01/26/2019

879-888
nature of a defamatory communication

belli v. Orlando daily newspaper, inc

a libel per se is any publication which exposes a person to distrust, hatred,
contempt, ridicule, obloquy.

Both judge and jury determine whether the language is defamatory: a publication
claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed in the sense in which the readers to
whom it is addressed would ordinarily understand it. When thus read, if this meaning is so
unambiguous as to reasonably bear but one interpretation, it is for the judge to say whether
that signification is defamatory or not.

Defendant: the article is capable of being reasonably interpreted as non-defamatory.

But since the article on its face is also capable of carrying a defamatory meaning, it is for
the jury to decide whether the words were in fact so understood.

Facts: March 1964, Handley, an attorney in Florida, in talking with Yothers who is a

columnist for a newspaper, repeating a story he heard about Belli.
The story was about Belli being invited to Florida BAR, but since the BAR could not
pay him for speaking, the understanding was that his hotel tab would be picked up.
The story goes that he rang up a lot of clothes purchases to his bills which the BAR
found out about; this part of the story is actually false and there were no clothes
purchased however Yothers ran and exaggerated the story. 
District court dismissed the claim for failure to state a claim upon which he can get
relief because the court has discretion over whether or not a statement is a libel or slander.
Decision: Reversed
Reasoning: The formula for libel asks if there has been a false or unprivileged
publication by letter or otherwise which exposes a person to ridicule or which can injure a
person in their employment.
If so, and its natural and proximate consequences necessarily causes injury to a
person, then such publication is actionable per se.
It is also for the court in the first instance to determine whether the words are
reasonably capable of a particular interpretation or whether they are necessarily so and it
is juries to say whether they were understood to be defamatory. 
If it is unambiguous then the judge says if the interpretation is defamatory or not but
if more than one meaning then it must be for the jury to say.
 Court applied this logic and found that the jury should have decided that the article
was defamatory because it had more than one meaning

Holding: If a publication, by itself, is capable of carrying a defamatory meaning then

it is for a jury to decide if it was so understood by the “common mind”.

grant v. reader’s digest ass’n

Facts: Complaint said that plaintiff was a Massachusetts lawyer and that defendant a
NY corporation published a periodical of general circulation where one issue had the
statement: “legislative agent… who but recently was a legislative rep for the communist
party.”

This innuendo was alleged to have charged the plaintiff with representing the
communist party which was an untrue statement and malicious.
So the question is if it is libelous in NY to write of a lawyer that he has acted as an
agent of the communist party and is a believer.
Lower court thought that it was not and dismissed the case. 
Decision: Reversed for a new trial 
Reasoning: A jury may usually rule whether a man’s reputation was damaged and
how much the reputation is damaged and award it.
However, the limitation on recovery is if “right thinking” people would so think
that the statements are defamatory.
However, the court said it does not matter if “wrong thinking” people think worse of
a communist sympathizer, it is enough if there are some people who do 

Holding: It does not matter what type of thinking people are of when they think
worse of someone if defamatory statements are made and there are those who would
believe it then it is actionable. 

Issue: whether it is libelous in new york to write of a lawyer that he has acted as
agent of the communist party, and is a believer in its aims and methods.

888-920
 Kilian v. doubleday &co., Inc
Facts: At the American U a course in English was taught by Wolfe with students being
disabled veterans of WWII.
The course consisted of the writing by the students of essays or stories of their
personal experiences in WWI and submitted to Wolfe who suggested corrections.
Wolfe conceived the idea of publishing these stories into a K with the defendant for
that purpose.
Everyone entered a story and the binding said it was intimate and personal
experiences with many copies sold.
The story by O’Connell gave rise to the suit. 
In his original draft, he narrated incidents that occurred at Lichfield camp which were
described by people who saw it.
Wolfe said more details are probably needed and submitted it back to him so
O’Connell wrote it in the first person, purporting that the incidents occurred in his own
experience which was wrong. 
The story had gruesome injuries and commented on how people were being taken
advantage of by the brass and specifically Kilian who was a colonel and the plaintiff.
There was also a footnote in the book that said that Kilian was convicted of
permitting cruel and unusual punishment of American soldiers and fined.
The footnote was there to signify that the story is corroborated by his conviction
while suggesting that he got off light. 
During the trial, he admitted that his article was wholly false even though his
defense is it is an accurate and true story of events by the author.
No soldiers were able to testify that the stories were true so no evidence of any
wrongdoing at all. 
In the military court the plaintiff(Killan) actually was acquitted by many counts and
only convicted of negligence.
Decision: Reverse and remand with a new trial because the defendant won on trial
and court thinks jury instructions were off 

Reasoning: The statements made were all false and there was no evidence at all that
it was true and that Kilian was such a bad guy.
Specific charges cannot be justified just by showing the plaintiff is a bad guy if the
accusation is of one particular misconduct and no evidence about that misconduct exists.   
 Rule: while in order to support a defense of truth, and while, therefore, if the
testimony of those witness had shown a variance merely in the details of the events
described in the article it would nevertheless have been admissible as giving support to the
plea of truth, it furnished no such support by proving that other and wholly different
incidents occurred although these also may have been equally blameworthy.

Note 1
Supreme court has held that a criminal libel statute is unconstitutional if it imposes a
penalty for making a true statement about a public official. However, a criminal libel
prosecution to public persons is sustainable if calculated falsehood is proved.

