1

Hannah Serana vs. Sandiganbayan

653 SCRA (2011)

1. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan covers Board of

Regents. The Sandiganbayan, also has jurisdiction over
the other officers enumerated in PD No. 1606. While the
first part of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with Salary
grade 27 and higher but who are by express provisions of
law placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
as she is placed there by express provisions of law. Sec.
4(A)(1)(g) of PD No. 1606 explicitly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
directors and trustees, or manager of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities, or
educational foundations. Petitioner falls under this
category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Board
of Regents performs functions similar to those of a board
of trustee of a non-stock corporation. By express
mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as
contemplated by PD No. 1606.

2. Estafa is one of those felonies within the jurisdiction of

the Sandiganbayan, subject to the twin requirements that:
1) the offense is committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of PD No. 1606,
as amended, and that; 2) The offense is committed in
relation to their office.

3. It is well-established that compensation is not an

essential element of public office. At most, it is merely
incidental to the public office. Delegation of sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for
the benefit of the public makes one a public officer
 2

4. A UP Student Regent is a Public Officer. A public office

is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by
law, by which for a given period, either fixed or enduring
at the pleasure of the power, an individual is interested
with some portion of sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public.

5.
 3

Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. NO. 191894 July 15, 2015
PERALTA, J.

1. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of

Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, unless committed by public officials and
employees occupying positions of regional director and
higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.

2. Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade

27 or higher. Neither does he hold any position
particularly enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g).
Jurisdiction over the cases falls with the Regional Trial
Court.
 4

De Lima vs. Guerrero

G.R. No. 229781 October 10, 2017
VELASCO JR., J.

1. The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA

9165 is not transferred to the Sandiganbayan whenever
the accused occupies a position classified as Grade 27 or
higher, regardless of whether the violation is alleged as
committed in relation to office. The power of the
Sandiganbayan to sit in judgment of high-ranking
government officials is not omnipotent. The
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is circumscribed by law
and its limits are currently defined and prescribed by RA
10660, which amend PD No. 1606. As it now stands, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction currently defined and
prescribed by RA 10660.

2. The three-justice system of the Sandiganbayan was

envisioned as a safeguard to counter the political
influence of powerful public officials accused before it,
or to check any element of political persecution against
the political enemies of incumbent authorities. The
single-judge system of the regular judiciary is not
designed to fulfill this purpose of the Anti-Graft Court,
and is therefore more prone to powerful and irresistible
political influences in its decision-making.

3. On top of this are the basic statutory conditions for the

exercise of Sandiganbayan jurisdiction: public officials
with Salary Grade 27 and above charged with crimes
committed in relation to their office. The allegations
against De Lima constitute an Information for direct
bribery, not for drug trading, simply because according
 5

to the statements in the Information itself, what she was

interested in was the delivery of money from whatever
source, whether this came from the trading of illegal
drugs or not. Direct bribery committed by officials with
Salary Grade 27 and above involving more than one
million pesos squarely falls within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
 6

City of Manila vs. Judge Cuerdo

G.R. No. 175723 February 4, 2014
PERALTA, J.

1. The CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for

certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the
RTC in a local tax case. In order for any appellate court
to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must
have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of
certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over
appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be
assumed that the law intended to transfer also such
power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in
aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable
reason why the transfer should only be considered as
partial, not total.

2. If a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial

tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or
body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of
certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

3. A court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its

appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to
review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or
decisions of the lower court.
 7

CE Casecnan Water & Energy Co. vs. Prov. Of Nueva

Ecija
GR No. 196278 June 17, 2015
DEL CASTILLO, J.

1. Republic Act No. 9282 expanded the jurisdiction of the

Court of Tax Appeals which now includes its exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions,
orders or resolutions of the regional trial courts in local
tax cases originally decided or resolved by the regional
trial courts in the exercise of its original or appellate
jurisdiction. It is the CTA which has exclusive
jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari
assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a
local tax case.

2. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is required for a court

to act on any controversy. It is conferred by law and not
by the consent or waiver upon a court. As such , if a
court lacks jurisdiction over an action, it cannot decide
the case on the merits and must dismiss.
 8

Lomondot vs. Balindong

G.R. No. 192463 July 13, 2015
PERALTA, J.

1. The Shari’a Appellate Court has yet to be organized with

the appointment of a Presiding Justice and two Associate
Justices. Until such time that the Shari’a Appellate Court
shall have been organized, however, appeals or petitions
from final orders or decisions of the SDC filed with the
CA shall be referred to a Special Division to be
organized in any of the CA stations preferably composed
of Muslim CA Justices.

2. The SDC Decision dated January 31, 2005 ordered

respondents to vacate the portions or areas they had
illegally encroached had become final and executory
after we affirmed the same and an entry of judgment was
made. Such decision can no longer be modified or
amended. In Dacanay v. Yrastorza, Sr., Once a judgment
attains finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable.
This is the doctrine of finality of judgment. In Abrigo v.
Flores,33 we said: x x x a supervening event is an
exception to the execution as a matter of right of a final
and immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects
the matter already litigated and settled, or substantially
changes the rights or relations of the parties therein as to
render the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable.
The party who alleges a supervening event to stay the
execution should necessarily establish the facts by
competent evidence; otherwise, it would become all too
easy to frustrate the conclusive effects of a final and
immutable judgment. In this case, the matter of whether
respondents' houses intruded petitioners' land is the issue
 9

in the recovery of possession complaint filed by

petitioners in the SDC which was already ruled upon,
thus cannot be considered a supervening event that
would stay the execution of a final and immutable
judgment.
 10

Municipality of Tangkal vs. Balindong

G.R. No. 193340 January 11, 2017
JARDELEZA, J.

1. The matters over which Shari'a district courts have

Jurisdiction are enumerated in the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, specifically in Article 143 which has a
catchall provision granting Shari'a district courts
original jurisdiction over personal and real actions
except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer.
The Shari'a district courts' jurisdiction over these
matters is concurrent with regular civil courts, i.e.,
municipal trial courts and regional trial courts. There is,
however, a limit to the general jurisdiction of Shari'a
district courts over matters ordinarily cognizable by
regular courts: such jurisdiction may only be invoked if
both parties are Muslims. If one party is not a Muslim,
the action must be filed before the regular courts.

2. In determining whether the Shari'a District Court has

jurisdiction over the case, the threshold question is
whether both parties are Muslims. When Article 143(2)
(b) qualifies the conferment of jurisdiction to actions
"wherein the parties involved are Muslims," the word
"parties" necessarily refers to the real parties in interest.
Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines real
parties in interest as those who stand to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or are entitled to the
avails of the suit.

3. It is clear from the title and the averments in the

complaint that Mayor Batingolo was impleaded only in
 11

a representative capacity, as chief executive of the local

government of Tangkal. When an action is defended by
a representative, that representative is not-and neither
does he become-a real party in interest. The person
represented is deemed the real party in interest; the
representative remains to be a third party to the action.
That Mayor Batingolo is a Muslim is therefore
irrelevant for purposes of complying with the
jurisdictional requirement under Article 143(2)(b) that
both parties be Muslims. To satisfy the requirement, it
is the real party defendant, the Municipality of Tangkal,
who must be a Muslim. Such a proposition, however, is
a legal impossibility.

4. The Code of Muslim Personal Laws defines a "Muslim"

as "a person who testifies to the oneness of God and the
Prophethood of Muhammad and professes Islam."
Although the definition does not explicitly distinguish
between natural and juridical persons, it nonetheless
connotes the exercise of religion, which is a
fundamental personal right. The ability to testify to the
"oneness of God and the Prophethood of Muhammad"
and to profess Islam is, by its nature, restricted to
natural persons. In contrast, juridical persons are
artificial beings with "no consciences, no beliefs, no
feelings, no thoughts, no desires." They are considered
persons only by virtue of legal fiction. The Municipality
of Tangkal falls under this category. Under the Local
Government Code, a municipality is a body politic and
corporate that exercises powers as a political
subdivision of the national government and as a
corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its
territory.
 12

Unduran vs. Aberasturi

G.R. No. 181284 April 18, 2017
PERALTA, J.

1. It is the court of general jurisdiction has the power or

authority to hear and decide cases whose subject matter
does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
any court, tribunal or body exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial function. In contrast, a court of limited
jurisdiction, or a court acting under special powers, has
only the jurisdiction expressly delegated. An
administrative agency, acting in its quasi-judicial
capacity, is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction which could
wield only such powers that are specifically granted to it
by the enabling statutes. Limited or special jurisdiction is
that which is confined to particular causes or which can
be exercised only under limitations and circumstances
prescribed by the statute.

2. Meanwhile, the NCIP's jurisdiction is limited under

customary laws presents two important issues: first,
whether it is legally possible to punish non-ICCs/IPs
with penalties under customary laws; and second,
whether a member of a particular ICC/IP could be
punished in accordance with the customary laws of
another ICC/IP.

3. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the court cannot

be made to depend on the defenses raised by the
defendant in the answer or a motion to dismiss;
otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend
almost entirely on the defendant. The nature of an action,
as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
 13

determined based on the allegations contained in the

complaint... of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein. Once vested by the
allegations in the... complaint, jurisdiction also remains
vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein.
 14

LBP vs. Dalauta

G.R. No. 190004 August 08, 2017
MENDOZA, J.

1. In connection with the courts' jurisdiction vis-a-vis

jurisdiction of administrative bodies, the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction takes into play. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction tells us that courts cannot, and will
not, resolve a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal,
especially where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of
fact.

2. In agrarian reform cases, primary jurisdiction is vested in

the DAR, more specifically, in the DARAB as provided
for in Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657.

3. It is clear from Sec. 57 of R.A. No. 6657 that the RTC,

sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has “original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners.” This
“original and exclusive” jurisdiction of the RTC would
be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative
officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases and
make the RTC an appellate court for the review of
administrative decisions. Thus, although the new rules
speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators
to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear
from Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction
to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to
 15

transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to

convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into
appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and
therefore would be void. Thus, direct resort to the SAC
by Dalauta is valid.

4. On the supposedly conflicting pronouncements in the

cited decisions, the Court reiterates its ruling in this case
that the agrarian reform adjudicator's decision on land
valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day
period stated in the DARAB Rules. The petition for the
fixing of just compensation should therefore, following
the law and settled jurisprudence, be filed with the SAC
within the said period.

