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Vocabulary
• Dabble
• Secede
• Batter
• Buttress
• Bluster
• Allay
 Fire to fuel
India must brace for the impact of oil supply cuts after the drone attacks in Saudi Arabia
• The immediate impact of last week’s drone attacks on the Saudi Aramco-owned Khurais oilfield and Abqaiq oil
processing facility has been the suspension of more than half of Saudi Arabia’s daily crude oil output, thereby affecting
contribution to global supply. While the Saudis have restored a portion of the supply that was hit, the sudden disruption
resulted in the highest spike (nearly 20%) in Brent crude prices in more than a decade before the U.S. President’s
statement that America would release some of its strategic reserves resulted in the price easing back to $66 per barrel
(a 10% increase over the day). While the Houthi militia fighting Yemen’s Saudi Arabia-backed government in a four-
year-long civil war claimed responsibility for the attacks, the U.S. has suggested that Iran was responsible for them.
After a belligerent statement that the U.S. was “locked and loaded” to respond to this alleged provocation from Iran, Mr.
Trump suggested that he was still trying to draw the Iranians to make a deal over their nuclear programme. Iran’s
response has been to dismiss the allegations accompanied by a refusal to talk on the U.S.’s terms. Yet, for all his bluster
and erratic policy decisions, Mr. Trump has sought to avoid conflict or to engage in new military adventures — an
opening Iran must seize and work toward de-escalation through diplomacy. Meanwhile, the Saudis must halt their
Yemen intervention and leave it to the UN to broker peace in a battered country. The Saudi-led military campaign,
buttressed with logistics support from the U.S. and the U.K., has only brought a stalemate in Yemen, while escalating
the conflict to include energy supply targets that the world had imagined to be secure.
• The sudden disruption of global crude oil supply is the unintended consequence of the unravelling of the painstakingly
crafted P5+1+EU-Iran nuclear deal, the Saudis’ reckless adventure in Yemen and the Iranian empowerment of its
proxies in West Asia as a response. This development is bound to affect several emerging economies, including India’s.
The Union Petroleum Ministry has sought to allay fears of a supply cut by relaying messages of assurance from Aramco
officials, but there is already an indication that crude prices would rise further due to an increase in the risk premium,
leading to increased fuel pump costs. With India importing more than two-thirds of its oil from West Asia, a price surge
is expected to impact the current account, and will result in further currency depreciation as was the case on Monday.
Higher fuel costs and the imported inflation could also hurt the consumer at a time of a slowdown in the economy. The
government should be prepared to handle the fallout with steps such as re-evaluating the excise duties on petroleum
products.
• Yemen is in the south-west corner of the
Arabian Peninsula. Though most Yemenis vouch
for national unity, the northern and southern
parts of the country are two distinct entities.
While the north is hilly and fertile and has some
oil reserves, the southern part is mostly desert.
The country has a population of around 27
million, with most living in the north. With GDP
per capita of $944, which is less than half of
India’s, Yemen’s poverty is a sharp contrast to
the oil-riches of her northern neighbours.
• The country is a tribal society with a strong
sense of identity and kinship. While almost all
Yemenis are Muslims, the population in the
north is mostly Zaidi which is closer to the Shia
sect followed in Iran.
• The southerners are mostly Sunnis akin to a
majority of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
citizens. While the north remains rooted in
esoteric Zaidi traditions, the south which was
colonized by the British to protect the sea route
to India became relatively more westernized.
South Yemen also had close links with India —
the Nizam of Hyderabad relied on troops from
Hadhramaut and the founder of Reliance
Industries, Dhirubhai Ambani, began his career
in Aden.
• A history of conflict
• The roots of the current imbroglio can be traced to the 1930s when north Yemen’s Imam ceded to the resurgent
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia three provinces that many Yemenis still considered theirs. In the 1960s, north Yemen
passed through a six-year-long civil war between the Imam’s fighters with Saudi support, against the Republican
forces backed by Egypt. The civil war resulted in formation of Yemen Arab Republic in 1968; it also established a
quasi-tradition of foreign dabbling in Yemeni politics.
