Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Queer Muslims Between Orthodoxy, Secularism and The Struggle For Acceptance
Queer Muslims Between Orthodoxy, Secularism and The Struggle For Acceptance
Nadeem Mahomed
To cite this article: Nadeem Mahomed (2016) Queer Muslims: between orthodoxy,
secularism and the struggle for acceptance, Theology & Sexuality, 22:1-2, 57-72, DOI:
10.1080/13558358.2017.1296688
Article views: 2
ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
The aim of this paper is to concentrate on responses by Muslim Islam; LGBTQ; sexuality;
scholars to both the Orlando incident and the United States contemporary Muslim
Supreme Court Judgment on same-sex marriage. I first provide scholars; religion; secularity
some comments on the Orlando incident in relation to the issue
of Muslims, violence and homophobia. More importantly and
central to my argument, I consider what the import of these
responses are for Muslims – especially Muslims who identify as
LGBTIQ or at least experience same-sex sexual attraction or
participate in same-sex sexual conduct – and also what do such
responses suggest about the prospect of same-sex sexuality being
seriously considered, understood and accepted within the
contemporary Islamic tradition and the possible consequences
thereof. I make the case that the Islamic tradition, by way of its
self-identified and proclaimed scholarly interpreters and
representatives, urgently need to engage with the issue of same-
sex sexuality in a more robust, dynamic and imaginative manner
or risk a deepening epistemological crisis.
Introduction
The brutal massacre that transpired at Pulse, a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida, on 12
June 2016, has given rise to some important discussions relating to sexual diversity
among Muslims and scholars of Islam particularly in North America, primarily due to
the fact that the perpetrator of this heinous crime identified as Muslim. While in recent
years there has been more open debate and exchange of ideas on sexual diversity in
Islam and among Muslims mainly in North America, Western Europe and other parts
of the world such as South Africa, this same discussion among Muslim communities else-
where is long overdue.1 It is most unfortunate that such an important issue, a matter which
affects the lives of millions of Muslims who identify as LGBTIQ or at least experience
same-sex sexual attraction or participate in same-sex sexual conduct,2 is primarily dis-
cussed when Muslims are considered to express a type of homophobia that directly cor-
relates with violence and discrimination against sexual minorities.
The aim of this paper is to concentrate on responses by Muslim scholars to both the
Orlando incident and the United States Supreme Court Judgment on same-sex marriage.
Responses to these events are generally representative of the positions held among
Muslims and Muslim scholars in the West, and increasingly also by Muslims in countries
where there exist legal protections and recognition of equal rights on the basis of sexual
orientation (“legally protected societies”). In doing so, I will first provide some comments
on the issue of Muslims, violence and homophobia. More importantly and central to my
argument, I will consider what the import of these responses are for Muslims – especially
Muslims who identify as LGBTIQ or at least experience same-sex sexual attraction or par-
ticipate in same-sex sexual conduct – and also what do such responses suggest about the
prospect of same-sex sexuality being seriously considered, understood and accepted within
the contemporary Islamic tradition and the possible consequences thereof. Accordingly,
the purpose is not to delve into detailed or substantial issues of Islamic law or theology
or to enter into debates about the etiology of sexual orientation, but rather to assess the
significance of the current dominant position on same-sex sexuality among Muslim scho-
lars and within Muslim communities – at least within the West and/or legally protected
societies. I will make the case that there are in reality two principal possibilities: first,
either the Islamic tradition, by way of its self-identified and proclaimed scholarly
interpreters and representatives, engage with the issue of same-sex sexuality in a more
robust, dynamic and imaginative manner or second, the Islamic tradition, at least for
those who are excluded from its ambit based on their sexual orientation, will not maintain
its ethical and spiritual importance and will also fail to adhere to its own ideals of justice.
who assaulted his wife. How credible any of these allegations are is uncertain but it does
complicate Mateen’s motive for the massacre.6
It is not entirely clear which of the above factors, or combination, if any, were the cause
for his murderous outrage. What is important to note is that it is difficult to presume or
prove that Islam was the direct and necessary or sufficient cause for what transpired. To
attribute the full cause of the incident to a diverse and complex religious tradition such as
Islam and/or to suggest that this religious tradition is unique in its vitriolic homophobia
compared to any other religious tradition is an obfuscation of the real political and social
issues that are currently at play. In incidents such as Orlando, Muslims are expected to
explicitly condemn and disassociate themselves from the conduct of a few individuals
in order to reconfirm their loyalty to the law and values of the secular nation state.
Why are Muslims – particularly in North America and Western Europe – held to a differ-
ent standard? The most persuasive response to this question is that Muslims are seen as
the enemy, as people who contradict the democratic principles of their home countries
and are against crafting a cosmopolitan life with people of different beliefs and opinions.