5. The taking of property under R.A. No. 6657 is an

exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State.
The valuation of property or determination of just
compensation in eminent domain proceedings is
essentially a judicial function which is vested with the
courts and not with administrative agencies.
Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of
Dalauta’s petition for determination of just
compensation.
 16

DBP vs. Carpio

G.R. No. 195450 February 1, 2017
MENDOZA, J.
1. Residual jurisdiction refers to the authority of the trial
court to issue orders for the protection and preservation
of the rights of the parties which do not involve any
matter litigated by the appeal; to approve compromises;
to permit appeals by indigent litigants; to order execution
pending appeal in accordance with Section 2, Rule 39;
and to allow the withdrawal of the appeal, provided these
are done prior to the transmittal of the original record or
the record on appeal, even if the appeal has already been
perfected or despite the approval of the record on
appeal[24] or in case of a petition for review under Rule
42, before the CA gives due course to the petition.

2. The "residual jurisdiction" of the trial court is available at

a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have
lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter
involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the
perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the
approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the
transmittal of the original records or the records on
appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its
so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders,
approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent
litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the
withdrawal of the appeal.

3. Before the trial court can be said to have residual

jurisdiction over a case, a trial on the merits must have
 17

been conducted; the court rendered judgment; and the

aggrieved party appealed therefrom.
Regulus Dev. Inc. vs. De la Cruz
January 25, 2016 G.R. No. 198172
BRION, J.

1. Equity jurisdiction aims to provide complete justice in

cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its
judgments to the special circumstances of a case because
of a resulting legal inflexibility when the law is applied
to a given situation. The purpose of the exercise of equity
jurisdiction, among others, is to prevent unjust
enrichment and to ensure restitution.

2. The RTC’s equity jurisdiction is separate and distinct

from its appellate jurisdiction on the ejectment case. The
RTC could not have issued its orders in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction since there was nothing more to
execute on the dismissed ejectment case. As the RTC
orders explained, the dismissal of the ejectment case
effectively and completely blotted out and cancelled the
complaint. Hence, the RTC orders were clearly issued in
the exercise of the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, not on the
basis of its appellate jurisdiction.
 18

Resident Marine Mammals vs. Reyes

G.R. No. 180771 April, 21 2015
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

1. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases

has been given a more liberalized approach. The Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a
“citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an
action before our courts for violation of our
environmental laws on the principle that humans are
stewards of nature.

2. The need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal

standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which
allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to
bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is
worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real
parties in the Petition and not just in representation of
the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and
Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there
may be possible violations of laws concerning the
habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore
declared to possess the legal standing to file this
petition.
 19

City of Manila vs. Judge Cuerdo

G.R. No. 175723 February 4, 2014
PERALTA, J.

1. If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that

jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies with the CA,
this Court would be confirming the exercise by two
judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over
basically the same subject matter – precisely the split-
jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly
administration of justice. The Court cannot accept that
such was the legislative motive, especially considering
that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal
with the specialized competence over tax and tariff
matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases
without mention of any other court that may exercise
such power. Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the
CA that since appellate jurisdiction over private
respondents' complaint for tax refund is vested in the
CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking
nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said
case should, likewise, be filed with the same court.

2. Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent

with the pronounced judicial abhorrence to split
jurisdiction to conclude that the intention of the law is to
divide the authority over a local tax case filed with the
RTC by giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari against interlocutory orders of
the RTC but giving to the CTA the jurisdiction over the
appeal from the decision of the trial court in the same
case.
 20

3. It is more in consonance with logic and legal soundness

to conclude that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the
CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC
carries with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when
necessary in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. The
supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a
writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction should
co-exist with, and be a complement to, its appellate
jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and
decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete
supervision over the acts of the latter.
 21

Edcel Lagman vs. Pimentel Ill

GR Nos. 235935, 236061, 236145, 236155 February 6, 2018
Tijam, J.

1. Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution pertains to the

Court's judicial power to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. The first part is to be
known as the traditional concept of judicial power while
the latter part, an innovation of the 1987 Constitution,
became known as the court's expanded jurisdiction.

2. Under its expanded jurisdiction, courts can now delve

into acts of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government traditionally considered as political if such
act was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

3. A petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section

5 of Article VIII is not the proper tool to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
 22

Duero vs CA
G.R. No. 131282 January 4, 2002
QUISUMBING, J.

1. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must

be unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied,
estoppel may become a tool of injustice.

2. The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of

the court over an action cannot be waived by the parties,
or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by
their express consent. Further, a party may assail the
jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of
the proceedings and even on appeal. The appellate court
did not err in saying that the RTC should have declared
itself barren of jurisdiction over the action

3. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an

action 'whenever it appears that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter.' (Sec. 2, Rule 9,
Rules of Court)
 23

Gonzaga vs CA
G.R. NO. 130841 : February 26, 2008
VELASCO, JR., J.

1. While an order or decision rendered without jurisdiction

is a total nullity and may be assailed at any stage, active
participation in the proceedings in the court which
rendered the order or decision will bar such party from
attacking its jurisdiction.

2. In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves who

invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting
an action for reformation of contract against private
respondents. It appears that, in the proceedings before the
trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their cause
from start to finish. Not even once did petitioners ever
raise the issue of the court’s jurisdiction during the entire
proceedings which lasted for two years. It was only after
the trial court rendered its decision and issued a writ of
execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise
the issue of jurisdiction ─ and it was only because said
decision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus
effectively waived their right to question the court’s
jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.
 24

Manila Bankers vs. Ng Kok Wei

G.R. No. 139791 December 12, 2003
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

1. It is the HLURB which has the exclusive jurisdiction to

hear and decide cases involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of…
condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman (Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1344).

2. While it may be true that the trial court is without

jurisdiction over the case, petitioner’s active participation
in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of
it. We have held that it is an undesirable practice of a
party participating in the proceedings and submitting its
case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only
if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction,
when adverse.
 25

Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. CA

G.R. No. 173946 June 19, 2013
PEREZ, J.

1. The principle of estoppel by laches finds no application

in his case. Instead the principles relating to jurisdiction
are pertinent therein. Since the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is not one
of those defenses which are not deemed waived under
Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense must be invoked when
an answer or a motion to dismiss if filed in order to
prevent a waiver of the defense. If the objection is not
raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, the
objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the
plaintiff or the defendant is deemed waived by virtue of
the first sentence of the above quoted Section 1, Rule 9
of the Rules of Court.

2. A defendant is informed of a case against him when he

receives summons. “Summons is a writ by which the
defendant is notified of the action brought against him.
Service of such writ is the means by which the court
acquires jurisdiction over his person.” In the case at bar,
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of Manuel since there was no valid service of summons
upon him, precisely because he was already dead even
before the complaint against him and his wife was filed
in the trial court.

3. Lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to

waiver, is a personal defense which can only be asserted
by the party who can thereby waive it by silence.
 26

Agan vs. Piato

G.R. No. 155001 May 5, 2003
Puno, J.

1. The rule on hierarchy of courts may be relaxed when the

redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts
or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise
of this Court's primary jurisdiction.

2. Both petitioners and respondents agree that these cases are

of transcendental importance as they involve the
construction and operation of the country's premier
international airport. Moreover, the crucial issues
submitted for resolution are of first impression and they
entail the proper legal interpretation of key provisions of
the Constitution, the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations. Thus, considering the nature of the
controversy before the Court, procedural bars may be
lowered to give way for the speedy disposition of the
instant cases.

3. Nevertheless, the unavoidable consequence of having to

await the rendition and the finality of any such judgment
would be a prolonged state of uncertainty that would be
prejudicial to the nation, the parties and the general public.
And, in light of the feared loss of jobs of the petitioning
workers, consequent to the inevitable pretermination of
contracts of the petitioning service providers that will
follow upon the heels of the impending opening of NAIA
Terminal III, the need for relief is patently urgent, and
therefore, direct resort to this Court through the special
civil action of prohibition is thus justified.
 27

Liga Ng Mga Barangay vs. Atienza

G.R. No. 154599 January 21, 2004
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.

1. The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ

of certiorari (as well as of prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive,
but is concurrent with the RTC and CA in certain cases.

2. SC will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress

desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the
availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of
certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction. No special and important reason or
exceptional and compelling circumstance has been
adduced by the petitioner or the intervenor why direct
recourse to this Court should be allowed.
 28

St. Mary Crusade Foundation vs. Riel

G.R. No. 176508 January 12, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.

1. The Court enforces the observance of the hierarchy of

courts in order to free itself from unnecessary,
frivolous and impertinent cases and thus afford time
for it to deal with the more fundamental and more
essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it.

2. Although the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with

the Court of Appeals in issuing the writ of certiorari,
direct resort is allowed only when there are special,
extra-ordinary or compelling reasons that justify the
same. There being no special, important or compelling
reason, the petitioner thereby violated the observance
of the hierarchy of courts, warranting the dismissal of
the petition for certiorari.
 29

Intramuros Administration vs. Offshore Construction

And Development Co.
G.R. No. 196795 March 07, 2018
LEONEN, J.

1. The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of

courts was created by this court to ensure that every
level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in
an effective and efficient manner.

2. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not inviolable,

and this Court has provided several exceptions to the
doctrine. One of these exceptions is the exigency of
the situation being litigated.

3. The Supreme Court's rules of procedure permit the

direct resort to the SC from a decision of the Regional
Trial Court upon questions of law.

4. Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the

evaluation of the evidence presented before them.
They are likewise competent to determine issues of
law which may include the validity of an ordinance,
statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the
Constitution. There are, however, some cases where
resort to courts at their level would not be practical
considering their decisions could still be appealed
before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.
 30

Bureau of Customs vs. Gallegos

G.R. No. 220832, February 28, 2018
TIJAM, J.

1. The Court enforces the observance of the hierarchy of

courts in order to free itself from unnecessary,
frivolous and impertinent cases and thus afford time
for it to deal with the more fundamental and more
essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to
it.31 Absent any showing of any special, important or
compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the
petition will cause the dismissal of the recourse.

2. The concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme

Court, CA and the RTC to issue the writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum.

3. Although this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with

the CA and the RTC in issuing the writ of certiorari,
direct resort is allowed only when there are special,
extraordinary or compelling reasons that justify the
same.
 31

Katon vs. Palanca

G.R. NO. 151149 September 7, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.

1. The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a

stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost
jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved
in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection
of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the
records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the
original records or the records on appeal. In either
instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual
jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve
compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order
execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of
the appeal.
2. Residual prerogatives under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court states that defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and
(4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the
evidence on record. In the four excepted instances, the
court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action.
 32

Pat-og vs. CSC

697 SCRA (2013)

1. The CSC, the Department of Education (DepEd) and the

Board of Professional Teachers-Professional Regulatory
Commission (PRC) have concurrent jurisdiction over
administrative cases against public school teachers.

2. Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over

the same parties or subject matter at the same time by
two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows
upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be
presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be
proved that another body is likewise vested with the
same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have
concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.

3. Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals,

the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.

4. The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the

government, has the inherent power to supervise and
discipline all members of the civil service, including
public school teachers.
 33

First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. vs. Phil Bank of

Communications
G.R. No. 202836 June 19, 2018
Leonen, J.

1. To determine the nature of an action, whether or not

its subject matter is capable or incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the nature of the principal action or relief
sought must be ascertained.

2. If the principal relief is for the recovery of a sum of

money or real property, then the action is capable of
pecuniary estimation. However, if the principal relief
sought is not for the recovery of sum of money or real
property, even if a claim over a sum of money or real
property results as a consequence of the principal
relief, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
 34

Alday vs. FGU Insurance

G.R. No. 138822 January 23, 2001
GONZAGA-REYES, J.

1. The counterclaim being permissive, in order for the trial

court to acquire jurisdiction over the same, petitioner is
bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. It is not simply
the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee
that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-
matter or nature of the action.

2. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not

accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court
may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. The same rule applies to permissive
counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings,
which shall not be considered filed until and unless the
filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may
allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but
also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
 35

Mercado vs. CA
G.R. No. 169576 October 17, 2008
CORONA, J.

1. A counterclaim (or a claim which a defending party may

have against any party) may be compulsory or
permissive.

2. A counterclaim that (1) arises out of (or is necessarily

connected with) the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; (2) falls
within the jurisdiction of the court and (3) does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties
over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, is
compulsory. Otherwise, a counterclaim is merely
permissive.

3. SMC’s counterclaim, being logically related to

Mercado’s claim, was compulsory in nature.
Consequently, the payment of docket fees was not
necessary for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
 36

Proton Pilipinas vs. Banque Nationale de Paris

G.R. NO. 151242 June 15, 2005
CARPIO-MORALES, J.

1. The Court rules that it is not simply the filing of the

complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature
of the action.

2. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not

accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court
may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.

3. It also stated that where the trial court acquires

jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified
in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefore shall constitute a lien on the judgment.

4. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his

duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess
and collect the additional fee. The clerk of court should
thus have assessed the filing fee by taking into
consideration "the total sum claimed, inclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and costs, or the stated value of the
property in litigation.
 37

Ruby Shelter Builders vs. Formaran

G.R. No. 175914 February 10, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

1. The dictum adhered to in this jurisdiction is that the

nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the
body of the pleading or Complaint itself, rather than by
its title or heading.

2. A real action is one in which the plaintiff seeks the

recovery of real property; or, as indicated in what is now
Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is
an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of
real property.

3. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment

or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to
efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of
the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real
action. A real action indisputably involves real property.

4. The docket fees for a real action would still be

determined in accordance with the value of the real
property involved therein; the only difference is in what
constitutes the acceptable value. In computing the docket
fees for cases involving real properties, the courts,
instead of relying on the assessed or estimated value,
would now be using the fair market value of the real
properties (as stated in the Tax Declaration or the Zonal
Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever
is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated value of
the same.
 38

St. Louis University vs. Cobarrubias

G.R. No. 187104 August 3, 2010
BRION, J.

1. Non-compliance with the procedural requirements shall

be a sufficient ground for the petition’s dismissal. Thus,
payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed
period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. It is
an essential requirement, without which, the decision
appealed from would become final and executory as if no
appeal has been filed.

2. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed

simply because their non-observance may have
prejudiced a party's substantive rights; like all rules, they
are required to be followed. However, there are
recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as:
a. Most persuasive and weighty reasons;
b. To relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure;
c. Good faith of the defaulting party by immediately
paying within a reasonable time from the time of the
default;
d. The existence of special or compelling
circumstances;
e. The merits of the case;
f. A cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
the rules;
g. A lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory;
 39

h. The other party will not be unjustly prejudiced

thereby;
i. Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
without the appellant's fault;
j. Peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances
attendant to each case;
k. In the name of substantial justice and fair play;
l. Importance of the issues involved; and
m. Exercise of sound discretion by the judge,
guided by all the attendant circumstances.

3. Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory

privilege, thus, appeal must be made strictly in
accordance with the provision set by law
 40

Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute

G.R. No.177425 June 18, 2014
DEL CASTILLO, J.

1. An appeal on certiorari, as in this case, is a continuation

of the original suit. Hence, the parties in the original suit
must also be the parties in such an appeal. Placer,
therefore, not being a party in the complaint before the
RTC has no personality to continue the same on appeal
and cannot be considered as a petitioner. At the most, her
only role in this Petition was to sign the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping for and in behalf of
petitioners.

2. Concomitant to the liberal interpretation of the rules of

procedure should be an effort on the part of the party
invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to
abide by the rules. Those who seek exemption from the
application of the rule have the burden of proving the
existence of exceptionally meritorious reason warranting
such departure.

3. Petitioners’ failure to advance any explanation as to why

they failed to pay the correct docket fees or to complete
payment of the same within the period allowed by the
CA is thus fatal to their cause. Hence, a departure from
the rule on the payment of the appeal fee is unwarranted.
 41

Sy-Vargas vs. Estate of Ogsos

G.R. No. 221062 October 05, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

1. The nature of a counterclaim is determinative of whether or

not the counterclaimant is required to pay docket fees.

2. A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is

not necessarily connected with the subject matter of the
opposing party’s claim. It is essentially an independent claim
that may be filed separately in another case.

3. While the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only

upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee, its non-
payment at the time of the filing of the initiatory pleading
does not automatically cause its dismissal provided that:
(a) the fees are paid within a reasonable period; and
(b) there was no intention on the part of the claimant to
defraud the government.
 42

Camaso vs. TSM Shipping Inc.

G.R. No. 223290 November 07, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

1. The Rules of Court provides that in original actions filed

before the CA, payment of the corresponding docket fees is
required, and that the failure to comply with the same shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal of such action,

2. The failure to pay the required docket fees per se should not
necessarily lead to the dismissal of a case. It has long been
settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-
payment at the time of filing of the initiatory pleading does
not automatically cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the
fees are paid within a reasonable period; and (b) there was no
intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the
government.

3. Here, it appears that when Camaso filed his petition, a

check was attached thereto to serve as payment of docket fees.
Although this was not an authorized mode of payment, the
attachment of such personal check shows that Camaso exerted
earnest efforts to pay the required docket fees. Clearly, this
exhibits good faith and evinces his intention not to defraud the
government.
 43

Dynamic Builders vs. Presbitero

G.R. No. 174202 April 07, 2015
LEONEN, J.

1. The splitting of a cause of action "violates the policy

against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective is
to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the courts. If
two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same
cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the
merits in any one is available as a ground for the
dismissal of the others.

2. Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court requires the

plaintiff or principal party to certify under oath that he or
she has not commenced any action involving the same
issues in any court.

3. Forum shopping is the practice of litigants resorting to

two different fora for the purpose of obtaining the same
relief, to increase their chances of obtaining a favorable
judgment. Forum shopping is present when, in two or
more cases pending, there is identity of (1) parties (2)
rights or causes of action and reliefs prayed for and (3)
the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that
any judgment rendered in the other action, will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.
 44

Relucio vs. Lopez

G.R. No. 138497 January 16, 2002
PARDO, J.

1. A real party in interest is one who stands "to be

benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit."

2. An indispensable party is one without whom there

can be no final determination of an action.

3. A necessary party as one who is not indispensable

but who ought to be joined as party if complete relief
is to be accorded those already parties, or for a
complete determination or settlement of the claim
subject of the action.
 45

De Castro vs CA
G.R. No. 115838 July 18, 2002
CARPIO, J.

1. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be

affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and
without whom no final determination of the case can be
had.

2. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory and

courts cannot proceed without their presence. Whenever
it appears to the court in the course of a proceeding that
an indispensable party has not been joined, it is the duty
of the court to stop the trial and order the inclusion of
such party.

3. However, the rule on mandatory joinder of indispensable

parties is not applicable to the instant case. Under the
note/letter sent by the De Castro to Antigo, a contract of
agency was clearly constituted between Constante and
Artigo. Whether Constante appointed Artigo as agent, in
Constante’s individual or representative capacity, or
both, the De Castros cannot seek the dismissal of the
case for failure to implead the other co-owners as
indispensable parties.
 46

Orquiola vs CA
G.R. No. 141463. August 6, 2002
QUISIMBING, J.

1. Petitioners are not privies (interested in the outcome of

the action) and cannot be bound by the judgment against
Lising and his predecessors-in-interests.

2. Petitioners acquired the lot before the commencement of

Civil Case No. Q-12918 and petitioners acquired the
registered title in their own names. The sale to petitioners
was made before Pura Kalaw Ledesma claimed the lot.
Petitioners could reasonably rely on Mariano Lising’s
Certificate of Title which at the time of purchase was still
free from any third party claim.
 47

China Banking Corp., vs Oliver

G.R. No. 135796 October 3, 2002
QUISIMBING, J.

1. An indispensable party is a party in interest, without

whom no final determination can be had of an action.

2. However, mortgagor Oliver One’s absence from the case

does not hamper the trial court in resolving the dispute
between respondent Oliver Two and petitioner. Oliver
Two’s allegations in the complaint shows that it was for
annulment of mortgage due to petitioners negligence in
not determining the actual ownership of the property. To
support said allegations, respondent Oliver Two had to
prove (1) that she is the real Mercedes M. Oliver referred
to in the TCT, and (2) that she is not the same person
using that name who entered into a deed of mortgage
with the petitioner. This, respondent Oliver Two can do
in her complaint without necessarily impleading the
mortgagor Oliver One. Hence, Oliver One is not an
indispensable party in the case filed by Oliver Two.

3. A party is also not indispensable if his presence would

merely permit complete relief between him and those
already parties to the action, or will simply avoid
multiple litigation, as in the case of Chinabank and
mortgagor Oliver One. The latter’s participation in this
case will simply enable petitioner Chinabank to make its
claim against her in this case, and hence, avoid the
institution of another action. Thus, it was the bank who
should have filed a third-party complaint or other action
versus the mortgagor Oliver One.
 48

David vs. Paragas, Jr.

G.R. No. 176973 February 25, 2015
MENDOZA, J.

1. An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without

whom no final determination can be had of an action,
and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest
the court with jurisdiction.

2. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory.

3. Considering that David was asking for judicial

determination of his rights in Olympia, it is an
indispensable party as it stands to be injured or benefited
by the outcome of the main proceeding. It has such an
interest in the controversy that a final decree would
necessarily affect its rights. Not having been impleaded,
Olympia cannot be prejudiced by any judgment where its
interests and properties are adjudicated in favor of
another even if the latter is a beneficial owner. It cannot
be said either to have consented to the judicial approval
of the compromise, much less waived substantial rights,
because it was never a party in the proceedings.