Neiman-Marcus v. Lait
Restatement: one who publishes defamatory matter concerning a group or class of
persons is subject to liability to an individual member of it, but only if a. the group or class
is so small that the matter can reasonably be understood to refer to the member; or b. the
circumstances of publication reasonably give rise to the conclusion that there is particular
reference to the member.
RULE:
A corporation, while having no reputation in a personal sense, does have prestige
and position in the business in which it is engaged which are capable of being damaged by
defamatory language. Special damage must be alleged unless the language is of so
defamatory a nature as to directly affect credit and to occasion pecuniary injury.
FACTS:
Defendants published a book which named plaintiff's company as a company that
mostly hired homosexuals and prostitutes.
However, the book did not name any particular employees.
The employees and the corporation both sued the defendants, and the defendants
moved to dismiss both suits.
ISSUE:
Could plaintiffs maintain libel suits against the defendants, arising out of the
publishing of defendants' book?
There is no language referring to some ascertained or ascertainable person. nor is
the class so small that defamation of the class infects the individual of the class. Since no
reasonable man would take the writer seriously and conclude from the publication a
reference to any individual salewoman.
ANSWER:
Yes and No. 
CONCLUSION:
 In ruling on the motions, the court granted the motion with regard to dismissing the
employees' complaint, but sustained the corporation's complaint. 
The court found that there was no allegation in the complaint concerning the point
of origination or state of first publication of the book in question.
In addition, all of the named individual plaintiffs were alleged to be citizens of Texas,
and were not presumably persons of national prominence who might suffer damage
elsewhere.
Further, the complaint failed to indicate membership in the libeled groups of
plaintiff employees named at the time the cause of action was alleged to have arisen.
It also failed to disclose the numerical size of these groups at such time. However,
plaintiff company's complaint was found to have properly alleged a claim for damages
resulting from such defamation.

Binderim v. Mitchell
The test is whether a reasonable person, reading the book, would understand that
the fictional character therein pictured was, in actual fact, the plaintiff acting as described.
It’s a jury question.
General rule: publication for purpose of defamation is sufficient when the
publication is to only one person other than the person defamed. Therefore it is irrelevant
whether all readers realized plaintiff and Herford were identical.
Facts: Bindrim, who is a licensed psychologist, used “nude marathon in group
therapy
as a means of helping people shed psychological inhibitions with the removal of their
clothes.
Mitchell participated in this nude therapy program telling him she was participating
only for therapeutic reasons and signing a contract not to take any photos, write articles or
disclose what happened at this event.
Shortly after, she contracted with Doubleday for a novel based on this technique that
was called touching with a principal character, Herford, using this technique.
Plaintiff sues for defamation and libel against Doubleday and Mitchell. 
Plaintiff won but then trial court granted a new trial which was appealed. 
Decision: Affirmed the lower court’s decision 
Reasoning: First case: 
Defendants defend by saying that the character in the book is not identified as the
plaintiff and they are completely different so even if the statements in the book are true, it
cannot be identified with this plaintiff.
The court said that besides physical appearance and employment, everything else
about the character was the exact same as the plaintiff.
 In previous cases, it was decided that if the plaintiff could be identified by a
stranger, then there is defamation but if the person cannot be identified by a stranger, the
plaintiff could not have been harmed by the remarks.
They continue by saying that the character in all but name and physical
characteristics was exactly the same as the plaintiff. 
Test – “Whether a reasonable person, reading the book, would understand that the
fictional character therein pictured was in actual fact the plaintiff acting as described”. It is
also irrelevant if all readers realized that Herford and plaintiff were identical, only if it was
published and at least one person can realize it. 

Dissent: thinks that the decision is not a good one because it supports the idea that
not accurately portraying a certain technique can be libel. That is what happened in this
case, the technique was not accurately portrayed.
Note: Libel consists of the publication of defamatory matter by written or printed
words or physical form or any other communication method that has qualities of written or
printing
Slander consists of the publication of defamatory matter by words, gestures, or any
other communication not in libel. 

Dissemination, the deliberate and premeditated character of publication and the

persistence of defamation are factors to consider in determining slander v. libel 

Libel and slander

Libel: originally concerned written or printed words; slander: originally oral. Slander
needs to prove special damage. Slander has been extended to transitory gestures.
Libel has been extended to include defamatory pictures, signs, statues, motion
pictures and the like, and even conduct carrying a defamatory implication, such as hanging
the plaintiff in effigy, or erecting a gallows before his door.

Shor v. Billingsley
Facts: A person ad-libbed a remark on the nationwide telecast of how much money
the plaintiff owes to people and how he wishes he had that money.
The issue is of whether not reading from a prepared script is libel or slander. 
The previous case said that remarks read from a script into radio mic constitutes
libel, so now court decides what to do here. 
Decision: This type of remark is still libel 
 Reasoning: Looking at the extent of the damage a statement can do and thought that
a televised newscast has as much if not more strength than a publication by writing. Just
because it is ad-libbed does not mean that it does less harm than if it was published so
defamation by radio should be allowed and should exist. 
The court finds no problem applying libel to motion picture because of the amount
of damage that it can do. 

Note: A speech, on the other hand, would be slander if it is delivered over an

amplifier to a vast audience in a stadium. Defamation by radio, in the absence of a script for
transcription, lacks the measure of durability possessed by written libel, in nowise lessens its
capacity for harm.

Issue: whether the broadcasting defamatory remarks, read from the script into a
radio constitute publication of libel or slander?
Reasoning: defamation by radio, in absence of a script or transcription, lacks the
measure of durability possessed by written libel, in nowise lessens its capacity for harm. It’s
true the delivery of same speech over an amplifier to a vast audience in a stadium would be
still treated as a slander; but such as speech falls so inescapably within the conventional
definition of slander that in the foregoing situation abolition of the line between libel and
slander would be too extreme a break with the past to be achieved without legislation.

Terwilliger v. Wands
CASE SYNOPSIS
Plaintiff appealed a decision from the Supreme Court (New York) that granted
defendant's motion for a non-suit in plaintiff's slander action.

CASE FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant were neighbors.
Defendant allegedly spoke with several people regarding plaintiff's continuous visits
to a married woman's home.
Defendant told people that the married woman was bad and the only reason
plaintiff visited her was for sexual intercourse.
Plaintiff initiated a slander action against defendant. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At trial, plaintiff presented witnesses who testified regarding defendant's allegations and the
mental stress the allegations caused plaintiff.
 The court granted defendant's motion for a non-suit finding that defendant never
spoke to plaintiff regarding the allegations and there was no evidence of damages. 