In this sense then, Muslims are subjects who are feared, loathed and above all suspected of
being insincere to the political and ethical framework of the societies they inhabit. This
precarious position transforms Muslims from equal citizens to subjects of tolerance
where each and every time they have to demonstrate their commitment to the nation
state and its ethos in exchange for existential tolerance.7
This discourse creates the impression of static and impermeable identities that are too
often at loggerheads. One such combination of conflicting identities is that of “Muslim”
and “queer”. The construction of identity-based politics is advantageous in that the
lived experiences of the marginalized can be harnessed to demonstrate that the prejudice
suffered is systemic and socially unjust. It also has the potential to privilege one identity
over many others by ignoring or erasing the particular lived experiences of people at
the intersection of two or more identities. Depending on the context, the “Muslimness”
or “queerness” of the queer Muslim subject is overlooked. Within the Muslim sphere,
the sexuality of queer Muslims is routinely dismissed and when it appears in more
visible or vocal ways it is at times aggressively berated.
that affords the same rights to LGBTIQ people. In fact, in response to both the Supreme
Court of the United States’ ruling legalizing same-sex marriages and the Orlando incident,
American Muslim scholars argued that as Muslims living in a secular non-Muslim
environment they are obliged to demonstrate a certain level of tolerance in that “individ-
uals are at liberty to pursue happiness as each sees fit” as it is everyone’s “political right”12
and that “Muslims can ‘support’ the idea that non-Muslim homosexual relationships
conforms to their specific morality and can therefore be ‘tolerated’ to an extent just like
we tolerate so many other things that are unIslamic”.13 Another scholar, Jonathan
Brown, states:
As a Muslim American, I support the right of same-sex couples to have civil marriages
according to US law. Islam does not approve of same-sex acts, but I don’t believe that the
social or religious traditions of any one group should dictate what sort of contracts or
unions those of other beliefs can engage in. I want to preserve my right to have my
Shariah marriage contract with my wife recognized by US law even though I know many
Americans consider Islam’s conception of marriage to be unpalatable … This right is as
important and sacrosanct as the right of minorities (be they Muslims or the gay community)
to engage in unions and contracts free from the hobbles of majoritarian bias.14
All of these scholars, however, at the same time also maintain the fundamental immoral
and unlawful nature of homosexuality within the Islamic tradition or some sort of “strict
Abrahamic morality”.15 In essence, these ethical arguments posit three essential points and
by implication suggest two significant positions which are relevant to our discussion. The
three ethical points are: (1) Homosexual conduct is unlawful, sinful and punishable in
terms of Islamic law; (2) Muslims in the West and/or legally protected societies are
obliged to respect and accept the current secular legal framework which affords rights
to certain groups of people even though Muslims may consider such people and/or
their actions as unlawful and abhorrent;16 and (3) Muslims have the right to concurrently
maintain and espouse their view that homosexuality does not accord with the alleged
divine prescription for an ethical and moral life and that any departure whatsoever
from formal heterosexual marriage as the only lawful framework for sexual relations is
unlawful and sinful.17 The two implications of these arguments is that, first, there is no
possibility whatsoever for homosexual conduct or desires18 to be considered legitimate
in terms of Islamic law and, second, LGBTIQ Muslims in the West and/or legally pro-
tected societies have no recourse to any Islamic or religious acceptance or support and
their only avenue of accessing certain social goods in a similar way to their heterosexual
counterparts such as romantic relations and sexual intimacy is via the secular space.
These two implications are interrelated (which will become clear), but I will deal with
each separately beginning with the latter. In the responses cited above (the Joint Muslim
Statement published on the Orlando incident, Jonathan Brown’s article on Islamic law and
homosexuality and rights19 and Zaytuna Institute’s Abdullah bin Hamid’s reflections on
gay marriage) the LGBTIQ Muslim subject is ignored. This is demonstrative of the
double bind LGBTIQ Muslims routinely experience: in order to exist within religious com-
munities and spaces they need to remain silent and invisible in relation to their sexual
orientation. This is not a remarkable expectation for a community and legal-religious tra-
dition that understands same-sex sexual desires to be inconsistent with a moral lifestyle
and that such desires should be attenuated in some way so as not to result in any
conduct that may be considered a breach of Islamic law proscriptions on sexual behavior.