4. The absence of an indispensable party renders all

subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even
to those present.
 49

Land Bank vs. Cacayuran

G.R. No. 191667 April 22, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

1. Sec 7, Rule 3 mandates that all indispensable parties are

to be joined in a suit as it is the party whose interest will
be affected by the court’s action and without whom no
final determination of the case can be had. His legal
presence is an absolute necessity. Absence of the
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void for want of authority to act.

2. Failure to implead any indispensable party is not a

ground for the dismissal of the complaint. The proper
remedy is to implead them.

3. In this case, Cacayuran failed to implead the

Municipality, a real party in interest and an indispensable
party that stands to be directly affected by any judicial
resolution. It is the contracting party and the owner of the
public plaza. It stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment of the case. The decision of the RTC, affirmed
with modification by the CA, and finally affirmed by the
SC is not binding upon the Municipality as it was not
impleaded as defendant in the case.
 50

Lotte Phils. co. Inc. vs. De la Cruz

G.R. No. 166302 July 28, 2005
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

1. An indispensable party is a party in interest without

whom no final determination can be had of an action,
and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The
presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the
court with jurisdiction, which is the authority to hear and
determine a cause, the right to act in a case. Thus,
without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or
proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real
finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders
all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want
of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even as to those present.

2. Here, 7J is an indispensable party. It is a party in interest

because it will be affected by the outcome of the case.
The LA and the NLRC found 7J to be solely liable as the
employer of respondents. The CA however rendered
Lotte jointly and severally liable with 7J who was not
impleaded by holding that the former is the real
employer of respondents. Plainly, its decision directly
affected 7J.

3. Although 7J was a co-party in the case before the LA and

the NLRC, respondents failed to include it in their
petition for certiorari in the CA. Hence, the CA did not
acquire jurisdiction over 7J. No final ruling on this
matter can be had without impleading 7J, whose
inclusion is necessary for the effective and complete
 51

resolution of the case and in order to accord all parties

with due process and fair play.
 52

Carabeo vs. Dingco

G.R. No. 190823 April 4, 2011
CARPIO MORALES, J.

1. The question as to whether an action survives or not

depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued
for.

2. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong

complained affects primarily and principally property
and property rights, the injuries to the person being
merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do
not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the
property and rights of property affected being incidental.

3. In the present case, respondents are pursuing a property

right arising from the kasunduan, whereas petitioner is
invoking nullity of the kasunduan to protect his
proprietary interest. Assuming arguendo, however, that
the kasunduan is deemed void, there is a corollary
obligation of petitioner to return the money paid by
respondents, and since the action involves property
rights, it survives.
 53

De la Cruz vs, Joaquin

G.R. No. 162788. July 28, 2005
PANGANIBAN, J.

1. Formal substitution of heirs is not necessary when they

appear, participated, and presented evidence in the
defense of the deceased. These actions negate any claim
that the right to due process was violated.

2. When the party to a pending action dies, the claim is not

extinguished. It requires substitution of the deceased.
The procedure is specifically governed by Section 16 of
Rule 3.

3. The rule on the substitution of parties was crafted to

protect every party’s right to due process. The estate of
the deceased party will continue to be properly
represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal
representative.

4. The rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of

jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. Thus,
when due process is not violated, as when the right of the
representative or heir is recognized and protected,
noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the
Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated
decision. Mere failure to substitute for a deceased
plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s
decision. The alleging party must prove that there was an
undeniable violation of due process.
 54

Navarro vs. Escobido

G.R. NO. 153788 November 27, 2009
BRION, J.

1. Karen Go is the registered owner of the business name

Kargo Enterprises, as the registered owner of Kargo
Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly
benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this case.
Karen Go is the real party-in-interest, and it is legally
incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause
of action because her name did not appear in the Lease
Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo
Enterprises.

2. Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo

Enterprises and the properties registered under this name;
hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of
these properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners,
namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery
of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party
thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable
parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a
complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without
their participation, since the suit is presumed to have
been filed for the benefit of all co-owners. We hold that
since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in
the action to recover possession of the leased vehicles, he
only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma party to the
suit, based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules.
 55

Divinagracia vs. Parilla

G.R. No. 196750 March 11, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

1. The co-heirs are indispensable parties. They have rights

over the subject land and, as such, should be impleaded
as indispensable parties in an action for partition.

2. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be

affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and
without whom no final determination of the case can be
had. The party’s interest in the subject matter of the suit
and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined
with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party to
the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence,
there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties
before the court which is effective, complete, or
equitable. Thus, the absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void,
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.

3. The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground

for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead
the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
 56

Enrique Vda de Santiago vs. Vilar

G.R. No. 225309 March 06, 2018
TIJAM, J.

1. By definition, an indispensable party is a party-in-interest

without whom no final determination can be had of an
action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants. It is a party whose interest will be affected by
the court's action in the litigation.

2. Rosario is an indispensable party in the petition before

the CA as she is the widow of the original party-plaintiff
Eduardo. The determination of the propriety of the action
of the trial court in merely noting and not granting his
motion would necessarily affect her interest in the
subject matter of litigation as the party-plaintiff.

3. Failure to implead Rosario as an indispensable party

rendered all the proceedings before the CA null and void
for want of authority to act. her failure to participate in
the proceedings before the CA constitutes a denial of her
constitutional right to due process
 57

Pacific Consultants International Asia vs. Schonfeld

G.R. NO. 166920 February 19, 2007
CALLEJO, SR. J.

1. The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue is that

while they are considered valid and enforceable, venue
stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the
general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of
Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words.
They should be considered merely as an agreement or
additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If
the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there
must be accompanying language clearly and
categorically expressing their purpose and design that
actions between them be litigated only at the place
named by them.

2. In the instant case, no restrictive words like "only,"

"solely," "exclusively in this court," "in no other court
save —," "particularly," "nowhere else but/except —," or
words of equal import were stated in the contract.

3. Petitioners’ insistence on the application of the principle

of forum non conveniens must be rejected. The bare fact
that respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a repatriate
does not warrant the application of the principle for the
following reasons:

First. The Labor Code of the Philippines does not include

forum non conveniens as a ground for the dismissal of
the complaint.
 58

Second. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this

principle requires a factual determination; hence, it is
properly considered as defense.

Third. In Bank of America, NT&SA, Bank of America

International, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, this Court held
that: [a] Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over
the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the
following requisites are met:
(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties
may conveniently resort to;
(2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an
intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and,
(3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have
power to enforce its decision.
 59

Biaco vs. Countryside Rural Bank

G.R. No. 161417 February 8, 2007
TINGA, J.

1. An action in personam is an action against a person on

the basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is an
action against the thing itself instead of against the
person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an
individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the
proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the
obligation or lien burdening the property.

2. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of

the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and
decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided
that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is
brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result
of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the
power of the court is recognized and made effective. In a
proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, the only relief that
may be granted by the court against a defendant over
whose person it has not acquired jurisdiction either by
valid service of summons or by voluntary submission to
its jurisdiction, is limited to the res.

3. In this case, while the trial court acquired jurisdiction

over the res, its jurisdiction is limited to a rendition of
judgment on the res. It cannot extend its jurisdiction
 60

beyond the res and issue a judgment enforcing

petitioner’s personal liability. In doing so without first
having acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner,
as it did, the trial court violated her constitutional right to
due process, warranting the annulment of the judgment
rendered in the case.
 61

BPI Savings Bank vs. Sps. Yujuico

G.R. No. 175796 July 22, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.

1. The venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or

a personal action. A real action is one that affects title to
or possession of real property, or an interest therein. The
real action is to be commenced and tried in the proper
court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which
explains why the action is also referred to as a local
action. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other
actions as personal actions.

2. The venue of a personal action is the place where the

plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where
he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, for
which reason the action is considered a transitory one.

3. In civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not

jurisdictional, and may be waived by the defendant if not
seasonably raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court thus
expressly stipulates that defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived.
 62

Planters Dev. Bank vs. Ramos

G.R. No. 228617 September 20, 2017
REYES, JR., J

1. The general rules on venue admit of exceptions in

Section 4 thereof, i.e., where a specific rule or law
provides otherwise, or when the parties agreed in writing
before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue
thereof.

2. Stipulations on venue, however, may either be

permissive or restrictive. "Written stipulations as to
venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be
filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive
in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place
agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law. As in
any other agreement, what is essential is the
ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting
the matter."

3. Because restrictive stipulations are in derogation of this

general policy, the language of the parties must be so
clear and categorical as to leave no doubt of their
intention to limit the place or places, or to fix places
other than those indicated in Rule 4, for their actions. In
view of the predilection to view a stipulation on venue as
merely permissive, the parties must therefore employ
words in the contract that would clearly evince a contrary
intention.

4. Therefore, the employment of the same language in the

subject mortgages signifies the clear intention of the
parties to restrict the venue of any action or suit that may
 63

arise out of the mortgage to a particular place, to the

exclusion of all other jurisdictions.

5. The complaint being one for annulment of real estate

mortgages and promissory notes is in the nature of a
personal action, the venue of which may be fixed by the
parties to the contract. In this case, it was agreed that any
suit or action that may arise from the mortgage contracts
or the promissory notes must be filed and tried in Makati
only. Not being contrary to law or public policy, the
stipulation on venue, which PDB and Spouses Ramos
freely and willingly agreed upon, has the force of law
between them, and thus, should be complied with in
good faith.
 64

A.L. Ang Network Inc. vs. Mondejar

G.R. No. 200804 January 22, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
1. The remedy of appeal is not allowed in the final nature of a
small claims case decision and the prevailing party may, thus,
immediately move for its execution. Nevertheless, the
proscription on appeals in small claims cases does not
preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.

2. In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that

"the extraordinary writ of certiorari is always available where
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.

3. Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively

within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its
dispositions should be filed before their corresponding
Regional Trial Courts.
 65

Alba vs. Malapajo

G.R. No. 198752 January 13, 2016
PERALTA, J.

1. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being

cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of
or is connected with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within
the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the
nature thereof, except that in an original action before the
Regional Trial Court, necessarily connected with the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim or even
where there is such a connection, the Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the claim or it requires for
adjudication the presence of third persons over whom the
court acquire jurisdiction. A compulsory counterclaim is
barred if not set up in the same action.

2. A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or

is not necessarily connected with the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim. It is essentially an
independent claim that may be filed separately in another
case.