• A united Republic of Yemen was finally established in 1990. In 1994, a section of the south tried to secede, but
the insurrection was put down after a short civil war.
• In 2004, the northern Shia militia called “Ansar Allah” began an insurgency led by dissident cleric Hussein
Badreddin al-Houthi, head of the Zaidi sect, against President Ali Abdullah Saleh. In November 2011, the Yemeni
Arab Spring movement managed to remove Saleh who was replaced by his southern deputy Abdrabbuh Mansour
Hadi; Saleh and his clan remained influential till his assassination in 2017.
• The al-Houthis rebelled against Mr. Hadi, ousting him in 2014 and forcing him to flee to Riyadh where he
currently heads an ‘internationally recognised’ but largely ineffective government of Yemen. Saudi Arabia,
apprehensive of an al-Houthi led Yemen becoming a surrogate of Iran (a regional Shia rival), cobbled a military
coalition comprising the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt and other Sunni powers, with Pakistan reluctantly
opting out. This coalition began a military campaign (“Operation Decisive Storm”) against the al-Houthis in
March 2015, mostly through aerial bombardment, with army units supporting Mr. Hadi’s forces in southern
Yemen; it also imposed a naval blockade. Four years on, the civil war has ground to a stalemate, with the al-
Houthis hunkering it out in the north. The United Nations has described Yemen to be currently in the grip of the
world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe, with over 11,000 deaths and 3 million internally displaced.
• During the past month, the Yemeni civil war seems to have entered its endgame, crossing two watersheds which
could cast a shadow over India’s strategic national interests. Though both these developments were a long-time
coming, each arrived with a bang and the potential to alter the future course of the conflict.
• Drone attacks fallout
• The most significant recent development in the Yemeni war has been the coordinated pre-dawn
drone attacks last Saturday on the two Saudi upstream oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais.
Though al-Houthi militia claimed responsibility, the details (10 drones were said to have engaged
17 targets) and sophistication (accurate hits nearly 1,300 km away from the Yemeni-Saudi
border) leaves many questions unanswered. The strikes managed to put 5.7 million barrels per
day of crude production out of action — over half of Saudi output and nearly 5% of global
supplies. This caused an unprecedented 19% initial surge in oil prices on Monday, with Brent
crude topping $71 a barrel. In a worst case scenario of the hostilities escalating or long-term
derailment of Saudi production, oil prices could rise above $100 a barrel. These game-changing
attacks not only mark a dramatic escalation of the conflict but also showcase the efficacy of an
asymmetric warfare. With most hydrocarbon assets in the Gulf region currently defenceless
against such attacks, this vulnerability is a foretaste of any future conflict in this tension-prone
region.
• The second development has been the growing rift within the Saudi-led coalition. In July 2019,
the UAE announced a drawdown of its forces from Yemen where they have anchored the
coalition ground forces.
• By the end of August, Yemeni government forces were compelled to withdraw from southern
port of Aden leaving it to the UAE-backed units of the Southern Transitional Council (STC),
formed in mid-2017.
• The STC calls for an independent South Yemen and is vehemently against the
presence of Islamists in Yemen such as Islah party (member of Saudi-led
coalition), al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic State. The UAE is
estimated to have trained and equipped thousands of fighters for the STC and
other Yemeni militias. Abu Dhabi has also been expanding its strategic presence
in neighbouring Eritrea and Somaliland.
• Many observers foresee the current civil war coagulating into a de facto
division of the Republic of Yemen roughly along the pre-1990 border: between
an al-Houthi-led north and an STC-dominated south. Yemeni re-partition, if
realised, may strongly impact the intra- and inter-state dynamics from Yemen
itself to Yemen-Saudi ties and to the UAE-Iran-Saudi Arabia triangle.