THEOLOGY & SEXUALITY 61
These responses, which are representative of the dominant view in Muslim communities,
lack a candid and sincere concern and interest in the well-being of LGBTIQ Muslims: their
complicated relationship with Islam; their sexuality and what it means; and their need, like
other non-LGBTIQ Muslims, to form romantic relationships. At the point at which there
is some sort of visibility or vocality on any of these issues then the relationship between the
person and the community is ruptured in that the person is viewed otherwise as being
different or apart from the normative ethical framework.20 It would seem that the only
option offered to LGBTIQ Muslims in the West and/or legally protected societies (with
the exception of remaining celibate, maintaining a position of invisibility and silence relat-
ing to one’s sexuality, and/or possibly verbalizing one’s condition by way of an avowal of
its unlawful nature) is to seek acceptance through the secular framework. This line of
reasoning has two implications: First, in one sense this buttresses the secular state’s role
in disciplining the relationships between people by adopting an Enlightenment approach
which guarantees individualism by way of a system of collaboration for “mutual benefit” in
securing the “needs of ordinary life” for all equally.21 This is viewed favorably by the
authors or signatories of the responses under discussion which means that the only
form of pluralism that they possibly envisage is one where the secular domain in the
form of a liberal republican democratic dispensation is ascendant. Accordingly, a
society and political structure established on the basis of some religious or divine provi-
dence would be unable to accommodate the securing of social goods to certain categories
of people, such as homosexuals. Therefore, there is very little possibility of LGBTIQ
Muslims ever enjoying any of these rights in Muslim majority countries unless (but not
necessarily)22 such countries adopt the legal protections necessary for guaranteeing equal-
ity and protection to sexual minorities, which is present in many republican liberal demo-
cratic countries. It would seem that Muslims within these type of liberal democracies are
prepared to forge some sort of alliance based in the public secular space to recognize the
rights of another minority on the basis that their rights, as a minority, be recognized – but
not within the private religious space where LGBTIQ Muslims and their allies are a min-
ority and other – heterosexual – Muslims are the majority. Majoritarian bias is seen as an
unfavorable interference in the secular public space but not within the private religious
sphere. Second, the argument that LGBTIQ rights and access to social goods, such as mar-
riage, are protected in the civic and secular space – which Muslims should respect primar-
ily from a position of self-interest or “mutual benefit” – and not necessarily within
religious communities as religious communities have the right to continue to advocate
and maintain that such LGBTIQ interests cannot be accepted, reinforces the position
that religion and sexuality belong to the private sphere. The Western secular relegation
of religion as a private matter is therefore supported and it is within this space that religion
– as the privatized belief of a community – has the authority to regulate matters of family,
gender and sexuality. According to Saba Mahmood, the demarcation of sex and religion
“as quintessential elements of private life under secular modernity has created an explosive
symbiosis between them that is historically unique”.23 For many Muslims it is a contradic-
tion for a person to identify as both Muslim and homosexual. The uncritical elevation of
the secular space as the only forum where differences can be arbitrated and solved for the
mutual benefit of all parties exhibits a lack of critical engagement and imagination in
dealing with the Islamic tradition.24 If LGBTIQ Muslims can only turn to the secular
space in legally protected societies and Western liberal democracies for safety, recognition
62 N. MAHOMED
and acceptance, what does that say about the dynamism of the religious tradition? It is to
that question I now turn.
Talal Asad in his influential paper, “The Ideology of Islam”, identifies Islam as a discur-
sive tradition
that includes and relates itself to the founding texts of the Qur’an and the Hadith … [that]
has a history … [and] is simply a tradition of Muslim discourse that addresses itself to con-
ceptions of the Islamic past and future, with reference to a particular Islamic practice in the
past.25
My aim here is not to offer a resolution. Nonetheless, the three works cited above (endnote
28) go a long way in offering a response to MacIntyre’s three step approach in arguing
from the tradition and the lived realities of queer Muslims for the permissibility of
same-sex marriage. These scholars are actively involved in pursuing a path that connects
both being Muslim and queer in a way that is respectful to both the Islamic tradition and
the lived realities and experiences of queer Muslims. In conducting such an exercise non-
LGBTIQ Muslim scholars and Muslims need to seriously ask what does it mean, in the
current constellation of circumstances, to permit or prohibit this or that line of conduct
and what are the consequences of failing to act empathically toward an issue that
affects people on the margins of the Muslim community. After the Orlando incident
Imam Rashied Omar at the historic Claremont Main Road Mosque in Cape Town,
South Africa, devoted his Eid al-Fitr sermon to the issue of confronting homophobia in
Muslim communities and posed some critical questions for Muslim communities:
Is Omar Mateen’s apparent inner struggle with his sexual identity an isolated phenomenon
among Muslims? What happens to other individuals who struggle to reconcile their sexual
identities together with their commitment to Islam? How do families cope with loved ones
who struggle with their sexual identities? How can we nurture more just and compassionate
communities who can support struggling individuals to live with their sexual orientation with
integrity, dignity and justice? Last but not least, how can our communities and institutions
create safe spaces, free from homophobia?31
64 N. MAHOMED
As a point of departure these questions require thoughtful analysis and engagement with
LGBTIQ Muslims and are essential in beginning to appreciate their struggles. The discus-
sion should not be limited to a choice between a “yes” to religion or a “no” to sex or vice
versa. It is not a zero-sum game. It should be a genuine attempt that seeks to understand
the form of same-sex sexual desire, how it is shaped by its social context – like all other
aspects of the human experience – and how it can be appropriately patterned to be
both compliant with the religious tradition and afford the queer Muslim subject a
genuine opportunity at human flourishing. It is an urgent calling, as Farid Esack in his
pioneering work on Islamic liberation theology in the South African apartheid context
says,
for the freedom to rethink the meanings and use of the scripture in a racially divided, econ-
omically exploitative and patriarchal society and to forge hermeneutical keys that will enable
us to read the text in such a way as to advance the liberation of all people.32
Notes
1. Some of the earliest arguments articulated in favour of a sexuality sensitive reading of the
Qur’an and Hadith were by people working within the nascent LGBTIQ Muslim sector
during the 1990s. Imam Muhsin Hendricks, the founder of the South African LGBTIQ
Muslim organisation The Inner Circle enunciated some of these novel readings of Islam’s
sacred scripture and traditions of the Prophet Muhammed which can be accessed in a
more recent article titled “Islamic texts: A Source for Acceptance”. A good overview of the
literature on the subject is Geissinger’s “Islam and Discourses of Same-Sex Desire”.