General rule: words must be disparaging to character, that the special damage to
give an action must flow from disparaging it.
Here, it does not prove that the plaintiff’s character was injured.
The loss of character must be a substantive loss
DISCUSSION and HOLDING

On appeal, the court affirmed the decision. 

The court held that plaintiff did not prove that his mental stress and difficulties
arose directly and legitimately from defendant's allegations. 
There was no evidence that plaintiff's character had suffered from the allegations or
that his reputation had been damages.

CONCLUSION
The court affirmed the decision granting defendant's motion for a non-suit.

Note 1
If no pecuniary loss is shown, it is not enough that the plaintiff has suffered acute
mental distress and serious physical llness as a result of the defamation.
Note3
Defendant was liable only for damages due to his own publication, and was not
responsible for the repetition by others. Later decisions become original publisher is liable
for damages due to repetition that might reasonably have been anticipated.

Slander per se
1. imputations of major crime
2.loathsome disease
3. business, trade, profession or office: if the spoken words are likely to affect the
plaintiff in his business, trade, profession or office, the probability of some temporal damage
is sufficiently obvious.
4.serious sexual misconduct

libel per se and libel per quod

if the statement was not defamatory on its face and it was necessary to be aware of
certain extrinsic facts in order to appreciate its defamatory implications, it was sometimes
called libel per quod.
 Publication
Publication means communication of the defamatory words to someone other than
the person defamed. It is not enough that the words are spoken to the plaintiff himself, even
in the presence of others, if no one else overhears them.

Economopoulos v. A.G.Pollard Co.

RULE:
There is no publication of a statement where, on the evidence, the words could not
have been heard by any one but the plaintiff.
FACTS:
Plaintiff brought a defamation action against defendant for statements allegedly
made regarding accusations of larceny on plaintiff's part.
The trial court directed the jury to enter a verdict for defendant.
On appeal, the state supreme court denied plaintiff's exceptions and affirmed
because there was no evidence of publication of defendant's statements as there was no
evidence that the words were heard by anyone but the plaintiff, and there was no
evidence that other words spoken by another employee in Greek were understood by
anyone else but the plaintiff.

ISSUE:
Is there publication of a statement when no one one except people who do not
speak the language hears the statement?
ANSWER:
No.
CONCLUSION:
Exceptions to the lower court's judgment entering a directed verdict were overruled
because there was no evidence of publication of defendant's statements as there was no
evidence defendant's words were heard by anyone but plaintiff, and no evidence that words
spoken by another employee in Greek were understood by anyone else.

Note 5
for a communication to a third party to be a publication, it must have been done
intentionally or by a negligent act. Thus, there is no publication when words are spoken by
defendant directly to plaintiff, with no reason to suppose that any one can overhear, but
they are in fact overheard by a concealed listener.

Note 6
 If the defamatory matter is sent by defendant to plaintiff himself in a sealed letter,
which is unexpectedly opened and read by a third person, there is no publication.
But there is liability if defendant knows, or should know, that plaintiff’s spouse or
secretary is in the habit of reading plaintiff’s mail, or in circumstances would likely read it,
and the words are in fact read by such person.
Note 7. Defendant is not liable for any publication made by the plaintiff alone, since
it is considered that it is plaintiff’s responsibility and not the defendant’s.

Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.

RULE:
Under the statutory scheme of 47 U.S.C.S. § 230(c), an "interactive computer service"
qualifies for immunity so long as it does not also function as an "information content
provider" for the portion of the statement or publication at issue.

FACTS:
A third-party created a matchmaking profile on the defendant internet matchmaker's
internet service, using the plaintiff identity theft victim's name, address, personal
information, and pictures.
The victim discovered the identity theft when she began receiving sexual and
threatening emails and voicemails.
The victim brought suit against the internet matchmaker for invasion of privacy,
defamation, negligence, and misappropriation, but the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendant.
Plaintiff appealed from the United States District Court for the Central District of
California.
ISSUE:
Under 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), which stated: no provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider, may a computer matchmaking service be
statutorily immune from liability for false content in a dating profile provided by someone
posing as another person?
ANSWER:
Yes.
CONCLUSION:
The judgment of the district court was affirmed on other grounds.
The grant of summary judgment was affirmed because the appellate court found that
under 47 U.S.C.S. § 230(c)(1), the internet matchmaker was statutorily immune from the
victim's suit.
 Under 47 U.S.C.S. § 230(c), so long as a third party willingly provides the essential
published content, the interactive service provider receives full immunity, regardless of the
specific editing or selection process.
The internet matchmaker was not an information content provider because none of
its matchmaking profiles had any content until a user actively created it.
The internet matchmaker simply published a profile that was created by a third-
party, and the fact that some of the content was formulated in response to the internet
matchmaker's questionnaire did not alter the fact that the internet matchmaker did not
play a significant role in creating, developing or transforming the relevant information.

Ogden v. Association of the United States Army (The statute of limitations for libel)
Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff brought suit for an allegedly libelous book that was
originally published at a time that would have caused the statute of limitation to have
accrued, but more copies had been published since then.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Under the single publication rule, written material containing
defamatory matter gives rise to only one cause of action for libel. This cause accrues at the
time of the original publication, and the statute of limitation runs from that date.

Facts. 
The plaintiff published a book containing allegedly defamatory content about the
defendant in November 1955.
The defendant brought suit in June 1959.

The statute of limitations for libel in the District of Columbia is one year.
The defendant moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limitation
Compare with traditional English rules and modern American rule wins: single
publication rule.

Issue. Does the District of Colombia apply the single publication rule?

Held. Yes. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment granted

* Under the common law, every sale or delivery of libelous matter was a new
publication, allowing a new cause of action to accrue.
 As the fact The plaintiff published a book containing allegedly defamatory content
about the defendant in November 1955, and the statue only allow 1 year statue of
limitation, plaintiff shall have sued defendant before 1956, since the cause accrues at the
time of the original publication, and the statute of limitation runs from that date.

Under modern conditions, this would allow for an unnecessary multiplicity of suits.
The number of copies of the offending publication that are published will be a factor
in determining the amount of recoverable damages.
However, the original publication of the defamatory material causes the statute of
limitations to run.