• Riyadh’s inability to attain its objectives in Yemen — despite enormous military
resources at its disposal — may have long-term consequences, possibly making it
more reliant on the large Sunni states such as Pakistan and Egypt. If a viable
South Yemeni state takes shape, the STC’s symbiotic ties with the UAE would put
Abu Dhabi in the driving seat along the geo-strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait — a
choke point connecting the Arabian Sea with the Red Sea onwards to the Suez
Canal.
• Indian interests
• These two aforementioned developments are significant as most of India’s west-bound sea trade passes
through Bab al Mandeb. India, therefore, needs to watch the evolving situation carefully and revive long-
standing ties with the emerging stakeholders in Yemen, particularly along the southern coastal belt. The
weekend’s drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities, too, have direct and serious implications for India as
world’s third largest crude importer (with Saudi Arabia supplying nearly a fifth). The oil price surge hits
India precisely when the economy is already struggling. A rise of oil price by even a dollar raises India’s
annual oil bill by $1.5 billion, the country having spent $112 billion on crude imports in 2018-19.
• A highly volatile oil market and a tense regional situation would also affect India’s thriving economic
engagements as well as its manpower there.
• Additionally, the attacks could affect Saudi Aramco’s ongoing negotiations of two major upstream
investments in India totalling over $30 billion with Reliance Industries and the proposed Ratnagiri
Refinery, respectively.
• In view of direct negative fallout on our interests, India has rightly condemned the Abqaiq-Khurais
attacks. Further, it needs to take evasive actions in order to avoid being trapped in the worst case
scenario; such steps could include frontloading India’s biofuel programme, expanding its strategic
petroleum reserves and diversifying its crude sources away from the West Asia.
• At a different level, drones could emerge as a weapon of choice for motley anti-Indian non-state actors.
Indeed, many of them are no worse than the al-Houthis in their resourcefulness and foreign sponsorships.
Much of our infrastructure could be vulnerable to copy-cat attacks using such affordable and effective
platforms available virtually off-the-shelf internationally. India’s defence and security experts need to
urgently devise counter measures to mitigate such vulnerabilities.
• India may dip into its strategic oil reserves stored in
underground caverns at Mangaluru, Paddur (near
Udupi) and Visakhapatnam, after the drone strikes
on Saudi Arabian Oil Co or Saudi Aramco’s facility
over the weekend sent shock waves across global
oil markets, hitting supplies.
• The attacks affected half of the Kingdom’s oil
exports or about 5 per cent of the global supply and
bringing the entire production back on stream
could take weeks.
• “The strategic reserves are available to us to utilise
except for the portion reserved for the Abu Dhabi
National Oil Company,” a top official at one of the
state-run oil companies said.
• “ADNOC has got some right on a part of the
strategic reserves, the balance can be utilised by
the government oil companies for the government’s
requirements,” he said. If that happens, it could be
the first time that India has counted on the strategic
reserves to tide over a crisis. “The whole thing is
emerging now. We have no clarity on what will
happen. We are waiting and watching, but the
strategic reserves can help to an extent in the short
term,” the official said.
Storage capacity
State-owned Indian Strategic Petroleum
Reserve Ltd (ISPRL), which manages
emergency oil reserves in the country, has
already built 5.33 million tonnes (mt) of
underground storage capacity at
Visakhapatnam (1.33 million tonnes),
Mangaluru (1.5 million tonnes) and Padur
(2.5 million tonnes), which can help meet
around 9.5 days of the country’s oil needs.
Currently, the strategic reserves are not filled
to its full capacity. Typically, India’s oil
refiners hold a crude inventory of 15-20
days, including the crude on the high seas
en-route to be delivered to customers.
About 16 per cent of India’s crude imports
comes from Saudi Arabia, the world’s biggest
oil producer. This translates into a volume of
35-40 million tonnes. India is the world’s third
largest oil importer
• Expansion
• In the 2017-18 budget speech by the Indian finance minister Arun
Jaitley, it was announced that two more such caverns will be set
up Chandikhole in Jajpur district of Odisha and Bikaner in Rajasthan
as part of the second phase. This will take the strategic reserve
capacity to 15.33 million tons.
