
be only those in the Cabanatuan City or should it be
the entire voting population of Nueva Ecija. Part of the
discussion was on the delegation of the power to
declare a city as highly urbanized.
The Supreme Court took notice that the local
government code provisions provide as follows: That
Section 453 mandates that it is the duty of the
president to declare a city as highly urbanized after it
has met the minimum requirements prescribed in
Section 452 of the local government code. Also, under
Section 10 of the local government code, there shall
be a plebiscite in order that the creation, division,
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries shall be effective. So Supreme Court
mentioned that the power to declare a city as highly
urbanized based on Section 453 in relation to Section
10 of the Local Government Code has been delegated
to the President under Section 10, Article 10 of the
Constitution.
The answer as to who are to vote, it is the entire voting
population of the province because they are also
affected.
The framers of the Constitution have, however,
allowed for the delegation of such power in Sec. 10,
Art. X of the Constitution as long as (1) the criteria
prescribed in the LGC is met and (2) the creation,
division, merger, abolition or the substantial alteration
of the boundaries is subject to the approval by a
majority vote in a plebiscite.
X XX
Congress delegated such power to the
SangguniangPanlalawigan or
SangguniangPanlungsod to create barangays
pursuant to Sec. 6 of the LGC.
X XX
With the twin criteria of standard and plebiscite
satisfied, the delegation to LGUs of the power to
create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter
boundaries has become a recognized exception to the
doctrine of non-delegation of legislative powers.
2) PROHIBITION AGAINST PASSAGE OF
IRREPEALABLE LAWS
Laws which are valid and effective for a specific period
of time and after such period of time it loses its
effectivityis not an example of a law which cannot be
repealed. That is just a SELF-LIMITING LAW where
after a certain period of time, it would ordinarily lose its
effect or efficacy.
Legislative power (general and plenary in
character) includes the power not only to pass
new laws but to pass a new law repealing the
previous one. All laws therefore by nature, are
subject to repeal by future actions.
PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS
Art VI Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a
law unless it has passed three readings on
61
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its
final form have been distributed to its Members
three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
3 meetings on Saturdays and there must have to be
printed copies of the final draft for the 3rd reading
where voting will be had. 3-3-3. Once passed, this
shall be referred to the other house for their
consideration.
The requirement on the 333 can be dispensed with if
the President certifies it as urgent. To be technical
about it, what can be dispensed with are readings on
separate days. There should still be 3 readings still.
As proof, there shall be printed copies to be passed to
the members for their voting on 3rd reading. So it can
be done in 1 day because the bill is certified as urgent.
You cannot do away with the deliberations. You
cannot do away with the voting.
The furnishing of printed copies which is required to be
there 3 days before the third and final reading can be
dispensed with but the printed copy, the document
itself, cannot be because what is there to certify and
enroll for submission to the president for his signature.
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress
shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign
it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same
with his objections to the House where it
originated, which shall enter the objections at large in
its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of
such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be
sent, together with the objections, to the other
House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,
and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of
that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases,
the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas
or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or
against shall be entered in its Journal. The President
shall communicate his veto of any bill to the
House where it originated within thirty days after
the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall
become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect
the item or items to which he does not object.
BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE is
referred to as the third house of congress. This is not
found in the Constitution but is based on legislative
practice. It is composed of members of both houses
who are interested in the passage of certain
legislations and who will have to meet:
1. When there is a conflict in the versions of
the bills coming from both houses in order to
harmonize them; or
2. Even if there is no real conflict but there is a
need to refine the language or phraseology of
the intended legislation, then the Bicameral
conference committee may have to convene
to come up with the third and the final version
of the bill.
NO-AMENDMENT RULE - When a bill is passed
by one house and it is thereafter submitted to the
other house for consideration, the Constitution
prohibits that house to amend the approved
legislation or bill if there is already a final draft.
The final draft as approved by bicameral
conference committee does not violate the no-
amendment rule because there is technically no
nominal voting during the passage of the final draft
coming from the Conference committee.
ARROYO VS DE VENECIA
Simple passage of the approved measure for lack of
any objection or opposition is considered the approval
of the final draft. It does not also violate the rule on 3
passages because most houses have already tackled
their respective versions of the bill but which have
been subjected to the discretionary exercise of power
by the bicameral conference committee.
B) QUESTION HOUR
Art VI Section 22. The heads of departments may
upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as
the rules of each House shall provide, appear before
and be heard by such House on any matter
pertaining to their departments.Written questions
shall be submitted to the President of the Senate
or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at
least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to
written questions, but may cover matters related
thereto. When the security of the State or the
public interest so requires and the President so
states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.
QUESTION HOUR and LEGISLATIVE
INVESTIGATIONS are part of their
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS.
ABAKADA VS PURISIMA
SC mentioned of 3 Congressional Oversight
Functions:
1) Legislative Scrutiny (which may include
Question Hour) 62
2) Legislative Investigations
3) Legislative Supervision
Of these 3, Congress can only exercise 2, which are
(1) Legislative Scrutiny, which includes the budget
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
hearings and question hour and (2) Legislative
Investigations.
Generally, Legislative supervision amounts to Inward-
Turning Legislation which is not allowed. But there
are two ways by which it can be done:
a. Congressional Oversight Committee -
normally had when there is a need for
congress to ensure that the law it has passed
is properly implemented.
b. Budget Hearings (?)
FOUR PHASES OF BUDGET
C) LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS
Art VI Section 21. The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE CONCEPT - Members of the
cabinet can now be called to congress not only in
Question hour but they can be called in Legislative
Investigations.
GARCILLANO VS HR COMMITTEE
575 SCRA 77 (2008)

BUDGET BUDGET
PLANNING AUTHORIZ QUESTION HOUR LEGISLATIVE
ATION (SEC 22) INVESTIGATIONS
(SEC 21)

It is quite specific. It is As opposed to question

referring to heads of hour, any person can
BUDGET BUDGET executive department. be called.
ACCOUNTA EXECUTION

BILITY

There must have to be

written questions
submitted before they
are asked.
1) BUDGET PLANNING - it is normally with the
president where all offices of government
including the judiciary and the congress will Only those matters Any question can be
submit how much they would need. President pertaining to the asked provided it is an
will prepare the basis for the general respective issue or question which
appropriations bill which is the national budget departments of the Congress has
for next year. head who is called to jurisdiction over.
testify can be asked.
2) BUDGET AUTHORIZATION - It will go
through congress. The only limitation is that
the rights of any person
3) BUDGET EXECUTION - Once it gets out of appearing or may be
congress, it will be implemented by the affected by such inquiry
delegate and that delegate is the executive must have to be
through the DBM. respected. Also, the
rules of the inquiry must
4) BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY have been published

LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY: QUESTION HOUR

Congress regularly scrutinizes the executive or other
branches through the budget hearings.
Apparently, because Question Hour under Section 22
is new in or Constitution, the initial thinking was that
there has to be a Presidential consent or approval
before any of these ―heads of the executive
department‖ can be called to congress for an inquiry.
NERI VS SENATE COMMITTEE
While Section 22 is quite specific that if a member of
the cabinet is called to an inquiry in congress, that
should rightfully be under Question Hour. 63
But if they are called to an inquiry not necessarily
relating to their respective departments, they can
be called under Section 21 as an Inquiry In Aid of
Legislation. In this case presidential permission or

COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA

authority is not required. They are protected under
section 21 if they are asked questions which would
incriminate them.
They cannot refuse a subpoena by Congress or a
committee thereof to attend and testify on a
legislative inquiry under the claim that (1) they can
only be asked under question hour or (2) they are
covered by executive privilege.
THERE ARE TWO TYPES OF COMMUNICATIONS
WHICH MAY GENERALLY FALL IN WHAT IS
KNOWN AS FALLING PART OF THE EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE.
1) PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION
PRIVILEGEwhere they reflect the
discussions leading to Presidential
decision making, and
2) DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGEwhich
are generally advisory opinions on
government decisions and policies not
necessarily limited to the President‟s
policy-making or decisions.
What is covered by the exception to any inquiry would
be the PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS
PRIVILEGE. There is limited Legislative Inquiry
allowed because it is related to presidential elections.
It presupposes 2 things: (1) it is for a valid purpose,
(2) it is for a legal objective.
The Presidential Communications Privilege not only
covers those who are members of the cabinet per se
but it follows the PROXIMITY RULE.
PROXIMITY RULES or
RULE ON OPERATIONAL PROXIMITY
You may not be a member of the cabinet but if you are
included in the deliberations and the discussion
leading to the presidential policy or decision, then you
are covered by the Executive Privilege.
You can refuse to answerwhich would be covered
under the Presidential Communications Privilege, not
refuse to attend an inquiry by Congress.
GUDANI VS SENATE
If it were to be a military officer who would be
called to congress, they can refuse not because of
Executive Privilege per se but under the CHAIN OF
COMMAND RULE.
The commander in chief being the president, can order
any subordinate not to attend any inquiry and the
subordinate being the soldier is supposed to follow
that command because of the peculiar structure of the
military. The chain of command rule can prevent or
prohibit the subordinate officer from attending any
inquiry, much more divulging any information.
PHILCOMSAT V SENATE
It has been said then and still holds true today
that an inquiry in aid of legislation is not invalid
simply because it does not result in legislation. An
inquiry is not always for the purpose of coming up
of a legislation or proposed legislation. It can also
be used for:
1) Examination of an existing legislation
2) Examination as to its efficacy, as to its
propriety
3) Whether there is a need to amend or
revise the law
Petitioners Locsin and Andal's allegation that their
constitutionally-guaranteed right to counsel was
violated during the hearings held in furtherance of PSR
No. 455 is specious. The right to be assisted by
counsel can only be invoked by a person under
custodial investigation suspected for the commission
of a crime, and therefore attaches only during such
custodial investigation. Since petitioners Locsin and
Andal were invited to the public hearings as resource
persons, they cannot therefore validly invoke their right
to counsel.
D) ACT AS BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR
PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS
Art VII Sec 4 The returns of every election for
President and Vice-President, duly certified by the
board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be
transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President
of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of
canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later
than thirty days after the day of the election, open all
the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the
House of Representatives in joint public session, and
the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity
and due execution thereof in the manner provided by
law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall
be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall
have an equal and highest number of votes, one of
them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a
majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the 64
canvassing of the certificates.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
E) CALL FOR SPECIAL ELECTIONS FOR THE
PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
Art VII Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o‘clock
in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the
offices of the President and Vice-President occurs,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call and within seven days, enact a law calling for a
special election to elect a President and a Vice-
President. xxx
This is a situation where both the offices of the
President and Vice President are vacant. Under the
Constitution, Congress, without need of call, meet to
enact a law to call for special elections.
Considering that there is a need to call for special
elections, congress would have to convene without
need of call and they are supposed to enact a law
calling for a special election. That bill is considered:
 to be certified as urgent and
 that bill is coupled already with availability of
funds
F) REVOKE OR EXTEND SUSPENSION OF
PRIVILEGE OF HABEAS CORPUS OR
DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW
Art VII Section 18. xxx Within forty-eight hours from
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing
to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not
be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner,
extend such proclamation or suspension for a period
to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-
four hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call.
Power of congress is shared with the executive and
the executive. The president has to make a report to
congress. Consequentially, congress has the power to
go over such declaration or suspension. There is no
need of any other act that should entitle the congress
to exercise its authority.
SC will consider such declaration or suspension only
when there is a petition filed.
G) APPROVE PRESIDENTIAL AMNESTIES
Art VII Section 19. xxx President xxx shall also have
the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the Congress.
H) CONFIRM CERTAIN APPOINTMENTS
Art VII Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the
Office of the Vice-President during the term for
which he was elected, the President shall nominate
a Vice-President from among the Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives who shall
assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of
all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately.
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. xxx
For those officers mentioned in the first sentence of
section 16 of Art 7 of the Constitution, they need to be
confirmed by the CA. When Congress exercises its
powers under the Commissions on Appointments,
they are not exercising legislative power but
executive in character.
AD INTERIM APPOINTMENTS- those appointments
extended by the President for positions falling in the
first sentence of Sec 16 but are extended when
Congress is not in session.
If the appointment therefore is not among those
listed in the first sentence of sec 16, even if Congress
is not in session, that is not an ad interim
appointment.
While ad interim means RECESS APPOINTMENTS,
the term recess does not refer to the time that the
appointment was made solely. It must also refer to
the nature or the position that the appointment is
made for. If the position is not again covered by the
first sentence of sec 16, regardless of whether
Congress is in session, that is not ad interim.
PIMENTEL VS HRET
ISSUE:Can the President extend acting appointments
for those officers falling in the first sentence of sec 16
and not extend to them either regular or ad interim
appointments?
If it is an ad interim appointmentfalling in the first 65
sentence of Sec 16 and Congress is not in
session, eventually that appointment would be
submitted to the CA.Acting appointments on the
other hand, need not be submitted to the CA
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
because they are made in an acting capacity. It can
never become permanent.
Is that not an abuse of discretion on the part of the
President in extending acting appointments,
instead of ad interim or regular appointments?If
there is no grave abuse of discretion, then acting
appointments are perfectly valid.The appointing
powers of the President are generally executive and
largely discretionary. Congress and the SC cannot
impose upon the President‘s appointing authority to
make appointments either ad interim or regular.
Unless there is a pattern showing that the grant of
acting appointments are made to avoid scrutiny by the
CA, the court is not ready to rule that there was an
exercise of grave abuse of discretion.
If an appointment is bypassed by the CA, can the
President reappoint that person?Yes, he can be re-
nominated to the same position up to ad infinitum. It is
considered bypassed because Congress refused to
act on the nomination. But if Congress had already
rejected that nomination, say, he can no longer be re-
nominated to the same position.
I) CONCUR IN TREATIES
Art VII Section 21. No treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
When it comes to the presence of foreign military
troops, bases and facilities, the question can be
thrown to the electorate whether they agree or concur
to the treaty allowing their presence here.
J) DECLARATION OF WAR AND DELEGATION OF
EMERGENCY POWERS
Art VI Section 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of
two-thirds of both Houses in joint session
assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole
power to declare the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers
shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
K) BE JUDGE OF THE PRESIDENT‟S PHYSICAL
FITNESS OR CAPACITY
Art VII Section 11 If the Congress, within ten days
after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in
session, within twelve days after it is required to
assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the
President shall continue exercising the powers and
duties of his office.
This is a new provision in the 1987 Constitution.
This will happen if [Congress] or the President will
contest the declaration of his incapacity by a majority
of the members of his cabinet.
L) POWER OF IMPEACHMENT
Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to
remove a public official for serious crimes or
misconduct as provided in the Constitution. A
mechanism designed to check abuse of power,
impeachment has its roots in Athens and was adopted
in the United States (US) through the influence of
English common law on the Framers of the US
Constitution.
Our own Constitution‘s provisions on impeachment
were adopted from the US Constitution.
PERSONS WHO MAY BE SUBJECT OF
IMPEACHMENT (EXCLUSIVE):
1. President,
2. Vice-President,
3. Supreme Court justices,
4. Constitutional Commissioners,
5. Ombudsman.
GONZALES V OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (2012)
While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also
expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by
impeachment under Section 244 of the same Article,
there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly
dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy
Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter.
By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress
simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of
any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In
fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes
Congress to provide for the removal of all other public
officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to
impeachment.
GONZALES VS OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (2014)
The intent of the framers of the Constitution in
providing that "[a]ll other public officers and employees
may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment" in the second sentence of 66
Section 2, Article XI is to prevent Congress from
extending the more stringent rule of "removal only by
impeachment" to favored public
officers. Understandably so, impeachment is the most
difficult and cumbersome mode of removing a public
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
officer from office. It is, by its nature, a sui generis
politico-legal process that signals the need for a
judicious and careful handling as shown by the
process required to initiate the proceeding; the one-
year limitation or bar for its initiation; the limited
grounds for impeachment; the defined instrumentality
given the power to try impeachment cases; and the
number of votes required for a finding of guilt.All these
argue against the extension of this removal
mechanism beyond those mentioned in the
Constitution.
GROUNDS FOR IMPEACHMENT:
1. Treason,
2. Bribery,
3. Graft and Corruption,
4. Culpable violation of the Constitution,
5. Other high crimes,
6. Betrayal of public trust.
NOTE: Except for treason, bribery and graft and
corruption, all the rest have no technical definition yet
by law.
The determination of the three other grounds, which
are betrayal of public trust, culpable violation of the
Constitution and other high crimes would largely
depend on the determination of the Lower House,
initially, because it is where it is initiated, and
eventually, by the Senate where the case is tried.
PROCEDURE FOR IMPEACHMENT
Art XI Section 3. (1) The HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES shall have the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be
filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within
ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the
House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of
the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall
be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed byat least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute
the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the
Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a
PERIOD OF ONE YEAR.
(6) The SENATE shall have the sole power to try
and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting
for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or
affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is
on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
shall preside, but shall not vote.No person shall be
convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of
all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not
extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution,
trial, and punishment, according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of
this section.
If it is senator initiating a complaint, his complaint must
be coupled by a resolution of a member of the Lower
House.
ONE-YEAR BAN
The one-year ban is applied based on the FILING
AND REFERRAL RULE. It is not counted form the
date of filing alone. The complaint must have been
filed, must have been calendared for reading in the
house and must have been referred to the appropriate
committee which is the Committee on Justice and
Good Government.
CONSEQUENCE OF IMPEACHMENT
Do not use the word ―acquittal‖ because this is not a
criminal proceeding, but simply the complaint for
impeachment is dismissed, if the required two-thirds
majority is not achieved.
If there is a finding of liability, the decision of the
Senate finding liability will not go beyond removal from
public office and perpetual disqualification. Since the
officer is impeached, he is now open to any and all
kinds of proceeding for the acts subject of the
impeachment. The impeachment court of the Senate is
not a criminal court which will impose liability resulting
to any imprisonment other than removal form office
and perpetual disqualification. 67
The rules on double jeopardy do not apply
because impeachment proceedings are not
criminal in nature. Thus, first jeopardy will never
attach.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA

M) POWER WITH REGARD TO THE UTILIZATION
OF NATURAL RESOURCES
Art XII Sec 2 The Congress may, by law, allow small-
scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with
priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in
rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
REQUIREMENTS AS TO BILLS
(1) AS TO TITLES OF BILLS
Art VI Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall
be expressed in the title thereof.
The reasons why a bill must be on one subject, which
subject must be indicated in the title, are as follows:
i. To prevent log rolling legislation
ii. To avoid misrepresentation or surprises on
part of members of congress who are to tackle
the legislation
iii. To apprise the public of what the object or
subject of the legislation is, in order for them to
be heard on account of due process.
In FARIÑAS V. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, the
Court explained the provision as follows:
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-
called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well
as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The
provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to
its subject finding expression in its title.
To determine whether there has been compliance with
the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the
rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter
and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of
legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical construction. It is
sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough
reasonably to include the general object which a
statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and
every end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be
set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of
the Act.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES V PRBRE
According to petitioners, the new law is constitutionally
infirm because (1) it violates Article VI, Section 26 (1)
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which mandates
that "[e]very bill passed by Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.‖
We hold that R.A. No. 9646 "An Act Regulating the
Practice of Real Estate Service in the Philippines,
Creating for the Purpose a Professional Regulatory
Board of Real Estate Service, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and For Other Purposes." does not violate
the one-title, one-subject rule.
We find that the inclusion of real estate developers is
germane to the law‘s primary goal of developing "a
corps of technically competent, responsible and
respected professional real estate service practitioners
whose standards of practice and service shall be
globally competitive and will promote the growth of the
real estate industry." Since the marketing aspect of
real estate development projects entails the
performance of those acts and transactions defined as
real estate service practices under Section 3(g) of R.A.
No. 9646, it is logically covered by the regulatory
scheme to professionalize the entire real estate
service sector.
IMBONG VS OCHOA
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of
the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ),
Article VI of the Constitution,122 prescribing the one
subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for
reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the
assailed legislation violates the constitutional
standards of due process by concealing its true intent -
to act as a population control measure.
RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.
In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on
Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was
written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule
does not require the Congress to employ in the title of
the enactment language of such precision as to mirror,
fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if
the title is comprehensive enough as to include the
general object which the statute seeks to effect, and
where, as here, the persons interested are informed of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has
invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical 68
construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede
legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various
provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated
and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle
that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to
or indicating one subject where another or different
one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or scope of
the act."
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive
health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to
the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable
human development" as stated under its terms, the
Court finds no reason to believe that Congress
intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the
contents of the assailed legislation.
(2) REQUIREMENTS AS TO CERTAIN LAWS
APPROPRIATION LAWS
Art VII Section 22. The President shall submit to
the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of
every regular session as the basis of thegeneral
appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and
sources of financing, including receipts from existing
and proposed revenue measures.
When the President submits the entire budget to
Congress, all the budget of the Executive, the
Judiciary, and the Constitutional Commissions will be
subjected to what is known as Budgetary Hearings.
If the head of the Executive department should be
asked by members of Congress to explain why an
amount is needed for the operation of a particular
office for the ensuing year, the same shall be done to
the Speaker of the House. The Speaker shall be asked
by his own peers to explain why an amount of money
is needed by Congress in its operations
Art VI Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or
tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills
shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
Section 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the
appropriations recommended by the President for
the operation of the Government as specified in the
budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation
of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in
the general appropriations bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation therein.
Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its
operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
WITH RESPECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF AN
APPROPRIATIONS BILL, IT MUST INCLUDE
SPECIFIC THINGS:
1) Subject of the appropriation and
2) Amount of the appropriation.
MACARAIG
DOCTRINE OF INAPPROPRIATE PROVISION -
When the word and phrases in an appropriations
bill do not refer or relate to a particular item of
appropriation, that provision or words or phrases
are considered inappropriate.
If the provision in an appropriations bill do not conform
to Section 25 (2) of Article VI, which requires that all
provisions in the appropriations bill must refer to a
particular item or appropriated item, then the
president can “delete” it from the appropriations
bill not because of the item veto of the president
(Section 27 of Article VI) but because they are
inappropriate for inclusion under the Doctrine of
Inappropriate Provision(Section 25 Par 2).
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the
Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for
approving appropriations for other departments and
agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the
purpose for which it is intended, and shall be
supported by funds actually available as certified by
the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposed therein.
SPECIAL APPROPRIATIONS - the only requirement
there is the nature of the purpose, and that there is
availability of funds, or there is a corresponding
revenue proposal
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the President
of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions
may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices
from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
69
TRANSFER OF FUNDS
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
The general rule is that there shall be no transfer
of funds allowed in government because if the
money is appropriated for a particular item, it should
be spent for that particular item.
Otherwise, that act may constitute technical
malversation. It is not malversation per se because
the benefit is not for the accused but for the
government but there was misapplication of the
appropriated funds.
THERE IS AN ALLOWABLE TRANSFER OF FUNDS
IF THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS CONCUR:
i. There is a special law allowing transfer of
funds.
ii. It allows the following officers: Heads of the
various branches of government, the
President, Chief Justice, Senate President,
Speaker of the House and the different
chairpersons of the Constitutional
Commissions.
They can be authorized by law to transfer funds
provided that there are savings in an appropriated item
and the savings are spent for augmentation of another
appropriated item.
Savings cannot, therefore, be used to be spent for an
item which has not been allowed by Congress to be
funded. The item on which the augmentation is
allowed must have to be authorized by Congress.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular
officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to
be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to
such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall
have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for
the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law
for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed
reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the
general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
AUTOMATIC RE-ENACTMENT PROVISION is to
prevent a possibility that Congress will hold the
Executive or hi-jack the President in agreeing to some
forced trading. To prevent that from happening, there
shall be an automatic passing of the previous
appropriations until a new appropriations bill shall have
been passed.
NOTE:The Judicial Development Fund (JDF) is not
an appropriated amount. The JDF comes from the
docket fees paid by the litigants.
TAX LAWS
Art VI Section 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be
uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President
to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the
Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or
convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used
for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall
be exempt from taxation.
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed
without the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.
Art XIV Sec 4 (3) All revenues and assets of non-
stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually,
directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall
be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution
or cessation of the corporate existence of such
institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the
manner provided by law.
Proprietary educational institutions, including those
cooperatively owned, may likewise be entitled to such
exemptions, subject to the limitations provided by law,
including restrictions on dividends and provisions for
reinvestment.
(4) Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants,
endowments, donations, or contributions used
actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes shall be exempt from tax.
PROCEDURE FOR THE PASSAGE OF BILLS
SECTION 26. (2) No bill passed by either House shall
become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final
form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies
to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of
a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter,
and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
70
ORIGIN OF BILLS
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
With respect to
1) Appropriations,
2) Revenue and tariff bills,
3) Bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
4) Bills of local application and
5) Private bills
Those 5 types of bills must originate from the Lower
House under the theory that they are more applied to
localities. Therefore, they should originate from the
House of Representatives.
With respect to these bills, the filing in the Senate
is not prohibited.What is prohibited is for the
Senate to process the bill, i.e. to tackle it, to
deliberate on it even without receiving the
approved version of the Lower House. The Senate
President can refer it to the appropriate committee and
come out with a committee report. That would be filing,
but they could not discuss on second reading the bill
without receiving the approved version coming from
the Lower House.
Once the bills are passed by both houses, Senate
may pass a totally different version of the bill.
Senate is only prevented from deliberating on the bill
without receiving the final draft as approved by the
Lower House. It is not prohibited from passing a totally
different version of the bill. When the Constitution says
that the Senate can make amendments thereto, it
does not preclude the Senate from modifying the
entire bill and coming up its own version which is
totally different from the Lower House, though on the
same subject matter.
BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE
If both Houses‘ versions differ from one another, they
can come up with a harmonized version based on the
functions of the Bicameral Conference Committee.
There is no violation of the provision on origin of bills
or on three readings in separate days on both Houses
because the Bicameral Conference Committee does
not violate any of the provisions in the Constitution.
ARROYO VS DE VENECIA
If a bill has been processed in the Bicameral
Conference Committee and it has complied with
Section 26, there is no Constitutional violation. If the
bill has not been processed under the provision on
Section 26, it would necessarily be considered as
unconstitutional for being violative of the procedure for
the passage of law.
BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE BILL-
The report, which is the approved version of the
bicameral conference committee, need not be the
same as that passed by either or both houses.
And as we have said before, any of these do not
violate the NO AMENDMENT RULE because both
have been passed and approved by the Senate and
the House.
THE PRESIDENT‟S VETO POWER
Art VI Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the
Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented
to the President. If he approves the same, he shall
sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same
with his objections to the House where it originated,
which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal
and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such
House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent,
together with the objections, to the other House by
which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that
House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the
votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or
nays, and the names of the Members voting for or
against shall be entered in its Journal. The President
shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House
where it originated within thirty days after the date of
receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if
he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or
tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items
to which he does not object.
GENERAL RULE: President must VETO THE
ENTIRE BILL OR NONE AT ALL. – With respect to
the ordinary legislation or bills which are submitted to
the President for his action, he has to veto the entire
bill or none at all.
The President, however, may do LINE ITEM VETO
for revenue, tariff or appropriations billbecause of
the different character of the said bills. This is to avoid
the possibility that the President may be held hostage
by Congress. It is called a ―line item veto‖ because the
President has to veto the entire line relating to an item
and not only to a particular part of an entire item of
appropriation.
Items in revenue, tariff or appropriations bill are by
nature separable from each other. If the items are
SEPARABLE, then the President may pick one to
veto and let the others stand. But if it is NOT
SEPARABLE, then the President is not allowed to
veto a portion of a line which is not separable from
the rest.
Example:There is an appropriation for a sum
of money but there is a condition attached to
how this appropriated sum of money can be 71
spent. They are connected to each other,
therefore, not separable. President cannot
delete only that condition or limitation and let
the remainder remain valid. The President
must have to veto the entire line.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA

BELGICA V OCHOA
On this premise, it may be concluded that an
appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be
able to exercise his power of item veto, must contain
"specific appropriations of money" and not only
"general provisions" which provide for parameters of
appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of
appropriation must be an item characterized by
singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a
specified singular amount for a specified singular
purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item."211 This
treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with
its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but
also ensures that the President may discernibly veto
the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the
existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the
Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a
specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be
considered as "line- item" appropriations which are
rightfully subject to item veto.
X XX
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x
xx system where the PDAF is a lump-sum
appropriation, the legislator‗s identification of the
projects after the passage of the GAA denies the
President the chance to veto that item later
on."212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto
power of the President mandates that appropriations
bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress
cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively
renders the constitutionally-given power of the
President useless."
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79
Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit
since the said amount would be further divided among
individual legislators who would then receive personal
lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is
passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on
their own discretion. As these intermediate
appropriations are made by legislators only after the
GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it
necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the
General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated
without veto consideration. This kind of lump-
sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting
system fosters the creation of a budget within a
budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of
presentment and consequently impairs the President‗s
power of item veto.
INSTANCES WHEN A BILL BECOMES A LAW
WITHOUT THE PRESIDENT‟S SIGNATURE:
(1) When Congress certifies a bill and then enrolls it or
submits it to the President, the President has 30 days
within which to act on the enrolled bill.
He is required to write a VETO MESSAGE. The veto
message together with the vetoed bill must be
returned to the house from which it originated. If the
President does not act on the enrolled bill by
signing it or vetoing it the bill will become a law by
lapse of time.
(2) If there is a successful OVERRIDE by the required
two-thirds (2/3) vote of both houses of Congress,
then, the bill becomes a law even without the
President‘s signature.
(3) When it is a special law calling for a special
elections because the offices of both the President
and Vice-President are vacant.
LEGISLATIVE VETO
1) If you talk about failure or refusal of
Congress to act on intended or proposed
legislation, there is such a thing as legislative
veto.
2) The other is inward-turning legislation which
is not valid.
3) The third one probably is a POCKET VETO.
Pocket veto is a tradition or practice which is
valid in the United States. It is the failure of
the President to return a bill vetoed by him
simply because Congress is not in
session.
Article 1 Section 7 of the US Constitution: ―if any bill
shall not be returned by the president within ten days
(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented
to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he
had signed it, unless the Congress by their
adjournment prevent its return in which case it shall
not be a law.‖
There is no Pocket Veto in the Philippines. In the
Philippines, under our Constitution, there seems to be
no requirement must be in session. Upon receipt, the
President must return it whether or not Congress is in
session. Otherwise, from the lapse of the 30-day
period, the bill becomes a law without the President‘s
signature. The 30-day period refers to calendar days.
EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS
72
CC Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA

Republic Act 6735
"The Initiative and Referendum Act"
(a) "INITIATIVE" is the power of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution or to propose and
enact legislations through an election called for the
purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition
proposing amendments to the Constitution;
Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition
proposing to enact a national legislation; and
Initiative on local legislation which refers to a
petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial,
city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or
ordinance
(b) "INDIRECT INITIATIVE" is exercise of initiative by
the people through a proposition sent to Congress or
the local legislative body for action.
(c) "REFERENDUM" is the power of the electorate to
approve or reject a legislation through an election
called for the purpose. It may be of two classes,
namely:
Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to
approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed
by Congress; and
Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to
approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance
enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative
bodies.
Section 5. Requirements. — (a) To exercise the
power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per
centum (10%) of the total number of the registered
voters, of which every legislative district is represented
by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and
register the same with the Commission.
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987
Constitution must have at least twelve per centum
(12%) of the total number of registered voters as
signatories, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution
may be exercised only after five (5) years from the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once
every five (5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed,
as the case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters;
and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one
hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or
printed at the top of every page of the petition.
(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law,
resolution or ordinance passed by the legislative
assembly of an autonomous region, province or
city is deemed validly initiated if the petition thereof is
signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the
registered voters in the province or city, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein;
Provided, however, That if the province or city is
composed only of one (1) legislative district, then at
least each municipality in a province or each barangay
in a city should be represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance
passed in a municipality shall be deemed validly
initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at least ten
per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the
municipality, of which every barangay is represented
by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters therein.
(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay
resolution or ordinance is deemed validly initiated if
signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the
registered voters in said barangay.
Section 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or
Referendum. — The Commission shall call and
supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum.
Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the
petition, the Commission shall, upon determining the
sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino
and English at least twice in newspapers of general
and local circulation and set the date of the initiative or
referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five
(45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the
determination by the Commission of the sufficiency of
the petition.
SECTION 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. — (a)
Not less than two thousand (2,000) registered voters in
case of autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in
case of provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in
case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of
barangays, may file a petition with the Regional
Assembly or local legislative body, respectively,
proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or
73
amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution. xxx
(h) If the required number of the signatures is
obtained, the Commission shall then set a date for the
initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
the registered voters in the local government unit
concerned for their approval within ninety (90) days
from the date of certification by the Commission, as
provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of
autonomous regions, sixty (60) days in case of the
provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of
municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of
barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date
set, after which the results thereof shall be certified
and proclaimed by the Commission on Elections.
QUALIFICATIONS, ELECTION, TERM AND OATH
Art VII Section 2. No person may be elected
President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and
write, at least forty years of age on the day of the
election, and a resident of the Philippines for at
least ten years immediately preceding such
election.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN NATIONAL INITIATIVE Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall
AND A LOCAL INITIATIVE: be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of
six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day
of June next following the day of the election and shall
end at noon of the same date, six years thereafter.
In a local initiative there The President shall not be eligible for any re-
is a requirement for a In the national initiative election. No person who has succeeded as
prior demand. The there is no requirement of President and has served as such for more than
proponents of the prior demand from four years shall be qualified for election to the
initiative must have to Congress. same office at any time.
demand for the local
sanggunian to enact an Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election
ordinance. If the for President and Vice-President shall be held on the
sanggunian does not act second Monday of May.
within 30 days from the
demand to enact an The returns of every election for President and Vice-
ordinance, then the President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of
proponents can file or each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
initiate an initiative or start Congress, directed to the President of the Senate.
and commence an Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the
initiative petition. President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days
after the day of the election, open all the certificates in
the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and
due execution thereof in the manner provided by law,
canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall

be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall
have an equal and highest number of votes, one of
them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a
majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the

canvassing of the certificates.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the

sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.

Section 5. Before they enter on the execution of their

office, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting 74
President shall take the following oath or affirmation:
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT “I do solemnly swear [or affirm] that I will faithfully and
conscientiously fulfill my duties as President [or Vice-
THE PRESIDENT President or Acting President] of the Philippines,

COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA

preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws,
do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the
service of the Nation. So help me God.” [In case of
affirmation, last sentence will be omitted].
PRIVILEGE AND SALARY
With respect to salary, the only difference with respect
to congress is in the executive there is no allowance of
increase or decrease during the term.
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
There is no Constitutional provision expressly granting
the President the claim on executive privilege.
In our jurisprudence, the President has been granted
the discretion not to disclose to the Congress or to
the Courts without violating the public‟s right to
information under Art III Section 7 to publicly disclose
some information with respect to the decision-making
of the President.
 In TREATY-MAKING, the right of the public to
information including disclosure will have to
extend only to the result which is the treaty
itself as signed, but will not include the
discussions in the execution and conclusion of
a treaty and other executive agreements.
 TRADE SECRETS are traditionally included in
executive privilege.
 MILITARY SECRETS under the military
powers of the President, the discussions
related to the policy whether there should be
an exercise of the Commander-in-Chief or
military powers of the President including
operational discussions cannot be made
public.
 PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS
PRIVILEGE which includes the RULE ON
OPERATIONAL PROXIMITY.
We allow legitimacy of the DOCTRINE OF
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE based on:
1) The need of secrecy in the formulation of
certain policies
2) The need for a candid discussion for those
involved in decision-making and
3) Similar widely accepted privileges as
accepted by the Rules of Evidence like
doctor-patient privilege, lawyer-client privilege,
priest-penitent privilege
This may also be related, or be in the same category,
as discussions of courts, especially the SC in
coming up with its decisions. While the Constitution
requires that the Supreme Court and other collegiate
courts to certify that before the decision was reached
there was prior consultation among members
however, they cannot be compelled to disclose
what the discussions were during the consultation
before the writing of the decision.
The same thing applies during congressional meetings
among members of Congress in what is known as
EXECUTIVE SESSIONS. During the executive
sessions, the public, including the media, can be
excluded from the discussion and whatever is
discussed during the executive deliberations or
meetings among any member of Congress cannot be
compelled to be made public even by a court order.
NERI VS SENATE COMMITTEE
Supreme Court discussed the executive privilege of
the president which is rooted from the case of US v.
Nixon. The Supreme Court quoting the case of Nixon
said that the president must have an expectation of
confidentiality in his conversations, correspondence
likened to confidentiality of judicial deliberations. The
president and those who assist him must be free to
explore in the process of shaping policies and making
decisions and to do so and obey, many would be
unwilling to express, except in privity.
OFFICIAL RESIDENCE
Art VII Section 6. The President shall have an official
residence
The president shall also have, well, the official
residence. While it is traditionally known to be
Malacanang, the official residence of the President is
the residence that he is maintaining under the expense
of government. So if it is in any other place, it is the
official residence he is entitled to.
TERM
There is only one term. The term of the President is six
(6) years without re-election
Is the prohibition for re-election applicable only
after the term or does it also apply to some other
time? This kind of situation has not yet come up so
those are the questions that have yet to be answered.
SALARY
Art VII Section 6. xxx The salaries of the President
and Vice-President shall be determined by law and
shall not be decreased during their tenure. No
increase in said compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the term of the
incumbent during which such increase was
75
approved. They shall not receive during their tenure
any other emolument from the Government or any
other source.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
The salary of the president cannot be increased nor
decreased during his term, unlike members of
Congress, the prohibition is only on increase to take
effect during their term.
PROHIBITIONS
Art VII Section 13. The President, Vice-President,
the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not,unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not,
during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any
other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in
any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They
shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or
affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
President shall not, during his tenure, be
appointed as Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or
as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or
heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries.
The first paragraph is the prohibition on
appointments while the second paragraph is the
prohibition to appoint.
The president and the members of the executive
family, shall not be allowed to engage in any other
office or employment
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER VS ELMA
Elma was appointed as PCGG Chairperson and also
as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel. His
appointment to both was questioned for being violative
of Section 13.
SC said that both positions are not covered by Section
13 because they are not referring to the official family
of the President which are the members of the
Cabinet, assistant secretaries and undersecretaries.
COMPARE PROHIBITIONS
AGAINST OTHER OFFICIALS
Art VI Section 13. No Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives may hold any other
office or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term
without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been
created or the emoluments thereof increased
during the term for which he was elected.
Art XI A Section 2. No member of a Constitutional
Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any
other office or employment.Neither shall he
engage in the practice of any profession or in the
active management or control of any business
which, in any way, may be affected by the
functions of his office, nor shall he be financially
interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract
with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the
Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Art IX B Section 7. No elective official shall be
eligible for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public office or position during his
tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Art VIII Section 12. The Members of the Supreme
Court and of other courts established by law shall
not be designated to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions.
EXCEPTIONS TO RULE PROHIBITING EXECUTIVE
OFFICIALS FROM HOLDING ADDITIONAL
POSITIONS:
1) Vice President as Member of the Cabinet
(Art VII Sec 3 Par 2)
2) Secretary of Justice as Member of the JBC
(Art VII Sec 8(1))
3) Ex Officio Position
The allowance for those holding ex officio positions is
premised on two things:
1) There is no additional appointment as the
additional tasks in the ex officio positions are
deemed included in the primary functions of
the office and
2) There is no additional remuneration.
FUNA VS AGRA
76
Agra was appointed as acting solicitor general. Agra
was then appointed as Acting Secretary of DOE. His
appointment as acting Solictor General and as Acting
Secretary was violative of Section 13.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
Agra countered by saying that these are only acting
positions. The SC said that the intention of the
prohibition is to prohibit trafficking in public office,
to prevent over concentration of power in so few
officials in the executive branch, therefore there is
a total prohibition of taking other positions and
there is no distinction of whether it is temporary or
permanent.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS SECRETARY
This is the first decision of the SC with respect to
Section 13. The Civil Liberties Union ruling
differentiated between section 7, article ix-b and
section 13.
Section 13 provides that unless otherwise provided
in the Constitution, the President, Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants,
shall not hold any other office and employment during
their tenure.
Section 7, Article IX-B which allows other public
officers to hold any other office if allowed by law or
by the primary functions of his office refers to
other officers in the government except the
executive family.
The executive family is covered by Section 13, Article
VII of the Constitution.
BETOY VS BOARD OF DIRECTORS
The members of the cabinet were made directors by
law to some corporations including PSALM in order to
streamline the electric industry in the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether the appointments are considered
violative of the prohibition under Section 13
SC said their designations therein are not supposed to
be violative because these are in relation to the policy
on on the electric industry. Therefore, there is a need
to elect representatives to the Board. However, since
they are not allowed to receive additional remuneration
for additional task under Sec. 7 of Article IX, they shall
not receive this additional remuneration.
SUCCESSION
Under the rules on succession, if both the offices of
the President and Vice President are vacant, the
rules of succession provide that the Senate President
will succeed, and if he is incapable or not willing,
then the Speaker of the House will succeed. If the
Speaker is unable or unwilling, then there are two
possibilities:
1) In the beginning of the term, congress must
have to enact a law on who shall become the
acting president.
2) If it is during the term, the law must refer to
that person who is to act as president if this
two unwilling officers are unable or unwilling to
succeed to the presidency.
(2) AT THE BEGINNING THE TERM
Art VII Section 7. The President-elect and the Vice
President-elect shall assume office at the beginning of
their terms.
If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice
President-elect shall act as President until the
President-elect shall have qualified.
If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice
President-elect shall act as President until a
President shall have been chosen and qualified.
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the
President-elect shall have died or shall have
become permanently disabled, the Vice President-
elect shall become President.
Where no President and Vice-President shall have
been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both
shall have died or become permanently disabled,
the President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall act as President until a
President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen
and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in
which one who is to act as President shall be selected
until a President or a Vice-President shall have
qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or
inability of the officials mentioned in the next preceding
paragraph.
If the vacancy, which is permanent, occurs at the
beginning of the term, then supposedly the Congress
must have to provide for a law for succession in case
the Senate President as well as the Speaker are
unable to succeed.
(3) DURING TERM
Art VII Section 8. In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office, or resignation of
the President, the Vice-President shall become the
President to serve the unexpired term. In case of
death, permanent disability, removal from office,
or resignation of both the President and Vice-
President, the President of the Senate or, in case
of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until the 77
President or Vice-President shall have been elected
and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall
serve as President in case of death, permanent
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
disability, or resignation of the Acting President.
He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President
shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject
to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications
as the Acting President.
Section 10. The Congress shall, xxx enact a law
calling for a special election to elect a President
and a Vice-President xxx
The person or the particular public functionary, who
shall act as President is not to be named by his name.
It has to be by his position.
(3) IN CASE OF TEMPORARY DISABILITY
Art VII Section 11. Whenever the President
transmits to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, and until he
transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary,
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the
Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the
Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate
and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice-President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the
office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration
that no inability exists, he shall reassume the
powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should
a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit within five days to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the
issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene,
if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last
written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve
days after it is required to assemble, determines by a
two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as
President; otherwise, the President shall continue
exercising the powers and duties of his office.
Section 12. In case of serious illness of the
President, the public shall be informed of the state
of his health. The members of the Cabinet in
charge of national security and foreign relations
and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, shall not be denied access to the
President during such illness.
REMOVAL
The President shall be removed by impeachment.
Art XI Section 2. The President, the Vice-President,
the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of
the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
may be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public
officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Section 3.
1. The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
2. A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed
by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order
of Business within ten session days, and referred to
the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report
to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution.
The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by
the House within ten session days from receipt
thereof.
3. A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The
vote of each Member shall be recorded.
4. In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
5. No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.
6. The Senate shall have the sole power to try and
decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that
purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation.
When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the 78
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but
shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without
the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
7. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend
further than removal from office and disqualification to
hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines,
but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and
subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment,
according to law.
8. The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of
this section.
POWERS, FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT
(1) EXECUTIVE POWER
Art VII Section 1. The executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines.
Section 1 of Article 7 indicates who shall exercise the
executive power but does not limit what Executive
Power is. The various provisions in the Constitution
relating to executive power or specific powers of the
Executive are considered to be limitations to such
power.
RESIDUAL POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
Whatever the constitution has provided in relation to a
particular power of the president, that is not supposed
to be a grant of power of a limitation of the exercise of
such power.
MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
SC clarified that the President has residual powers
in the execution and the implementation of the law.
The provisions in the Constitution relating to the
executive powers do not partake of grants, or
listing, or enumeration of the extent of the powers
of the President, rather they are limitations of the
powers of the president.
The executive power simply means the power to
execute the laws. And this power does not only
refer to specific laws.There is no specific specific law
granting the President the power to refuse to issue
travel documents but it is allowed since her decision
was made to maintain peace and order by preventing
the return of a prior ousted president.
ON DAP: It is the same thing with the DAP, there is no
need for a specific law to authorize the DAP in order to
spur economic growth because the SC said the DAP
as it is, is not an appropriations bill. There is nothing
appropriated under DAP, so there is no need for a law
even to authorize its expenditure. So, whatever is not
legislative, whatever is not judicial, is technically
considered as executive. Same thing with the rest, if it
is not judicial, it is not executive, then it necessarily is
legislative in our tripartite system of government
. proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the
(2) CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Art VII Section 17. The President shall have control of
all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
 POWER OF CONTROL is simply the power
of a superior officer to undo, amend,
revise, reverse or modify or affirm
decisions or conclusions of the
subordinate office. In Power of Control, the
power of the President is exercised over
the actions of the actors not on the actors
themselves, without actually affecting the
subordinate officer himself.
 POWER OF SUPERVISION is the power of
the president to ensure that the laws are
faithfully implemented or executed. It
carries with it the power to impose penalties
for non-compliance.
The Power of Supervision is the control of
the actor themselves. The President,
therefore, in the power of supervision, can
affect the actor, not only the action of the actor
by which the power of discipline can be
exercised. If the subordinate officer under the
power of supervision did not comply with the
law, then the superior officer can discipline the
subordinate officer, which is included in the
power of supervision.
THE DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED
POLITICAL AGENCY
The doctrine of qualified political agency, also known
as the alter ego doctrine, was introduced in the
landmark case of Villena v. The Secretary of
Interior. In said case, the Department of Justice, upon
the request of the Secretary of Interior, investigated
Makati Mayor Jose D. Villena and found him guilty of
bribery, extortion, and abuse of authority. The
Secretary of Interior then recommended to the
President the suspension from office of Mayor Villena.
Upon approval by the President of the
recommendation, the Secretary of Interior suspended
Mayor Villena. Unyielding, Mayor Villena challenged
his suspension, asserting that the Secretary of Interior
had no authority to suspend him from office because
there was no specific law granting such power to the
Secretary of Interior; and that it was the President
alone who was empowered to suspend local
government officials. The Court disagreed with Mayor
Villena and upheld his suspension, holding that the
doctrine of qualified political agency warranted the
suspension by the Secretary of Interior. Justice Laurel,
writing for the Court, opined: 79
After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the
contention of the government in this case on the broad
presidential type of government which we have
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
adopted and considering the departmental
organization established and continued in force by
paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution,
all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of
the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or the law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments,
and the acts of the secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by
the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive.
This is an example of allowable delegation of
power.
Delegation of power or the NON-DELEGATION
DOCTRINE applies to all branches of government
under our tripartite system. The non-delegation
doctrine applies as well to the executive and the
judicial branch.
The allowable delegation under the executive branch
would fall under this DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED
POLITICAL AGENCY. The president directly
controls the members of the cabinet and through
them indirectly controls the rest of the officers in the
executive department.
Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, the
president is allowed to appoint them as his alter egos,
but it does not prevent him from becoming the
secretary of the departments.
VILLENA VS SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
It characterizes the members of the cabinet as alter
egos of the president. The decisions of the cabinet
members are considered as decisions of the
president, unless and until changed or reprobated
by the president.Except when the Constitution
requires the president to act on it personally, the
doctrine allows the president to delegate all of his
powers to the members of the cabinet.
The SC said that the power to declare martial law or
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or pardoning power are those
which the president must do personally, and
cannot be delegated.
ANGELES VS GAITE
Where there is an appeal from the decision of the
Regional State Prosecutor to the DOJ, Memorandum
Circular No. 58 provides that resolutions and orders of
the DOJ may be appealed to the President only if the
crime or felony involved is punishable by reclusion
perpetua or death. Judge Angeles claims that the MC
violates the doctrine of qualified political agency
because it ties the hands of the president in exercising
qualified political agency or control over the decisions
of the department secretary, which is violative of the
doctrine.
The SC said no because the doctrine is to be viewed
as “unless the President is required to act
personally, the acts of the department secretary is
considered his acts.
There are only three mentioned. But the list is not
exclusive. If there are other functions which the
President must do with similar importance, then the
acts of the President may be done by his department
secretaries. The President can take cognizance of
the appeal, but also the President can refuse to
take cognizance of the appeal, because the
Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, grants to
the President the discretion to revise, repeal,
revoke, modify or affirm the decision of the
department secretary.
In Angeles v. Gaite, wherein petitioner raised the same
arguments, we find the same unmeritorious and ruled
in this wise:
x xx Petitioner argues in the main that Memorandum
Circular No. 58 is an invalid regulation, because it
diminishes the power of control of the President and
bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate
officer, almost unfettered power. This argument is
absurd. The President's act of delegating authority to
the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum
Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of
qualified political agency, long been established in our
jurisdiction.
MANALANG VS TIDCORP
Some GOCCs or almost all of them, if created under a
special law requires a government representative in
the board. In most, there are members of the cabinet
sitting as members of the board in that corporation.
This is allowed by law because they represent
government interest. This does not involve additional
remuneration as it is considered as ex officio position.
When the cabinet members sit as member of the
GOCC board, he does not act as an alter ego of the
president under the qualified political agency, but as a
representative of the government.
TIDCORP argues for the application of the doctrine of
80
qualified political agency, contending that the acts of
the Board of Directors of TIDCORP, an attached
agency of the Department of Finance whose head, the
Secretary of Finance, was an alter ego of the
President, were also the acts of the President.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA

TIDCORP‘s argument is unfounded.
the doctrine of qualified political agency could not be
extended to the acts of the Board of Directors of
TIDCORP despite some of its members being
themselves the appointees of the President to the
Cabinet. Under Section 10 of Presidential Decree No.
1080, as further amended by Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 8494,24 the five ex officio members were the
Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and
Industry, the Governor of the BangkoSentral ng
Pilipinas, the Director-General of the National
Economic and Development Authority, and the
Chairman of the Philippine Overseas Construction
Board, while the four other members of the Board
were the three from the private sector (at least one of
whom should come from the export community), who
were elected by the ex officio members of the Board
for a term of not more than two consecutive years, and
the President of TIDCORP who was concurrently the
Vice-Chairman of the Board. Such Cabinet members
sat on the Board of Directors of TIDCORP ex officio, or
by reason of their office or function, not because of
their direct appointment to the Board by the President.
Evidently, it was the law, not the President, that sat
them in the Board.
WHAT ARE THOSE ACTS WHICH THE PRESIDENT
CANNOT DELEGATE TO THE MEMBERS OF HIS
CABINET?
BANDA VS ERMITA
The SC had the occasion to mention that the
president cannot delegate four things:
1) Declare martial law,
2) Suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus,
3) Exercise pardoning powers, and
4) Those of similar import or importance.
All the rest can be delegated. President can delegate
the power to sign the bill into a law. The Executive
Secretary can sign an enrolled bill into law.
MACARAIG VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
The Executive Secretary signs not as Executive
Secretary per se, but rather for and in behalf of the
president.
Secretary for Food Security and Rehabilitation czar
are not covered by the Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency.
The president given the power to revamp the Office of
the President. The Department Secretaries of the
line agencies are not in the Office of the President
per se. They are under the executive branch but not
under the Office of the President.
Under the Office of the President are:
 Presidential Management Staff,
 Secretary to the Cabinet
 Secretary of Presidential Communications
 Presidential Spokesperson
The members of the cabinet can be removed by the
president, not because the president has control
powers over them. The power to discipline, which is
covered by the power to remove, is covered by the
power of supervision. It stems from the president‘s
power of appointment. If the reason for the
appointment does no longer exist, largely because of
loss of trust and confidence, then the president can
remove them, and the removal is always for cause.
MANALANG VS SC
GOCC was created under PD 1080 - Trade
Investments Development Associations of the
Philippines (TIDAP). The board members of which,
composed of 9 members, of the 5 were government
employees: Sec. of Finance, Sec. of DTI, the Director
General of NEDA, the cabinet Secretary, among
others, sit in the board. It issued an order reorganizing
the corporation
The question in the case is: Is the order of the board
subject to the power of the president, of control
under the doctrine of qualified political agency,
considering that the members of the board are
members of the cabinet?
On the matter of qualified political agency, the SC
said, that, they do not sit in the board, as presidential
appointees and they do not exercise functions as
members of the cabinet per se. Their decisions being
in the board will be in relation to the powers of the
board that has been created by law. It is not the
decision of a cabinet member, with respect to their
respective departments, which may be subject to
the review powers of the President under the
Qualified Political Agency Doctrine.
On the matter of appointments, are these
appointments to these boards, by reason of the
law creating the board, a violation of Section 13,
Article VII? SC said NO because they are ex officio
positions. The reason why they sit in the board by
reason of a law is that they are appointed there to
represent the interest of the government. And since
their appointment is by law and not by the president,
they are supposed to take these positions in ex-officio
capacities. There is no additional remuneration. 81
(3) GENERAL SUPERVISION OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS AND AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
Art X Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall
exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component
cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities
with respect to component barangays, shall ensure
that the acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
Section 16. The President shall exercise general
supervision over autonomous regions to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed.
(4) POWER OF APPOINTMENT
Generally, Power of Appointment is executive in
character and it is discretionary.
NOTE: Supreme Court has the power to appoint any
of its employees except judges. That is an executive
function of the Supreme Court, because power to
appoint is essentially executive.
While Congress may provide qualifications to the
public positions by law, such power of Congress must
not be ―abused‖ as to destroy the essentially
discretionary nature of the power to appoint. Congress
cannot create an office and provide for the
qualifications of the appointee that only one person
can fit in that qualification.
FLORES v DRILLON
Where the first chairperson of the SBMA shall be the
Mayor of Olonggapo City, the SC said it is
unconstitutional being violative of par. 2, Sec. 7, Art.
9B, and also it destroys the character of the power to
appoint as being discretionary.
Even provisions of law, which provides or requires a
prior recommendation, does not mind the appointing
authority as it is merely recommendatory.
When there is vacancy, any vacancy that results
due to an unexpired term, the SC said, that Rule on
Succession, which is provided for in the law,
should be followed by the appointing authority
that he cannot appoint anybody.But if the reason
for the vacancy does not result into an unexpired
term, the normal rule on seniority as to who shall
succeed to that position of Chair or presiding
officer, does not bind the appointing authority.
[Example: Supreme Court]
5 GROUPS IN THE CONSTITUTION, WHICH THE
PRESIDENT MAY APPOINT:
WITH THE CONSENT OF THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS
Art VII Section 16. The President shall nominate and
with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint: [EXCLUSIVE]
a. Heads of the executive departments,
b. Ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or
c. Officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and
d. Other officers whose appointments are vested
in him in this Constitution.
This includes the 50% of the seats allocated to
the party list system or to the party list
representatives, which are to be filled up by
appointments, for 3 terms under the 1987
Constitution.
e. Chairman and members of the Constitutional
Commissions (COA, COMELEC, CSC)
f. Regular Members of the JBC
Section 8. (2) The regular members of the Council
shall be appointed by the President for a term of four
years with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments xxx.
g. Sectoral Representatives
RULES WITH RESPECT TO THIS FIRST GROUP,
WHICH WOULD REQUIRE CONFIRMATION OF THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS ARE AS
FOLLOWS:
1) This group is exclusive. Those which
appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, or whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint, do not require
CA confirmation. Even if the President
erroneously refers it to the Commission on
Appointments, the Commission on
Appointments does not have any jurisdiction
over that nomination.
2) There can be no law increasing the list by
providing the requirement for Commission
on Appointments confirmation if the
position does not fall within the first
sentence because a legislation cannot
amend the Constitution.
The PROCEDURE is:
1) They shall be nominated to the position
2) The nominations shall be submitted to the
Commission on Appointments
3) The Commission on Appointments shall act on
it or by-pass their nominations.
82
a. If the CA acts on it, and rejects the
nomination – that‘s the end of it for the
particular position.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 b. Those nominated can be nominated to
other positions if the CA has not yet
rejected them.
c. For those whose appointments are
merely by-passed, the President can
re-appoint them or re-nominate them
until eternity until the CA rejects them
or their respective nominations.
THE SECOND GROUP ARE OFFICERS OF THE
GOVERNMENT WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE NOT
OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR BY LAW EITHER
BECAUSE:
1)Congress created an office butdid not
include the power of appointment
2)Congress enacted a law but the provision
on appointment has been declared
unconstitutional therefore, it is as if the
law, has not provided for a provision on
the appointing authority.
The THIRD, those whom, he may be authorized by
law to appoint.
There is a law providing for such appointment authority
lodged in the President.
THE FOURTH GROUP WOULD REFER TO
OFFICERS LOWER IN RANK, WHOSE
APPOINTMENT MADE BY LAW RESTS IN THE
PRESIDENT ALONE.
It presupposes the third group are officers who are
NOT LOWER IN RANK.
THE FIFTH GROUP WOULD BE THOSE
INDEPENDENT OF SECTION 16.
 Justices of the Supreme Court
 Judges of lower courts
 Ombudsman and his deputies
 Vice President as member of the cabinet
They are not found in section 16, while the other four
groups are found in section 16, but only those in the
first sentence would require the CA confirmation.
UPON RECOMMENDATION OF THE JBC
(1) MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND ALL
OTHER COURTS
Art VIII Section 9. The Members of the Supreme
Court and judges of lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least
three nominees preferred by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need
no confirmation.
(2) OMBUDSMAN AND DEPUTIES
Art XI Section 9. The Ombudsman and his
Deputies shall be appointed by the President from
a list of at least six nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three
nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such
appointments shall require no confirmation. All
vacancies shall be filled within three months after they
occur.
GONZALES VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
The 2012 decision has been reconsidered and this
time around. In 2014, SC had reversed its earlier ruling
that the sec. 8 (2) of RA 6770 grants the president
power to discipline the deputy OMB and the special
prosecutor.
ISSUE: WON the office of the president has the power
to discipline the deputy OMB or special prosecutor.
HELD: In the 2012 decision, SC said the president has
the power to discipline the Deputy OMB or Special
Prosecutor but maintained that since the grounds
provided for are the same grounds as that of
impeachment, then the determination of the OP to
dismiss a deputy OMB must be in the same
characterization as that of the ground for
impeachment.
In 2014, that was reversed. SC said that while
Congress has the power to enact a law providing for
the power to discipline, it must not be contrary to the
intent of the Constitution. SC said the OMB is not a
statutory creation because of RA 6770, but it is
mandated to be created by the Constitution. In which
sense, it has to have the so-called independence, and
it must be beyond the control of the President. The
Constitution makes the OMB an impeachable officer.
But with respect to the deputies, SC interpreted it by
saying that the deputies must have the same
independence as that of the OMB although they are
not impeachable officers. By reason of the functions of
their office, they must have to be independent and free
from the disciplining authority of the president. They
(Deputy Ombudsmen) can be disciplined by the OMB,
but the Special Prosecutor, since he is not subject to
the authority of the OMB with respect of the power to
prosecute, the power to discipline remains with the
Office of the President to discipline.
83
APPOINTMENT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT AS
MEMBER OF THE CABINET
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
Section 3. The Vice-President may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no
confirmation.
MANALO VS SISTOZA
This refers to the appointments to the PNP, the
corresponding rank of Colonel in the Armed Forces, to
the PNP, which is Senior Supt. Any position in the
PNP does not require CA confirmation because it
is not part of the armed forces. The reason being, it
is a civilian police force. Since the PNP is a civilian
police force under the Constitution, even if the
commensurate rank for colonel (senior
superintendent), the appointment need not pass
Commission on Appointments confirmation.
Coastguard of the Philippines is not part of the
naval force. While they assume military
characterization, the Coastguard is not part of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. Even if you are a
high ranking officer in the Philippine Coast Guard,
your appointment does not require CA
confirmation.
Appointment of NLRC Commissioner does not
require confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments. The law providing for that is
unconstitutional.
LIMITATIONS ON APPOINTING POWER OF THE
PRESIDENT: MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS
Art VII Section 15. Two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, a President or Acting President shall not
make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
That will be 2 months before 2nd Monday of May
and of 2nd Monday of May to noon of June 30 so
that would 3.5 months all in all.
There could be no appointments made by the
President except to executive positions temporary
in character where the continued vacancy would
prejudice or endanger or affect public safety.
AYTONA VS CASTILLO
This was a case involving an outgoing president, Pres.
Garcia in 1961 who appointed Aytona and 350 more.
The term of office was from 1955-1960, 1960-65 and
every 5 years. In that context, midnight appointment
should refer to the period when the president is
already outgoing. It should not be understood in
the context that congress has adjourned.
There is a misconception because of the factual
settings in the Aytona Case where congress has
adjourned and Pres. Garcia submitted the
appointments to the Commission on Appointments but
it could not be acted upon because Congress was not
in session and the CA was not functioning.
IN RE: MATEO VALENZUELA
SC said that appointment to the judiciary is
covered by midnight appointment ban.
DE CASTRO VS JBC
Supreme Court reversed that ruling, saying that the 2-
month midnight appointments ban does not apply
to the judiciary because of the mandatory nature of
appointments to Judiciary especially to the Supreme
Court (90-day rule).
With regard to the Supreme Court, it should be
made within 90 days from the occurrence of the
vacancy, unlike in the lower courts it is 90 days
from the submission of the list.This requirement
over the Supreme Court is mandatory. Otherwise,
there would be a constitutional violation.If the
vacancy occurs and the 90-days fall within the 2-
month period before a regular election, the
President rmust make the appointment.
SC even said that before the 90 day period
commences, from the expected vacancy (mandatory
retirement age of 70), the power and function of JBC is
discretionary to act on possible appointees to that
position. But once it falls within the 90 day period,
the exercise of authority of the JBC to process
applicants to that position is already mandatory
because they have to fill it up within 90 days.
APPOINTMENT OF RELATIVES
Art VII Section 13. Xxx The spouse and relatives by
consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of
the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed
as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the
Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or
offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.
INTERIM OR RECESS APPOINTMENTS
Art VI Section 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the
Commission on Appointments shall be constituted
within thirty days after the Senate and the House
of Representativesshall have been organized with
the election of the President and the Speaker. The
Commission on Appointments shall meet only
while the Congress is in session, at the call of its 84
Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge
such powers and functions as are herein conferred
upon it.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
Art VII Section 16. The President shall have the
power to make appointments during the recess of
the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory,
but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments
or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
AD INTERIM AND ACTING APPOINTMENTS
PIMENTEL VS ERMITA
President can appoint an acting secretary, without
therefore submitting his acting appointment to the CA
for confirmation even if the position refers to those
under the first sentence of Section 16 because the
appointing authority is largely discretionary. The
President is not required to make regular
appointments every time. When a position of
Cabinet Secretary is vacant, the President should
not be compelled to make a “permanent”
appointment. The president is given sufficient
leeway to make an acting appointment pending the
making of a permanent appointment because he
has yet to find a suitable replacement in a
permanent capacity.
Pimental argued that that could be abused by the
President because the President, in order to avoid or
skirt the requirement of CA confirmation, may make
temporary or acting appointments and not therefore
submitted to the CA. SC said, until it happens, the
court cannot presume that the President will eventually
abuse such discretion.
REGULAR AND AD INTERIM APPOINTMENTS
AD INTERIM APPOINTMENTS OR RECESS
APPOINTMENTS should refer to appointments made,
requiring CA confirmation, when congress was in
recess. Stated differently, if the position does not
require CA confirmation, even if the appointment is
made when Congress was in recess, it is not referred
to as Ad Interim or Recess Appointments.
When Congress is in recess, the CA cannot function
and therefore, it cannot act on any appointments
needing confirmation with the CA.
When it is Ad Interim Appointments, it is valid until
Congress, thru the CA, disapproves the
nomination or Congress adjourns again without
acting on it (by-passing the appointment).
If an appointment submitted to the CA is not acted
upon by it and the CA merely by-passed it, the
appointment is considered to be effective until acted
by the CA.
If the CA has already disapproved the nomination for
the appointment and withheld its confirmation, it is
considered to have been rejected by the CA.
Nonetheless, even if the appointment has been
rejected by the CA, such rejection is merely
considered to be for that particular position. It
does not prevent the appointing authority from
nominating or appointing the same person to
another cabinet position.
DECISION OF THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS
Decisions of the CA to approve or reject the
nomination/appointment made by the President, is
generally, not subject to review. Courts cannot
interfere with that shared power with respect to the
appointing authority of the President.
The only instance again, based on judicial review
is the presence of ABUSE OF DISCRETION. Abuse
of discretion could be shown if an appointment is
made of an unqualified person and that
appointment/nomination has been approved by the
Commissioner.
TEMPORARY DESIGNATIONS
Admin Code 1987 Bk III Sec. 17. Power to Issue
Temporary Designation. - (1) The President may
temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent
person to perform the functions of an office in the
executive branch, appointment to which is vested in
him by law, when: (a) the officer regularly appointed
to the office is unable to perform his duties by
reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or
(b) there exists a vacancy;
(2) The person designated shall receive the
compensation attached to the position, unless he is
already in the government service in which case he
shall receive only such additional compensation as,
with his existing salary, shall not exceed the salary
authorized by law for the position filled. The
compensation hereby authorized shall be paid out of
the funds appropriated for the office or agency
concerned.
(3) In no case shall a temporary designation exceed
one (1) year.
POWER TO REMOVE BY THE PRESIDENT
The power to remove members of the Cabinet
stems not from the Power of Control but from the
Power of the President to Appointment.
With respect to the power of removal, if the one
removed would be other subordinate executive
officials, follow the civil service rules on whether one
85
is career or non-career. Under the Revised Rules in
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, there is a
procedure for imposing disciplinary sanctions to erring
public officers.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
However, with respect to Members of the Cabinet,
they can be removed not because of any rules of
discipline, but it stems from the power of the President
to appoint them.
GONZALES VS OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
This is in relation to the Manila Hostage crisis, which
resulted into the death of many tourists from Hong
Kong. Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales III was charged
before the Office of the President and before the Office
of the Ombudsman. While he was exonerated by the
Office of the Ombudsman, he was ordered removed
by the Office of the President.
The Constitution has provided for the creation of the
office of the ombudsman and tasked Congress to
enact a law on it. R.A. 6770, the so called law creating
the office of the ombudsman, provided a full
administrative disciplinary power of the office of the
ombudsman over all elective and appointive officials.
RA 6770 Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary
Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over
all elective and appointive officials of the Government
and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies,
including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of
Congress, and the Judiciary.
Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy. — (1) In
accordance with the provisions of Article XI of the
Constitution, the Ombudsman may be removed from
office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public
trust.
(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be
removed from office by the President for any of the
grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman,
and after due process.
The president can order the deputy ombudsman
removed because provision of Sec 8 RA 6770 is clear.
Since the law provided by Congress requires the
grounds for removal similar to that of impeachment of
the Ombudsman, then by the same reasoning what
these grounds are if applied to impeachable officers,
should be interpreted in the same manner for the
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor. It cannot
be interpreted less.
Gonzales was charged for Betrayal of Public Trust. SC
said there was no ground or basis for removing him
because his failure to act on it based on the evidence
presented could not constitute betrayal of public trust.
SC said that with respect to "betrayal of public trust"
as embodying a ground for impeachment it was
construed as encompassing acts which are just
short of being criminal but constitute gross
faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse
of power, inexcusable negligence of duty,
favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary
power. Mere negligence in handling a case resulting
into some delay would not constitute betrayal of public
trust. The removal by the office of the president was
reversed.
LIMITATIONS ON APPOINTING POWER
OF ACTING PRESIDENT
Art VII Section 14. Appointments extended by an
Acting President shall remain effective, unless
revoked by the elected President, within ninety
days from his assumption or reassumption of
office.
Section 15. Two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not
make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
The Acting President‘s appointments are valid
appointments but they suffer the same limitations as
that of the Regular president. The only difference is
that, appointments made by the Acting President shall
always be subject to the actions of the Regular
President when he reassumes office.
BETOY VS BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Petitioner argues that bad faith is clearly manifested as
the reorganization has an eye to replace current
favorite less competent appointees.
The existence of any or some of the following
circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad
faith in the removals made as a result of the
reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement
or reappointment by an aggrieved party:
a) Where there is a significant increase in the number
of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned;
b) Where an office is abolished and another
performing substantially the same functions is created;
c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less
qualified in terms of status of appointment,
performance and merit;
86
d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the
department or agency concerned and the reclassified
offices perform substantially the same functions as the
original offices; and
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
e) Where the removal violates the order of separation
provided in Section 3 hereof.
The Solicitor General, however, argues that petitioner
has not shown any circumstance to prove that the
restructuring of NPC was done in bad faith. We agree.
Petitioner's allegation that the reorganization was
merely undertaken to accommodate new appointees is
at most speculative and bereft of any evidence on
record. It is settled that bad faith must be duly proved
and not merely presumed. It must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence, which is absent in the case
at bar.
(5) EXECUTIVE CLEMENCIES
Art VII Section 19. Except in cases of
impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with
the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
the Congress.
 Originally, prior to 1935, executive clemency
can be granted by the president after the
commission of the crime regardless of whether
or not the person was charged or has been
tried or has already been convicted.
 The 1935 Constitution required conviction.
 The 1973 Constitution in its original draft
actually changed it by requiring ―final
conviction‖, while it was interpreted to mean
conviction which has reached its logical
finality.
 In 1981 it was amended and it went back to
the Jones Law. It did not require any
conviction for there to be an exercise of
executive clemency.
 The 1987 Constitution changed altogether
the phraseology. Now, it is conviction by final
judgment. It becomes final if there is no
appeal, the accused has started to served
sentence, there is application forprobation or
there is a written express waiver on the right to
appeal.
Art IX C Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or
suspension of sentence for violation of election
laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the
President without the favorable recommendation
of the Commission (COMELEC).
PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT largely
is the official act of the president alone.
The only act of the sovereign is the GRANT OF
AMNESTY. That is the reason why the constitution
requires the congressional approval to grant any kind
of amnesty.
But generally, the grant of executive clemency or
amnesty is an official act of the president alone
and is largely discretionary on his part provided
there is no legal or constitutional limitation that
has been violated. Any grant of executive clemency
cannot be subjected to judicial review.
(A) PARDON DISTINGUISHED FROM PROBATION
PEOPLE VS VERA
Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are
they the same. They are actually district and
different from each other, both in origin and in
nature. The power to suspend sentence and the
power to grant reprieves and pardons, as
understood when the constitution was adopted, are
totally distinct and different in their nature. The former
was always a part of the judicial power;the latter
was always a part of the executive power.The
suspension of the sentence simply postpones the
judgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely,
but the conviction and liability following it, and the
civil disabilities, remain and become operative
when judgment is rendered. A pardon reaches
both the punishment prescribed for the offense
and the guilt of the offender. It releases the
punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt,
so that in the eyes of the law, the offender is as
innocent as if he had never committed the
offense.It removes the penalties and disabilities,
and restores him to all his civil rights. It makes
him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new
credit and capacity.
(B) PARDON DISTINGUISHED FROM PAROLE
(C) PARDON DISTINGUISHED FROM AMNESTY
1. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive
and as such it is a private act which must be
pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no
notice thereof; while amnesty is granted by
Proclamation of the Chief Executive with
the concurrence of Congress, and it is a
public act of which the courts should take
judicial notice.
2. Pardons are granted to one after
conviction; while amnesty is granted to 87
classes of persons or communities who
may be guilty of political offenses,
generally before or after the institution of
the criminal prosecution and sometimes
after conviction.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA

3. Pardon looks forward and relieves the
offender from the consequences of an
offense of which he has been convicted,
that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment,
and for that reason it does “not work the
restoration of the rights to hold public
office, or the right of suffrage, unless such
rights be expressly restored by the terms
of the pardon‖ and it ―in no case exempts
the culprit from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him the
sentence.‖ While amnesty looks backward
and abolishes and puts into oblivion the
offense itself, it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is
charged that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as
though he had committed no offense.
MAGDALO VS. COMELEC
673 SCRA 651 (2012)
This involves the application for registration and or
accreditation as a regional political party based in the
National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the
10 May 2010 National and Local Elections of the
Magdalo group. From the name itself it refers to the
group of rebel soldiers and the most prominent
member of this is Senator Trillanes. COMELEC did not
approve the application for registration of the party as
the party would fall under the disqualification of those
that espouse violence and use unlawful means to
achieve goals in the process of defying the laws of the
organized societies.
However, the issue on executive clemency was raised
They said that when a group who would fall under the
general amnesty proclamation is considered to have
not committed an offense at all.
SC said that the members of the Magdalo party would
no longer suffer from the disqualifications because of
the grant of the amnesty but they still need to prove
that they no longer espouse violence or that they will
not violently overthrow the government because that is
a continuing disqualification. (Different from what SC
ruled)
In light of the foregoing, to still sustain the finding,
based on the participation of its members in the
Oakwood incident, that MAGDALO employs violence
or other harmful means would be inconsistent with the
legal effects of amnesty. Likewise, it would not be in
accord with the express intention of both the Executive
and the Legislative branches, in granting the said
amnesty, to promote an atmosphere conducive to
attaining peace in line with the government‘s peace
and reconciliation initiatives.
X XX
This Court finds that the COMELEC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in denying the Petition for
Registration filed by MAGDALO. However, in view of
the subsequent amnesty granted in favor of the
members of MAGDALO, the events that transpired
during the Oakwood incident can no longer be
interpreted as acts of violence in the context of the
disqualifications from party registration.
(D) EFFECTS OF PARDON
(E) SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF
CONDITIONAL PARDONS
(F) DOES PARDONING POWER APPLY TO
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES?
LLAMAS VS EXECUTIVE SEC
Pardon can even be extended to those found liable
to administrative cases provided it pertains only to
administrative cases in the executive department
(G) WHO MAY AVAIL OF AMNESTY?
It may be granted to any person, whether charged or
not charged, arrested, detained, or convicted by final
judgment and serving sentence, provided that person
is covered by the amnesty proclamation.
(6) POWERS OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
Art VII Section 18. The President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In
case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President
shall submit a report in person or in writing to the
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at
least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by
the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty- 88
four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days
from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function,
nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within three
days, otherwise he shall be released.
This is an example of the so called THEORY OR
CHARACTER OF THE CONSTITUTION - the
constitution is not a document which provides powers
for government rather it is a document that omits the
powers of government.
The President has 3 powers that he may do under
Sec. 3 powers that he may do under Sec. 18:
1. To call out the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.
 WITH RESPECT TO INVASION OR
REBELLION, this is in the ordinary
understanding.
 WITH RESPECT TO MARTIAL LAW
DECLARATION AND SUSPENSION OF THE
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT, sainvasion or
rebellion and public safety are required for
them to be called.
 WITH RESPECT TO THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS, what is suspended is the privilege.
What the declaration does, solely, is not to
deny the courts of jurisdiction to issue the writ,
but to allow the military or the law enforcement
agencies to arrest or detain persons for having
been suspected of committing either acts of
rebellion or those inherent or in relation to an
invasion.
Art VIII Sec 1 (2) Judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
DAVID VS MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
The declaration of the president where there is a
state of emergency is nothing more than a
DECLARATION OF THE STATE OF FACT. It does
not grant the president additional powers because
the power of the president to call out the armed
forces in the case of lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, is inherent and based on his/her
discretion.
However, with respect to the declaration of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ, the
constitution has tried to limit of the powers of the
president to do so. It requires that there is an invasion
or rebellion and public safety requires it.
FORTUN VS. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
668 SCRA 504 (2012)
This is the only case filed to question the declaration of
the president of martial law in the province of
Maguindanao brought about the so called Ampatuan
Massacre. This petition was dismissed since the issue
has become moot and academic. But nonetheless, the
SC made pronouncements as to the nature of the
power of the president to declare martial law or
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The power of the president to declare martial law
or suspend the privilege of the writ is not a sole
power of the president. It said that this is a shared
power of the congress.
When the president declares martial law or suspend
the privilege of the writ, the president will submit within
48 hours a report to congress in person or through his
representative. Congress on the other hand according
to the constitution must have to convene in session
within 24 hours. These two provisions would tell us
that this is not the sole power of the president. This is
a shared power. Congress has the first opportunity at
validating or revoking such declaration or suspension.
The SC said that initially the declaration of martial
law or suspension of the writ is a POLITICAL
QUESTION. Only when there is a question on the
sufficiency of the factual basis that is filed before
the SC that it becomes a JUSTICIABLE QUESTION.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1959, President Arroyo 89
exercised the most awesome and powerful among her
graduated Commander-in-Chief powers to suppress a
supposed rebellion in Maguindanao, following the
massacre of 57 civilians in the worst election-related
violence in the country‘s history. Since then, the
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
government branded the Ampatuans, the alleged
masterminds of the massacre, as rebels orchestrating
the overthrow of the Arroyo administration. However,
the events before, during, and after the massacre
negate the existence of an armed uprising aimed at
bringing down the government, but rather point to a
surfeit of impunity and abuse of power of a political
clan closely allied with the Arroyo administration. In
short, Proclamation No. 1959 was issued without an
actual rebellion justifying the same.
Apparently, President Arroyo resorted to martial law
and suspension of the writ, not to quell a purported
rebellion because there was absolutely none, but to
show her indignation over the gruesome massacre
and her swift response in addressing the difficult
situation involving her close political allies. She was
reported to be "under pressure to deliver, amid rising
public outrage and international condemnation of the
68
massacre." However, mounting pressure to bring the
murderers to justice, without any invasion or rebellion
in Maguindanao, does not warrant the imposition of
martial law or suspension of the writ. Rather, what the
nation expects, and what the victims and their families
truly deserve, is the speedy and credible investigation
and prosecution, and eventually the conviction, of the
merciless killers.
In sum, Proclamation No. 1959 was anchored on a
non-existent rebellion. Based on the events before,
during and after the Maguindanao massacre, there
was obviously no rebellion justifying the declaration of
martial law and suspension of the writ. The discovery
of the Ampatuans‘ private army and massive
weaponry does not establish an armed public uprising
aimed at overthrowing the government. Neither do the
closure of government offices and the reluctance of
the local government officials and employees to report
for work indicate a rebellion.
The Constitution is clear. Only in case of actual
invasion or rebellion, when public safety requires it,
can a state of martial law be declared or the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus be suspended.
Proclamation No. 1959 cannot be justified on the basis
of a threatened, imminent, or looming rebellion, which
ground was intentionally deleted by the framers of the
1987 Constitution. Considering the non-existence of
an actual rebellion in Maguindanao, Proclamation No.
1959 is unconstitutional for lack of factual basis as
required under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution for the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
EFFECT OF SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The declaration is valid for 60 days, if there is no
period for efficacy. The president therefore can make it
effective for less than 60 days but if there is no efficacy
period it is assumed to initially be valid for 60 days. It
can go beyond that when the congress so grants it
when the president request for the extension. It is for
congress to determine the necessity based on the
information from the ground that there is a need either
to extend it or not to grant the extension.
In relation to Article 125 of the RPC on arbitrary
detention - the declaration or the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus extends the period of
detention after the warrantless arrest valid for more
than that 12, 18 and 36 hours provided in Art 125
because the constitution says those persons arrested
must have to be judicially charge within 72 hours.
When there is the suspension of the privilege of the
writ it does not make an illegal arrest as legal.
What it does simply is it allows the military in effect to
make arrest and then file cases against them within 72
hours. Otherwise, they must have to be released.
Art III Section 13. xxx The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. xxx
Technically you can seek bail once you are arrested
and even if the 72 hour deadline has not yet lapsed.
The problem with however, if you are not yet charged
in court, the judge will say what is your case.
Even if it is valid in the entire country or specific
territory for a certain period of time, it is not applicable
to everybody. The suspension of the writ is
effective only to specific persons charged or will
be charge with rebellion, or those crimes inherent
in or directly connected with invasion.
EFFECT OF DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW
The president:
1) Cannot suspend the operation of the
constitution (Rights under the bill of rights
remains to be applicable);
2) Cannot supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies;
3) Cannot authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies
over civilians where civil courts are able to
function;
4) Cannot automatically suspend the privilege
of the writ.(If the president wants both martial
law and suspension of the writ, the president
must declare both.)
90
The role of SC would come when there is petition
filed questioning the sufficiency of the factual
basis. This is not a question of veracity but this is
a question of sufficiency.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
SC has 30 days to resolve the sufficiency of the
factual basis and that 30 days is from the filling of
the petition
(7) EMERGENCY POWERS
Art VI Sec 32 (2) In times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
This Commander-In-Chief (CIC) Powers has always
been misconstrued to mean as emergency powers.
 Correctly understood in the constitutional
context, the Commander-In-Chief Powers‟ is
the original or inherent right of the president. It
is not granted to him by any law. Section 18
just provides for the limitations of the power
 The Emergency Powers under sec 23 is
supposed to be delegated to the president.
When there is national emergency or in times
or war or other emergency, congress may
delegate to the president the authority to meet
that declared national emergency. Congress
must pass a law, must have to provide for a
certain limits and specific details. S
The delegated authority of the president under
Emergency Powers Clause is only valid:
1) Until congress revokes it or withdraws it by
resolution. In cases of emergency law
delegating limited powers to the president,
emergency law extending the emergency
powers to the president loses efficacy if the
congress withdraws it by resolution. There
is no need for a law repealing or amending it
2) If congress has resumed session and has
adjourned again voluntarily, emergency
power delegation will also lose efficacy.
RATIONALE: to do away with the delay in terms of
legislation or legislative process which may be needed
in order to meet the fact of the national emergency or
the demands of the national emergency.
(8) CONTRACTING AND GUARANTEEING
FOREIGN LOANS
Art VII Section 20. The President may contract or
guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the
Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall,
within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the
calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete
report of its decision on applications for loans to be
contracted or guaranteed by the Government or
government-owned and controlled corporations which
would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt,
and containing other matters as may be provided by
law.
Art XII Section 21. Foreign loans may only be
incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of
the monetary authority. Information on foreign loans
obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be
made available to the public.
(9) POWER OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TREATY MAKING
Art VII Section 21. No treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members
of the Senate.
PIMENTEL VS THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
This is the Rome Statute involving the ICC where the
Philippines is a signatory. After the Philippines signed
through the Philippine Diplomatic Officer in NY,
Pimentel wanted it to be submitted to the Senate for
concurrence.
Senate has the power to confer and in fact ratify the
treaties entered by the president for and in behalf of
the country by required vote of 2/3.
The SC made mentioned of 4 STAGES IN TREATY
MAKING:
1) NEGOTIATIONS - parties negotiate; there is a
written proposal and they agree on terms.
2) SIGNING OF THE DOCUMENTS- Draft is
signed by the representatives of the parties.
These are the heads of states being the
persons representing the state. Signing is just
to authenticate what has been negotiated but
it is not yet binding and in effect.
3) RATIFICATION – During the ratification stage,
in our laws, the DFA will go over it and if it is
within the terms of what has been negotiated,
the DFA will forward it to the President for
ratification. Under our rules, after it is ratified
by the President, the DFA will send it to the
Senate for concurrence. After the Senate
concurs to it, we will present it to the other
party in exchange of documents. 91
4) EXCHANGE OF DOCUMENTS
The Senate‘s participation in our treaty making is
concurrence. Concurrence is part of ratification.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA

SC said it is only after the document is ratified that
there will be an exchange of documents. And after the
exchange of documents, normally this is when the
treaty will take effect.
CAN THE PRESIDENT BE COMPELLED TO
SUBMIT TO THE SENATE THE TREATY FOR
RATIFICATION? No, that is part of the president‟s
prerogative. Even the president entered into a
treaty with foreign country it does not mean that
the president is duty bound or could be compelled
by mandamus to submit the treaty to the senate
for ratification, because the president may still opt
not to have it ratified by the state even after the
exchange of signed documents. Until and unless the
president submits it to the senate, the senate cannot
compel him to submit that signed treaty to the
senators.
DEPORTATION OF UNDESIRABLE ALIENS
When the President directs the arrest of an
undesirable alien for his immediate deportation, that
order of arrest can be issued by the President and that
is not covered by the rule on judicial warrants. There
are 2 things that must concur:
a. There is already a declaration of
undesirability. That the executive has
determined that the stay of the foreigner here
is a privilege and not a right is no longer
desirable and that he must have to be arrested
and deported.
b. What is issued is not a warrant of arrest but an
ORDER OF ARREST.
PRESIDENT‟S AUTHORITY TO ORDER THE
ARREST THROUGH THE IMMIGRATION BUREAU
In undesirable alien cases situation, there must have
to be a determination first of his undesirability. If
that person is yet to be determined his
undesirability it requires a valid court issued
warrant.
If there has already been a DECLARATION OF
UNDESIRABILITY by the Office of the President
through the Immigration Bureau, any arrest
thereafter can be ordered by the president not
because the president has the power to issue a
warrant but because the president is the head of
foreign relation.
(12) POWER OVER LEGISLATION
(A) MESSAGE TO CONGRESS
Art VII Section 23. The President shall address the
Congress at the opening of its regular session. He
may also appear before it at any other time.
(B) PREPARATION AND SUBMISSION OF THE
BUDGET
Art VII Section 22. The President shall submit to the
Congress, within thirty days from the opening of every
regular session as the basis of the general
appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and
sources of financing, including receipts from existing
and proposed revenue measures.
(C) VETO POWER
Art VI Sec 27 (2) The President shall have the power
to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the
item or items to which he does not object.
(D) EMERGENCY POWER
Art VI Sec 23 (2) In times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
(E) FIXING OF TARIFF RATES
Art VI Sec 28 (2) The Congress may, by law,
authorize the President to fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
(13) IMMUNITY FROM SUITS
General Rule: The sitting president is immune from
suit, either civil, administrative or criminal. It is not only
because he is an impeachable officer but because we
follow the DOCTRINE OF IMMUNITY OF THE
SITTING PRESIDENT, regardless of when the
cause of action against the president has existed.
BASIS OF THE IMMUNITY
It is interesting to note that the 1987 Constitution
does not provide for presidential immunity from
suit. Unlike congressional immunity, presidential 92
immunity is not expressly stated nor prescribed by
the Constitution.
Basis for the immunity is only found in
jurisprudence, both in the U.S. and the Philippines,
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
which, by virtue of Article 8 of the Civil Code,
“forms a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.”
IN RE: BERMUDEZ (1986)
Supreme Court expressly held that, incumbent
presidents are immune from suit or from being
brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure.
SOLIVEN, ET AL., VS JUDGE MAKASIAR (1988)
The rationale for the grant to the President of the
privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free
from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job
that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder‘s time,
also demands undivided attention.
SAEZ VS MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
The Court also stresses that rule that the presidential
immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the
president‘s incumbency.
Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity
cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even for
acts committed during his or her tenure. Courts look
with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of
immunity, especially when it impedes the search for
truth or impairs the vindication of a right.
The petitioner, however, is not exempted from the
burden of proving by substantial evidence his
allegations against the President to make the latter
liable for either acts or omissions violative of rights
against life, liberty and security. In the instant case, the
petitioner merely included the President‘s name as a
party respondent without any attempt at all to show the
latter‘s actual involvement in, or knowledge of the
alleged violations. Further, prior to the filing of the
petition, there was no request or demand for any
investigation that was brought to the President‘s
attention. Thus, while the President cannot be
completely dropped as a respondent in a petition for
the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data
merely on the basis of the presidential immunity from
suit, the petitioner in this case failed to establish
accountability of the President, as commander-in-
chief, under the doctrine of command responsibility.
WHO MAY CLAIM IMMUNITY
SOLIVEN, ET AL., VS JUDGE MAKASIAR (1988)
Petitioners argued that the reasons which necessitate
presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative
disability to file suit‖. He contended that if criminal
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President‘s filing of
her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to
be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under
the trial court‘s jurisdiction. This would in an indirect
way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by
testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing
herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. In
turning down petitioners argument, the Court held that
the privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the
President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any
other person in the President‟s behalf. Thus, an
accused in a criminal case in which the President
is complainant cannot raise the presidential
privilege as a defense to prevent the case from
proceeding against such accused. Moreover, there
is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President
from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded by the
privilege and submit to the court‘s jurisdiction. The
choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to
waive it is solely the President‟s prerogative. It is a
decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by
any other person.
SCOPE OF IMMUNITY
CLINTON V. JONES
On 27 May 1997, a unanimous United States Supreme
Court held that the Constitution does not protect a
sitting President from a lawsuit that is predicated
on private, pre-presidential conduct. Basically, the
Court stated that an incumbent was liable to a suit
for damages, based on actions taken before his
term began.The Court held further that an official‟s
absolute immunity should extend only to acts in
performance of particular functions of his office
because immunities are grounded in the nature of
the function performed, not the identity of the
actor who performed it.
Further, an official‟s absolute immunity extends
only to acts in performance of particular functions
of his office. The doctrine of immunity finds no
application and cannot be invoked in cases where
the public official is being sued in his private
capacity or as an ordinary citizen. The mantle of
protection afforded public officers is removed the
moment they are sued in their individual capacity.
This usually arises where the government official acts
without authority or in excess of the powers vested in
him or his office such as when he has acted with
malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction.
LOZADA VS GMA
93
PGMA was no longer the president, the SC reiterated
the exception that immunity no longer applies.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court clarified that in the
petition for the writ of Amparo, since what is
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
sought to be established is the responsibility, not
the liability, of who is responsible for the acts
sought to be protected in the petition, then the
sitting President is not immune from such case.
A sitting president can be impleaded as a party
respondent in a Petition for Writ of Amparo filed
after the incumbency but the disappearance
happened during the president‟s incumbency.
The nature of the petition for the writ of Amparo
establishes not liability (civil, criminal, or
administrative) but rather the responsibility over
which for whom shall be tasked with determining
the whereabouts of persons whose absence or
disappearance is the subject for the writ of
Amparo.
Immunity of the president extends even beyond
his incumbency if it refers to official acts. If there
is any damage cause because the president acted
officially without any malice, bad faith, abuse of
power or discretion, the president will still be
immune for such cases even after incumbency To
prevent that occasion or possibility that the president
will refuse to act on a matter while he is president for a
fear that he be subjected to any case after his
incumbency he is supposed to be immune also after
the incumbency only for these effects of his official
acts.
The petition for Writ of Amparo is an improvement for
the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In Habeas
Corpus it can easily defeated by the simple reason
that the person subject for the petition for habeas
corpus is not in their custody and there is no
responsibility on the part of the respondent to explain
what, where, what happened, for as long as they could
reason out to the court that the person subject to the
petition is not in his custody.
In Petition for Writ of Amparorequires that if there
was a demand on the supposed disappearance of the
person the respondents must have to show the court
what actions have been made to ascertain the
whereabouts of the person.
Any public official can be made a respondent for
the writ of habeas corpus with the president
because of our concept of command
responsibility. In the Philippines, we apply the
doctrine of command responsibility. There is no
actual knowledge required. Constructive
knowledge is sufficient which can be proven by the
acts or omissions of the commander-in-chief at the
time of the actions complained of.
It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys
immunity from suit during his or her tenure of office or
actual incumbency.Conversely, this presidential
privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-
sitting president even for acts committed during his or
her tenure.
In the case at bar, the events that gave rise to the
present action, as well as the filing of the original
Petition and the issuance of the CA Decision, occurred
during the incumbency of former President Arroyo. In
that respect, it was proper for the court a quo to have
dropped her as a respondent on account of her
presidential immunity from suit.
It must be underscored, however, that since her tenure
of office has already ended, former President Arroyo
can no longer invoke the privilege of presidential
immunity as a defense to evade judicial determination
of her responsibility or accountability for the alleged
violation or threatened violation of the right to life,
liberty and security of Lozada.
Nonetheless, examining the merits of the case still
results in the denial of the Petition on the issue of
former President Arroyo‘s alleged responsibility or
accountability. A thorough examination of the
allegations postulated and the evidence adduced by
petitioners reveals their failure to sufficiently establish
any unlawful act or omission on her part that violated,
or threatened with violation, the right to life, liberty and
security of Lozada.
THE VICE PRESIDENT
a) Qualifications, election, term and oath (Art VII
Sec 3,4,5)
b) Privilege and Salary (Art VII Sec 6)
c) Prohibitions (Art VII Sec 13)
d) Succession (Art VII Sec 9)
e) Removal (Art XI Sec 2,3)
f) Functions
g) Right of Succession (Art VII Sec 8, 11)
h) Membership in Cabinet (Art VII Sec 3 (2))
94
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
The Supreme Court
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA

A. COMPOSITION
Art. VIII. Section 4.
1. The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit
en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five,
or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
2. All cases involving the constitutionality of a
treaty, international or executive agreement, or
law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en
banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of
Court are required to be heard en banc, including
those involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations,
orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations,
shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority
of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon.
3. Cases or matters heard by a division shall be
decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at
least three of such Members. When the required
number is not obtained, the case shall be decided
en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of
law laid down by the court in a decision rendered
en banc or in division may be modifiedor reversed
except by the court sitting en banc.
SC CIRCULAR NO. 2-89 February 7, 1989
1. The Supreme Court sits either en banc or in
Divisions of three, five or seven Members (Sec. 4[1],
Article VIII, 1987 Constitution). At present the Court
has three Divisions of five Members each.
2. A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court,
when concurred in by a majority of its Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a
case and voted thereon, and in no case without the
concurrence of at least three of such Members, is a
decision or resolution of the Supreme Court (Section
4[3]. Article VIII, 1987 Constitution).
3. The Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to
which decisions or resolutions of a Division may be
appealed.
4. At any time after a Division takes cognizance of a
case and before a judgment or resolutions of a
Division may refer the case en consultato the Court en
banc which, after consideration of the reasons of the
Division for such referral may return the case to the
Division or accept the case for decision or resolution.
4a. Paragraph [f] of the Resolution of this Court of 23
February 1984 in Bar Matter No. 205 [formerly item 6,
en banc Resolution dated 29 September 1977],
enumerating the cases considered as en banc cases,
states:
f. Cases assigned to a division including motions for
reconsideration which in the opinion of at least three
(3) members merit the attention of the Court en banc
and are acceptable by a majority vote if the actual
membership of the Court en banc.
5. A resolution of the Division denying a party's motion
for referral to the Court en banc of any Division case,
shall be final and not appealable to the Court en banc.
6. When a decision or resolution is referred by a
Division to the Court en banc, the latter may, in the
absence of sufficiently important reasons, decline to
take cognizance of the same, in which case, the
decision or resolution shall be returned to the referring
Division.
7. No motion for reconsideration of the action of the
Court en banc declining to take cognizance of a
referral by a Division shall be entertained.
This principle that there is only one Supreme Court is
strengthened by the provision of the constitution that a
case handled by the division can be referred to the
court en banc only in the following instances
when:
1) There has been no decision or resolution by
the division yet;
2) Majority of the division has referred the
case for decision or resolution to the court
en banc; and
3) Court en banc majority has accepted the
referral.
The decisions of the division referring and of the
Supreme Court en banc accepting or declining the
referral of the division shall be final and non-
reviewable.
WHAT CASES SHALL THE SC DECIDE EN BANC?
1) Constitutional issues or cases (e.g. when
there is a petition on the sufficiency of factual
basis on the declaration of Martial Law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus)
2) Petitions where the president exercises his
commander in chief powers; 95
3) When the division vote is not met, the case
may be referred to the Supreme Court en
banc;
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 4) When there is a reversal of any doctrine or
decision of the Supreme Court by division
or by the court en banc in a subsequent
case;
5) When the SC acts as the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET); and
6) When there is administrative case involving
disbarment, dismissal or if the suspension
is for more than one year or the fine is
more than 10,000 pesos. The decision of the
court must have to be handed down by the
court en banc.
If the decision in the administrative cases
involves judges, and justices of the lower
collegiate courts or lawyers or it involves none
of the cases listed above, then the decision
may be validly rendered by a division.
CITY OF TAGAYTAY VS GUERRERO
Supreme Court highlights the previous ruling that a
decision of the division or by the court en banc
must have to be reversed by the Court En Banc.
Decision of the case is the law between the
parties. In this case, there was a foreclosure sale for
failure to pay real estate or real property taxes. The
City of Tagaytay won, and filed a petition for the
issuance of title in its favor. The RTC granted the
petition and the Court of Appeals affirmed but the
Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower
courts on the ground that the foreclosure/public
auction sale based on the tax delinquency was not
valid because the City of Tagaytay had no authority
over the lands in question because it is situated in
Batangas and not in Tagaytay. All the proceedings
from the imposition of the tax, to the delinquency, to
the public auction sale were nullified by the Supreme
Court.
In another case, there was a petition seeking the
declaration of nullity of an auction sale. The RTC
decided that the foreclosure sale is invalid again based
on the same reasoning as the Tagaytay case, that the
lands in question were not within the City of Tagaytay.
The City of Tagaytay appealed to the Supreme Court
asking the Supreme Court to declare that the
properties were actually in Tagaytay and not in
Talisay, Batangas. The Supreme Court said that when
the first decision was rendered, it already became final
and executory, which decision is now the rule between
the parties. This prior ruling can only be overturned by
the Supreme Court en banc.
B. APPOINTMENT AND QUALIFICATIONS
Art. VIII. Section 7.
1. No person shall be appointed Member of the
Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member
of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of
age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a
judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law
in the Philippines.
2. The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of
judges of lower courts, but no person may be
appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the
Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
3. A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of
proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence.
Section 8 (par. 5). The Council shall have the
principal function of recommending appointees to the
judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and
duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and
judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three nominees
preferred by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the
appointment within ninety days from the submission of
the list.
“PRACTICE OF LAW”
CAYETANO VS MONSOD
“Practice of law means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge
or skill."
Because of the Judicial Reorganization Act of 1981,
BP 129, all Judges of the lower courts to the Supreme
Court, must be natural born citizens.
KILOSBAYAN VS JUSTICE GREGORY ONG
Justice Gregory Ong was nominated to the Supreme
Court. Kilosbayan headed by former Senate President
JovitoSalonga, raised the issue of his qualification
based on his citizenship. There is no question that he
is a Filipino citizen; the issue is whether he is natural
born.
If the sitting Associate Justice of the Supreme Court is
nominated to the Chief Justice position, there is no 96
need to process his nomination. His nomination to the
Chief Justice position does not make him any more
competent, more qualified, or more natural born
citizen. The only reason that the JBC will process any
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
position to the court is to determine that they have all
the qualifications and not any of the disqualifications.
C. SALARY
These 4 are constitutionally imposed limitations of
dispute to assure that the Judiciary will continue to be
independent from the Political branches of the
government:
1) SALARY
2) FISCAL AUTONOMY
3) NON DIMINUTION OF APPROPRIATIONS
4) AUTOMATIC RELEASE OF THE
APPROPRIATIONS AS APPROVED BY THE
CONGRESS
Art. VIII. Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice
and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law.
During the continuance in office, their salary shall not
be decreased.
Art. XVIII. Section 17. Until the Congress provides
otherwise, the President shall receive an annual salary
of three hundred thousand pesos; the Vice-President,
the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, and the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, two hundred forty thousand pesos
each; the Senators, the Members of the House of
Representatives, the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, and the Chairmen of the
Constitutional Commissions, two hundred four
thousand pesos each; and the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty
thousand pesos each.
The only matter that is to be discussed here is the
imposition of income taxes. We should always go back
to the basic premise that taxation is inherent power
and so long as there is no constitutional exemption
granted then, taxes should be imposed whether it
refers to the benefits of the member of the judiciary.
As safeguard of judicial independence, there is the
NON-DIMINUTION OR AUTOMATIC RELEASE OF
APPROPRIATIONS. The non-diminution or automatic
release of appropriations requires the President and
Congress, eventually, to at least maintain, if not
increase, the appropriations for the current year of the
Judiciary from the last year‘s level. The Congress
cannot diminish what has accrued already.
NITAFAN VS CIR
GR L-78780, 23 JULY 1987
FACTS: Petitioners David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo
and Maximo Savellano Jr., were duly appointed and
qualified Judges of the RTC National Capital Judicial
Region. They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin
respondents, (CIR and the Financial Officer of the
Supreme Court) from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries. Petitioners
submit that ―any tax withheld from their emoluments or
compensation as judicial officers constitutes a
decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to
Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.‖
ISSUE: Is a deduction of withholding tax a diminution
of the salaries of Judges/Justices?
HELD: The Supreme Court hereby makes of record
that it had then discarded the ruling in PERFECTO VS.
MEER (88 Phil 552) and ENDENCIA VS. DAVID (93
Phil 696), that declared the salaries of members of the
Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax and
considered such payment as a diminution of their
salaries during their continuance in office. The Court
hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and
Judges are property subject to general income tax
applicable to all income earners and that the
payment of such income tax by Justices and
Judges does not fall within the constitutional
protection against decrease of their salaries
during their continuance in office.
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed
regarding the constitutional provision in question until it
was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that
the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution,
in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of
the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent
is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers
of the organic law and of the people adopting it should
be given effect.
D. SECURITY OF TENURE
Art VIII. Section 11. The Members of the Supreme
Court and judges of the lower court shall hold office
during good behavior until they reach the age of
seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge
the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc
shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of
the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted in
thereon.
Section 2 (par. 2). No law shall be passed
reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the
security of tenure of its Members.
With respect to the judiciary, they do not have term of
offices. They only have tenure. They continue to be in
their position until the mandatory retirement in the
age of 70 unless in the meantime they are removed for
cause. They can only be removed for cause because 97
as Judges, they are supposed to be secured in their
tenure.
DE LA LLANA VS ALBA
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
When BP 129 in 1980 was passed, there were a lot of
Justices of the Appellate Court and Judges of the
lower court that were affected.
ISSUE: Whether BP 129 is a law which violated their
security of tenure or whether it was a valid law on
abolition.
The Supreme Court discussed the difference
between abolition of office and the removal of the
incumbent in violation of his constitutional
security of tenure.
In abolition of office, there is no incumbent
because the office is abolished. Unlike in removal,
the office remains and a new appointment is made.
If there is no new appointment and the office does
not remain, it becomes abolition and there is no
violation of the security of tenure.
Supreme Court maintained that abolition may
amount to removal from office and a violation of
security of tenure if the abolition is not done in
good faith. If it is done in good faith, there is no
violation of security of tenure.
E. REMOVAL
Art. VIII. Section 11. The Members of the Supreme
Court and judges of the lower court shall hold office
during good behavior until they reach the age of
seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge
the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc
shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of
the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted in
thereon.
Art. XI. Section 2. The President, the Vice-President,
the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of
the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
may be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public
officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.
The impeachable officers cannot be subjected to any
case. The logical result would be impeaching them
from office first.
Removal in relation to impeachment must have to be
understood as applicable only to the Supreme Court
Justices. Justices of the lower collegiate courts and
Judges of the lower courts are subject to the
disciplinary function of the Supreme Court.
If it involves disbarment, dismissal or if the
suspension is for more than one year or the fine is
more than 10,000 pesos or both, the decision of
the court must have to be handed down by the
Supreme Court en banc.
If less than that, the decision and the imposition of
the penalty shall be done by the Supreme Court
division.
IN RE FIRST INDORSEMENT FROM HONORABLE
RAUL M. GONZALEZ
Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article
VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the
Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only by
impeachment. To grant a complaint for disbarment
of a Member of the Court during the Member's
incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and
hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate
that Members of the Court may be removed from
office only by impeachment for and conviction of
certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the
Constitution.
The provisions of the 1973 Constitution quoted in
Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayanare substantially
reproduced in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution: Sec. 2 The President, the Vice-President,
the Members of the Supreme Court, … may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public
trust. All other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment.
A Member of the Supreme Court must first be
removed from office via the constitutional route of
impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI
of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the
Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by
impeachment, he may then be held to answer
either criminally or administratively (by disbarment
proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that
may be proven against him in appropriate
proceedings.
F. FISCAL AUTONOMY
One of the most important aspects of judicial
independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal
autonomy. Just as the Executive may not prevent a
judge from discharging his or her judicial duty (for
example, by physically preventing a court from holding
its hearings) and just as the Legislature may not enact
laws removing all jurisdiction from courts,the courts
may not be obstructed from their freedom to use or
dispose of their funds for purposes germane to judicial
functions. While, as a general proposition, the 98
authority of legislatures to control the purse in the first
instance is unquestioned, any form of interference by
the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciary‘s
fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a
co-equal branch of government. If the judicial branch is
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
to perform its primary function of adjudication, it must
be able to command adequate resources for that
purpose. This authority to exercise (or to compel the
exercise of) legislative power over the national purse
(which at first blush appears to be a violation of
concepts of separateness and an invasion of
legislative autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicial
independenceand is expressly provided for by the
Constitution through the grant of fiscal autonomy
under Section 3, Article VIII.
The Judiciary‘s fiscal autonomy is realized through the
actions of the Chief Justice, as its head, and of the
Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise of
administrative control and supervision of the courts
and its personnel.
Art. VIII. Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be
reduced by the legislature below the amount
appropriated for the previous year and, after approval,
shall be automatically and regularly released.
CSC VS DBM
SC held that the Judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy;
their appropriations shall be automatically and
regularly released. It cannot be impounded and
subjected to the DBM “no report, no release”
policy of the DBM.They shall be given priority in
the release of approved appropriations over all
other agencies not similarly vested with fiscal
autonomy, when there is a revenue shortfall.
RE: CLARIFYING AND STRENGTHENING THE
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE SET-UP OF THE PHILIPPINE
JUDICIAL ACADEMY (PHILJA)
ISSUE: WON DBM‘s issuance of the NOSCA
downgrading the Court‘s proposed positions and
reducing its corresponding salary grades "undermine
the independence of the Judiciary and impinge on the
Supreme Court‘s exercise of its fiscal autonomy
expressly granted by the Constitution.
In downgrading the positions and salary grades of SC
Chief Judicial Staff Officer and SC Supervising Judicial
Staff Officer in the PHILJA, the DBM overstepped its
authority and encroached upon the Court‟s fiscal
autonomy and supervision of court personnel as
enshrined in the Constitution; in fine, a violation of
the Constitution itself. Thus, the authority of the DBM
to "review" the plantilla and compensation of court
personnel extends only to "calling the attention of
the Court" on what it may perceive as erroneous
application of budgetary laws and rules on
position classification. The DBM may not overstep
its authority in such a way as to cause the amendment
or modification of Court resolutions even if these
pertain to administration of compensation and position
classification system. Only after its attention to an
allegedly erroneous application of the pertinent law or
rule has been called by the DBM may the Court
amend or modify its resolution, as its judgment and
discretion may dictate under the law.
RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF
THE APPRAISED VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES
PURCHASED BY THE RETIRED
CHIEF/ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME
COURT
678 SCRA 1 (2012)
This involves the valuation made by the Supreme
Court based on the prior COA Circular which was
made the basis for an En Banc Resolution.
5 retired judges were allowed to buy service vehicles
which the Supreme Court bought for them and
assigned for their use while they were in the judiciary.
When they retired, they were sold some lesser
amount. The COA tried to evaluate the disposed
vehicles and said that the Supreme Court should have
used another COA Circular providing for different
formula in assessing the value of the said properties.
ISSUE: WON COA encroached into the Court‘s
judicial prerogative in light of the Court‘s fiscal
autonomy, when it questions and attempts to
substitute the Court‘s policy in the disposal of its
property.
Held: YES. Under the guarantees of the Judiciary‘s
fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief
Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide
the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges
and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court
officials and court personnel within the parameters of
the Court‘s granted power. They determine the terms,
conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.
Considering that the Supreme Court has used a
formula which was previously based on a COA
resolution or memorandum which already formed
part of an En Banc resolution, then the Supreme
Court, or Judiciary for that matter, should not,
without violating the separation of power and
separation of autonomy, be dictated upon by COA
on how to dispose its properties.
While it is true that the Congress has the initial power
of the purse of the entire country or the State, once it
has authorized the Supreme Court over a certain
amount of money and that amount of money were
used to buy properties and which the Supreme Court
eventually disposed of, this is already part of the
powers or within the discretion of the Supreme Court.
Since the valuation of these properties were based on
an En Banc resolution, then, the formula as mentioned
99
by COA should not be used because it would violate
fiscal autonomy and separation of power.
As the Court En Banc‘s Resolution (dated March 23,
2004) in A.M. No. 03-12-01 reflects, the fiscal
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
autonomy of the Judiciary serves as the basis in
allowing the sale of the Judiciary‘s properties to retiring
Justices of the Supreme Court and the appellate
courts.
Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciary‘s fiscal
autonomy and its independence, the Chief Justice and
the Court En Banc determine and decide the who,
what, where, when and how of the privileges and
benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials
and court personnel within the parameters of the
Court‘s granted power; they determine the terms,
conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.
In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the
formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a
part of the Court‘s exercise of its discretionary
authority to determine the manner the granted
retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of.
Any kind of interference on how these retirement
privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of,
not only violates the fiscal autonomy and
independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches
upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief
Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage
the Judiciary‘s own affairs.
Judicial independence broken into two concepts:
Decisional Independence and Institutional
Independence.
 DECISIONAL INDEPENDENCE - refers to a
judge‘s ability to render decisions free from
political or popular influence based solely on
the individual facts and applicable law.
 INSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE - President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
describes the separation of the judicial branch
from the executive and legislative branches of
government Simply put, institutional
independence refers to the collective
independence of the judiciary as a body.
G. JURISDICTION
Art VIII Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,
assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court
is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is
involved.
Article VII Sec 18. Par (3) The Supreme Court may
review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from
its filing.
Article VII Sec 4 Par 7. The Supreme Court, sitting en
banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the
rules for the purpose.
Art IX A Section 7. Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of
each Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
days from receipt of a copy thereof.
WHEN WOULD A CASE BE CONSIDERED
INVOLVING A QUESTION OF LAW?
It is characterized by the conflict in the
interpretation or application of the law and there is
no conflict in the interpretation of facts. If the case
involves merely on the question on what law should be
applied or how it should be applied, and the facts are
either admitted or disputed, it is a pure question of law.
Eventually in cases where it would reach the Supreme
Court, questions of fact may nevertheless be
resolved by the Supreme Court. 10
0
Examples:
1. If Death penalty is imposed by lower
court, there is automatic review by the
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 Supreme Court. When the conviction is
automatically reviewed by the Supreme
Court, by force of circumstance, the
Supreme Court has to rule on the
evidentiary questions; and
2. When the commander in chief exercises
any of its powers, the petition on the
sufficiency of the factual basis, will have to
be filed before the Supreme Court only.
REPUBLIC V ORTIGAS
There is a question of law when the appellant
raises an issue as to what law shall be applied on
a given set of facts. Questions of law do "not
involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented." Its resolution rests solely
on the application of a law given the
circumstances. There is a question of fact when
the court is required to examine the truth or falsity
of the facts presented. A question of fact "invites a
review of the evidence."
The sole issue raised by petitioner Republic of the
Philippines to the Court of Appeals is whether
respondent Ortigas‘ property should be conveyed to it
