Factors Affecting
Evaluations of Risks and
Hazards in Mountaineering
by Michael Helms
This report is the condensation of a much more
detailed study of attitudes and adjustments to risks
and hazards in mountaineering. Persons interested in
the complete text may contact Evergreen State Col­
lege in Olympia, Washington.
That mountaineering is a hazardous activity
is obvious to anyone familiar with mountaineer­
ing or its literature. Perhaps the risks and
hazards involved with climbing make it the
challenging and rewarding sport it is. However,
there ^ are psychological and sociological
phenomena which directly affect the evaluations
a climber makes of both risks and hazards in a
specific situation. The end result will depend on
whether these evaluations were " c o r r e c t " or
not.
Assessment of Risk
The "sphere of acceptable risk" is the
amount of risk that a climber feels is acceptable
compared to the rewards or gains from a par­
ticular goal or type of behavior. The sphere of
acceptable risk for each person is based upon all
of the climber's protective measures and all the
possible mountain hazards. Climbers who are
capable, confident, and who have a healthy self-
image will adjust the sphere so that a degree of
uncertainty is maintained and the goal provides
sufficient challenge and reward to require the
highest level of the climber's competence.
Of course, climbers do not always climb
routes that require this level. When the climb is a
relatively easy, familiar route or peak, the
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reasons for climbing might be friendship or
camaraderie, maintaining or developing physical
condition, or simply the sheer joy of climbing
and being in the mountains. But even when clim­
bing well within the limits of ability, moun­
taineers are exposed to a number of hazards
which occasionally contribute to an accident.
When this happens, climbers can make one of
two possible adjustments to the sphere of accep­
table risk: They can rationalize the accident or
near miss as a chance occurrence and, accepting
that mountaineering is a hazardous activity,
make no adjustment to the sphere of acceptable
risk; alternately, they may reevaluate the sphere
of acceptable risk and adjust for the miscalcula­
tion that precipitated the accident.
Uncertainty in a mountaineering situation
also promotes perceived risk and stress in the
climber. Studies have shown that climbers will
actively promote uncertainty in order to main­
tain motivation. By maintaining a level of uncer­
tainty, a climber's aspirations for a goal are
maintained or increased; most important, the
more one aspires to a given goal, the more one is
willing to accept higher levels of risk (Emerson).
Most climbers indicate that they climb much bet­
ter when they are leading than when belayed
from above. The desirability of the result
justifies the increases in calculated risks. The
same holds true in relation to the amount of
time, money, and energy expended to complete a
climb.
The calculation of risk is based solely on a
climber's subjective perception of all the factors
that must be evaluated in order to determine the
level of risk that a given activity involves.
Calculated or perceived risk is affected by
several variables: the frequency and magnitude
of the hazard, the individual's experience with
the hazard and the individual's personality
(Parker and Harding, 1980). Most important,
the validity of the calculated risk is dependent on
the validity and accuracy of the climber's
perceptions of both the hazards and personal
capabilities. Any miscalculation invalidates the
climber's evaluation of the risks involved in a
given activity. This evaluation is influenced by
psychological and sociological phenomena that
allow the climber to accept higher levels of real
risk without realizing that the risks have increas­
ed.
Psychological Phenomena
Of the psychological phenomena that affect
the climber's perceptions of risk and hazards in
mountaineering, most important is the subjec­
tive perception of hazards. Accident investiga­
tions have historically attempted to attach finite
causes to mountaineering accidents when, in
fact, many accidents are the result of the climber
accepting higher risks than he or she perceived in
a situation. In an earlier survey, climbers
responded that mountain hazards could be con­
trolled by competency and concentration
(Helms, 1981). Accidents in North American
Mountaineering, however, lists natural or objec­
tive hazards as contributory causes in almost
half of all North American mountaineering ac­
cidents (Williamson, 1981). The survey indicates
that climbers use a broad spectrum of subjective
perceptions — from intellectualization to com­
plete denial — in order to accept mountain
hazards. By intellectualizing about a hazard,
one's perception of the hazard decreases without
one actively doing anything to reduce the
hazard. Another cause of misperception of
hazards comes from increased confidence in
protective measures (Fitzharris and Simpson -
Housley, 1979).
Another common cause of misperception
comes out of a kind of "hazard folklore" based
on informal communication among climbers,
not on hard evidence (Helms, 1981). This
folklore describes the type of accidents that
result from a given hazard. Articles in journals
and magazines, letters to the editor, lectures,
films, books and discussions with other climbers
are the means by which informal communica­
tion takes place. One does not have to actively
participate in the discussions to be affected by
them. No single accident will significantly affect
the folklore. Accidents addressed by the folklore
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will receive considerable notoriety; accidents not
addressed by the folklore are considered freak or
chance occurences.