• Apart from this, India is planning to expand more strategic crude oil
facilities in second phase at Rajkot in Gujarat and Padur in Udupi
district of Karnataka
The Rub' al Khali is the largest contiguous
sand desert (erg) in the
world, encompassing most of the southern
third of the Arabian Peninsula. The desert
covers some 650,000 km2 (250,000 sq mi)
(the area of long. 44°30′−56°30′E,
and lat. 16°30′−23°00′N) including parts
of Saudi Arabia, Oman, the United Arab
Emirates, and Yemen. It is part of the
larger Arabian Desert.
• Recently, Israeli and Pakistani scholars and opinion-makers appear to have
speculated about the possibility of the two states establishing diplomatic ties.
This has cast fresh light on the changing dynamics in the region and Israel’s
growing diplomatic reach and success.
• Ever since Israel’s founding in 1948, it has been the endeavor of the Jewish state
to overcome its regional isolation and enhance diplomatic relations with as many
countries as possible. Apart from Turkey (1949), Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994),
none of the states in the region have recognized Israel. In fact, the Organisation
of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) routinely pillories Israel for its “occupation” of
Palestinian lands. The latest in this long acrimonious saga is the OIC’s call to
convene an emergency session to discuss Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu’s remarks that, if re-elected, he would definitely annex the Jordan
Valley in the West Bank and the northern Dead Sea.
• The regular and scathing indictment by the Islamic world notwithstanding, Israel
has been successful in gradually expanding its diplomatic profile beyond its
immediate neighbourhood. Israel has established diplomatic relations with a
large majority of the 193 UN member states.
• India-Israel links
• India established full diplomatic ties with Israel in January 1992. While many factors brought
these two democracies together, it is a fact that both have successfully tackled state-centric
threats throughout their history. Israel has successfully dealt with the gauntlet thrown down by
the combined Arab opposition in 1948, 1967 and in 1973. India has prevailed over an acutely
hostile and implacable Pakistan in every conflict since Partition. Both Israel and India have been
victims of asymmetric warfare such as terrorism, which they continue to tackle with resolve.
• Thanks to the dynamism infused in India’s foreign policy by the Indian Prime Minister, India’s
interactions with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have witnessed an impressive
upward trajectory in recent times, encompassing economic and security ties. High-level political
engagement with the West Asian region has been another hallmark of the Narendra Modi
government.
• No doubt, mutual apprehensions about Iran have nudged Israel and the Gulf states closer. Israel
continues to look beyond the confines of its immediate region for greater economic and
diplomatic Lebensraum. The Indo-Pacific region too is fast emerging as a prime focus of its
endeavours.
• While Israel established diplomatic ties with China at the same time as with India (January
1992), their relations have been primarily limited to the economic realm due to the American
embargo on selling sophisticated weapons systems to Beijing. Israel, however, is expanding its
arms sales to India and to countries in Southeast Asia.
• Under a changing rubric, Israel is also looking at increasing its diplomatic footprint in South Asia
and beyond. Forging closer ties with populous Asian Muslim countries such as Bangladesh and
Indonesia would help it to gain greater legitimacy in the Islamic world.
• Investment in the Arab world
• Pakistan, however, is a different kettle of fish. The president of the Jerusalem Institute for
Strategy and Security, Prof. Efraim Inbar, recently published an opinion piece in the Israeli
newspaper, Haaretz, titled ‘Israel would welcome ties with Pakistan – Should India Worry?’
(https://bit.ly/2lWr8EE). He argues that Pakistan’s national interests would better be served by
having ties with Israel, particularly since Israel carries weight in Washington and could perhaps
mediate on recurring U.S.-Pakistan tensions. Concerns regarding Iran were also cited as a point
of convergence.