3. Since respondents' counterclaim is compulsory, it must

be set up in the same action; otherwise, it would be
barred forever. There is, therefore, no need for
respondents to pay docket fees and to file a certification
 66

against forum shopping for the court to acquire

jurisdiction over the said counterclaim.
Lim Teck Chuan vs. Uy
G.R. No. 155701 March 11, 2015
REYES, J.

1. The dismissal of the complaint does not necessarily

result to the dismissal of the counterclaim. For this
reason, since only the complaint and not the action is
dismissed, the defendant in spite of said dismissal may
still prosecute his counterclaim in the same action.

2. In the instant case, the petitioner’s preference to have his

counterclaim (and cross-claims) be prosecuted in the
same action was timely manifested. The records show
that Serafin and Leopolda furnished the petitioner’s
counsel with a copy of their Joint Motion to Dismiss by
posting it (via registered mail) on September 19, 2001.46
Said motion was filed in court the following day.47 On
October 4, 2001, the petitioner filed his
Opposition/Comment thereto.48 Copies of the said
opposition were personally served upon the opposing
parties on the same date.49 In paragraph 1.550 of said
opposition, the petitioner expressed his preference to
have his counterclaim and cross-claim prosecuted in the
same case.
 67

Metrobank vs. CPR Promotions

G.R. No. 200567, June 22, 2015
VELASCO, JR., J.

1. It is elementary that the burden to prove a claim rests on

the party asserting such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit,
non qui negat. He who asserts, not he who denies, must
prove.

2. For having failed to adequately substantiate its claims,

We cannot sustain the finding of the trial court that
respondents are liable for the claimed deficiency,
inclusive of foreclosure expenses. Neither can We
sustain the CA's finding that respondents are entitled to
the recovery of the alleged excess payment.
 68

Valdez vs. Dabon

A.C. No. 7353 November 16, 2015
PER CURIAM

1. The respondent's denial is a negative pregnant, a denial

coupled with the admission of substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied. Stated otherwise,
a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which
carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some
kind favorable to the adverse party. Where a fact is alleged
with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the
allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it
has been held that the qualifying circumstance alone is denied
while the fact itself is admitted.
2. Atty. Dabon interposed a blanket denial of the romantic
involvement but at the same time, he seemed to have tacitly
admitted the illicit affair only that it was not attended by
sexual assaults, threats and intimidations. The Court also
observed that he devoted considerable effort to demonstrate
that the affair did not amount to gross immoral conduct and
that no sexual abuse, threat or intimidation was exerted upon
the person of Sonia, but not once did he squarely deny the
affair itself. It is clear from Atty. Dabon's Comment that his
denial only pertained as to the existence of a forced illicit
relationship. Without a categorical denial thereof, he is
deemed to have admitted his consensual affair with Sonia.
 69

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 152154 July 15, 2003
CORONA, J.

1. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the

presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue
which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or
patently lacking in substance so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial.

2. If an allegation directly and specifically charges a party

with having done, performed or committed a particular
act which the latter did not in fact do, perform or
commit, a categorical and express denial must be made.
A general, self-serving claim of ignorance of the facts
alleged in the petition for forfeiture was insufficient to
raise an issue.

3. As a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the

admission of the substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in
effect an admission of the averments it was directed at.
Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of
negative expression which carries with it an affirmation
or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the
adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission
of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a
fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and
the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified
are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying
circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is
admitted.
 70

Caneland Sugar Corp. vs. Alon

G.R. NO. 142896 : September 12, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

1. Vague assertions by Petitioner are, in fact, negative

pregnants, i.e., denials pregnant with the admission of the
substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are
not squarely denied. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading.
Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying
language and the words of the allegation as so qualified
or modified are literally denied, has been held that the
qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact
itself is admitted.

2. The petition should be denied for the sole reason that the
act sought to be enjoined by petitioner is already fait
accompli. Injunction would not lie where the acts sought
to be enjoined have already become fait accompli or an
accomplished or consummated act.

3. In Ticzon v. Video Post Manila, Inc. this Court ruled that

where the period within which the former employees
were prohibited from engaging in or working for an
enterprise that competed with their former employer the
very purpose of the preliminary injunction has expired,
any declaration upholding the propriety of the writ would
be entirely useless as there would be no actual case or
controversy between the parties insofar as the
preliminary injunction is concerned.
71
 72

Alma Jose vs. Javellana

G.R. No. 158239 January 25, 2012
BERSAMIN, J.

1. Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against

whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one
forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion
in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil
action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause or
supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens when, in
the two or more pending cases, there is identity of
parties, identity of rights or causes of action, and identity
of reliefs sought. Where the elements of litis pendentia
are present, and where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other, there is forum
shopping.

2. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an

action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least
such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in
the two cases should be such that the judgment which
may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party
is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

3. For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve

the same transaction, same essential facts and
circumstances and must raise identical causes of action,
subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where
different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of
 73

action and issues were raised, and two objectives were

sought.
 Medado vs. Heirs of Antonio Consing
G.R. No. 186720 February 8, 2012
REYES, J.

1. The requirements for verification and certification

against forum shopping in the CA petition were
substantially complied with, following settled
jurisprudence. Where the petitioners are immediate
relatives, who share a common interest in the property
subject of the action, the fact that only one of the
petitioners executed the verification or certification of
forum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding
with the action.

2. The Court has consistently held that verification of a

pleading is a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement
intended to secure the assurance that the matters alleged
in a pleading are true and correct. Thus, the court may
simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act
on them and waive strict compliance with the rules. It is
deemed substantially complied with when one who has
ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations
in the complaint or petition signs the verification; and
when matters alleged in the petition have been made in
good faith or are true and correct.
 74

COA vs. Paler

G.R. No. 172623 March 3, 2010
CORONA, J.

1. Representatives, lawyers or any person who personally

knew the truth of the facts alleged in the petition could sign
the verification. However, as to the certification of non-forum
shopping, the established rule is that it must be executed by
the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel.
Lack of authority, (certification of non-forum shopping)
dismissible.

2. Procedural rules need not be strictly observed if appeal is

meritorious. “It is within the power of this Court to temper
rigid rules in favor of substantial justice. While it is desirable
that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously
observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural
lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of
justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the orderly conduct
of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek
which is the protection of substantive rights of the parties.”
 75

Basan vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils.

G.R. Nos. 174365-66 February 04, 2015
PERALTA, J.

1. While the general rule is that the verification and

certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by
all the petitioners in a case, the signature of only one of
them, appearing thereon may be deemed substantial
compliance with the procedural requirement.

2. The rule on verification is deemed substantially complied

with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the
truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs
the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition
have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

3. This Court has consistently held that when under

reasonable or justifiable circumstances, as when all the
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense, as in this case, the
signature of only one of them in the certification against
forum shopping substantially complies with the
certification requirement.

4. The fact that the petition was signed only by petitioner

Basan does not necessarily result in its outright dismissal
for it is more in accord with substantial justice to
overlook petitioners’ procedural lapses.

5. The application of technical rules of procedure may be

relaxed in labor cases to serve the demand of justice.
 76

Uy vs. CA
G.R. No. 173186, September 16, 2015
JARDELEZA, J.

1. A certification against forum shopping must be executed

by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for
reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is
unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) designating his counsel of record to sign
on his behalf.

2. A certification against forum shopping is a peculiar and

personal responsibility of the party, an assurance given to
the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending
cases involving basically the same parties, isssues, and
causes of action.

3. While the SC said that, strictly, a certification against

forum shopping by counsel is a defective certification,
the verification, signed by petitioner’s counsel is
substantial compliance because it served the purpose of
the Rules of informing the Court of the pendency of
another action or proceeding involving the same issues.
 77

People vs. Arojado

G.R. No. 207041 November 09, 2015
Peralta, J.

1. An information is a pleading since the allegations

therein, which charge a person with an offense, is
basically the same as a complaint in a civil action which
alleges a plaintiffs cause or cause of action.

2. An information is, for all intents and purposes,

considered an initiatory pleading because it is a written
statement that contains the cause of action of a party,
which in criminal cases is the State as represented by the
prosecutor, against the accused. Like a pleading, the
Information is also filed in court for appropriate
judgment. Undoubtedly then, an Information falls
squarely within the ambit of Bar Matter No. 1922, in
relation to Bar Matter 850.

3. Failure of the investigating prosecutor to indicate in the

subject Information the number and date of issue of her
MCLE Certificate of Compliance is a valid ground to
dismiss such Information. Suffice it to state that B.M.
No. 1922 categorically provides that “failure to disclose
the required information would cause the dismissal of the
case and the expunction of the pleadings from the
records.”
 78

Powerhouse vs. Rey

G.R. No. 190203 November 07, 2016
JARDELEZA, J.

1. In previous cases, we held that the following officials or

employees of the company can sign the verification and
certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the
Chairperson of the Board of Directors; (2) the President
of a corporation; (3) the General Manager or Acting
General Manager; (4) Personnel Officer; and (5) an
Employment Specialist in a labor case. The rationale
applied in these cases is to justify the authority of
corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to
sign the verification or certificate against forum
shopping, being "in a position to verify the truthfulness
and correctness of the allegations in the petition."

2. In this case, the verification and certification attached to

the petition before the CA was signed by William C. Go,
the President and General Manager of Powerhouse, one
of the officers enumerated in the foregoing recognized
exception. While the petition was not accompanied by a
Secretary's Certificate, his authority was ratified by the
Board in its Resolution adopted on October 24, 2007.
Thus, even if he was not authorized to execute the
Verification and Certification at the time of the filing of
the Petition, the ratification by the board of directors
retroactively confirms and affirms his authority and gives
us more reason to uphold that authority.
 79

Heirs of Josefina Gabriel vs. Segundina Cebrero

G.R. No. 222737, November 12, 2018
PERALTA, J.

1. When an SPA was constituted precisely to authorize the

agent to file and prosecute suits on behalf of the
principal, then it is such agent who has actual and
personal knowledge whether he or she has initiated
similar actions or proceedings before various courts on
the same issue on the principal's behalf, thus, satisfying
the requirements for a valid certification against forum
shopping.

2. However, there was no duly executed SPA appended to

the complaint to prove Caniza's supposed authority to file
and prosecute suits on behalf of Gabriel. The Court
cannot consider the mere mention in the December 15,
1993 Decision that he was Gabriel's attorney-in-fact as
evidence that he was indeed authorized and empowered
to initiate the instant action against respondents. There
was also no evidence of substantial compliance with the
rules or even an attempt to submit an SPA after filing of
the complaint.