Sociological Phenomena
M o s t i m p o r t a n t of t h e sociological
phenomena affecting perceptions of risk and
hazard in mountaineering is the "risky shift"
phenomena. Risk taking is a valued form of
behavior among climbers because it creates a
mental stress essential for promoting optimal
performance. However, risk taking also spawns
several phenomena which promote the accep­
tance of higher levels of risk. When a group ver­
balizes its decision concerning a risky situation,
the group's decision tends to be riskier than the
individuals would have recommended privately
(Cartwright). There are several factors that af-
"When a group verbalizes its
decision concerning a risky
situation, the group's deci­
sion tends to be riskier than
the individuals would have
recommended privately. ' '
feet the upward shift in risk taking capacity.
When an individual realizes that he or she is not
riskier than the other members of the group, he
or she will adjust his or her risk taking attitude
upward. Furthermore, group discussion allows
the members to rehearse their arguments regard­
ing the decision and familiarity with a hazard
promotes a higher level of acceptable risk con­
cerning the hazard or situation. Cautious
members initially change more than risky
members and groups displaying larger shifts in­
itially have riskier members. About a third of
group decisions are made by coalition rule. In
this process group members with more
knowledge or experience induce a riskier deci­
sion from the less knowledgeable or experienced
members of the group (Cartwright). This is in­
dicative of the fact that in risk taking situations,
the riskier members of a group are its more in­
fluential members (Helms, 1982). The shift also

"[There is] a kind of 'hazard
folklore' based on informal
communication among
climbers, not on hard
evidence."
occurs, in part, because the consequences of
their actions are borne by the group, not the in­
dividual (Rabow, 1966).
The 1979 report of the American Alpine
Club Safety Committee made reference to a
study done by Dan Meyer which examined fif­
teen years of accident data from adventure bas­
ed programs. That study and Williamson's
review of climbing accidents revealed three items
which clearly indicate that accepting increased
levels of risk contribute to most accidents. The
report summarized it this way:
Though immediate causes included the
usual categories such as (a) fall, slip on
rock, (b) falling rock and (c) avalanche,
three clear facts emerged: (1) Most ac­
cidents occurred as a result of one in­
dividual trying to please another, or a
group. (2) The second largest contributing
cause of an accident was from climbing
parties trying to adhere to a schedule. (3)
The third fact was a really curious obser­
vation: the great majority of serious in­
juries and fatalities were preceeded within
one year by a near miss or accident of a
parallel nature on the same route or at
least climbing area (Williamson, 1979).
The first item clearly shows the effects of the
risky shift phenomena. The importance of
behaving in an accepted manner outweighs the
additional risk or hazard. The second item in­
dicates that adhering to a schedule is so impor­
tant that additional risks and hazards are accep­
table in order to achieve the goal. Third, in spite
of the accident or near miss, the group leader­
ship failed to perceive that the hazards could af­
fect them or their group. This probably happen­
ed because continued exposure to a hazard on
routes that the group leaders frequented reduced
the risks the leaders perceived as associated with
the hazards. Obviously, the leaders were not ful­
ly aware that hazards existed on the climbing
routes, rationalizing previous accidents or near
misses as freak or chance occurrences.
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Clearly, these accidents resulted from higher
levels of risk and hazard than were acceptable to
those involved. Moreover, the levels of real risk
were much higher than the levels of perceived
risk. Possibly, had the guides and instructors
been aware of the psychological and sociological
phenomena that affect the levels of acceptable
risk, many of these accidents could have been
avoided.
But if we accept that mountaineering is a
hazardous activity and that, despite precautions,
accidents will occur, we should also understand
that by bringing the risk affecting phenomena to
a conscious level, many accidents can be avoid­
ed. An awareness that these phenomena exist
and affect one's evaluation of both risk and
hazard is the key to reducing the effect the
phenomena have on the climber's calculations of
risk and hazard. Hopefully, future training of
o u t d o o r leaders will stress t h a t these
psychological and sociological phenomena can
and do affect the safety of the groups in their
charge and, what is more important, that these
phenomena can be avoided.
REFERENCES
• Cartwright, D. "Risk Taking By Individuals and
Groups," Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, Vol. 20.
• Emerson, Richard. "Mount Everest: A Case Study
in Communication Feedback and Sustained
Group Goal Striving," Sociometry, Vol. 23 #3.
• Fitzharris, Blair and Simpson-Housley, P.
"Individual's Appreciation of Avalanche
Danger" New Zealand Alpine Journal, 1977.
• Helms, James M. "The Perception of Risk in
Mountaineering," unpublished manuscript,
Evergreen State College, Olympia, Washington,
1981.
• Helms, James M. "Psychological and Sociological
Phenomena Affecting the Perceptions of Risk and
Hazard in Mountaineering," unpublished
manuscript, Evergreen State College, Olympia,
Washington, 1982.
• Parker, D.J. and Harding, D.M. "Natural Hazard
Evaluation, Perception and Adjustment,"
Geography, Vol. 64, 1980.
• Rabow. "Role of Social Norms and Leadership in
Risk Taking," Sociometry, Vol. 29, 1966.
• Williamson, J. Ed. Accidents in North American
Mountaineering. New York; The American
Alpine Club, 1981.