FEDERICO S. ROBOSA, et. al. v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

G.R. No. 176085 February 8, 2012

FACTS:
Petitioners were rank-and-file employees of respondent Chemo-Technische Manufacturing, Inc. (CTMI),
the manufacturer and distributor of Wella products. They were officers and members of the CTMI
Employees UnionDFA (union). Sometime in the first semester of 1991, the union filed a petition for
certification election at CTMI. On July 15, 1991, CTMI issued two memoranda, which were considered
as union busting acts constituting unfair labor practice by the union. Thus, the union asked for the
withdrawal and deferment of CTMIs directives. CTMI ignored the request. Instead, it issued on July 23,
1991 a notice of termination of employment to the sales drivers, due to the abolition of the sales driver
positions. The union and its affected members filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor
practice, with a claim for damages, against private respondents CTMI, De Luzuriaga and other CTMI
officers. The union also moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order. The NLRC issued a TRO, directing CTMI, De Luzuriaga and other company executives
to cease and desist from dismissing any member of the union and from implementing the July 23, 1991
memorandum terminating the services of the sales drivers, and to immediately reinstate them if the
dismissals have been effected. Allegedly, the respondents did not comply with the NLRCs August 23,
1991 resolution. They instead moved to dissolve the TRO and opposed the unions petition for preliminary
injunction. The NLRC upgraded the TRO to a writ of preliminary injunction. The respondents moved for
reconsideration. The union opposed the motion and urgently moved to cite the responsible CTMI officers
in contempt of court. Private respondent De Luzuriaga argued that they were charged with indirect
contempt which may be initiated only in the appropriate regional trial court, pursuant to Section 12, Rule
71 of the Rules of Court. He posits that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over an indirect contempt charge.
He thus argues that the petitioners improperly brought the contempt charge before the NLRC.

Issue:
Whether or not the NLRC has contempt powers

Held:
Under Article 218 of the Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor arbiters) may hold any offending party in
contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in accordance with law. The penalty for
direct contempt consists of either imprisonment or fine, the degree or amount depends on whether the
contempt is against the Commission or the labor arbiter. The Labor Code, however, requires the labor
arbiter or the Commission to deal with indirect contempt in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court does not require the labor arbiter or the NLRC to initiate
indirect contempt proceedings before the trial court. This mode is to be observed only when there is no
law granting them contempt powers. As is clear under Article 218(d) of the Labor Code, the labor arbiter
or the Commission is empowered or has jurisdiction to hold the offending party or parties in direct or
indirect contempt. The petitioners, therefore, have not improperly brought the indirect contempt charges
against the respondents before the NLRC.
PEOPLES BROADCASTING SERVICE (BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.) v. THE SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT

G.R. No. 179652 6 March 2012

Facts:

Jandeleon Juezan filed a complaint against petitioner with the DOLE for illegal deduction, nonpayment of
service incentive leave, 13th month pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day and illegal diminution of
benefits, delayed payment of wages and noncoverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG and Philhealth. The DOLE
Regional Director found that private respondent was an employee of petitioner, and was entitled to his
money claims. When the matter was brought before the CA it was held that PBS was accorded due
process as it had been given the opportunity to be heard, and that the DOLE Secretary had jurisdiction
over the matter. However, the SC found that there was no employer-employee relationship between PBS
and private respondent. The NLRC was held to be the primary agency in determining the existence of an
employer-employee relationship. This was the interpretation of the Court of the clause in cases where the
relationship of employer-employee still exists in Art. 128(b). From this Decision, the Public Attorneys
Office (PAO) filed a Motion for Clarification of Decision. The PAO sought to clarify as to when the
visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE be not considered as co-extensive with the power to
determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship. The DOLE also sought the same
clarification.

Issue:

Whether or not the NLRC is the sole body with jurisdiction to determine the existence of an employer-
employee relationship

Held:

NO. No procedure was laid down where the DOLE would only make a preliminary finding, that the
power was primarily held by the NLRC. The law did not say that the DOLE would first seek the NLRCs
determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship, or that should the existence of the
employer-employee relationship be disputed, the DOLE would refer the matter to the NLRC. The DOLE
must have the power to determine whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists, and from
there to decide whether or not to issue compliance orders in accordance with Art. 128(b) of the Labor
Code, as amended by RA 7730.
AMECOS INNOVATIONS, INC. and ANTONIO F. MATEO v. ELIZA R. LOPEZ

G.R. No.178055 July 2, 2014

Facts:

Amecos is a corporation engaged in the business of selling assorted products. In 2003, a complaint was
filed by the SSS against Amecos for an alleged delinquency in the remittance of SSS contributions and
penalty liabilities in violation of Section 22(a) and 22(d) in relation to Section 28(e) of the SSS law, as
amended. By way of explanation, Amecos claimed that it hired Lopez as Marketing Assistant to promote
its products; that upon hiring, Lopez refused to provide Amecos with her SSS Number and to be deducted
her contributions; that on the basis of the foregoing, Amecos no longer enrolled Lopez with the SSS and
did not deduct her corresponding contributions up to the time of her termination in February 2002.
Amecos eventually settled its obligations with the SSS; consequently, SSS filed a Motion to Withdraw
Complaint, which was approved by the Office of the City Prosecutor. Thereafter, Amecos sent a demand
letter to Lopez for P27,791.65 representing her share in the SSS contributions and expenses for
processing, but to no avail. Thus, Amecos filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against Lopez
before the MeTC. Lopez filed her Answer with Motion to Dismiss claiming, among others, that the
regular courts do not have jurisdiction over the instant case as it arose out of their employer-employee
relationship.