Discussion. This case reflects the majority rule in American jurisdictions today.

922-934
basis of liability
new york times co. v. Sullivan
RULE:
Constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that prohibits a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with actual malice -- that is, with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Key facts:
Advertisement: they are being met by an unprecedented wave of terror by those
who would deny and negate that document which the whole world looks upon as setting the
pattern for modern freedom.
“ southern violators have answered Dr. King’s peaceful protests with intimidation and
violence”.
Although plaintiff was not mentioned by name, he contended that these
statements attributed misconduct to him as the Montgonmery commissioner who
supervised the police department.
Trial court: might be liable if the jury found that they had published the
advertisement and that the statements were made “ of and concerning” respondent.
Once libel per se has been established, the defendant has no defense as to stated
facts unless he can persuade the jury that they were true in all their particulars.
FACTS:
 An action for libel was brought by Sullivan, a City Commissioner in Montgomery,
Alabama, against the New York Times for allegedly publishing defamatory statements in a
paid advertisement describing the maltreatment of African American students protesting
segregation by police under his supervision.

Sullivan argued that he was implicated in the false and defamatory advertisement
because he oversaw the City police in his official capacity as City Commissioner.

Several of the allegations in the advertisement were false or exaggerated.

The jury awarded damages and the judgment on the verdict was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Alabama on the grounds that the statements in the advertisement were
libelous per se, false, and not privileged, and that the evidence showed malice on the part
of the newspaper.
The case was elevated by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States.

ISSUE:
Does a public official have to prove “actual malice” before he can recover damages in
a defamation action against persons criticizing their official conduct?
ANSWER:
Yes.
Principle is debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials. So the issue is: whether it forfeits that protection by the
falsity of some of its factual statements and by its alleged defamation of respondent.

The state rule of law is not saved by its allowance of the defense of truth. A rule
compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assentation
and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amounts – leads to a
comparable “ self censorship”

The constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that prohibits a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless
he proves that the statement was made with actual malice that is with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregarded of whether it was false or not.
CONCLUSION:
 The Court held that the First Amendment required a rule that prohibited a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to the public official's
official conduct unless the official can prove that the statement was made with actual
malice.
The Court defined actual malice as knowledge that the defamatory statement was
false or made with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The Court held that no
evidence was presented to show that the New York Times acted with actual malice in
publishing the advertisement, and as a result, could not be held liable in an action for
libel.

Reasoning: 1. The letter written by the times reflected a reasonable doubt on its part
as to whether the advertisement could reasonably be taken to refer to respondent at all. 2.
It was not a final refusal, since it asked for an explanation on this point – a request that
respondent chose to ignore. Nor does the retraction upon the demand of the governor
supply the necessary proof.

Notes: pubic official; public figure: university is a public figure and no actual malice,
comments;

actual malice, burdens of proof, and the press

actual malice: reckless disregarded of the truth?
St. Amant v. Thompson
SYNOPSIS:
The case was before the Court on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Louisiana filed
by petitioner candidate in a defamation action filed by respondent public official. The
candidate alleged that the appellate court erred in affirming an award of damages for the
public official and in ruling that the candidate had recklessly broadcast false information
about the public official and demonstrated actual malice.

Facts:
St. Amant (defendant) made a televised speech in which he falsely accused Thompson
(plaintiff), a deputy sheriff and thus public official, of criminal conduct.
Thompson brought suit for defamation.
The trial judge found in favor of Thompson and denied St. Amant’s motion for a new
trial based on the holding in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which was
decided after the trial.
The appellate court reversed the judgment, finding that St. Amant had not acted with
actual malice as defined in Sullivan.
 The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, finding that St. Amant had made the
statement recklessly, although not knowingly, and had thus acted with actual malice. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

HOLDING:
On certiorari, the Court reversed, holding that the state supreme court had misinterpreted
and misapplied the New York Times malice standard for reckless publication. 

ANALYSIS:
-The record showed that the candidate had read a third party's statements about the public
official during a televised speech, however, nothing referred to by the state courts indicated
the candidate's awareness of the probable falsity of the statements.
-The candidate's failure to verify the information, inattention to the consequences for the
public official, and mistaken belief that he had no responsibility because he was merely
quoting a third party did not prove the requisite reckless disregard for the accuracy of the
statements. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant
in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.

Reasoning: in new york times case, the plaintiff did not satisfy his burden because
the record failed to show that the publisher was aware of the likelihood that he was
circulating false information.
Reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have
published or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence
to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregarded for truth
or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.

The finder of fact must determine whether the publication was indeed made in good
faith. Professions of good faith will be unlikely to prove persuasive, where a story is
fabricated by the defendant is the product of his imagination, or is based wholly on an
unverified anonymous telephone call etc.

RULES:
The plaintiff in a public official's defamation action must prove that the
defamatory publication was made with "actual malice," that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. There
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment sustaining an award of damages for the public
official in a defamation action against the candidate and remanded the case for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the Court's opinion. 

notes

944-958
private plaintiff
gertz v. Robert welch, inc
Statement of the Facts:
Nuccio, a Chicago policeman, was convicted of murder.  
The murder victim’s family hired petitioner Elmer Gertz to represent them in the civil
case against Nuccio.  
Respondent, in its ongoing attempts to alert the public of a nationwide conspiracy to
undermine local law enforcement, published an article called “FRAME UP:  Richard Nuccio
And The War On Police.” The article stated that the testimony at Nuccio’s criminal trial was
false, and that it was a Communist campaign against the police.
Even though petitioner Gertz had no connection to the criminal trial, the article
characterized him as the architect of the “frame up.”  It also stated he had a criminal record
and that he was a Communist, none of which was true.  Accordingly, petitioner brought a
libel action against respondent.  
It labeled Gertz a Leninist and a communist fronter. It also stated that Gertz has been
an officer of the national lawyer guild, described as a communist organization probably did
more than any other outfit to plan the communist attack on the Chicago police during the
1968 democratic convention.
But these statements contained serious inaccuracies      
Procedural History:
A jury in the libel case found for petitioner.
The District Court found that the standard in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) controlled the case.  Because petitioner could not prove the requisite knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth under the New York Times standard, the court
found for respondent notwithstanding the verdict.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue and Holding:
 Can a media organization that published falsehoods about a private individual (who
is neither a public figure or public official) avoid liability for the harm caused by the
statements based on the New York Times v. Sullivan standard? No.
Because private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public
officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery.