3. Caniza's subsequent substitution as one of Gabriel's

heirs did not cure the defect in the complaint, i.e., when
he signed the verification and certification against forum
shopping without apparent authority. To reiterate, the
trial court acquires jurisdiction over the plaintiff upon the
filing of the complaint. Besides, the substitution merely
ensured that Gabriel's interest would be properly
 80

represented and that her heirs were brought to

jurisdiction of the court.
 81

Fernando Medical Enterprises vs. Wesleyan University

G.R. No. 207970 January 20, 2016
BERSAMIN, J.

1. The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings

upon motion of the claiming party when the defending
party's answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading. For that purpose, only the pleadings of the
parties in the action are considered. It is error for the trial
court to deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings
because the defending party's pleading in another case
supposedly tendered an issue of fact.

2. The CA erred in going outside of the respondent's answer

by relying on the allegations contained in the latter's
complaint for rescission. In order to resolve the
petitioner's Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings,
the trial court could rely only on the answer of the
respondent filed in Civil Case No. 09-122116. The CA
thus wrongly held that a factual issue on the total liability
of the respondent remained to be settled through trial on
the merits.

3. Under Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, the

answer was the sole basis for ascertaining whether the
complaint's material allegations were admitted or
properly denied.
 82

Go Tong Electrical supply vs. BPI Family Savings Bank

G.R. No. 187487 June 29, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

1. When an action or defense is founded upon a written

instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding
pleading as provided in the preceding Section, the
genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath,
specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to
be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not
apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a
party to the instrument or when compliance with an order
for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.

2. The defendant must declare under oath that he did not

sign the document or that it is otherwise false or
fabricated

3. The admission of the genuineness and due execution of a

document means that the party whose signature it bears
admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was
signed by another for him and with his authority; that at
the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly
as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that
the document was delivered; and that any formalities
required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or
revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Also,
it effectively eliminated any defense relating to the
authenticity and due execution of the document.
83
 84

Asian Const. & Dev. Corp. vs. CA

G.R. NO. 160242 May 17, 2005
CALLEJA, SR., J.

1. There must be a causal connection between the claim of

the plaintiff in his complaint and a claim for contribution,
indemnity or other relief of the defendant against the
third-party defendant.
2. There is no showing in the proposed third-party
complaint that the respondent knew or approved the use
of the leased equipment by the petitioner for the said
project in Quezon. The barefaced fact that the petitioner
used the equipment it leased from the respondent in
connection with its project with BOC does not provide a
substantive basis for the filing of a third-party complaint
against the latter. There is no causal connection between
the claim of the respondent for the rental and the balance
of the purchase price of the equipment and parts sold and
leased to the petitioner, and the failure of BOC to pay the
balance of its account to the petitioner after the
completion of the project in Quezon.

3. The controversy between the respondent and the

petitioner, on one hand, and that between the petitioner
and BOC, on the other, are thus entirely distinct from
each other. Hence, the denial of the third-party complaint
by the courts were proper.
 85

Benguet Exploration Inc. vs. CA

G.R. No. 117434. February 9, 2001
MENDOZA, J.

1. Authenticity and due execution constitutes only 4 things:

(1) that the document was signed; (2) that the document
complied with all the formalities under the laws; (3) that
when the document was signed, it was in the original
form without any alteration; and (4) that the document
was delivered.
2. The admission of the due execution and genuineness of a
document simply means that “the party whose signature
it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by
another for him with his authority; that at the time it was
signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in
the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the
document was delivered; and that any formal requisites
required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or
revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.”
Genuineness and due execution of the instrument means
nothing more than that the instrument is not spurious,
counterfeit, or of different import on its face from the
one executed.

3. It is equally true, however, that execution can only refer

to the actual making and delivery, but it cannot involve
other matters without enlarging its meaning beyond
reason. The only object of the rule was to enable a
plaintiff to make out a prima facie, not a conclusive case,
and it cannot preclude a defendant from introducing any
 86

defense on the merits which does not contradict the

execution of the instrument introduced in evidence.
BDO vs. Tansipek
G.R. No. 181235 July 22, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

1. It is important to note that a party declared in default is

not barred from appealing from the judgment on the
main case, whether or not he had previously filed a
Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, and regardless of
the result of the latter and the appeals therefrom.
However, the appeal should be based on the Decision’s
being contrary to law or the evidence already presented,
and not on the alleged invalidity of the default order.

2. A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from an

ordinary motion in that the Motion should be verified;
and must show fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect, and meritorious defenses. The allegations of (1)
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and (2) of
meritorious defenses must concur.
 87

Salvador vs. Rabaja

G.R. No. 199990, February 04, 2015
MENDOZA, J.

1. The failure to attend the pre-trial conference does not

result in the default of an absent party. Under the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant is only declared in
default if he fails to file his Answer within the
reglementary period. On the other hand, if a defendant
fails to attend the pre-trial conference, the plaintiff can
present his evidence ex parte.

2. The failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has indeed

adverse consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff,
then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant
who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to
present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render
judgment based on the evidence presented. Thus, the
plaintiff is given the privilege to present his evidence
without objection from the defendant, the likelihood
being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff,
the defendant having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or
present its own evidence.

3. The stringent application of the rules on pre-trial is

necessitated from the significant role of the pre-trial
stage in the litigation process. Pre-trial is an answer to
the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases.
 88

Bitte vs. Jonas

GR No. 212256 December 09, 2015
MENDOZA, J.

1. The rule is that "right to appeal from the judgment by

default is not lost and can be done on grounds that the
amount of the judgment is excessive or is different in
kind from that prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to
prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that
the decision is contrary to law."

2. If a party who has been declared in default has in his

arsenal the remedy of appeal from the judgment of
default on the basis of the decision having been issued
against the evidence or the law, that person cannot be
denied the remedy and opportunity to assail the judgment
in the appellate court. Despite being burdened by the
circumstances of default, the petitioners may still use all
other remedies available to question not only the
judgment of default but also the judgment on appeal
before this Court. Those remedies necessarily include an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
 89

Yujuico vs. United Resources Asset Mgt. Corp.

G.R. No. 211113 June 29, 2015
PEREZ, J.

1. Judicial policy of affording liberal treatment to

amendments to pleadings, especially those made
before the conduct of trial. We should always
remember that our rules of procedure are mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.

2. The amended answer aims to correct certain

allegations of fact in the original answer which,
needless to state, are crucial to a full and proper
disposition of the case. It is, therefore, in the best
interest of justice and equity that URAMI should be
allowed to file the amended answer.
 90

Lisam Enterprises vs. Banco De Oro

G.R. No. 143264 April 23, 2012
PERALTA, J.

1. A responsive pleading having been filed, amendments to

the complaint may, therefore, be made only by leave of
court and no longer as a matter of right.

2. The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a

matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only
to the limitations that the amendments should not
substantially change the cause of action or alter the
theory of the case, or that it was not made to delay the
action.

3. Nevertheless, even if the amendment substantially alters

the cause of action or defense, such amendment could
still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher
interest of substantial justice, prevent delay, and secure a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and
proceedings.

4. The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to

pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of suits and in order that
the real controversies between the parties are presented,
their rights determined, and the case decided on the
merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is
greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this
case where the amendment was made before the trial of
the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time
allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.
 91

5. Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally

favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of
justice in order that every case, may so far as possible, be
determined on its real facts and in order to speed up the
trial of the case or prevent the circuitry of action and
unnecessary expense. That is, unless there are
circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of
the adverse party by surprise or the like, which might
justify a refusal of permission to amend.
 92

Tiu vs. Phil. Bank of Communications

G.R. NO. 151932 August 19, 2009
PERALTA, J.

1. The pertinent rule on actionable documents is found in

Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which provides
that when the cause of action is anchored on a document,
its substance must be set forth, and the original or a copy
thereof "shall" be attached to the pleading as an exhibit
and deemed a part thereof.

2. The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a

matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only
to the limitations that the amendments should not
substantially change the cause of action or alter the
theory of the case, or that it was not made to delay the
action.

3. Nevertheless, even if the amendment substantially alters

the cause of action or defense, such amendment could
still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher
interest of substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and
proceedings.

4. The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to

pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of suits and in order that
the real controversies between the parties are presented,
their rights determined, and the case decided on the
merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is
greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this
case where the amendment was made before the trial of
 93

the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time

allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.
5. Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally
favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of
justice in order that every case, may so far as possible, be
determined on its real facts and in order to speed up the
trial of the case or prevent the circuity of action and
unnecessary expense. That is, unless there are
circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of
the adverse party by surprise or the like, which might
justify a refusal of permission to amend.
 94

Remington Industrial Sales Corp. vs. CA

G.R. No. 133657 May 29, 2002
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

1. Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court

explicitly states that a pleading may be amended as a
matter of right before a responsive pleading is served.
This only means that prior to the filing of an answer,
the plaintiff has the absolute right to amend the
complaint whether a new cause of action or change in
theory is introduced.

2. Substantial amendment of the complaint is not allowed

without leave of court after an answer has been served,
because any material change in the allegations
contained in the complaint could prejudice the rights
of the defendant who has already set up his defense in
the answer. In such an event, the defendant has not
presented any defense that can be altered or affected
by the amendment of the complaint in accordance with
Section 2 of Rule 10. Considerable leeway is thus
given to the plaintiff to amend his complaint once, as a
matter of right, prior to the filing of an answer by the
defendant.

3. The right granted to the plaintiff under procedural law

to amend the complaint before an answer has been
served is not precluded by the filing of a motion to
dismiss or any other proceeding contesting its
sufficiency.

4. Moreover, amendment of pleadings is favored and

should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of
 95

justice in order to determine every case as far as

possible on its merits without regard to technicalities.

5. The fact that the other defendants below has filed

their answers to the complaint does not bar petitioner’s
right to amend the complaint as against respondent.
Indeed, where some but not all the defendants have
answered, the plaintiff may still amend its complaint
once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted
solely against the non-answering defendant, but not as
to claims asserted against the other defendants.
 96

Palileo vs. Planters Dev. Bank

G.R. No. 193650 October 8, 2014
DEL CASTILLO, J.

1. Service and filing of pleadings by courier service is a

mode not provided in the Rules. Indeed, its filing or
service of a copy thereof to petitioners by courier service
cannot be trivialized.
 97

Heirs of Numeriano Miranda vs. Miranda

G.R. No. 179638 July 8, 2013
DEL CASTILLO, J.

1. Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, pleadings

may be filed in court either personally or by registered mail.
In the first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt. In the
second case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt.

2. It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be

filed “within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or
final order appealed from.