• A rapprochement between Israel and Pakistan appears to be far-fetched. The fly in the ointment
is that Pakistan is considered the “sword-arm” of the Sunni world. Islamabad has invested
considerably in the security of the Arab monarchies, including in Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
Pakistani military units have been stationed in these countries to promote internal stability.
Pakistani leaders such as Nawaz Sharif have sought and received refuge in the Arabian Peninsula.
• Pakistan has used the platform provided by the OIC to drum up support for its stand on Kashmir,
just as the OIC has done for the Palestinian issue. If Pakistan were to establish diplomatic ties
with Israel, it would dilute its Islamic credentials and lead to a weakened support base within
the OIC on Kashmir, a point acknowledged by Pakistani commentator Ayesha Siddiqa in an
opinion article in the same newspaper following Prof. Inbar’s piece. The regime in Pakistan
would also face the heat from its many domestic conservative Islamist groups. More
importantly, in a recent interaction with the media, military spokesperson Maj. Gen. Asif
Ghafoor refuted the possibility in response to a query about Pakistan’s recognition of Israel,
stating that such stories were part of a propaganda war aimed at turning the general public
against the country’s military.
• The Iran factor
• Iran is recognized as a potent threat by Israel and the Shia-Sunni divide in
Pakistan is frequently a point of friction between Iran and Pakistan. However, as
Ms. Siddiqa notes, Israel cannot expect Pakistan to be used against neighbouring
Iran and risk the dangers of escalation in sectarian conflict, given that more than
20% of its population is Shia. Pakistan is unlikely to take any steps that could rock
its relations with Iran.
• In April 2015, Pakistan’s Parliament had turned down Riyadh’s request to join a
Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen to fight the Houthi rebels supported
by Iran.
• India has successfully walked a tightrope between Israel and Palestine, and Israel
may well hope to do so between Pakistan and India. However, it is not in Israel’s
interest to seek diplomatic ties with a state that sponsors terrorism.
• While it is the sovereign right of nation states to decide such matters, it appears
that the idea of diplomatic ties between Israel and Pakistan remains, for now, a
pie in the sky.
• On September 2, Krishna Kumar Singh landed up at the post-mortem facility in
Chunar, Mirzapur, Uttar Pradesh, for a routine assignment. There he noticed the
family of a woman, who had allegedly hanged herself, misbehaving with the
doctors. As the scuffle grew, the staff called for additional security. The gathering
slowly turned into a mob.
• Given his 18 years of experience as a tehsil correspondent for a Hindi daily,
Singh’s instinct was to record the scene on camera. His action promptly angered
the mob. Unlike Pawan Jaiswal, the journalist who had been charged the same
day with criminal conspiracy for reporting that a primary school in the State was
serving rotis and salt in its mid-day meal to children, Singh was physically
assaulted in front of helpless policemen. He was whisked away to safety only
after much humiliation. Though the U.P. police lodged an FIR against the
assaulters, which Singh claims included supporters of a State BJP Minister, no
arrests have been made yet.
• This is not new to Singh. Over the years, his reports on corruption, including on a
cartridges scam and illegal land allocation, have sent officials to prison. When
the Samajwadi Party government was in power, Singh recalls being thrashed in a
police station by the land mafia. But the latest assault has especially shaken him.
Even his organization does not support him now, he says.
• Threats, abuse and intimidation
• There are many regional journalists like Singh in India who work at the district and tehsil
levels in the Hindi hinterland without proper security. In exchange for doing their job,
they face intimidation, threats, abuse, coercion and false police cases.
• An year ago, when Jaiswal reported on illegal mining, the land mafia apparently warned
him that “even the brakes of trucks can fail”. Such journalists often have little
organizational backing or hope that their grievances will be redressed. Unlike
journalists in the English language media, they are more vulnerable as regional
bureaus are known to often turn the other way if they land in a controversy.
• For a large and politically significant State like U.P., stringers and credible reporters at
the lowest administrative levels are extremely important for State- or national-level
news organisations.