Judgment:
The judgment of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed and remanded.
Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:
Freedom of the press does not protect media organizations from liability for actual
injury caused by defamatory false statements made about a private individual.

Court believe that new york times rule states an accommodation between this
concern and the limited state interest present in the context of libel action brought by
public persons. Hence state interest in compensating injury to the reputation of private
individuals requires that a different rule.

Reasoning:
The standard in New York Times v. Sullivan provides that media organizations are not
liable for defamatory falsehoods made about public officials or figures unless the statement
was made with knowledge of the falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.  The high
standard of proof, however, does not apply to falsehoods made about private individuals,
even if the subject matter is arguably of public concern.
The reason for the distinction is because public figures have access to channels of
communication to rebut false statements, and voluntarily choose to be in the public eye.
Private individuals do not have such access, nor do they seek such media attention.
Accordingly, media organizations should be liable for actual (not punitive) damages caused
by defamatory falsehoods made about private individuals.  Further, the facts in this case
demonstrate that petitioner was neither a public official nor public figure.
Concurring Opinion (Blackmun):
While the majority opinion departs from a recent plurality opinion by the Court, it is
important that the law is made clear.  Accordingly, it is appropriate to set the boundary of
the New York Times doctrine by only applying it in the context of public officials and figures,
not private individuals.  It is also appropriate to only allow media organizations to be liable in
such cases for actual, not punitive, damages.
Dissenting Opinion (Burger):
 The Court in this case has abandoned the natural evolution
of defamation jurisprudence and permitted the potential of an unclear “negligence” liability
against the media.
Dissenting Opinion (Douglas):
The First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit any liability against media
organizations for discussions of public affairs.
Dissenting Opinion (Brennan):
The proper balance between avoiding media self-censorship and protecting an
individual’s reputation is found in the New York Times standard, which should applied to
both public figures and private individuals involved in matters of public concern.  Because
petitioner failed to prove that respondent published the information with knowledge of its
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, the lower court’s decision should be affirmed.
Significance:
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. identifies a distinction between defamation liability for
media organizations based upon whether the subject of the media statement is a public or
private individual.  Yet, it is still the rule that strict liabilityfor defamation is unconstitutional
in the United States, which is not the case in other countries.

speech of private concern

dun & bradstreet, inc v. greenmoss builders, inc
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Gertz standard protecting the media does not apply in
cases involving nonmedia publications, including credit reports. Rather, these nonmedia
publications are held to the same standard as the normal common-law applies.
 Facts. Petitioner is a credit-reporting agency that provides subscribers with financial
and related information about businesses.
All of the information is confidential; under the terms of the subscription agreement
the subscribers may not reveal it to anyone else.
On July 26, 1976 Petitioner sent a report to five subscribers indicating that
respondent, a construction contractor, had filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy.
This credit report was false and grossly misrepresented Respondent’s assets and
liabilities.
Respondent then brought this defamation action in Vermont state court alleging that
the false report injured his reputation.
Respondent sought both compensatory and punitive damages.
He was awarded both, and upon appeal the Supreme Court of Vermont reversed
holding that Gertz does not apply to nonmedia defamation claims.
In gertz case, court held first amendment restricted the damages that a private
individual could obtain from a publisher for a libel that involved a matter of public concerns.
Issue.
Whether the rule of Gertz applies when the false and defamatory statements do
not involve matters of public concern?
State interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages,
even absent of showing of actual malice.
Whether Petitioner’s credit report involved a matter of public concern? no

Speech on matters of purely private concerns is of less first amendment concern.

Held.
No. The Gertz standard applies does not apply when the value of speech involving no
matters of public concern. Therefore, the state interest adequately supports awards of
presumed and punitive damages, even absent a showing of “actual malice.”
No. Under the factors that addresses whether speech is a matter of public concern,
including the “expression’s content, form, and context, as revealed by the whole record,” it is
evident that the Petitioner’s credit record concerns no public issue.
 Dissent. The argument that Gertz should be limited to the media misapprehends the
Supreme Court’s cases on the issue. The credit reporting at issue here involves a matter of
sufficient public concern to require the comprehensive protections of Gertz. Were this
speech appropriately characterized as a matter of only private concern, the elimination of
the Gertz restrictions on presumed and punitive damages would still violate basic First
Amendment requirements. The dissent believes that Respondent under Gertz is entitled to
all actual damages it can show from the misreporting of the credit record, but must show
actual malice to receive presumed or punitive damages.
Concurrence.
Believes that Gertz is ill conceived and therefore agrees that it should be overruled.
Believes that Gertz was erroneously decided. Also believes that it must be the Gertz
requirement of some kind of fault on the part of the defendant that is also inapplicable in
cases like this one. Finally believes that if Gertz is to be distinguished from this case on the
ground that it applies only where the allegedly false publication deals with a matter of
general or public importance, then when the false publication does not deal with such a
matter, the common law rules would apply whether the Defendant is a member of the
media or other public disseminator or a nonmedia individual publishing privately.

Discussion. This case is important in that it claims nonmedia speech is different from
media speech of a private figure. This is not as significant in determining actual damages,
which would be awarded either way with less than actual malice, as it is in allowing punitive
and presumed damages in incidents of nonmedia speech. Under Gertz, actual malice is
required to award punitive damages, but this case holds that nonmedia speech does not
have the Constitutional protections that media speech has in regards to punitive and passive
damages.