THEOLOGY & SEXUALITY 65
2. I do not deal with the etiology of homosexuality or sexual orientation as it is beyond the scope
of this paper. It suffices to say that it is quite apparent that people, including LGBTIQ people
or people who do not identify with a sexual identity but experience same-sex sexual desire or
participate in same-sex sexual conduct, do not consciously and deliberately “choose” their
sexual feelings or the objects of their sexual arousal. Even though it is becoming increasingly
common, at least in Western societies, for people to identify with a sexual orientation or
sexual identity, I am cognisant that some people prefer not to have a sexual identity label
attached to their sexual proclivities and/or activities. My intention in this paper is to deal
with the issue of same-sex sexual desires and conduct within the Muslim community and
therefore the question of identity, at least to this extent, is irrelevant to my argument. There-
fore I do not draw a neat distinction between those people who claim a sexual identity and
those who do not. Accordingly, I use the terms LGBTIQ, homosexual, queer and same-sex
desire interchangeably as markers of people who experience same-sex sexual attraction
and find same-sex sexual conduct both sexually fulfilling and expressive of romantic love
and emotion.
3. On the topic of homosexuality, an example of this sentiment in its more extreme form is
Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s article “Islam’s Jihad Against Homosexuals”, where she states that the
Orlando incident “is not primarily about guns or immigration. It is about a deeply dangerous
ideology that is infiltrating American society in the guise of religion. Homophobia comes in
many forms. But none is more dangerous in our time than the Islamic version.” See also
Nawaaz, “Admit It: These Terrorists are Muslims,” where Nawaaz attempts to establish a
continuity between dominant and general Muslim attitudes on a subject such as the proscrip-
tion of homosexuality and the exceptional violent actions of a gunman who targeted a gay
nightclub.
4. Greenwald, “Stop Exploiting LGBT Issues to Demonize Islam.”
5. Mahomed and Esack, “The Normal and Abnormal,” 224–243.
6. See Goldman et al., “He Was Not a Stable Person”; CBS News, “Man Who Says He Was
Omar Mateen’s Gay Lover Speaks Out”; Hennessy-Fiske, “FBI Investigators Say They
Have Found No Evidence”; Rustling, “Omar Mateen’s Final Text.”
7. Norton, The Muslim Question. Norton argues very convincingly that the Muslim Question in
the West has not much to do with the claim of the incompatibility between Muslims’ reli-
gious beliefs and Western values, but rather about the crisis facing Western societies in
respect of their own commitment to cosmopolitan and plural societies.
8. This is not to suggest in any way that Islam or Muslim communities have a monopoly on
treating queer people with disdain, bordering on disgust, or as people who are immoral,
sinful, unhealthy and unethical. Homosexuality and non-heterosexual sexual identities and
desires have for most of modern history in the West been considered a medical disorder.
Homosexual sex, particularly sodomy, was criminalized and there was (and to some extent
still is) a complete disregard for the emotional and psychological effects this has on
people. Until very recently most states within the USA refused to recognize same-sex
unions and there still exists a visible and trenchant anti-LQBTIQ sector. These efforts are
not connected to Islam or Muslims and are solidly grounded in the conservative culture of
American Christian religion.