only by donation, in accordance with Section 50 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529. This question involves
the interpretation and application of the provision. It
does not require the Court of Appeals to examine the
truth or falsity of the facts presented. Neither does it
invite a review of the evidence. The issue raised
before the Court of Appeals was, therefore, a question
purely of law. The proper mode of appeal is through a
petition for review under Rule 45. Hence, the Court of
Appeals did not err in dismissing the appeal on this
ground.
MACALINTAL VS PET
The Supreme Court acts as the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, which is one of those cases
where the Supreme Court exercises judicial power
of a specialized kind.
Petitioner contends that the Supreme Court sitting as
PET is unconstitutional, that the Supreme Court
cannot act as PET because courts are limited from
performing other than judicial functions.
The Supreme Court resolved that his claim is not right
because the Constitution allows the Supreme Court to
act as PET. Even if it is not strictly judicial power,
election contest involves the exercise of judicial
determination of conflicting rights, on who is entitled to
the office, by question of either qualification or if its
quo warranto, disloyalty to the republic.
H. CONGRESSIONAL POWER OVER
JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT
(1) The Congress may not deprive the Supreme Court
of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5
hereof.
Art VII Section 2 Par 1. The Congress shall have the
power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive
the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
This would refer to the original action under Section
5(1) and the appealed cases under Section 5(2).
The other would refer to those questions of law and
those wherein the penalty imposed in criminal cases is
reclusion perpetuaor higher.
Art VI Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in this Constitution without its advice and
concurrence.
FABIAN VS DESIERTO
This case speaks of Republic Act 6770, the creation of
the Office of the Ombudsman. There was a provision
that the decisions of the Ombudsman over certain
cases are directly reviewable by the Supreme
Court, which Supreme Court declared as an
unconstitutional provision considering that when
that law was passed, the prior consent and
concurrence of the Supreme Court was not
secured according to what is provided under Section
30 of Article VI. The Congress cannot enact a law
giving the Supreme Court more work in relation to
its review power. Any law which increases the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court must
have its prior consent.
In that case, decisions of the OMB must be appealed
to the Court of Appeals with respect to administrative
matters. With respect to the criminal cases, it‘s
supposed to be final. If you want that reviewed, you
have to seek its reversal on error on jurisdiction and
not on error on judgment. It is normally under Rule 65
on petitions for certiorari.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS
These are not judicial functions to begin with. They are
performed, nonetheless, by the SC because it is
granted to them by the Constitution.
1) SUPERVISION OF LOWER COURTS
Supervision of the lower courts highlights one principle
10
- that the Supreme Court has administrative power
1
over all judges of all collegiate courts and court
personnel.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
This prohibits other agencies of the government,
particularly the Office of the Ombudsman, to
exercise primary jurisdiction and even preliminary
investigation over the ADMINISTRATIVE cases
involving justices, judges, and other court
personnel. Any complaints must first be filed and
eventually resolved by the Supreme Court with
respect to CRIMINAL cases.
There are some personnel in the SC that are not really
under the SC and not under their payroll. So, OMB has
the power over government employees, appointed or
elective, except the impeachable officers, members of
the Congress and those under the judiciary.
The SC has held that OMB has no jurisdiction over
judiciary personnel under the power of the SC to
discipline of the SC. This refers to administrative
supervision only.
Therefore, it only refers to any administrative liabilities.
So, if there are cases filed in the Office of the OMB
which do not refer to the administrative liability, then,
the OMB has jurisdiction. For example, a criminal
complaint filed against members of the judiciary
except the Supreme Court.
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have
administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof.
When there is case that is filed in relation to the
ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY of all lower court
judges, lower collegiate court judges and all court
personnel, it cannot be under the jurisdiction of
Ombudsman
Criminal cases must have to be distinguished if the
criminal liability arose out of administrative
obligation or duty of the judge or court personnel.
 If so, then it must have to be in the SC first on
the administrative aspect.
 But if the criminal case or complaint is
unrelated, then the Ombudsman has the
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation
against a judiciary employee.
RPC Article 204. Knowingly rendering unjust
judgment. - Any judge who shall knowingly render an
unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for
decision, shall be punished by prision mayor and
perpetual absolute disqualification.
CAN A JUDGE OR JUSTICE BE CHARGED WITH
THE OMBUDSMAN CRIMINALLY FOR
MALICIOUSLY RENDERING UNJUST DECISION
OR RESOLUTION, A FELONY UNDER THE RPC? It
cannot prosper until the SC exercised its supervision
for a reason that the criminal aspect is related to his
administrative duty or obligation to render decisions,
orders or resolutions.
IN RE: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE
706 SCRA 502 (2013)
There was a request for guidance for the applicability
of Sec. 7 of Rule 3 of RA 10154. This act requires all
concerned government agencies to ensure the early
release of the retirement pay, pensions, etc. of the
government officials. Sec. 7 of Rule 3 requires that
before the retirement benefits are processed and
released, retiring officers must secure clearance from
Civil Service Commission, OMB, and in cases of
presidential-appointee, in the Office of the President.
ISSUE: Whether this provision of law is applicable to
employees and members of the judiciary.
The SC said NO, based on the administrative
supervision by the Supreme Court. The provision is
not applicable to the employees of the judiciary who is
under the supervision of the SC. However, the SC
clarified that it only applies to clearances for the
administrative liabilities because all administrative
cases on court personnel areunder the Supreme
Court.
If what is required is clearance from criminal charges
or pending criminal cases, then that should be
complied because that is not within the authority of the
Supreme Court.
3) TEMPORARILY ASSIGN JUDGES TO
OTHER PLACES IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Art VIII Sec 5(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower
courts to other stations as public interest may require.
Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six
months without the consent of the judge
concerned.
Due to the demands or the exigencies of service, with
a lot of courts which have remains vacant, the
Supreme Court can make temporary appointments.
When the President appoints a person to be a
member of the judiciary that is a permanent
appointment. Supreme Court to sit in another court.
Judges cannot be appointed by the president
temporarily because it violates independence and
security of tenure.
3) ORDER A CHANGE OF VENUE OR PLACE OF
TRIAL TO AVOID A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE.
Art VIII Sec 5(4) Order a change of venue or place of
trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
10
Unlike in civil cases, where the parties can agree 2
on the venue, venue in criminal cases is
jurisdictional. In order to avoid a miscarriage of
justice, caused by refusal or reluctance on the part of
witnesses to testify or there is no available voluntary
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
witnesses in the venue where the case is filed, there
may be an order of change of venue.
This, however, must have to be made upon request
by either of the parties, most especially by the
prosecution. The Supreme Court will have to issue an
order directing such case to be transferred. Until then,
the place where the crime was committed would have
to exercise jurisdiction over the criminal case.
4) DISCIPLINE JUDGES
Art. VIII. Section 11. The Members of the Supreme
Court and judges of the lower court shall hold
office during good behavior until they reach the
age of seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme
Court en banc shall have the power to discipline
judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by
a vote of majority of the Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted in thereon.
If the penalty is less than dismissal or less than 1-year
suspension or less than P10,000 in fine, that can be
heard by a division.
5) APPOINTMENT OF OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES OF ENTIRE JUDICIARY
Art VIII Sec 5 (6). Appoint all officials and employees
of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service
Law.
J. RULE MAKING
Art VIII Sec. 5(5) Promulgate rules concerning (1) the
protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, (2) rules on pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, (3) the admission to the
practice of law, (4) ) the admission to the
integrated bar, and (5) legal assistance to the
under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition
of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Art. XII. Section 14 (par 2). The practice of all
professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by law.
Art. VII. Section 18 (par. 3). The Supreme Court may
review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.
These are subject to these conditions;
 Simplified
 Inexpensive
 uniform for all course of the same grade
 Must not diminish, increase, or modify
substantiveness
BAR FLUNKERS CASE
ISSUE: Whether Congress can enact a law lowering
the passing rate in the bar.
SC held that it is unconstitutional because admission
to the Philippine Bar is part of the constitutional power
of the SC under its rule-making power.
LIMITED LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE - The
indigents can be legally assisted by a law student who
has finished third year in law school. You can now be
a legal practitioner under the limited law student
practice rule. The only difference is that you are not
yet a member of the Philippine Bar and is not covered
by the ethics. You can commit mistakes because you
are still under the supervision of a lawyer.
SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION INVOLVING THE
CONDUCT OF ACTIVITIES OR RALLIES OR
PICKETS IN COURTROOMS OR COURTHOUSES
The Supreme Court said it is a CONTENT
NEUTRAL RESTRICTION because it prevents
these acts from disrupting court activities. It is
unlawful to conduct these activities within 200 meter
radius from the court room or courthouse.
Otherwise, you can be held liable for contempt.
EDILLON VS MALLARI
Membership in the IBP is a precondition for the
practice of law. But membership is one thing,
being allowed to practice is another. Non-payment
of the membership dues does not allow a member
of the IBP to practice law.
IN RE: IBP ELECTIONS
696 SCRA 8 (2013)
Supreme Court has the power to integrate the bar.
Therefore, the integration of the bar is largely under
the supervision of the Supreme Court.
IN RE: IBP ELECTIONS involves the rotational plan in
the elections of the IBP President and the Executive
Vice President from the 9 members of the Board of
Governors. Supreme Court recommended that the
rule on the rotational plan for the said positions
has to be amended. 10
3
YLAYA VS. GACOTT
689 SCRA 452 (2013)
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
IBP Board of Governors is given the primary
jurisdiction over disbarment and suspension of
lawyers.Although the Supreme Court made or
clarified, that the findings of the Board is merely
recommendatory, it is always subject to the review
of the Supreme Court.
IBP found the respondent liable for violating a Canon 1
and 16 and recommended a 6-month suspension, the
Supreme Court nullified the findings of the Board. It
said that he is not liable for Canon 1 and 16 but Canon
15 and 18. The SC also imposed a 1-year suspension.
 In the 1935 CONSTITUTION, it is stated under
Section 13 of Article VIII that the Congress
shall have the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the Rules concerning pleading,
practice, procedure or the rule-making powers
of the Supreme Court.
 In the 1973 CONSTITUTION, this was
rephrased and the rules promulgated by the
SC may be repealed, altered or supplemented
by the BatasangPambansa, which was then
the Congress.
 In the 1987 CONSTITUTION, there is no
similar provision.
ECHEGARAY VS SECRETARY
1987 Constitution has expanded the rule-making
powers of the SC and omitted such power of the
Congress. Such omission showed the intent of the
framers to grant the SC the rule-making power in its
entirety without any power remaining with Congress.
K. NO QUASI-JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
WORK OF JUDGES
Art. VIII. Section 12. The Members of the Supreme
Court and of other courts established by law shall not
be designated to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative function.
L. REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY
Art. VIII. Section 16. The Supreme Court shall, within
thirty days from the opening of each regular
session of the Congress, submit to the President
and the Congress an annual report on the
operations and activities of the Judiciary.
M. MANNER OF SITTING AND NUMBER OF VOTES
REQUIRED.
Art VIII Section 4.
1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
international or executive agreement, or law, which
shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all
other cases which under the Rules of Court are
required to be heard en banc, including those involving
the constitutionality, application, or operation of
presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall
be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the case and voted thereon.
3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be
decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority
of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at
least three of such Members. When the required
number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en
banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in
division may be modified or reversed except by the
court sitting en banc.
In the present Constitution, with respect to voting, it
follows what is commonly referred to as SHIFTING
MAJORITY.
Unlike in the 1973 Constitution, any constitutional
question must be heard en banc and a vote of 10
justices is required. All other cases which is not
constitutional questions that must be decided en
banc requires only 8 votes. Division cases would
require 5 votes.
In 1935, en banc cases requires 2/3.
JAVELLANA VS SECRETARY
This case questions the constitutionality or the efficacy
of the 1973 Constitution based on Proclamation No.
58. SC failed to resolve the validity of Proclamation
simply because the SC failed to come up with the 2/3
votes based on the 1935 Constitution.
To avoid similar situation in the past, that by reason of
numbers, an act of the President cannot be declared
unconstitutional by merely failing to get the required
votes, we now have in 1987 Constitution a SHIFTING
MAJORITY.
IN AN EN BANC CASE, the SC is merely required
to have a simple majority en banc to have quorum
(more than half) and have business. Assuming all the
15 justices are there, the minimum number of justices
to be in quorum is 8. And the majority of that quorum 10
would require the majority of that quorum. That would 4
be 5. It shift because it depends on the number of
the justices participating in the deliberations and
thereafter vote.Members of the court that do not
participate either because they are on official leave
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
or have inhibited are not counted in determining
the majority.Members who did not vote but took
part in the deliberations, their number/s will be
considered for purposes of determining the
majority.
In a Division Case, while it still follows the shifting
majority rule, there is a special rule there that in no
case shall there be less than three votes. If the
division sits in 5 members, 3 must be present and all 3
must vote to have a valid decision. The vote must be
unanimous.
RULES OF COURT HAS PROVIDED MECHANISM
IN CASE THE REQUIRED VOTES ARE NOT
OBTAINED.
1997 Rules on CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 56 Sec. 7.
Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where the
Court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the
necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall
again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation
no decision is reached, the original action commenced
in the Court shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, the
judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed;
and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion
shall be denied.
 IF A DIVISION DECISION IS NOT REACHED
DESPITE PRIOR CONSULTATION, the issue
or case shall be referred to the Court en banc.
 IF THE COURT EN BANC IN THE CIVIL
CASE OR PETITION HAS NOT REACHED
THE REQUIRED MAJORITY OR ARE
EQUALLY DIVIDED, the requirement under
Rule 56, Section 7 will be applied.
 IF STILL, AFTER DELIBERATION, NO VOTE
IS REACHED OR THE COURT IS EQUALLY
DIVIDED, then the rules state that:
o If it is an original action or petition, it
shall be dismissed.
o If it is an appealed case, the
appealed decision shall be considered
affirmed.
All other incidents of the petition are deemed denied.
2000 Rules on CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 12
Sec. 3. Decision if opinion is equally divided. –
When the Supreme Court en banc is equally divided in
opinion or the necessary majority cannot be had on
whether to acquit the appellant, the case shall again
be deliberated upon and if no decision is reached after
re-deliberation, the judgment of conviction of lower
court shall be reversed and the accused acquitted.
 IF A DIVISION HAVE NOT REACHED A
DECISION, they must refer the case to SC en
banc.
 IF THE COURT EN BANC IN CRIMINAL
CASES, IS STILL DIVIDED OR THE
MAJORITY VOTE IS NOT REACHED, the
Court will deliberate on the case again.
 IF AFTER THE RE-DELIBERATION, STILL
THE COURT IS DIVIDED OR THE
MAJORITY VOTE IS NOT REACHED, then
the judgment of conviction in the lower court is
deemed reversed and the accused shall be
acquitted.
RESOLUTION 2-89 clarified that the En Banc is not
a review or appellate court of the Division. The only
time the division can constitutionally refer the case to
En Banc is when after hearing the case is deliberated
and voted on, they have failed to get the majority.
But in certain cases in 2-89, the SC admits that there
is a possibility that before a decision or resolution is
rendered, the division may refer the case to en banc
and the court may hear the case. 2 things are
required.
i. That majority of the division have referred
the case to the court en banc for resolution;
ii. The majority of the en banc has accepted
the case.
The acceptance or refusal of the case is already final.
N. REQUIREMENTS AS TO DECISIONS
There are two basic requirements with respect to the
decision making of the courts:
i. Formal requirements and
ii. Substantive requirements
FORMAL REQUIREMENTS
Art. VIII. Section 13. The conclusions of the
Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for the
decision en banc or in division shall be reached in
consultation before the case the case assigned to
a Member for the writing of the opinion of the
Court. A certification to this effect signed by the
Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof
attached to the record of the case and served upon
the parties. Any Member who took no part, or
dissented, or abstained from a decision or
resolution must state the reason therefor. The
same requirements shall be observed by all lower
collegiate court.
A. THE CONCLUSIONS SHALL BE REACHED IN
CONSULTATION BEFORE THE CASE IS 10
ASSIGNED TO A MEMBER FOR THE WRITING OF 5
THE OPINION OF THE COURT.
The SC and the lower collegiate courts follow what is
known as the RULE ON CERTIFICATION. Before the
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
decision is read and written, there must have to be a
consultation with the other members of the court and a
certification is required to that effect to be appended in
the decision.
There must have a consultation because the decision
of the collegiate courts is not just the decision of one
member but a decision of the collective members.
In the Supreme Court, whether in division or en banc,
the most junior of the justices votes first. This is to
prevent the undue influence of the senior members.
However, there have been several cases in the
past that even if the certification is wanting; it
does not make the decision invalid because the
presumption of regularity is still there. The proble,
however, is that it may amount to an administrative
liability to the justices or to the court involved for failing
to write or include the certification.
B. ANY MEMBER WHO TOOK NO PART, OR
DISSENTED, OR ABSTAINED FROM A DECISION
OR RESOLUTION MUST STATE THE REASON
THEREFOR.
The justice has to explain why he dissented with the
majority. Because it is constitutionally required in form
that there is a separate dissenting opinion to be
written, some justices who would not want to write a
separate dissent would just join the dissent of another.
That would substantially comply with the constitutional
requirement.
Because the majority is the decision of the Court,
those who agree or concur to the decision are not
required to write a separate concurring opinion, though
they are not prohibited.
SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENT
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of
a decision of the court shall be refused due course or
denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
A. THE DECISIONS MUST HAVE TO EXPRESSLY
AND DISTINCTLY CONTAIN THE FACTS AND THE
LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED.
It is specifically required for the purpose of complying
With Due Process. The reason for this is to inform the
parties how the tribunal has reached the decision. If
there is an appeal, the parties may be able assign
appropriately and properly the errors and discuss it
with the appellate court and to fully understand such
errors.
In administrative cases, the facts and the law must
also be stated not because of Section 14. It is because
of the ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS. Under the so-called 7 Cardinal Primary
Rights in administrative cases, this is the seventh right
or rule.
There is no requirement as to how it is to be
written.
A MEMORANDUM DECISIONis a decision which
simply copies material portions of the decision subject
of the review. The Constitution does not prohibit it
and the Rules of Court does not make these
Memorandum decisions invalid. If the facts and the
law are expressed therein for the parties to
understand, and how the Court has reached the
decision, then it substantially complies with the
requirement.
When you file a petition with the SC, you are required
to submit e-copies of everything. Apparently, there is
an application that you can buy and you can do it and
put it in a folder. Then, put it in a usb or cd. Then,
submit it to SC. Otherwise, your petition will be
dismissed, among others.
B. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE REFUSAL OR
DENIAL OF A PETITION FOR REVIEW OR MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION MUST BE STATED.
MANGELEN VS CA
If the Supreme Court grants the motion for
reconsideration, the court does not have to apply
the second paragraph which requires stating the
legal basis because it is not a denial of the motion
for reconsideration. The first paragraph of Section
14 must be applied, which requires that the
decision must restate the law and the facts of the
case because it is a new decision.
O. MANDATORY PERIOD FOR DECIDING CASES
Art. VIII. Section 15.
1. All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within
twenty-four months from date of submission for
the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower
collegiate courts, and three months for all other
lower courts.
2. A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
Rules of Court or by the court itself. 10
6
3. Upon the expiration of the corresponding
period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief
Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued
and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
or matter, and served upon the parties. The
certification shall state why a decision or
resolution has not been rendered or issued within
said period.
4. Despite the expiration of the applicable
mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to
such responsibility as may have been incurred in
consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the
case or matter submitted thereto for
determination, without further delay.
Art. VII. Section 18 (par. 3). The Supreme Court may
review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty
days from its filing.
Art. XVIII. Section 12. The Supreme Court shall,
within one year after the ratification of this Constitution,
adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or
resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme
Court or the lower courts prior to the effectivity of this
Constitution. A similar plan shall be adopted for all
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies.
Section 13. The legal effect of the lapse, before the
ratification of this Constitution, of the applicable period
for the decision or resolution of the cases or matters
submitted for adjudication by the courts, shall be
determined by the Supreme Court as soon as
practicable.
Section 14. The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4),
Section 15 of Article VIII of this Constitution shall apply
to cases or matters filed before the ratification of this
Constitution, when the applicable period lapses after
such ratification.
In all cases involving the mandatory period for
deciding cases, it has been applied strictly to justices
of collegiate courts and judges of lower courts. If they
have not complied with them, they may be found
administratively liable.
For lower courts, 90 days; for lower collegiate
courts, 12 months; for the Supreme Court, 24
months. The period for deciding cases would be
counted from or commenced from the time the
case is submitted for decision.
These periods are both mandatory and
discretionary.
 Discretionary in the sense that with respect
to the decisions rendered after these periods,
the decisions will not be invalid simply
because they were promulgated after the