963-966
public figures and public officials
whether a person may be a limited public figure, it is necessary first to inquire
whether a public controversy exists. Mere public interest is not enough: many people are
interested in the divorces of the wealthy, but curiosity does not a public controversy.
The issue must be one publicly debated with foreseeable and substantial
ramifications for nonparticipants.
Once a public controversy is identified, the issue then becomes whether the
plaintiff’s role was such that he is a limited public figure in the context of that controversy.
You are not a public figure because you had not thrust yourself or your views into the
public controversies to influence others.
 Although an important factor, voluntary assumption of risk is not essential. Some
persons may be deemed to be public figures even if they were drawn involuntarily into a
public controversy.
Before the plaintiff can be classified as involuntary or voluntary public figure, as a
limited purpose public figure, the defendant must prove five necessary elements:

974-984
privileges (defense?)
the common law recognized that some speech was essential for the functioning of
representative government and the administration of justice and hence gave precedence to
this speech by according it an absolute privilege.
This speech was not actionable, although defamatory, if it was communicated by
the publisher to the recipient where both parties had a reciprocal duty and interest to
communicate and receive it.
1. a judge has absolute immunity for defamatory words published in the course of
judicial proceedings.
2.the privilege extends also to witnesses, even though they testify voluntarily, and
not under subpoena. It extends to a defamatory statement in a pleading filed in the action.
3.？hearing of sanity commission
4. the result of the absolute privilege is that there is no civil remedy at all against the
witness who gives perjured testimony in court, even though he does no in furtherance of a
conspiracy to injure the plaintiff.
5. privilege extends beyond pure speech and debate when the matter is an integral
part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which members of congress
participate in proceedings.
12. if the publication took place within the scope of the federal official’s office, or
employment, no cause of action in defamation is available against the officer or the united
states. A statutory immunity is granted to the official under amendments to the federal torts
claims act.

conditional or qualified privilege

sindorf v. jacron sales co., inc.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. While a conditional privilege may exist, when two parties
are discussing another party they have in common, and there is truth to the discussion, the
question of whether the communication was made out of malice is still a proper question for
a jury.
 Facts. Plaintiff, Defendant’s former employee, resigned after a dispute as to his sales
practice.
After Plaintiff sought employment with a competitor, Defendant’s Vice President
called Plaintiff’s new employer and made derogatory insinuations regarding Plaintiff’s
honesty.
Plaintiff brought suit for defamation. The trial court held that the conversation between
Plaintiff’s current and former employers was privileged, and directed verdict for Defendant.
Plaintiff appealed.

Issue.
1. whether Jacron enjoyed a conditional privilege to defame Sindorf.

This case considers whether a conditional privilege exists in defamation suits where
the Plaintiff is a former employee of the Defendant.
Held. Reversed.
* The court reversed the judgment, holding that a privilege may exist where the truth
is in question. The question of malice must be for a jury, and Plaintiff may be afforded the
opportunity to bring suit.
 Rule and reasoning: one of these defense is
privilege. It rests upon the idea, that conduct which
otherwise would be actionable is to escape liability
because the defendant is acting in furtherance of some
interest of social importance, which is entitled to
protection even at the expense of uncompensated harm
to the plaintiff’s reputation. The interest thus favored may
be one of the defendant himself, of a third person, or of
the general public.
 Discussion. When considering whether a communication was made with malice, the
question will be presented to a jury for determinati

942-943 note6 and note8

note 6 the privilege of common law

note 8 the privilege under the constitution

994-999
remedy
1. damage
jury were permitted to estimate the harm to plaintiff’s reputation that they were
permitted to estimate the harm to plaintiff’s reputation that they thought the defamation
had caused, without the need of evidence to support the conclusion.
To the extent that damages cover pecuniary, or out of pocket loss, an award of
money damage is entirely appropriate, as it purports to make the plaintiff whole.
2. mitigation of damages: provocation by the plaintiff is generally regarded as
admissible for the purpose of mitigating punitive damages.

privacy
1001-1040
Joe Dickerson & assocaitons , LLC v. Dittmar appropriation: taking someone’s
for using. (appropriation of name, title)
RULE:
In order to succeed on a claim for invasion of privacy by appropriation of one’s name
or likeness, a plaintiff must prove: a) the defendant used the plaintiff’s name or likeness; b)
the use of the plaintiff’s name or likeness was for the defendant’s own purposes or
benefit; c) the plaintiff suffered harm; and d) the defendant caused the harm incurred.
Rule 2: the plaintiff don’t have to hold value of his name to rise cause of action as
invasion of privacy; but if his name and likeness in connection with a truthful article is
privileged, no invasion of privacy.
FACTS:
Defendant was hired to investigate plaintiff during a custody dispute.
During the investigation, defendant reported issues pertaining to plaintiff's bearer
bonds to the authorities and plaintiff was convicted of felony theft.
 Defendant then published a newsletter, which defendant sent to various law
enforcement agencies and law firms containing articles about investigations, tips about
avoiding fraud, and other information.
In one article, defendant discussed plaintiff's case, and used plaintiff's name and
photograph.
Plaintiff sued defendant, claiming invasion of privacy by appropriation of another's
name or likeness, as well as defamation.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant on the grounds that
Colorado did not recognize the claim, and the plaintiff had not provided that plaintiff's
name or likeness had any value.
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling, and the plaintiff
appealed again.
Element: 1. Defendant used the plaintiff’s name or likeness; 2. The use of the
plaintiff’s name or likeness was for the defendant’s own purpose or benefit, commercially or
otherwise;3. The plaintiff suffered damages; 4. The defendant caused the damages incurred.

Trial: as article about plaintiff’s name and criminal conviction is a matter of legitimate
public concern and is therefore privileged, invasion of privacy would not be succeed.

Appellate court: in order for liability to exist, the defendant must have appropriated
to his or her own use or benefit the reputation, prestige, social, or commercial standing,
public interest or other values of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.
ISSUE:
Whether a claim for invasion of privacy based on appropriation of one's name or
likeness requires evidence that a plaintiff's name has value.
ANSWER:
No, a claim for invasion of privacy based on appropriation of one's name or likeness
does not require evidence that a plaintiff's name has value.
Can plaintiff prevail invasion of privacy?
No. publication of a plaintiff’s name and likeness in connection with a truthful
article regarding the plaintiff’s felony conviction is privileged.