• Away from the safety net that is Lucknow, it is these reporters who handle all the risks
that come with reporting on contentious issues which go on to occupy the national
spotlight. Despite this, they are poorly paid, have few rights or statutory entitlements,
are randomly sacked, and sometimes not even issued proper identity cards. This leaves
them vulnerable to administrative excesses, political pressure and corruption.
• “Earlier, mainstream media houses recruited professionals like lawyers and teachers to
report at the district level for a nominal wage,” says Nagendra Pratap, former Editor of a
Hindi daily in Varanasi and Gorakhpur. “But over time, newspapers and TV channels
have started roping in contributors who are often poorly trained and lack other sources
of income, without upgrading their pay structure.” This pushes some journalists to seek
official and political patronage for survival. Hemant Tiwari, Uttar Pradesh Accredited
Correspondents Committee president, admits that at the district level even the staff
reporters of well-known Hindi dailies are asked to bring in advertisement revenue,
while stringers work for commissions.
• The Jaiswal episode brought a lot of condemnation for the U.P. government and police,
but it has not been a deterrent. A few days later, the Azamgarh police arrested a stringer
working with a Hindi daily after he clicked photographs of children mopping the floor of
their school. The police alleged that the scribe was engaging in extortion, but his
colleagues contended that he was falsely implicated due to a grudge nursed against him
by the local station house officer. On September 7, five journalists in Bijnor were booked
for ‘promoting enmity’ after they reported that a Dalit family had put its ‘house on sale’
after being denied water from a village hand pump. The police alleged that the reporters
had concocted the story to show the administration in poor light.
• Showing solidarity
• In all these cases, journalists staged protests, but little has been achieved.
The daily nature of news, conflicting business interests, toothless journalist
organisations, and a disconnect between the mainstream English language
press and the regional press hinders any united and sustained call for
action.
• According to the 2019 World Press Freedom Index, India ranks 140 out of
180 countries. At such a bleak time, it is crucial for the media to rise above
these factors, show solidarity towards its own, and constantly question the
excesses of state power, while improving working conditions for those on
the margins. After all, what is at stake is truth itself.
 Major defence contracts for local industry
• The Defence Ministry has signed a ₹5,500-crore contract for additional
indigenous Akash surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems and in the next one year,
contracts worth ₹70,000-80,000 crore are expected to be signed with Indian
industry.
• “Akash SAM contract was signed two days back worth ₹5,500 crore. Though
Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) and Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) are the
main vendors, there are almost 150 private vendors involved,” Apurva
Chandra, Director-General, Acquisition, in the Defence Ministry, said at a session
on Make in India organized by the Society of Indian Defence Manufacturers. The
deal is for seven additional Akash units for the Indian Air Force.
• The government aims to build a $10 trillion economy by 2032 and defence has
been identified as one of the most prominent sectors to contribute to this
growth, said Defence Minister Rajnath Singh.
 Govt.-funded NGOs come under RTI ambit, says SC
• Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) “substantially” financed by the government fall within
the ambit of the Right to Information Act, the Supreme Court held in a judgment on Tuesday.
• A Bench of Justices Deepak Gupta and Aniruddha Bose laid down that NGOs which receive
considerable finances from the government or are essentially dependent on the government fall
under the category of “public authority” defined in Section 2(h) of the Right to Information (RTI)
Act of 2005.
• This means that they have to disclose vital information, ranging from finances to hierarchy to
decisions to functioning, to citizens who apply under RTI. An NGO, the court said, may also
include societies which are neither owned or controlled by the government, but if they are
significantly funded by the government, directly or indirectly, they come under the RTI Act.
• The court defined “substantial” as a “large portion.”
• “It does not necessarily have to mean a major portion or more than 50%. No hard and fast rule
can be laid down in this regard. Substantial financing can be both direct or indirect,”
Justice Gupta wrote in the judgment.
• If government gives land in a city free of cost or on heavy discount to hospitals, educational
institutions or any such body, this in itself could also be substantial financing, the judgment
explained.