said periods. They remain to be valid for so
long as they are valid to begin with.
 However, with respect to those persons
who are tasked to render these decisions,
they are mandatory.
If part of the decision was plagiarized, it would not
invalidate the decision. The omission of the sources
of the quotation would not make the quotation invalid.
It simply is your failure to make the proper citation.
Relate the mandatory period for deciding cases in
relation to the RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF
CASES.
 If it pertains to court decisions, any violation
to this right will not result to the dismissal of
the cases
 The dismissal of cases which have been
ordered by the Supreme Court for violation
refers to cases not yet pending in court for
the trial and resolution of the case but only
those cases which would pertain to finding
probable cause.
If the prosecution has not yet determined
probable cause for a certain period of time and
the delay was inexcusable, it may be that the
State has no case against the respondent.
But if the case is already filed in court, the
prosecution and defense have evidence
already, and the case is ready for disposition
of the case, and there is a delay, even if the
delay is inexcusable, at most the judges of the
court may be found administratively liable for
violating those periods that are mandatory to
them.
RE: FAILURE OF FORMER JUDGE ANTONIO A.
CARBONELL TO DECIDE CASES SUBMITTED FOR
DECISION AND TO RESOLVE PENDING MOTIONS
IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 27,
SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION.
The Court cannot overstress its policy on prompt
disposition or resolution of cases.Delay in the
disposition of cases is a major culprit in the erosion of
public faith and confidence in the judicial system, as
judges have the sworn duty to administer justice
without undue delay.13 Thus, judges have been
constantly reminded to strictly adhere to the rule on
the speedy disposition of cases and observe the
periods prescribed by the Constitution for deciding
cases, which is three months from the filing of the last
pleading, brief or memorandum for lower courts.To
10
further impress upon judges such mandate, the Court
has issued guidelines (Administrative Circular No. 3-99
7
dated January 15, 1999) that would insure the speedy
disposition of cases and has therein reminded judges
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the
Constitution.
Nonetheless, the Court has been mindful of the plight
of our judges and understanding of circumstances that
may hinder them from promptly disposing of their
businesses. Hence, the Court has allowed extensions
of time to decide cases beyond the 90-day period. All
that a judge needs to do is to request and justify an
extension of time to decide the cases, and the Court
has almost invariably granted such request.
Judge Carbonell failed to decide a total of 63 cases
and to resolve 16 pending motions or incidents within
the 90-day reglementary period. He intimated that his
poor health affected his pace in deciding the cases.
Had such been the case, then he should have
explained his predicament to the Court and asked for
an extension of time to decide the cases.
Unfortunately, he failed to do so.
Judge Carbonell claims that some of the inherited
cases had no transcripts of stenographic notes,
thereby preventing him from resolving the cases on
time. He posits that a case would not be considered
submitted for decision if the parties did not yet file their
respective memoranda.1âwph
i1
The Audit Team‘s Report shows that, in an apparent
attempt to suspend the running of the 90-day period to
decide the cases, Judge Carbonell liberally gave the
parties in most of the overdue cases several
extensions of time to file their respective memoranda.
Some extensions were even for indefinite periods, with
the parties being simply given "ample time to file their
memo," as the relevant court orders stated.
In view of the foregoing, Judge Carbonell‘s excuses
are futile in the light of the following provisions of
Administrative Circular No. 28
LOWER COURTS
a. Appointments and Qualifications (Art. VIII.
Section 7, Section 8 (5), Section 9)
b. Salary (Art. VIII, Sec 10)
c. Congressional power to reorganize and Security
of Tenure (Art. VIII. Section 11. Section 2 (par 2)
d. Removal (Art. VIII. Section 11)
e. Jurisdiction (Art. VIII. Section 1)
f. Requirements as to Preparation of Decisions
(Art. VIII. Section 15)
g. Mandatory period for deciding cases (Art. VIII.
Section 15, Art. XVIII. Section 12 – 14)
THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
Art. VIII. Section 8.
1. A JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL is hereby
created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme
Court, and a representative of the private sector.
ATTY. FRANK CHAVEZ VS JBC
The term ―Congress‖ refers to one member of the
lower house or a member of the Senate. It is a non-
legislative duty of the Congress. When the Constitution
refers to Congress sitting there, it does not refer to
Congress consisting of both houses. The practice in
the past where there are 2members, one from both
houses, jointly participating with half a vote each or
sequentially sitting in the JBC, term-sharing so to
speak, is not valid.
CHAVEZ V JBC (2013)
As stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to
use the singular letter "a" to describe "representative
of Congress," the Filipino people through the Framers
intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat
in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the
Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided, as can be read in its other provisions.
X XX
It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the
three governmental branches to assign the same
weight to considerations that any of its representatives
may have regarding aspiring nominees to the judiciary.
The representatives of the Senate and the House of
Representatives act as such for one branch and
should not have any more quantitative influence as the
other branches in the exercise of prerogatives evenly
bestowed upon the three. Sound reason and principle
of equality among the three branches support this
conclusion.
The argument that a senator cannot represent a
member of the House of Representatives in the JBC
and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any
member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the
House of Representatives, is constitutionally
empowered to represent the entire Congress. It may
be a constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an
absurdity.
From this score stems the conclusion that the lone
representative of Congress is entitled to one full vote. 10
This pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme 8
of splitting the said vote into half (1/2), between two
representatives of Congress. Not only can this
unsanctioned practice cause disorder in the voting
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
process, it is clearly against the essence of what the
Constitution authorized. X XX
2. The regular members of the Council shall be
appointed by the President for a term of four years
with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the
representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four
years, the professor of law for three years, the retired
Justice for two years, and the representative of the
private sector for one year.
The staggered terms would assure the:
i. Continuity of the functions of the office, and
ii. Ensure that there is continued independence
of that body because they will always out-term
the President who will only sit for six (6) years.
3. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the
Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a
record of its proceedings.
4. The regular Members of the Council shall receive
such emoluments as may be determined by the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in
its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
5. The Council shall have the principal function of
recommending appointees to the judiciary. It may
exercise such other functions and duties as the
Supreme Court may assign to it.
DE CASTRO VS JBC
The JBC has been created largely to screen
appointees to the judiciary in order to shield these
appointees from the politics of the regular
appointments made by the President. Before the
creation of the JBC, appointments to the SC and
justices of lower collegiate courts and judges of lower
courts have been screened through the Commission
on Appointments.
iii. AUTOMATIC RELEASE OF
APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE JUDICIARY
Art. VIII. Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not
be reduced by the legislature below the amount
appropriated for the previous year and, after
approval, shall be automatically and regularly
released.
CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSION
While they enjoy the safeguards of independence
by automatic releases of appropriations to them,
they do not enjoy the non-diminution of the
appropriation as enjoyed by the Judiciary.
Constitutional Conventions need invariably
appropriations dependent on their actual need for the
fiscal year.
ROTATIONAL PLAN BEING PART OF THEIR
FISCAL AUTONOMY AND INDEPENDENCE - No
President can appoint all the members of the
Constitutional Conventions at a given time except the
first appointees. These first appointees even out-term
the President because they sit for a regular term of 7
years. That would insure that they would act
independent from the appointing authority.
The rotational plan prohibits the rule on serving
for more than 7 years even before the Constitution
and after the efficacy of the 1987 Constitution.
FUNA VS. VILLAR
670 SCRA 579 (2012)
What is prohibited under the “NO
REAPPOINTMENT RULE” as part of the rotational
plan to safeguard independence and fiscal
autonomy of the commissions is the appointment
of a commissioner to the same position of
commissioner, or from chairman to chairman. But
if the appointment is from ordinary commissioner
to the chairman, that is not a violation of the “no
reappointment rule” because that is not a
reappointment. That commissioner had been
appointed to a different and higher position from his
first appointment.
Supreme Court said that to insure the independence
of the Commission, the appointing authority
cannot appoint any Commissioner or Chairman to
a temporary capacity.Only a permanent
appointment can make the incumbent secured in
his position. Temporary appointment would not
make the Commissioner independent for fear that
his appointment will never become permanent.
If there is vacant in the Chairman position, the
remaining Commissioners have the power to
appoint among themselves who will be the acting-
chairman for the meantime.
An ―UPGRADING APPOINTMENT,‖ which is not
violative of the rotational plan or the fiscal autonomy
10
and independence, allows the appointment of
9
incumbent Commissioner to the position of Chair
provided the following 2 conditions are met:
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 a. The incumbent chairperson must have
resigned; died, removed by
impeachment or by reason of disability
could no longer perform his functions
thereby leaving an unexpired term.
b. An incumbent Commissioner can be
appointed as Chair. He must serve
only for the unexpired term of the
chairperson.
c. The tenure of the incumbent as
commissioner and the unexpired term
of the Chairperson must not exceed
seven years. This is to maintain the so
called staggered terms - that no
president except for those first
appointed will be allowed to appoint all
the members of the commission
during his term.
The reason for the unexpired term of the Chairman is
either the Chairman died, has been removed by
impeachment, has voluntarily resigned or any other
causes which resulted to an unexpired term. If the
position of Chair has been vacant because of end
of term, then there is no unexpired term and there
can be no upgrading appointment.
The end of term will be dependent on the original
term of the departing Commissioner.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
A. COMPOSITION AND QUALIFICATIONS OF
COMMISSIONERS
Art IX B Section 1 (1) The civil service shall be
administered by the Civil Service Commission
composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-
five years of age, with proven capacity for public
administration, and must not have been candidates
for any elective position in the elections
immediately preceding their appointment.
Art VII Sec 13 (2) The spouse and relatives by
consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil
degree of the President shall not, during his tenure,
be appointed as Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as
Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of
bureaus or offices, including government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
BARCELONA V LIM
CSC has the power and the authority to amend the
Civil Service Rules whenever it deems the amendment
necessary. The insinuation of petitioner that this
change was made for the sole purpose of hurting his
appeal is a mere product of his imagination. The CSC
is under no obligation to review all the cases before it
and, on the basis thereof, decide whether or not to
amend its internal rules.
B. APPOINTMENT AND TERM OF OFFICE OF
COMMISSIONERS; RULE AGAINST
REAPPOINTMENT
Art IX B Section 1 (2) The Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the
Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a
Commissioner for five years, and another
Commissioner for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall
any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
C. APPOINTMENT OF PERSONNEL OF CSC
Art IX A Section 4. The Constitutional Commissions
shall appoint their officials and employees in
accordance with law.
D. SALARY
Art XVIII Section 17. xxx the Chairmen of the
Constitutional Commissions, two hundred four
thousand pesos each; and the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty
thousand pesos each.
Art IX A Section 3. The salary of the Chairman and
the Commissioners shall be fixed by law and shall not
be decreased during their tenure.
E. DISQUALIFICATIONS
Art IX A Section 2.No member of a Constitutional
Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any
other office or employment. Neither shall he engage
in the practice of any profession or in the active
management or control of any business which, in
any way, may be affected by the functions of his
office, nor shall he be financially interested,
directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any
franchise or privilege granted by the Government,
any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
F. IMPEACHMENT
11
Art XI Section 2. xxx the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, xxx may be removed 0
from office on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
G. APPEAL
H. SCOPE OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
Art IX B Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
CSC VS LIM
CSC has the powers to amend its rules as it may
deem fit. There is no prior requirement of legislation
before CSC can amend its rules. It can amend as
often as it wants to because it may be required under
the circumstances provided that it is consistent with all
other principles like due process. While it has authority
to amend its rules, it cannot however violate any
substantial rights. CSC cannot direct to apply rules
retroactively. It should always be prospective.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
CAGAS V COMELEC
The COMELEC‘s power to administer elections
includes the power to conduct a plebiscite beyond the
schedule prescribed by law.
SEVILLA VS COMELEC
In the present case, while the October 6, 2012
Resolution of the Comelec en banc appears to have
affirmed the Comelec Second Division‘s Resolution
and, in effect, denied Sevilla‘s motion for
reconsideration, the equally divided voting between
three Commissioners concurring and three
Commissioners dissenting is not the majority vote that
the Constitution and the Comelec Rules of Procedure
require for a valid pronouncement of the assailed
October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc.
The October 6, 2012 Comelec en banc‘s Resolution
must be reheard pursuant to the Comelec Rules of
Procedure
To break the legal stalemate in case the opinion is
equally divided among the members of the Comelec
en banc, Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure mandates a rehearing where parties are
given the opportunity anew to strengthen their
respective positions or arguments and convince the
members of the Comelec en banc of the merit of their
case.
A. COMPOSITION AND QUALIFICATIONS OF
COMMISSIONERS
Art IX C Section 1. There shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens
of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective positions in the
immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
B. APPOINTMENT AND TERM OF OFFICE OF
COMMISSIONERS; RULE AGAINST
REAPPOINTMENT
Art IX C Sec 1(2) The Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three
Members shall hold office for seven years, two
Members for five years, and the last Members for
three years, without reappointment. Appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
C. APPOINTMENT OF PERSONNEL (ART IX A SEC
4)
D. SALARY (ART XVIII SEC 17, ART IX A SEC 3)
E. DISQUALIFICATIONS (ART IX A SEC 2)
F. IMPEACHMENT (ART XI SEC 2)
G. APPEAL
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
A. COMPOSITION AND QUALIFICATIONS OF
COMMISSIONERS
Art IX D Section 1 (1). There shall be a Commission
on Audit composed of a Chairman and two
Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens
of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age, Certified Public
Accountants with not less than ten years of
auditing experience, or members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the
elections immediately preceding their
appointment. At no time shall all Members of the
Commission belong to the same profession.
B. APPOINTMENT AND TERM OF OFFICE OF
COMMISSIONERS; RULE AGAINST 11
REAPPOINTMENT 1
Art IX D Section 1(2) The Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the
Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one
Commissioner for five years, and the other
Commissioner for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no
case shall any Member be appointed or designated in
a temporary or acting capacity.
C. APPOINTMENT OF PERSONNEL (ART IX A SEC
4)
D. SALARY (ART XVIII SEC 17, ART IX A SEC 3)
E. DISQUALIFICATIONS (ART IX A SEC 2)
F. IMPEACHMENT (ART XI SEC 2)
G. APPEAL
SUMMARY OF DISTINCTIONS
AS TO COMPOSITION:
 The composition of the CSC and COA
consists of 3 members, one of whom is Chair.
 In COMELEC, 7 members, one of whom is the
Chair.
AS TO QUALIFICATIONS:
 For the CSC, members must have proven
capacity for public administration.
 For the COA, they must have to be Certified
Public Accountants or members of the
Philippine Bar with ten years of experience.
 For the COMELEC, the Chair and the
majority of the members must be lawyers
with 10 years of practice of law.
LAME DUCK DISQUALIFICATION - They must not
have been candidates for any elective election
immediately preceding their appointment.
It does not mention here that they have run and lost
unlike in Sec. 6 of Art. IX-B which is the standard
disqualification for all other appointees in the
government position in the Civil Service:
ART. IX-B, Sec. 6. No candidate who has lost in any
election shall, within one year after such election, be
appointed to any government office, GOCC, or
subsidiary.
But for the Commissions, it does not require you
to be the losing candidate. Provided that you run in
the preceding election, you cannot be appointed.
AS TO JURISDICTION OF COMMISSIONS
 CSC is tasked to oversee the rules on civil
service where they have administrative and
quasi-judicial functions. It would include not
only the government and all its subdivisions
but also GOCCs with original charters.
GOCCs created under Corporation Code are
not covered by CSC.
 For the COMELEC, all laws pertaining to
elections, plebiscite, initiative, referendum
and recall. It has administrative and quasi-
judicial functions.
 For the COA, it shall have the power,
authority and duty to examine, audit and
settle all accounts including GOCCs with
original charters. It can do post-audit on
Constitutional bodies, those that enjoy fiscal
autonomy, autonomous state colleges
universities, other GOCCs or NGOs receiving
subsidy or equity.
VELOSO VS COA
The power of the COA includes the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive
and extravagant, or unconscionable expenditure,
or uses of the government funds and properties.
This is the Constitutional basis of the “NOTICE OF
DISALLOWANCE.”
COA has extra-judicial powers but in a limited sense.
COA can only make recommendation. At most, it can
only disallow payment.
AGUINALDO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
NOVEMBER 28, 1996
Governor Aguinaldo was charged in the
Sandiganbayan. The COA actually acquitted him for
―violating any existing COA rules and regulations.‖
Supreme Court said that the finding of COA is valid
only as to the findings of the administrative liability. It
has nothing to do with the finding of criminal
responsibility. The State can still hold that the
public officer criminally liable even if COA cleared
you of administrative liability.
Stated differently, findings of COA are only good
when it comes to administrative impositions of
liability. Criminal responsibility may be maintained
by evidence other than COA findings.
AS TO PROHIBITED OFFICES AND INTEREST OF
MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSIONS
 No other office or appointment; Ex-officio
would be excluded
 Cannot practice their profession nor shall be
engage in the active management or control of
a conflicting business.
11
Business is not prohibited per se. It is a conflicting 2
business that is prohibited. Also, if they don‘t have
active management or control in a conflicting business,
that is not prohibited.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
  Similar financial interest limitation in the
government, GOCCs, agencies,
instrumentalities and subsidiaries.
AS TO APPEAL TO DECISIONS
 CSC decision is reviewable by certiorari to the
CA under Rule 43. CSC decision refers to
their decision in their exercise of their quasi-
judicial functions.
 The COMELEC and COA Decisions are
reviewable by the SC under Rule 64 in relation
to Rule 65.
CAPABLANCA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. NO. 179370, NOVEMBER 19, 2009
The decision of the CSC finding him liable for cheating
in the CSC, which imposed a penalty of perpetual
disqualification to take another CS exam, is a decision
of CSC not appealable to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 43.
The usual process in the COMELEC is that, the
division decides the case. You can file a Motion for
Reconsideration and it is already automatic appeal to
the Comelec en banc. Generally, it is the Comelec en
banc decision which is subject to this Rule 64. But
there are cases that you can go directly but it is under
Rule 65 for the lack of jurisdiction of the Division of the
Comelec.
REBLORA VS AFP
698 SCRA 727 (2013)
This case involves a naval captain who retired. There
was an agreement for additional retirement pay which
he claimed. The AFP denied his claim so he went to
COA, which denied his claim also. He went to SC
under Rule 45 (error of judgment).
SC said decisions of COA are final unless there is
error on jurisdiction. Appropriately, it should be Rule
64 in relation to Rule 65.
THE AMENDING PROCESS
AMENDMENT VS REVISION
AMENDMENT refers to a change in the Constitution
but does not substantially alter the basic set up or
framework of the government. It is not the amount of
the changes but the quality of the changes. If it
changes the basic framework of the government, then,
it is not an amendment. It is REVISION.
Amendment can be had by the 3 modes given:
i. Congress acting as Constituent Assembly
ii. Constitutional Convention in 2 modes
iii. Referendum
Revision can be had in 2 modes:
i. Constituent Assembly
ii. Constitutional Convention in 2 modes
 In the FIRST MODE, automatically Congress
enacts. Then, there will be election.
 In the SECOND MODE, only a majority is
required. There should be 2 electoral processes.
One is to let the public decide whether there
should be a Constitutional Convention. And two, if
so, there will be an election to the membership of
the Constitutional Convention.
 The THIRD MODE is referendum which is
available only to amendments.
A) PROPOSAL
BY CONGRESS
Art XVII Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of,
this Constitution may be proposed by: a. The
Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members; or b. A constitutional convention.
When it is Constituent Assembly, the Congress itself
becomes a body task to amend or revise the
Constitution. It is not anymore required to elect
members to a certain body to change the Constitution.
BY CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
Art XVII Section 3. The Congress may, by a vote of
two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional
convention, or by a majority vote of all its
Members, submit to the electorate the question of
calling such a convention.
In Constitutional Convention, there are separate 11
elections. In the first mode, Congress calls for 3
Constitutional Convention by a required vote of 2/3 of
all members of the congress. Then, there will be an
election.
COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA
 BY PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE

Art XVII Art Section 2. Amendments to this

Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.

B) RATIFICATION

Art XVII Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision

of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be
valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than
sixty days nor later than ninety days after the
approval of such amendment or revision.

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid

when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty
days nor later than ninety days after the
certification by the Commission on Elections of
the sufficiency of the petition.

C) THEORIES REGARDING THE POSITION OF A

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION IN OUR SYSTEM
OF GOVERNMENT

It has always been established that a Constitutional

Convention is considered to be separate from the
other branches of the government. That it is
supposed to be a creation as authorized by law calling
it just for the purpose of amending or revising the
Constitution.

D) Judicial review of the Amending Process

Art VIII Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested

in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.

Its exercise or discharge of powers should not be

subjected to judicial review unless it refers to the
Constitutional requirement as provided in the
provision.

Generally therefore, the actions of the

Constitutional Convention that is subject to
judicial review would only be on the procedural
matter. As to the substantial matters involved in
the amendment or revision as proposed, the
Constitutional Convention‟s discharge would be 11
beyond review. 4

COMPILED BY: |JUSTIN RYAN D. MORILLA