Restatement: one who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.
Five elements: d use p’s name 2. D sought advantage of p’s reputation 3. Use of p’s
name is for d’s own purpose or benefit,4. Damages. 5. Causation
 But in the court declined to use 2. Reason: a plaintiff whose identity has no
commercial value may still experience mental anguish based on an unauthorized use of her
name and likeness.

CONCLUSION:
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's ruling, finding that the newsletter
was protected by the First Amendment. 
The investigator's publication was primarily noncommercial because it related to a
matter of public concern, namely the facts of the secretary's crime and felony conviction.
The investigator's article detailed how the secretary stole a customer's bearer bonds from
her place of employment and cashed them for personal use.
In addition, the article described the investigation of the secretary, the fact that the
jury convicted her of theft, and how the court ordered her to pay restitution to the theft
victim. There was no question that those details about the plaintiff's crime and conviction
were matters of legitimate public concern.

Sanders v. American broadcasting companies, inc., et al (seclusion of intrusion)

1. reasonable expectation of privacy
2.
Brief Fact Summary. Reporter went undercover at a telepsychic company and
videotaped interactions she had with an employee of the company, who sued the reporter
and her employer for invasion of privacy.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The intrusion of privacy has two elements: 1) intrusion into
a private place, conversation or matter, and 2) in a manner highly offensive to a
reasonable person.
Based thereon, an employee has a legitimate expectation that his conversations will
not be secretly videotaped even though such conversations may not have been completely
private, assuming the invasion is highly offensive and taking into account the nature of the
conduct and surrounding circumstances (i.e., there may be scenarios where covert taping by
a reporter does not constitute a tort, as a legitimate means to conduct investigative
journalism).

Facts.  Defendant Lescht, a reporter for Defendant ABC, went undercover, obtaining
employment as a telepsychic with the Psychic Marketing Group (PMG).
Plaintiff Sanders was an employee of PMG. While working for PMG, Defendant Lescht
wore a wire and videotaped with a hat camera various conversations with PMG coworkers,
including Plaintiff.
 Plaintiff sued Defendants for invasion of privacy by intrusion. A jury found in favor of
Plaintiff,
but the appellate court reversed, finding that because the jury found for the defense
on another cause of action (violation of Penal Code s.632), Plaintiff could have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his workplace conversations because they could be overheard by
coworkers in shared office space.

Issue. Whether an employee who lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in a

conversation that can be overhead by coworkers may maintain a claim for invasion of
privacy by intrusion based on covert taping of that conversation?

Held. Yes, an employee has a legitimate expectation that his conversations will not be
secretly videotaped even though such conversations may not have been completely private,
assuming the invasion is highly offensive and taking into account the nature of the conduct
and surrounding circumstances.

Whether a reasonable expectation of privacy is violated by such recording depends

on the exact nature of the conduct and all the surrounding circumstances. Liability under
intrusion requires invasion be highly offensive to a reasonable person, considering among
other factors, the motive of the alleged intruder.

Discussion. Citing a recent decision in Schulman, the court notes that the intrusion
tort has two elements: 1) intrusion into a private place, conversation or matter, and 2) in a
manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.
1. plaintiff must show defendant penetrated some zone of physical or sensory
privacy surrounding or obtained unwanted access to data about the plaintiff.
The tort is only proven if plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation of
seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation or data source, but the expectation does not
need to be one of complete privacy.

Intrusion=seclusion
Seclusion need not be absolute. The mere fact that a person can be seen by someone
does not automatically mean that he or she can legally be forced to be subject to being seen
by everyone.
This is supported also by Huskey case: mere fact a person can be seen by others does
not mean that person cannot legally be secluded.
 Privacy for purposes of the intrusion tort must be evaluated with respect to the
identity of the alleged intruder and the nature of the intrusion.
Given that, Plaintiff’s privacy was still violated here despite the fact that his
conversations could be overheard by his coworkers, because he still had a legitimate
expectation that his conversation would not be covertly recorded by an outsider.
The reasonableness of a person’s expectation of visual and aural privacy depends,
not only on who might have been able to observe the subject interaction, but on the
identity of the claimed intruder and the means of intrusion.

The court makes it clear that it is not adopting a per se rule, but just holding that as a
matter of law, the possibility of being overheard by workers does not render unreasonable
an employee’s expectation that his nonpublic workplace interactions will not be covertly
videotaped. A journalist in a similar situation will still have the opportunity to show that
there was a legitimate motive of gathering the news, but in this case, no constitutional 1st
Amendment issues were analyzed.

Hall v. post
Brief Fact Summary.  True facts about a child’s adoption were published in two
newspaper articles.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Claims for invasion of privacy by publication of true but
“private” facts are not recognized in North Carolina.
Facts. The plaintiffs, Susie Hall (child) and Mary Hall (adoptive mother) sued
Defendant The Salisbury Post and its reporter, Rose Post, for invasion of privacy based on
two articles published in Defendant’s newspaper, one entitled “Ex-Carny seeks Baby
Abandoned 17 Years Ago”. Susie was apparently abandoned by her parents as an infant; she
was left by her father with babysitter Mary. The article detailed the facts surrounding Susie’s
abandonment, and the mother’s desire to return to the area and locate her long-lost child.
Based on responses to the article Susie was located and a 2nd article was published
identifying Plaintiffs and the details of the telephone encounter between Mary and the birth
mother. As a result, Plaintiffs were compelled to flee their home to avoid the public
attention, and each of them sought psychiatric care for their emotional and mental distress
caused by the incident.
Issue. Whether a claim for tortious invasion of privacy by truthful public disclosure of
private facts is cognizable under North Carolina law?
Cantrell v. forest city publishing co.

No, a "private facts" invasion of privacy tort cannot be justified when it punishes
defendants for broadly proclaiming the truth by speech or writing.
Court: we agree with the court of appeals that the intrusion branch of the invasion of
privacy tort is not involved here.
Supreme court reversed appellate court’s decision: constitutional rights will not be risen
here especially for truthful statement.