3. In this case, however, the counsel for petitioners filed the

Notice of Appeal via a private courier, a mode of filing not
provided in the Rules. Though not prohibited by the Rules, we
cannot consider the filing of petitioners’ Notice of Appeal via
LBC timely filed.

4. It is established jurisprudence that “the date of delivery of

pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be
considered as the date of filing thereof in court;” instead, “the
date of actual receipt by the court x x x is deemed the date of
filing of that pleading.” Records show that the Notice of
Appeal was mailed on the 15th day and was received by the
court on the 16th day or one day beyond the reglementary
period. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the Notice of Appeal
was filed out of time.
 98

Valmonte vs CA
G.R. No. 108538 January 22, 1996
MENDOZA, J.

1. The action herein is in the nature of an action quasi in

rem. Such an action is essentially for the purpose of
affecting the defendant’s interest in a specific property
and not to render a judgment against him. As petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found
in the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in
accordance with Rule 14, Sec. 17. Such service, to be
effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1)
by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in such places and for such time as
the court may order, in which case a copy of the
summons and order of the court should be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the
defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court
may deem sufficient.

2. The service in the attempted manner on petitioner was

not made upon prior leave of the trial court as required
also in Rule 14, Sec. 17. As provided in Sec. 19, such
leave must be applied for by motion in writing,
supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on
his behalf and setting forth the grounds for the
application. And, because there was no order granting
such leave, petitioner Lourdes was not given ample time
to file her Answer which, according to the rules, shall be
not less than sixty (60) days after notice.
 99

Millenium Ind. & Com. Corp., vs Tan

G.R. No. 131724 February 28, 2000
MENDOZA, J.

1. Petitioner contends that the enumeration in Rule 14, Sec.

13 is exclusive and that service of summons upon one
who is not enumerated therein is invalid. This is the
general rule.

2. However, it is settled that substantial compliance by

serving summons on persons other than those mentioned
in the above rule may be justified. This Court
enumerated the requisites for the application of the
doctrine of substantial compliance, to wit:

(a) there must be actual receipt of the summons by

the person served, i.e., transferring possession of the
copy of the summons from the Sheriff to the person
served;
(b) the person served must sign a receipt or the
sheriff’s return; and
(c) there must be actual receipt of the summons by
the corporation through the person on whom the
summons was actually served.

3. The third requisite is the most important for it is through

such receipt that the purpose of the rule on service of
summons is attained. For there to be substantial
compliance, actual receipt of summons by the
corporation through the person served must be shown.
 100

E.B. Villarosa vs. Benito

G.R. No. 136426 August 6, 1999
GONZAGA-REYES, J.

1. A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary

to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The
officer upon whom service is made must be one who is
named in the statute; otherwise the service is insufficient.
The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the
corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an
action against it or to insure that the summons be served
on a representative so integrated with the corporation that
such person will know what to do with the legal papers
served on him.

2. The service of summons upon the branch manager of

petitioner at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead
of upon the general manager at its principal office at
Davao City is improper. Consequently, the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

3. The fact that defendant filed a belated motion to dismiss

did not operate to confer jurisdiction upon its person.
There is no question that the defendant’s voluntary
appearance in the action is equivalent to service of
summons. Section 20 now provides that “the inclusion in
a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance.” The emplacement of
this rule clearly underscores the purpose to enforce strict
enforcement of the rules on summons.
 101

Santos vs. PNOC Exploration

G.R. No. 170943 September 23, 2008
CORONA, J.

1. Service of summons by publication is proved by the

affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or
of the editor, business or advertising manager of the
newspaper which published the summons. The service of
summons by publication is complemented by service of
summons by registered mail to the defendant’s last
known address. This complementary service is
evidenced by an affidavit "showing the deposit of a copy
of the summons and order for publication in the post
office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by
registered mail to his last known address." The rules,
however, do not require that the affidavit of
complementary service be executed by the clerk of
court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of
copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make the
complementary service by registered mail is imposed on
the party who resorts to service by publication.

2. Even assuming that the service of summons was

defective, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner by his own voluntary appearance in
the action against him.
 102

Mason vs. CA
G.R. No. 144662 October 13, 2003
QUISIMBING, J.

1. The designation of persons or officers who are

authorized to accept summons for a domestic
corporation or partnership is now limited and more
clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states "general
manager" instead... of only "manager"; "corporate
secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer"
instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or any of its
directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.

2. Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to

present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial
matter in any administrative or judicial proceedings.
The service of summons is a vital and indispensable
ingredient of due process.
 103

Jose vs. Boyon

G.R. No. 147369 October 23, 2003
PANGANIBAN, J.

1. In general, courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of

the defendant by the service of summons. Where the
action is in personam and the defendant is in the
Philippines, such service may be done by personal or
substituted service.

2. Personal service of summons is preferred to substituted

service. Only if the former cannot be made promptly can
the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the
proof of service of summons must (a) indicate the
impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable
time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the
defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served
upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is
residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office
or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is
likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these
circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the
officer’s return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly
and fully with all the foregoing requirements of
substituted service renders the service of summons
ineffective.

3. The extraterritorial service of summons or summons by

publication applies only when the action is in rem or
quasi in rem. That is, the action against the thing itself
instead of against the defendant’s person if the action is
in rem or an individual is named as defendant and the
purpose is to subject the individual’s interest in a piece of
 104

property to the obligation or loan burdening it if quasi in

rem.
Manotoc vs. CA
G.R. No. 130974 August 16, 2006
VELASCO, JR., J.

1. Requirements for Substituted Service, Section 8 of Rule

14 of the old Revised Rules of Court which applies to
this case can be broken down to the following
requirements: (1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal
Service; (2) Specific Details in the Return; (3) A Person
of Suitable Age and Discretion; (4) A Competent Person
in Charge.

2. Before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff must

demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate the
defendant through more direct means. Respondent
Trajano failed to demonstrate that there was strict
compliance with the requirements of the then Section 8,
Rule 14 (now Section 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure), the proceedings held before the trial
court perforce must be annulled.

3. There is no clear valid reason cited in the Return why

those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion
that personal service has become impossible or
unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of
“on many occasions several attempts were made to serve
the summons . . . personally,” “at reasonable hours
 105

during the day,” and “to no avail for the reason that the
said defendant is usually out of her place and/or
residence or premises.”
Ong vs. Co
G.R. No. 206653 February 25, 2015
MENDOZA, J.

1. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a

valid service of summons or the defendant's voluntary
appearance in court. If the defendant does not voluntarily
appear in court, jurisdiction can be acquired by personal
or substituted service of summons as laid out under
Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

2. The stricter rule in substituted service of summons was

meant to address "the numerous claims of irregularities
in substituted service which have spawned the filing of a
great number of unnecessary special civil actions of
certiorari and appeals to higher courts, resulting in
prolonged litigation and wasteful legal expenses."
 106

Domagas vs. Jensen

G.R. No. 158407 January 17, 2005
CALLEJA, SR., J.

1. Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in

order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. The statutory requirement of
substituted service must be followed faithfully and
strictly and any substituted service other than that
authorized by the statute is rendered ineffective.

2. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the

service of summons must be stated in the proof of service
or Officer’s Return; otherwise, any substituted service
made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This is
necessary because substituted service is in derogation of
the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary
in character and hence may be used only as prescribed
and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Failure to
faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the
requirements of substituted service renders said service
ineffective.
 107

Dole Phil. vs. Quilala

G.R. NO. 168723 July 9, 2008
QUISIMBING, J.

1. Service of summons on a domestic corporation is

restricted, limited and exclusive to the persons
enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, following the rule in statutory
construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius.
Service must therefore be made on the president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate
secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

2. There was no evidence that she was authorized to

receive court processes in behalf of the president.
Considering that the service of summons was made on
a legal assistant, not employed by herein petitioner and
who is not one of the designated persons under Section
11, Rule 14, the trial court did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over petitioner.

3. However, under Section 20 of the same Rule, a

defendant's voluntary appearance in the action is
equivalent to service of summons. As held previously
by this Court, the filing of motions seeking affirmative
relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to
file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment,
and to lift order of default with motion for
reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission
to the jurisdiction of the court.
 108

4. Consequently, petitioner having acknowledged the

receipt of the summons and also having invoked the
jurisdiction of the RTC to secure affirmative relief in
its motion for additional time, petitioner effectively
submitted voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the RTC. It
is estopped now from asserting otherwise, even before
this Court.
 109

Green Star Express v. Nissin Universal Robina Corp

G.R. No. 181517 July 06, 2015
PERALTA, J.

1. The rule now likewise states “general manager” instead

of “manager”; “corporate secretary” instead of merely
“secretary”; and “treasurer” instead of “cashier.” It has
now become restricted, limited, and exclusive only to the
persons enumerated in the aforementioned provision,
following the rule in statutory construction that the
express mention of one person excludes all others, or
expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Service must,
therefore, be made only on the persons expressly listed in
the rules.

2. It is a well-established rule that the rules on service of

summons upon a domestic private juridical entity must
be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be
said to have acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant.

3. Notably, under the new Rules, service of summons upon

an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized. It has
now become restricted, limited, and exclusive only to the
persons enumerated in the aforementioned provision.
 110

Guy vs. Gacott

G.R. No. 206147, January 13, 2016
MENDOZA, J.

1. Under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules

of Civil Procedure, when the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized
under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical
personality, the service of summons may be made on
the president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
Such provision provides an exclusive enumeration of
the persons authorized to receive summons for
juridical entities.

2. Service of summons upon persons other than those

officers enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. Even
substantial compliance is not sufficient service of
summons. The CA was obviously mistaken when it
opined that it was immaterial whether the summons to
QSC was served on the theory that it was a
corporation.

3. Nevertheless, while proper service of summons is

necessary to vest the court jurisdiction over the
defendant, the same is merely procedural in nature and
the lack of or defect in the service of summons may be
cured by the defendant's subsequent voluntary
submission to the court's jurisdiction through his filing
a responsive pleading such as an answer. In this case,
 111

it is not disputed that QSC filed its Answer despite the

defective summons. Thus, jurisdiction over its person
was acquired through voluntary appearance.
G. V. Florida Transit Inc. vs. Tiara Commercial
Corporation
G.R. No. 201378 October 18, 2017
JARDELEZA, J.

1. In cases of improper service of summons, courts should

not automatically dismiss the complaint by reason of lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The
remedy is to issue alias summons and ensure that it is
properly served.

2. Service of summons is the main mode through which a

court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant in a civil case. Through it, the defendant is
informed of the action against him or her and he or she is
able to adequately prepare his or her course of action.
Rules governing the proper service of summons are not
mere matters of procedure. They go into a defendant's
right to due process. Thus, strict compliance with the
rules on service of summons is mandatory.