9. An example of this position can be seen in Abdullah bin Hamid Ali’s reflections on same-sex
marriage after the Supreme Court of the United States ruling on the issue, “Reflections on a
Supreme Court Verdict: Gay Marriage.” Ali is the head of Zaytuna College’s Islamic law
program, labelled America’s first liberal arts Muslim college. Ali says “Islam throughout
all of its history has upheld the view that homosexual intercourse is an invalid form of inti-
macy. Similarly, the homosexual impulse has been the subject of condemnation. What this
means is that while Islamic jurists have differed about the appropriate penalty prescribed
for when two consenting adults engage in homosexual public indecency (i.e. intercourse),
there is no disagreement that attraction to a person of the same gender is unnatural. A
man being attracted to another man is no more natural than a man being attracted to his
mother or daughter.” For scholarship on the premodern attitude toward same-sex sexuality
66 N. MAHOMED
the interim Constitution explicitly prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation and the final 1996 Constitution retained this clause which is part of the equality
clause in the Bill of Rights. In 1998 the Constitutional Court ruled that the criminalisation
of sodomy is unconstitutional (National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and
Another v Minister of Justice and Others). In 1999 the Constitutional Court extended
pension benefits to foreign spouses of South African citizens in same-sex relationships
(National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home Affairs
and Others) and in 2001 same-sex couples were jointly permitted to adopt children (Du
Toit and Another v Minister of Welfare and Population Development and Others). In
2005 the Constitutional Court recognised the urgent need for Parliament to institute a
legal framework that recognises the partnerships of same-sex couples (Minister of Home
Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another). Within this context and during the period
when the Civil Unions Bill was debated in Parliament, a prominent South African Mufti
responded to a question on homosexuality as follows:
We would, you know abhor, those kind of things. But at the same time, we have to
understand that we have a democratic dispensation … [that] would have to dispense
the needs of all its citizens. So if certain citizens have made their claim, and if they
have a right of staying in the country, we would expect that, the democratic dispensation
facilitates for them as well … . (Mufti Ebrahim Desai quoted in Tayob, “Islam and
Democracy in South Africa,” 20–4)
17. The religious legal construction of heterosexual marriage as the only framework for licit
sexual relations is not accurately reflective of the Islamic legal tradition despite its almost uni-
versal acceptance by most Muslims. The permissibility of concubinage as a vehicle for a
man’s sexual access to women is generally ignored. While the system of slavery and concu-
binage no longer exists – with the exception of some grotesque instances where Islamist pol-
itical movements have “reinstated” this practice – the consequences of what such a ruling in
the shari’ah means for notions of consent, equality, mutuality and sexual access in current
sexual relationships is rarely discussed. For a discussion on the institution of concubinage
in Islamic law, see Ali, Sexual Ethics and Islam, and for the way in which the master slave
relationship was in some ways parallel to the husband and wife relationship in Islamic
law, see Ali, Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam.
18. Some scholars maintain that the Shari’ah is not interested in homosexual desire and that only
homosexual conduct is censured (see Brown, “Muslim Scholar on How Islam Really Views
Homosexuality”). This is true of what constitutes punishable and sinful conduct in terms of
the Shari’ah but in practice the current common position also deems same-sex desires pro-
blematic in that they are sexual impulses that do not accord with what is considered to be
healthy, normal and natural and the risk that one may act upon such desires.
19. Jonathan Brown does not focus on homosexual desire but actions and states that it is only the
latter (actions) that are proscribed by the Shari’ah.
20. The centrality of the “coming out of the closet” narrative in Western societies is problematic
for a number of reasons. It views the privacy of sexuality as akin to subjugation. The only
truly liberated person is one who is free to visibly and vocally express his or her sexuality
or sexual interests. Many people, especially many people who operate within non-Western
ethical frameworks, prefer to keep their sexual lives confidential and private. Also, the
opacity of the closet allows many LGBTIQ Muslims the option of still maintaining their
current community and kinship links while also inhabiting a space that is protective of
their sexual orientation (see Esack and Mahomed, “Sexual Diversity, Islamic Jurisprudence
and Sociality”). That being said, any agency on the part of LGBTIQ Muslims to chart a
life beyond the shadows of secrecy is usually met with resistance (see biographical sketches
of LGBTIQ Muslims in Hijab: Unveiling Queer Muslim Lives and Kugle, Living Out Islam).
21. Taylor, A Secular Age, 128–9; 159–71.
68 N. MAHOMED
22. The argument that the more secular orientated a society the greater the probability that
LGBTIQ rights will be protected is not necessarily true. The United States only recently
recognised same-sex marriages and that too by way of judicial intervention and not parlia-
mentary legislation. In Egypt, homosexual men have been targeted under the Sisi regime
which has been widely seen as a more secular administration compared to the former demo-
cratically elected Morsi administration, see Nader, “11 ‘homosexuals’ arrested”; Trew,
“They’re Here, They’re Queer, They’re Arrested.”