Discussion. This was an issue of first impression for the court concerning the private
facts branch of the invasion of privacy tort. Plaintiffs also stipulated that all facts in the
articles were true and accurate.
Under the 2nd Restatement of Torts, liability under the invasion of privacy tort
occurs where the matter publicized is a kind that a) would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
Consequently, four elements must be proven to be entitled to relief: 1) publicity; 2)
private facts; 3) offensiveness; and 4) absence of legitimate public concern.
To decide what is legitimate public concern, community mores must be analyzed,
and the line is drawn where the information ceases to be the giving of information to
which the public is entitled, and instead, becomes a prying into private lives, such that a
reasonable member of the public with decent standards would say that he has no concern.

The court has failed to recognize “false light” claims and now holds that publication
of true but private facts shall not trigger invasions of privacy, because such issues are too
intertwined with 1st Amendment rights and allowing the claim would add additional
tension to the law of torts and would be of little practical value to anyone.
Moreover, relying on the US Supreme Court decision in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, the court notes that the Supreme Court has also declined to address whether
truthful publications may ever be subjected to civil or criminal liability consistent with the
1st and 14th Amendments.

Here, because this is an action between two non-governmental parties, we do not

have a tension between two constitutional interests, but instead we must balance state tort
law with constraints of the Constitution (1st Amt.).
Reasoning:
As the constitutional right of privacy is not triggered here, and given that even false
statements that cause harm are often shielded from liability based on 1st Amendment
concerns (see Hustler v. Falwell), it is reasonable to conclude that publication of true
statements should be entitled to no less protection than that guaranteed of certain false
statements.
 Concurrence: Justice Frye does not join in the opinion that the claim for relief for
invasion of privacy by public disclosure of true but private facts should be rejected. He
believes that the media should not be given license to pry into the private lives of ordinary
citizens and spread highly offensive but private facts without any degree of accountability.
We must apply a “newsworthiness” or “public interest” standard to determine what
publications are privileged and what publications are actionable—this way, neither the right
of privacy nor the right of freedom of press is absolute.
If the 2nd Restatement standard is adopted, then the public concern element can be
an issue of law for the trial court and not put in the hands of the jury (because publishers
were concerned that juries would turn into lay sensors).
Applying such standard to the facts at hand, the return of Plaintiff’s birth mother to
search for her daughter would have been deemed a matter of legitimate public.

Cantrell v. forest city publishing co.

RULE:
Under traditional doctrines of respondeat superior, a publishing company could be
held vicariously liable for the damage caused by the knowing falsehoods contained in its
writer's story.
History procedure:
District court: struck the claims relating to punitive damages as to all the plaintiffs
and dismissed the actions of three of cantrel children in their entirety, but allowed the case
to go to the jury as to mrs. Cantrell and her oldest son
Appeals court held in light of 1st and 14th amendment, district court should have
granted the publishing’s motion for a directed verdict as to all the cantrells.
FACTS:
Forest City Publishing Co. (Forest City) (defendant) published an article written by
Joseph Eszterhas (defendant) featuring the Cantrell family.
Mr. Cantrell was killed in a bridge collapse five months earlier. Eszterhas went to the
family’s home and interviewed the Cantrell children, but their mother, Margaret Cantrell,
was not home.
Despite this, Eszterhas wrote that Mrs. Cantrell would not talk about what happened
to her husband or how the family is doing. He also wrote that Mrs. Cantrell “wears the same
mask of non-expression she wore at the funeral.”
The article also mischaracterized the Cantrells’ living conditions, overemphasizing the
extent of the poverty they were living in.
Mrs. Cantrell brought suit for invasion of privacy on a theory of false light. The jury
returned a verdict in Mrs. Cantrell’s favor.
The court of appeals reversed and Mrs. Cantrell appealed.
 The theory of this case was that by publishing the false story about the cantrells and
thereby making them the objects of pity and ridicule, the respondents damaged mrs.
Cantrell and her son William by causing them to suffer outrage, mental distress, shame, and
humiliation.

ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals err in setting aside the jury’s verdict on an invasion of
privacy claim in which the defendant was a newspaper publisher?
ANSWER:
Yes.

Time, inc. v, hill case: the court held that the constitutional protections for speech
and press precluded the application of the new york statute to allow recovery for false
report of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that the defendant published the
report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregarded of the truth.
This case presents no occasion to consider whether a state may constitutionally apply
a more relaxed standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of false statements
injurious to a private individual under a false-light theory of invasion of privacy, or whether
the constitutional standard announced in times, inc v. hill applies to all false light cases.

In false light case, common law malice – frequently expressed in terms of either
personal ill will toward the plaintiff or reckless or wanton disregard of the plaintiff’s rights –
would focus on the defendant’s attitude toward the plaintiff’s privacy, not towards the truth
or falsity of the material published.

CONCLUSION:
The sole question for the Court's determination was whether the appellate court
erred in setting aside the jury's verdict. After reviewing the trial record, the Court concluded
that the district judge was referring to the common-law standard of malice rather than to
the New York Times "actual malice" standard when he dismissed the punitive damages
claims.

In a false-light case, common-law malice -- frequently expressed in terms of either

personal ill will toward the plaintiff or reckless or wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights
-- would focus on the defendant's attitude toward the plaintiff's privacy, not toward the
truth or falsity of the material published.
 Reversing, the Court determined that the only way to harmonize two virtually
simultaneous rulings by the district judge was to conclude, contrary to the decision of the
appellate court, that in dismissing the punitive damages claims he was not determining that
petitioners had failed to introduce any evidence of knowing falsity or reckless disregard of
the truth. The appellate court concluded that there was no evidence that the publishing
company had knowledge of any of the inaccuracies contained in the article.
However, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the writer produced
article within the scope of his employment and that the publishing company was therefore
liable under traditional doctrines of respondeat superior. The Court reversed the judgment
of the appellate court and the case was remanded to that court with directions to enter a
judgment affirming the judgment of the district court as to the publishing company and
writer.
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