ISSUE: Does the LA have jurisdiction over cases involving the reimbursement of SSS contribution paid
by the Amecos in behalf of Lopez?

SC RULING: YES. The LA has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the matter, since the same
necessarily flowed from the employer-employee relationship between Amecos and Lopez. In this
connection, it is noteworthy to state that "the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs
provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code." At the same time, it cannot be
assumed that since the dispute concerns the payment of SSS premiums, Amecos’ claim should be referred
to the Social Security Commission (SSC). As far as SSS is concerned, there is no longer a dispute with
respect to Amecos’ accountability to the System; Amecos already settled their pecuniary obligations to it.
Since there is no longer any dispute regarding coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties to speak of,
the SSC need not be unnecessarily dragged into the picture. Besides, it cannot be made to act as a
collecting agency for petitioners’ claims against the respondent; the Social Security Law should not be so
interpreted, lest the SSC be swamped with cases of this sort. At any rate, the complaint shall be dismissed
for lack of cause of action. Since Amecos did not remit the full SSS contributions of Lopez, the latter was
never covered by and protected under the System. If she was never covered by the System, certainly there
is no sense in making her answerable for the required contributions during the period of her employment.
And it follows as a matter of consequence that claims for other damages founded on the foregoing non-
existent cause of action should likewise fail.
SY ET.AL. v. FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CO., INC.

G.R. No. 182915 December 12, 2011

Facts:

Workers Marialy O. Sy et.al. filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC a Complaint for
underpayment and/or non-payment of wages, overtime pay, premium pay for holidays, 13th month pay
and other monetary benefits against Weesan and its owner Susan. Weesan filed before the DOLE-NCR a
report on its temporary closure for a period of not less than six months. As the workers were not anymore
allowed to work on that same day, they filed Amended Complaint and another pleading entitled Amended
Complaints and Position Paper for Complainants, to include the charge of illegal dismissal and impleaded
Fairland and its manager, Debbie, as additional respondents. A Notice of Hearing was thereafter sent to
Weesan requesting it to appear before Labor Arbiter Reyes. On said date and time, Atty. Antonio A.
Geronimo (Atty. Geronimo) appeared as counsel for Weesan and requested for an extension of time to
file his client’s position paper. On the next hearing, Atty. Geronimo also entered his appearance for
Fairland and again requested for an extension of time to file position paper. Atty. Geronimo filed two
separate position papers – one for Fairland and another for Susan/Weesan. The Position Paper for
Fairland was verified by Debbie while the one for Susan/Weesan was verified by Susan. To these
pleadings, the workers filed a Reply. Atty. Geronimo then filed a Consolidated Reply verified both by
Susan and Debbie.

Issue:

Did the Labor tribunals acquire jurisdiction over the [person of the] respondent?

Held:

Yes. It is basic that the Labor Arbiter cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent
without the latter being served with summons. It must be noted that for the initial complaints, the Labor
Arbiter issued summons to Susan/Weesan which was received by the latter. The workers thereafter
amended their then already consolidated complaints to include illegal dismissal as an additional cause of
action as well as Fairland and Debbie as additional respondents. We have, however, scanned the records
but found nothing to indicate that summons with respect to the said amended complaints was ever served
upon Weesan, Susan, or Fairland. True to their claim, Fairland and Debbie were indeed never summoned
by the Labor Arbiter. Although not served with summons, jurisdiction over Fairland and Debbie was
acquired through their voluntary appearance. The fact that Atty. Geronimo entered his appearance for
Fairland and Debbie and that he actively defended them before the Labor Arbiter raised the presumption
that he is authorized to appear for them. It is unlikely that Atty. Geronimo would have been so
irresponsible as to represent Fairland and Debbie if he were not in fact authorized. As an officer of the
Court, Atty. Geronimo is presumed to have acted with due propriety. Moreover, "[i]t strains credulity that
a counsel who has no personal interest in the case would fight for and defend a case with persistence and
vigor if he has not been authorized or employed by the party concerned."
Eastern Mediterranean Maritime vs Surio

Gr no 154213 August 23 2012

FACTS:

Respondents Estanislao Surio, et al. were former crewmembers of MT Seadance, a vessel owned by
petitioner Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. (Eastern).

On December 23, 1993, Eastern filed against Surio, et al. a complaint for disciplinary action based on
breach of discipline and for the reimbursement of the wage increases in the Workers Assistance and
Adjudication Office of the POEA.

During the pendency of the administrative complaint in the POEA, R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) took effect on July 15, 1995. Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 vested original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all money claims arising out of employer-employee relationships
involving overseas Filipino workers in the Labor Arbiters. The jurisdiction over such claims was
previously exercised by the POEA under the POEA Rules and Regulations of 1991 (1991 POEA Rules).

The POEA dismissed the complaint for disciplinary action. Eastern elevated the matter to the NLRC. The
NLRC also dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Likewise, the CA also denied the Eastern’s
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction to review on appeal cases decided by the POEA on
matters pertaining to disciplinary actions?

Held:

No. Although Republic Act No. 8042, through its Section 10, transferred