23. Mahmood, Religious Difference in A Secular Age, 21.
24. A possible counter-argument or objection could be that part of the purpose and infrastruc-
ture of constructing or maintaining a civic public space is that it enables communities to
maintain positions within the “private” space which are not considered acceptable according
to dominant standards of public reason at a particular time. Accordingly, to demand that reli-
gious communities and/or people who hold specific ethical positions on the basis of their reli-
gious beliefs to revise them on the basis that they support a public secular space that
accommodates for beliefs and action that are considered religiously unlawful is disingenuous
because that negates the reason for supporting the public secular space in the first instance. I
acknowledge the validity of this argument, however it does not consider the queer Muslim
subject as worthy of also occupying the same private community religious space as a
queer Muslim subject who does not reject her/his sexuality as abnormal and/or unnatural
and/or unlawful and/or rejected. The point is that queer Muslims are not afforded the
same treatment as their heterosexual counterparts within the community as equal Muslims.
25. Asad, “The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam,” 20.
26. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 7.
27. Ibid., 1. The late scholar Shahab Ahmad critiques Asad’s positon (and MacIntyre to the
extent that it influences Asad’s position) by reading Asad as arguing that Islam is fundamen-
tally a discursive tradition that establishes orthodoxy within a given historical context.
Despite being unconvinced by Ahmad’s critique of Asad, Ahmad’s overall point that Islam
as a “historical and human phenomenon” (What is Islam? 5) is welcoming and accommoda-
tive of contradictory claims that are not restrained by the borders of what is generally con-
sidered to be orthodox is important particularly in relation to how same-sex sexuality was
received and experienced in pre-modern Muslim societies (see the references in footnote
10). However, queer Muslims today more often than not experience discrimination within
their communities on the basis of Islamic law (which is a part of the Islamic tradition that
has as its primary purpose the reinforcement of orthodoxy and orthopraxy in Muslim com-
munities) and how that law ultimately more than any other aspect of Islam as a literary, artis-
tic, human and historical phenomenon influences the community’s position on the subject of
sexual diversity.
28. In my opinion, the three most comprehensive arguments put forward for the legitimization
of same-sex marriage in Islam can be found in Kugle, Islam and Homosexuality; El-Menyawi,
“Same-Sex Marriage in Islamic Law”; and Jahangir and Abdullatif, Islamic Law and Muslim
Same-Sex Unions. All three works argue from an Islamic perspective, using Islamic jurispru-
dential tools as well as marshalling modern Western notions of dignity, freedom and equality.
What is key here is that all the scholars attempt to argue for a reform of the Islamic legal
tradition in a manner that will allow the tradition to accept LGBTIQ Muslims as full
human beings that have access to the same social goods in accordance with their sexual orien-
tation. It is obvious that the substance of these arguments is unique and original in that pre-
modern Muslim scholars were closed to the permissibility of sexual intimacy between
members of the same sex. These arguments may not be persuasive to all parties and they
may be critiqued. However, to simply dismiss these arguments on the basis that these argu-
ments have no precedent in classical Islamic law is to miss the point. The Islamic tradition
accepts hierarchical cosmologies that justify and normalise patriarchal dominance and the
ultimate authority of the husband in marital relationships (see Chaudhry, Domestic Violence;
Hidayatullah, Feminist Edges). In some intrinsic sense the Islamic tradition as it stands may
be unable to accommodate or support any of these interpretations be they of a feminist or
THEOLOGY & SEXUALITY 69
sexually-sensitive nature (Hidayatullah, Feminist Edges). However, the point is not to affirm
this position but rather to treat the tradition as dynamic in so far as Muslims have the
freedom to interpret it against a backdrop of a struggle for justice in a patriarchal, heteronor-
mative and homophobic context. To be closed to this option because of its potential revisio-
nist nature is to concede to stunting the growth of the tradition and to accept that the Islamic
legal tradition effectively denies justice to a category of persons.
29. In an op-ed piece in the Washington Post, the American traditional scholar Hamza Yusuf
opines on how he could have counseled Omar Mateen after learning that Mateen googled
his name before the attack. Had Mateen approached him, Hamza says, he would like to
think that he could “have dissuaded him or advised him to seek professional help, or at
least helped him channel his anger and frustration into something productive and meaning-
ful.” The main issue for Hamza is Mateen’s violent conduct, which is not trivial. However,
given some of what has come to light about Mateen, had Mateen informed Hamza about
his sexual feelings, it begs the question: what would have been Hamza’s response according
to the dictates of “strict Abrahamic morality”? (see Yusuf, “The Orlando Shooter Googled My
Name”). Hamza states in an interview soon after the Orlando incident that his “recommen-
dation” to queer Muslims “is not to actively engage in behavior outside of what is permitted
in the religion” on the basis that “people can live celibate lives” because Hamza was celibate
for many years (Burke, “Muslim leaders”). It is quite remarkable for Hamza to compare his
temporary celibacy with recommending permanent celibacy and his confidence in the ethi-
cality and appropriateness of this solution is disconnected from and dismissive of the lived
realities and needs of queer Muslims.
30. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 362.
31. Omar, “Id Al Fitr Khutbah.”
32. Esack, Qur’an, Liberation & Pluralism, 78.
33. While the act of liwat is the most egregious form of same-sex sexual conduct in terms of
Islamic law all other forms of same-sex sexual intimacy short of anal penetrative sex is
also prohibited. However, the common automatic association between male same-sex
sexual conduct or even “homosexuality” and anal penetrative sex is problematic and
untrue. The truth is that same-sex sexual conduct can, and in reality does, include many
other actions besides anal penetrative sex. It is beyond the scope of this paper but it would
be interesting to investigate if the absence of male anal penetrative sex within a same-sex
relationship may alter the dynamic of how the relationship is considered. Perhaps a reconsi-
deration of male same-sex sexuality simply as analogous to anal penetrative sex could yield a
discussion or environment that is less scornful even if it may not be completely accepting. In
this regard, it would be interesting to see what changes, if any, could come about in the legal
and wider religious discourse by divorcing the issue and question of anal penetrative sex from
the wider gamut of same-sex sexual conduct.
34. The idea that a religious tradition becomes sterile in that its treatment of certain categories of
people are so immoral that there is no other way forward but to seek the destruction of the
tradition is an extreme but relevant view to take into account. The South Asian anti-caste and
pro-independence activist and intellectual B R Ambedkar stridently attacked Hinduism for
its inherent system of caste differentiation and prejudice. I do not think that caste and
sexual orientation are similar in that in one way caste is an obvious marker that one
cannot conceal or escape while sexual orientation is a more subtle identity form in how it
is expressed. The social effects of caste and sexual discrimination are also dissimilar.
However, Ambedkar’s argument regarding religion is very applicable to the issue of sexual
orientation. Religion, in the terms of Ambedkar’s philosophy, cannot be separated from
an egalitarian morality and citizenship. Ambedkar differentiates between rules and prin-
ciples. Rules are prescriptive and direct an agent on what to do and how to do it while prin-
ciples are intellectual and not prescriptive. “A principle, such as that of justice, supplies a
main heading by reference to which he is to consider the bearings of his desires and purposes,
it guides him in his thinking by suggesting to him the important consideration which he
should bear in mind.” For Ambedkar, the moment that religion equates to rules is the
70 N. MAHOMED
precise moment when morality and reason are undermined. It is at this juncture that
Ambedkar says
[t]he moment it [religion] degenerates into rules it ceases to be religion, as it kills the
responsibility which is the essence of a truly religious act … . I have, therefore, no hes-
itation in saying that such a religion must be destroyed, and I say there is nothing irre-
ligious in working for the destruction of such a religion. (see Ambedkar, Annihilation of
Caste, 303–6)
There may possibly come a time when the burden of traditional fossilized rules are so oppres-
sive that the only possibility of reform is to strike it down completely for “if a choice needs to
be made between violence towards the text and textual legitimation of violence against real
people then I would be comfortable to plead guilty to charges of violence against the text”
(Esack, “Islam and Gender Justice,” 192).
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Professors Farid Esack and Scott Kugle, Dr Iqram Bux, the editors of this
journal and the anonymous reviewer for their comments. I am also indebted to Professor Amina
Wadud for indulging me in discussing some of the issues that appear in this paper and to Professor
Jonathan Brown for reviewing the article and offering insightful comments and critiques of the
arguments.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Nadeem Mahomed is a lawyer and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Religion Studies at the
University of Johannesburg, South Africa.
Bibliography
Ahmad, Shahab. What Is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2015.
Ali, Ayaan Hirsi. “Islam’s Jihad Against Homosexuals.” Wall Street Journal, June 13, 2016. Accessed
September 18, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/islams-jihad-against-homosexuals-
1465859170.
Ali, Kecia. Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010.
Ali, Abdullah bin Hamid. “Reflections on a Supreme Court Verdict: Gay Marriage.” Lamp Post
Education Initiative, July 3, 2015. Accessed September 18, 2016. http://www.lamppostproductions.
com/reflections-on-a-supreme-court-verdict-gay-marriage/.
Ali, Kecia. Sexual Ethics and Islam [Revised Edition]. London: Oneworld, 2016.
Ambedkar, B. R. Annihilation of Caste [Annotated Version]. New Delhi: Navayana, 2014.
Andrews, Walter G., and Mehmet Kalpakli. The Age of Beloveds: Love and the Beloved in Early-
Modern Ottoman and European Culture and Society. Durham: Duke University Press, 2005.
Asad, Talal. “The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam.” Qui Parle 17, no. 2 (2009): 1–30.