3. There is voluntary appearance when a party, without

directly assailing the court's lack of jurisdiction, seeks
affirmative relief from the court. When a party appears
before the court without qualification, he or she is
deemed to have waived his or her objection regarding
 112

lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of summons.

When a defendant, however, appears before the court for
the specific purpose of questioning the court's
jurisdiction over him or her, this is a special appearance
and does not vest the court with jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. Section 20 of Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court provides that so long as a defendant raises
the issue of lack of jurisdiction, he or she is allowed to
include other grounds of objection. In such case, there is
no voluntary appearance.

4. Still, improper service of summons and lack of voluntary

appearance do not automatically warrant the dismissal of
the complaint. Thus, when there is improper service of
summons and the defendant makes a special appearance
to question this, the proper and speedy remedy is for the
court to issue alias summons.
 113

Sunrise Garden Corp. vs. CA

G.R. No. 158836, September 30, 2015
LEONEN, J.

1. While Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court provides

that voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of
summons, the same rule also provides that "the inclusion
in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not
be deemed a voluntary appearance."

2. Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:

(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the

general rule on voluntary appearance;

(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the

court over the person of the defendant must be
explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal
manner; and

(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to

the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances
where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative
relief is filed and submitted to the court for
resolution.
 114

Tujan-Militante vs. Nustad

G.R. No. 209518 June 19, 2017
TIJAM, J.

1. A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the

defendant by service of summons. However, it is equally
significant that even without valid service of summons, a
court may still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears before it.

2. By seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, the

individual petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. A party cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court to secure the
affirmative relief against his opponent and after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction.

3. In this case, while Tujan-Militante's motion to dismiss

challenged the jurisdiction of the court a quo on the
ground of improper service of summons, the subsequent
filing of a Motion for Reconsideration which sought for
affirmative reliefs is tantamount to voluntary appearance
and submission to the authority of such court. Such
affirmative relief is inconsistent with the position that no
voluntary appearance had been made, and to ask for such
relief, without the proper objection, necessitates
submission to the court's jurisdiction.
 115

Republic vs. Dimarucut

G.R. No. 202069 March 07, 2018
CAGUIOA, J.

1. Strict compliance with Rule 15 should have been waived

in the interest of substantial justice. Accordingly, the
"strict and rigid application, of procedural rules which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed."

2. Every written motion which cannot be acted upon

without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party must
be set for hearing; The adverse party must be given:

(a) a copy of such written motion, and

(b) notice of the corresponding hearing date;

The copy of the written motion and the notice of hearing

must be furnished to the adverse party at least three (3)
days before the hearing date, unless otherwise ordered by
the RTC (3-day notice rule); and No written motion that
is required to be heard shall be acted upon by the
receiving court without proof of service done in the
manner prescribed in the rules.

3. The 3-day notice rule was established not for the benefit
of movant but for the adverse party, in order to avoid
surprises and grant the latter sufficient time to study the
 116

motion and enable it to meet the arguments interposed

therein. The duty to ensure receipt by the adverse party at
least three days before the proposed hearing date
necessarily falls on the movant.
 117

Acampado vs. Cosmilla

G.R. No. 198531 September 28, 2015
PEREZ, J.

1. The Motion for Reconsideration is a contentious motion

that needs to comply with the required notice and hearing
and service to the adverse party as mandated by the
provisions of the Revised Rules of Court

2. A motion that does not comply with the requirements of

Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a
worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no
right to receive and which the court has no authority to
act upon.

3. The notice of hearing to the adverse party is therefore a

form of due process; it gives the other party the
opportunity to properly vent his opposition to the prayer
of the movant. In keeping with the principles of due
process, therefore, a motion which does not afford the
adverse party a chance to oppose should simply be
disregarded. Principles of natural justice demand that a
right of a party should not be affected without giving it
an opportunity to be heard.

4. Nevertheless, the three-day requirement is not a hard and

fast rule. Where a party has been given an opportunity to
be heard, the time to study the motion and oppose it,
there is compliance with the rule.
 118

Laude vs. Gines-Jabalde

G.R. No. 217456 November 24, 2015
LEONEN, J.

1. Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it

a mandatory rule that the adverse party be given notice of
hearing on the motion at least three days prior. Failure to
comply with this notice requirement renders the motion
defective consistent with protecting the adverse party’s
right to procedural due process.

2. While the general rule is that a motion that fails to

comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap
of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may
still be acted upon by the court, provided doing so will
neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his
or her due process rights. The adverse party must be
given time to study the motion in order to enable him or
her to prepare properly and engage the arguments of the
movant. In this case, the general rule must apply because
Pemberton was not given sufficient time to study
petitioners’ Motion, thereby depriving him of his right to
procedural due process.
 119

De Guzman vs. Ochoa

G.R. No. 169292 April 13, 2011
MENDOZA, J.

1. An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory

order which neither terminates the case nor finally
disposes of it, as it leaves something to be done by the
court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As
such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to
dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for
certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.

2. Therefore, an order denying a motion to dismiss may

only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an
appeal from the judgment after trial. Only in exceptional
cases where the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion that the Court allows the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari.

3. A motion to dismiss is an omnibus motion because it

attacks a pleading, that is, the complaint. For this reason,
a motion to dismiss, like any other omnibus motion, must
raise and include all objections available at the time of
the filing of the motion because under Section 8, "all
objections not so included shall be deemed waived."
 120

Blay vs. Bana

G.R. No. 232189 March 7, 2018
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

1. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by the defendant prior

to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for the
dismissal - as in this case - the rule is that the dismissal
shall be limited to the complaint.

2. Instead of an ‘action’ shall not be dismissed, the present

rule uses the term ‘complaint’. A dismissal of an action
is different from a mere dismissal of the complaint. For
this reason, since only the complaint and not the action is
dismissed, the defendant inspite of said dismissal may
still prosecute his counterclaim in the same acton."

3. If the defendant desires to prosecute his counterclaim in

the same action, he is required to file a manifestation
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion.
Otherwise, his counterclaim may be prosecuted in a
separate action.

4. The passing of the fifteen (15)-day period triggers the

finality of the court's dismissal of the complaint and
hence, bars the conduct of further proceedings. Thus, in
order to obviate this finality, the defendant is required to
file the required manifestation within the aforesaid
period; otherwise, the counterclaim may be prosecuted
only in a separate action.
 121

Lim Teck Chuan vs Uy

G.R. No. 155701 March 11, 2015
REYES, J.

1. The dismissal of the complaint does not necessarily

result to the dismissal of the counterclaim. For this
reason, since only the complaint and not the action is
dismissed, the defendant in spite of said dismissal may
still prosecute his counterclaim in the same action.

2. In the instant case, the petitioner’s preference to have his

counterclaim (and cross-claims) be prosecuted in the
same action was timely manifested. The records show
that Serafin and Leopolda furnished the petitioner’s
counsel with a copy of their Joint Motion to Dismiss by
posting it (via registered mail) on September 19, 2001.
Said motion was filed in court the following day.47 On
October 4, 2001, the petitioner filed his
Opposition/Comment thereto. Copies of the said
opposition were personally served upon the opposing
parties on the same date. In paragraph 1.5 of said
opposition, the petitioner expressed his preference to
have his counterclaim and cross-claim prosecuted in the
same case.
 122

Ching vs. Cheng

G.R. No. 175507               October 8, 2014
LEONEN, J.

1. Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of the

plaintiff, not of the defendant. Dismissals upon the
instance of the defendant are generally governed by Rule
16, which covers motions to dismiss.

2. As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17

are without prejudice except when it is the second time
that the plaintiff caused its dismissal. Accordingly, for a
dismissal to operate as an adjudication upon the merits,
i.e, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim, the
following requisites must be present:

(1) There was a previous case that was dismissed by a

competent court;

(2) Both cases were based on or include the same claim;

(3) Both notices for dismissal werefiled by the plaintiff;

and

(4) When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was

consented to by the defendant on the ground that the
latter paid and satisfied all the claims of the former.

3. The purpose of the "two-dismissal rule" is "to avoid

vexatious litigation." When a complaint is dismissed a
second time, the plaintiff is now barred from seeking
relief on the same claim.
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Office of the Ombudsman vs. Sison

G.R. No. 185954 February 16, 2010
VELASCO JR., J.

1. It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a

Motion to Intervene is addressed to the sound discretion
of the court. The permissive tenor of the rules shows the
intention to give to the court the full measure of
discretion in permitting or disallowing the intervention.

2. Intervention is a procedure by which third persons, not

originally parties to the suit but claiming an interest in
the subject matter, come into the case in order to protect
their right or interpose their claim. Its main purpose is to
settle in one action and by a single judgment all
conflicting claims of, or the whole controversy among,
the persons involved.

3. To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of

Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (2)
intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the
claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly
decided in a separate proceeding. The interest, which
entitles one to intervene, must involve the matter in
litigation and of such direct and immediate character that
the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal
operation and effect of the judgment.

4. The Rules provides explicitly that a motion to intervene

may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by
the trial court.
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Ombudsman vs. Chavez

G.R. No. 172206 July 3, 2013
PERALTA, J.

1. In asserting that it was a "competent disciplining body,"

the Office of the Ombudsman correctly summed up its
legal interest in the matter in controversy. In support of
its claim, it invoked its role as a constitutionally
mandated "protector of the people," a disciplinary
authority vested with quasi-judicial function to resolve
administrative disciplinary cases against public officials.
Moreover, the Office of the Ombudsman had a clear
legal interest in the inquiry into whether respondent
committed acts constituting grave misconduct, an offense
punishable under the Uniform Rules in Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service. It was in keeping with its duty
to act as a champion of the people and preserve the
integrity of public service that petitioner had to be given
the opportunity to act fully within the parameters of its
authority.

2. It is true that under our rule on intervention, the

allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is left
to the sound discretion of the court after a consideration
of the appropriate circumstances. One of the limits in the
exercise of such discretion is that it must not be exercised
in disregard of law and the Constitution.
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Anonuevo vs. Intestate Estate of Jalandoni

G.R. No. 178221 December 1, 2010
PEREZ, J.

1. A court’s power to allow or deny intervention, albeit

discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the basic
demand of sound judicial procedure that only a person
with interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed
to intervene. Otherwise stated, a court has no authority to
allow a person, who has no interest in an action or
proceeding, to intervene therein.

2. Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and

allows an uninterested person to intervene in a case—the
mistake is not simply an error of judgment, but one of
jurisdiction. In such event, the allowance is made in
excess of the court’s jurisdiction and can only be the
product of an exercise of discretion gravely abused. That
kind of error may be reviewed in a special civil action for
certiorari.
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