Babayan, Kathryn, and Afsaneh Najmabadi, eds. Islamicate Sexualities: Translations Across
Temporal Geographies of Desire. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008.
Brown, Jonathan. “Muslim Scholar on How Islam Really Views Homosexuality.” Variety, June 30,
2015. Accessed September 18, 2016. http://variety.com/2015/voices/opinion/islam-gay-
marriage-beliefs-muslim-religion-1201531047/.
THEOLOGY & SEXUALITY 71
Brown, Jonathan. “The Shariah, Homosexuality & Safeguarding Each Other’s Rights in a Pluralist
Society.” Al Madinah Institute, June 18, 2016. Accessed September 18, 2016. http://
almadinainstitute.org/blog/the-shariah-homosexuality-safeguarding-each-others-rights-in-a-
pluralist-so/.
Burke, Daniel Burke. “Muslim Leaders: ‘We Will Not Allow the Extremists to Define us’.” CNN,
June 15, 2016. Accessed September 18, 2016. http://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/14/living/
orlando-muslims-statement/index.htm?sr=twcnni061516orlando-muslims-statement0433AMV
ODtopLink&linkId=25553587.
Chaudhry, Ayesha. Domestic Violence in the Islamic Tradition. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2014.
El-Menyawi, Hassan. “Same-Sex Marriage in Islamic Law.” Wake Forest Journal of Law & Policy 2,
no. 2 (2012): 375–531.
El Rouayheb, Khaled. Before Homosexuality in the Arab-Islamic World, 1500–1800. Chicago:
Chicago University Press, 2009.
Esack, Farid. “Islam and Gender Justice: Beyond Simplistic Apologia.” In What Do Men Owe
Women? Men’s Voices from World Religions, edited by J. C. Raines and G. C. Maguire.
Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001.
Esack, Farid. Qur’an, Liberation & Pluralism: An Islamic Perspective of Interreligious Solidarity
Against Oppression. Oxford: Oneworld, 1996.
Esack, Farid, and Nadeem Mahomed. “Sexual Diversity, Islamic Jurisprudence and Sociality.”
Journal of Gender and Religion in Africa 17, no. 2 (2011): 41–57.
Geissinger, Aisha. “Islam and Discourses of Same-Sex Desire.” In Homosexuality in Modern
Religious History: Volume 1, edited by Donald L. Boisvert, and Jay Emerson Johnson, 69–90.
Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2012.
Goldman, Adam, Joby Warrick, and Max Bearak. “‘He Was Not a Stable Person’: Orlando Shooter
Showed Signs of Emotional Trouble.” The Washington Post, June 12, 2016. Accessed September 18,
2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ex-wife-of-suspected-orlando-
shooter-he-beat-me/2016/06/12/8a1963b4-30b8-11e6-8ff7-7b6c1998b7a0_story.html.
Greenwald, Glenn. “Stop Exploiting LGBT Issues to Demonize Islam and Justify Anti-Muslim
Policies.” The Intercept June 13, 2016.
Hendricks, Pepe, ed. Hijab: Unveiling Queer Muslim Lives. Cape Town: The Inner Circle, 2009.
Hendricks, Muhsin. Islamic Texts: A Source for Acceptance of Queer Individuals into Mainstream
Muslim Society. London: Equal Rights Trust, 2009.
Hennessy-Fiske, Molly. 2016. “FBI Investigators Say they have Found no Evidence that Orlando
Shooter Had Gay Lovers.” The Los Angeles Times, June 23. Accessed September 18, 2016.
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-orlando-gay-fbi-20160623-snap-story.html.
Hidayatullah, Aysha. Feminist Edges of the Qur’an. Oxford: Oxford University, 2014.
Hoosen, Mufti A. K. “A Jihad for Love.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ibmaiIGr56w
(YouTube).
Jahangir, Junaid, and Hussein Abdullatif. Islamic Law and Muslim Same-Sex Unions. Lanham:
Lexington Books, 2016.
“A Joint Muslim Statement on the Carnage in Orlando.” June 13, 2016. Accessed September 18,
2016. http://orlandostatement.com/.
Kugle, Scott. Islam and Homosexuality: Critical Reflection on Gay, Lesbian, and Transgender
Muslims. London: Oneworld, 2010.
Kugle, Scott. Living Out Islam: Voices of Gay, Lesbian, and Transgender Muslims. New York:
New York University Press, 2014.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press,
1988.
Mahmood, Sabah. Religious Difference in A Secular Age: A Minority Report. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2016.
Mahomed, Nadeem, and Farid Esack. “The Normal and Abnormal: On the Politics of Being
Muslim and Relating to Same-Sex Sexuality.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 85,
no. 1 (2017): 224–243. doi:10.1093/jaarel/lfw057.
72 N. MAHOMED